The alliance was short and
Qutb Khan had deserted with his followers to join his father.
Qutb Khan had deserted with his followers to join his father.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Mugul Period
It was as lord of Kabul that he cast
longing glances across the Hindu Kush.
The question naturally presents itself: how did Babur keep such
1 Akbar-nama, p. 276.
? Hodivala, p. 262.
## p. 19 (#51) ##############################################
BABUR'S CHARACTER
19
a detailed record of his own doings from the age of eleven (A. H. 899) ?
Not only his own doings, but those of his relations are recorded in
full detail. And whence did he derive all this information, bio-
graphical and geographical? Mirza Haidar Dughlat had the same
gift: he tells us he wrote the Tarikh-i-Rashidi because the memory
of the Mughuls and their Khans—i. e. the eastern branch of the
Chaghatai-stood in danger of being altogether lost through want of
a chronicler. The earlier Mongols, Chingiz and his descendants, had
been fortunate in their chroniclers in their own day. It was the
descendants of Tamerlane, however, Babur, Mirza Haidar, Gulbadan
Begam, who first among princes undertook to write autobiographies,
while Humayun, Jahangir (for part of his reign) and Shah Jahan
were content to have their memoirs written by personal attendants.
There are very few examples in history of a great conqueror who was
also an eminent poet, though many soldiers, like Julius Caesar and
Xenophon, have been men of letters. Babur was a sufficiently good
poet (in Turki) to have become famous on that account alone, had
he achieved no fame as a soldier or ruler.
In writing an epitome of the emperor Babur's career, having in
view only the part he played in the history of his times, the romantic
side of this remarkable man's personal character has perforce been
relegated to the background: but in conclusion a few words may be
said regarding his private life.
Babur was one of those men who are so active in mind and body
that they are never idle and always find time for everything. Excepting
during the three years when he was hiding in Tashkent under the
protection of the Sultan of Kashghar he knew no rest, and he himself
says towards the end of his life that he had never kept the Fast of
Ramazan twice in any one place. He was pre-eminently human,
and has drawn a picture of himself in his memoirs in which no attempt
is made to hide either his virtues or his vices. He was a rigid Sunni
Muslim, and both orthodox and superstitious in his beliefs. When in
order to please the Shiah Shah Isma'il he adopted the Qizilbash
head-dress for himself and his soldiers, he showed a form of mora!
courage reminding one of his grandson Akbar, who while still pro-
fessing Islam displayed the utmost leniency towards Hindus and
Christians : and if Babur's motive was purely political, it required
no little self-reliance to face the sarcasm and derision which this
head-dress provoked among the zealous Sunnis of Transoxiana: not
to mention the hatred in which the name of Shah Isma'il was held
by reason of his cruelty towards the Sunnis of Khurasan.
As a soldier Babur was, like most of his race, fearless in battle, and
as a general he was a great tactician with a keen eye to detect any
mistake on the part of his opponents. He was also one of the first
military commanders in Asia to appreciate the value of artillery.
As a diplomatist he seems to have shown much more cunning and
## p. 20 (#52) ##############################################
20
BABUR
skill in dealing with the Afghans than with his own people and
the manner in which he played off the rebellious amirs of Sultan
Ibrahim against each other was worthy of a Machiaveili.
While inheriting a savagery common to all the Mongols and
Turks, and a total disregard for human life, he was capable of great
generosity in forgiving those who had behaved ill towards him. Like
all his family he was strongly addicted to intemperance, though his
drinking bouts were always followed by very sincere repentance.
He had a love for the beauties of nature probably rare in his day,
something apart from a delight in the artificial beauties of poetry,
which was common to all his co-religionists whether Turks or Persians.
His careful descriptions of the animals and plants of India reves)
great powers of observation. These portions of his memoirs read like
the notes of a peace-loving naturalist rather than those of a restless
warrior.
The Memoirs of Babur must be reckoned among the most enthral-
ling and romantic works in the literature of all time. They were
written in that form of Turkish known as Turki, which was Bahur's
mother-tongue. As we possess them they are not complete; all the
copies known to us contain gaps from 1508 to 1519, from 1520 to
1525 and from 1529 to 1530. A more complete copy was apparently
known to his cousin Mirza Haidar, the author of the Tarikh-i-Rashidi.
but the translation into Persian made in 1589 by Khan Khanan
'Abdur-Rahim, the son of Bairam Khan, contains the same gaps as
the Haidarabad Codex, from which Mrs Annette Beveridge made
her admirable English translation.
Babur was a real poet, and apart from the incidental verses intro-
duced in his memoirs we have from his pen a small collection of
Turki lyrics, which bear comparison with the best poetry of his day!
He also wrote a religious pcem called the Mubayyin, and about two
years before his death he wrote a versified rendering of the Risala-i-
Walidiyya, a pious tract written by the famous Khwaja Ahrar in
honour of his parents:
See Divan-i-Babur Padishah, edited with facsimile by E. Denison Ross.
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1910. This edition was based on a
unique MS. in the library of the Nawab of Rampur:
## p. 21 (#53) ##############################################
CHAPTER II
HUMAYUN
ALTHOUGH Babur had recognised his eldest son Humayun as
successor to the large territory he had acquired, the new ruler's
position was extremely insecure. As he lay dying Babur had warned
Humayun of the possibility of claims by the three other brothers and
had charged him always to forgive their faults.
By force of arms the Mughuls had imposed themselves on northern
India, but they had been so occupied in fighting that they had hardly
begun to rule, and India was still only an outlying portion of the
realm, Kabul being the proper capital and centre. Their generals
were still soldiers and not administrators, and, as Babur had said on
his first conquest of Kabul, the scheme of government was still saifi
(by the sword) not qalami (by the pen). To strengthen his position
Babur had invited members of the families of Timur and Chingiz
freely to join him. Not a few with royal blood in their veins were
possible claimants to the throne recently vacated. In the occupied
area were many turbulent elements excited by the century of chaos
which had followed Timur's invasion, and among these, especially
towards the east, were many Afghans belonging to the last dynasty
which had ruled. Babur had met and defeated the Rajputs, but had
not subdued them, and they, more than the other sections of Indians
in the north, had a strong national instinct. South-east of Rajputana
lay Gujarat, where Bahadur Shah was reviving and extending the
kingdom of his predecessors. "
Humayun, taking his insecure seat on the throne four days after
his father's death, assigned the westerly Punjab, Kabul and Qandahar
to be governed by his brother Kamran, and made smaller provisions
for the two younger brothers. He then proceeded early in 1531 to
besiege the strong fortress of Kalinjar in Bundelkhand, which might
be used as a base for attacks on the lower Duab. During these
operations he received news that Mahmud Lodi, brother of the late
king Ibrahim Lodi, who had received support in Bengal, had invaded
the east of his territory and taken Jaunpur. Humayun marched
rapidly towards Jaunpur and defeated the Afghans. They were
scattered for a time, but Sher Khan, who was reported to have failed
to support Mahmud Lodi at the critical time and was the ables!
1 There was even a plot in favour of Mahdi Khvaja, brother-in-law of Babu:.
(Humayun-nama, pp. 25 and 298. )
2 See vol. II, chap XIII.
3 The site of the battle was probably in the Daunrua estate, on the banks of
the Sai river, 15 miles east of Jaunpur.
4 For Sher Khan's earlier history see chap. III.
## p. 22 (#54) ##############################################
22
HUMAYUN
leader among them, began a fresh concentration. In order to break
this up Humayun despatched an army to invest the stronghold of
Chunar on the Ganges south of Benares, and followed it himself.
Before any results could be obtained other embarrassments led him
to arrange a peace by which Sher Khan was left to continue his plans
for an Afghan supremacy in the east. Kamran, since his father's
death, had cherished hopes of gaining the whole of Babur's territory
in spite of the ample provision he had received. Leaving his brother
'Askari in charge of Qandahar he advanced with an army to Lahore
which he secured by a cunning stratagem, as the governor refused
to be false to his trust. At the same time he continued to assure
Humayun of his loyalty and actually received a further grant
of territory round Hissar Firuza which had been Humayun's own
governorship and for some generations to come was regarded as the
holding of the Mughul heir apparent.
While his hold over his own territory was thus weakened through
the claims of a treacherous brother and the open attempts of the
Afghans, Humayun was forced to take notice of affairs outside.
Suspecting the loyalty of Muhammad Zaman Mirza, who was not
only his brother-in-law but was also descended like himself from Timur,
and had been appointed by Babur governor of Bihar, he removed
him from office in 1533 and placed him in confinement at Bayana.
Muhammad Zaman escaped and offered his services to Bahadur
Shah, king of Gujarat, while a cousin named Muhammad Sultan and
his son who had been plotting with him were seized and sentenced
to be blinded. The peaceful relations which existed between Gujarat
and Agra were broken by the refusal of Bahadur Shah to turn away
the fugitives and by the terms of the letter sent in his name to
Humayun. His continued extension of authority towards central
India and Rajputana also aroused jealousy and some alarm. Humayun
received an application for help from the Rana of Chitor who was
in danger of being crushed by his ambitious neighbour, and although
Humayun's religious principles would not allow him to aid an
unbeliever against an enemy of his own faith, he marched to Gwalior
late in 1534 and called on Bahadur Shah to stop his enterprise against
the Rana and again demanded the fugitives. Despairing of help
from Agra the Rana came to terms with Bahadur Shah and Humayun
hoped to be able to attend to his eastern possessions where Afghan
intrigue was most dangerous.
Peace between Chitor and Gujarat was, however, short, and
Bahadur Shah not only renewed his attack but also sent a strong
force to resist the Mughul power. This army was commanded by
Tatar Khan Lodi, whose father ‘Ala-ud-din was one of the Afghan
kings of Delhi, and had himself, after two unsuccessful attempts on
the throne, been banished by Babur to Badakhshan, and escaping
i See vol. III, p. 329.
## p. 23 (#55) ##############################################
INVASION OF GUJARAT
23
thence was one of the refugees in Gujarat. While 'Ala-ud-din took
one force towards Kalinjar and another threatened the Punjab, Tatar
Khan moved directly on Agra. He was successful in taking Bayana
and his advance troops even raided the suburbs of Agra.
Humayun now displayed better qualities of determination than
hitherto. He directed his brothers Hindal and 'Askari who were at
Agra to attack the invaders and himself moved through eastern
Malwa to Sarangpur, receiving the capitulation of the strong fortress
of Raisen on the way. Tatar Khan's army, in spite of its initial success,
did not await the Mughul forces under 'Askari. Most of his troops
abandoned him with their booty and having only a few thousand
horse remaining with him he was overwhelmed and slain by 'Askari
at Mandrel. 'Ala-ud-din's force, threatened by Humayun himself,
withdrew to Gujarat, and the army which had marched towards the
Punjab also returned.
When Humayun reached Sarangpur Chitor had not fallen, and a
council was held in the Gujarat camp to decide whether the siege
should be pressed or the Mughul enemy met. It was correctly guessed
that Humayun would not fight a Muslim king while he was engaged
against an unbeliever like the Rana, and efforts were redoubled to
take the fortress. The Gujarat artillery prevailed at last, and while
the women of the city perished voluntarily in flames the remnant
of the garrison hurled themselves to death against the weapons of
the besiegers. As the end of the siege was approaching Humayun
had moved on into Gujarat territory till he reached Mandasor only
60 miles from Chitor, and once again Bahadur Shah had to make
choice of his plan of campaign. This time he rejected the advice of
his most acute councillor who wished him to attack Humayun at
once with troops elated by their recent success. He decided to remain
on the defensive and rely on his superior artillery to repel the
Mughuls. An entrenched camp in such a position was merely a trap.
When the besieged made a sally they were easily defeated in the
open field by the Mughuls even with odds in their favour, and rarely
succeeded in drawing them close enough to bring them under
artillery fire. As the siege continued supplies ran short and could
not be replaced. The garrison was dying of starvation and Bahadur
Shah decided to escape. With a few attendants he left the camp in
the night (March, 1535) and made his way to Mandu with Mallu
Qadir Khan, the governor of that place, while some of the surviving
troops either followed him or were led by Muhammad Zaman Mirza
to cause revolt in the Punjab.
The tumult of departure added to the explosion of cannon made
the Mughuls believe that they were about to be attacked and their
forces were drawn up in readiness. As daylight appeared the truth
was known and they broke into the camp and divided the spoil.
A body of horse was sent in pursuit of the fugitives and Humayun
## p. 24 (#56) ##############################################
2+
HUMAYUN
followed it to Mandu. This vast fortress with a battlemented wall
23 miles in length stands on an isolated plateau 2079 feet above the
sea. Its size and the length of its defences have frequently enabled
surprise attacks to penetrate its walls, though later it held out for
six months when besieged by Akbar. Bahadur Shah opened negotia-
tions for peace in which the cession of Malwa to Humayun was
proposed, but while the terms were still being discussed a small
body of Mughuls forced their way over an unguarded part of the
walls and opened the nearest gate. Mallu Khan at once warned
Bahadur Shah, who tried to escape and meeting a Mughul force cut
his way through and reached the citadel. Despairing of his ability
to hold this he ordered his horses to be raised and lowered over the
wall and fled to Champaner” while the Mughul army sacked Mandu.
For the time being the whole of Malwa lay at the mercy of Humayun,
who followed up his success by a hasty pursuit of Bahadur Shah.
As the Mughul troops reached Champaner, Bahadur Shah, after
setting fire to the town, fled north to Cambay where he halted only
to destroy the fleet he had prepared to combat the Portuguese, and
escaped thence to Diu, evading Humayun by only a few hours and
cutstripping the force which pursued him. Humayun at Cambay
was the first of his house to see the ocean. During his halt there his
small escort had a narrow escape from being overwhelmed by the
local chieftains who were tributary to Bahadur Shah, and who planned
a night attack. Though they were able to plunder the camp during
the night Humayun had been warned of the design by an old woman
of the neighbourhood whose son had been enslaved by the Mughuls
and who hoped by this service to gain his release. As light appeared
the marauders were attacked and driven off with great slaughter.
When Bahadur Shah had fled from Humayun before Chitor, his
chief artillery officer, a Turk called Rumi Khan, had deserted to the
Mughul side and had remained with Humayun. He was now
approached by an emissary from Bahadur Shah, who by a skilful
mixture of abuse and persuasion induced him to dissuade Humayun
from an attack on Diu. Humayun was convinced that the air of the
seashore did not suit him and he returned to Champaner which was
being stoutly defended by Ikhtiyar Khan, a Gujarat general.
Though this magnificent city had been laid in ashes after an
existence of only 50 years the citadel was still intact, well equipped
for a siege, and situated in difficult jungle through the concealed
paths of which the people of the country could take fresh supplies.
The Mughul army was not well supplied for siege operations and
four months passed without any progress being made. Success was
finally due to the intelligence of the emperor fortified by his personal
bravery. While reconnoitring the position he saw some villagers come
I For a-description see G. Yazdani, Mandu, 1929.
2 In 22° 29' N. , 73° 32' E.
## p. 25 (#57) ##############################################
FAILURE TO HOLD GUJARAT
25
out of the woods and as their explanations were not satisfactory he
had them beaten. They then guided the Mughuls to the foot of the
walls. Though these could not be breached Humayun at once devised
a means of scaling them by driving spikes into the mortar between
the stones, and on a moonlight night, while a furious attack was made
on other parts of the fortress 300 men climbed the wall, Humayun
himself being the fortieth. This unexpected attack inside the citadel,
with the news that the emperor himself was in command, terrified
the defenders, who allowed Humayun's party to capture a gate.
Ikhtiyar Khan although safe in the upper fort had not sufficient
munitions there to prolong his resistance and was forced to surrender
on 9 August, 1535. Since its foundation Champaner had been a
repository for the treasure of the Gujarat kings and Humayun's army
was enriched by great booty. One of Bahadur Shah's officers whom
Humayun plied with drink, instead of putting to the torture as his
counsellors advised, revealed great treasures hidden in a reservoir
and well. The capture of the two celebrated forts at Mandu and
Champaner so delighted Humayun that he commemorated his vic-
lories by striking coin at these places.
While Humayun had thus beaten down open resistance, had taken
strongholds and had assumed the outward appearance of sovereignty,
he took no steps to consolidate his rule and wasted months in revelry
and enjoyment of his booty. An army sent by Shah Husain of Sind
to help in his campaign against Gujarat was diverted by a bribe
offered by the governor of Patan in the north of the kingdom who stili
held out for Bahadur Shah, and it finally returned as Shah Husain
feared that his troops might be corrupted by the luxury of the imperial
army. Bahadur Shah in his retreat at Diu was approached by the
chiefs in the north of his lost kingdom, who offered to remit their land
revenue to him as the Mughuls were taking no steps to collect it.
He commissioned 'Imad-ul-Mulk to march to Ahmadabad with full
powers over collection and remission. As the new governor progressed,
taking steps to restore administration, he was joined by considerable
forces and was able to recruit more by using the funds he had col-
lected. Humayun, though he easily fell into habits of sloth and
luxury during success, could always rouse himself when danger was
apparent. He marshalled forces and sending his brother 'Askari in
advance went to meet 'Imad-ul-Mulk. Although the latter was able
to surprise 'Askari at a disadvantage and plunder his camp, the
Mughul army reformed and won the battle which ensued. Humayun
then advanced to and occupied Ahmadabad and at last took steps
to organise the newly acquired province. He placed 'Askari in charge
as viceroy with Hindu Beg, an experienced general, to aid him and
appointed officials to other posts. His advisers pressed him in view
of the disturbances and rebellion which were taking part in the east
of his realm to restore Gujarat to Bahadur Shah. So far was he from
## p. 26 (#58) ##############################################
26
HUMAYUN
taking this sound advice that he planned to attack Diu where Bahadur
Shah was sheltering.
Malwa had been left in such haste, with no arrangements for the
proper government of the province, that it had been invaded by
former officials and the Mughul troops had been driven to Ujjain.
Humayun decided to return to Mandu which had greatly attracted
him, and his arrival there was sufficient for the time to quell opposi-
tion. His departure from Gujarat was, however, the signal for
disaster in that tract; Bahadur Shah still had a fleet, and his people
held one or two ports on the coast. With help from the Portuguese
and a body of African slaves he was able to re-establish a stronger
footing and took town after town. There was no master mind to
direct the sending of reinforcements and 'Askari showed more dis-
position to call in troops to ensure his own safety than to help his
subordinates. Moreover, detachments of Gujarat forces left scattered
in the north and east when Bahadur Shah abandoned Chitor were
now coming together. Ghazanfar, who was a foster brother of
'Askari, deserted after being confined for a rude jest at the viceroy
and offered to disclose to Bahadur Shah full details of the Mughul
position at Ahmadabad, which he described as so precarious thai
*Askari would fly if attacked. The local chiefs in Gujarat, who had
found no reason to prefer the new rulers, also urged their former
king to return, promising him their assistance.
While Bahadur Shah was rallying his former subjects, collecting
troops and approaching Ahmadabad, his opponent 'Askari began to
lose heart. No help was to be expected from Humayun, and a section
of 'Askari's advisers urged him to declare himself independent of his
brother in the hope that such a measure would be popular in the
locality and an encouragement to the troops. Bahadur Shah had
arrived within a few miles of Ahmadabad and the Mughul army
moved out to meet him. Although 'Askari was not prepared to set
himself up against Humayun he was convinced that retreat was
necessary, and his counsellors planned to take what treasure was
left in Champaner and to make for Agra where they still hoped to
persuade 'Askari to assume the royal title. After a bombardment
which nearly led Bahadur Shah to execute Ghazanfar, as he had fore-
told no opposition, the Mughuls abandoned their camp and even
their private baggage and hastened towards Champaner. Their flight
encouraged Bahadur Shah to pursue them rapidly and even to attack
the rear-guard. This, however, turned on the Gujarat force with
such bravery that the Mughuls were able to reach the Mahi river,
and to cross it, though not without loss owing to the hastiness of their
flight. Thirty miles beyond it lay Champaner where 'Askari hoped
to secure treasure and supplies. In this he was disappointed, as Tardi
Beg, the governor, was faithful to Humayun, to whom he had already
sent news of the plan for 'Askari's independence. Accordingly, while
## p. 27 (#59) ##############################################
REVOLT IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES
27
he refreshed the troops he gave no access to the fort and in reply
to demands for its contents urged that he must await Humayun's
orders. Hindered in their plans the officers of the army now proposed
to seize Tardi Beg by stratagem, to take the treasure, and to proclaim
'Askari. Tardi Beg, however, evaded capture and bade them move.
As their camp still surrounded the fort he used his artillery and drove
them off towards Agra. News of their departure drew on Bahadur
Shah, who had halted at the river. Tardi Beg, either on instructions
from Humayun or unwilling in the circumstances to stand a siege,
then carried off as much of the treasure as he could to Mandu where
he was praised for his bravery by the emperor. Thus ended for the
time the Mughul occupation of Gujarat which had lasted barely more
than a year (1535-6).
Impressed by the fuller news which Tardi Beg was able to give
him Humayun was convinced of the necessity for action to save the
centre of his precarious rule. He hastily left Mandu and made for
Agra through Chitor territory where he met the disorganised force
of 'Askari. It was not a suitable time for recriminations and punish-
ment of disaffection. A sterner character might have swept aside a
father's dying injunctions, but Humayun knew that during his idle
sojourn in Malwa rebellion had broken out in the eastern provinces.
A fratricidal struggle would end all his hopes of restoring peace.
He therefore affected forgiveness and even rewarded the plotters,
before he marched with them to Agra. Very soon after his departure
from Malwa that province was seized by Mallu Khan who had once
been in the service of the kings of Malwa, and later governor after
the annexation by Gujarat. Mughul domination in western India
thus ceased entirely.
In the eastern provinces it was also becoming insecure. Muhammad
Sultan, who had been confined, with the additional sentence of
blinding, when he revolted with his cousin Muhammad Zaman
Mirza, had evaded the operation and later made his escape from
prison. He then established himself beyond the Ganges at Bilgram,
a few miles north of Kanauj, which he also took, while one of his
sons secured the country along the river as far as Manikpur and
another marched on Jaunpur. The danger of losing a rich province
led Hindal, the youngest brother of Humayun, who had been left
in charge at Agra, to proceed against the rebels. He soon retook
Kanauj, and though his crossing there was opposed he discovered
a ford higher up the river and passing over it unobserved met
Muhammad Sultan and defeated him before his sons could rejoin
their father. He then pursued the flying rebels as far as Ajodhya
and halted as he felt himself unable to attack the rebel whose forces
had been strengthened by the recall of his sons from their various
enterprises. The deadlock was relieved by news that Humayun was
1 See vol. IV, p. 369.
## p. 28 (#60) ##############################################
28
HUMAYUN
approaching Agra on his return from Malwa, and Muhammad Sultan
Mirza decided that his best chance of success was to fight before the
emperor's forces arrived. In the battle which ensued the rebels fared
the worse and being a collection of mercenaries with no common
bond except the hope of success they lost heart and began to desert.
Muhammad Sultan himself fied with his sons far into Bengal and
Hindal was able to occupy Jaunpur, where he stayed till Humayun
arrived at Agra and then joined him.
When Humayun had made his peace with Sher Khan after his
fruitless siege of Chunar, so that he might be free to pursue his
expedition against Gujarat he had taken with him by way of gua-
rantee a son of Sher Khan variously known as Qutb Khan or ‘Abdur-
Rashid with a small force of Afghans.
The alliance was short and
Qutb Khan had deserted with his followers to join his father. And
while the emperor was engaged in what did not amount to more
than military promenades, or was sitting still to enjoy the temporary
gains of his enterprises, Sher Khan had consolidated his hold on
scuth Bihar without the slightest opposition by Mughul forces, whose
able commander Sultan Junaid Barlas was dead. Humayun after
his return to Agra remained there for a wasted year, at times medi-
tating the recovery of Gujarat and Malwa, where he had an offer
of help from the king of Ahmadnagar, but usually occupied with the
pleasures of social life, which were always apt to distract him from
serious affairs. It was not till the rainy season of 1537 had set in that
he started out to crush or at least check Sher Khan, having made
some attempt to settle the administration of the provinces he still
held. His naturally forgiving disposition, aided by the persuasion of his
sister, led him on the way to accept the submission of her husband
Muhammad Zaman, who after his unsuccessful attempt to rouse the
Punjab had also failed to seize the throne of Gujarat after the death
of Bahadur Shah. ? Travelling by boat along the Jumna and Ganges,
Humayun reached the strong fortress of Chunar which he besieged.
This ancient castle, founded on a steep rock jutting into the Ganges,
was built by the Hindus and strengthened by successive Muslim
rulers. It had come into Sher Khan's possession through his marriage
to a daughter of a governor and was held for him at this time by his
son Qutb Khan. As Humayun approached Qutb Khan withdrew
part of his forces to the forest-covered hills in the neighbourhood
from which he could harass the Mughuls. A siege of several months
ensued during which Rumi Khan, the Turkish gunner who had
deserted from the Gujarat army to join Humayun, made many
unsuccessful attempts to force an entry. Finally he obtained certain
information about the state of the defences by stratagem. An African
slave possessed of some ability and willing to endure hardship was
savagely flogged in the Mughul camp and then managed to enter
1 See chap. III, p. 50.
2 Vol. II, p. 334.
## p. 29 (#61) ##############################################
WAR WITH SHER KHAN
29
the fort, where he showed his wounds and offered to help the garrison
by advice on their defence in revenge for the treatment he had
received. He was thus allowed to inspect the fortifications, and
escaping after a few days was able to tell Rumi Khan where to direct
his fire. A floating battery was moved close to the fort and a breach
made. Though the first assault was driven back the garrison, seeing
the battery being repaired for further work, lost heart and yieldeci
under a promise of amnesty, but this was broken by one of the
Mughul leaders who had the hands of several hundred gunners struck
off. Rumi Khan who was appointed commandant for his services
held his post for only a few days, when he died suddenly, probably
poisoned at the instance of jealous rivals.
As an isolated military exploit the capture of Chunar was notable,
but it commanded no land routes and the time occupied in its
reduction was wasted. Sher Khan, having strengthened his position
in Bihar while Humayun was in western India, had advanced into
Bengal. He was held up for a time at the pass of Teliyagarhi by
the forces of Ghiyas-ud-din Mahmud of Bengal, but finally compelled
him to retreat to his capital at Gaur. During the blockade Mahmud
sought help from Humayun and receiving none fled by boat to
Hajipur and the city was taken soon after. Pursued by Sher Khan's
troops Mahmud barely escaped with his life and reached Humayun's
camp severely wounded. Humayun, after moving the short distance
from Chunar to Benares and halting there, had at last made up his
mind to prevent Sher Khan from acquiring further territory. He
therefore began his march eastwards and met Mahmud near the
confluence of the Son and Ganges (1538). Even now, though he
knew that Sher Khan had seized the capital and treasure of Bengal,
he first sent an envoy to Sher Khan offering him a governorship near
his home if he would surrender his new gains. When the envoy after
some delay returned he brought the news that Sher Khan was already
removing his booty to the hills of south Bihar. The rainy season
having set in Humayun's officers suggested a halt until the country
could be more easily traversed" but the emperor accepted the sug-
gestion of Mahmud that it was best to attack before Sher Khan had
consolidated his power. Accordingly the Mughul forces advanced
into a trap devised by the strategy of Sher Khan. When they reached
the difficult pass at Teliyagarhi they found it strongly defended by
Jalal Khan, a son of Sher Khan. Halting to reconnoitre they were
attacked by Jalal Khan, who had orders from his father to delav
the advance till the treasure was secured, and who observed that the
Mughul forces were carelessly disposed. He inflicted considerable
loss and drove the van back on the main army at Kahalgaon. A
heavy storm which sank Humayun's barge and flooded the country
prevented advance for several days. When a scouting party was
1 Colgong in 25° 16' N. and 87° 14' E.
## p. 30 (#62) ##############################################
30
HUMAYUN
able to move it was discovered that Jalal Khan, who had now
received news of his father's safe arrival in the fastnesses of south
Bihar, had abandoned the defence. Sher Khan had in fact gained
by stratagem the fort of Rohtas as a place of refuge for his family
and treasure now that Chunar was lost.
While the emperor was at Kahalgaon Mahmud received news that
two of his sons had been killed by the Afghans, and still suffering
from his wounds he died from the effects of this last shock. Humayun
now pressed on to seize what he hoped would be a rich prize. But
Gaur, though entered without further opposition, was a desolate
place with corpses still lying in the streets, and the rich granaries
which Mahmud had promised him were wasted. In spite of these
warnings of the vanity of his hopes, Humayun liked the attractive
fertility of the place and gave it the name of Jannatabad, or abode
of Paradise, on the coins he struck to commemorate his success. The
former government having been destroyed there was no opposition
in the country-side to his officers or to his parcelling out the districts
among his followers. Once more reaction set in after an apparently
successful enterprise, and the whole force from emperor to private
soldier devoted itself to ease and pleasure.
Gaur is about 350 miles east of Benares which was the nearest
place really within the Mughul occupation. To secure communica-
tions and supplies Humayun left his brother Hindal on the north
bank of the Ganges, neglecting all precaution on the south, where
the level alluvial plain soon meets the Kaimur range and its eastern
extension. In these hills covered with thorny jungle and hence
known as Jharkhand, Sher Khan found a convenient base from which
to develop his plan of cutting off Humayun from his capital. Hindal
soon deserted his post in north Bihar and there were grounds for
suspecting his loyalty, while Sher Khan rapidly overran the south
as far as the river, and crossing it took Benares. He sent his son Jalal
Khan to besiege Jaunpur, arrested and imprisoned the families of
the leading men in the district, and invested Chunar. Though the
governor of Jaunpur still held the city, reinforcements which arrived
from Oudh were roughly handled by Jalal Khan owing to the rash-
ness of their leader.
Humayun's officers, who for a time had successfully concealed from
him the serious events which were taking place, were now alarmed.
He himself realised that further delay would entail complete loss
of his position, and he was spurred by finding that the officer whom
he designated to hold Bengal while he attempted to cut his way
through Sher Khan's forces regarded such promotion as equivalent
to a sentence of death. Delay had once more placed him in the
unfavourable position of a campaign during the rainy season and as
his force laboured through the adhesive mud of the Ganges valley
in 1539, he received news that his vanguard had been taken in the
## p. 31 (#63) ##############################################
DISASTROUS RETREAT FROM BENGAL
31
town of Monghyr and its leader captured. In doubt as to the best
method of advance he offered through his brother 'Askari to grant
any boons to those who could suggest suitable plans. 'Askari
'
would have asked for money, silks, slaves and eunuchs, but
the officers of the army, impressed by their critical situation and
perhaps less corrupted by the recent period of sensuality and luxury,
were content with rank, and better pay for themselves and their
troops. When 'Askari advanced he found that Sher Khan had not
only gained the victories already reported, but had also sent troops
as far as Kanauj and had styled himself Shah or King. Humayun
now joined 'Askari on the north bank of the Ganges opposite Monghyr,
and would have been wise to pursue his march on that side. Accepting,
however, the advice of an unworthy favourite against that of more
experienced and reliable officers, he crossed to the south bank, which
was the more usual route. When the Mughul army reached the con-
fluence of the Son and Ganges the Afghan forces of Sher Khan were
in sight, and the great gun made by Rumi Khan for the siege of
Chunar was taken by them in the boat which was conveying it up
the river. So far only slight opposition had been met with and the
army was able to reach Chausa, a short distance from the Karamnasa
which divides Bihar from the territory of Benares.
Here it was necessary to halt in view of the uncertainty as to Sher
Khan's exact position. His near approach was certain and he had
in fact withdrawn his troops from the siege of Jaunpur and arrived
near the western bank of the river as Humayun reached the eastern.
Once again Humayun rejected the sound advice of his officers who
pointed out that his troops were that day comparatively fresh after
a short march, while Sher Khan's cavalry had ridden many miles.
An immediate attack might have given him victory. But he preferred
his favourite's plan merely to cross the river and postpone the struggle.
The delay favoured Sher Khan, who set about fortifying his camp,
knowing that the Mughul army would deteriorate and was already
weakened by its long march and absence of the stimulus of success.
From his brothers Humayun could rely on no help. Hindal had
abandoned his post on the line of communications when Humayun
advanced into Bengal, and was living in the palace at Agra where he
enjoyed the outward forms of power without using them for the
benefit of the state. But while his immediate advisers traded on his
youth and inexperience other officers saw more clearly the dangers
which threatened. Faqr 'Ali, the governor of Delhi, with difficulty
persuaded Hindal to mobilise the troops available at Agra and to
move them east. He also visited Yadgar Nasir at Kalpi lower down
the Jumna and planned a concentration in southern Oudh which
would threaten Sher Khan's designs on Jaunpur. These wise designs
were, however, ruined by the arrival at Kanauj of Mughul officers
who had abandoned Humayun in Bengal, including Zahid Beg, who
>
## p. 32 (#64) ##############################################
32
HUMAYUN
had declined to remain there as governor. They found Nur-ud-din
Muhammad, who was in charge of Kanauj, favourable to their dis-
loyal proposals though he was married to Humayun's sister. Offering
their services to Hindal they at once advanced to Kol ("Aligarh).
where they would be in a position to join Hindal or to move farther
west to Kamran in the Punjab if Hindal did not meet their wishes.
Hindal, though he received their message graciously, was not yet
prepared to declare his own independence and despatched news of
their arrival to Yadgar Mirza. Before it reached its destination the
rebels informed Hindal that while they were prepared to give him
support if he would stand forth as emperor they would join Kamrar.
if he declined. Hindal now decided to revolt, but was for a few days
held back by the remonstrances of Shaikh Phul, whom Humayun
sent from Gaur on first hearing of Hindal's departure from his post.
The Shaikh, like his more celebrated brother Muhammad Ghaus,
was a renowned religious teacher and was Humayun's own spiritual
adviser. His message of remonstrance accompanied by offers of for-
giveness and affection seemed at first likely to recall Hindal to
allegiance. Orders were issued to equip and despatch forces to raise
the siege of Jaunpur. Unfortunately Nur-ud-din arrived while these
measures were being expedited and he was able to destroy the whole
effect of the Shaikh's mission, and Hindal was persuaded once more
to accept the support of the rebel nobles, for which they demander
the sacrifice of Shaikh Phul as he had caused Hindal to break his
former promises to them. They hoped that Hindal, involved in such
a disgraceful crime, would be irretrievably separated from Humayun,
whom they hated and despised. A frivolous charge of conspiracy
with Sher Khan” was laid and the Shaikh was executed under the
orders of Nur-ud-din. Such a crime revolted the ladies of the palace
and all officers who still remained faithful to Humayun. It marked
indeed the destruction of Hindal's ambitious designs, for when he
advanced on Delhi instead of marching to assist the emperor, Yadgar
Nasir and Fagr 'Ali forestalled him by hasty marches and reached
that city before he arrived. While Hindal was unsuccessfully be-
sieging Delhi Kamran arrived from the Punjab. Humayun's genero-
sity had placed him in a commanding position which he had improved
by successful expeditions. The capture of Qandahar completed his
domination over practically the whole of Afghanistan and the Funjab.
He now moved towards Humayun's territory and Hindal, uncertain
as to his intentions, abandoned the siege of Delhi and withdrew to
Agra. If Kamran had really exerted himself and pressed on to attack
Sher Khan it is possible that the emperor might have come out of
his difficulties with some success. But although Kamran was per-
suaded to leave Delhi untouched and to follow Hindal to Agra his
1 Buhlul, according to some writers.
2 He was said to have secretly collected military stores; Humayun-nama. p. 133.
## p. 33 (#65) ##############################################
SHER KHAN DEFEATS HUMAYUN
33
intentions were completely selfish. On Kamran's approach Hindal
withdrew to his own government at Alwar, but soon was persuaded
to offer his submission, together with the rebel officers who were
almost his sole adherents. The brothers did indeed set out as if to
march to Humayun's help, but the ambition of Kamran and the
weakness of Hindal made them yield to the suggestion of the nobles
that if Sher Khan defeated Humayun the empire would fall to his
brother and that if the emperor won he could be persuaded to forgive
them. So after a few marches they turned back to Agra just as
Humayun's affairs reached a crisis.
He was indeed in a critical position, having missed his first oppor-
tunity to engage in battle before Sher Khan was ready. During more
than two months of scorching weather he had lain in an open camp
and now the rainy season had arrived which made military tactics
difficult. Before him was the strongly entrenched camp of the
Afghans; on his right flank lay the Ganges, its stream swelling as
the snows melted in the Himalayas and the monsoon rains added to
its volume; on the left were the hills with Sher Khan's stronghold
of Rohtas. No help was to be expected from his brothers and after
some fruitless skirmishing he made overtures for peace. Sher Khan
at first replied that while the Mughul army wished for peace the
emperor had made war. He himself also desired peace but his army
was for fighting. Later he sent his own spiritual adviser who entered
on negotiations, the terms of which are variously stated. Humayun
was to give up Bihar and, according to some accounts, Bengal and
also the prized fortress of Chunar but was to retain sovereignty, as
shown by the right to strike coin. With their affairs settled to outward
appearance the Mughul forces were negligently disposed, and Sher
Khan had beaten off a Hindu ally who was supporting Humayun.
Seizing his opportunity for destroying his opponent Sher Khan sent
a force across the Karamnasa as if to occupy Bihar and secretly
instructed his main army to attack the Mughul camp in two places
and also to prevent escape across the Ganges. Their surprise was
complete and the attack was well developed before Humayun was
awake (26 June, 1539). He sprang on a horse and collected a small
guard, endeavouring to save his empress, but was unable to reach the
tents and would have been killed but for his own personal bravery.
The royal harem, crowded with fugitive wives of Mughul officers, was
captured and protected by Sher Khan, while Humayun, attempting
to cross the Ganges on horseback, was forced to use the inflated skin
offered him by a water-carrier when he had lost his seat. The rout
was complete and the Mughul army practically destroyed.
Exulting in his victory Sher Khan related that it had been foretold
in a dream the night before, and he promised a safe-conduct to the
ladies of the Mughul court, a promise which he honoured later. While
Humayun and 'Askari made their way with difficulty to Agra, Sher
## p. 34 (#66) ##############################################
34
HUMAYUN
Khan advanced into Bengal and there defeated the governor left by
Humayun and scattered his small force completely. While he was
thus engaged the four brothers had come together. Humayun either
through a sense of the weakness of his own position or through genuine
fraternal love had forgiven, at once, Kamran's failure to come to his
help and, after a formal rebuke, Hindal's open rebellion. He still
hoped to defeat Sher Khan and refused to accept Kamran's offer,
prompted by ambitious and selfish aims, to lead the fresh troops from
the Punjab against the enemy. Kamran, seeing the failure of his
design to become the master of Hindustan, wished to return to the
Punjab where his rule was undisputed, and in spite of Humayun's
opposition was at last able to depart owing to ill-health which he
attributed openly to the climate of Agra, but secretly believed was
due to poison administered by Babur's widows at the instigation of
Humayun.
Sher Khan, having now consolidated his position in Bengal, re-
turned along the north bank of the Ganges and felt himself strong
enough to attack the Mughuls. A preliminary expedition led by his
son Qutb Khan against Yadgar Mirza, who still held Kalpi, was a
failure and Qutb Khan lost his life. Excited by this success, Humayun
advanced early in 1540 from Agra towards the Ganges and Sher
Khan retreated across it. The Mughul army though probably twice
the size of Sher Khan's was no longer the equal of Babur's trained
forces. Many of its best soldiers had perished in the fruitless expedi-
tion to Bengal. As the force drew near the enemy it was abandoned
by numbers of experienced leaders, especially those who had joined
from Kamran's troops. An exception was that of Mirza Haidar
Dughlat, a first cousin of Babur, who had been greatly trusted by
Kamran and had been left by him in charge of Lahore when he
made his successful raid on Qandahar. Both the brothers sought to
retain his services and he finally decided to serve Humayun, who had
• treated him as a brother, in the honest belief that if Sher Khan were
not defeated he would drive all the Mughuls, including Kamran, out
of India. The two armies lay facing each other near Kanauj with
the broad bed of the Ganges between. As defections continued it was
clear that Humayun must fight or would find himself a leader without
an army. Accordingly the river was crossed and small engagements
took place. Before any general battle had occurred the rainy season
began unduly early and the Mughul camp in the low land near the
river was flooded. Mirza Haidar suggested a bold maneuvre to mask
a change to a better position near the enemy. This was difficult to
carry out as the camp was thronged with many thousands of fol-
lowers and the army would be an easy prey if attacked during the
confusion of a move. On 17 May, 1540, the Mughul artillery was
sent to the front and the guns and wagons were chained together,
so that the camp followers could march behind their protection if an
## p. 35 (#67) ##############################################
2
HUMAYUN FLEES TO THE PUNJAB
35
attack was made. Sher Khan moved out his forces against them,
while the Mughuls were still in confusion with their numerous non-
combatants pressing on behind the guns in such masses that the
chains were broken. The leaders were incapable and cowardly and
many of them fled for their lives as they saw the Afghan troops arrive.
Humayun with his usual personal bravery tried to rally his men, but
was forced to fly. Mirza Haidar laments that 40,000 men in armour
fled before 10,000 without a single cannon being fired. A few miles
behind them lay the river in which many perished, encumbered by
their armour. Humayun crossed with difficulty on an elephant but
only a few of the thousand men immediately accompanying him
succeeded in escaping. As the small band rode towards Agra it was
attacked by Chauhan Thakurs at Bhongaon ? and the refusal of
'Askari to help in chastising the assailants moved Humayun's wrath.
At Agra, the capital, there was no chance of a rally. So great was
their distress that Humayun, who had lost a daughter after the battle
of Chausa, discussed with Hindal the question of killing their female
relations to avoid capture by the Afghans, but was dissuaded and
Hindal conducted them to Lahore, often having to beat off attacks
by the villagers on the route. The emperor's small party rode in
confusion towards Delhi till the news that a party of Afghans was
following roused Humayun to instil some order into his small fol-
lowing. After a couple of days' halt at Delhi he hurried on to Lahore,
forced to cross rivers swollen by rain without the help of boats. Close
behind them came the Afghans, who occupied Agra and Delhi with-
out opposition. At Lahore all four brothers met, Hindal and 'Askari
having visited the headquarters of their charges on the way to collect
what treasure could be recovered. Even in the presence of imminent
danger from the Afghans concord was impossible. With Humayun
driven out of Hindustan Kamran saw that he was likely to have to
give up his own possessions in the Punjab and Afghanistan, and the
danger of this made him disinclined to join in a hazardous resistance
to Sher Khan which might involve the waste of his own resources.
As Sher Khan overran the Punjab the need for action increased.
Humayun sent him a request to allow Sirhind to be the boundary
and received a contemptuous warning that he should withdraw to
Kabul. Kamran hoped that he could at least maintain his hold on
the west if he held the rugged tribal country between India and
Afghanistan. Humayun, while brave in tactical affairs, failed him-
self to produce any strategical plan. He was pressed by Mirza
Haidar to withdraw to the Punjab hills and shelter in Kashmir,
while Hindal and Yadgar Mirza suggested a movement through
Sind to reconquer Gujarat from which Hindustan might be again
invaded. While the brothers wrangled, Kamran treacherously sent
1 The manuscripts read variously hasht=eight, or shast=sixty.
2 In 27° 17' N. and 79° 14' E.
## p. 36 (#68) ##############################################
36
HUMAYUN
a message to offer his assistance to Sher Khan if he were left alone.
An ambassador from Sher Khan was received as if he had come to
the court of Humayun, while secret negotiations continued. Sher
Khan crossed the Beas and the brothers abandoned Lahore in a rout
described as being as confused as the Day of Resurrection. The
treachery of Kamran was now so well known in the Mughul camp that
Humayun was urged to have him killed, but the memory of Babur's
dying wishes was still too fresh on his mind to allow him to agree to
fratricide. He determined to adopt Mirza Haidar's scheme for the con-
quest of Kashmir and moved in that direction. Before he had advanced
far a threatening movement by Kamran was reported and his army,
disgusted with the treachery of the latter, was eager to oppose him
by arms. Humayun in his anxiety to avoid a contest which could
only have weakened the Mughul strength refused to show a hostile
appearance to his brother, and the meeting was thus peaceful. It
ended with the departure of Kamran for his governorship at Kabul
accompanied by his brother 'Askari. But Humayun's clemency con-
vinced Hindal that his brother was wanting in the firmness which at
that time was necessary for one who sought to rule in India. And
just as Kamran had pursued his self-seeking aims by leaving the
emperor when most in need of help, so Hindal abandoned him and
set out on a vain expedition to pursue his scheme of conquering Sind
and then Gujarat again and making it a base for further attacks on
Hindustan. In this expedition he was joined by still more adherents
from Humayun's shrinking forces.
Mirza Haidar's plan for capturing Kashmir was sound in every
way. His previous experience in 1533, when he had raided the
country as a general of the king of Kashghar, had shown him what
little resistance could be expected in a country torn by faction, and
he knew and pointed out that a determined force holding it could
repel any army of men from the plains, hampered by the difficulty
of travel and the absence of supplies. He was, moreover, sure of
support from one of the parties in the state. It had been arranged
that he should enter Kashmir from Naushahra and he marched in
advance of Humayun. When the emperor followed him and reached
Bhera, where he hoped to obtain the assistance of the local governor,
he found that Kamran had already preceded him and forestalled his
hopes. Once more he was urged to assert himself and brush Kamran
from his path, but refused as he had done at Lahore. A proposal
that he should retreat through Kabul to Badakhshan was rejected by
Kamran, whose treacherous nature led him to suspect that Humayun
might dispossess him from Kabul and advance no farther. The road
to Naushahra being blocked and it being impossible for Humayun
to stay between an envious and unscrupulous brother on one hand
and the victorious Sher Khan who was pressing on from Lahore, he
1 Vol. II, p. 287,
## p. 37 (#69) ##############################################
ATTEMPTS TO TAKE SIND
37
decided to abandon the hope of Kashmir and to follow Hindal to
Sind (end of 1540). He had hardly started when again a collision
with Kamran was imminent. Their forces met in a defile of the Salt
Range near Khushab, at the end of which the roads towards Sind
and Kabul diverged, and a dispute arose as to which should pass
through it first. Kamran's thinly veiled intention of assuming the
headship of the family appeared more clearly than ever when he
asserted his own right of precedence, and for once Humayun's pride
was stung and battle seemed inevitable. It was averted only by the
remonstrances of a man of saintly reputation in the train of Kamran.
Thus began a wearying exile which lasted for nearly 15 years and
was endured only by the greatest fortitude and perseverance, though
it was constantly prolonged by Humayun's inability to command
respect and faithful allegiance. Before he could join Hindal news
came that the country round Multan, which had been ceded to Babur
by the Arghun ruler of Sind, was in a state of anarchy. Hindal's
force had met and overwhelmed a small escort of Afghans accom-
panying Kamran's messenger to Sher Khan, but was unable to face
the Baloch raiders who had overrun the country and cut off what
scanty supplies were available. Hindal was thus compelled to return
and the brothers met, but were almost immediately faced with the
danger of attack by Khavass Khan, an Afghan general who had taken
Multan and was searching for them, but retired to headquarters
as he could get no news of them.
longing glances across the Hindu Kush.
The question naturally presents itself: how did Babur keep such
1 Akbar-nama, p. 276.
? Hodivala, p. 262.
## p. 19 (#51) ##############################################
BABUR'S CHARACTER
19
a detailed record of his own doings from the age of eleven (A. H. 899) ?
Not only his own doings, but those of his relations are recorded in
full detail. And whence did he derive all this information, bio-
graphical and geographical? Mirza Haidar Dughlat had the same
gift: he tells us he wrote the Tarikh-i-Rashidi because the memory
of the Mughuls and their Khans—i. e. the eastern branch of the
Chaghatai-stood in danger of being altogether lost through want of
a chronicler. The earlier Mongols, Chingiz and his descendants, had
been fortunate in their chroniclers in their own day. It was the
descendants of Tamerlane, however, Babur, Mirza Haidar, Gulbadan
Begam, who first among princes undertook to write autobiographies,
while Humayun, Jahangir (for part of his reign) and Shah Jahan
were content to have their memoirs written by personal attendants.
There are very few examples in history of a great conqueror who was
also an eminent poet, though many soldiers, like Julius Caesar and
Xenophon, have been men of letters. Babur was a sufficiently good
poet (in Turki) to have become famous on that account alone, had
he achieved no fame as a soldier or ruler.
In writing an epitome of the emperor Babur's career, having in
view only the part he played in the history of his times, the romantic
side of this remarkable man's personal character has perforce been
relegated to the background: but in conclusion a few words may be
said regarding his private life.
Babur was one of those men who are so active in mind and body
that they are never idle and always find time for everything. Excepting
during the three years when he was hiding in Tashkent under the
protection of the Sultan of Kashghar he knew no rest, and he himself
says towards the end of his life that he had never kept the Fast of
Ramazan twice in any one place. He was pre-eminently human,
and has drawn a picture of himself in his memoirs in which no attempt
is made to hide either his virtues or his vices. He was a rigid Sunni
Muslim, and both orthodox and superstitious in his beliefs. When in
order to please the Shiah Shah Isma'il he adopted the Qizilbash
head-dress for himself and his soldiers, he showed a form of mora!
courage reminding one of his grandson Akbar, who while still pro-
fessing Islam displayed the utmost leniency towards Hindus and
Christians : and if Babur's motive was purely political, it required
no little self-reliance to face the sarcasm and derision which this
head-dress provoked among the zealous Sunnis of Transoxiana: not
to mention the hatred in which the name of Shah Isma'il was held
by reason of his cruelty towards the Sunnis of Khurasan.
As a soldier Babur was, like most of his race, fearless in battle, and
as a general he was a great tactician with a keen eye to detect any
mistake on the part of his opponents. He was also one of the first
military commanders in Asia to appreciate the value of artillery.
As a diplomatist he seems to have shown much more cunning and
## p. 20 (#52) ##############################################
20
BABUR
skill in dealing with the Afghans than with his own people and
the manner in which he played off the rebellious amirs of Sultan
Ibrahim against each other was worthy of a Machiaveili.
While inheriting a savagery common to all the Mongols and
Turks, and a total disregard for human life, he was capable of great
generosity in forgiving those who had behaved ill towards him. Like
all his family he was strongly addicted to intemperance, though his
drinking bouts were always followed by very sincere repentance.
He had a love for the beauties of nature probably rare in his day,
something apart from a delight in the artificial beauties of poetry,
which was common to all his co-religionists whether Turks or Persians.
His careful descriptions of the animals and plants of India reves)
great powers of observation. These portions of his memoirs read like
the notes of a peace-loving naturalist rather than those of a restless
warrior.
The Memoirs of Babur must be reckoned among the most enthral-
ling and romantic works in the literature of all time. They were
written in that form of Turkish known as Turki, which was Bahur's
mother-tongue. As we possess them they are not complete; all the
copies known to us contain gaps from 1508 to 1519, from 1520 to
1525 and from 1529 to 1530. A more complete copy was apparently
known to his cousin Mirza Haidar, the author of the Tarikh-i-Rashidi.
but the translation into Persian made in 1589 by Khan Khanan
'Abdur-Rahim, the son of Bairam Khan, contains the same gaps as
the Haidarabad Codex, from which Mrs Annette Beveridge made
her admirable English translation.
Babur was a real poet, and apart from the incidental verses intro-
duced in his memoirs we have from his pen a small collection of
Turki lyrics, which bear comparison with the best poetry of his day!
He also wrote a religious pcem called the Mubayyin, and about two
years before his death he wrote a versified rendering of the Risala-i-
Walidiyya, a pious tract written by the famous Khwaja Ahrar in
honour of his parents:
See Divan-i-Babur Padishah, edited with facsimile by E. Denison Ross.
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1910. This edition was based on a
unique MS. in the library of the Nawab of Rampur:
## p. 21 (#53) ##############################################
CHAPTER II
HUMAYUN
ALTHOUGH Babur had recognised his eldest son Humayun as
successor to the large territory he had acquired, the new ruler's
position was extremely insecure. As he lay dying Babur had warned
Humayun of the possibility of claims by the three other brothers and
had charged him always to forgive their faults.
By force of arms the Mughuls had imposed themselves on northern
India, but they had been so occupied in fighting that they had hardly
begun to rule, and India was still only an outlying portion of the
realm, Kabul being the proper capital and centre. Their generals
were still soldiers and not administrators, and, as Babur had said on
his first conquest of Kabul, the scheme of government was still saifi
(by the sword) not qalami (by the pen). To strengthen his position
Babur had invited members of the families of Timur and Chingiz
freely to join him. Not a few with royal blood in their veins were
possible claimants to the throne recently vacated. In the occupied
area were many turbulent elements excited by the century of chaos
which had followed Timur's invasion, and among these, especially
towards the east, were many Afghans belonging to the last dynasty
which had ruled. Babur had met and defeated the Rajputs, but had
not subdued them, and they, more than the other sections of Indians
in the north, had a strong national instinct. South-east of Rajputana
lay Gujarat, where Bahadur Shah was reviving and extending the
kingdom of his predecessors. "
Humayun, taking his insecure seat on the throne four days after
his father's death, assigned the westerly Punjab, Kabul and Qandahar
to be governed by his brother Kamran, and made smaller provisions
for the two younger brothers. He then proceeded early in 1531 to
besiege the strong fortress of Kalinjar in Bundelkhand, which might
be used as a base for attacks on the lower Duab. During these
operations he received news that Mahmud Lodi, brother of the late
king Ibrahim Lodi, who had received support in Bengal, had invaded
the east of his territory and taken Jaunpur. Humayun marched
rapidly towards Jaunpur and defeated the Afghans. They were
scattered for a time, but Sher Khan, who was reported to have failed
to support Mahmud Lodi at the critical time and was the ables!
1 There was even a plot in favour of Mahdi Khvaja, brother-in-law of Babu:.
(Humayun-nama, pp. 25 and 298. )
2 See vol. II, chap XIII.
3 The site of the battle was probably in the Daunrua estate, on the banks of
the Sai river, 15 miles east of Jaunpur.
4 For Sher Khan's earlier history see chap. III.
## p. 22 (#54) ##############################################
22
HUMAYUN
leader among them, began a fresh concentration. In order to break
this up Humayun despatched an army to invest the stronghold of
Chunar on the Ganges south of Benares, and followed it himself.
Before any results could be obtained other embarrassments led him
to arrange a peace by which Sher Khan was left to continue his plans
for an Afghan supremacy in the east. Kamran, since his father's
death, had cherished hopes of gaining the whole of Babur's territory
in spite of the ample provision he had received. Leaving his brother
'Askari in charge of Qandahar he advanced with an army to Lahore
which he secured by a cunning stratagem, as the governor refused
to be false to his trust. At the same time he continued to assure
Humayun of his loyalty and actually received a further grant
of territory round Hissar Firuza which had been Humayun's own
governorship and for some generations to come was regarded as the
holding of the Mughul heir apparent.
While his hold over his own territory was thus weakened through
the claims of a treacherous brother and the open attempts of the
Afghans, Humayun was forced to take notice of affairs outside.
Suspecting the loyalty of Muhammad Zaman Mirza, who was not
only his brother-in-law but was also descended like himself from Timur,
and had been appointed by Babur governor of Bihar, he removed
him from office in 1533 and placed him in confinement at Bayana.
Muhammad Zaman escaped and offered his services to Bahadur
Shah, king of Gujarat, while a cousin named Muhammad Sultan and
his son who had been plotting with him were seized and sentenced
to be blinded. The peaceful relations which existed between Gujarat
and Agra were broken by the refusal of Bahadur Shah to turn away
the fugitives and by the terms of the letter sent in his name to
Humayun. His continued extension of authority towards central
India and Rajputana also aroused jealousy and some alarm. Humayun
received an application for help from the Rana of Chitor who was
in danger of being crushed by his ambitious neighbour, and although
Humayun's religious principles would not allow him to aid an
unbeliever against an enemy of his own faith, he marched to Gwalior
late in 1534 and called on Bahadur Shah to stop his enterprise against
the Rana and again demanded the fugitives. Despairing of help
from Agra the Rana came to terms with Bahadur Shah and Humayun
hoped to be able to attend to his eastern possessions where Afghan
intrigue was most dangerous.
Peace between Chitor and Gujarat was, however, short, and
Bahadur Shah not only renewed his attack but also sent a strong
force to resist the Mughul power. This army was commanded by
Tatar Khan Lodi, whose father ‘Ala-ud-din was one of the Afghan
kings of Delhi, and had himself, after two unsuccessful attempts on
the throne, been banished by Babur to Badakhshan, and escaping
i See vol. III, p. 329.
## p. 23 (#55) ##############################################
INVASION OF GUJARAT
23
thence was one of the refugees in Gujarat. While 'Ala-ud-din took
one force towards Kalinjar and another threatened the Punjab, Tatar
Khan moved directly on Agra. He was successful in taking Bayana
and his advance troops even raided the suburbs of Agra.
Humayun now displayed better qualities of determination than
hitherto. He directed his brothers Hindal and 'Askari who were at
Agra to attack the invaders and himself moved through eastern
Malwa to Sarangpur, receiving the capitulation of the strong fortress
of Raisen on the way. Tatar Khan's army, in spite of its initial success,
did not await the Mughul forces under 'Askari. Most of his troops
abandoned him with their booty and having only a few thousand
horse remaining with him he was overwhelmed and slain by 'Askari
at Mandrel. 'Ala-ud-din's force, threatened by Humayun himself,
withdrew to Gujarat, and the army which had marched towards the
Punjab also returned.
When Humayun reached Sarangpur Chitor had not fallen, and a
council was held in the Gujarat camp to decide whether the siege
should be pressed or the Mughul enemy met. It was correctly guessed
that Humayun would not fight a Muslim king while he was engaged
against an unbeliever like the Rana, and efforts were redoubled to
take the fortress. The Gujarat artillery prevailed at last, and while
the women of the city perished voluntarily in flames the remnant
of the garrison hurled themselves to death against the weapons of
the besiegers. As the end of the siege was approaching Humayun
had moved on into Gujarat territory till he reached Mandasor only
60 miles from Chitor, and once again Bahadur Shah had to make
choice of his plan of campaign. This time he rejected the advice of
his most acute councillor who wished him to attack Humayun at
once with troops elated by their recent success. He decided to remain
on the defensive and rely on his superior artillery to repel the
Mughuls. An entrenched camp in such a position was merely a trap.
When the besieged made a sally they were easily defeated in the
open field by the Mughuls even with odds in their favour, and rarely
succeeded in drawing them close enough to bring them under
artillery fire. As the siege continued supplies ran short and could
not be replaced. The garrison was dying of starvation and Bahadur
Shah decided to escape. With a few attendants he left the camp in
the night (March, 1535) and made his way to Mandu with Mallu
Qadir Khan, the governor of that place, while some of the surviving
troops either followed him or were led by Muhammad Zaman Mirza
to cause revolt in the Punjab.
The tumult of departure added to the explosion of cannon made
the Mughuls believe that they were about to be attacked and their
forces were drawn up in readiness. As daylight appeared the truth
was known and they broke into the camp and divided the spoil.
A body of horse was sent in pursuit of the fugitives and Humayun
## p. 24 (#56) ##############################################
2+
HUMAYUN
followed it to Mandu. This vast fortress with a battlemented wall
23 miles in length stands on an isolated plateau 2079 feet above the
sea. Its size and the length of its defences have frequently enabled
surprise attacks to penetrate its walls, though later it held out for
six months when besieged by Akbar. Bahadur Shah opened negotia-
tions for peace in which the cession of Malwa to Humayun was
proposed, but while the terms were still being discussed a small
body of Mughuls forced their way over an unguarded part of the
walls and opened the nearest gate. Mallu Khan at once warned
Bahadur Shah, who tried to escape and meeting a Mughul force cut
his way through and reached the citadel. Despairing of his ability
to hold this he ordered his horses to be raised and lowered over the
wall and fled to Champaner” while the Mughul army sacked Mandu.
For the time being the whole of Malwa lay at the mercy of Humayun,
who followed up his success by a hasty pursuit of Bahadur Shah.
As the Mughul troops reached Champaner, Bahadur Shah, after
setting fire to the town, fled north to Cambay where he halted only
to destroy the fleet he had prepared to combat the Portuguese, and
escaped thence to Diu, evading Humayun by only a few hours and
cutstripping the force which pursued him. Humayun at Cambay
was the first of his house to see the ocean. During his halt there his
small escort had a narrow escape from being overwhelmed by the
local chieftains who were tributary to Bahadur Shah, and who planned
a night attack. Though they were able to plunder the camp during
the night Humayun had been warned of the design by an old woman
of the neighbourhood whose son had been enslaved by the Mughuls
and who hoped by this service to gain his release. As light appeared
the marauders were attacked and driven off with great slaughter.
When Bahadur Shah had fled from Humayun before Chitor, his
chief artillery officer, a Turk called Rumi Khan, had deserted to the
Mughul side and had remained with Humayun. He was now
approached by an emissary from Bahadur Shah, who by a skilful
mixture of abuse and persuasion induced him to dissuade Humayun
from an attack on Diu. Humayun was convinced that the air of the
seashore did not suit him and he returned to Champaner which was
being stoutly defended by Ikhtiyar Khan, a Gujarat general.
Though this magnificent city had been laid in ashes after an
existence of only 50 years the citadel was still intact, well equipped
for a siege, and situated in difficult jungle through the concealed
paths of which the people of the country could take fresh supplies.
The Mughul army was not well supplied for siege operations and
four months passed without any progress being made. Success was
finally due to the intelligence of the emperor fortified by his personal
bravery. While reconnoitring the position he saw some villagers come
I For a-description see G. Yazdani, Mandu, 1929.
2 In 22° 29' N. , 73° 32' E.
## p. 25 (#57) ##############################################
FAILURE TO HOLD GUJARAT
25
out of the woods and as their explanations were not satisfactory he
had them beaten. They then guided the Mughuls to the foot of the
walls. Though these could not be breached Humayun at once devised
a means of scaling them by driving spikes into the mortar between
the stones, and on a moonlight night, while a furious attack was made
on other parts of the fortress 300 men climbed the wall, Humayun
himself being the fortieth. This unexpected attack inside the citadel,
with the news that the emperor himself was in command, terrified
the defenders, who allowed Humayun's party to capture a gate.
Ikhtiyar Khan although safe in the upper fort had not sufficient
munitions there to prolong his resistance and was forced to surrender
on 9 August, 1535. Since its foundation Champaner had been a
repository for the treasure of the Gujarat kings and Humayun's army
was enriched by great booty. One of Bahadur Shah's officers whom
Humayun plied with drink, instead of putting to the torture as his
counsellors advised, revealed great treasures hidden in a reservoir
and well. The capture of the two celebrated forts at Mandu and
Champaner so delighted Humayun that he commemorated his vic-
lories by striking coin at these places.
While Humayun had thus beaten down open resistance, had taken
strongholds and had assumed the outward appearance of sovereignty,
he took no steps to consolidate his rule and wasted months in revelry
and enjoyment of his booty. An army sent by Shah Husain of Sind
to help in his campaign against Gujarat was diverted by a bribe
offered by the governor of Patan in the north of the kingdom who stili
held out for Bahadur Shah, and it finally returned as Shah Husain
feared that his troops might be corrupted by the luxury of the imperial
army. Bahadur Shah in his retreat at Diu was approached by the
chiefs in the north of his lost kingdom, who offered to remit their land
revenue to him as the Mughuls were taking no steps to collect it.
He commissioned 'Imad-ul-Mulk to march to Ahmadabad with full
powers over collection and remission. As the new governor progressed,
taking steps to restore administration, he was joined by considerable
forces and was able to recruit more by using the funds he had col-
lected. Humayun, though he easily fell into habits of sloth and
luxury during success, could always rouse himself when danger was
apparent. He marshalled forces and sending his brother 'Askari in
advance went to meet 'Imad-ul-Mulk. Although the latter was able
to surprise 'Askari at a disadvantage and plunder his camp, the
Mughul army reformed and won the battle which ensued. Humayun
then advanced to and occupied Ahmadabad and at last took steps
to organise the newly acquired province. He placed 'Askari in charge
as viceroy with Hindu Beg, an experienced general, to aid him and
appointed officials to other posts. His advisers pressed him in view
of the disturbances and rebellion which were taking part in the east
of his realm to restore Gujarat to Bahadur Shah. So far was he from
## p. 26 (#58) ##############################################
26
HUMAYUN
taking this sound advice that he planned to attack Diu where Bahadur
Shah was sheltering.
Malwa had been left in such haste, with no arrangements for the
proper government of the province, that it had been invaded by
former officials and the Mughul troops had been driven to Ujjain.
Humayun decided to return to Mandu which had greatly attracted
him, and his arrival there was sufficient for the time to quell opposi-
tion. His departure from Gujarat was, however, the signal for
disaster in that tract; Bahadur Shah still had a fleet, and his people
held one or two ports on the coast. With help from the Portuguese
and a body of African slaves he was able to re-establish a stronger
footing and took town after town. There was no master mind to
direct the sending of reinforcements and 'Askari showed more dis-
position to call in troops to ensure his own safety than to help his
subordinates. Moreover, detachments of Gujarat forces left scattered
in the north and east when Bahadur Shah abandoned Chitor were
now coming together. Ghazanfar, who was a foster brother of
'Askari, deserted after being confined for a rude jest at the viceroy
and offered to disclose to Bahadur Shah full details of the Mughul
position at Ahmadabad, which he described as so precarious thai
*Askari would fly if attacked. The local chiefs in Gujarat, who had
found no reason to prefer the new rulers, also urged their former
king to return, promising him their assistance.
While Bahadur Shah was rallying his former subjects, collecting
troops and approaching Ahmadabad, his opponent 'Askari began to
lose heart. No help was to be expected from Humayun, and a section
of 'Askari's advisers urged him to declare himself independent of his
brother in the hope that such a measure would be popular in the
locality and an encouragement to the troops. Bahadur Shah had
arrived within a few miles of Ahmadabad and the Mughul army
moved out to meet him. Although 'Askari was not prepared to set
himself up against Humayun he was convinced that retreat was
necessary, and his counsellors planned to take what treasure was
left in Champaner and to make for Agra where they still hoped to
persuade 'Askari to assume the royal title. After a bombardment
which nearly led Bahadur Shah to execute Ghazanfar, as he had fore-
told no opposition, the Mughuls abandoned their camp and even
their private baggage and hastened towards Champaner. Their flight
encouraged Bahadur Shah to pursue them rapidly and even to attack
the rear-guard. This, however, turned on the Gujarat force with
such bravery that the Mughuls were able to reach the Mahi river,
and to cross it, though not without loss owing to the hastiness of their
flight. Thirty miles beyond it lay Champaner where 'Askari hoped
to secure treasure and supplies. In this he was disappointed, as Tardi
Beg, the governor, was faithful to Humayun, to whom he had already
sent news of the plan for 'Askari's independence. Accordingly, while
## p. 27 (#59) ##############################################
REVOLT IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES
27
he refreshed the troops he gave no access to the fort and in reply
to demands for its contents urged that he must await Humayun's
orders. Hindered in their plans the officers of the army now proposed
to seize Tardi Beg by stratagem, to take the treasure, and to proclaim
'Askari. Tardi Beg, however, evaded capture and bade them move.
As their camp still surrounded the fort he used his artillery and drove
them off towards Agra. News of their departure drew on Bahadur
Shah, who had halted at the river. Tardi Beg, either on instructions
from Humayun or unwilling in the circumstances to stand a siege,
then carried off as much of the treasure as he could to Mandu where
he was praised for his bravery by the emperor. Thus ended for the
time the Mughul occupation of Gujarat which had lasted barely more
than a year (1535-6).
Impressed by the fuller news which Tardi Beg was able to give
him Humayun was convinced of the necessity for action to save the
centre of his precarious rule. He hastily left Mandu and made for
Agra through Chitor territory where he met the disorganised force
of 'Askari. It was not a suitable time for recriminations and punish-
ment of disaffection. A sterner character might have swept aside a
father's dying injunctions, but Humayun knew that during his idle
sojourn in Malwa rebellion had broken out in the eastern provinces.
A fratricidal struggle would end all his hopes of restoring peace.
He therefore affected forgiveness and even rewarded the plotters,
before he marched with them to Agra. Very soon after his departure
from Malwa that province was seized by Mallu Khan who had once
been in the service of the kings of Malwa, and later governor after
the annexation by Gujarat. Mughul domination in western India
thus ceased entirely.
In the eastern provinces it was also becoming insecure. Muhammad
Sultan, who had been confined, with the additional sentence of
blinding, when he revolted with his cousin Muhammad Zaman
Mirza, had evaded the operation and later made his escape from
prison. He then established himself beyond the Ganges at Bilgram,
a few miles north of Kanauj, which he also took, while one of his
sons secured the country along the river as far as Manikpur and
another marched on Jaunpur. The danger of losing a rich province
led Hindal, the youngest brother of Humayun, who had been left
in charge at Agra, to proceed against the rebels. He soon retook
Kanauj, and though his crossing there was opposed he discovered
a ford higher up the river and passing over it unobserved met
Muhammad Sultan and defeated him before his sons could rejoin
their father. He then pursued the flying rebels as far as Ajodhya
and halted as he felt himself unable to attack the rebel whose forces
had been strengthened by the recall of his sons from their various
enterprises. The deadlock was relieved by news that Humayun was
1 See vol. IV, p. 369.
## p. 28 (#60) ##############################################
28
HUMAYUN
approaching Agra on his return from Malwa, and Muhammad Sultan
Mirza decided that his best chance of success was to fight before the
emperor's forces arrived. In the battle which ensued the rebels fared
the worse and being a collection of mercenaries with no common
bond except the hope of success they lost heart and began to desert.
Muhammad Sultan himself fied with his sons far into Bengal and
Hindal was able to occupy Jaunpur, where he stayed till Humayun
arrived at Agra and then joined him.
When Humayun had made his peace with Sher Khan after his
fruitless siege of Chunar, so that he might be free to pursue his
expedition against Gujarat he had taken with him by way of gua-
rantee a son of Sher Khan variously known as Qutb Khan or ‘Abdur-
Rashid with a small force of Afghans.
The alliance was short and
Qutb Khan had deserted with his followers to join his father. And
while the emperor was engaged in what did not amount to more
than military promenades, or was sitting still to enjoy the temporary
gains of his enterprises, Sher Khan had consolidated his hold on
scuth Bihar without the slightest opposition by Mughul forces, whose
able commander Sultan Junaid Barlas was dead. Humayun after
his return to Agra remained there for a wasted year, at times medi-
tating the recovery of Gujarat and Malwa, where he had an offer
of help from the king of Ahmadnagar, but usually occupied with the
pleasures of social life, which were always apt to distract him from
serious affairs. It was not till the rainy season of 1537 had set in that
he started out to crush or at least check Sher Khan, having made
some attempt to settle the administration of the provinces he still
held. His naturally forgiving disposition, aided by the persuasion of his
sister, led him on the way to accept the submission of her husband
Muhammad Zaman, who after his unsuccessful attempt to rouse the
Punjab had also failed to seize the throne of Gujarat after the death
of Bahadur Shah. ? Travelling by boat along the Jumna and Ganges,
Humayun reached the strong fortress of Chunar which he besieged.
This ancient castle, founded on a steep rock jutting into the Ganges,
was built by the Hindus and strengthened by successive Muslim
rulers. It had come into Sher Khan's possession through his marriage
to a daughter of a governor and was held for him at this time by his
son Qutb Khan. As Humayun approached Qutb Khan withdrew
part of his forces to the forest-covered hills in the neighbourhood
from which he could harass the Mughuls. A siege of several months
ensued during which Rumi Khan, the Turkish gunner who had
deserted from the Gujarat army to join Humayun, made many
unsuccessful attempts to force an entry. Finally he obtained certain
information about the state of the defences by stratagem. An African
slave possessed of some ability and willing to endure hardship was
savagely flogged in the Mughul camp and then managed to enter
1 See chap. III, p. 50.
2 Vol. II, p. 334.
## p. 29 (#61) ##############################################
WAR WITH SHER KHAN
29
the fort, where he showed his wounds and offered to help the garrison
by advice on their defence in revenge for the treatment he had
received. He was thus allowed to inspect the fortifications, and
escaping after a few days was able to tell Rumi Khan where to direct
his fire. A floating battery was moved close to the fort and a breach
made. Though the first assault was driven back the garrison, seeing
the battery being repaired for further work, lost heart and yieldeci
under a promise of amnesty, but this was broken by one of the
Mughul leaders who had the hands of several hundred gunners struck
off. Rumi Khan who was appointed commandant for his services
held his post for only a few days, when he died suddenly, probably
poisoned at the instance of jealous rivals.
As an isolated military exploit the capture of Chunar was notable,
but it commanded no land routes and the time occupied in its
reduction was wasted. Sher Khan, having strengthened his position
in Bihar while Humayun was in western India, had advanced into
Bengal. He was held up for a time at the pass of Teliyagarhi by
the forces of Ghiyas-ud-din Mahmud of Bengal, but finally compelled
him to retreat to his capital at Gaur. During the blockade Mahmud
sought help from Humayun and receiving none fled by boat to
Hajipur and the city was taken soon after. Pursued by Sher Khan's
troops Mahmud barely escaped with his life and reached Humayun's
camp severely wounded. Humayun, after moving the short distance
from Chunar to Benares and halting there, had at last made up his
mind to prevent Sher Khan from acquiring further territory. He
therefore began his march eastwards and met Mahmud near the
confluence of the Son and Ganges (1538). Even now, though he
knew that Sher Khan had seized the capital and treasure of Bengal,
he first sent an envoy to Sher Khan offering him a governorship near
his home if he would surrender his new gains. When the envoy after
some delay returned he brought the news that Sher Khan was already
removing his booty to the hills of south Bihar. The rainy season
having set in Humayun's officers suggested a halt until the country
could be more easily traversed" but the emperor accepted the sug-
gestion of Mahmud that it was best to attack before Sher Khan had
consolidated his power. Accordingly the Mughul forces advanced
into a trap devised by the strategy of Sher Khan. When they reached
the difficult pass at Teliyagarhi they found it strongly defended by
Jalal Khan, a son of Sher Khan. Halting to reconnoitre they were
attacked by Jalal Khan, who had orders from his father to delav
the advance till the treasure was secured, and who observed that the
Mughul forces were carelessly disposed. He inflicted considerable
loss and drove the van back on the main army at Kahalgaon. A
heavy storm which sank Humayun's barge and flooded the country
prevented advance for several days. When a scouting party was
1 Colgong in 25° 16' N. and 87° 14' E.
## p. 30 (#62) ##############################################
30
HUMAYUN
able to move it was discovered that Jalal Khan, who had now
received news of his father's safe arrival in the fastnesses of south
Bihar, had abandoned the defence. Sher Khan had in fact gained
by stratagem the fort of Rohtas as a place of refuge for his family
and treasure now that Chunar was lost.
While the emperor was at Kahalgaon Mahmud received news that
two of his sons had been killed by the Afghans, and still suffering
from his wounds he died from the effects of this last shock. Humayun
now pressed on to seize what he hoped would be a rich prize. But
Gaur, though entered without further opposition, was a desolate
place with corpses still lying in the streets, and the rich granaries
which Mahmud had promised him were wasted. In spite of these
warnings of the vanity of his hopes, Humayun liked the attractive
fertility of the place and gave it the name of Jannatabad, or abode
of Paradise, on the coins he struck to commemorate his success. The
former government having been destroyed there was no opposition
in the country-side to his officers or to his parcelling out the districts
among his followers. Once more reaction set in after an apparently
successful enterprise, and the whole force from emperor to private
soldier devoted itself to ease and pleasure.
Gaur is about 350 miles east of Benares which was the nearest
place really within the Mughul occupation. To secure communica-
tions and supplies Humayun left his brother Hindal on the north
bank of the Ganges, neglecting all precaution on the south, where
the level alluvial plain soon meets the Kaimur range and its eastern
extension. In these hills covered with thorny jungle and hence
known as Jharkhand, Sher Khan found a convenient base from which
to develop his plan of cutting off Humayun from his capital. Hindal
soon deserted his post in north Bihar and there were grounds for
suspecting his loyalty, while Sher Khan rapidly overran the south
as far as the river, and crossing it took Benares. He sent his son Jalal
Khan to besiege Jaunpur, arrested and imprisoned the families of
the leading men in the district, and invested Chunar. Though the
governor of Jaunpur still held the city, reinforcements which arrived
from Oudh were roughly handled by Jalal Khan owing to the rash-
ness of their leader.
Humayun's officers, who for a time had successfully concealed from
him the serious events which were taking place, were now alarmed.
He himself realised that further delay would entail complete loss
of his position, and he was spurred by finding that the officer whom
he designated to hold Bengal while he attempted to cut his way
through Sher Khan's forces regarded such promotion as equivalent
to a sentence of death. Delay had once more placed him in the
unfavourable position of a campaign during the rainy season and as
his force laboured through the adhesive mud of the Ganges valley
in 1539, he received news that his vanguard had been taken in the
## p. 31 (#63) ##############################################
DISASTROUS RETREAT FROM BENGAL
31
town of Monghyr and its leader captured. In doubt as to the best
method of advance he offered through his brother 'Askari to grant
any boons to those who could suggest suitable plans. 'Askari
'
would have asked for money, silks, slaves and eunuchs, but
the officers of the army, impressed by their critical situation and
perhaps less corrupted by the recent period of sensuality and luxury,
were content with rank, and better pay for themselves and their
troops. When 'Askari advanced he found that Sher Khan had not
only gained the victories already reported, but had also sent troops
as far as Kanauj and had styled himself Shah or King. Humayun
now joined 'Askari on the north bank of the Ganges opposite Monghyr,
and would have been wise to pursue his march on that side. Accepting,
however, the advice of an unworthy favourite against that of more
experienced and reliable officers, he crossed to the south bank, which
was the more usual route. When the Mughul army reached the con-
fluence of the Son and Ganges the Afghan forces of Sher Khan were
in sight, and the great gun made by Rumi Khan for the siege of
Chunar was taken by them in the boat which was conveying it up
the river. So far only slight opposition had been met with and the
army was able to reach Chausa, a short distance from the Karamnasa
which divides Bihar from the territory of Benares.
Here it was necessary to halt in view of the uncertainty as to Sher
Khan's exact position. His near approach was certain and he had
in fact withdrawn his troops from the siege of Jaunpur and arrived
near the western bank of the river as Humayun reached the eastern.
Once again Humayun rejected the sound advice of his officers who
pointed out that his troops were that day comparatively fresh after
a short march, while Sher Khan's cavalry had ridden many miles.
An immediate attack might have given him victory. But he preferred
his favourite's plan merely to cross the river and postpone the struggle.
The delay favoured Sher Khan, who set about fortifying his camp,
knowing that the Mughul army would deteriorate and was already
weakened by its long march and absence of the stimulus of success.
From his brothers Humayun could rely on no help. Hindal had
abandoned his post on the line of communications when Humayun
advanced into Bengal, and was living in the palace at Agra where he
enjoyed the outward forms of power without using them for the
benefit of the state. But while his immediate advisers traded on his
youth and inexperience other officers saw more clearly the dangers
which threatened. Faqr 'Ali, the governor of Delhi, with difficulty
persuaded Hindal to mobilise the troops available at Agra and to
move them east. He also visited Yadgar Nasir at Kalpi lower down
the Jumna and planned a concentration in southern Oudh which
would threaten Sher Khan's designs on Jaunpur. These wise designs
were, however, ruined by the arrival at Kanauj of Mughul officers
who had abandoned Humayun in Bengal, including Zahid Beg, who
>
## p. 32 (#64) ##############################################
32
HUMAYUN
had declined to remain there as governor. They found Nur-ud-din
Muhammad, who was in charge of Kanauj, favourable to their dis-
loyal proposals though he was married to Humayun's sister. Offering
their services to Hindal they at once advanced to Kol ("Aligarh).
where they would be in a position to join Hindal or to move farther
west to Kamran in the Punjab if Hindal did not meet their wishes.
Hindal, though he received their message graciously, was not yet
prepared to declare his own independence and despatched news of
their arrival to Yadgar Mirza. Before it reached its destination the
rebels informed Hindal that while they were prepared to give him
support if he would stand forth as emperor they would join Kamrar.
if he declined. Hindal now decided to revolt, but was for a few days
held back by the remonstrances of Shaikh Phul, whom Humayun
sent from Gaur on first hearing of Hindal's departure from his post.
The Shaikh, like his more celebrated brother Muhammad Ghaus,
was a renowned religious teacher and was Humayun's own spiritual
adviser. His message of remonstrance accompanied by offers of for-
giveness and affection seemed at first likely to recall Hindal to
allegiance. Orders were issued to equip and despatch forces to raise
the siege of Jaunpur. Unfortunately Nur-ud-din arrived while these
measures were being expedited and he was able to destroy the whole
effect of the Shaikh's mission, and Hindal was persuaded once more
to accept the support of the rebel nobles, for which they demander
the sacrifice of Shaikh Phul as he had caused Hindal to break his
former promises to them. They hoped that Hindal, involved in such
a disgraceful crime, would be irretrievably separated from Humayun,
whom they hated and despised. A frivolous charge of conspiracy
with Sher Khan” was laid and the Shaikh was executed under the
orders of Nur-ud-din. Such a crime revolted the ladies of the palace
and all officers who still remained faithful to Humayun. It marked
indeed the destruction of Hindal's ambitious designs, for when he
advanced on Delhi instead of marching to assist the emperor, Yadgar
Nasir and Fagr 'Ali forestalled him by hasty marches and reached
that city before he arrived. While Hindal was unsuccessfully be-
sieging Delhi Kamran arrived from the Punjab. Humayun's genero-
sity had placed him in a commanding position which he had improved
by successful expeditions. The capture of Qandahar completed his
domination over practically the whole of Afghanistan and the Funjab.
He now moved towards Humayun's territory and Hindal, uncertain
as to his intentions, abandoned the siege of Delhi and withdrew to
Agra. If Kamran had really exerted himself and pressed on to attack
Sher Khan it is possible that the emperor might have come out of
his difficulties with some success. But although Kamran was per-
suaded to leave Delhi untouched and to follow Hindal to Agra his
1 Buhlul, according to some writers.
2 He was said to have secretly collected military stores; Humayun-nama. p. 133.
## p. 33 (#65) ##############################################
SHER KHAN DEFEATS HUMAYUN
33
intentions were completely selfish. On Kamran's approach Hindal
withdrew to his own government at Alwar, but soon was persuaded
to offer his submission, together with the rebel officers who were
almost his sole adherents. The brothers did indeed set out as if to
march to Humayun's help, but the ambition of Kamran and the
weakness of Hindal made them yield to the suggestion of the nobles
that if Sher Khan defeated Humayun the empire would fall to his
brother and that if the emperor won he could be persuaded to forgive
them. So after a few marches they turned back to Agra just as
Humayun's affairs reached a crisis.
He was indeed in a critical position, having missed his first oppor-
tunity to engage in battle before Sher Khan was ready. During more
than two months of scorching weather he had lain in an open camp
and now the rainy season had arrived which made military tactics
difficult. Before him was the strongly entrenched camp of the
Afghans; on his right flank lay the Ganges, its stream swelling as
the snows melted in the Himalayas and the monsoon rains added to
its volume; on the left were the hills with Sher Khan's stronghold
of Rohtas. No help was to be expected from his brothers and after
some fruitless skirmishing he made overtures for peace. Sher Khan
at first replied that while the Mughul army wished for peace the
emperor had made war. He himself also desired peace but his army
was for fighting. Later he sent his own spiritual adviser who entered
on negotiations, the terms of which are variously stated. Humayun
was to give up Bihar and, according to some accounts, Bengal and
also the prized fortress of Chunar but was to retain sovereignty, as
shown by the right to strike coin. With their affairs settled to outward
appearance the Mughul forces were negligently disposed, and Sher
Khan had beaten off a Hindu ally who was supporting Humayun.
Seizing his opportunity for destroying his opponent Sher Khan sent
a force across the Karamnasa as if to occupy Bihar and secretly
instructed his main army to attack the Mughul camp in two places
and also to prevent escape across the Ganges. Their surprise was
complete and the attack was well developed before Humayun was
awake (26 June, 1539). He sprang on a horse and collected a small
guard, endeavouring to save his empress, but was unable to reach the
tents and would have been killed but for his own personal bravery.
The royal harem, crowded with fugitive wives of Mughul officers, was
captured and protected by Sher Khan, while Humayun, attempting
to cross the Ganges on horseback, was forced to use the inflated skin
offered him by a water-carrier when he had lost his seat. The rout
was complete and the Mughul army practically destroyed.
Exulting in his victory Sher Khan related that it had been foretold
in a dream the night before, and he promised a safe-conduct to the
ladies of the Mughul court, a promise which he honoured later. While
Humayun and 'Askari made their way with difficulty to Agra, Sher
## p. 34 (#66) ##############################################
34
HUMAYUN
Khan advanced into Bengal and there defeated the governor left by
Humayun and scattered his small force completely. While he was
thus engaged the four brothers had come together. Humayun either
through a sense of the weakness of his own position or through genuine
fraternal love had forgiven, at once, Kamran's failure to come to his
help and, after a formal rebuke, Hindal's open rebellion. He still
hoped to defeat Sher Khan and refused to accept Kamran's offer,
prompted by ambitious and selfish aims, to lead the fresh troops from
the Punjab against the enemy. Kamran, seeing the failure of his
design to become the master of Hindustan, wished to return to the
Punjab where his rule was undisputed, and in spite of Humayun's
opposition was at last able to depart owing to ill-health which he
attributed openly to the climate of Agra, but secretly believed was
due to poison administered by Babur's widows at the instigation of
Humayun.
Sher Khan, having now consolidated his position in Bengal, re-
turned along the north bank of the Ganges and felt himself strong
enough to attack the Mughuls. A preliminary expedition led by his
son Qutb Khan against Yadgar Mirza, who still held Kalpi, was a
failure and Qutb Khan lost his life. Excited by this success, Humayun
advanced early in 1540 from Agra towards the Ganges and Sher
Khan retreated across it. The Mughul army though probably twice
the size of Sher Khan's was no longer the equal of Babur's trained
forces. Many of its best soldiers had perished in the fruitless expedi-
tion to Bengal. As the force drew near the enemy it was abandoned
by numbers of experienced leaders, especially those who had joined
from Kamran's troops. An exception was that of Mirza Haidar
Dughlat, a first cousin of Babur, who had been greatly trusted by
Kamran and had been left by him in charge of Lahore when he
made his successful raid on Qandahar. Both the brothers sought to
retain his services and he finally decided to serve Humayun, who had
• treated him as a brother, in the honest belief that if Sher Khan were
not defeated he would drive all the Mughuls, including Kamran, out
of India. The two armies lay facing each other near Kanauj with
the broad bed of the Ganges between. As defections continued it was
clear that Humayun must fight or would find himself a leader without
an army. Accordingly the river was crossed and small engagements
took place. Before any general battle had occurred the rainy season
began unduly early and the Mughul camp in the low land near the
river was flooded. Mirza Haidar suggested a bold maneuvre to mask
a change to a better position near the enemy. This was difficult to
carry out as the camp was thronged with many thousands of fol-
lowers and the army would be an easy prey if attacked during the
confusion of a move. On 17 May, 1540, the Mughul artillery was
sent to the front and the guns and wagons were chained together,
so that the camp followers could march behind their protection if an
## p. 35 (#67) ##############################################
2
HUMAYUN FLEES TO THE PUNJAB
35
attack was made. Sher Khan moved out his forces against them,
while the Mughuls were still in confusion with their numerous non-
combatants pressing on behind the guns in such masses that the
chains were broken. The leaders were incapable and cowardly and
many of them fled for their lives as they saw the Afghan troops arrive.
Humayun with his usual personal bravery tried to rally his men, but
was forced to fly. Mirza Haidar laments that 40,000 men in armour
fled before 10,000 without a single cannon being fired. A few miles
behind them lay the river in which many perished, encumbered by
their armour. Humayun crossed with difficulty on an elephant but
only a few of the thousand men immediately accompanying him
succeeded in escaping. As the small band rode towards Agra it was
attacked by Chauhan Thakurs at Bhongaon ? and the refusal of
'Askari to help in chastising the assailants moved Humayun's wrath.
At Agra, the capital, there was no chance of a rally. So great was
their distress that Humayun, who had lost a daughter after the battle
of Chausa, discussed with Hindal the question of killing their female
relations to avoid capture by the Afghans, but was dissuaded and
Hindal conducted them to Lahore, often having to beat off attacks
by the villagers on the route. The emperor's small party rode in
confusion towards Delhi till the news that a party of Afghans was
following roused Humayun to instil some order into his small fol-
lowing. After a couple of days' halt at Delhi he hurried on to Lahore,
forced to cross rivers swollen by rain without the help of boats. Close
behind them came the Afghans, who occupied Agra and Delhi with-
out opposition. At Lahore all four brothers met, Hindal and 'Askari
having visited the headquarters of their charges on the way to collect
what treasure could be recovered. Even in the presence of imminent
danger from the Afghans concord was impossible. With Humayun
driven out of Hindustan Kamran saw that he was likely to have to
give up his own possessions in the Punjab and Afghanistan, and the
danger of this made him disinclined to join in a hazardous resistance
to Sher Khan which might involve the waste of his own resources.
As Sher Khan overran the Punjab the need for action increased.
Humayun sent him a request to allow Sirhind to be the boundary
and received a contemptuous warning that he should withdraw to
Kabul. Kamran hoped that he could at least maintain his hold on
the west if he held the rugged tribal country between India and
Afghanistan. Humayun, while brave in tactical affairs, failed him-
self to produce any strategical plan. He was pressed by Mirza
Haidar to withdraw to the Punjab hills and shelter in Kashmir,
while Hindal and Yadgar Mirza suggested a movement through
Sind to reconquer Gujarat from which Hindustan might be again
invaded. While the brothers wrangled, Kamran treacherously sent
1 The manuscripts read variously hasht=eight, or shast=sixty.
2 In 27° 17' N. and 79° 14' E.
## p. 36 (#68) ##############################################
36
HUMAYUN
a message to offer his assistance to Sher Khan if he were left alone.
An ambassador from Sher Khan was received as if he had come to
the court of Humayun, while secret negotiations continued. Sher
Khan crossed the Beas and the brothers abandoned Lahore in a rout
described as being as confused as the Day of Resurrection. The
treachery of Kamran was now so well known in the Mughul camp that
Humayun was urged to have him killed, but the memory of Babur's
dying wishes was still too fresh on his mind to allow him to agree to
fratricide. He determined to adopt Mirza Haidar's scheme for the con-
quest of Kashmir and moved in that direction. Before he had advanced
far a threatening movement by Kamran was reported and his army,
disgusted with the treachery of the latter, was eager to oppose him
by arms. Humayun in his anxiety to avoid a contest which could
only have weakened the Mughul strength refused to show a hostile
appearance to his brother, and the meeting was thus peaceful. It
ended with the departure of Kamran for his governorship at Kabul
accompanied by his brother 'Askari. But Humayun's clemency con-
vinced Hindal that his brother was wanting in the firmness which at
that time was necessary for one who sought to rule in India. And
just as Kamran had pursued his self-seeking aims by leaving the
emperor when most in need of help, so Hindal abandoned him and
set out on a vain expedition to pursue his scheme of conquering Sind
and then Gujarat again and making it a base for further attacks on
Hindustan. In this expedition he was joined by still more adherents
from Humayun's shrinking forces.
Mirza Haidar's plan for capturing Kashmir was sound in every
way. His previous experience in 1533, when he had raided the
country as a general of the king of Kashghar, had shown him what
little resistance could be expected in a country torn by faction, and
he knew and pointed out that a determined force holding it could
repel any army of men from the plains, hampered by the difficulty
of travel and the absence of supplies. He was, moreover, sure of
support from one of the parties in the state. It had been arranged
that he should enter Kashmir from Naushahra and he marched in
advance of Humayun. When the emperor followed him and reached
Bhera, where he hoped to obtain the assistance of the local governor,
he found that Kamran had already preceded him and forestalled his
hopes. Once more he was urged to assert himself and brush Kamran
from his path, but refused as he had done at Lahore. A proposal
that he should retreat through Kabul to Badakhshan was rejected by
Kamran, whose treacherous nature led him to suspect that Humayun
might dispossess him from Kabul and advance no farther. The road
to Naushahra being blocked and it being impossible for Humayun
to stay between an envious and unscrupulous brother on one hand
and the victorious Sher Khan who was pressing on from Lahore, he
1 Vol. II, p. 287,
## p. 37 (#69) ##############################################
ATTEMPTS TO TAKE SIND
37
decided to abandon the hope of Kashmir and to follow Hindal to
Sind (end of 1540). He had hardly started when again a collision
with Kamran was imminent. Their forces met in a defile of the Salt
Range near Khushab, at the end of which the roads towards Sind
and Kabul diverged, and a dispute arose as to which should pass
through it first. Kamran's thinly veiled intention of assuming the
headship of the family appeared more clearly than ever when he
asserted his own right of precedence, and for once Humayun's pride
was stung and battle seemed inevitable. It was averted only by the
remonstrances of a man of saintly reputation in the train of Kamran.
Thus began a wearying exile which lasted for nearly 15 years and
was endured only by the greatest fortitude and perseverance, though
it was constantly prolonged by Humayun's inability to command
respect and faithful allegiance. Before he could join Hindal news
came that the country round Multan, which had been ceded to Babur
by the Arghun ruler of Sind, was in a state of anarchy. Hindal's
force had met and overwhelmed a small escort of Afghans accom-
panying Kamran's messenger to Sher Khan, but was unable to face
the Baloch raiders who had overrun the country and cut off what
scanty supplies were available. Hindal was thus compelled to return
and the brothers met, but were almost immediately faced with the
danger of attack by Khavass Khan, an Afghan general who had taken
Multan and was searching for them, but retired to headquarters
as he could get no news of them.
