No More Learning

In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in
the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii. ], "no sorrow is contrary to that
pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the
same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be understood as
being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of
itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat
is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the
object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the
mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other.
Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as
bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain
annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in drinking through being
troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the
pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation
is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that
contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming"
but a perfect operation, as stated above ([1303]Q[31], A[1]).

Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of
an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as
regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a
bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the
normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and
the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though
agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it
exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above
([1304]Q[33], A[2]), the result being that an apprehension which at
first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur
directly in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no
corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above
that intellectual contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor
"tediousness. " Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes
use of the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is
incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled
with contemplation.

Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony
with it, as is evident from what has been said above [1305](A[4]):
while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the
same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is
evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of
contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.

Reply to Objection 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not
caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something
which the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as
contrary to the love of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are
not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are
contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed
rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and
the same science considers contraries.

Reply to Objection 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it
is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of
the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i. e. in so far as
the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a
more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which
the appetite is inordinately attached.

Reply to Objection 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is
not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with
it, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation
accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
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Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than
pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There
is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure. " Now
that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is
natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is
sought.

Objection 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and
intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as
the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due
to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for
pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the
suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more
eagerly than pleasure is sought.

Objection 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists
according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more
virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good"
(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of shunning
sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the
movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised. " Therefore the
movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking
pleasure.

On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good
which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of
evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning
of sorrow.

I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the
shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is
a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable
evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any
repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so
unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be
entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore desire
for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another
reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought
for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is
to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is by reason
of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else.
Moreover we find a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every
natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches
the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it
leaves the term that is unsuitable to its nature: as though nature were
more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what
is unsuitable. Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of
itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.

But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than
he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of
the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is
felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love. " Now from the lack
of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of
some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure
suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession of it.
Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more
the shunned, according as love is the more keenly felt on account of
that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of
sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved
than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural
well-being of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and
consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from
fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are
contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part of the
effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but
all.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned
more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And
this is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most
savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of
pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not the same with movement from within and
movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is
suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we
remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from without
is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in
its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming at its own
preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and slackens
towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from
within: since it tends from the soul to the object. Consequently
pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned.
But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from without, as it were
from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is
the more it is felt. And then too, accidentally, in so far as the
senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than
pleasure is sought.

Reply to Objection 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance
with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever,
but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the
dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than
pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which
latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved more
than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for
refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the
pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
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Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant
to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow
is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is
loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has
been said above [1306](A[6]), outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does.
But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary;
whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a
contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain
has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than
of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned
more than interior sorrow.

On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the
heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman
is all evil. " Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses
all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart
surpasses every outward wound.

I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ
in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive
power, as stated above [1307](A[1]). But they differ in respect of
those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in
respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect
of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil
repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined
evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an
apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from
an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.

If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward
pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both
these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly.
Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the
appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being
repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body. Now,
that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of
another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses
outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because
the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than
the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently inward pain is,
simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is
that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward
pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior
appetite, it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of
inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward
pain, and then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only
greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever is
repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and
whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and
reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is
said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every wound," because even
the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of
the heart.

Reply to Objection 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are
destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain
must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain;
but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is
compared to the appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended
likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the
apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness
represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by
means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and
abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being
caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an
inward apprehension.

Reply to Objection 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by
outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a
corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the
sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more
material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more
material than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above
([1308]Q[22], A[3];[1309] Q[31], A[5] ), the body undergoes a greater
change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like
manner, from outward than from inward pain.
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Whether there are only four species of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor,
distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ] calls
"anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy. " For sorrow is contrary to pleasure.
But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is
incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are
"indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this
division is insufficient.

Objection 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that
are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one
another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ]
"torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that
weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for
another's wrongs. " But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's
wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed down
inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is
correct.

On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] and of Damascene.

I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is
something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in
two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and
virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal. " Such
an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a
genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that
genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal. "
Such an addition does not make true species of the genus, according to
the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes
a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, through having
something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that
genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a
species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied
to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and
perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles
of mathematics are applied to natural matter.

In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are
reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign
to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the
object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is "one's own
evil. " Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either
through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus
we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, considered, however,
as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is
neither evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as
one's own evil: and thus we have "envy. " The proper effect of sorrow
consists in a certain "flight of the appetite. " Wherefore the foreign
element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first
part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs
on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also
called "perplexity. " If, however, the mind be weighed down so much,
that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then
we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither
flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor
especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the
external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward
thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is
stated in Polit. i, 1.

Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one
meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow
is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the
proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.
Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain
later ([1310]SS, Q[36], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite
species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the
notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.
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OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the
presence of an evil?

(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?

(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?

(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
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Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good
rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ.
Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods.
Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some
good.

Objection 2: Further, it was said above ([1311]Q[35], A[4]) that the
sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that
pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above
([1312]Q[23], A[4];[1313] Q[31], A[1];[1314] Q[35], A[3]). Therefore
sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9),
love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But
the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the
loss of good rather than for an evil that is present.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of
sorrow. "

I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they
are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. For,
as stated in the [1315]FP, Q[14], A[10] and [1316]FP, Q[48], A[3], evil
is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than
the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for
the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of
evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an
apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of a
being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason. " And in this way
evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary. " Accordingly, so
far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference
which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which
is lost.

Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place
in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; the
truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements.
For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach and
withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to
nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something contrary to
nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place,
and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause
of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself inclines
towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place,
since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its downward
tendency.

Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind
of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or
approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its
proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the other
hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good
rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause
of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or
pain, than the good which is lost.

Reply to Objection 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an
evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this
sense Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.

Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same
object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a
particular thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same
thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation
of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in
respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing under
a contrary aspect.
Reply to Objection 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does
not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards
chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards
chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
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Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or
sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above
[1317](A[1]): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards
good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement
towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.

Objection 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is
something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.

Objection 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause
of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of
things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their
way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company. " But
ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.

I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as
stated above [1318](A[1]), the appetitive movement is likened to the
natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause;
one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of
movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's
downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that
movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.

Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is
the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above
[1319](A[1]) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the
other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the
inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of
all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil.
Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is
the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good:
while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of
the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or
desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest
pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine
often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was
also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire
is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in
its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a
movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that
which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of
sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we
sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But
it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the
loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for
the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.

Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession
of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as
stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard
good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard
evil.

Reply to Objection 2: That which is desired, though really future, is,
nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may
say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance
is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope
of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through
the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
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Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of
sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion,"
which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division
[*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin version,
read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'? ], the cause of
sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with
food. " But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the
craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion
pertains to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.

Objection 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If
therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation
would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation
of whatever is superfluous.

Objection 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of
good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since
it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore
the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving
for separation, as causing sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the
pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire
unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but
a feeling of impatience of division or corruption? "

I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned
as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be
accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in
a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the
elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists
held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything
naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore,
just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the
love or craving for unity.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness,
but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence
neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as
some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from
the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a
man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating;
because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than
conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the
craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the
perfection of nature consists.

Reply to Objection 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it
removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has
some union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.

Reply to Objection 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is
desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore
the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow,
whereas the craving for unity is.
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Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned
a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent is not
present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater
power is not a cause of sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt
can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power
should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the
causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something
external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul
is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the
body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body. "

I answer that, As stated above [1320](A[1]), a present evil, is cause
of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause
of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or
sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the
appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to
a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action of
something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as
being the cause of sorrow.

But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to
transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will
be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its
action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its
consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.

Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from
the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain
or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the
contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says
(De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a
stronger power": for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting,
the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.

Reply to Objection 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not
potentially but actually, i. e. by causing the actual presence of the
corruptive evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply
greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able
to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm
at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive
movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it
is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?

(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?

(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?

(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other
passions of the soul?
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Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power
to learn. For it is written (Is. 26:9): "When Thou shalt do Thy
judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn
justice": and further on (verse 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring
Thy instruction was with them. " But the judgments of God and
tribulation cause sorrow in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far
from destroying, increases the power of learning.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 28:9): "Whom shall He teach
knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that
are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts," i. e.
from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure;
since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and
(Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one
forget great delights. " Therefore pain, instead of taking away,
increases the faculty of learning.

Objection 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated
above ([1321]Q[35], A[7]). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much
more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during
those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to
turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and
as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required
undivided attention. "

I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one
essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the
soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is
withdrawn from the action of another power: because the soul, being
one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws
upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion
thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible
therewith.

Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's
attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend
wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in
natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn anything
new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly
stated in Prov. 2:4,5: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall
dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou understand learning"
[Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man
is prevented at the time from learning anything: indeed it can be so
acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention
even to that which he knew already. However a difference is to be
observed according to the difference of love that a man has for
learning or for considering: because the greater his love, the more
will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from
turning entirely to the pain.

Reply to Objection 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to
wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard
to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus,
"in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt to be taught by
God.

Reply to Objection 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw
upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of
consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the
moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything. "
Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure
does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural
body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water
is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes
harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce
accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an
excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be
intense, it prevents it altogether.

Reply to Objection 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body,
so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does:
and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain,
which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater
hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward
sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts
the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first
time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary
on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).
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Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden
the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11): "Behold this self-same
thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great
carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation," etc. Now
carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is
contrary to being depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of
sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of
pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but
contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect
of sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted
therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor.
2:7): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow. "
But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by
something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the
consumer. Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of
sorrow.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ] and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow. "

I answer that, The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named
metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason that
the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the
natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expansion
to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be
depressed, through being hindered in his own movement by some weight.
Now it is evident from what has been said above ([1322]Q[23],
A[4];[1323] Q[25], A[4];[1324] Q[36], A[1]) that sorrow is caused by a
present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to
the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it
from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is
the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of
avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for the
present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the
movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, the
strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then
even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely
hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that.
Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that
a man becomes completely stupefied.

Reply to Objection 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow
which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the
forgiveness of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is
concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the
soul, through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to
outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.

Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of
the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and
thus also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain
things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally,
appear to exclude one another.
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Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity.
Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage
of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to
good work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study
to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed. "
Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work
well.

Objection 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore sorrow
does too.

Objection 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are
others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing is
improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are
not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure
perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it"
(Ethic. x, 5).

I answer that, As stated above [1325](A[2]), sorrow at times does not
depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal
or external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow
itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow.
First, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any
action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that
which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is
that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we
do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened
in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to
its principle and cause: and such action must needs be improved by
sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the
more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of
shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result from that
sorrow.

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the
soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body.
For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things
which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in
the body: as is evident with regard to the images of colors, which
images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow
is not harmful to the body.

Objection 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due
to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily
transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated
above ([1326]Q[22], AA[1],3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to
the body than the other passions of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger
and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm,
since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair
seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow.
Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other
passions of the soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age
flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Prov.
25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the
sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Ecclus.