No More Learning

Paradoxical as it sounds, it was the king who had planned and achieved
this situation; the plans of the Pope were upset by this sudden appear-
ance, his mind was unprepared for the emergency. The three days of
waiting are not so much the measure of Henry's humiliation as of
Gregory's irresolution. Could he refuse absolution to one so humble and
apparently so penitent? The influence of those on whom he was wont to
lean for spiritual help, especially the Abbot of Cluny, urged him to
mercy; the appeal of the beloved Countess Matilda moved him in the
same direction. But they only saw a king in penitential garb; he had
the bitter experience of the last two years to guide him, and what confi-
dence could he feel that the penitence of Henry was more sincere now,
when his need was greater, than it had been in 1073? He saw before him
too the prospect of the wrecking of all his hopes, the breach of his
engagement with the German nobles, which would probably result
from an absolution given in circumstances that neither he nor they had
contemplated. His long hesitation was due, then, to the conflict in his
mind; it was not a deliberate delay designed to increase to the utmost the
degradation of the king.
But at last the appeal to the divine mercy prevailed over all other
considerations. The doors were opened and Henry admitted to the Pope's
presence; the ban was removed, and the king was received once more
into communion with the Church. From him the Pope extracted such
assurances of his penitence and guarantees for his future conduct as would
justify the absolution and at the same time leave the situation as far as
possible unaltered from the papal point of view. With his hand on the
Gospels the king took an oath to follow the Pope's directions with regard
to the charges of the German nobles against him, whichever way they
might tend, and further by no act or instigation of his to impede
Gregory from coming into Germany or to interfere with his safe-conduct
while there. The Pope sent a copy of this oath to the German nobles
with a letter describing the events at Canossa. He realised that the
absolution of Henry in Italy would appear to them in the light of a be-
trayal of the compact he had entered into with them. His letter is an
explanation, almost an apology of his action; while he points out that
1 Or contemporary opinion so little. Bismarck's famous words “zu Canossa gehen
wir nicht" indicate the aspect of Canossa that impresses the modern mind. But the
brief allusions to Canossa in contemporary writers only refer to the king's absolution
and its political results; it did not occur to them that the monarchy had been
degraded by Henry's action. His seat on the throne had been shaken by the ex-
communication; he righted himself by his penance at Canossa.
2 This letter ! ( Reg. iv, 12) is our only real authority for the details of Canossa.
Lampert of Hersfeld's account is clearly based on the Pope's letter, with characteristic
embellishments of his own invention.


## p. 71 (#117) #############################################

The election of Rudolf as anti-king
71
the non-appearance of the promised escort had prevented him from
reaching Germany, he is careful to insist firstly that it was impossible for
him to refuse absolution, secondly that he has entered into no engagement
with the king and that his purpose is as before to be present at a council
in Germany. He lingered, in fact, for some months in North Italy,
waiting for the escort that never came; at last he resigned himself to the
inevitable and slowly retraced his steps to Rome, which he reached at the
beginning of September.
Henry's plan had been precisely fulfilled. He had counted the cost-
a public humiliation—and was prepared to pay the additional price in the
form of promises; he had obtained his end-absolution-and the results
he had anticipated from this were to prove the success of his policy? . In
Lombardy he resumed his royal rights, but resisted the clamour of his
Italian adherents, whose ardour he most thoroughly disappointed; he
must still walk with great discretion, and Germany, not Italy, was his
immediate objective. Thither he soon returned, and the effects of his
absolution were at once revealed. By the majority of his subjects he was
regarded as the lawful sovereign once more. He had endured a grave
injury to imperial prestige, but he had administered an important check
to the two dangerous rivals of imperial power—the spiritual authority
and the feudal nobility.
The news of Henry's absolution came as a shock to his enemies in
Germany, upsetting their plans and disappointing their expectations.
Nor were they comforted by the Pope's effort to reassure them. They
decided, however, to proceed with their original purpose and to hold a
diet at Forchheim in March. Their invitation to the Pope to be present
at this diet must have contained a reference to their disappointment at
his action, for in his reply he finds it necessary to justify himself again,
laying stress also on their failure to provide an escort. This was still the
difficulty that prevented him from coming to Germany, but he sent two
papal legates who were present at Forchheim, and who seem on their own
responsibility to have confirmed the decision of the nobles and to have
given papal sanction to the election of Duke Rudolf of Swabia as king.
The election of Rudolf created a difficult situation, but one full of
possibilities for the Pope which he was not slow to recognise. He refused,
indeed, to confirm the action of his legates at Forchheim, but he recog-
nised the existence of two kings and claimed for himself the decision
between them. If he could establish this claim and obtain acquiescence
in his decision, the predominance of the spiritual power would be revealed
as a fact. His decision must not be hurried; it must be given only after
clear evidence and on the spiritual and moral grounds which were the
justification of the supremacy he claimed. Righteousness must be the
supreme test; he will give his decision to the king cui iustitia favet.
1 This is very clearly stated by the writer most favourable to him, Vita Heinrici
imperatoris, c. 3, SGUS, p. 16.
3
CB, II.


## p. 72 (#118) #############################################

72
The Pope's neutrality
Again and again he emphasised this, and that the marks of iustitia were
humility and obedience, obedience to the commandments of God and so
to St Peter, and through St Peter to himself. Obedience to the Pope was
to be the final test of worthiness to rule, and he gave one practical
application of this principle. He still continued for a time to cherish the
hope that he would preside in person over a council in Germany; when
this was proved impossible, his plan was to send legates to preside in his
place. From both kings he expected assistance. The king who was con-
victed of hindering the holding of the council would be deposed, and
judgment given in favour of the other; for as Gregory the Great had said,
“even kings lose their thrones if they presume to oppose apostolic
decrees. ” Naturally his attitude gave intense dissatisfaction to both
Henry and Rudolf; neither felt strong enough to stand alone, and both
expected papal support. Henry urged the Pope to excommunicate the
traitor Rudolf, who had presumed to set himself up against God's anointed.
The supporters of Rudolf were equally persistent. The Pope had absolved
them from their allegiance to Henry. In conformity with this they had
made a compact with him for joint action, a compact which they felt he
had broken by his absolution of Henry. They had persisted, however,
with the scheme and had elected Rudolf, and papal legates had been
present and confirmed the election. Moreover, a garbled version of
Canossa soon prevailed among them, which made it appear that the king
had been granted absolution on conditions (distinct from those in his oath)
which he had immediately broken, and was thereby again excommunicate
In this view they were again supported by the papal legates, who continued
to embarrass the Pope by exceeding their instructions. Rudolf and his
supporters can hardly be blamed for interpreting the action of the legates
as performed on behalf of the Pope and by his orders. His continued
neutrality and his constant reference to two kings only bewildered and
irritated them. He persisted, however, in neutrality, undeterred by the
complaints of either side, determined to take no action until the righteous-
ness of one party or the absence of it in the other could be made apparent.
But there could never have been much doubt as to the final decision. He
always shewed complete confidence in Rudolf's rectitude; his previous
experience could have given him little confidence in Henry. The three
days' hesitation at Canossa had ended when he allowed himself to be
assured of Henry's penitence; the hesitation of the three years following
Canossa was to be resolved when he could feel complete assurance of
Henry's guilt.
From 1077 to 1080 the decision in Germany is naturally the chief
object of the Pope's attention. This did not divert his mind from the
important questions of Church government and papal authority, but to
some extent it hampered and restricted his actions; it would appear that
he was careful to avoid any cause of friction with Henry which might
compromise the settlement of the great decision. His authority was set


## p. 73 (#119) #############################################

Papal legislation, 1078-1079
73
at naught by the bishops of North Italy, who refused to execute his decrees
and defied his repeated excommunications. In Germany there is hardly a
trace of the struggle that had been so bitter in 1074 and 1075; this was
mainly due to the confusion arising from the state of civil war. Probably
too the German episcopate was not anxious to engage in another trial
of strength with the Pope. Their revolt at Worms had resulted in
bringing them in submission to the Pope's feet, and their leader, Arch-
bishop Siegfried of Mayence, had given up all further thoughts of revolt
against him. He had even abandoned his royal master and had con-
secrated Rudolf as king; his instinct in every crisis for the losing side
remained with him to the end. In Gregory's correspondence during this
period there is an almost complete absence of reference to ecclesiastical
affairs in Germany. At the same time it is the period of his chief legis-
lative activity. At the Lenten and November Synods of 1078, especially
at the latter, he issued a number of decrees dealing with the leading ques-
tions of Church discipline, most of which were subsequently incorporated
by Gratian into his Decretum. . The increased stringency of the measures
taken to deal with ecclesiastical offenders is the principal feature of these
decrees. Bishops are ordered to enforce clerical chastity in their dioceses,
under penalty of suspension. The sacraments of married clergy had
previously been declared invalid, and the laity ordered not to hear the
mass of a married priest; now entry into churches is forbidden to married
clergy. All ordinations, simoniacal or otherwise uncanonical, are declared
null and void, as are the orders of those ordained by excommunicated
bishops. Naturally, then, the ordinations of simoniacal bishops are invalid;
an exception is made in the case of those ordained nescienter et sine pretio
by simoniacal bishops before the papacy of Nicholas II, who, after the
laying-on of hands, might be confirmed in their orders! As to the en-
forcement of these decrees by the Pope we hear nothing; but they raised
issues which were to be seriously contested after his death, and his imme-
diate successors were eventually to take less extreme views. Further, the
Pope dealt with the unlawful intervention of the laity in ecclesiastical
affairs. Not only are the laity sternly prohibited from holding Church pro-
perty or tithes; a decree is also passed in November 1078 condemning the
practice of lay investiture. It is noticeable that it only prohibits investi-
ture with the spiritual office, and that it enforces penalties only on the
recipients, not on the laity who invest. Finally, there were a number of
decrees connected with points of doctrine, the most important of which was
issued after considerable debate at the Lenten Synod of 1079, affirming
the substantial change of the elements after consecration. It was an
answer to the heresy of Berengar of Tours, who is compelled once more to
recant; Gregory as before shewed great leniency in dealing with him, and
actually threatened with excommunication anyone who should molest him.
Reg. vi, 39. Saltet, Les Réordinations, pp. 205 sq. , fails to notice this im-
portant letter, and therefore forms a different conclusion as to Gregory's attitude.
1
CH. II.


## p. 74 (#120) #############################################

74
Excommunication and deposition of Henry IV, 1080
All this legislation, important as it was and fruitful in future contro-
versies, was subsidiary to the question of the German kingdom, which at
every synod took the leading place. Gregory was continually striving to
bring about the council in Germany over which his legates were to preside.
Both kings promised to co-operate and to abide by the decision of the
legates; both promised an escort to ensure the safe conduct of the legates.
But nothing was done by either; Rudolf was doubtless unable, Henry
was certainly unwilling. There was in consequence a strong feeling at the
Lenten Synod of 1079 that the Pope should immediately decide for Rudolf,
Gregory, however, persevered and contented himself with renewed promises,
guaranteed by oath, from the ambassadors of both kings. Henry was be-
coming impatient. As his position in Germany grew more secure, his
need to conciliate the Pope became less urgent. At the Lenten Synod of
1080 his ambassadors appeared not with promises but with the demand,
accompanied probably by threats, that the Pope should immediately
excommunicate Rudolf; Rudolf's ambassadors replied with a string of
charges against Henry, to prove his unrighteousness and insincerity. The
Pope could remain neutral no longer. Henry's embassy had provided the
evidence he required to prove the king's breach of faith. Against Henry
the decision was given.
The proceedings of the synod commenced with a renewal of the decree
against lay investiture, accompanied, now that negotiation with Henry
was at an end, by a further decree threatening with excommunication the
lay power that presumed to confer investiture of bishopric or abbey. A
third decree enforced the pure canonical election of bishops, and provided
that, where this was in any way vitiated, the power of election should
devolve on the Pope or the metropolitan. The synod terminated with
the pronouncement of the papal decision on the German kingdom. Again
in the form of a solemn address, this time with added effect to both
St Peter and St Paul, Gregory dwells on his reluctance at every stage in his
advancement to the papal chair, and recounts the history of his relations
with Henry during the three preceding years, marking the insincerity of
the king and his final disobedience in the matter of the council, which, with
the ruin and desolation he had caused in Germany, proved his unrighteous-
ness and unfitness to reign. Then follows the sentence—Henry, for his
pride, disobedience, and falsehood, is excommunicated, deposed from his
kingdom, and his subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance. Rudolf
by his humility, obedience, truthfulness, is revealed as the righteous man;
to him the kingdom, to which he had been elected by the German people,
is entrusted by the Pope acting in the name of the two Apostles, to whom
he appeals for a vindication of his just sentence.
The sentence has a ring of finality in it that was not present in 1076.
Henry is now deposed for ever and a successor appointed in his place. So it
is on the deposition that the main emphasis is laid, as it was on the excom-
munication in 1076. Gregory's justification of his action is again addressed


## p. 75 (#121) #############################################

The Pope's justification of his sentence. Its effect
75
to Bishop Herman of Metz, though not written till the following year.
Unlike the similar letter of 1076 it shews no sign of haste or impatience;
it is a reasoned statement, full of quotations from precedent and authority,
and is concerned mainly with emphasising the complete subjection of the
secular to the spiritual power, for even the lowest in the ecclesiastical
hierarchy have powers which are not given to the greatest Emperors. It
is a mighty assertion of the unlimited autocracy of the Pope over all men,
even the greatest, on earth. And it was an assertion of authority in the
justice of which Gregory had the supremest confidence. In the sentence
he had prayed that Henry might acquire no strength in war, no victory
in his lifetime. He followed this up on Easter Monday by his famous
prophecy that Henry, if he did not repent, would be dead or deposed
before St Peter's day. He felt assured that the easy victory of 1076 would
be repeated. But the situation was entirely different from that in 1076,
as also the issue was to be. Then opinion in Germany had been shocked
by the violence and illegality of the king in attempting to expel the Pope.
The papal excommunication had been obeyed as a just retribution; to the
sentence of deposition little attention had been paid. As soon as the king
was absolved he received again the allegiance of all those who were in
favour of legitimacy and a strong central authority, and were opposed to
the local ambitions of the dukes who set up Rudolf. The Pope's claim
to have the deciding voice was not regarded very seriously by them, and
still less attention was paid to his assertion of the complete autocracy of
the spiritual power. When Henry would do nothing to make possible
the council that the Pope so earnestly desired, his action was doubtless
approved by them; and when the Pope in consequence excommunicated
and deposed the king and appointed Rudolf in his place, he aroused
very wide-spread indignation. It is Gregory who is the aggressor now,
as Henry was in 1076; it is he that is regarded now as exceeding his
powers in attempting to dethrone the temporal head of Western Christen-
dom. The situation is completely reversed, and it is not too much to say
that as a result of the papal sentence Henry's power in Germany became
stronger than it had been for some years.
Henry was probably more alive than Gregory to the real facts of the
situation. Rapidly, but with less precipitancy than he had shewn in 1076,
he planned his counter-stroke. A council of German bishops held at
Mayence on Whitsunday decreed the deposition of the Pope and arranged
another council to be held at Brixen on 25 June, where a successor to
Gregory was to be appointed. To this council the bishops of North Italy
came in large numbers; the king was present and many nobles both of
Germany and Italy. The bishops confirmed the Mayence decree and
unanimously declared Gregory deposed; to the royal power was entrusted
the task of executing the sentence. They also proceeded to the election
of a successor, and their choice fell on Archbishop Guibert of Ravenna,
the leader of the Lombard bishops in their revolt against papal authority.
CH. 11


## p. 76 (#122) #############################################

76
Council of Brixen. The anti-Pope Guibert
A man of strong determination, resolute in upholding the independence
he claimed for his see, he had been repeatedly summoned to Rome by the
Pope, and for his absence and contumacy repeatedly excommunicated.
Though violently attacked by papalist writers and likened to the beast in
the Apocalypse, no charges were made against his personal character; he
seems also to have been in sympathy with Church reform, as his decrees
shew. A stubborn opponent of Gregory, unmoved by papal excommuni-
cations, he was eminently the man for Henry's purpose in the final struggle
that had now begun. For it was a struggle that admitted of no compro-
mise—king and anti-Pope versus Pope and anti-king. St Peter's day
came and Gregory's prophecy was not fulfilled; in October Rudolf was
killed in battle. It was now possible for Henry to take in hand the
execution of the Brixen decree, and to use the temporal weapon to expel
the deposed Pope.
Even before the Council of Brixen met, Gregory had realised the danger
that threatened him. Spiritual weapons were of avail no longer; he must
have recourse to the aid of temporal power. The Romans, he knew, were
loyal to him and would resist the invader. In Tuscany he could rely
absolutely on the devotion of Countess Matilda, but against this must be
set the hostility of Lombardy. To restore the balance in his favour he
was driven to seek assistance from the Normans in South Italy. He knew
that they would welcome the alliance if he was willing to pay their price.
The issues at stake were so vital to the Papacy and the Church that he
felt justified in consenting to the price they demanded, though it involved
what in other circumstances he would have regarded as an important
breach of principle. To understand this it is necessary to review briefly
his relations with the Normans during the past seven years.
The relations of the Pope with the Normans were affected by two
considerations—the protection of papal territory, and the possible need
for their assistance. Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia, Calabria, and
Sicily, who was trying to form a centralised Norman state in South
Italy, had readily done homage to previous Popes in return for the
cession of territory, and had rendered valuable assistance to the Papacy
at Alexander II's accession. Gregory was determined to yield no more ter-
ritory. This and the reconciliation with Henry were the two chief objects
of his attention during the first few months of his papacy. He increased
the area of papal suzerainty by the addition of the lands belonging to
the surviving Lombard rulers in the south, especially Benevento and
Salerno; in return for his protection they surrendered them to the Pope
and received them back again as fiefs from the Papacy. Richard, Prince
of Capua, the only Norman who could rival Robert Guiscard, took the
same step, and Gregory was delighted at the success of his policy, which
was, as he himself declared, to keep the Normans from uniting to the
damage of the Church. Robert Guiscard, desiring to expand his power,
could only do so at the expense of papal territory. This, in spite of his


## p. 77 (#123) #############################################

Alliance of the Pope with Robert Guiscard
77
oath, he did not scruple to do, and was in consequence excommunicated
at the Lenten Synods of 1074 and 1075. But the breach with Henry in
1076 caused the Pope to contemplate the desirability of Norman aid;
Robert made the cession of papal territory a necessary condition, and
negotiations fell through. Moreover Richard of Capua had in the mean-
time broken his allegiance and allied himself with Robert Guiscard, and
together they made a successful attack on various portions of the papal
territory. In Lent 1078 the Pope issued a bull of excommunication against
them once more. Richard died soon afterwards and on his death-bed was
reconciled with the Church; his son Jordan came to Rome and made his
peace with the Pope on the old terms. So once more Gregory had brought
about disunion; and a serious revolt of his vassals against Robert Guiscard,
which it took the latter two years to quell, saved the Pope from further
Norman aggression. The revolt was extinguished by the middle of 1080, at
the very moment that the Pope decided to appeal to Robert for aid. They
met at Ceprano in June. The ban was removed, Robert did fealty to the
Pope, and in return received investiture both of the lands granted him by
Popes Nicholas II and Alexander II and of the territory he had himself
seized, for which he agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Pope. The
Pope thus confirmed what he is careful to call “an unjust tenure," and
to gain Robert's aid sacrificed the principle for which he had stood firm
in 1076. Whether justifiable or not the sacrifice was ineffectual. Robert
Guiscard welcomed the alliance because his ambitions were turned to the
East. Instead of obtaining the immediate help he required, the Pope had
to give his blessing to Robert's expedition against the Eastern Empire.
The duke's absence in Greece gave the opportunity for a renewed outbreak
of revolt among his vassals. This forced him to return and he was not
successful in crushing the revolt until July 1083; it was not till the
following year, when it was as much to his own interest as to the Pope's to
check the successful advance of Henry, that he at last moved to Gregory's
support. Up to this time the alliance, without bringing any advantage
to the Pope, had actually assisted the king. It gained for him two useful
allies, both of whom were anxious to hamper the power of Robert Guis-
card-Jordan of Capua and the Eastern Emperor Alexius. The latter
supplied Henry with large sums of money, intended for use against Robert,
but which the king was eventually to employ with success in his negotia-
tions with the Romans.
Robert Guiscard did at any rate, as previously in 1075, reject Henry's
proposals for an alliance. But he also disregarded the Pope's appeals, and
set sail for the East at the very time that Henry was marching on Rome.
The Pope therefore had to rely on his own resources and the assistance
of Countess Matilda. This did not weaken his determination; convinced
of the righteousness of his cause he was confident of the result. At the
Lenten Synod of 1081 he excommunicated Henry and his followers afresh,
and from this synod he sent his legates directions with regard to the
CH. 11.


## p. 78 (#124) #############################################

78
Siege of Rome by Henry IV
election of a successor to Rudolf. He must not be hastily chosen; the
chief qualifications must be integrity of character and devotion to the
Church. The Pope also sent them the wording of the oath he expected
from the new king—an oath of fealty, promising obedience to the papal
will in all things. This was the practical expression of the theories he
enunciated at the same time in his letter to Bishop Herman of Metz
justifying the excommunication and deposition of Henry. It is important
as marking the culmination of his views, but it was without effect; at the
new election it seems to have been completely disregarded.
The weakness of the opposition in Germany made it possible for
Henry to undertake his Italian expedition. He came to assert his posi-
tion, and to obtain imperial coronation at Rome: by negotiation and
from Gregory, if possible, but if necessary by force and from his anti-Pope.
His first attempt was in May 1081; whether from over-confidence or
necessity he brought few troops with him. He announced his arrival in a
letter to the Romans, recalling them to the allegiance they had promised
to his father. The Romans, however, justified Gregory's confidence in their
loyalty, and Henry was forced to retire after a little aimless plundering
of the suburbs. The situation was not affected by the election of Count
Herman of Salm at the end of 1081 as successor to Rudolf. Henry
could not reduce Saxony to submission, but he could safely ignore
Herman and resume his Italian design.
He reappeared before Rome in
February 1082, preceded by a second letter to the Romans; this attempt
was as unsuccessful as the former one, and for the rest of the year
he
occupied with the resistance of the Countess Matilda in northern Italy.
He returned to Rome at the beginning of 1083 and settled down to
besiege the Leonine City, which he finally captured in June, thus gaining
possession of St Peter's and all the region on the right bank of the Tiber
except the castle of Sant'Angelo. This success shewed that the loyalty of
the Romans to Gregory was weakening; they were not equal to the strain
of a long siege, and the money supplied by the Emperor Alexius was
beginning to have its effect. At the same time a moderate party was
being formed within the Curia itself, which managed to obtain the papal
consent to the holding of a synod in November, at which the questions at
issue between Pope and king were to be discussed; Henry's party was
approached and promised a safe-conduct to those who attended the synod.
Thus in both camps there were influences at work to procure a peaceful
settlement. The king himself was not averse to such a settlement. He had
moreover come to a private understanding with the leading Romans on
the matter of greatest importance to himself. Unknown to the Pope they
had taken an oath to Henry to obtain for him imperial coronation at
Gregory's hands, or, failing this, to disown Gregory and recognise the anti-
Pope.
The attempt at reconciliation came to nothing. The Pope issued
his summons to the synod, but the tone of his letters, addressed only to
was


## p. 79 (#125) #############################################

His victory.
The Norman sack of Rome V
79
those who were not under excommunication, shewed that he would not
compromise his views or negotiate with the impenitent. The king, who
had been further irritated by what he regarded as the treachery of certain
of the Romans in demolishing some fortifications he had constructed,
adopted an attitude equally intransigeant. He deliberately prevented
Gregory's chief supporters from coming to the synod, and actually took
prisoner a papal legate, the Cardinal-bishop Otto of Ostia. The synod,
therefore, was poorly attended and entirely without result. But the
secret negotiations of Henry were more successful. He was about to leave
Rome, in despair of attaining his object, when a deputation arrived
promising him instant possession of the main city. With some hesitation
he retraced his steps to find the promise genuine and his highest hopes
unexpectedly fulfilled. On 21 March 1084 he entered Rome in triumph
with his anti-Pope. A council of his supporters decreed anew the deposition
of Pope Gregory VII, and on Palm Sunday Guibert was enthroned as
Pope Clement III. On Easter Day the new Pope crowned Henry and
Bertha as Emperor and Empress, and Henry's chief object was attained.
He had followed in the footsteps of his father--the deposition of Pope
Gregory, the appointment of Pope Clement, the imperial coronation and
felt that he had restored the relations of Empire and Papacy as they existed
in 1046.
The Emperor proclaimed his triumph far and wide, and his partisans
celebrated it in exultant pamphlets. But their rejoicing was premature
and short-lived. Gregory VII was still holding the castle of Sant'Angelo
and other of the fortified positions in Rome, his determination unmoved
by defeat. And at last his appeals to Robert Guiscard were heeded. The
Norman duke at the head of a large army advanced on Rome. As he
approached, Henry, who was not strong enough to oppose him, retreated,
and by slow stages made his way back to Germany, leaving the anti-Pope
at Tivoli. His immediate purpose had been achieved, and he had to
abandon Rome to its fate. He could not, like his father, take the deposed
Pope with him to Germany; the degradation of Gregory VII was to be
the work of the man who came to his rescue. The brutal sack of Rome by
the Normans lasted for three days, and put in the shade the damage done
to the city in former days by Goths and Vandals. When Robert Guiscard
returned south he took with him the Pope, whom he could not have left
to the mercy of the infuriated populace. Gregory would fain have found
a refuge at Monte Cassino; but his rescuer, now his master, hurried him
on (as if to display to him the papal territory that had been the price of
this deliverance), first to Benevento and then to Salerno. In June they
arrived at the latter place, where Gregory was to spend the last year
of
his life, while the anti-Pope was able quietly to return to Rome and
celebrate Christmas there. At Salerno the Pope held his last synod,
It added to the weakness of Guibert's position that the functions of the cardinal-
bishops at this ceremony were usurped by the Bishops of Modena and Arezzo.
CH. II.


## p. 80 (#126) #############################################

80
Death of Pope Gregory VII
repeated once more his excommunication of Henry and his supporters, and
dispatched his final letter of justification and appeal to the Christian
world. The bitterness of failure hung heavily upon him. He, who had
prayed often that God would release him from this life if he could not be
of service to the Church', had now no longer any desire to live. He
passed away on 25 May 1085, and the anguish of his heart found expres-
sion in his dying words: “I have loved righteousness and hated iniquity? ;
therefore I die in exile. "
The emphasis was on righteousness to the last. And it was justified.
Had he consented to compromise his principles and to come to terms with
Henry he could have maintained himself unchallenged on the papal throne.
The rough hand of the Norman had made his residence at Rome im-
possible; but without Norman aid it would have been equally impossible.
The Romans had deserted him; the king was master of the city. His end
might even have been more terrible, though it could not have been more
tragic. What impresses one most of all is not his temporary defeat,
but the quenching of his spirit. The old passionate confidence has gone;
though still convinced of the righteousness of his cause, he has lost
all hope of its victory on earth. “The devil,” he wrote, “has won no
such victory since the days of the great Constantine; the nearer the day
of Anti-Christ approaches, the more vigorous are the efforts he is making.
His vision was dimmed by the gloom of the moment, and this gave
him
a pessimistic outlook that was unnatural to him and was not justified by
facts. (The Papacy had vindicated its independence, had taken the lead in
Church reform, and had established the principles for which the reformers
had been fighting. It had also asserted its authority as supreme within
the ecclesiastical department, and exercised a control unknown before and
not to be relaxed in the future. This was largely the work of Gregory VII.
The great struggle too in which he was engaged with Henry IV was to
end eventually in a complete victory for the Papacy; his antagonist was
to come to an end even more miserable than his own. The great theories
which he had evolved in the course of this struggle were not indeed to be
in practice by his immediate successors. But he left a great
cause behind him, and his claims were repeated and defended in the
pamphlet-warfare that followed his death. Later they were to be
revived again and to raise the Papacy to its greatest height; but they were
to lead to eventual disaster, as the ideal which had inspired them was for-
gotten. They were with Gregory VII the logical expression of his great
ideal—the rule of righteousness upon earth. He had tried to effect this
with the aid of the temporal ruler; when that was proved impossible, he
tried to enforce it against him. The medieval theory of the two equal and
independent powers had proved impracticable; Gregory inaugurated the
new papal theory that was to take its place. )
followed up
I As he tells Hugh of Cluny in 1075.
2 Psalm xlv. 8.


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Gregory's relations with France
81
The main interest of Gregory VII's papacy is concentrated on the
great struggle with the Empire and the theories and claims that arose out
of it. If his relations with the other countries of Europe are of minor
interest, they are of almost equal importance in completing our under-
standing of the Pope. He was dealing with similar problems, and he
applied the same methods to their solution; the enforcement of his
decrees, the recognition of his supreme authority in the ecclesiastical
department, co-operation with the secular authority, are his principal
objects. Conditions differed widely in each country; he was keenly alive
to these differences, shrewd and practical in varying his policy to suit
them. He had frequently to face opposition, but in no case was he
driven into open conflict with the secular authority. This must be borne
in mind in considering the claims which he advanced against the Empire,
which were the result of his conflict with the temporal ruler; where no
such conflict occurred, these claims did not emerge. Evidently then they
must not be taken to represent his normal attitude; they denote
rather the extreme position into which he was forced by determined
opposition.
Gregory had himself been employed as papal legate to enforce the
reform decrees in France, and had thus been able to familiarise himself with
the ecclesiastical situation. The king, Philip I, had little real authority
in temporal matters, but exercised considerable influence in ecclesiastical,
as also did the leading nobles! . The alliance of monarchy and episcopate,
a legacy to the Capetians from the Carolingians, was of importance to the
king, both politically and financially. The rights of regalia and spolia,
and the simoniacal appointments to bishoprics, provided an impor-
tant source of revenue, which the king would not willingly surrender; he
was therefore definitely antagonistic to the reform movement. The
simoniacal practices of the king and his plundering of Church property
naturally provoked papal intervention. Remonstrance and warning were
of no effect, until at the Lenten Synod of 1075 a decree was passed
threatening Philip with excommunication if he failed to give satisfaction
to the papal legates. The threat was apparently sufficient. Philip was
not strong enough openly to defy the Pope and risk excommunication.
Co-operation of the kind that Gregory desired was impossible, but
Philip was content with a defensive attitude, which hindered the progress
of the papal movement but did not finally prevent it. ) At any rate there
is no further reference to papal action against the king, who seems to have
made a show of compliance with the Pope's wishes in 1080, when Gregory
wrote to him, imputing his former moral and ecclesiastical offences to
youthful folly and sending him precepts for his future conduct. The
1 In France, unlike Germany, the lay control complained of was exercised as much
by the uobles as by the king. Gregory, who knew the local conditions, recognised that
it was often not the king but a noble, such as the Count of Flanders, whose influence
had to be counteracted.
6
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. II.


## p. 82 (#128) #############################################

82
Relations with France
episcopate adopted an attitude similar to that of the king. The lay
influence at elections, the prevalence of simony and of clerical marriage,
had created an atmosphere which made the work of reform peculiarly
difficult. The bishops, supporting and supported by the king, were
extremely averse to papal control, but owing to the strength of the
feudal nobility they lacked the territorial power and independence of the
German bishops. They had to be content therefore, like the king, with a
shifty and defensive attitude; they resisted continually, but only half-
heartedly.
In Gregory VII's correspondence with the French Church there are
two striking features. In the first place his letters to France are, at every
stage of his papacy, more than twice as numerous as his letters to Ger-
many. These letters reveal the laxity prevailing in the Church, and the
general disorder of the country owing to the weakness of the central
government; they also shew the timidity of the opposition which made it
possible for the Pope to interfere directly, not only in matters affecting the
ecclesiastical organisation as a whole but also in questions of detail con-
cerning individual churches and monasteries. Secondly, while the Pope's
correspondence with Germany was mainly concerned with the great
questions of his reform policy, his far more numerous letters to France
have hardly any references to these questions. His methods were the
same in both countries: in 1074 he sent papal legates to France, as to
Germany, to inaugurate a great campaign against simony and clerical
marriage. The legates in Germany had met with determined resistance,
but those in France had pursued their work with such ardour and success
that the Pope established them eventually as permanent legates in France
-Bishop Hugh of Die being mainly concerned with the north and
centre, Bishop Amatus of Oloron with Aquitaine and Languedoc. To
them he left the task of enforcing compliance with the papal decrees; hence
the silence on these matters in his own correspondence. The legates,
especially Bishop Hugh, were indefatigable. They held numerous synods",
publishing the papal decrees and asserting their own authority. Inevit-
ably they provoked opposition, especially from the lower clergy to the
enforcement of clerical celibacy, and their lives were sometimes in danger;
at the Council of Poictiers in 1078 there was even a popular riot against
them. The archbishops were naturally reluctant to submit to their
authority, but had to be content with a passive resistance. They refused
to appear at the synods, or questioned the legatine authority. The sen-
tence of interdict, which Hugh never failed to employ, usually brought
them to a reluctant submission. Only Manasse, Archbishop of Rheims, for
whose character no writer has a good word, took a decided stand. He
refused to appear at the synods when summoned, and appealed against
the Pope's action in giving full legatine authority to non-Romans. As he
1 Hugh of Flavigny (MGH, Script. viii, pp. 412 sqq. ) gives an account of several
of these synods.


## p. 83 (#129) #############################################

Relations with England
83
continued obstinate in his refusal to appear before the legates, he was
deposed in 1080 and a successor appointed in his place; not even the
king's support availed to save him. The action of the papal legates was
often violent and ill-considered. (Hugh in particular was a man of rigid
and narrow outlook whose sentences never erred on the side of leniency.
The Pope repeatedly reminded him of the virtues of mercy and discretion,
and frequently reversed his sentences. The legate was aggrieved at the
Pope's leniency. He complained bitterly that his authority was not being
upheld by the Pope; offenders had only to run to Rome to obtain
immediate pardon. In the Pope's mind, however, submission to Rome
outweighed all else; when that was obtained, he readily dispensed with
the penalties of his subordinates. An important step towards the strength-
ening of the papal authority was taken in 1079, when he made the
Archbishop of Lyons primate of the four provinces of Lyons, Rouen, Tours,
and Sens, subject of course to the immediate control of the Papacy; and
in 1082 the legate Hugh was, practically by the Pope's orders, promoted
Archbishop of Lyons. The Pope, in his decree, spoke of the restoration
of the ancient constitution, but the Archbishop of Sens had by custom
held the primacy, and Lyons was now rather imperial than French in its
allegiance. A consideration of this nature was not likely to weigh with
the Pope; it was against the idea of national and independent churches,
which monarchical control was tending to produce, that he was directing
his efforts. If he was not able definitely to prevent lay control of elections
in France, he had firmly established papal authority over the French
Church. If his decrees were not carefully obeyed, the principles of the
reform movement were accepted; in the critical years that followed his
death, France was to provide many of the chief supporters of the papal
policy.
The situation with regard to England was altogether different.
Gregory's friendship with King William I was of long standing. His had X
been the influence that had induced Alexander II to give the papal
blessing to the Norman Duke's conquest of England. William had
recognised the obligation and made use of his friendship. On Gregory's
accession he wrote expressing his keen satisfaction at the event. William
was a ruler of the type of the Emperor Henry III. Determined to be
master in Church and State alike, he was resolved to establish good order
and justice in ecclesiastical as well as in secular affairs. He was therefore
in sympathy with Church reform and the purity of Church discipline and
government. He was fortunate in his Archbishop of Canterbury, Lanfranc,
whose legal mind shared the same vision of royal autocracy; content
to be subject to the king he would admit no ecclesiastical equal, and
successfully upheld the primacy of his see against the independent claims
of York. The personnel of the episcopate, secularised and ignorant,
needed drastic alteration; William was careful to refrain from simony
and to make good appointments, but he was equally careful to keep the
CH. II.
6--2


## p. 84 (#130) #############################################

84
Relations with England
appointments in his own hands. He took a strong line against the
immorality and ignorance of the lower clergy, and promoted reform by
the encouragement he gave to regulars. Frequent Church councils were
held, notably at Winchester in 1076, where decrees were passed against
clerical marriage, simony, and the holding of tithes by laymen; but the
decrees were framed by the king, and none could be published without his
sanction. The work of Church reform was furthered, as Gregory wished,
by the active co-operation of the king; the separation of the ecclesiastical
from the civil courts, creating independent Church government, was also
a measure after Gregory's heart. The Pope frequently expressed his
gratification; the work of purifying the Church, so much impeded else-
where, was proceeding apace in England without the need of his interven-
tion. Disagreement arose from William's determination to be master in
his kingdom, in ecclesiastical affairs as well as in secular; he made this
clear by forbidding papal bulls to be published without his permission,
and especially by refusing to allow English bishops to go to Rome. The
Pope bitterly resented the king's attitude; a novel and formidable obstacle
confronted him in the one quarter where he had anticipated none.
Matters were not improved by the papal decree of 1079, subjecting the
Nornian archbishopric of Rouen to the primacy of the Archbishop of
Lyons. So for a time relations were much strained, but an embassy from
William in 1080 seems to have restored a better understanding, and even
to have encouraged Gregory to advance the striking claim that William
should do fealty to the Papacy for his kingdom. There is good reason to
believe that the claim was made in 1080, and that it took the form of a
message entrusted to the legate Hubert with the letter he brought to
William in May 10801. The king abruptly dismissed the claim on the
ground that there was no precedent to justify it. The Pope yielded to
this rebuff and made no further attempt, nor did William's refusal inter-
fere with the restored harmony. Gregory was sensible, as he wrote in
1081, of the many exceptional merits in William, who moreover had
refused to listen to the overtures of the Pope's enemies. And in one respect
William made a concession. He allowed Lanfranc to visit Rome at the
end of 1082, the first visit that is recorded of any English bishop during
Gregory's papacy? . It was only a small concession. For, while the reform
movement was directly furthered by royal authority in England, the
Church remained quasi-national under royal control; the introduction of
papal authority was definitely resisted.
In the remaining parts of Europe the Pope's efforts were mainly
directed towards three objects +missionary work, uniformity of ritual, and
the extension of the temporal power of the Papacy! With backward
1
1 Cf. EHR, XXVI, pp. 225 sqq.
2 Ordericus Vitalis
says
that Lanfranc went to Rome in 1076. The statements in
Gregory's letters, Reg. vi, 30 (1079) and vili, 43 (1082), are sufficient contradiction
of this.


## p. 85 (#131) #############################################

Relations with other states
85
countries such as Norway and Sweden, where the difficulty of the language
was an obstacle to the sending of Roman missionaries, he urged that
young men should be sent to Rome for instruction, so that they might
return to impart it to their fellow-countrymen. In Poland it was the
undeveloped ecclesiastical organisation that called for his attention; it
possessed no metropolitan and hardly any bishops, and he sent legates to
introduce the necessary reforms. The question of uniformity of ritual
arose with regard to the territory recently recovered to Christianity from
the Saracens, especially in Spain. The acceptance by the Spanish Church
of the Ordo Romanus was an event of great importance for Catholicism in
the future. Over Spain, and on the same grounds over Corsica and Sardinia
as well, the Pope claimed authority temporal as well as spiritual. They
were all, he declared, in former times under the jurisdiction of St Peter,
but the rights of the Papacy had long been in abeyance owing to the
negligence of his predecessors or the usurpation of the Saracens. Though
he does not state the ground for his assertion, it is doubtless the (forged)
Donation of Constantine to Pope Sylvester I that he had in his mind'.
He was more precise in his claims over Hungary. St Stephen had handed
over his kingdom to St Peter, as the Emperor Henry III recognised after
his victory over Hungary, when he sent a lance and crown to St Peter.
King Salomo, despising St Peter, had received his kingdom as a fief
from King Henry IV; later he had been expelled by his cousin Géza.
This was God's judgment for his impiety. In these cases Gregory was
trying to establish claims based on former grants. He was equally anxious
to extend papal dominion by new grants. ) He readily acceded to the
request of Dmitri that the kingdom of Russia might be taken under papal
protection and held as a fief from the Papacy; the King of Denmark had
made a similar suggestion to his predecessor, which Gregory tried to
persuade the next king to confirm.
His positive success in this policy was slight. The interest lies rather
in the fact that he rested all these claims on grants from secular rulers ;
in no case does he assert that the ruler should do fealty to him in virtue
of the overlordship of the spiritual power over all earthly rulers. This
was a claim he applied to the Empire alone, his final remedy to cure the
sickness of the world, and to prevent a recurrence of the great conflict in
which he was engaged. He seems to have been loth to resort to this
remedy until open defiance drove him to its use. It is not unlikely,
however, that he did contemplate the gradual extension over Western
Christendom of papal overlordship; but he conceived of this overlordship
as coming into being in the normal feudal manner, established by consent
and on a constitutional basis. In this way, when he could compel obedience
even from temporal rulers to the dictates of the moral law, his dream of
the rule of righteousness would at last be fulfilled.
1 Urban II in 1091 directly quotes Constantine's Donation as the source of the
authority he claims over Corsica and Lipara.
CH. II.


## p. 86 (#132) #############################################

86
Pope Victor III
II.
Gregory VII was dead, but his personality continued to dominate the
Church, his spirit lived on in the enthusiasm of his followers. The great
pamphlet-warfare, already in existence, became fuller and more bitter
over his final claims against the Empire. But his immediate successors
were concerned with the practical danger that threatened the Papacy.
They had to fight not for its supremacy so much as for the continued exis-
tence of its independence, once more threatened with imperial control.
With Henry, endeavouring to establish a Pope amenable to his wishes,
there could be no accommodation. Until his death in 1106 everything had
to be subordinated to the immediate necessities of a struggle for existence.
But in the rest of Europe the situation is entirely different.