No More Learning

(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?
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Whether sensuality is only appetitive?

Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but
also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the sensual
movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common
to us and beasts. " But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive
powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

Objection 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be
of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality
against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge.
Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.

Objection 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the
place of the "serpent. " But in the temptation of our first parents, the
serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin,
which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a
cognitive power.

On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things
belonging to the body. "

I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual
movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the
name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing.
Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive
apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly
called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of
the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing
apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the
appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne
towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the
apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the
appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual
movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that
sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul
is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to
understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but
rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the
bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the
bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a
preamble.

Reply to Objection 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower
reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the
apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a
motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Reply to Objection 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but
also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is
signified by the serpent.
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Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and
concupiscible as distinct powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided
into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same
power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards
both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11).
But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible
power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with
what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same
power in the soul.

Objection 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is
suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the
concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing
from the concupiscible.

Objection 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says
on Mat. 13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible
power. " But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible
part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive
appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.

I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is
called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species
of the sensitive appetite---the irascible and the concupiscible. In
order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible
things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of
what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to
resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a
hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of
harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise
from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher
position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or
hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an
inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an
inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the
sensitive part two appetitive powers---one through which the soul is
simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and
to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and
another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is
suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we
say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to
overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced
to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant
things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order
that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight
against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible
appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since
the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being
roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from
the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender
of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the
acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or
against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for
this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the
passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for
instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance,
terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are
about things concupiscible---namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher
says [*De Animal. Histor. viii. ].

Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is
suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power
is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

Reply to Objection 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive
part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which
do not impress the senses, as we have said above ([656]Q[78], A[2]); so
also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power
which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses,
but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is
the irascible power.

Reply to Objection 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible
appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may
belong to the irascible appetite.
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Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible
appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts
of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is
signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13).
Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.

Objection 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it.
But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according
to the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting
against the law of my mind. " Therefore the irascible and concupiscible
appetites do not obey reason.

Objection 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the
rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the
sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear
nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the
powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey
reason.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part
of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into
concupiscence and anger. "

I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey
the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will;
first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in
their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is
naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep,
esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power,
as we have said above ([657]Q[78], A[4]), is replaced by the cogitative
power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it
compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite
is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular
reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason:
wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from
universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason
directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and
irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular
conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect,
as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and
concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the
intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying
certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be
modified or excited.

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which
is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement
follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for
instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no
superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at
once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he
awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For
wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second
only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not
sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And
this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher
appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the
lower. " In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are
subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what
is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and
concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the
part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We
observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul
dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the
appetite by a politic and royal power. " For a power is called despotic
whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any
way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing
of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man
rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the
ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which
they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is
said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the
body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's
command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by
voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is
said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power:
because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue
whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive
appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other
animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason
guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we
experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist
reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which
reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the
fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something,
we must not conclude that they do not obey.

Reply to Objection 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior
sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which
is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and
apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are
subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify
the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms
of the imagination.
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OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)

We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?

(2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?

(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?

(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?

(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?
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Whether the will desires something of necessity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not
voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore
nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a
rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in
the reason. " Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and
therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions.
But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act
of the will cannot be necessitated.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire
happiness with one will. " Now if this were not necessary, but
contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the
will desires something of necessity.

I answer that, The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that
which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it
by an intrinsic principle---either material, as when we say that
everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible---or
formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a
triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is "natural" and
"absolute necessity. " In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to
it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the
agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be
attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be
necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is
called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility. " On the part of
the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so
that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity of
coercion. "

Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For
we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But
the very movement of the will is an inclination to something.
Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the
inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is
according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is
impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so
it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and
voluntary.

But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot
be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea,
arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.
Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to
the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last
end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the
principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally
and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining
thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and
every movement arises from something immovable.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of
the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away
the liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).

Reply to Objection 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally,
corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than
to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this
respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.

Reply to Objection 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of
our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end,
but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).
Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions
of which we are masters.
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Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of
necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"evil is outside the scope of the will. " Therefore the will tends of
necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Objection 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as
the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable
necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's
object moves it of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object
of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is
the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But
what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of
necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are
moved by things seen. " Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended
by the intellect moves the will of necessity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by
which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite
things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever
it desires.

I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it
desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the
intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles,
so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already
[658](A[1]). Now there are some things intelligible which have not a
necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent
propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the
first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of
necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary
connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions,
a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to
these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the
necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it
does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it
recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the
will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary
connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and
to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some
things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of
which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists.
Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the
necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God
of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the
man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as
now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the
will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Reply to Objection 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the
aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the
will is not of necessity determined to one.

Reply to Objection 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in
the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing
movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as
the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its
capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is
not of necessity moved by it.

Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive power does not compare different
things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some
one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the
sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that
compares several things together: therefore from several things the
intellectual appetite---that is, the will---may be moved; but not of
necessity from one thing.
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Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the
intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end
is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and
highest power.

Objection 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a
progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the
powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more
noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act
of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power
than the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as
perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the
will---namely, charity---is more noble than the habits which perfect
the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should know all
mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am
nothing. " Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher
power than the will.

I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be
considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively. " Now a thing is
considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself:
but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If
therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to
themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear
if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object
of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of
the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of
appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the
intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more
abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and
therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the
will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to
its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is
higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with
something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the
intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in
something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect.
Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than
sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than
something in which there is color, though color is nobler and simpler
than sound. For as we have said above ([659]Q[16], A[1]; [660]Q[27],
A[4]), the action of the intellect consists in this---that the idea of
the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of
the will consists in this---that the will is inclined to the thing
itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in
Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the
will, "are in things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the
intellect, "are in the mind. " When, therefore, the thing in which there
is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea
understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than
the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the
soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher
than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge
of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is
better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is
nobler than the will.

Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing
one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is
found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and
extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something
true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect
is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most
excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.

Reply to Objection 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is
less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes
act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely
and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes
potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the
motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the
passive; for good which is understood moves the will.

Reply to Objection 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared
with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love
God.
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Whether the will moves the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect.
For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is
an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the
intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above
[661](A[3]). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except
perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the
good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas
the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved
by the will.

Objection 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If,
therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to
understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the
intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will,
and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does
not move the intellect.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our
power to learn an art or not, as we list. " But a thing is in our power
by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will
moves the intellect.

I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end;
for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the
intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of
the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as
an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves
what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the
powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The
reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active
powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers
which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature
and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal
preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all
inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own
species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common
good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of
cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object
of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed
to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the
perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth.
Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their
respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part,
which are not subject to our will.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as
apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a
particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will
may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its
object---that is to say, as appetitive of universal good---and as a
determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore,
the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to
the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said
above [662](A[3]), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the
will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature
of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the
intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion
of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and
its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act,
and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as
stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and
truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its
object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special
power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is
truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the
common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the
intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why
these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect
understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to
understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it
is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired
good.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and
the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we
must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every
movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every
apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle
of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher
than our intellect ---namely, God---as also Aristotle says (Eth.
Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to
proceed indefinitely.
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Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the
superior appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and
concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For
the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to desire],
and the irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. But there is a
concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only
to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom,
of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): "The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth
to the eternal kingdom. " There is also a certain anger which cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when
our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Mat.
13:33 warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part. "
Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of
the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive.

Objection 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the
concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in
the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but
intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible
power to the intellectual part.

Objection 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul
has these powers"---namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and
rational---"before it is united to the body. " But no power of the
sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body
united, as we have said above (Q[78], AA[5],8). Therefore the irascible
and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual
appetite.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. ) says "that
the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and
irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while
in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or
"desire and animus. "

I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said
above ([663]Q[59], A[4]; [664]Q[79], A[7]), a power which is directed
to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by
special differences which are contained under that common notion. For
instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common
notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied
according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power
regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be
distinct from a power regarding black as black.

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good,
because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore
the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different
notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to
it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable
to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as
something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will
regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in
the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no
differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the
intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible
power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the
apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the
senses.

Reply to Objection 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be
understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising,
that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are
commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive
appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they
are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and
thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are
attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they
do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is
called the will.

Reply to Objection 2: The will itself may be said to irascible, as far
as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion,
but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be
said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in
the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the
will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand
the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and
concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body
(as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time),
although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence
the answer to the third objection is clear.
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OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man has free-will?

(2) What is free-will---a power, an act, or a habit?

(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?

(4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?
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Whether man has free-will?

Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has
free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is
written (Rom. 7:19): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil
which I will not, that I do. " Therefore man has not free-will.

Objection 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or
not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it
is written (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to
will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has
not free-will.

Objection 3: Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is
not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1): "The
heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He
shall turn it" and (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in you both to
will and to accomplish. " Therefore man has not free-will.

Objection 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own
actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written
(Jer. 10:23): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to
walk. " Therefore man has not free-will.

Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According
as each one is, such does the end seem to him. " But it is not in our
power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from
nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end,
and therefore we are not free in so doing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the
beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss
adds: "That is of his free-will. "

I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations,
commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In
order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act
without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all
things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free
judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a
thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it
judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing
is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from
judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something
should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of
some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act
of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and
retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in
contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic
syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are
contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may
follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch
as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.

Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([665]Q[81], A[3], ad 2),
the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case
can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the
good which man does not when he wishes---namely, "not to desire against
reason," as Augustine says.

Reply to Objection 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as
though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because
the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped
by God.

Reply to Objection 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement,
because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of
necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause
of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be
the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes
both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He
does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary
causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather
is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each
thing according to its own nature.

Reply to Objection 4: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the
execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or
not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of
God.

Reply to Objection 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and
adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part,
or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man
is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual
part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which
desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will,
as is clear from what we have said above ([666]Q[82], AA[1],2). But on
the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a
natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition
due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which
cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a
corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality,
such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a
man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations
are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys,
as we have said ([667]Q[81], A[3]). Wherefore this is in no way
prejudicial to free-will.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which
a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even
these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such
qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to
acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them,
or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to
free-will.
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Whether free-will is a power?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will
is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a
power. Therefore free-will is not a power.

Objection 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will
and reason. " But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due
to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De
Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of
disposing of itself. " Therefore it is not a power.

Objection 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But
free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by
abusing free-will, loses both it and himself. " Therefore free-will is
not a power.

On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a
habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it
chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.

I answer that, Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium---i. e. free
judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of
speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by
which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both
power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge
and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a
power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit
nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.
First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit;
for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural
habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will:
for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural
habits---for instance, to assent to first principles: while those
things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as
we have said of the desire of happiness ([668]Q[82], AA[1],2).
Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be
a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against
its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason
of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and
passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as
regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by
knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know
the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will is
indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for
free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from
its act.