No More Learning

Allowances may be termed black-
mail when they are granted solely to induce the tribesmen to abstain
from raiding. Sandeman never withheld allowances because of
offences committed by individual members of a tribe. He always
demanded that the actual offenders should be brought to justice, that
the guilty alone should be punished. This system was quite successful
amongst Baluch tribes where there was some tribal chief powerful
enough to enforce his authority. Its introduction by Mr R. İ. Bruce,
the Commissioner of the Derajat (1890-6), into Waziristan among
the more democratic Mahsuds, where no such authority existed, ended
in complete failure. Bruce, who had previously served under
Sandeman, hoped that Mahsud maliks, chosen by him, would, in
return for allowances, be able to control the ulus, the name given to
the body of the Mahsud tribe. 2 But Bruce made a fatal mistake. He
| Parl. Papers, 1877 (C. 1808), pp. 255-7, 314-16.
2 Idem, 1902 (C. 1177), pp. 125-7.


## p. 456 (#496) ############################################

456
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
introduced his maliki system without first having occupied a com-
manding and central position in the Mahsud country. Sandeman,
on the contrary, realised that the first essential was to dominate the
Baluch country with troops. The policy of Sir Robert Warburton in
the Khyber was similar to that of Sandeman, in that an attempt was
made to gain the confidence of the surrounding tribes. But, in reality,
the two systems were fundamentally different, for, in the Khyber, the
object aimed at was the control of the pass. To this everything else
was subordinated. It was not considered necessary to extend British
control over the neighbouring tribes, though friendly intercourse was
not forbidden. For this reason, in the Khyber, the British never
interfered with the internal feuds of the Afridis, who were allowed to
wage war, even within sight of the walls of Jamrud, so long as their
struggles did not affect the protection of the pass.
It will be convenient at this stage to summarise the later history of
Baluchistan, for, after 1890, interest chiefly centres in the Pathan
frontier. By the Treaty of Gandammak, May, 1879, Pishin and Sibi
were handed over to the Government of India by Yakub Khan as
“assigned districts”, which meant that any surplus of revenue over
expenditure had to be handed back to the amir. Although this
treaty was abrogated by the massacre of Cavagnari and his escort,
these areas were retained by the British, but were not declared British
territory until 1877, when the agent to the governor-general was
appointed chief commissioner for them. The ten years preceding
Sandeman's death, in 1892, were marked by tremendous adminis-
trative activity. Communications were opened out in every direction,
irrigation schemes were taken in hand, forests were developed, and
arrangements made for the collection of land-revenue. In the adṁinis-
tration of justice the indigenous system of jirgas, or councils of tribal
elders, has been developed under British administration. Local cases
are referred to local jirgas, while more important disputes are placed
before inter-district jirgas, or before the Shahi Jirga, which meets
twice a year, once at Sibi and once at Quetta. The province as now
administered can be divided into British Baluchistan, consisting of
the tracts assigned by the Treaty of Gandammak; agency territories,
which have been acquired by lease or otherwise brought under the
control of the Government of India; and the native states of Kalat and
Las Bela.
Closely interwoven with the local question of tribal control is the
more important problem of imperial defence. From the conquest of
the Panjab, in 1849, frontier policy was in the hands of administrators
of the Lawrence or “non-intervention” school, but the arrival of
Lord Lytton, in 1876, marked the end of “masterly inactivity”. It was
the second Afghan War, 1878–80, and the consequent occupation of
Afghan territory, that impressed upon statesmen the necessity for a
1 Aitchison, Treaties, XI, 346.


## p. 457 (#497) ############################################

THE INDUS LINE
457
scientific frontier. Military strategists became divided into two op-
posing camps, the Forward and the Stationary. Both these terms are
unfortunate in that they can both be subdivided into the extremists
and the moderates. The extreme section of the Forward School did
not know where their advances would stop; the moderates desired
the best possible strategic frontier with the least possible advance. On
the other hand, the extreme advocates of non-intervention would have
held the Indus line; the moderates were inclined to an advance, if it
could have been proved to them that Russia constituted any real
menace.
The essential function of any frontier is that of separation. But a
good frontier, while serving this useful purpose, should at the same
time constitute a line of resistance following, as far as possible, easily
recognisable natural features, and avoiding sharp salients and re-
entrants. If possible, it should also be based upon ethnic considerations.
There are four possible lines of resistance on the Indian borderland:
the river Indus; the old Sikh line, which roughly corresponds to
the administrative boundary; the Durand line, delimited in 1893
and demarcated, as far as was possible, in the succeeding years; and
the so-called scientific frontier stretching from Kabul through Ghazni
to Kandahar. Military experts have waxed eloquent over what they
have considered to be India's best line of defence. One thing however
is certain: they have all erred in regarding it from a purely military
point of view, when the problem should have been examined in all
its aspects, military, political, ethnological, and financial.
Early writers went astray in supposing that the Indus was once the
north-west frontier of India. This is the origin of the “Back to the
Indus" cry. It can be safely asserted that the Indus frontier, in the
literal sense of the term, never existed. The British inherited their
frontier from the Sikhs who never held the river line, but the foothills
towards the independent Pathan country. The greatest exponent of
the Indus boundary was Lord Lawrence, who advocated meeting any
invader in the valley of the Indus, for the longer distance an invading
army had to march through Afghanistan and the tribal country, the
more harassed it would be. This contention is contrary to the opinion
of the greatest military authorities who hold that a river is not a good
line of defence in that it can always be forced by an enterprising
general. The defensive capacity of rivers naturally varies, and depends
very much upon whether the defenders' bank commands the other.
This is not the case with the Indus, where the left bank is flat and is
frequently commanded by the right. Although many of the defects of
the old days have been remedied by improved communications in the
rear, the natural defects still remain. The Indus is continually shifting
its course, and, when in flood, overflows its bank for miles on either
side. Again, the unhealthiness of the valley renders it unsuitable as
1 Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LXXVI (73), 15.


## p. 458 (#498) ############################################

458
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
an area for the concentration of troops. Perhaps the weightiest argu-
ment that can be brought forward against meeting an enemy on the
banks of the Indus is the disastrous moral effect such a course would
have upon the inhabitants of the Indian peninsula.
The present administrative boundary, besides violating ethnic con-
siderations, breaks ncarly every requirement of a good frontier. To
give but one example: Peshawar and Kohat are separated by a sharp
salient of independent territory, known as the Jowaki peninsula,
through which narrow strip of Afridi country runs the road between
these two important frontier outposts. This is a notorious example of
the haphazard way in which the frontier was taken over from the
Sikhs. Both here and in the Gumatti area, farther south, the boundary
line should have been straightened out long ago.
The Durand line, which demarcate, the respective spheres of
influence of the amir and the Government of India over the frontier
tribes, possesses no strategic value at all. The Khost salient between
Kurram and Waziristan is but one of its many strategical imper-
fections. This disposes of three possible lines of resistance. The real
frontier that the British are called upon to defend in India is the
mountain barrier. To do so, it is essential to cross the Indus in order
to prevent the enemy fic. n debouching on to the plains. To defend
a mountain barrier it is necessary to do more than this. The defenders
must be in a position to see what is taking place on the oth'c side.
The greatest advance from the old red line of the maps was the result
of Sandeman's work in Baluchistan. The strategic importance of
Quetta must now be discussed.
The proposal to occupy Quetta dates back to the days of General
John Jacob of Sind fame, who, in 1856, urged Lord Canning to
garrison this important point of vantage, for, as he observed, this
would enable the British to threaten the flank of any army advancing
upon the Khyber. 1 In his letter of 18 October, 1856, Lord Canning
rejected the proposal on the grounds that, surrounded by hostile
tribes and cut off from its true base, the isolated position of the garrison
would be extremely precarious. The next time, in 1866, the proposal
emanated from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Green, the political
superintendent of Upper Sind, but, unfortunately, it had to face the
united opposition of Lord Lawrence and his council. Ten years
passed. The exponents of “masterly inactivity" were no longer pre-
dominant in the viceroy's council-chamber; Khiva had fallen before
Cossack hosts which were drawing nearer and nearer to the gates of
India; and, more dangerous still, the estrangement of the amir Sher
'Ali had brought India and Afghanistan to the brink of war. Reference
has alrcady been made to the occupation of Quetta which served such
a useful purpose during the second Afghan War. During this war the
question of the so-called scientific frontier was broached: should the
1 Views and Opinions of General John Jacob (cd. Pelly), p. 349.


## p. 459 (#499) ############################################

KANDAHAR
459
British hold the Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar line? Some extremists
advocated the retention of all the recent conquests in Afghanistan;
others recommended a complete withdrawal, even to the banks of the
Indus. Amongst the moderates the stumblingblock was the retention
of, or withdrawal from, Kandahar. The question was further com-
plicated by a discussion as to the relative merits and demerits of the
Khyber, Kurram, and Bolan as channels of communication with
Afghanistan.
The retention of Kandahar was advocated on military, political,
and commercial grounds. Situated at the junction of roads leading
tö Kabul and to Herat, Kandahar dominated the whole of southern
Afghanistan. Easily defensible, with a good water supply, its garrison
would not be called upon to endure great hardships. A strongly
fortified Kandahar would not only threaten the flank of any force
advancing by way of Kabul towards the Khyber, but forces advancing
simultaneously from Kabul and Herat would also be isolated. The
majority of minutes written in support of retention entirely ignored
the financial side of the question, and refused to acknowledge that
permanent occupation would entail a drain of money and men. But
would the occupation of Kandahar have been the end of an advance
into Afghanistan? It was predicted that the defence of Kandahar
would necessitate the occupation of Girishk and Kalat-i-Ghilzai, in
which case the British would have been called upon to defend a
frontier as unscientific as the one it was proposed to abandon, for
both ran along the foothills of a wild, mountainous country. Some
even went so far as to assert that the British advance would not cease
until Herat had been reached, for the greatest difficulty confronting
the Forward School would be to know where to stop. Fortunately
the counsels of the moderates prevailed. They realised that the recent
acquisitions in Baluchistan would enable the British to occupy this
position whenever it became necessary, for in their eyes the importance
of Kandahar was a war-time importance only. Furthermore, the
later extension of the railway to New Chaman advanced the British
borders to the Khwaja Amran range, beyond which a broad desert
stretched to the walls of Kandahar. Closely connected with the
Kandahar question was the proposal to occupy the Kabul, Ghazni,
Kandahar line, which was the outcome of a desire to discover the best
possible line of defence against invasion from the direction of Central
Asia. It was argued, that, if this line were connected with the main
Indian railway system, troops could be rapidly concentrated on either
flank. Neither the right flank nor the left could be turned, for the
northern was protected by an almost impenetrable maze of moun-
tains, the southern by an impassable desert. The retirement already
· Davies, “An Imperial Problem”, Army Quarterly, October, 1927, pp. 28-41; see also
Parl. Papers, 1881, Lxx, 67.
> Parl. Papers, 1881, Lxx (C. 2776), 91.


## p. 460 (#500) ############################################

460 THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843–1918
a
referred to necessitated the abandonment of this frontier. The British
scheme of defence against Russia was settled not by military strate-
gists, but by diplomatists. The steady advance of Russia towards the
northern frontiers of Afghanistan brought about a compromise
between the Forward and Stationary Schools, and it was decided to
build up a strong, friendly, united Afghanistan to serve as a buffer
state. By means of an annual subsidy, together with gifts of arms and
ammunition, an attempt was made to form a closer and more intimate
alliance with the amir. At the same time the frontiers of Afghanistan
were strictly defined by international agreement; and, as long as
British control of Afghan foreign affairs continued, any violation of
the amir's northern frontier by Russia would have been tantamount
to a declaration of war.
This settlement of the imperial problem by no means settled the
local problem of tribal control. The causes of unrest on the Indian
borderland are geographical, economic, religious and political.
Certain factors, such as the geographical and economic, have been
operative from the dawn of history: others, such as the arms' traffic,
are of more recent origin. As long as hungry tribesmen inhabit barren
and almost waterless hills, which command open and fertile plains,
so long will they resort to plundering incursions in order to obtain
the necessaries of life. The rich daman (plain) of Dera Ismail Khan is
a case in point. The greater part of. Waziristan is a region of stony
nullahs and barren raghzas (plateaux), with only occasional stretches
of cultivated land in the warmer valleys. In close proximity lie the
fertile plains of the Derajat, while to the south runs the famous
Powindah caravan route from Ghazni and the bazaars of Central
Asia. Thus the plundering of caravans and the raiding of the daman
have been forced upon the Mahsud by his environment. In the cold
weather, from November to April, the tribesmen enter British India
to engage in agricultural labour and for the purpose of trade. In
April they receive their allowances, after which they return to their
hills. For this reason, “the political barometer of the North-West
Frontier is always more nearly at 'fair' in April than at any other
season of the year". 1 Therefore, the hot season, when no hostages
.
remain in British territory, is the Pathans' opportunity.
Although it is often stated that the economic factor is at the root of
almost every frontier disturbance, a close study of the problem should
convince anyone that political propaganda, especially from 1890
onwards, has been the most potent cause of unrest. It has been Afghan
intrigues, either instigated directly from Kabul with the full cognizance
of the amir, or carried on by his local officials, which have from time
to time incited the tribes to rebel against the British raj. The colony
of Hindustani fanatics, which for years disturbed the peace of the
Hazara border and which was reinforced by a steady stream of
i Secret Border Report, 1917-18, p. 1.


## p. 461 (#501) ############################################

THE FORWARD POLICY
461
>
recruits from Bengal and other parts of India, is a notorious example
of anti-British intrigues originating in British India.
Considerable unrest has also been produced by the practice of
dealing with the tribes through arbabs, or Pathan “middlemen". This
system, the adoption of which was to a certain extent inevitable in the
early days of British rule, when officers were ignorant of the language
and customs of the tribes, was one of the evils inherited from the Sikhs.
In the year 1877 a raid, committed by Bunerwals on the Yusafzai
border, was traced to the direct instigation of Ajab Khan, a "middle-
man” and leading khan of the Peshawar district. One of the chief
causes of trouble on the Kohat borders before the Miranzai expedi-
tions of 1891 was that a local “middleman”, the khan of Hangu, had
a
stirred up discontent amongst the very tribes for whose peaceful
conduct he was responsible. 1
Throughout the 'nineties of the last century, especially from 1895
onwards, the frontier districts were abnormally disturbed. There were
two main reasons for this: the forward policy pursued under Lord
Lansdowne and Lord Elgin, and the intrigues of the amir of Afghani-
stan. By the year 1889 Sandeman had extended British control over
the Bori and Zhob valleys, to the south of the Gumal pass. The occu-
pation of Zhob was of paramount importance from a military,
political, and commercial standpoint. Not only did it shorten the
British line of defence and prevent raiding gangs from escaping into
Afghanistan, but it also served as a protection for the Gumal trade-
route. In the year 1890 the Gumal river, from Domandi to its junction
with the Zhob stream, was declared the boundary between Baluchistan
and the Panjab frontier zone.
The opening years of the ’nineties witnessed punitive expeditions
against the Shiranis inhabiting the slopes of the Takht-i-Sulaiman;
the Orakzai clans in the neighbourhood of the Samana range; the
Isazai tribes of the ill-omened Black Mountain; and the petty chiefs,
or thums, of Hunza and Nagar. Far more important than these
petty wars was the peaceful acquisition of the Kurram valley, which
was taken over, in 1892, at the request of its Turi inhabitants. This
active policy along the entire length of the British border, especially
its later developments, not only alarmed the tribesmen whose in-
dependence has ever been their proudest boast, but it also thoroughly
alarmed the amir, Abd-ur-rahman Khan, with the result that, between
1890 and 1898, Anglo-Afghan relations were so strained, that on
several occasions war seemed imminent. When it is realised that the
inhabitants of the frontier hills, with rare exceptions, are orthodox
Muhammadans of the Sunni sect, and are, in many cases, of the same
racial stock as the people of south-eastern Afghanistan, it becomes
· Parl. Papers, 1890-1, LIX (C. 6526), 8-9.
: Mason, Expedition against Isazai clans ; Parl. Papers, 1890-1, LIX (C. 6526), pt I.
• Durand, The Making of a Frontier; Parl. Papers, 1892, Lvin (C. 6621).


## p. 462 (#502) ############################################

462
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
>
apparent that the amir has been able to show his displeasure by
exploiting the marauding proclivities of these turbulent tribesmen.
For this reason, it was fortunate for the British during the Mutiny
that diplomatic negotiations had resulted in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty
of 1855 and the Agreement of January, 1857. The outbreak of war
with Afghanistan in 1878 was the signal for increased disturbances
throughout the tribal zone. The Hazara border was in a perpetual
ferment; the Khyber was constantly raided by Zakka Khels and
Mohmands; Zaimushts harassed the Kohat line of communications;
and Mahsuds from the heart of Waziristan raided and laid waste the
country in the vicinity of Tank.
For some time before the dispatch of the Durand Mission to Kabul,
in 1893, it had been rumoured abroad that the British were desirous
of a more exact delimitation of the Indo-Afghan frontier. This know-
ledge may have led to the increase of the amir's intrigues in Zhob and
Waziristan. It undoubtedly prompted Abd-ur-rahman Khan to write
a letter to the viceroy, in which he warned Lord Lansdowne of the
results of a more forward policy.
“If you should cut them out of my dominions”, he wrote, “they will neither
be of any use to you nor to me. You will always be engaged in fighting or other
trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your
government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a
strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India,
these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies. . . . In your cutting away from me
these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will
injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my
weakness is injurious for your government. ""
The Durand Agreement of 1893 resulted in the delimitation of a
boundary, afterwards known as the Durand line, across which neither
the amir nor the Government of India was to interfere in any way.
The importance of this agreement has been somewhat overrated. It
is true that by putting an end to the existing uncertainty the demarca-
tion of this boundary should have considerably facilitated frontier
administration, but frontier history, since 1893, shows that this agree-
ment has not only increased the responsibilities of the Government of
India, but has also increased the chances of collision with the tribes
and of war with the amir. The new boundary line was not based upon
sound topographical data, for, during the process of demarcation, it
was discovered that certain places, marked on the Durand map, did
not exist on the actual ground. Many ethnic absurdities were per-
petrated, such as the handing over to the amir of the Birmal tract of
Waziristan, peopled by Darwesh Khel Waziris, the majority of whom
were included within the British sphere of influence. The worst
blunder of all was the arrangement by which the boundary cut the
Mohmand tribal area into two separate parts. It seems certain that
i Abd-ur-rahman, Autobiography, II, 158.


## p. 463 (#503) ############################################

CHITRAL
463
this could not have been a tripartite agreement, for there is no evidence
that the tribesmen were consulted before 1893. To give but one
example: it was not until the year 1896 that the Halimzai, Kamali,
Dawezai, Utmanzai, and Tarakzai Mohmands, afterwards known as
the eastern or “assured” clans, accepted the political control of the
Government of India. " In all probability the political issues at stake
occasioned this sacrifice of ethnological requirements. If the amir had
not been promised the Birmal tract, it is quite likely that he would
have refused his consent to the inclusion of Wana within the British
sphere of influence. In the light of subsequent events it is difficult to
understand the reasons which prompted the amir to sign this agree-
ment. It may have been that the increase of his subsidy to eighteen
lakhs of rupees, and the recognition of his right to import munitions
of war, bribed him into acquiescence.
While these negotiations were taking place Chitral became the
scene of fratricidal conflicts. On his death, in 1892, . Aman-ul-mulk,
the Mehtar of Chitral, had been succeeded by one of his sons, Afzal-
ul-mulk, who, after a short reign of two months and seven days, was
slain by his uncle, Sher Afzal, who had been allowed to escape from
Kabul where he had been living as a pensioner of the amir. Sher
Afzal held the reins of government until he was ousted from his
position by his nephew, Nizam-ul-mulk, who was recognised by the
Government of India. It is significant that Sher Afzal fled to the camp
of the Afghan commander-in-chief at Asmar. In answer to the new
Mehtar's request, a mission under Dr Robertson was dispatched to
Chitral. Although Robertson advocated the retention of British
troops in Chitral and Yassin, Lord Lansdowne, towards the end of
1893, issued instructions for the withdrawal of the political officer
from Chitral, if no further complications occurred. Two factors were
instrumental in reversing this decision. It was considered inexpedient
to withdraw so long as the Pamir boundary dispute with Russia
afforded an excuse for aggressive action from that direction. It was
further feared that, owing to the hostile attitude of Umra Khan of
Jandol, on the southern borders of Chitral, withdrawal would be
followed by a period of anarchy. In January, 1895, the Mehtar was
murdered, and Sher Afzal once more appeared on the scene. To make
matters worse, Umra Khan proclaimed a jehad throughout Dir, Swat,
and Bajaur, and Robertson found himself besieged in Fort Chitral by
a combined force of Chitralis and Pathans. 3 This necessitated the
immediate dispatch of a relief column.
The memorable siege from
4 March to. 19 April, 1895; the heroic efforts of the defenders; Kelly's
marvellous march of 350 miles in 35 days from Gilgit; and the advance
of Sir Robert Low by way of the Malakand are well known to students
of the frontier problem.
1 Parl. Papers, 1908, LXXIV (Cd. 4201), 125-6.
* Idem, 1895, LXXI (C. 7864), 27-9.
3 Idem, pp. 35-42.


## p. 464 (#504) ############################################

464 THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
Prior to Low's march over the Malakand, the only communication
with Chitral was by way of Kashmir and the isolated position of
Gilgit. Not only was this route circuitous and the roads bad, but
Gilgit for many months in the year was cut off by snow from both
India and Chitral. The question of the retention of a garrison in
Chitral therefore hinged on the proposal to construct a more direct
road over the Malakand. As soon as it had been decided to move
troops over the Malakand and Lowarai to Chitral, a proclamation
had been issued on 14 March, 1895, to the people of Swat and Bajaur,
to the effect that if they granted British forces an unmolested passage
through their territories, their country would not be occupied. On
8 May, 1895, the Government of India decided to retain a garrison in
Chitral; and, to ensure its safety, proposed the construction of a road
a
from Peshawar through Swat. This decision did not meet with the
approval of Lord Rosebery's cabinet and the liberal government at
home. Once more, however, was an important imperial problem to
become the sport of English party politics, for this decision was reversed
by Lord Salisbury's government in August of the same year. The
liberal contention, that the construction of the new road was a de-
liberate breach of faith with the tribes and contrary to the spirit of the
proclamation, was merely a party cry, for the tribes, with one excep-
tion, had paid no heed to the proclamation and had resisted the
British advance. 2
Is the retention of a garrison in Chitral a strategic necessity for the
protection of that part of the frontier? It was pointed out at the time
that, by the Durand Agreement, the amir had pledged himself not to
interfere in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral: consequently all danger from
Afghanistan had passed away. On the other hand, it should have
been remembered that Afghan intrigues had played no small part in
the recent struggles in Chitral. On 10 September, 1895, the Pamir
boundary dispute came to an end, and the spheres of influence of
Great Britain and Russia were definitely mapped out in that region.
Some authorities were therefore of opinion that the danger of Russian
aggression had passed away. The answer to this was that the Pamir
Agreement had brought Russia a great extension of military and
political prestige, because she had been allowed to advance her
frontiers to the Hindu Kush. Military experts were at loggerheads.
Lord Roberts lent his support to the advocates of retention. Arrayed
against him were formidable antagonists, such as Sir Donald Stewart,
Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Adye, Sir Charles Gough, and
Lord Chelmsford. It is, however, difficult to see how any effective
movement could be made by Russia from the Chitral side, unless she
were in complete military occupation of Afghanistan, or in friendly
alliance with the amir. In 1895 the danger of an attack upon India
from the direction of Chitral was infinitesimal.
i Parl. Papers, 1895, LXXI (C. 7864), p. 39. · Idem, 1896, lx (C. 8037), 9-10.


## p. 465 (#505) ############################################

THE MAIZAR OUTRAGE
465
The echoes of the Chitral expedition had no sooner died away than
the frontier was abnormally disturbed by the conflagration of 1897.
The first outbreak occurred in the Tochi valley, which had been taken
over, at the request of its Dawari inhabitants, in 1895. Here, on
10 June, 1897, the political officer and his escort were treacherously
attacked in the village of Maizar. Thence the revolt spread into Swat,
where the tribesmen rose under Sadullah Khan, the Mad Mullah,
and attacked the Malakand and Chakdarra. The next to rebel were
the Mohmands, who, under Najm-ud-din, the Adda Mullah, attacked
the village of Shankargarh in the Peshawar district. Finally, the
Orakzais and Afridis, instigated by Mullah Sayyid Akbar, an Aka
Khel Afridi, captured the Khyber forts and laid siege to the Samana
posts. The result was that troops had to be marched to Datta Khel in
the Tochi; to Swat, Bajaur, Chamla, the Utman Khel country, and
Buner, The Mohmands were punished by a force operating from
Peshawar; and lastly, a well-organised expeditionary force penetrated
into the heart of Orakzai and Afridi Tirah.
Many frontier officials believed that each rising had its own par-
ticular local cause; that, in the beginning, there was not the slightest
connection between the Malakand, Afridi, and Maizar disturbances. 1
The relative importance of fanaticism, Afghan and other intrigues,
and the feeling of unrest engendered by discontent at tribal allowances,
as causes of the Maizar outrage, will perhaps never be definitely
determined, but it seems certain that the exaggerated reports of this
affair, disseminated by anti-British mullahs, did tend to affect the rest
of the border-to some extent Maizar heralded the approaching storm.
The main factors underlying the 1897 risings were the active
forward policy pursued in the 'nineties and the influence of fanaticism.
There can be no doubt that this policy of intervention in tribal affairs
had thoroughly alarmed and annoyed the amir. The charges brought
against Abd-ur-rahman were that he had received deputations from
the British tribal zone; that he had failed to prevent his regular troops
and subjects from joining tribal lashkars; and that he had granted an
asylum to the enemies of the Government of India. It is a well-known
fact that he addressed an assembly of mullahs from all parts of
Afghanistan and the frontier, and impressed upon them that it was
the duty of all true believers to wipe out the infidel. It is significant,
too, that at the same time he assumed the title of Zia-ul-Millat wa-
ud-Din, the “Light of the Nation and Religion". The publication of
the amir’s book entitled Taqwim-ud-din, “Catechism” or “Almanac
of Religion”, which dealt with the question of a jehad, was, to say the
least, inopportune. A correct interpretation of this book may have
been perfectly harmless; the construction placed upon it by frontier
mullahs and its distribution within the British tribal zone were not
calculated to promote peaceful relations.
i Bruce, Forward Policy and its Results, p. 141.
CHI VI
30


## p. 466 (#506) ############################################

466
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
.
In 1897 a spirit of fanaticism was in the air. Wholesale massacres of
Christians had taken place; the Turks had been victorious over the
infidel Greeks; the Arabs of the Sudan had broken British squares;
and behind it all was the sinister figure of Sultan Abdul Hamid II.
British prestige was very low indeed until that crushing blow at
Omdurman. It would be difficult to state how far these happenings
affected the Indian frontier, but certain letters discovered in Mullah
Sayyid Akbar's house in the Waran valley of Tirah show clearly the
wild rumours that were prevalent. 1 Contemporary opinion, especially
that of officers and officials in the war zone, favoured fanaticism as
the chief cause of the outbreak, but they have ever been ready to
confuse fanaticism with the natural desire of the tribesmen for inde-
pendence.
If the risings were the outcome of a more forward policy, why did
the movement not spread to Baluchistan and Kurram? A detailed
answer to this question would revive one of the greatest of frontier
controversies, the respective merits and demerits of the Sandeman and
Panjab systems. The answer lies in the difference between the Baluch
and Pathan, in tribal constitution and in racial characteristics, and
in the fact that Baluchistan had long enjoyed an ordered administra-
tion. Although minor disturbances did take place among the Sarawan
Brahui chiefs and in Makran, it would be difficult to connect them
with the northern Pathan upheaval. As for the Turis of Kurram, they
were Shiahs and at deadly enmity with their Sunni neighbours.
Thus, when Lord Curzon arrived in India, in January, 1899, the
Government of India had successfully brought to a conclusion a series
of punitive expeditions against widespread and violent tribal risings.
The new viceroy found more than 10,000 troops cantoned across the
administrative border, in the Khyber, on the Samana range, in
Waziristan, and in the Malakand area. Not only were these advanced
positions many miles from a base, but they were also entirely uncon-
nected by lateral communications, and were consequently in constant
danger of being overpowered before supports could be rushed to their
assistance. The lesson of 1897 seemed to have had no effect upon the
authorities in India, for, not only were they still persisting in a policy
of dispersion instead of concentration of forces, but proposals were
also being brought forward for the construction of fresh and costly
fortifications in tribal territory. 2 Fortunately, wiser counsels prevailed
under Lord Curzon, whose policy can be described as one of with-
drawal and concentration. In other words, the policy pursued in the
’nineties was to be replaced by one of non-interference resembling in
many respects the old “close border” system. What Lord Curzon
accomplished can be best summed up in his own words:
Withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions, employment of tribal
forces in defence of tribal country, concentration of British forces in British
1 Parl. Papers, 1898 (C. 8714), Appendix G, p. 39 C. 3 Idem, 1901 (Cd. 496), p. 116.


## p. 467 (#507) ############################################

CURZON'S POLICY
467
territory behind them as a safeguard and a support, improvement of communica-
tions in the rear. '
1
1
The important point to remember about his militia scheme is that he
recognised that a tribal militia would break down, if called upon to
perform the duties of regulars. Consequently, he arranged for their
protection and support by movable columns and light railways. By
1904 the new system was in operation along the whole frontier from
Chitral to Baluchistan. All regular troops had been withdrawn from
Gilgit, and the protection of that isolated position left in the hands of
the Kashmir Imperial Service troops. In Chitral alone were regular
forces to be found. These were concentrated at Kila Drosh in the
extreme south, at a discreet distance from the Mehtar's capital.
Mastuj was the headquarters of the Chitrali irregulars. In 1902 the
Khar Movable Column was withdrawn and regulars stationed at
Chakdarra, Malakand and Dargai. Chakdarra was of great im-
portance owing to the fact that the Swat river had been bridged at
that spot, and because it was the starting-point of the famous road to
Chitral. All the outlying posts were held by the Dir and Swat levies,
who were responsible for the safety of the road. To support the
Malakand garrisons, a light railway was constructed from Naushahra
to Dargai. Similarly, regular troops were withdrawn from the Khyber,
which was guarded by the reorganised Khyber Rifles, consisting of
two battalions under British officers. For their support a flying
column was kept in constant readiness at Peshawar, which was con-
nected with Jamrud by an extension of the broad gauge railway, with
Landi Kotal by a road running through the Mullagori country, and
with Kohat by a cart-road running through the Kohat pass. The
Mullagori road was an alternative route to the Khyber, and its con-
struction had been previously advocated by Sir Robert Warburton.
The bridge over the Indus at Kushalgarh and the extension of the
railway from Kohat to Thal were not completed during Lord Curzon's
term of office. In the Orakzai country, the Samana Rifles were raised,
and were supported by British troops at Kohat. British garrisons were
recalled from Kurram and were replaced by two battalions of the
Kurram Militia, equipped and officered on the same lines as the
Khyber Rifles. In the Waziri country, the Northern and Southern
Waziristan Militia were raised for the protection of the Tochi and
Gumal passes respectively, and were supported by movable columns
stationed at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. In Baluchistan the
Quetta-Nushki railway was commenced, but it was not completed
until 1905. This line played an important part in the later develop-
ment of the Nushki-Seistan caravan route.
The creation of the North-West Frontier Province was the consum-
mation of all Curzon's frontier policy. For at least a quarter of a century
1 Budget Speech, 30 March, 1904.
30-2


## p. 468 (#508) ############################################

468
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
viceroys and frontier administrators had put forward proposals for the
formation of a new administrative unit. In 1843, six years before the
Panjab was wrested from its Sikh owners, Sind had been placed under
the government of Bombay. Had the Panjab been annexed first, in
all probability Sind would have been incorporated with it, for these
two areas are connected by the strongest of all natural links, a large
river. During the governor-generalship of Lord Dalhousie a proposal
had been made to unite them, but, for financial reasons, it was not
sanctioned by the court of directors. After the Mutiny the question
was reconsidered, but, owing to the backward state of communications
along the Indus, Lord Canning refused to give his consent. Moreover,
Sind was prospering under the excellent administration of Sir Bartle
Frere. The status quo was, therefore, maintained, and, even to-day, in
spite of distance, Sind remains under the government of Bombay
Lord Lytton sought to solve the problem by the creation of an
enormous trans-Indus province, consisting of the six frontier districts
of the Panjab and of the trans-Indus districts of Sind, with the ex-
ception of Karachi. ? To compensate Bombay for the loss of trans-
Indus Sind, Lytton proposed that it should receive the whole, or part,
of the Central Provinces. It was this proposal which contributed
largely to the non-acceptance of his scheme. During the viceroyalty
of Lord Lansdowne the proposal was revived in its original form, but,
owing to the formation of the Baluchistan Agency, Sind had ceased
to be a frontier district. Nothing had been done when Lord Curzon
assumed office, although the secretary of state, in his dispatch of
5 August, 1898, had pointed out the desirability of placing tribal
policy more directly under the control and supervision of the Govern-
ment of India. After carefully considering all previous proposals,
Lord Curzon determined to carve out a new frontier province across
the Indus. The reasons which led him to take this step are clearly laid
down in his minute of 27 August, 1900. The most important reason
for the change was that between the frontier system and the authority
of the viceroy there was placed a subordinate government, through
whose hands all frontier questions had to pass before they reached the
Government of India. He pointed out that under this system,
with its
long official chain of reference, rapidity of action and swiftness of
decision, both of which were essential on an exposed frontier, were
well-nigh impossible.
Politically, the new province was divided into two parts: the settled
districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan;
and the trans-border tracts which lay between the administrative and
Durand boundaries. It should be remembered that the trans-border
area, in addition to the five political agencies of the Malakand, Khyber,
Kurram, Tochi, and Wana, also contained tribal tracts under the
i Parl. Papers, 1878, lvi (Cd. 1898), 5.
2 Idem, pp. 136-43.
• Idem, 1901 (Cd. 496), p. 71.


## p. 469 (#509) ############################################

THE FRONTIER PROVINCE
469
political control of the deputy-commissioners of the adjoining settled
districts. The cis-Indus tract of Hazara was not included in the scheme
as originally drafted by Lord Curzon. It is interesting to note that
between Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara there was only one trans-
Indus tract which was not taken away from the Panjab; the trans-
riverain tahsil of Isa Khel, the inhabitants of which were non-Pashtu-
speaking Pathans, remained within the limits of the Panjab. The head
of the new unit was to be a chief commissioner and agent to the
governor-general, to be appointed by and responsible to the Govern-
ment of India. In addition, there was to be both a revenue and a
judicial commissioner.
The first chief commissioner was Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Deane,
whose staff consisted of officers of the political department of the
Government of India, members of the provincial and subordinate
civil services, police officers, and officers specially recruited for the
militia, engineering, education, medicine, and forestry departments. 1
The civil and judicial administration of the settled districts approxi-
mated to that obtaining elsewhere in British India. Each of the five
districts was placed under a deputy-commissioner who was assisted
by the usual tahsildars, naib-tahsildars, kanungos, and patwaris. The
judicial commissioner, Mr C. E. Bunbury, was the controlling
authority in the judicial branch of the administration, his court being
the highest criminal and appellate tribunal in the province. Sub-
ordinate to him were the two divisional and sessions judges of Peshawar
and the Derajat. The revenue administration of the whole settled area
was likewise under the control of the revenue commissioner, Mr (after-
wards Sir) Michael O'Dwyer.
It was, however, found impossible to separate the administration of
the five settled districts from the political control of the adjoining
unadministered areas. This had always been the case. Nevertheless,
before the formation of the new province, a suggestion had been
brought forward to make the commissioner of Peshawar directly re-
sponsible to the Government of India as far as his external policy was
concerned, while for internal affairs he was still to remain answerable
to the Panjab authorities. Fortunately, Lord Curzon was well aware
that, for at least a quarter of a century, this suggestion had been
reprobated by all the greatest frontier administrators. Neither did
he fail to realise that the administrative boundary was an arbitrary
line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous popula-
tion, that the people on either side were closely connected socially,
ethnically, and commercially.
Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many
thousands of the hillmcn regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half
1 A good account of the early administrative system will be found in O'Dwyer, India as
I knew il, chap. vii. For later changes in the staff of the chief commissioner see N. -W. F.
Province Administration Repori, 1921-2, p. 17.


## p. 470 (#510) ############################################

470
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER, 1843-1918
the year on this and for the other half of the year on that side of the border; where
the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the
same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage,
neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured
for many generations. "
Before proceeding to describe how this close connection between the
plains and the hills affects the administration of justice in the settled
districts, some account of the state of affairs in the tribal tracts, where
no organised magistracy exists, is essential.
The Pathan code of honour, known as Pakhtunwali, imposes upon
the tribesman three obligations, the non-observance of which is re-
garded as the deadliest of sins, and is followed by lasting dishonour
and ostracism. He must grant to all fugitives the right of asylum
(nanawatai), he must proffer open-handed hospitality (melmastia), even
to his deadliest enemy, and he must wipe out insult with insult (badal).
This leads to blood-feuds, which, as a general rule, have their origin
in zar, zan, and zamin—gold, women, and land. Hence the tribes are
perpetually at feud, tribe with tribe, clan with clan, and family with
family. Feuds are of rare occurrence amongst the law-abiding
Marwats; they are almost domestic incidents in the Afridi country,
where it is not uncommon to find one half of a village at deadly feud
with the other. Indeed, the Afridis are so distracted by intestine
quarrels that they have little time for carrying on feuds with the
neighbouring tribes. According to the customary law of the Mahsud
and the Shirani, only the actual murderer should be punished, but
theory is one thing, practice another. As a general rule revenge
extends to the male relatives of the murderer. There is, however, a
growing tendency in some quarters to blot out the remembrance of
former wrongs by means of a payment known as blood-money.
A temporary cessation of tribal feuds may occur during harvest
operations, or in the face of a common danger, such as the advance of
a British punitive force. The Maidan Jagis had been for years at
deadly feud with the Turis of Kurram, but, in the spring of 1907, the
leading men of both factions concluded a two-years' truce, which was
faithfully kept on both sides. Again, Pathans who are hereditary
enemies may serve together for ; ears in the Indian Army, but, once
across the border, revenge is again uppermost in their minds. Under
this system of bloody vengeance, murder begets murder, and the
greater the bloodshed the greater the probability of the duration of
the feud. Unfortunately, the unruly tribesmen fail to realise that,
under the disastrous influence of this barbarous custom, many of their
noblest families are being brought to the verge of extinction. Blood-
feuds are not the sole cause of internecine warfare, for the tribes are
also split up into several political and religious factions. The most
1 Parl. Papers, 1901 (Cd. 496), p. 75.
Kurram Agency Gazetteer, 1908, p. 13.


## p. 471 (#511) ############################################

THE JIRGA SYSTEM
471
important of the former are the Gar and Samil, which appear to have
originated in the Bangash country whence they spread to the Afridis,
Orakzais, and Mohmands. Whatever their origin may have been,
their existence has undoubtedly complicated the frontier problem and
produced a chronic state of internal warfare. West of the Gar and
Samil, the Spin (White) and Tor (Black) political factions prevail.
With the exception of the Turis of Kurram and certain Bangash and
Orakzai clans who are Shiahs, the border tribesmen are orthodox
Muhammadans of the Sunni sect. The important point to remember is
that the religious creed of the Pathans does not affect their political
convictions, for a tribe or clan may be Samil and Sunni, or Samil and
a
Shiah: the combination varies.
No description of these tribes would be complete without some
account of their internal administration and of their method of
negotiating with the British raj. Even the most lawless community
is compelled to recognise the necessity for some sort of government;
even the rudest form of customary law needs enforcing. From Chitral
to the Kabul River the British are able to deal with important chiefs
and rulers, such as the Mehtar of Chitral and the hereditary chiefs of
the numerous khanates into which Dir and Bajaur are divided.
Farther south, between the Kabul and the Gumal, this is not the case.
Here the controlling power is a council of elders or tribal maliks,
known as the jirga, through which agency all negotiations between the
tribesmen and British frontier officials are carried out. The more
democratic a tribe the larger the jirga. For this reason a full jirga
often means nothing less than a gathering of every adult male.
Rarely, if ever, does any jirga represent the whole tribe, for there are
always unruly members who refuse to recognise any control save their
own interests and desires. The tribal council is usually composed of
a certain number of influential maliks and mullahs wilo attempt to
enforce their decrees by meting out punishment in the form of out-
lawry, heavy fines, or the destruction of property. For the enforce-
ment of jirga decrees, the Mahsuds have an institution known as the
chalweshtis, or tribal police. No blood-feud can arise because of any
death caused by them in the execution of their duties. In ordinary
times the jirga deals with questions of inter-tribal politics, and, since
its functions are political rather than social, it cannot be compared
to a caste panchayat.
Because of the close connection between the semi-independent hills
and the settled districts, a modified form of the jirga system has been
introduced into the administered area. This system is in accordance
with the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, which superseded the
Panjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1887.