This
principle
is the highest in all human cog nition.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
We have already seen that we are in pos session of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they botli apply to objects completely a priori.
These are the concep tions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the cate gories as pure conceptions of the understanding.
To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them.
Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcen dental.
Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes * of their production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two very dis similar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising ou; of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought ; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impres sions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such
* Gelegenheitsursachea.
? ? ? ? DEDT/CTIOK OF THE CATEGORIES. 73
an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions,
is undoubtedly of great utility ; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke, for having first opened the way for this en
But a deduction of the pure d priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future employment, which must be entirely inde pendent of experience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a queesiio facli, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cog nition. It is therefore manifest that there can caly be a tran scendental deduction of these conceptions, and by no means an empirical one ; also, that all attempts at an empirical de
duction, in regard to pure &. priori conceptions, are vain, and
can only be made by one who does not understand the alto
gether peculiar nature of these cognitions.
But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction
of pure a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not,
for that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is
absolutely necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of space and time, by means of a transcen dental deduction, and we have explained and determined their objective validity t> priori. Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure h priori cogni tions, without needing to ask from Philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental concep tion of space. But the use of the conception in this science extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of the intuition of which is space ; and in this world, therefore, all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon h priori intuition, posesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this cognition are given & prion (as regards their form) in intuition
by and through the cognition itself. * With the pure concep tions of Understanding, on the contrary, commences the ab-
* Kant's meaning is : The object! of cognition in Geometry, -- anirias, lines, figures, and the like,--are not different from the aet of cognition which produces them, except in thought. The object does not exist hut while we think it--docs not exist apart from our thinking it. The act of thinking and the object of thinking, are but one thing regarded from two different points ofview. --IV.
quiry.
? ? ? ? 74
TBAWBCENDEKTAL LOGIC.
solute necessity of seeking a transcendental deduction, not only of these conceptions themselves, but likewise of space, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations* concerning
not by means of the predicates of intuition and sen sibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply to objects without any of the conditions of sensibility. Besides, not being
founded on experience, they are not presented with any object in h priori intuition upon which, antecedently to expe rience, they might base their synthesis. Hence results, not only doubt as to the objective validity and proper limits of their use, but that even our conception of space is rendered equivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of
the categories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition ;--and for this reason, we have already found a transcendental deduction of it needful. The reader, then, must be quite convinced of the absolute neces sity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step in the field of pure reason ; because otherwise he goes to work blindly, and after he has wandered about in all directions, returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he started. He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand, the un-
* I have been compelled to adopt a conjectural reading here. All the editions of the Critik der reinen Vernunft, both those published during Kant's lifetime, and those published by various editors after his death, have tie. . von Gegenttanden. . . . redet. But it is quite plain that the tie is the pronoun for die reine Vertttmdesbegriffe ; and we ought, there fore, to read reden. In the same sentence, all the editions (except Har- tenstein's) insert die after the first und, which makes nonsense. In page 75 also, sentence beginning "For that objectt," I have altered "tyn- thetitchen Einticht det Denkent" into " tyrUheiitchen Einheit. " And in page 77, sentence beginning, " But it it evident," vre find "die trtte Bedingung liegtn. " Some such word as mutt is plainly to be understood.
Indeed, I have not found a single edition of the Critique trust worthy. Kant must not have been very careful in his correction of the
Those published by editors after Kant's death seem in most cases to follow Kant's own editions closely. That by Rosencrantz is perhaps the best ; and he has corrected a number of Kant's errors. But although I have adopted several uncommon and also conjectural readings, I have not done ao hastily or lightly. It is only after diligent comparison of all the tditions I could gainaocesa to, that I have altered the common reaaing ; while a conjectural reading has been adopted only when it was quite clear that the reading of every edition was a misprint.
Other errors. occurring previously to those mentioned above, have been, and others after them will be, corrected ii silence. -- 2V.
objects
? press.
? ? ? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.
75
BToidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may not afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path ;--because we have a choice of only two things -- either at once to give up all pretensions to know ledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring this critical investigation to completion.
We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it com prehensible how the conceptions of space and time, although a priori cognitions, must necessarily apply to external ob-
independently of all experience. For inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object can appear to us, that be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions, which contain a priori the con dition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and an
priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity.
On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do
not represent the conditions under which objects are given
to us in intuition objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves with these, and consequently without any necessity binding on the under standing to contain priori the conditions of these objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in difficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of sensibility, that to say, we cannot discover how the subjective conditions thought can have objective validity, in other words, can become con ditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects --for phsenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without any help from the functions Let us take, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates peculiar kind of synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something entirely different, connected according to law. not priori manifest why phsenomena should contain anything of this kind (we are of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated priori), and hence remains doubtful a priori, whether such con ception be not quite void, and without any corresponding object among phenomena. For that objects of sensuous
? ? ? it
It
a a
of is ;
is h
is,
B, is
aa
a
; h
&
? 76 TBANSCEXDESTAL LOGIO.
intuition must correspond to tlic formnl conditions of sen sibility existing h priori in the mind, is quite evident, froir. the fact, that without these they could not be objects for us ; but that they must also correspond to the conditions which understanding requires for the synthetical unity 01 thought, is nn assertion, the grounds for which are not so easily to be discovered. For phenomena might be so con stituted, as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought ; and all things might lie in such confusion, that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere of phsenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so cor
? to the conception of cause and effect ; so that this conception would lie quite void, null, and without significance. Phsenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition ; for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought.
respond
Ifwc thought to free ourselves from the labour of these
investigations by saying, " Experience is constantly offering us examples of the relation of cause and effect in pheno mena, and presents us with abundant opportunity of ab stracting the conception of cause, and so at the same time of corroborating the objective validity of this conception ;" -- we should in this case be overlooking the fact, that the concep tion of cause cannot arise in this way at all ; that, on the con trary, it must either have an a priori basis in the understand ing, or be rejected as a mere chimacra. For this conception demands that something, A, should be of such a nature, that something else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and ac cording to an absolutely universal law. We may certainly collect from phsenomena a law, according to which this or that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not tc be found in it. Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis ; for it is no mere mechanical syn thesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one, that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the
cause, but aa posited by and through the cause, and resulting from it. The strict universality of this law never can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through in duction only a comparative universality, tint an extended range of practical application. But tie pure conceptions ol
? ? is,
? DEDUCTION OY THE CATEGORIES. 77
(he understanding -would entirely lose all their peculiar cha racter, if we treated them merely as the productions of ex
perience.
Tbanbition to the Tbanscendental Deduction oi hie Cateqouies.
? 10.
There are only two possible ways in which synthetical re presentation and its objects can coincide with and relate
to each other, and, as it were, meet together, blither the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible. In the former case, the relation between them is only empirical, and
an a priori representation is impossible. And this is the case with phsenomena, as regards that in them which is refer able to mere sensation. In the latter case --although repre sentation alone (for of its causality, by means cf the will, we do not here speak,) does not produce the object as to its ex istence, it must nevertheless be a priori determinative in re gard to the object, if it is only by means of the represent ation that we can cognize any thing as an object. Now there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects ; firstly, Intuition, by means' of which the object, though only as phsenomenon, is given ; secondly, Conception, by means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is evident from what has been said on aes thetic, that the first condition, under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, u priori in the mind. With this formal condition of sensi
bility, therefore, all phsenomena necessarily correspond, because it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all ; that can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is,,
necessarily
? whether there do not exist priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding also, as conditions under which alone something,
not intuited, yet thought as object. If this question be answered in the affirmative, follows that all empirical cogni tion of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions, since, they are not presupposed, impossible that anything can be an object of experience. Now all experience contains, besidro the intuition of 'he senses through which an object
? ? is
if if
is,
it is
it
&
is
? 78 nursuM duvix logic.
given, a conception also of an object that is given in intuition. Accordingly, conceptionsof objects in general must lie as a priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition ; and con
sequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as re gards the form of thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only through them can an object of ex perience be thought.
The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a prion conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions
which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience, are for that very reason necessary. But the analysis of the experiences in which they are met with is not deduction, but only an illustration of them, because from experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity. Without their original applicability and relation to all pos sible experience, in which all objects of cognition present themselves, the relation of the categories to objects, of what ever nature, would be quite incomprehensible.
The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and because he met with pure conceptions of the un derstanding in experience, sought also to deduce them from
experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive at cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that the conceptions should have an a priori origin. But as he could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding, must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in the object, --and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experi ence in which its objects were presented to --he was forced to derive these conceptions from experience, that from
subjective necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective, --in one word, from " habit. " But he proceeded with perfect con sequence, and declared to be impossible with such con
? ? ? it
a
is
it,
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBTEB.
79
eeptions and the principles arising from them, to Dverstep the limits of experience. The empirical derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to these concep tions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do possess scientific & priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics.
The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to extravagance --(for if reason has once undoubted righ. on its side, it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague recommendations of moderation) ; the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism, --a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trust-worthy. We now intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason be tween these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity.
? I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are. They are conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in rela tion to one of the logical functions of judgment. The fol lowing will make this plain. The function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate ; for example, in the proposition, " All bodies are divisible. " But
in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it still remains undetermined to which of these two conceptions belongs the function of subject, and to which that of predi cate. For we could also say, " Some divisible is a body. " But the category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought under determines that and its empirical intui tion in experience must be contemplated always as subject, and never 80 were predicate. And so w th all the other cate gories.
? ? it,
;
? 8C TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
Deditction OF THE fuh;s Conceftions OF the Undeb- STANDING. '
SECTION II.
Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceftions of tub Understanding.
? 11.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre sentations given by Sense.
Tlie manifold content in our representations can be given in an intuition which is merely sensuous --in other words, is nothing but susceptibility ; and the form of this intuition can exist h priori in our faculty of representation, without being any thing else but the mode in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition never can be given us by the senses ; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this facult) understanding; so all conjunction -- whether conscious or un conscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non- sensuous, or of several conceptions --is an act of the under standing. To this act we shall give the general appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we cannot represent any thing as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental notions, that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but can be originated only by the sub ject itself, because it is an act cf its purely spontaneous activity. The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act, and that it must be equally valid for all conjunction ; and that analysis, which appears to be its contrary, must, never theless, always presuppose it ; for where the understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or analyse, because only a>> conjoined by must that which to be analysed have been given to our faculty of representation.
But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception of the manifold and of the synthesis of that of thf
? ? ? it,
is
it,
? TBANSCEKDENTAI. DEDUCTION Ot THJ CATIGOltlEB. 81
unity of it also. Conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of the manifold. * This idea of unity, there fore, cannot arise out of that of conjunction ; much rather does that idea, by combining hself with the representation of the manifold, render the conception of conjunction pos sible. This unity, which a priori precedes all conceptions of conjunction, is not the category of unity(? 6); for all the categories are based upon logical functions of judgment, and in these functions we already have conjunction, and consequently unity of given conceptions. It is therefore evident that the category of unity presupposes conjunction. We must therefore look still higher for this unity (as quali tative, ? 8), in that, namely, which contains the ground of the unity of diverse conceptions in judgments, the ground, consequently, of the possibility of the existence of the under standing, even in regard to its logical use.
? 0/ the Originally Synthetical
? 12.
accompany
Unity of Apperception. -^
I think must
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought ; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation tc me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to all thought, is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the
The
all my representations, for
I think, in the iI
n which this is found. subject diversity
think, is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distin-
But this representation,
* Whether the representations are in themselves
identical, and conse quently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and through the other, is a question which we need not at present consider. Our cun-
tcioumest of the one, when we speak of the manifold, is always distinguish able from our consciousness of the other ; and it is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that we here treat.
t Apperception simply means consciousness. But it has been considered better to employ this term, not only because Kant saw fit to have another word besides Bevmntteyn, but because the term contcimunem denotes a ttate, apperception an act of the ego; and from this alone the superiority Ot* the latter is apparent. -- 7>.
O
? ? ? 82 TRASaCWTDEKTAL LOGIC.
guish it from empirical ; or primitive apperception, because it is a self-consciIousness which, whilst it gives birth to the >>>
think, must necessarily be capable of accom panying all our representations. It is in all acts of conscious ness one and the same, and unaccompanied by no repre
sentation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in an intui tion would not all of them be my representations, they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that as my representations (even although am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition under which alone
they can exist together in common self-consciousness, be
cause otherwise they would not all without exception belong
to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many impor tant results.
For example, this universal identity of the apperception of the manifold given in intuition, contains synthesis of repre sentations, and possible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness which accompanies difFerent representations in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without relation to the identity of the subject. This relation, then does not exist because accom pany every representation with consciousness, but because join one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because can connect
variety of given representations in one consciousness, possible that can represent to myself the identity of con sciousness in these representations in other words, the ana
lytical unity of apperception possible only under the pre supposition of synthetical unity. * The thought, "These repre-
All general conceptions -- as sucli -- depend, for their existence, on tlie analytical unity of consciousness. For example, when think of red general, thereby think to myself property which (as characteristic mark) can be discovered somewhere, or can be united with other repre sentations consequently, only by means of forethought possible synthetical unity that can think to myself the analytical. represen tation which cogitated as common to different representations, re garded as belonging to such as, besides this common representation, con tain something different; consequently must be previously thought in
synthetical unity with other although only possible representations, before
presentation
? ? ? it
is
I
A is
I
is,
I
is
I ;
it is
a
is
a
a
is
;
a
I
h
I a
I
it, if
*
a
a
is
in itI
I
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOKIES.
tentatiofls given in intuition, belong all of them to me," is
"I unite them in one self-con sciousness, or can at least so unite them ;" and although this
accordingly just the same as,
thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of re
presentations, it presupposes the possibility of it ; that is to say, for the reason alone, that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many- coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious. Synthetical unity of the manifold in intui tions, as given a priori, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, which antecedes it priori all determinate thought. But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining a priori, and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apper ception.
This principle is the highest in all human cog nition.
This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apper ception is indeed an identical, and therefore analytical propo sition i but it nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without which the identity of self-consciousness would be incogitable. For the Ego, as a simple representation, presents us with no manifold content ; only in intuition, which is quite different from the representation Ego, can it be given us, and by means of con junction, it is cogitated in one self-consciousness. An under standing, in which all the manifold should be given by means of consciousness itself, would be intuitive ; our understanding can only think, and must look for its intuition to sense. I am, therefore, conscious of my identical self, in relation to all the variety of representations given to me in on intuition,
because I call all of them my representations. In other
I can think in it the analytical unity of consciousness which makes it ? coHCtptai comtmmu. And thus the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every operation of the under standing, even the whole of logic, and after it our transcendental philo sophy ; indeed, this faculty U the understanding itself.
? si
? ? ? 84 TKANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
words, I am conscious myself of a necessary a prtori syn thesis of my representations, which is called the original synthetical unity of apperception, under which rank all the representations presented to me, but that only by means of a synthesis.
The principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest principle of all exercise of the Understanding.
? 13.
The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, according to our transcendental esthetic, that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of Space and Time. The supreme prin ciple of the possibility of it in relation to the Understanding is : that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical Unity of Apperception. * To the former of these two principles are subject all the various representa tions of Intuition, in so far as they are given to us ; to the latter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one consciousness ; for without this nothing can be thought or cognized, because the given representatioIns would not have
Understanding to speak generally, the faculty of Cog nitions. These consist in the determined relation of given representations to an object. But an object that, in the conception of which the manifold in given intuition
united. Now all union of representations requires unity of
? in common the act of the apperception
fore could not be connected in one self-consciousness.
consciousness in the synthesis of them.
the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and con-
Space and Time, and all portions thereof, are hitutiiom conse quently are, with manifold for their content, single representations. (See the Transcendental 1Eithetic. ) Consequently, they arc not pure conceptions, by means of which the same consciousness found in great number of representations but, on the contrary, they are many representations contained in one, the consciousness of which is, so to speak, compounded. The unity of consciousness nevertheless tyu- thttieal, and therefore primitive. From this peculiar character of con- tcicrasness follow many important consequences. (See 21. )
think ; and there
Consequently,
? ? is ?
a
is
;
is
a
it
is is
a
*
;
is,
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.
85
sequentlv, the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself.
The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception. Thus the mere form of external sensuous in tuition, namely, space, affords us, per se, no cognition ; it merely contributes the manifold in h priori intuition to a pos sible cognition. But, in order to cognize something in space, (for example, a line,) I must draw and thus produce syn thetically determined conjunction of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act at the same time the unity of con sciousness, (in the conception of line,) and by this means alone an object determinate space) cognized. The syn thetical unity of consciousness therefore, an objective con dition of all cognition, which do not merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must neces sarily be subject, in order to become an object for me be cause in any other way, and without this synthesis, the mani fold intuition could not be united in one consciousness.
This proposition as already said, itself analytical, though constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought for states nothing more than that all my repre sentations in any given intuition, must be subject to the con dition which alone enables me to connect them, as my repre sentation with the identical self, and so to unite them syn thetically in one apperception, by means of the general ex
? think.
But this principle not to be regarded as principle for
every possible understanding, but only for that understanding means of whose pure apperception in the thought am, no manifold content given. The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through the act itself of its own self-consciousness, in other words, an
understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist, would not require special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of which the human understanding, which thinks only and can not intuite, has absolute need. But this principle the first
pression,
? ? is
a
(a
is
is,
by
/
; al
I is
in ;
is
a
a
it it
is I
is,
a
it,
? TBAN8CF. ? fl)F. NTAL 1,O010.
principle of all the operations of our understanding, *o that we cannot form the least conception of any other possible un derstanding, either of one such as should be itself intuition, or possess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different from those of space and time.
What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. ? 14.
It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold given in an intuition is united into a conception of the object. On this account it is called ob jective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of the internal sense, by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united. Whether I can be empirically conscious of the manifold as co-existent or as successive, de pends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world, and is wholly contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intui tion in time, merely as an intuition,*. which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the / think, consequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding, which lies h priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis. The transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid ; the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions in con-
creto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing ; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical, in relation to that which given experi ence, not necessarily and universally valid.
The Logical Form all Judgments consists in the Objective
? Unity Apperception
the Conceptions contained therein.
15.
could never satisfy myself with the definition which gicians (rive of iudgment. is, according to them, the
? ? It
I
a
of
lo
of ?
of
is,
is
by
? DEDFOTIOK OF THE OATieOBIBS.
87
representation of a relation between two conceptions. Ishall not dwell here on the faultiness of this definition, in that it suits only for categorical and not for hypothetical or disjunc tive judgments, these latter containing a relation not of con ceptions but of judgments themselves ; --a blunder from which many evil results have followed. * It is more important for our present purpose to observe, that this definition does not determine in what the said relation consists.
But if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish as belonging to the understanding, from the relation which produced ac cording to laws of the reproductive imagination, (which has only subjective validity), find that judgment nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions under the objective unity of apperception. This plain from our use of the term of relation in judgments, in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective unity. For this term indicates the relation of these representations to the original apperception, and also their necessary unity, even though the judgment empirical, therefore contingent, as in the judgment, " All bodies are heavy. " do not mean by this, that these representations do necessarily belong to each other in empirical intuition, but that by means of the necessary unity of apperception they belong to each other in the syn thesis of intuitions, that to say, they belong to each other according to principles of the objective determination of all our representations, in so far as cognition can arise from them, these principles being all deduced from the main principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way alone can there arise from this relation judgment, that rela tion which has objective validity, and perfectly distinct from that relation of the very same representations which
The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only categorical syllogisms and although nothing more than an artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions (consequential imme diate) among the premises of pure syllogism, to give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing conclusion than that in the first figure, the artifice would not have had much success, had not its authors succeeded
bringing categorical judgments into exclusive respect, as those to which all others must be referred-- doctrine, however, which, according to
utterly false.
? ? ? is
in
*
a
a is
a is isI
f i,
al
;
it is
a is
a
is, a
I
is
is
is it,
? 88 TKAWSCEITOENTAL LOGIC.
has only subjective validity--a relation, to wit, which ii produced according to laws of association. According to these laws, I could only say : " When 1 hold in my hand or carry a body, I feel an impression of weight ;" but I could not say : " It, the body, is heavy ;" for this is tantamount to saying both these representations are conjoined in the ob ject, that without distinction as to the condition of the subject, and do not merely stand together in my perception, however frequently the perceptive act may be repeated.
All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold Content tliem can be united
one Consciousness.
16.
The manifold content given in sensuous intuition comes
necessarily under the original synthetical unity of appercep tion, because thereby alone the unity of intuition possible
13). But that act of the understanding, by which the mani fold content of given representations (whether intuitions or conceptions), brought under one apperception, the logical function of judgments 15). All the manifold therefore, in so far as given in one empirical intuition, determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgment, means of which brought into union in one consciousness. Now the categories are nothing else than these functions of judg ment, so far as the manifold in given intuition deter mined in relation to them(? 9). Consequently, the manifold
given intuition necessarily subject to the categories of the understanding.
Observation.
? 17.
The manifold in an intuition, which call mine, repre
sented by means of the synthesis of the understanding, ns belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this takes place means of the category. * The category
* The proof of this re>>t>> on the represented unity intuition, neans of which an object given, and which always includes in itsell synthesis of the manifold to be intuited, and also the relation of t'l;i
atter to unity of apperception.
? ? ? a
in a
(?
is
is
(?
by
I of
of
by
is
is
by
a
it
is is
is,
it
is
is
is
is
? a
in
? DEDUCTION O? CUE CATlGORtES. 89
indicates accordingly, that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a pure self-con sciousness H priori, in the same manner as an empirical in tuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which is also h priori. -- In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must in my deduction make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an em pirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclu sively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what follows
(? 22), it will be shown from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category (according to ? 16) imposes on the manifold in a given intui tion, and thus its (I priori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deduction will be fully attained.
But there is one thing in the above demonstration, of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the un derstanding, and independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined. For if I cogitate an understand ing which was itself intuitive (as, for example, a divine un derstanding which should not represent given objects, but by whose representation the objects themselves should be given or produced) -- the categories would possess no signification in relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which presented to in intuition from very different quarter, to the unity of apperception -- faculty, therefore, which cognizes nothing per >>e, but only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition, namely, which must be presented to means of the object. But to show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, that produces unity of apperception priori only by means of categories, and certain kind and number thereof, as
impossible as to explain why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of judgment and no more, or why time and space arc the only forms of our intuition.
? ? ? a
is
it
h
it by
; a
is, is
it
a
? 00 TBAHSCXirDXHTAL LOGIC. ? 18.
In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is tit only legitimate use of the Category.
To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing. In cognition there are two elements :
firstly, the conception, whereby an object is cogitated category) ; and, secondly, the intuition, whereby the object is given. For supposing that to the conception a corresponding intuition could not be given, it would still be a thought as re gards its form, but without any object, and no cognition of anything would be possible by means of inasmuch as, so far as knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us
sensuous consequently, our thought of an object means of pure conception of the understanding, can become cogni tion for us, only in so far as this conception applied to objects of the senses. Sensuous intuition either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition--of that which im mediately represented in space and time means of sensation as real. Through the determination of pure intuition we ob tain a priori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but only as regards their form as phenomena whether there can exist things which must be intuited in this form not thereby established. All mathematical conceptions, therefore, are not per se cognition, except in so far as we presuppose that there exist things, which can only be represented con formably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition. But things in space and time are given, only in so far as they are percep tions (representations accompanied with sensation), therefore only by empirical representation. Consequently the pure con. ceptions of the understanding, even when they are applied to intuitions priori (as in mathematics), produce cognition only in so far as these (and therefore the conceptions of the understanding by means of them,) can be applied to empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories do not, even means of pure intuition, afford us any cognition of things they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intui tion. That to say, the categories serve only to render em pirical cognition possible. But this what we call experience
(the
? ? ? ;
is
is
;
by
by
a
;
is
is
;
is by
is
it,
is aI
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBIEB. 91
cation to objects of ex* the categories.
The foregoing proposition of the utmost importance, for determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions
of the understanding in regard to objects, just as transcen dental esthetic determined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous intuition. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the presentation of objects to us, are valid no further than for objects of sense, con sequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits they re present to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and have no reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to
objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike to ours, provided only be sensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension of conceptions beyond the range of our in tuition of no advantage for they are then mere empty con ceptions of objects, as to the possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no means of dis covery. They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, because we have no intuition to which the synthetical unity of apperception, which alone the categories contain, could be applied, for the purpose of determining an object. Our sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance and meaning. .
If, then, we suppose an object of non-sensuous intuition to be given, wo can in that case represent by all those pre dicates, which are implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous intuition belongs to for example that not extended, or in space that its duration not time that in no change (the effect of the determinations in time)
to be met with, and so on. But no proper knowledge merely indicate what the intuition of the object not, with
out being able to say what contained in for have not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure con
ception of understanding could be applicable, because have not been able to furnish any intuition corresponding to but am only able to say that our intuition not valid for it. But the most important point this, that to something al
? ? ? is is
; it
is
ili
is a
it ;
I it,
if
it,
I is
it
I is
it
is
a
it it is
is
is
it ;
? 92 TRA2fSCEWDEirrAL LO9IC.
this kind not one category can be found applicable. Take, for example, the conception of substance, that is something tLat can exist as subject, but never as mere predicate ; in regard to this conception I am quite ignorant whether there can really be anything to correspond to such a determination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me the occa sion for its application. But of this more in the sequel.
? 20.
Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Sense* in general.
The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition in general, through the understanding alone, whether the intuition be our own or some other, provided only it be sensuous, but are, for this very reason, mere forms of thought, by means of which alone no determined object can be cognized. The synthesis or conjunction of the manifold in these conceptions relates, we have said, only to the unity of apperception, and is for this reason the ground of the possibility of & priori cognition, in so far as this cognition is dependent on the understanding. This synthesis is, there fore, not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual. But because a certain form of sensuous intuition exists in the mind 5 priori which rests on the receptivity of the representa tive faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a spontaneity, is able to determine the internal sense by means of the di versity of given representations, conformably to the synthetical unity of apperception, and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the apperception of the manifold of sensuous in tuition a priori, as the condition to which must necessarily
De submitted all objects of human intuition. And in this
nanner the categories as mere forms of thought receive ob
iective reality, that is application to objects which are given to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it is only of phcenomena that we are capable of o priori intuition.
This synthesis of the-manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), in contra-distinction to that which is co gitated in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and is called connexion or conjunction of the understanding {synlhcr's intellectualis). Both are trans
? ? ? ? DEDUCTION OF TUB CATEGOBIES. M
cendental, not merely because they themselves precede A prion all experience, but also because they form the basis for the possibility of other cognition a priori.
But the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the originally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the transcendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be en titled the transcendental synthesis of imagination. * Imagina tion is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which
alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility. But in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, which is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable, and which is consequently able to determine sense a priori, according to its form, conformably to the unity of appercep tion, in so far is the imagination a faculty of determining sen sibility a priori, and ita synthesis of intuitions according to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagi
? nation. It is an operation of the understanding on sensibility, and the first application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time the basis for the exer cise of the other functions of that faculty. As figurative, it is distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis, which is produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of imagination. Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it also the productive imagination, and distin guish it from the reproductive, the synthesis of which is sub ject entirely to empirical laws, those of association, namely, and which, therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori cognition, and for this reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy, but to psychology.
*****
We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox, which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal sense (? 0), namely, --how this sense repre sents us to our own consciousness, only as we appear to our selves, not as wc are in ourselves, because, to wit, we uituitc
* Sec note on p. 3-1
? ? ? 94 TKANSCKNUENTAX LOOIO.
ourselves only as we are inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive re lation to ourselves; and therefore in the systems- of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully distin guish them.
That which determines the internal sense is the under standing, and its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself). Now, as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the syn thesis of understanding considered per se, nothing but the unity of action, of which, as such, self-conscious, even apart from sensibility, by which, moreover, able to determine our internal sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to according to the form of sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of transcendental synthesis of imagi nation, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty and so we are- right in saying that the internal sense affected thereby. Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects.
Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes * of their production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two very dis similar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising ou; of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought ; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impres sions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such
* Gelegenheitsursachea.
? ? ? ? DEDT/CTIOK OF THE CATEGORIES. 73
an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions,
is undoubtedly of great utility ; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke, for having first opened the way for this en
But a deduction of the pure d priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future employment, which must be entirely inde pendent of experience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a queesiio facli, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cog nition. It is therefore manifest that there can caly be a tran scendental deduction of these conceptions, and by no means an empirical one ; also, that all attempts at an empirical de
duction, in regard to pure &. priori conceptions, are vain, and
can only be made by one who does not understand the alto
gether peculiar nature of these cognitions.
But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction
of pure a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not,
for that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is
absolutely necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of space and time, by means of a transcen dental deduction, and we have explained and determined their objective validity t> priori. Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure h priori cogni tions, without needing to ask from Philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental concep tion of space. But the use of the conception in this science extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of the intuition of which is space ; and in this world, therefore, all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon h priori intuition, posesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this cognition are given & prion (as regards their form) in intuition
by and through the cognition itself. * With the pure concep tions of Understanding, on the contrary, commences the ab-
* Kant's meaning is : The object! of cognition in Geometry, -- anirias, lines, figures, and the like,--are not different from the aet of cognition which produces them, except in thought. The object does not exist hut while we think it--docs not exist apart from our thinking it. The act of thinking and the object of thinking, are but one thing regarded from two different points ofview. --IV.
quiry.
? ? ? ? 74
TBAWBCENDEKTAL LOGIC.
solute necessity of seeking a transcendental deduction, not only of these conceptions themselves, but likewise of space, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations* concerning
not by means of the predicates of intuition and sen sibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply to objects without any of the conditions of sensibility. Besides, not being
founded on experience, they are not presented with any object in h priori intuition upon which, antecedently to expe rience, they might base their synthesis. Hence results, not only doubt as to the objective validity and proper limits of their use, but that even our conception of space is rendered equivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of
the categories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition ;--and for this reason, we have already found a transcendental deduction of it needful. The reader, then, must be quite convinced of the absolute neces sity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step in the field of pure reason ; because otherwise he goes to work blindly, and after he has wandered about in all directions, returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he started. He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand, the un-
* I have been compelled to adopt a conjectural reading here. All the editions of the Critik der reinen Vernunft, both those published during Kant's lifetime, and those published by various editors after his death, have tie. . von Gegenttanden. . . . redet. But it is quite plain that the tie is the pronoun for die reine Vertttmdesbegriffe ; and we ought, there fore, to read reden. In the same sentence, all the editions (except Har- tenstein's) insert die after the first und, which makes nonsense. In page 75 also, sentence beginning "For that objectt," I have altered "tyn- thetitchen Einticht det Denkent" into " tyrUheiitchen Einheit. " And in page 77, sentence beginning, " But it it evident," vre find "die trtte Bedingung liegtn. " Some such word as mutt is plainly to be understood.
Indeed, I have not found a single edition of the Critique trust worthy. Kant must not have been very careful in his correction of the
Those published by editors after Kant's death seem in most cases to follow Kant's own editions closely. That by Rosencrantz is perhaps the best ; and he has corrected a number of Kant's errors. But although I have adopted several uncommon and also conjectural readings, I have not done ao hastily or lightly. It is only after diligent comparison of all the tditions I could gainaocesa to, that I have altered the common reaaing ; while a conjectural reading has been adopted only when it was quite clear that the reading of every edition was a misprint.
Other errors. occurring previously to those mentioned above, have been, and others after them will be, corrected ii silence. -- 2V.
objects
? press.
? ? ? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.
75
BToidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may not afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path ;--because we have a choice of only two things -- either at once to give up all pretensions to know ledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring this critical investigation to completion.
We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it com prehensible how the conceptions of space and time, although a priori cognitions, must necessarily apply to external ob-
independently of all experience. For inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object can appear to us, that be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions, which contain a priori the con dition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and an
priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity.
On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do
not represent the conditions under which objects are given
to us in intuition objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves with these, and consequently without any necessity binding on the under standing to contain priori the conditions of these objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in difficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of sensibility, that to say, we cannot discover how the subjective conditions thought can have objective validity, in other words, can become con ditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects --for phsenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without any help from the functions Let us take, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates peculiar kind of synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something entirely different, connected according to law. not priori manifest why phsenomena should contain anything of this kind (we are of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated priori), and hence remains doubtful a priori, whether such con ception be not quite void, and without any corresponding object among phenomena. For that objects of sensuous
? ? ? it
It
a a
of is ;
is h
is,
B, is
aa
a
; h
&
? 76 TBANSCEXDESTAL LOGIO.
intuition must correspond to tlic formnl conditions of sen sibility existing h priori in the mind, is quite evident, froir. the fact, that without these they could not be objects for us ; but that they must also correspond to the conditions which understanding requires for the synthetical unity 01 thought, is nn assertion, the grounds for which are not so easily to be discovered. For phenomena might be so con stituted, as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought ; and all things might lie in such confusion, that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere of phsenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so cor
? to the conception of cause and effect ; so that this conception would lie quite void, null, and without significance. Phsenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition ; for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought.
respond
Ifwc thought to free ourselves from the labour of these
investigations by saying, " Experience is constantly offering us examples of the relation of cause and effect in pheno mena, and presents us with abundant opportunity of ab stracting the conception of cause, and so at the same time of corroborating the objective validity of this conception ;" -- we should in this case be overlooking the fact, that the concep tion of cause cannot arise in this way at all ; that, on the con trary, it must either have an a priori basis in the understand ing, or be rejected as a mere chimacra. For this conception demands that something, A, should be of such a nature, that something else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and ac cording to an absolutely universal law. We may certainly collect from phsenomena a law, according to which this or that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not tc be found in it. Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis ; for it is no mere mechanical syn thesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one, that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the
cause, but aa posited by and through the cause, and resulting from it. The strict universality of this law never can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through in duction only a comparative universality, tint an extended range of practical application. But tie pure conceptions ol
? ? is,
? DEDUCTION OY THE CATEGORIES. 77
(he understanding -would entirely lose all their peculiar cha racter, if we treated them merely as the productions of ex
perience.
Tbanbition to the Tbanscendental Deduction oi hie Cateqouies.
? 10.
There are only two possible ways in which synthetical re presentation and its objects can coincide with and relate
to each other, and, as it were, meet together, blither the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible. In the former case, the relation between them is only empirical, and
an a priori representation is impossible. And this is the case with phsenomena, as regards that in them which is refer able to mere sensation. In the latter case --although repre sentation alone (for of its causality, by means cf the will, we do not here speak,) does not produce the object as to its ex istence, it must nevertheless be a priori determinative in re gard to the object, if it is only by means of the represent ation that we can cognize any thing as an object. Now there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects ; firstly, Intuition, by means' of which the object, though only as phsenomenon, is given ; secondly, Conception, by means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is evident from what has been said on aes thetic, that the first condition, under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, u priori in the mind. With this formal condition of sensi
bility, therefore, all phsenomena necessarily correspond, because it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all ; that can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is,,
necessarily
? whether there do not exist priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding also, as conditions under which alone something,
not intuited, yet thought as object. If this question be answered in the affirmative, follows that all empirical cogni tion of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions, since, they are not presupposed, impossible that anything can be an object of experience. Now all experience contains, besidro the intuition of 'he senses through which an object
? ? is
if if
is,
it is
it
&
is
? 78 nursuM duvix logic.
given, a conception also of an object that is given in intuition. Accordingly, conceptionsof objects in general must lie as a priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition ; and con
sequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as re gards the form of thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only through them can an object of ex perience be thought.
The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a prion conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions
which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience, are for that very reason necessary. But the analysis of the experiences in which they are met with is not deduction, but only an illustration of them, because from experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity. Without their original applicability and relation to all pos sible experience, in which all objects of cognition present themselves, the relation of the categories to objects, of what ever nature, would be quite incomprehensible.
The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and because he met with pure conceptions of the un derstanding in experience, sought also to deduce them from
experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive at cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that the conceptions should have an a priori origin. But as he could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding, must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in the object, --and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experi ence in which its objects were presented to --he was forced to derive these conceptions from experience, that from
subjective necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective, --in one word, from " habit. " But he proceeded with perfect con sequence, and declared to be impossible with such con
? ? ? it
a
is
it,
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBTEB.
79
eeptions and the principles arising from them, to Dverstep the limits of experience. The empirical derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to these concep tions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do possess scientific & priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics.
The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to extravagance --(for if reason has once undoubted righ. on its side, it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague recommendations of moderation) ; the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism, --a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trust-worthy. We now intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason be tween these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity.
? I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are. They are conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in rela tion to one of the logical functions of judgment. The fol lowing will make this plain. The function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate ; for example, in the proposition, " All bodies are divisible. " But
in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it still remains undetermined to which of these two conceptions belongs the function of subject, and to which that of predi cate. For we could also say, " Some divisible is a body. " But the category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought under determines that and its empirical intui tion in experience must be contemplated always as subject, and never 80 were predicate. And so w th all the other cate gories.
? ? it,
;
? 8C TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
Deditction OF THE fuh;s Conceftions OF the Undeb- STANDING. '
SECTION II.
Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceftions of tub Understanding.
? 11.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre sentations given by Sense.
Tlie manifold content in our representations can be given in an intuition which is merely sensuous --in other words, is nothing but susceptibility ; and the form of this intuition can exist h priori in our faculty of representation, without being any thing else but the mode in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition never can be given us by the senses ; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this facult) understanding; so all conjunction -- whether conscious or un conscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non- sensuous, or of several conceptions --is an act of the under standing. To this act we shall give the general appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we cannot represent any thing as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental notions, that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but can be originated only by the sub ject itself, because it is an act cf its purely spontaneous activity. The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act, and that it must be equally valid for all conjunction ; and that analysis, which appears to be its contrary, must, never theless, always presuppose it ; for where the understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or analyse, because only a>> conjoined by must that which to be analysed have been given to our faculty of representation.
But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception of the manifold and of the synthesis of that of thf
? ? ? it,
is
it,
? TBANSCEKDENTAI. DEDUCTION Ot THJ CATIGOltlEB. 81
unity of it also. Conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of the manifold. * This idea of unity, there fore, cannot arise out of that of conjunction ; much rather does that idea, by combining hself with the representation of the manifold, render the conception of conjunction pos sible. This unity, which a priori precedes all conceptions of conjunction, is not the category of unity(? 6); for all the categories are based upon logical functions of judgment, and in these functions we already have conjunction, and consequently unity of given conceptions. It is therefore evident that the category of unity presupposes conjunction. We must therefore look still higher for this unity (as quali tative, ? 8), in that, namely, which contains the ground of the unity of diverse conceptions in judgments, the ground, consequently, of the possibility of the existence of the under standing, even in regard to its logical use.
? 0/ the Originally Synthetical
? 12.
accompany
Unity of Apperception. -^
I think must
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought ; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation tc me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to all thought, is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the
The
all my representations, for
I think, in the iI
n which this is found. subject diversity
think, is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distin-
But this representation,
* Whether the representations are in themselves
identical, and conse quently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and through the other, is a question which we need not at present consider. Our cun-
tcioumest of the one, when we speak of the manifold, is always distinguish able from our consciousness of the other ; and it is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that we here treat.
t Apperception simply means consciousness. But it has been considered better to employ this term, not only because Kant saw fit to have another word besides Bevmntteyn, but because the term contcimunem denotes a ttate, apperception an act of the ego; and from this alone the superiority Ot* the latter is apparent. -- 7>.
O
? ? ? 82 TRASaCWTDEKTAL LOGIC.
guish it from empirical ; or primitive apperception, because it is a self-consciIousness which, whilst it gives birth to the >>>
think, must necessarily be capable of accom panying all our representations. It is in all acts of conscious ness one and the same, and unaccompanied by no repre
sentation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in an intui tion would not all of them be my representations, they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that as my representations (even although am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition under which alone
they can exist together in common self-consciousness, be
cause otherwise they would not all without exception belong
to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many impor tant results.
For example, this universal identity of the apperception of the manifold given in intuition, contains synthesis of repre sentations, and possible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness which accompanies difFerent representations in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without relation to the identity of the subject. This relation, then does not exist because accom pany every representation with consciousness, but because join one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because can connect
variety of given representations in one consciousness, possible that can represent to myself the identity of con sciousness in these representations in other words, the ana
lytical unity of apperception possible only under the pre supposition of synthetical unity. * The thought, "These repre-
All general conceptions -- as sucli -- depend, for their existence, on tlie analytical unity of consciousness. For example, when think of red general, thereby think to myself property which (as characteristic mark) can be discovered somewhere, or can be united with other repre sentations consequently, only by means of forethought possible synthetical unity that can think to myself the analytical. represen tation which cogitated as common to different representations, re garded as belonging to such as, besides this common representation, con tain something different; consequently must be previously thought in
synthetical unity with other although only possible representations, before
presentation
? ? ? it
is
I
A is
I
is,
I
is
I ;
it is
a
is
a
a
is
;
a
I
h
I a
I
it, if
*
a
a
is
in itI
I
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOKIES.
tentatiofls given in intuition, belong all of them to me," is
"I unite them in one self-con sciousness, or can at least so unite them ;" and although this
accordingly just the same as,
thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of re
presentations, it presupposes the possibility of it ; that is to say, for the reason alone, that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many- coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious. Synthetical unity of the manifold in intui tions, as given a priori, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, which antecedes it priori all determinate thought. But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining a priori, and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apper ception.
This principle is the highest in all human cog nition.
This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apper ception is indeed an identical, and therefore analytical propo sition i but it nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without which the identity of self-consciousness would be incogitable. For the Ego, as a simple representation, presents us with no manifold content ; only in intuition, which is quite different from the representation Ego, can it be given us, and by means of con junction, it is cogitated in one self-consciousness. An under standing, in which all the manifold should be given by means of consciousness itself, would be intuitive ; our understanding can only think, and must look for its intuition to sense. I am, therefore, conscious of my identical self, in relation to all the variety of representations given to me in on intuition,
because I call all of them my representations. In other
I can think in it the analytical unity of consciousness which makes it ? coHCtptai comtmmu. And thus the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every operation of the under standing, even the whole of logic, and after it our transcendental philo sophy ; indeed, this faculty U the understanding itself.
? si
? ? ? 84 TKANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
words, I am conscious myself of a necessary a prtori syn thesis of my representations, which is called the original synthetical unity of apperception, under which rank all the representations presented to me, but that only by means of a synthesis.
The principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest principle of all exercise of the Understanding.
? 13.
The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, according to our transcendental esthetic, that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of Space and Time. The supreme prin ciple of the possibility of it in relation to the Understanding is : that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical Unity of Apperception. * To the former of these two principles are subject all the various representa tions of Intuition, in so far as they are given to us ; to the latter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one consciousness ; for without this nothing can be thought or cognized, because the given representatioIns would not have
Understanding to speak generally, the faculty of Cog nitions. These consist in the determined relation of given representations to an object. But an object that, in the conception of which the manifold in given intuition
united. Now all union of representations requires unity of
? in common the act of the apperception
fore could not be connected in one self-consciousness.
consciousness in the synthesis of them.
the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and con-
Space and Time, and all portions thereof, are hitutiiom conse quently are, with manifold for their content, single representations. (See the Transcendental 1Eithetic. ) Consequently, they arc not pure conceptions, by means of which the same consciousness found in great number of representations but, on the contrary, they are many representations contained in one, the consciousness of which is, so to speak, compounded. The unity of consciousness nevertheless tyu- thttieal, and therefore primitive. From this peculiar character of con- tcicrasness follow many important consequences. (See 21. )
think ; and there
Consequently,
? ? is ?
a
is
;
is
a
it
is is
a
*
;
is,
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.
85
sequentlv, the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself.
The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception. Thus the mere form of external sensuous in tuition, namely, space, affords us, per se, no cognition ; it merely contributes the manifold in h priori intuition to a pos sible cognition. But, in order to cognize something in space, (for example, a line,) I must draw and thus produce syn thetically determined conjunction of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act at the same time the unity of con sciousness, (in the conception of line,) and by this means alone an object determinate space) cognized. The syn thetical unity of consciousness therefore, an objective con dition of all cognition, which do not merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must neces sarily be subject, in order to become an object for me be cause in any other way, and without this synthesis, the mani fold intuition could not be united in one consciousness.
This proposition as already said, itself analytical, though constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought for states nothing more than that all my repre sentations in any given intuition, must be subject to the con dition which alone enables me to connect them, as my repre sentation with the identical self, and so to unite them syn thetically in one apperception, by means of the general ex
? think.
But this principle not to be regarded as principle for
every possible understanding, but only for that understanding means of whose pure apperception in the thought am, no manifold content given. The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through the act itself of its own self-consciousness, in other words, an
understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist, would not require special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of which the human understanding, which thinks only and can not intuite, has absolute need. But this principle the first
pression,
? ? is
a
(a
is
is,
by
/
; al
I is
in ;
is
a
a
it it
is I
is,
a
it,
? TBAN8CF. ? fl)F. NTAL 1,O010.
principle of all the operations of our understanding, *o that we cannot form the least conception of any other possible un derstanding, either of one such as should be itself intuition, or possess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different from those of space and time.
What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. ? 14.
It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold given in an intuition is united into a conception of the object. On this account it is called ob jective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of the internal sense, by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united. Whether I can be empirically conscious of the manifold as co-existent or as successive, de pends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world, and is wholly contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intui tion in time, merely as an intuition,*. which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the / think, consequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding, which lies h priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis. The transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid ; the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions in con-
creto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing ; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical, in relation to that which given experi ence, not necessarily and universally valid.
The Logical Form all Judgments consists in the Objective
? Unity Apperception
the Conceptions contained therein.
15.
could never satisfy myself with the definition which gicians (rive of iudgment. is, according to them, the
? ? It
I
a
of
lo
of ?
of
is,
is
by
? DEDFOTIOK OF THE OATieOBIBS.
87
representation of a relation between two conceptions. Ishall not dwell here on the faultiness of this definition, in that it suits only for categorical and not for hypothetical or disjunc tive judgments, these latter containing a relation not of con ceptions but of judgments themselves ; --a blunder from which many evil results have followed. * It is more important for our present purpose to observe, that this definition does not determine in what the said relation consists.
But if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish as belonging to the understanding, from the relation which produced ac cording to laws of the reproductive imagination, (which has only subjective validity), find that judgment nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions under the objective unity of apperception. This plain from our use of the term of relation in judgments, in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective unity. For this term indicates the relation of these representations to the original apperception, and also their necessary unity, even though the judgment empirical, therefore contingent, as in the judgment, " All bodies are heavy. " do not mean by this, that these representations do necessarily belong to each other in empirical intuition, but that by means of the necessary unity of apperception they belong to each other in the syn thesis of intuitions, that to say, they belong to each other according to principles of the objective determination of all our representations, in so far as cognition can arise from them, these principles being all deduced from the main principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way alone can there arise from this relation judgment, that rela tion which has objective validity, and perfectly distinct from that relation of the very same representations which
The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only categorical syllogisms and although nothing more than an artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions (consequential imme diate) among the premises of pure syllogism, to give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing conclusion than that in the first figure, the artifice would not have had much success, had not its authors succeeded
bringing categorical judgments into exclusive respect, as those to which all others must be referred-- doctrine, however, which, according to
utterly false.
? ? ? is
in
*
a
a is
a is isI
f i,
al
;
it is
a is
a
is, a
I
is
is
is it,
? 88 TKAWSCEITOENTAL LOGIC.
has only subjective validity--a relation, to wit, which ii produced according to laws of association. According to these laws, I could only say : " When 1 hold in my hand or carry a body, I feel an impression of weight ;" but I could not say : " It, the body, is heavy ;" for this is tantamount to saying both these representations are conjoined in the ob ject, that without distinction as to the condition of the subject, and do not merely stand together in my perception, however frequently the perceptive act may be repeated.
All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold Content tliem can be united
one Consciousness.
16.
The manifold content given in sensuous intuition comes
necessarily under the original synthetical unity of appercep tion, because thereby alone the unity of intuition possible
13). But that act of the understanding, by which the mani fold content of given representations (whether intuitions or conceptions), brought under one apperception, the logical function of judgments 15). All the manifold therefore, in so far as given in one empirical intuition, determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgment, means of which brought into union in one consciousness. Now the categories are nothing else than these functions of judg ment, so far as the manifold in given intuition deter mined in relation to them(? 9). Consequently, the manifold
given intuition necessarily subject to the categories of the understanding.
Observation.
? 17.
The manifold in an intuition, which call mine, repre
sented by means of the synthesis of the understanding, ns belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this takes place means of the category. * The category
* The proof of this re>>t>> on the represented unity intuition, neans of which an object given, and which always includes in itsell synthesis of the manifold to be intuited, and also the relation of t'l;i
atter to unity of apperception.
? ? ? a
in a
(?
is
is
(?
by
I of
of
by
is
is
by
a
it
is is
is,
it
is
is
is
is
? a
in
? DEDUCTION O? CUE CATlGORtES. 89
indicates accordingly, that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a pure self-con sciousness H priori, in the same manner as an empirical in tuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which is also h priori. -- In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must in my deduction make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an em pirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclu sively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what follows
(? 22), it will be shown from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category (according to ? 16) imposes on the manifold in a given intui tion, and thus its (I priori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deduction will be fully attained.
But there is one thing in the above demonstration, of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the un derstanding, and independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined. For if I cogitate an understand ing which was itself intuitive (as, for example, a divine un derstanding which should not represent given objects, but by whose representation the objects themselves should be given or produced) -- the categories would possess no signification in relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which presented to in intuition from very different quarter, to the unity of apperception -- faculty, therefore, which cognizes nothing per >>e, but only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition, namely, which must be presented to means of the object. But to show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, that produces unity of apperception priori only by means of categories, and certain kind and number thereof, as
impossible as to explain why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of judgment and no more, or why time and space arc the only forms of our intuition.
? ? ? a
is
it
h
it by
; a
is, is
it
a
? 00 TBAHSCXirDXHTAL LOGIC. ? 18.
In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is tit only legitimate use of the Category.
To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing. In cognition there are two elements :
firstly, the conception, whereby an object is cogitated category) ; and, secondly, the intuition, whereby the object is given. For supposing that to the conception a corresponding intuition could not be given, it would still be a thought as re gards its form, but without any object, and no cognition of anything would be possible by means of inasmuch as, so far as knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us
sensuous consequently, our thought of an object means of pure conception of the understanding, can become cogni tion for us, only in so far as this conception applied to objects of the senses. Sensuous intuition either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition--of that which im mediately represented in space and time means of sensation as real. Through the determination of pure intuition we ob tain a priori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but only as regards their form as phenomena whether there can exist things which must be intuited in this form not thereby established. All mathematical conceptions, therefore, are not per se cognition, except in so far as we presuppose that there exist things, which can only be represented con formably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition. But things in space and time are given, only in so far as they are percep tions (representations accompanied with sensation), therefore only by empirical representation. Consequently the pure con. ceptions of the understanding, even when they are applied to intuitions priori (as in mathematics), produce cognition only in so far as these (and therefore the conceptions of the understanding by means of them,) can be applied to empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories do not, even means of pure intuition, afford us any cognition of things they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intui tion. That to say, the categories serve only to render em pirical cognition possible. But this what we call experience
(the
? ? ? ;
is
is
;
by
by
a
;
is
is
;
is by
is
it,
is aI
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBIEB. 91
cation to objects of ex* the categories.
The foregoing proposition of the utmost importance, for determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions
of the understanding in regard to objects, just as transcen dental esthetic determined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous intuition. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the presentation of objects to us, are valid no further than for objects of sense, con sequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits they re present to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and have no reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to
objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike to ours, provided only be sensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension of conceptions beyond the range of our in tuition of no advantage for they are then mere empty con ceptions of objects, as to the possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no means of dis covery. They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, because we have no intuition to which the synthetical unity of apperception, which alone the categories contain, could be applied, for the purpose of determining an object. Our sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance and meaning. .
If, then, we suppose an object of non-sensuous intuition to be given, wo can in that case represent by all those pre dicates, which are implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous intuition belongs to for example that not extended, or in space that its duration not time that in no change (the effect of the determinations in time)
to be met with, and so on. But no proper knowledge merely indicate what the intuition of the object not, with
out being able to say what contained in for have not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure con
ception of understanding could be applicable, because have not been able to furnish any intuition corresponding to but am only able to say that our intuition not valid for it. But the most important point this, that to something al
? ? ? is is
; it
is
ili
is a
it ;
I it,
if
it,
I is
it
I is
it
is
a
it it is
is
is
it ;
? 92 TRA2fSCEWDEirrAL LO9IC.
this kind not one category can be found applicable. Take, for example, the conception of substance, that is something tLat can exist as subject, but never as mere predicate ; in regard to this conception I am quite ignorant whether there can really be anything to correspond to such a determination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me the occa sion for its application. But of this more in the sequel.
? 20.
Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Sense* in general.
The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition in general, through the understanding alone, whether the intuition be our own or some other, provided only it be sensuous, but are, for this very reason, mere forms of thought, by means of which alone no determined object can be cognized. The synthesis or conjunction of the manifold in these conceptions relates, we have said, only to the unity of apperception, and is for this reason the ground of the possibility of & priori cognition, in so far as this cognition is dependent on the understanding. This synthesis is, there fore, not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual. But because a certain form of sensuous intuition exists in the mind 5 priori which rests on the receptivity of the representa tive faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a spontaneity, is able to determine the internal sense by means of the di versity of given representations, conformably to the synthetical unity of apperception, and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the apperception of the manifold of sensuous in tuition a priori, as the condition to which must necessarily
De submitted all objects of human intuition. And in this
nanner the categories as mere forms of thought receive ob
iective reality, that is application to objects which are given to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it is only of phcenomena that we are capable of o priori intuition.
This synthesis of the-manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), in contra-distinction to that which is co gitated in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and is called connexion or conjunction of the understanding {synlhcr's intellectualis). Both are trans
? ? ? ? DEDUCTION OF TUB CATEGOBIES. M
cendental, not merely because they themselves precede A prion all experience, but also because they form the basis for the possibility of other cognition a priori.
But the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the originally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the transcendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be en titled the transcendental synthesis of imagination. * Imagina tion is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which
alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility. But in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, which is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable, and which is consequently able to determine sense a priori, according to its form, conformably to the unity of appercep tion, in so far is the imagination a faculty of determining sen sibility a priori, and ita synthesis of intuitions according to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagi
? nation. It is an operation of the understanding on sensibility, and the first application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time the basis for the exer cise of the other functions of that faculty. As figurative, it is distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis, which is produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of imagination. Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it also the productive imagination, and distin guish it from the reproductive, the synthesis of which is sub ject entirely to empirical laws, those of association, namely, and which, therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori cognition, and for this reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy, but to psychology.
*****
We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox, which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal sense (? 0), namely, --how this sense repre sents us to our own consciousness, only as we appear to our selves, not as wc are in ourselves, because, to wit, we uituitc
* Sec note on p. 3-1
? ? ? 94 TKANSCKNUENTAX LOOIO.
ourselves only as we are inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive re lation to ourselves; and therefore in the systems- of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully distin guish them.
That which determines the internal sense is the under standing, and its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself). Now, as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the syn thesis of understanding considered per se, nothing but the unity of action, of which, as such, self-conscious, even apart from sensibility, by which, moreover, able to determine our internal sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to according to the form of sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of transcendental synthesis of imagi nation, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty and so we are- right in saying that the internal sense affected thereby. Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects.
