No More Learning

But Madhu Rao, fully alive
to the weak character of his younger brother, just before his death,
summoned his uncle to his bedside and confided his successor to his
care. Narayan Rao, a weak man given over to sensuality, was duly
invested as Peshwa at Satara, and Sakharam Bapu became minister,
with Nana Phadnavis in his hereditary position. The implacable
enmity that existed between the Peshwa's mother, Gopika Bai, and
Anandi Bai soon led to a rupture between nephew and uncle, and
Raghunath Rao was again placed under restraint and confined in the
Peshwa's palace at Poona.
On 30 August, 1773, symptoms of discontent manifested them-
selves amongst the Peshwa's infantry, and Hari Pant Phadke, the army
commander, was warned to take precautions, which unfortunately
he omitted to do. While the Peshwa was resting at mid-day a com-
1


## p. 255 (#283) ############################################

MURDER OF NARAYAN RAO
255
motion arose and a body of men from the regiment burst into the
palace led by one of the officers, Sumer Singh. Narayan Rao fled to
his uncle's apartments for safety, where Raghunath Rao appears
indeed to have interceded for his life, but Sumer Singh then threat-
ened Raghunath Rao also, and he withdrew, while the conspirators
murdered the young Peshwa with their swords.
There is no doubt that Raghunath Rao was fully cognisant of the
rebellion, but he was attached to his nephew, as far as so egotistical
a nature was capable of affection, and it is probable that the confine-
ment of Narayan Rao was all he had intended, the tragic ending being
due to the sinister intervention of Anandi Bai.
It was agreed that Raghunath Rao's claim to the Peshwaship must
now be recognised, and he was duly invested. But it was fated that
whenever Raghunath Rao was placed in a position of command
troubles should at once commence. He proceeded to appoint as his
ministers new men who were lacking in the necessary qualities, while
his own excessively suspicious nature made him distrust even his
own nominees.
His first troubles arose with the Nizam who, always ready to profit
by events at Poona, prepared to attack the Marathas. Raghunath
Rao, however, defeated him, but once more surrendered any advant-
ages he might have obtained, and characteristically yielding to the
Nizam's flattery and cajolery restored all that was to have been
taken from him.
Raghunath Rao was turning his attention to Hyder 'Ali and the
nawab of the Carnatic, when the dislike with which he was univer-
sally regarded developed into concerted opposition, conducted by
Sakharam Bapu and Nana Phadnavis, and he hastened back to Poona.
At length the plan was made public. A trump card had been placed
in his opponents' hands, for it was found that Ganga Bai, the Peshr
wa's widow, was pregnant. On her husband's death she had proposed
to become sati, but Anandi Bai, knowing her own part in the tragedy
of Narayan Rao's death, contrived to confine her until her husband's
cremation was complete, as she feared a sati's curse. Now Nemesis
was satisfied. The confederates removed Ganga Bai to safety in
Purandhar Fort where she was placed in charge of Parvati Bai, the
widow of Sadashiv Rao Bhao, who had been killed at Panipat. On
18 April, 1774, a son was born to Ganga Bai, and Raghunath Rao's
claims to the Peshwaship were finally extinguished. The confederates
at once formed a council of regency.
Raghunath Rao was in the middle of the campaign against Hyder
'Ali when he received news of the imminent birth of a child to the
late Peshwa, and hastened back to Poona, defeating a force under
Trimbak Rao Mama sent out by the regency to oppose him. In
consequence o. this victory troops, as usual, flocked to his standard,
and consternation reigned in Poona, when, with typical indecision,
he suddenly abandoned his advance on the capital and turned in


## p. 256 (#284) ############################################

256
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
the direction of Burhanpur. It was at this moment that the birth of
Ganga Bai's son was publicly announced. The child was at once
formally invested as Peshwa. From this time Raghunath Rao
becomes, in fact, a mere pawn in the complicated intrigues and
consequent struggles, in which the Maratha leaders gradually played
more and more for their own individual aggrandisement and but
little for the cause of the Maratha state, thus facilitating the ultimate
supremacy of the English.
Raghunath Rao, finding himself in this desperate case, turned
once more to the English, with whom he had coquetted in 1761. The
Bombay Council had never lost sight of the necessity for acquiring
Bassein, Salsette and the islands of Bombay harbour. Indeed the
directors in London, in their dispatch of April, 1772, had instructed
the council to appoint a regular envoy at Poona, who would endea-
vour to secure such rights and privileges as might be beneficial to
their commerce and the safety of their possessions, and in particular
these coveted places.
On receiving overtures from Raghunath Rao, therefore, although
averse from an alliance with the Marathas, they seized this opening
to renew their demands for Bassein, Salsette and the islands. Raghu-
nath Rao, however, marched away to Indore soon after, in the hope
of enlisting Holkar and Sindhia on his side, but finding that, if not
actually hostile, they were at any rate indifferent to his cause, he
returned. On his return, Gambier, the Company's agent at Surat,
was asked by Raghunath Rao if the English would provide him with
a force sufficient to carry him to Poona and establish him in the
government, in return for which he would defray all costs and make
substantial grants to the Company.
The Bombay Council were uncertain, in view of the passing of the
Regulating Act, whether they had powers to make a treaty without
sanction from Bengal, but, as they had not been notified of the arrival
of the new councillors at Calcutta, they decided to act. Raghunath
Rao, however, positively refused to cede Bassein and Salsette. While
this matter was still under discussion news arrived that the Portu
guese were about to endeavour to recover Bassein, taken from them
by Chimnaji Appa in 1739. The council, faced with this new danger,
decided to obtain possession of Salsette at all costs. An attack was
made on Thana Fort, the key to the district, and it was captured on
31 December, 1774. 1
The council defended this attack in a letter to the governor-
general on the grounds that it would have been fatal to allow the
Portuguese to acquire Salsette, as they would have
had it in their power to obstruct our trade, by being in possession of the prin-
cipal passes to the inland country which, of course, would have been of
1 Forrest, Bombay Selections, Maratha Series, I, 179-208.


## p. 257 (#285) ############################################

TREATY OF SURAT
257
>
infinite prejudice to the trade, revenue and interests of the Company in these
parts, in so much that we should in great measure have been subject to the
caprice of the Portuguese. 1
The council at Calcutta, except Warren Hastings himself, expres-
sed their disapproval of the capture of Salsette, which they held had
seriously damaged the Company's reputation for good faith. The
Poona ministers had in the meantime contrived to bribe Holkar and
Sindhia away from Raghunath Rao, who retired into Gujarat towards
Baroda, leaving his wife Anandi Bai, who was enceinte, in Dhar Fort,
where she gave birth in January, 1775, to Baji Rao, destined to be
the last of the Peshwas. Raghunath Rao's object in moving into
Gujarat was to get into touch with the English and also to obtain
the assistance of Govind Rao Gaekwad, who was engaged in be-
sieging his brother Fateh Singh in Baroda.
This quarrel, into which the English were drawn, arose in 1768
on the death of Damaji
Gaekwad. Damaji
left four sons, Sayaji who
was imbecile, Govind Rao, Manaji and Fateh Singh. Govind Rao
was the son of the senior wife and claimed on that basis. Fateh Singh,
who was manager for Sayaji, supported him. After the murder of
Narayan Rao Peshwa, Govind Rao obtained the support of the Poona
ministers for his cause and was granted the hereditary family title of
Sena Khas Khel.
Negotiations continued between the English and Raghunath Rao
and finally on 7 March, 1775, the Treaty of Surat, as it is called,
was signed. It consisted of sixteen articles of which the most im-
portant provisions were that the earlier treaties of 1739 and 1756 be
confirmed; that the English would assist Raghunath Rao with a force
of 2500 men, he defraying the cost, and undertaking not to side with
enemies of the Company; Salsette, Bassein and the islands were to be
ceded in perpetuity with a share of the revenues of the Broach and
Surat districts," Maratha raids into Bengal and the Carnatic were to
cease; any peace made with Poona was to include the English. As
security Raghunath Rao deposited six lakhs. Such was the treaty
which, as Grant Duff says, occasioned infinite discussions amongst
the English in India and in Europe, and led to the first Maratha war.
Before the treaty was completed the Bombay Council had as-
sembled troops under Colonel Keating who arrived at Surat, by sea,
on 27 February, 1775. 3
Raghunath Rao had, however, been forced to fly from Baroda
owing to defection amongst his own troops, and the arrival of an
army from Poona under Hari Pant. He first made his way to Cambay
where he was assisted by Charles Malet to reach Surat. Here he met
Colonel Keating, who describes him as "a man of sound judgment
and of quick and clear conceptions”, an estimate of Raghunath Rao's
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 205.
2 Idem, pp. 211-16; Aitchison, Treaties, vi, 21.
8 Forrest, op. cit. I, 217.


## p. 258 (#286) ############################################

253
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
character, which it may be safely said, was not generally held. The
view ordinarily taken of Raghunath Rao's disposition is often alluded
to by Ahalya Bai Holkar in her letters, where she refers to his entire
lack of judgment, which, she adds, was well known to the English
who in consequence invariably acted without consulting him and
merely used him in furthering their own designs. It is clear that the
Bombay Council, perhaps influenced by events in Bengal, imagined
that their small force could easily account for the whole of the
Maratha army, and Colonel Keating was, therefore, instructed to
assist their ally against all his enemies, as well as against the minis-
terial party and their adherents, and to do everything to bring the
war to a speedy and happy conclusion.
The first difficulty that arose was Raghunath Rao's lack of funds
and the consequent disaffection in his army. Colonel Keating was
obliged to advance money before they would even march. The allies
advanced and after a minor engagement or two encountered on 18
May, 1775, the ministerial army on the plain of Adas [Arras], which
lies between the town of Anand and the Mahi river. This was the
first direct encounter between the Maratha forces and the English
since Sivaji's attack on Surat in 1664. At one time the allies were in
serious trouble but the steadiness of the English troops and the cool-
ness of Colonel Keating secured the complete discomfiture of the
enemy. This victory decided Fateh Singh Gaekwad to make an
alliance with the English, with whom he had for some time been
playing fast and loose. The destruction of the Maratha fleet by
Commodore John Moore, at almost the same time, drove the ministers
at Poona to desperation. Raghunath Rao's affairs were now in the
ascendant, and important members of the Maratha community were
preparing to join him when the whole situation was suddenly changed
by the action of the council at Calcutta.
On 3 February, 1775, the governor-general and council at Calcutta
wrote to Bombay expressing surprise that the capture of Salsette had
never been reported to them, and later, on 8 March, intimated their
alarm at the support offered to Raghunath Rao, which was wholly
inconsistent with their traditional friendly relations with Poona and
with Sabaji Bhonsle. Divided as the Calcutta Council were in most
things, they were united in condemning this act of the Bombay
government.
On 31 May, 1775, the Supreme Government again
addressed the Bombay Council, pointing out that their action was
not merely impolitic but directly contrary to the Act of Parliament;
and they concluded, "we peremptorily require you to withdraw
the Company's forces to your own garrison, in whatsoever state your
affairs may be in, unless their safety may be endangered by an
instant retreat".
3
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 220-5.
8 Forrest, op. cit. I, 232.
2 Idem, p. 226; Forbes, Oriental Memoirs, 11, 95.
4 Idem, p. 238.


## p. 259 (#287) ############################################

BOMBAY VIEWS
259
Warren Hastings was not in favour of these orders but was out-
voted by his council. The Bombay Council, convinced that they had
acted for the best, if unconstitutionally, fought to the end for their
policy. They pointed out the immense advantage they had obtained in
securing Salsette and the fairness of the terms come to with Raghu-
nath Rao, who was, in their opinion, the rightful heir to the Peshwa-
ship. They added, with some reason, that if at that distance they were
always to await confirmatory orders from Calcutta it must be fatal
to any policy, a fact, it may be remarked, that had not escaped
Hastings, who in a minute on this question expresses his doubts as to
the action which should be taken in view of the impossibility of their
knowing what the actual state of affairs at Bombay might be by the
time their orders arrived. So eager were the Bombay Council, how-
ever, to carry their point that they sent one of their members, Taylor,
to Calcutta. He submitted a very able, clear and on the whole fair
and accurate report on Maratha affairs, past and present, to the gov-
ernor-general, explaining the methods followed in Maratha politics. 1
He laid stress on the importance to the very existence of Bombay,
in having control, through Salsette, of the passes by which goods
travelled inland, and of Bassein and the islands for the protection
of the harbour. By supporting Raghunath Rao these safeguards were
being secured. The Bombay Council, he said, had never intended
to flout the authority of the governor-general and, in their opinion,
the new act even supported their position, inasmuch as it exempted
them from referring to Calcutta cases in which they had received
direct orders from England, and they had received repeated and
special orders regarding the safeguarding of Bombay. Moreover,
success had attended Colonel Keating's operations, and any desertion
of Raghunath Rao at this juncture would throw him into the arms of
the Nizam and Hyder 'Ali, or of Holkar and Sindhia, and the trouble
would recommence. Indians also did not in the least understand this
sudden limiting of the powers of the Bombay Council, and the
abandonment of Raghunath Rao would be considered a deliberate
breach of faith. Parliament, Taylor said, when it armed the Supreme
Government with controlling power over the other presidencies, had
never intended, "that they should appear so degraded and so con-
temptible in the eyes of the native governments as the Presidency of
Bombay must be, unless you will commit the treaty of peace to their
management"
But the Supreme Government was adamant and sent its own
officer, Lt. Colonel Upton, from Calcutta to Poona with full powers to
negotiate a treaty. The dispatches of this date from Calcutta clearly
show the Bengal Council's ignorance of conditions in Western India,
even on the part of Hastings himself, who frankly expressed his
surprise at the vigour of the Maratha confederacy. Hastings wrote
1 Torrest, op. cit. I, 247-68.


## p. 260 (#288) ############################################

260
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
personally, at the same time, to Sakharam Bapu, at Poona, explaining
the new controlling powers vested in him as governor-general and the
illegality of the Bombay Council's action in supporting Raghunath
Rao without his sanction, and intimating the dispatch of his envov;
he concluded, "I have heard of your wisdom and capacity from
everywhere, therefore trust in your person that you will not fail to
get the business done through your interest”. 1
Although the Bombay Council were not free from blame, this
action on the part of the Supreme Government meant playing directly
into the hands of the Poona ministers, and they at once saw the
advantage it gave them.
As Taylor had pointed out, the first effect of this interference was
to lower the prestige of the Bombay authorities in the eyes of all
Maharashtra, while it simultaneously exalted, for the time being, the
prestige of the ministers.
In accordance with these orders from Calcutta, Colonel Keating
was at once made to withdraw his forces, the Bombay Council in
conveying these orders to him sincerely lamenting "that these gentle-
men have so unluckily taken upon themselves to interfere as they
have done, at this juncture". He retired to the neighbourhood of
Surat.
Colonel Upton proceeded to Purandhar, where he arrived in
December, 1775, and commenced his negotiations. But he was in no
sense a match for the astute Brahman ministers, who, while they
loudly extolled the far-sighted statesmanship of the governor-gene-
ral, proceeded to seize every possible advantage of the new turn in
affairs. They refused to consider for a moment the cession of Salsette
or Bassein or of the revenues of Broach, taking their stand upon the
ground that the governor-general could not claim to draw advantages
from a war which he had condemned as unjust. On the other hand
they demanded the surrender of Raghunath Rao and the restoration
of all territory acquired since hostilities commenced. Colonel Upton
on 7 February, 1776,2 reported the deadlock to Calcutta on which
the governor-general and his council determined to resume hostilities.
Troops were prepared and Raghunath Rao, the Nizam, Hyder 'Ali,
the Bhonsle, Holkar and Sindhia were all addressed and desired to
join the English, or at least to remain neutral.
This unexpected volte face brought the ministers to their knees
and they at once conceded practically all that Colonel Upton demanded,
and on 1 March, 1776, the Treaty of Purandhar was signed. The
gist of the treaty was : the establishment of a general peace with the
Marathas; the retention of Salsette, if the governor-general so desired;
the cession of the Broach revenues; twelve lakhs of rupees to be paid
to defray expenses incurred in the war; the Treaty of Surat to be
>
1 Forrest, op. cit. 1, 246.
2 Idem, p. 274.
3 Idem, p. 277; Gleig, Warren Hastings, , 194 ff. ; Aitchison, Treaties, VI, 28.


## p. 261 (#289) ############################################

TREATY OF PURANDHAR
261
formally annulled; and Raghunath Rao's army to be disbanded within
a month, he himself retiring to Kopargaon in Gujarat on a pension
of 25,000 rupees a month, with a retinue consisting of a body of 1000
horse and certain domestic servants. The Bombay Council rightly
condemned this treaty as highly injurious to the interests ana
리
​reputation of the Company.
Raghunath Rao was wholly bewildered by these transactions and
imagined that they were due to the insufficient liberality of the terms
he had offered, and he at once proposed others, which could not of
course be considered. He then decided to refuse the terms agreed
upon and to continue fighting, an attitude in which he was encouraged
by the friendly overtures of Mahadaji Sindhia, who was now com-
mencing to work out the policy which was, a few years later, to make
him independent of Poona. But Raghunath Rao, whose character
invariably alienated those who might have assisted him, found that
none of the Maratha leaders would give him any practical help. The
Bombay Government, on their part, would not lift a hand in support
of a treaty which they considered grossly unfair to themselves, but
they readily afforded asylum to Raghunath Rao at Surat, in spite
of the protests of Colonel Upton, who considered it as a direct breach
of the treaty. But they held that they were well within their rights
in protecting their late ally from personal danger at the nands of
his enemies. Hastings, although he felt bound to ratify the Treaty
of Purandhar, disapproved of it.
While affairs were in this uncertain state a dispatch, dated 5 April,
a
1776, came from the directors in England approving the Treaty of
Surat and directing that the territory obtained from Raghunath Rao
should be retained. On this the Bombay Government threw the
Treaty of Purandhar to the winds and Raghunath Rao was invited
to Bombay, where he arrived in November and took up his residence
on Malabar Hill. The Peshwa at once objected to the asylum thus
given to the ex-Peshwa.
Colonel Upton was recalled to Bengal (1777) and Mostyn was
then sent to Poona to superintend the carrying out of the treaty. But
nothing resulted, as he was suspected by the ministers, who believed
that he was the person responsib! for the capture of Salsette, while
dissensions between the aged Sakharam Bapu and Nana Phadnavis
tended to complicate matters still more.
These negotiations were dragging on when an entirely fresh turn
was given to events by the unexpected appearance of a French
adventurer, called St Lubin. He landed at Chaul from a French ship
and stated that he was an accredited ambassador from the French
king Louis. He was in fact, as Mr. Farmer reported, "a most per-
fect adventurer" who had previously lived at Pondichery and had
some connection with the Madras authorities. He had contrived to
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 296.


## p. 262 (#290) ############################################

262
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
a
-
ingratiate himself with Sartine, the French minister of marine, alleg-
ing that he was an intimate friend of the raja at Satara, whose
children he had taught to ride. He soon disgusted his colleagues by
his arrogance, and the mission came to nothing. Nana affected, at any
rate, to credit his story, as he was not prepared to lose such an oppor-
tunity of opposing the English, and St Lubin was received with a
respect and ceremony never shown to the British resident, being met
personally, as he alighted from his elephant, by Sakharam Bapu and
Nana. The idea of a French intrigue in India was sufficient to stir up
the resentment of every Englishman in the country. At the same time
a dispatch dated 7 April was received from the directors regretting
the sacrifices made by the Treaty of Purandhar, but stating that it
must be adhered to unless any attempts were made by the ministers
to evade its conditions, in which case the Bombay Government would
be at liberty to form a fresh alliance with Raghunath Rao on the
basis of the Treaty of Surat. As the ministers had never carried out
the stipulations of the Treaty of Purandhar the Bombay Government
at once formed a fresh alliance with Raghunath Rao.
In 1778 Sakharam Bapu, whose quarrel with Nana had reached
an acute stage, with Holkar's assistance commenced intriguing to
support Raghunath Rao, and enlisted Moroba Phadnavis, a cousin
of Nana, on his side. Moroba appealed to the Bombay Council who
agreed to assist him, informing Hastings of their action, which met
with his approval and that of Mr Barwell, though strongly opposed
by the rest of the council, and he agreed to send a force to aid them.
The force assembled at Kalpi, Colonel Leslie being put in command
with orders to march across India to Bombay. 1 This feat had never
before been attempted and was stigmatised by Dundas as one of
Hastings' "frantic military exploits", exploits, nevertheless, which
fully justified their inception and proved the governor-general's
courage and understanding of Indian psychology. Events were
becoming insistent, and fully established the truth of Hornby's
opinion, expressed in a minute written at the time, that we were fast
verging on a period which must compel the English nation either to
take some active and decisive part in events or relinquish for ever all
hopes of bettering their situation on the west of India.
Moroba Phadnavis soon proved to be a broken reed, while Sakha-
ram Bapu, always a trimmer, declined specifically to announce his
support of Raghunath Rao. The Bombay Council were deliberating
how to effect a change in the control at Poona when Nana, who had
been driven temporarily to take refuge in Purandhar Fort, managed to
cajole Moroba into deserting Raghunath Rao, and soon after, with
the connivance of Sindhia, seized his cousin and imprisoned him at
Ahmadnagar, Holkar, who had been supporting him, being easily
bribed, with nine lakhs, to stand aside. Nana was now again in
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 327.


## p. 263 (#291) ############################################

RENEWAL OF WAR
263
power, but he had miscalculated the effect of the change at Poona on
the English, who at once called upon him to state whether he was
prepared to carry out the Treaty of Purandhar, and dismiss St Lubin,
with whom he was still coquetting, and to whom it appears he had
made certain promises, though probably with no intention of ful-
filling them. Nana was in a dilemma. It was impossible for him to
conciliate the ex-Peshwa, towards whoin his enmity was too well
known, while on the other hand he had no desire to fulfil the con-
ditions of the Treaty of Purandhar and so come to terms with the
English.
This evasion was enough for the Bombay authorities and they felt
that they might now act under the instructions conveyed to them by
the dispatch of 23 March, 1778, from the Supreme Government, which
empowered them to take any step necessary to subvert a hostile
party in the Maratha state. The Bombay Council thereupon de-
cided that Raghunath Rao should be installed at Poona as regent for
the young Peshwa, Madhu Rao Narayan, since he could no longer
claim the Peshwaship. ?
Nana, fully cognisant of their intentions, took immediate steps to
oppose them. He removed the aged Sakharam Bapu from all voice
in affairs and collected troops. Sindhia and Nana held complete
control, Holkar, whose leaning towards Raghunath Rao made him
suspect, being employed at a distance. Luckily the Bombay Govern-
ment had a most able agent, Lewis, at Poona who kept them fully
informed of Nana's activities.
The Bombay forces were weak, and Draper urged caution, but
was outvoted by the rest of the council, though Colonel Leslie's force,
on which they relied for support, was still far distant in Bundelkhand.
Hastings remarked, when criticising these proceedings, that the
passions of the Council were enlisted on Raghunath Rao's side
because in supporting him they were carrying out their own personal
wishes.
The council placed their forces under the command of Colonel
Egerton, an officer whose health was bad, and whose purely European
training and entire ignorance of Indian conditions wholly unfitted
him for the post. Thus, with a mere handful of troops under an ineffi-
cient commander, and most ill-considered preparations for hostilities,
the Bombay Council set out to defy the whole strength of the
Maratha Empire; that they in fact suffered comparatively lightly
was due to good fortune and not to any action of their own.
The campaign started in November, 1778, the force consisting of
3900 men, of whom 592 were Europeans. Owing to jealousies in the
Bombay Council a curious and fatal arrangement was adopted, by
which the control of the troops in the field was vested in a committee
of three, consisting of the commanding officer and two civilians. The
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 314.
2 Idem, p. 334.


## p. 264 (#292) ############################################

264
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
movements of the troops were in fact controlled by Colonel Carnac
acting as civil commissioner, in spite of Colonel Egerton's protests.
He was by profession a soldier, who had distinguished himself in
Bengal, but he failed lamentably on this occasion. Governor Hornby
afterwards admitted that the powers granted to the committee were
far too comprehensive and had escaped his notice when they were
issued. Raghunath Rao, in his usual vacillating way, now began to
raise various objections and insisted on being granted certain con-
cessions before he would move. The force, encumbered with an
enormous baggage-train of 19,000 bullocks, was scarcely able to march
two miles a day.
Raghunath Rao at length appreciated that he was being used as
a mere pawn in the game. In December, 1778, he sent an envoy to
Dom José da Camara, the captain-general at Goa, asking for assistance
in troops and munitions and offering in return to cede Bassein and
other forts as well as territory in the neighbourhood of Daman. The
envoy said that Raghunath Rao had become suspicious of British
intehsions in regard to his affairs and feared that their real object
was to place him in the same position of subjection as that in which
they had placed the nawab of Bengal; hence he was most anxious to
become an ally of the king of Portugal. The captain-general com-
mended the proposal to his superiors, but nothing came of it.
"
In January, 1779, Colonel Egerton had to resign the command
through ill-health and Colonel Cockburn took over the force.
Raghunath Rao and his adopted son Amrit Rao now joined the army
which proceeded up the ghats. On 9 January the army reached the
village of Talegaon, twenty miles north-west of Poona, to find it
destroyed and themselves confronted by a large Maratha army.
Colonel Carnac was seized with panic and instead of boldly pushing
on to Poona, most fatally counselled retreat, his panic being aug-
mented by Raghunath Rao who assured him that until a substantial
victory was gained no influential Maratha would join his standard.
Colonel Cockburn considered he could reach Poona with the troops,
but that he could only do so by abandoning the enormous baggage-
train. Raghunath Rao begged them not to retire, but in vain, and
on 11 January all the heavy guns were thrown into a tank, the stores
were burnt, and the force started on its return journey, as it fondly
believed unbeknown to the enemy, some 50,000 strong.
On 12 January, 1779, the force encamped at Wadgaon, twenty-
three miles north-west of Poona. The retreat was at once known to
the enemy who attacked continuously. On the 13th further retreat
was held to be impossible, and Farmer, secretary to the committee,
was sent to negotiate terms. As a preliminary Nana demanded the
surrender of Raghunath Rao, and this would have been perforce
1 Letter from the captain-general to Martinho de Mello e Castro of 22
December, 1778 (unpublished).


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CONVENTION OF WADGAON
266
agreed to, but luckily the ex-Peshwa decided the matter for himself
by taking refuge with Sindhia. The action taken by Colonel Carnac
was inconsistent, for while Farmer was instructed to point out that
no treaty could be made without the sanction of the Supreme
Government, Holmes was at the same time deputed with full powers
to negotiate with Mahadaji Sindhia. Sindhia was delighted at this
mark of distinction as it assisted him to attain the position he had so
long coveted, that of acting as an independent arbiter between the
two Maratha parties.
Finally terms were settled : that all acquisitions of territory made
since 1773 should be restored; that the force advancing from Bengal
should be stopped; that Sindhia was to obtain the share of the Broach
revenues; and that a sum of 41,000 rupees and two hostages were to
be surrendered as security for performance. Such was the disgraceful
Convention of Wadgaon, fatal alike to the interests and good name
of the Company. The army retired but the order countermanding
the advance of the Bengal force was suspended.
This ill-starred venture of the Bombay army was at once repu-
diated by Hastings who felt the disgrace acutely, and wrote: "We
have already disavowed the Convention of Wargaum. Would to God
we could as easily efface the infamy which our national character has
sustained”. ? He considered, however, that the promise in the treaty
made to Sindhia should be carried out, in return for his support.
The directors, on receiving the report of the convention, ordered the
dismissal of Colonel Carnac, Colonel Egerton and Colonel Cockburn
from the Company's service. The scheme deserved, indeed, no better
fate in view of the impolitic lines on which it was conceived and the
lack of care devoted to its execution. It was in fact born of pique,
pique at the control exercised by the Supreme Government, and of
the insane desire to show what Bombay could do on their own initia-
tive, combined with a greater consideration for private interests than
for the general good of the Company, the limited views of the com-
mercial adventurer obscuring the wider outlook required by states-
manship.
Hornby, however, rose to the occasion. He also disavowed the
convention, which Carnac had, indeed, no power to make, and at
once took steps to recruit and improve his army. He believed, more-
over, that Sindhia, who was known to be inimical to the French,
would be open to an alliance, and he urged the payment to Mahadaji
of the sum of 41,000 rupees settled under the Convention of Wadgaon.
Colonel Leslie, who had been instructed to march with all speed
to Bombay, had wasted time embroiling himself with the chiefs in
Bundelkhand. When the detachment started, Nana had been asked
3
1 Forrest, op. cit. I, 333-6; Aitchison, Treaties, vi, 39.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, 1, 672.
3 Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 385.


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268
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
to grant passports for the march. He objected, on the ground that
as the force was sent to counteract French machinations, its advance
was now unnecessary, since St Lubin had gone. But Holkar and
Sindhia, who feared that their possessions in Malwa might suffer,
agreed to allow the detachment a passage. Nana ultimately also
granted permission, but secretly told his officers and the Bundelkhand
chiefs to oppose the advance. Hastings, in view of Leslie's incompet-
ence, had decided to replace him by his second-in-command, Colonel
Goddard, and letters had been issued to the Bundelkhand chiefs,
disavowing Colonel Leslie's acts. At this moment, however, news
arrived of Leslie's death on 3 October, 1778. Goddard was a man of
very different calibre. He used the utmost tact, and advanced with
great rapidity through Bhopal, where Nawab Hayat Muhammad
Khan assisted him to the utmost in spite of Maratha threats. On
2 December he reached the Narbada where, in accordance with
Hastings's instructions, he awaited a communication from Mudaji
Bhonsle, with whom Hastings hoped to form an alliance thus de-
taching him from the Peshwa's party. But Mudaji declined, and
informed Colonel Goddard that he could not negotiate.
The Bombay Council now sent urgent appeals to Colonel Goddard
to expedite his ma . . and although, by Hastings's express orders,
Goddard was independent of Bombay control, he considered it was
incumbent on him, in the interests of his country, to comply.
He reached Burhanpur on 30 January, 1779, and Surat on 26
February. Thus by his tact and skill did Goddard bring this "frantic
military exploit” of Hastings to a successful conclusion, and as
Hastings had foreseen, immensely increase the prestige of the British
arms throughout India. Writing to Laurence Sulivan 2 (1779) Hastings
says that the precipitate and miserable enterprise of the Bombay
Presidency had blasted his political plans, but that Goddard's march
had gained no trivial or speculative advantage as it had shown the
people of India the difference between the powers of the capital
government of the British nation and the feeble efforts of an inferior
presidency, and had done far more than military victories to confirm
our ascendancy. On reaching Bombay Goddard was given a seat on
the council and the position of commander-in-chief. 3
Mahadaji Sindhia had not as yet responded, as Hornby had hoped
he would, and hence nothing remained but to continue the war, a
somewhat alarming situation, in view of the fact that the Bombay
Council had no funds for the purpose. Hastings had instructed
Goddard, who remained directly under his orders, to endeavour to
make peace with the ministerial party at Poona on the lines of the
Purandhar Treaty, adding a clause specifically excluding the French
from acquiring any settlements in Maratha territory. He refused,
1
1 Bhopal State Gazetteer, p. 16.
3 Forrest, Home Series, I, 368.
2 Gleig, Warren Hastings, , 272.
Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 386.
4


## p. 267 (#295) ############################################

GODDARD'S CAMPAIGN
267
1
however, to agree to Hornby's proposal to intervene and settle the
quarrel between Govind Rao and Fateh Singh Gaekwad. As regarded
Sindhia, Goddard was to wait until he showed a desire to form an
alliance before approaching him. At this time, however, Sindhia was
secretly instigating hostilities against the Company while simul-
taneously sending his agents to talk platitudes at Bombay.
Sindhia now saw that nothing was to be gained by supporting
Raghunath Rao, whereas his hold over Nana would be strengthened
if the ex-Peshwa returned to the English. He used his influence,
therefore, to get Nana to grant the ex-Peshwa a jagir in Bundelkhand,
and then connived at his escape from custody while proceeding there.
Raghunath Rao at once fled to the protection of Goddard, who made
him an allowance of 50,000 rupees a month, which Hastings con-
sidered excessive. No treaty was, however, arranged for him, and
from this moment he drops out of practical politics, the support of
one so unpopular with the whole of his compatriots being too obvious
a mistake to be continued. The English now became in name, as well
as in fact, a principal in the struggle which ensued.
Negotiations continued between Nana and General Goddard with-
out any definite result until, at the end of the rains, Goddard learnt
of the formation of a confederacy of the Marathas, the Nizam and
Hyder 'Ali, which was to make a series of simultaneous attacks on
the English possessions. A final request to Nana for a definite reply
elicited a reiteration of the demand for the surrender of Raghunath
Rao and the restoration of Salsette, as preliminaries.
Without sending an answer to this demand, General Goddard
proceeded to Bombay, where he expedited the dispatch of a force
under Colonel Hartley, and obtained sanction to make a treaty with
Fateh Singh Gaekwad. At the same time Hastings, in order to create
a diversion in the north, entered into a treaty with the rana of Gohad,
who had always been a thorn in the side of the Marathas.
On his return to Surat Goddard dismissed the vakils of Nana
Phadnavis and opened negotiations with Fateh Singh who, however,
gave no definite reply until Goddard, crossing the Tapti on 1 January,
1780,2 captured Dhaboi, on which he signed a treaty (26 January)
agreeing to assist General Goddard with a force of 3000 horse and
cede the revenues of certain districts as soon as he was put in posses-
sion of Ahmadabad, the Peshwa's possessions north of the Mahi river
being also made over to him.
Goddard at once marched on Ahmadabad, which was carried by
assault by Colonel Hartley on 15 February, eighty-one Europeans
being killed and wounded including ten officers. 3 Sindhia and Holkar
now advanced in support of the Peshwa, though how far Sindhia was
in earnest seems doubtful, as on reaching Baroda he released Farmer
2 Idem, pp. 392-96.
1 Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 387.
3 Idem, pp. 397-99.


## p. 268 (#296) ############################################

268
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
and Captain Stewart, the hostages for the Convention of Wadgaon,
and also sent his agent, who assured General Goddard of his master's
friendly feelings towards the English and of Nana's enmity. Goddard
made no overtures, merely replying in the same vein, but requiring
Sindhia, if he wished to treat, to send definite proposals within three
days, thus defeating any intention of the Maratha leader to keep him
inactive until the dry season was over. Nothing came of these pour-
parlers, while Sindhia began to negotiate with Govind Rao Gaekwad,
the rival of Fateh Singh.
Goddard, finding negotiation useless, proceeded to attack. He
advanced against the Marathas and drove them back with severe
loss, but without any material gain as the enemy following their
usual tactics, merely encamped at a short distance, in an endeavour
to lead the English into a long fruitless pursuit.
In spite of protests from Bombay, where the council were urging
the need for capturing Bassein, General Goddard refused to leave
Gujarat, as it would have meant abandoning his ally Fateh Singh
Gaekwad.
The approaching summer found the fortunes of the English at a
somewhat low ebb. Funds were exhausted, in all three presidencies;
the Nizam, and Hyder 'Ali, who had swept over the Carnatic up to
the gates of Madras, were supporting the Marathas; and fears were
entertained of the co-operation of a French fleet on the east coast.
But numerous successful engagements of minor importance took
place, including the seizure of Kalyan (October, 1780). 1
Amidst all these difficulties Hastings never lost his head. He
created a diversion in Central India by dispatching Captain Popham
from Bengal to support the rana of Gohad. Captain Popham after
capturing the fort of Lahar, fifty miles from Kalpi, advanced to
Gwalior which he carried by a brilliant night escalade on 3 August,
1780. This, an achievement of great merit in itself, was of far greater
importance in its political effects. This fort had always been looked
upon throughout India as impregnable, and its capture raised the
prestige of the English enormously. Warren Hastings writing to
Laurence Sulivan on 27 August, 1780,3 thus refers to this episode :
"I shall begin by reciting to you an event of the greatest importance
. . . an enterprise . . . (of which] in this country the effect is not to be
described . . . it is the key of Indostan”. But it also had another, and
perhaps even more important, result. Sindhia, to whom the fort
belonged, was dismayed at its loss and at once hurried northwards,
abandoning his colleagues.
To turn for a moment to the other members of the confederacy.
Hyder 'Ali had attacked the Carnatic, and Mudaji Bhonsle had sent
his son Chimnaji against Cuttack, but as he had no real intention of
1 Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 413-15.
2 East Indian Military Calendar, 1823, II, 93.
3 Gleig, Warren Hastings, II, 311.


## p. 269 (#297) ############################################

RELATIONS WITH NAGPUR
269
1
seriously aiding the cause, he was easily bought off by Hastings. "
Mudaji had, in fact, himself originally informed Warren Hastings of
the confederacy formed between Nana Phadnavis, the Nizam, and
Hyder 'Ali, also intimating that the obligation to attack Bengal had
been laid upon him, and that he could not refuse to obey. His son
Chimnaji was, however, instructed to delay his march as much as
possible. This he effectually contrived to do, reaching the Bengal
border in May, 1780, instead of in October, 1779, as he might have
done. Hastings, well aware of the enmity which existed, the alliance
notwithstanding, between the Poona ministers and Hyder 'Ali, asked
Mudaji if he would act as mediator between the English and Nana
Phadnayis, and even sent him a draft treaty. But these negotiations
came to nothing. Hastings then deputed David Anderson to inter-
view Chimnaji and inform him that a force, under Colonel Pearse,
was marching from Bengal to Madras,” and to ask for his assistance
for the detachment. This was granted, and the promise most faith-
fully kept. Anderson then went to Cuttack where he induced Mudaji
to recall his forces on the payment of fifteen lakhs. The Nizam took
no active part in the proceedings of the confederacy.
In October General Goddard advanced on Bassein and, starting
operations against the fort in November, captured it on 11 December.
The fall of Bassein was a very serious blow to Nana, as besides the
loss of a stronghold the moral effect of the victory was almost as
great as that caused by the capture of Gwalior, owing to the fact that
it had been taken from the Portuguese in 1739 and thus represented
a victory over Europeans.
Goddard in 1781 received orders to conclude peace if he saw any
chance of effecting it. The Madras Presidency, in particular, was
anxious for a cessation of hostilities, ascribing the attacks made on
them by Hyder 'Ali to the support of Raghunath Rao and the
consequent war. Sir Eyre Coote, at this time in Southern India,
wrote to Goddard in the strongest terms pointing out that he must
impose upon him as a duty he owed to his king, his country and his
employers to leave no means untried to effect a peace. He also wrote
in similar strain to the Bengal Council (March, 1781). He says,
I have frequently declared it to you, gentlemen, as my firm opinion that we
are altogether unequal to the difficult and dangerous contention in which we
are now engaged . . . and I must once more call upon you to apply the least
dangerous and least expensive means whereof a change may be speedily brought
about on a system of policy so ruinous in itself and so destructive to their (the
Company's] interests.
After the capture of Bassein Goddard moved up and forced the
Bhor Ghat pass. But he allowed himself to be delayed in negotiations,
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, a,
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, 1, 749.
8 Forrest, Maratha Series, 1, 445-7.
4 Forrest, Selections
from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, m, 760.
707.


## p. 270 (#298) ############################################

270
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
which Nana began in order to give himself time to bring up more
troops. Holkar and Hari Pant advanced with a large force and when
Goddard, seeing that the negotiations were leading to nothing, tried
to retire on Kalyan and Bombay, he was attacked fiercely and lost
400 men killed and wounded. This it may be noted was the only
reverse Goddard ever suffered.
Sindhia who had hastened northwards on the fall of Gwalior was
defeated on 16 February, 1781, at Sipri (now Shivpuri) by Major
Camac, who had been sent in June, 1780, to support the rana of
Gohad. The effect of the fall of Gwalior and of Bassein, his own defeat
and the enhancement of his rival Holkar's reputation by the victory
at Bhor Ghat, convinced Sindhia that his real advantage lay in
coming to early terms with the English, and he never again took up
arms against them. He opened negotiations with Colonel Muir and
signed a treaty on 13 October, 1781. 1 By this treaty Sindhia agreed
to retire to Ujjain while Colonel Muir recrossed the Jumna. But the
really important clause in the agreement was that by which Mahadaji
undertook to effect a treaty between the ministers and the English
and so stand guarantee for its observance.
Hastings, on receiving this news, deputed David Anderson, in
January, 1782, with full powers to conclude a treaty. His instructions
to Anderson are contained in a letter dated 4 November, 1781, from
Benares. The points which Anderson was to bear in mind were : to
make an alliance with the Peshwa through Sindhia's mediation against
all enemies, but in particular against Hyder 'Ali; otherwise simply
peace, on the condition that we restored all territory gained during
the war, except the city of Ahmadabad and lands granted to Fateh
Singh Gaekwad; adequate provision to be made for Raghunath Rao;
Bassein to be kept if possible, even if all the lands obtained by the
Treaty of Purandhar had to be restored, except Salsette and the
islands and revenues of Broach; but if the retention of Bassein hin-
dered the settlement of the peace, it must be given up; nothing was to
be done hostile to the raja of Berar; Fateh Singh Gaekwad was to be
included in the treaty; the treacherous rana of Gohad was to be left
to make his own terms; all other European nations were to be pro-
hibited from founding new settlements; and if possible the Marathas
were to be induced to attack Hyder 'Ali.
Hastings, when he learnt of Colonel Muir's negotiations, was at
Benares, surrounded by rebels, almost in their hands, yet, wholly
undisturbed, he issued these instructions to his envoy. Well might
he refer to this transaction with pardonable pride in one of his letters
as having "conducted a successful negotiation of peace with Mah-
dajee Sindia in the most desperate period of my distress". 3 Anderson
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, m,
813; Aitchison, Treaties, IV, 33.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department,
8 Gleig, Warren Hastings, II, 453.
DII, 821-2.


## p. 271 (#299) ############################################

TREATY OF SALBAI
271
joined Mahadaji Sindhia, who was acting as our intermediary, and
on 17 May the Treaty of Salbai was signed. 1
The Treaty of Salbai contains seventeen clauses, the chief stipu-
lațions being that the whole of the territory conquered since the
Treaty of Purandhar (1776) should be restored, together with three
lakhs' worth of revenue at Broach; the Gaekwad's possessions to be
restored to what they were before the war, in 1775; Raghunath Rao,
within three months from the signing of the treaty, to fix on a place of
residence, receiving no further help from the English, the Peshwa
undertaking to pay him an allowance of 25,000 rupees a month, if
he would of his own accord repair to Sindhia; Hyder 'Ali to return
all territory recently taken from the English, and the nawab of Arcot;
and the Peshwa and the English undertook that their several allies
should remain at peace with one another.
Anderson writing about these negotiations (27 February, 1783)
remarks on Sindhia's difficulties as intermediary owing to differences
among the ministers at Poona, the opposition of his rival Holkar, who
was supported by Hari Pant, and the Nizam's intrigues. The treaty
was ratified by Nana till the next year, as he was still striving for the
restoration of Salsette and was, in fact, secretly intriguing with
Hyder 'Ali in hopes of being able to reject the treaty altogether.
But on 7 December, 1782, Hyder 'Ali had died. In any case his
support would have been unlikely, as he was said to be convinced of
the futility of opposing these new forces which had entered the arena
or Indian politics, and to have left a written message for his son Tipu
enjoining him to make peace with the English on any terms, and so
avoid ruining himself, advice which Tipu did not follow. Hyder
'Ali's death obliged Nana to ratify the treaty, which he did not do
until 20 February, 1783.
The importance of this treaty, which placed the political relations
of the English and the Marathas on an entirely new and definite
footing, cannot be over-estimated. It formed the turning-point in the
history of the English in India. It secured us peace with the Marathas
for twenty years, and, without the acquisition of any fresh territory,
it established, beyond dispute, the dominance of the British as con-
trolling factor in Indian politics, their subsequent rise in 1818 to the
position of the paramount power, being an inevitable result of the
position gained by the Treaty of Salbai.
No greater vindication of Hastings's policy can be asked for than
this successful termination of seven years of constant struggling, no
finer monument be raised to his courage, talents and amazing powers
of organisation for it was he, single-handed, who found money and
men, and steered the political course which led to victory.
1 Gleig, op. cit. 1, chap. xii; Aitchison, Treaties, IV, 41.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, ui,
929.


## p. 272 (#300) ############################################

272
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
It forms the turning-point in Mahadaji's career. Mahadaji and
Nana were both desirous of forcing Tipu to conform to the Treaty of
Salbai in order that he should figure as a tributary, but each of them
wished to claim the whole credit for doing so and Sindhia was not
prepared to abrogate his newly-established, independence of Poona
by sharing that credit with Nana. Hitherto, though he had often
disregarded orders, Mahadaji had considered himself a vassal of the
Peshwa, and had generally acted in conformity with the wishes of
his chief. During the next twelve years, however, assured that the
English would leave him a free hand, he becomes the most prominent
actor on the stage of Indian history, pursuing with quiet tenacity, but
without ever forgetting, as his successor did, the limits of his strength,
his policy of personal aggrandisement, a policy, moreover, which, to
a very large extent, determined the general course of events in India,
up to his death in 1794.


## p. 273 (#301) ############################################

CHAPTER X V
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
In the Carnatic the course of events was very different from that
in Bengal. In both provinces the English had attained military supre-
macy; but in the south they did not follow this up by the almost
immediate assumption of political control. The reasons for the differ-
ence seem to be that with the overthrow of the French the Carnatic
had become a secondary area not rich enough to provoke direct
administration or to bring the interests of the nawab and the Com-
pany's servants into direct conflict. The pet vice of the latter in the
Carnatic was indeed quite different from that which prevailed in
Bengal. In Bengal they had sought to trade untaxed; in the Carnatic
they found their easiest advantage to lie in lending money to the
nawab. Muhammad 'Ali had from the first found himself in em-
barrassed circumstances. The war with the French had been carried
on at his expense though largely with the Company's funds; so that
the fall of Pondichery found him with a debt of 22,25,373 pagodas
owing to the Company. In 1766 this had been reduced to 13,65,104
pagodas; but in reality his financial position had grown worse instead
of better, for at the later date he owed private creditors a sum
exceeding that which he had owed the Company in 1761. These
private loans had been borrowed at the high rates of interest prevailing
in the country-at first from 30 to 36 per cent. ; then 25 per cent. ;
and then on the intervention of the governor, Palk, to 20 per cent.
When questioned, the nawab stated, probably with truth, that he
would have had to pay higher rates to Indian lenders. In 1766 the
interest was reduced by the Company's orders to 10 per cent. The
existence of thiş large private debt, which so far from being liquidated
went on increasing throughout the whole of Mohammad 'Ali's gov-
ernment, branching out into all those divers funds which Burke
enumerated with such passionate emphasis, affected the whole of
the relations between the English and the Nawab Walajah, as he
became after Clive's Treaty of Allahabad. Having the control of so
large a portion of the private savings of the settlement, the nawab
was able to exercise a most unwholesome influence over the policy of
the council, particularly in regard to Tanjore; and was sure of a
following even when the Company or the governor was positively
opposed to his designs. Not a governor but was corrupted by his
bribes or calumniated by his hatred. For a time at least the financial
interests thus created dominated Madras in the person of Paul
Benfield, who, though probably not quite deserving all the strictures
of Burke, undoubtedly subordinated public affairs to the exigencies
of private concerns. The true history of the period will perhaps
18


## p. 274 (#302) ############################################

274
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
never be written. The persons principally concerned did not entrust
their designs to the publicity of the Company's records; and though
a certain number of private papers have come to light, many others
have been destroyed or concealed; so that we are often left to guess
at what actually happened.
While the French war was still continuing, there was a strong
inclination on the part of the council to take the direct administra-
tion of the territory secured by the Company's arms. But the
nawab's protests and perhaps more solid arguments induced the
council to abandon that idea; 1 nor, even under the pressure of cir-
cumstances, did it in fact proceed to that extremity. Probably the
financial help which was received from Bengal saved the nawab's
independence. At the fall of Pondichery he found his nominal power
undiminished. He had granted to the Company the district imme-
diately surrounding Madras, and mortgaged other parts of his
dominions, but the English displayed no desire to take any part in the
administration of these areas; and even in the Company's jagir the
revenue was ultimately leased out to the nawab himself.
In the south the first ostensible exercise of power resulted from
Clive's Treaty of Allahabad.