No More Learning

But say -- the conception of the eiui realissimum conception of this kind, and in fact the only conception which adequate to our idea of necessary being, am obliged to admit, that the latter may be inferred from the former. Thus properly the ontological argument which figures the cosmological, and constitutes the whole strength of the latter while the spurious basis of experience has been of no further use than to conduct ns to the conception of absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute any deter minate existence or thing. For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we must abandon the sphere of ex
perience, and rise to that of pure conceptions, which we exa mine with the purpose of discovering whether any one con tains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely neces sary being. But the possibility of such being thus demonstrated, its existence also proved for we may then assert that, of all possible beings there one which possesses the attribute of necessity --in other words, this being possesses an absolutely necessary existence.
All illusions au argument are more easily detected, when
? ? in it Iisit
is
;
if is
in
is a
a
:
is
it
in
;
it
is is
if I
is
is,
in
is
is
aa
a
it is
? 574 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
they are presented in the formal manner employed by th<< schools, which we now proceed to do.
If the proposition, Every absolutely necessary being is like wise an ens realissimum, is correct (and it is this which con
stitutes the nervus probanJi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conver sion --the eonversio per accidens, at least. It follows, then, that some entia reulissima are absolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any respect different from another, and whnt is valid of some, is valid of all. In this present case, therefore, I may employ simple conversion,* and say, Every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But as this pro position is determined h priori by the conceptions contained in the mere conception of an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this exactly what was maintained the ontological argument, and not recognised the cosmological, although formed the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning.
Thus the second mode employed speculative reason of demonstrating the existence of Supreme Being, not only,
like the first, illusory and inadequate, but possesses the addi tional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi -- professing to conduct us
new road to the desired goal, but bringing us back, after short circuit, to the old path which we had deserted at its call. mentioned above, that this cosmological argument contains
perfect nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendents* criticism does not find difficult to expose and to dissipate.
shall merely enumerate these, leaving to the reader, who must this time be well practised in such matters, to inves tigate the fallacies residing therein.
The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable this mode of proof: The transcendental principle, Ev<<ry thing that contingent must have cause -- principle without sig nificance, except in the sensuous world. For the purely in tellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like that of causality, which itself without significance or distinguishing characteristic except in the phsenomenal world. But in the present case employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere. 2. From the im possibility of an infinite ascending series of causes th*
Contersio inira seu simplex. --Tr,
? ? ? *
1.
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? Or THB CO8MOLOGI0AL ARGUMENT. 376
worlJ of sense a first cause is inferred; --a conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not justify even in tiie spltere of experience, and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3. Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with regard to the completion of this series. It removes all conditions (without which, however, no conception of Necessity can take place) ; and, as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conception, it accepts this as a completion of the con ception it wishes to form of the series. 4. The logical possi bility of a conception of the total of reality (the criterion of this possibility being the absence of contradiction J is con founded with the transcendental, which requires a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis --a principle which again refers us to the world of experience. And so on.
? The aim of the cosmologies! argument is to avoid the ne cessity of proving the existence of a necessary being & priori
from mere conceptions --a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel ourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an actual existence -- an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary condition of that ex istence. It is in this case unnecessary to demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists, the ques tion regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do not look out for some being the conception which would enable us to comprehend the necessity of its being --
for if we could do this, an empirical presupposition would be unnecessary ; no, we try to discover merely the negative con dition (conditio sine qud non), without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly admissible in every sort of reasoning, from a consequence to its principle ; but in the present case it unfortunately happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered in but a single being, the conception of which must consequently
contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of absolute necessity, and thus entitle me to infer this ab solute necessity a priori. --That must be possible to reason conversely," and say the thing, to which the concep
tion of the highest reality belongs, absolutely necessary. But cannot reason thus --and cannot, unless believe in
? ? if I
I
is,
I
is it
? 376
THAITSCTODTOTAX DIALECTIC.
the sufficiency of the ontoiogical argument --I fud insnr* mountable obstacles in my new path, and am really no further than the point from which I set out. The conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori regarding the internal determinations of n thing, and is for this reason an ideal without equal or parallel, the general conception of it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the question regarding its existence --which was the purpose of all our enquiries ; and, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we should find it impossible to answer the question --What of all things in the world must be regarded as such ?
It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all- sufficient being -- a cause of all possible effects, for the purpose of enabling reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with regard to phenomena. But to assert that such a being necessarily exists, is no longer the modest enun ciation of an admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic certainty ; for the cognition of that which is absolutely necessary, must itself possess that character.
The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind either to discover conception which shall harmonise with the idea of absolute necessity, or conception which shall contain that idea. If the one possible, so the other for reason recognises that alone as absolutely necessary, which necessary from its conception. * But both attempts ,are equally beyond our power --we find impossible to satisfy the under standing upon this point, and as impossible to induce to remain at rest in relation to this incapacity.
Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support
and stay of all existing things, an indispensable require ment of the mind, an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the idea of eternity, ter rible and sublime as as depicted by Haller, does not pro duce upon the mental vision such feeling of awe and terror for, although measures the duration of things, does not support tbem. We cannot bear, nor can we rid ourselves the thought, that beiDg, which we regard as the greatest
all possible existences, should say to himself: am from That is, wliicli cannot In erplalf' >>s other thsn necefsary --Tr
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? Or THE ILLUSION IN THE FOBEfcOlNO ABGTJMEST8.
eternity to eternity ; beside me there is nothing, except that winch exists by my will ; but whence then am I? Here all sinks away from under us ; and the greatest, as the smallest, perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the speculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with the other.
Many physic. il powers, which evidence their existence by their effects, are perfectly inscrutable in their nature ; they elude all our powers of observation. The transcendental ob ject which forms the basis of phenomena, and, in connection with the reason why our sensibility possesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions, are and must ever remain hidden from our mental vision the fact there, the reason of the fact we cannot see. But an ideal of pure reason cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable, because the only credential of its reality the need of felt by reason, for the purpose of giving completeness to the world of synthetical
An ideal not even given as cogitable object, and therefore cannot be inscrutable on the contrary, must, as mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and solution. For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to give account of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions -- upon objective, or, when they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon subjective grounds.
Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion till Transcendental Arguments for the Existence a Necessary
Being.
Both of the above arguments are transcendental in other words, they do not proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the cosmological argument professed to lay basis of experience for its edifice of reasoning, did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar constitution of experience, but upon pure principles of reason -- in relation to an existence given empirical consciousness utterly abandoning its guidance, however, for the purpose of supporting its assertion!
unity.
Now what the cause, these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural, illusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and
entirely upon pure conceptions.
tupreme reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot be anj
377
? ? ? by
;
it is
of ;
in
a
a
in
;
it
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;
it,
? 378 TRANSCENDENTAL DIAXLCTCC.
tLing but an idea ? What is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason, of admitting that some one among all existing tilings must be necessary, while it falls back from tiie assertion of the existence of such a being as from an Abyss ? And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly to itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid and re luctant approbation --always again withdrawn, arrive at a calm nud settled insight into its cause? thj
It is something very remarkable that, on
that something exists, I cannot avoid the inference, that some
thing exists necessarily. Upon this perfectly natural -- but not on that account reliable--inference doea the cosmological argument rest. But, let me form any conception whatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me--be the thing or being what it may -- from cogitnting its non-existence, I may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or indivi dual thing as necessary. In other words, I can never com plete the regress through the conditions of existence, without admitting the existence of a necessary being ; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a commencement from this be ing-
If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the nasis of existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable in ference that necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves -- otherwise an internal contradiction would result that consequently neither of these principles ue objective, but merely subjective principles of reason -- the one requiring us to seek for necessary ground for every thing that exists, that to be satisfied with no other expla nation than that which complete priori, the other forbid ding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness, that to regard no member of the empirical world as un conditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, in uaeir purely heuristic and regulative character, and as con cerning merely the formal interest of reason, are quite con sistent with each other. The one says -- you must philoso phise upon nature, as there existed necessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the purpose of introducing
supposition
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is is,
a
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? OF THE ILLUBION IN THE FOBEGOING AHGUMEWT8. 379
systematic unity into your knowledge, by pursuing nn idea of this chnracter --a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate ; while the other warns you to consider no indi vidual determination, concerning the existence of things, ns such an ultimate foundation, that as absolutely necessary, but to keep the way always open for further progress in the deduction, and to treat every determination as determined some other. But all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally necessary, impossible that anything which
empirically given should be absolutely necessary.
follows from this, that you must accept the absolutely
necessary as out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as useful only as principle of the highest possible unity in ex
perience, ancLyou cannot discover any such necessary existence in the world, the second rule requiring you to regard all em pirical causes of unity as themselves deduced.
? The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as contingent; while matter was considered by them, id accordance with the judgment of the common reason of mankind, as primal and necessary. But they had regarded matter, not relatively --as the substratum of phsenomena, but absolutely and itself -- ns an independent existence, this idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared. For there nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence on the contrary, can annihilate in thought, always and without self-contradiction. But thought alone lay the idea of absolute necessity. regulative principle must, therefore, have been at the foundation of this opinion.
In fact, extension and impenetrability--which together con stitute our conception of matter --form the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phsenomena, and this principle, in so far as empirically unconditioned, possesses the property of regulative principle. But, as every determinntion ol matter which constitutes what real in --and consequently
impenetrability --
an effect, which must have cause, and for this reason always derived, the notion of matter cannot harmonise with the idea of necessary being, in its character
of the principle of all derived unity. For every one of its
real properties, being derived, mast be only conditionally ne cessary, and can therefore be annihilated in thonght and thus the whole existence of matter can be bo annihilated 01
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if
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? 380 TRANSCMTDENTAL DIALECTIC.
If this were not the case, we siunld have fcnnd in the world of phenomena the highest ground or condition of unity --which is impossible, according to the second regu lative principle. It follows, that matter, and, in general, all that farms part of the world of sense, cannot be a necessary primal being, ncr even a principle of empirical unity, but that this being or principle must have its place assigned without the world. And, in this way, we can proceed in perfect con fidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their ex istence from other phenomena, just as if there existed no ne cessary being ; and we can at the same time, strive without ceasing towards the attainment of completeness for our de duction, just as if such a being --the supreme condition of all existences -- were presupposed by the mind.
These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of the Supreme Being, far from being an cnounce- ment of the existence of a being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing between phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena. We cannot, at the same time, avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal principle as constitutive, and hypostatising this unity. Pre cisely similar is the case with our notion of space. Space is the primal condition of all forms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it ; and thus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help regarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing -- as an object given a priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite natural that, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be esta blished as a principle for the empirical employment of reason,
unless it is based upon the idea of an en* realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should regard this idea as a real object, and this object, in its character of supreme condition, as ab solutely necessary, and that in this way a regulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle. This interchange becomes evident when I regard this supreme being, which, relatively to the world, was absolutely (unconditionally) ne cessary, as a thing per se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this necessity in or by any conception, and it
suppressed.
? ? ? ? 01' THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGiCAL ARGUMENT. 381
rliaU merely in my own mind, as the formal condition of thought, bat not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence.
CHAPTER THIRD. Section Sixth.
Of the Impossibility of <i Physico-Theologital Proof.
then, neither pure conception nor the general experi ence of an existing being can provide sufficient basis for the proof of the existence of the Deity, we can make the attempt by the only other mode --that of grounding our argument upon determinate experience of the phsenomena of the pre sent world, their constitution and disposition, and discover whether we can thus attain to sound conviction of the ex istence of Supreme Being. This argument we shall term
? If shown to be insuf ficient, speculative reason cannot present us with any satis
factory proof of the existence of being corresponding to our transcendental idea.
evident from the remarks that have been made in the preceding sections, that an answer to this question will be far from being difficult or unconvincing. For how can any ex perience be adequate with an idea The very essence of an idea consists in the fact that no experience can ever be dis covered congruent or adequate with it. The transcendental idea of necessary and all-sufficient being so immeasurably great, so high above all that empirical, which always con ditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials in the sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception, and vain seek the unconditioned among things that are condi tioned, while examples, nay, even guidance, denied us
the laws of empirical synthesis.
If the Supreme Being forms link in the chain of empirical conditions, must be member of the empirical series, and, like the lower members which precedes, have its origin in some higher member of the series. If, on the other hand, we
from the chain, and cogitate as an intelligible being, apart from the series of natural causes-- how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates the lattpr from the former?
disengage
411 laws nvprct'iMg uiv regress from i-llicts to causes, all syu-
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? 382 fRUBOKTDEKTAL DIALECTIC.
thetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible experience and the objects of the sensuous world, anil, apart from them, are without significance.
The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue our observations into ttie infinity of space in the one direction, or into its illimitable divisions on the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations, --even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we find that language in the presence of wonders so inconceivable has lost its force, and number it? power to reckon, nay, even
thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without the power of expression --all the more eloquent that it is dumb. Every where around us we observe a chain of causes and effects, of means and ends, of death and birth ; and, as nothing has entered of itsclf into the condition in which we find we are constantly referred to some other thing, which itself suggests the same inquiry regarding its cause, anil thus the
universe must sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain of contingencies, there exists something that primal and self-subsistent -- something which, as the cause of this pheuomenal world, secures its continuance and preservation.
it? Of the content of the world we are ignorant; still less
can we estimate its magnitude comparison with the sphere
? This highest cause --what magnitude shall we attribute to
of the possible. But this supreme cause
of the human mind, what there to prevent us from attri buting to such degree of perfection as to place above the sphere of all that possible This we can easily dn, although only the aid of the faint outline of an abstract conception, representing this being to ourselves as contain ing in itself, as an individual substance, all possible perfec tion-- conception which satisfies that requirement of reason which demands parsimony principles,* which free from
? elf-contradiction, which even contributes to the extension of
*
reference to the metaphysical dogma Enlia practer uecttntalem ? cn imt multipHeanda, which may also be applied to lope, by the eus- Itnution of principia for fnfia. -- Tr.
being necessity
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? OF THE PHrslCO-THEOI-OOICAL ABGUMENT.
3S3
the employment of reason in experience, by means of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and system, and which in no respect conflicts with any law of experience.
This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it itself derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that source. It introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could not of itself have discovered them, and extends our knowledge of nature, by directing our attention to a unity, the principle of which lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature again re-acts upor. this idea--its cause ; and thus our belief in a divine author ot the universe rises to the power of an irresistible conviction.
For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind, unceasingly elevated by these considerations, which,
although empirical, are so remarkably powerful, and continually adding to their force, will not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle speculation ; it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned author of all.
But although we have nothing to object to the reasonable ness and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to demonstrative certainty and to recep tion upon its own merits, apart from favour or support other arguments. Nor can injure the cause of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist, and to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the proper ties of belief that brings calm and content into the mind, without prescribing to an unworthy subjection. maintain, then, that the physico- theological argument insufficient of itself to prove the existence of Supreme Being, that must entrust this to the ontological argument --to which serves merely as an introduction, and thnt, consequently, this argu ment contains the only possible ground ofproof (possessed speculative reason) for the existence of this being.
? ? ? by
by
it it
I
a
a
is
a
it
it
it,
? 384 TliASBCENDtNTAL DIALECTIC.
The chief momenta in the physico-theological argument art as follow : 1. We observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose, executed with great wisdom, and exieting in a whole of a content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. 2. This arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world- it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute ; in other woida, the nature of different things could not of itself, what ever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a rational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain fundamental ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sub lime and wise cause (or several), which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature, producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelli gent cause of the world. 4. The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic edifice -- an inference which all our observation favours, and all principles of analogy support.
In the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain products of nature with those of human art, when it compels Nature to bend herself to its purposes, as in the case of a house, a ship, or a watch, that the same kind of causality -- namely, understanding and will -- resides in nature. It is also declared that the internal possibility of this freely-acting nature (which is the source of all art, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from another and superhuman art, --a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable ol
the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to neither of these opinions shall we at present bject. We shal! only remark that it must be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of cause at all, we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the analogy subsisting between nature and such products of design -- these being the only products whose causes and modes of originatioii are completely known to us. Reason would be unable to satisfy her own requirements, if she passed from a causality which she does know, to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explana tion which she does not know.
According to the physico-theological argument, the con
? stnnding
? ? ? OJ TJIE PHYSICO-THEOLOeiCAL ABOTTMEKT. 385
nection and harmony existing in the world evidence the con tingency of the form merely, but not of the matter, that
of the substance of the world. To establish the truth of the latter opinion, would be necessary to prove that nll things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony and order, unless they were, even as regards their substance, the product of supreme wisdom. But this would require very different grounds of proof from those presented the aualogy with human art. This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world, whose efforts are limited the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of creator of the world, to whom all things are sub ject. Thus this argument utterly insufficient for the task before us -- demonstration of the existence of an all-sufficient being. we wish to prove the contingency of matter, we must have recourse to transcendental argument, which the physico-theological was constructed expressly to avoid.
We infer, from the order and design visible in the universe,
as disposition of thoroughly contingent character, the ex istence of cause proportionate thereto. The conception of this cause must contain certain determinate qualities, and must therefore be regarded us the conception of being which possesses all power, wisdom, and so on, one word, all per fection --the conception, that is, of an all-sufficient bein^. For the predicates of very great, astonishing, or immeasurable power and excellence, give us no determinate conception of the thing, nor do they inform us what the thing may be in itself. They merely indicate the relation existing between the magnitude of the object and the observer, who compares with himself and with his own power of comprehension, and are mere expressions of praise and reverence, by which the
either magnified, or the observing subject depreciated relation to the object. Where we have to do with the mag
nitude (of the perfection) of thing, we can discover no determinate conception, except that which comprehends all
? object
or completeness, and only the total {omnitudo) of reality which completely determined in and
through its conception alone.
Now cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough
to declare that he has perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude of the world he contemplates, bears (in its extent
possible perfection
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a
a
it
a Ifaby a
is
a
is
it is
in
n
by
in
is
a
a
it
it
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it
? 380 TILMSCENDKMAL DIALECTIC.
as well as in its content) to omnipotence, into that of the order and design in (lie world to the highest wisdom, and that of the unity of the world to the absolute unity of a Supreme Being. * Physico-theology is therefore incapable of presenting a deter minate conception of a supreme cause of the world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology --a theology which is itself to be the basis of religion.
The attainment of absolute totality is completely impos sible on the path of empiricism. And yet this is the path
in the physico-theological argument. What means shall we employ to bridge the abyss ?
After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power, wisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and finding we can advance no further, we leave the argument on empirical grounds, and proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order and conformity to aims that are observable in it. From this contingency we infer, by the help of transcendental conceptions alone, the existence of something absolutely necessary ; and, still advancing, proceed from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determined or determining conception thereof--the conception of an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing in its undertaking, recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument ; and, as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise, it executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at first professed to have no connection with this faculty, and
to base its entire procedure upon experience alone.
The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard
with such contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For they reflect upon and examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following for some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering themselves no nearer theirobject, tliey suddenly leave this path and pass into the region
Kant's meaning that no one will be bold enough to declare that he certain that the world could not haw existed without an omiupoleiU author that none but the highest wisdom could have produced the ir. mony and order we observe in and that its unit) -ssihle only unriiv tht condition of an absolute unity. -- Tr.
pursued
? ? ? it ;
it,
is p
ii * ;
if
h
is,
? CRITNJUE OF ALL THEOLOOY. 387
of pure possibility, where they hope to reach upon the wings ofideas, what had eluded all their empirical investigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this immense leap, they extend their determinate conception --into the pos session of which they have come, they know not how--over the whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from experience --though in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience.
Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmo- logical, and this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being ; and as besides these three there is no
other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof, on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all.
CHAPTER THIRD. Section Seyenth.
Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles oj Reason.
It by the term Theology I understand the cognition of a primal being, that cognition is based either upon reason alone {theologia rationulis) or upon revelation (theologia re-
The former cogitates its object either by means of pure transcendental conceptions, as an ens originarium, rea- lissimum, ens entium, and is termed transcendental theology ; or, by means of a conception derived from the nature of our own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must then be entitled natural theology. The person who believes in a transcen dental theology alone, is termed a Deist ; he who acknow ledges the possibility of a natural theology also, a Theist. The former admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone
the existence of a supreme being, but at the same time main tains that our conception of this being is purely transcen dental, and that all we can say of it is, that it possessed nil reality, without being able to define it more closely. The second asserts that reason is capable of presenting us, from
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TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
the analogy with nature, with a more definite conception oi this being, and that its operations, as the cause of all things, are the results of intelligence and free will. The formet regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world -- whether by the necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left un determined ; the latter considers this being as the author of the world.
Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the exist ence of a Supreme Being from a general experience --without any closer reference to the world to which this experience belongs, and in this case it is called Cosmotheology ; or it en deavours to cognize the existence of such a being, through mere conceptions, without the aid of experience, and is then termed Ontotheology.
As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all tilings, and as it is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we might, in strict rigour, deny to the Deist any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being or thing -- the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct --as it is
? Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author of the world, from the constitution of, the order and unity observable in, the world, in which two modes of
must be admitted to exist -- those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from this world to a supreme intelli gence, either as the principle of all natural, or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it is termed Phy- sico- theology, in the latter Ethical or Moral-theology. *
causality
less harsh --to say, the Deist believes in a God, the Theist in a living God (summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to
* Not theological ethics; for this science contains
which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world; while Moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a conviction of the existence of a Suprene Being, founded upon ethical laws.
ethical laws,
? ? ? ClUTlQtJE
Of AIL THEOLOGf. 389
investigate the sources of all these attempts of reason to esta blish the existence of a Supreme Being.
It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical know ledge or cognition as knowledge of that which and prac
tical knowledge as knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical employment of reason that
which cognize priori (as necessary) that something is, while the practical that by which cognize a priori what ought to happen. Now, an indubitably certain, though it the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that some thing is, or ought to happen, either certain determinate condition of this truth absolutely necessary, or such con dition may be arbitrarily presupposed. In the former case the condition postulated (per thesin), in the latter supposed [per hypothesin). There are certain practical laws --those of morality -- which are absolutely necessary. Now, these laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being, as the condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, this being must be postulated, because the conditioned, from which we reason to this determinate condition, itself cognized
? priori as absolutely necessary. We shall at some future time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the existence of Supreme Being, but also, as themselves abso lutely necessary in different relation, demand or postulate
--although only from practical point of view. The dis cussion of this argument we postpone for the present.
When the question relates merely to that which not to that which ought to be, the conditioned which presented in experience, always cogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot be regarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively necessary, or rather as needful the con dition in itself and priori mere arbitrary presupposition
in aid of the cognition, reason, of the conditioned. If, then, we are to possess theoretical cognition of the absolute neces sity of thing, we cannot attain to this cognition otherwise than a priori means of conceptions while impos sible in this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any relation to an existence given in experience.
Theoretical cognition speculative when relates to an object or certain conceptions of an object which not given and cannot be discovered by means of experience. op
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posed to the cognition of nature, which concerns only those abjects or predicates which can be presented in a possible experience.
The principle that everything which happens (the empi rically contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of nature, but not of speculative cognition. For, if we change it into an abstract principle, and deprive it of its reference to experience and the empirical, we shall find that it oannot with justice be regarded any longer as a syn thetical proposition, and that it is impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists to something en tirely different --termed cause. Nay, more, the conception of a cause -- as likewise that of the contingent--loses, in this speculative mode of employing all significance, for its
objective reality and meaning are comprehensible from expe rience alone.
? When from the existence of the universe and the things in the existence of cause of the universe inferred, reason proceeding not in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle of the former enounces, not that things themselves or substances, but only that which happens
or their states -- as empirically contingent, have cause: the assertion that the existence substance itself contin gent *iot justified by experience, the assertion of
reason employing its principles in speculative manner. again, infer from the form of the universe, from the way in which all things are connected and act and react upon each other, the existence of cause entirely distinct from the universe, -- this would again be judgment of purely specula tive reason because the object in this case -- the cause--can never be an object of possible experience. In both these cases the principle of causality, which valid only in the
field of experience, --useless and even meaningless beyond this region, would be diverted from its proper destination.
Now maintain that all attempts of reason to establish
the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological truths, and, consequently, that rational theology can have no existence, unless founded upon Lite laws of morality. For all synthetical principles of the
understanding are valid only as immanent experience while
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OF ALL THEOLOOT. 391
the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates their being em ployed transcendentally, and of this the understanding is
quite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to con duct us to a Supreme Being, this being must belong *o the chain of empirical objects --in which case it would be, like all phenomena, itself conditioned. If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be admitted, by means of the dyna mical law of the relation of an effect to its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this procedure ?
Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects, and
it is only an effect of this character that could witness to the
existence of a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of
fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, we recognise her right to assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely neces sary being, this cnu be admitted only from favour, and cannot be regarded as the result of irresistible demonstration. The physico-theological proof may add weight to others --if other proofs there are --by connecting speculation with experience ; hut in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction, than establishes a sure foundation for theology.
? It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions
admit only of transcendental answers --those presented ii priori
by pure conceptions without the least empirical admixture.
But the question in the present case is evidently synthetical -- it aims at the extension of our cognition beyond the bounds
of experience --it requires an assurance respecting the exist ence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds, to which no experience can ever be adequate. Now it has been abundantly proved that all it priori synthetical cognition is oossible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a
iossible experience ; and that the validity of all principles lepends upon their immanence in the field of experience, that 8, their relation to objects of empirical cognition, or phseno- nena. Thus all transcendental procedure in reference to
speculative theology is without result.
If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs
of our Analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and time-honoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the question --how he can pass the limits of all
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TBAXSCESDENTAI. DIALECTIC.
possible experience by the help cf mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements upon old arguments-- I request him to spare me. There is certainty no great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative argu ments must at last look for support to the ontologiesl, and I have, therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason. Without looking upon myself as a remarkably com bative person, I shall not decline the challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every attempt of specu lative theology. And yet the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners will demonstrate, from the nature of the human mind as well as from that of the other sources of knowledge, how we are to proceed to extend our cognition completely ci priori, and to carry it to that point where experience abandons us, and no means
exist of guaranteeing the objective reality of our conceptions. In whatever way the understanding may have attained to a
conception, the existence of the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis, because the cognition
of the existence of the object depends upon the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the conception. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our conception, without the aid of experience --which presents to the mind nothing but phsenomena, or to attain by the help of mere conceptions tc a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects or super natural beings.
But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest utility in correcting our conception of this being --on the supposition that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means -- in making it consistent with itself and with al. other conceptions of intelligible objects, clearing it from al. that is incompatible with the conception of an ens tummum, and eliminating from it all limitations or admixture of empi rical elements.
Transcendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its objective insufficiency, 01 importance in a negative respect ; it is useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged
? ? ? ? CRITIQUt OF Ait THEOtOGT. 393
with pure ideas, no other than a transcendental standard being in this case admissible. For from practical point of view, the hypothesis of Supreme and All-sufficient Being to maintain its validity without opposition, must be of the highest importance to define this conception in correct and rigorous manner --as the transcendental conception of ne cessary being, to eliminate all phenomenal elements (anthro pomorphism its most extended signification), and at the same time to overthrow all contradictory assertions --be they atheittie, tleistic, or anthropomorphic. This of course 7ery easy as the same arguments which demonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm the existence of <. Supreme Being, must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial. For impossible to gain from the pure speculation of reason demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being, as the ground of all that exists, or that this being possesses none of those properties which we regard as analogical with the dynamical qualities of thinking being, or that, as the an- thropomorphists would have us believe, subject to all the limitations which sensibility imposes upon those intelligences
mere ideal, though faultless one-- conception which per fects and crowus the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. If this defect ever supplied Moral Theology, the problematic Transcendental Theology whicli has preceded, will have been at least serviceable as demonstrating the mental necessity existing for the conception, by the complete determine. tion of which has furnished, and the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of reason often de ceived by sense, and not always in harmony with its own ideas. The attributes of necessity, infinitude, unity, exist ence apart from the world (and not as world-soul), eternity --free from conditions of time, omnipresence -- free from conditions of space, omnipotence, and others, are pure trans cendental predicates and thus the accurate conception of
Supreme Being, which every theology require*, furnished transcendental theology alone.
? which exist in the world of experience.
Supreme Being therefore, for the speculative reason,
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APPENDIX
TO TBANSCENDENTAi DIALECTIC.
Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason
The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only confirms the truth of what wr have already proved in our Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless, but it at the same time teaches us this im portant lesson, that human reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the understanding. There exists this difference, however, that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the fallacies which
they induce.
Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers, will be
found to be in harmony with the final purpose and proper
of these powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim. We are entitled to suppose, there fore, that there exists a mode of employing transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent ; although, when we mis take their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of actual things, their mode of application is transcendent and delusive. For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea in relation to possible experience, that is transcendent or immanent. An idea is employed transcendently, when it is
applied to an object falsely believed to he adequate with and to correspond to it ; immanently, when it is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the sphere of expe rience. Thus all errors of subreptio--oi misapplication, nre to be ascribed to defects of judgment, and not to understand ing or reason.
Reason never has an immediate relation to an object ; it relates immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the understanding that it can be employed in
the field of experience. It does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arianges them and gives to them
? employment
? ? ? OF THB IDEAS 9* PURE REABO2). . 39. 1
that unity which they are capable of possessing when the ? phere of their application has been extended as widely as possible. Reason avails itself of the conceptions of the under standing for the sole purpose of producing totality in the dif ferent series. This totality the understanding does not con cern itself with ; its only occupation is the connection of ex periences, by which series of conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The object of reason is there fore the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas ; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding, which without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone.
I accordingly maintain, that transcendental ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be con ceptions of objects, and that, when thus considered, they as sume a fallacious and dialectical character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects --as regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards which all its laws follow, and in which they all meet in one point. This point -- though a mere idea (focus imaginarius), that not point from which the conceptions of the under standing do really proceed, for lies beyond the sphere of possible experience --serves notwithstanding to give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with the great est possible extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion --which we may hinder from imposing upon us -- necessary and unavoidable, we desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us, but those which are at great distance behind us that to say, when, in the present case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond every given experience, towards an extension as great as can possi bly be attained.
If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find that the peculiar business of reason to arrange them into system, that to say, to give them connection accord
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? 396 TIIVNSCENDE5TAL DIALECTIC.
ing to a principle. This unity presupposes an idea--the idea of the form of a whole (of cognition), preceding the de terminate cognition of the parts, and containing the condi tions which determine a priori to every part its place and relation to the other parts of the whole system. This idea accordingly demands complete unity in the cognition of the understanding -- not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of a system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be affirmed with propriety that this idea is a concep tion of an object ; it is merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions of objects, in so far as this unity is available to the understanding as a rule. Such concep tions of reason are not derived from nature ; on the contrary, we employ them for the interrogation and investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long as it is not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as pure earth, pure water, or pure air, is not to be discovered.
? And yet we require these conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so far as regards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose of determining the share which each of these natural causes lias in every phenomenon. Thus the different kinds of matter are all referred to earths -- as mere weight, to salts and inflammable bodies -- as pure force, and finally, to water and air--as the vehicula of the former, or the machines employed by them in their opera tions, --for the purpose of explaining the chemical action and re-action of bodies in accordance with the idea of a me chanism. For, although not actually so expressed, the in fluence of such ideas of reason is very observable in the pro cedure of natural philosophers.
If reason is the faculty of dednting the particular from the general, and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only necessary that the judgment should subsume the particular under the general, the particular being thus necessarily deter mined. I shall term this the demonstrative or apodeictic em ployment of reason. If, however, the general is admitted as problematical only, and is a mere idea, the particular case is certain, but the universality of the rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem. Several particular cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt, are then taken and examined, for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is
? ? ? Or THE IDEAS OF PUBE REASON.
397
applicable to them ; and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be collected follow from the rule, its univer sality is inferred, and tt the same time, all the causes which have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are con cluded to be of the same character with those which we have observed. This I shall term the hypothetical employment of the reason.
The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas
employed as problematical conceptions is properly not consti tutive. That is to say, if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, which has been employed as an hypo thesis, does not follow from the use that is made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible cases thai may arise ? -- some of which may, however, prove exceptions to the universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the approximating of the rule to universality.
The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the systematic unity of cognitions ; and this unity is the criterion of the truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity -- as a mere idea -- is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as given, but only in the light of a problem --a problem which serves, however, as a principle for the various and particular exercise of the understanding in experience, directs it with regard to thope cases which nre not presented to our observation, and iutroditces harmony and consistency into all its operations.
All that we can be certain of from the above considerations
that this systematic unity logical principle, whose aim to assist the understanding, where cannot of itself attain to rules, means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be attained. But the assertion that objects and the understanding by which they
? are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to system atic unity, that this may be postulated a priori, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that we are justified
all possible cognitions -- empirical and others --to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they art
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