Objection
2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated
above ([2035]Q[90], AA[1],2).
above ([2035]Q[90], AA[1],2).
Summa Theologica
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Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed
by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good
thereby, as stated above ([2024]Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be
induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against
their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame
laws.
Objection 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have
recourse to a judge as to animate justice. " But animate justice is
better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it
would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to
the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
Objection 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human
actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ([2025]Q[90],
AA[1],2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are
infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions
cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for
human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the
framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in
fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence
might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of
punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm. " But these things
are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human
laws should be made.
I answer that, As stated above ([2026]Q[63], A[1];[2027] Q[94], A[3]),
man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue
must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we
observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for
instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from
nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full
complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency
of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice
for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of
virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to
which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more
capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this
training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue.
And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by
their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of
God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since
some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily
amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil
by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from
evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by
being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what
hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of
training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline
of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it
was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in
virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and
righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable
to do.
Reply to Objection 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to
virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are
evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is
better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by
judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to
find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the
many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.
Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what
laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced
as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by
taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one
solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of
future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present,
towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of
cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man,
and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever
possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few
matters to be left to the decision of men.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered
by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the
Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning
something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
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Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the
natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal
just is that which originally was a matter of indifference. " But those
things which arise from the natural law are not matters of
indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived
from the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as
stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But
those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of
the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above
([2028]Q[94], A[4]). Therefore that which is established by human law
does not belong to the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is
equally valid everywhere. " If therefore human laws were derived from
the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all:
which is clearly false.
Objection 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which
are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the
reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist
says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat. ].
Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from
nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and
reverence for the laws. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not
just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends
on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to
be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the
first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has
been stated above ([2029]Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the
law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature,
it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law
in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of
determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by
which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the
craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some
particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general
principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e. g. that "one
must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that
"one should do harm to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way
of determination; e. g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer
should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a
determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But
those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human
law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from
the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second
way, have no other force than that of human law.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments
which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of
the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for those things that are
derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.
Reply to Objection 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot
be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety
of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among
various people.
Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as
referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of
the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and
prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they
see at once what is the best thing to decide.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we
ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and
opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as
to their demonstrations. "
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Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of
positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall
be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the
country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly
expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed
for no private benefit, but for the common good. " Because he had
previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying
that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster
religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal. "
Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.
Objection 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De
Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add
"just. "
Objection 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according
to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the
definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country. "
Objection 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be
necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is
necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore
human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing
may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as
usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and
"useful. "
On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.
I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be
determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as
to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that
is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and
measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it
is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz.
the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above [2030](A[2];
Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the
jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff. , tit. iii; De Leg. et
Senat. ]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down,
at first, three conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as
it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to
discipline," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and
that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to
the utility of mankind.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three.
For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes
on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the
customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first
on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly,
it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be
adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account
the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on
children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since
man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it
depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted
to place and time. " The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean
that law should further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to
the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good;
"clearness of expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing
from the law itself. And since, as stated above ([2031]Q[90], A[2]),
law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part
of the description.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?
Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes
or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq. ). For under this law he includes the
"law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations
use it. " But as he says, "natural law is that which is common to all
nations. " Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive
human law, but rather under natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to
differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the
commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym.
v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except
materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may
go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not
appropriate.
Objection 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests
and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems
that, as this division includes "military law," and "public law,"
referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should include other
laws pertaining to other offices of the state.
Objection 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed
over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that
man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names
of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" law, another the
"Falcidian" law, etc.
On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices.
I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something
contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or
irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal
is divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or
irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are
entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law,
many things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be
divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to
the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as
explained above [2032](A[2]). In this respect positive law is divided
into the "law of nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in
which something may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above
[2033](A[2]). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which
are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e. g.
just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live
together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature
a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But those things which
are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination,
belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is
best for itself.
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the
common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided
according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for
the common good: e. g. priests, by praying to God for the people;
princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety
of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to
these men.
Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that
one who governs the community of the state, as shown above
([2034]Q[90], A[3]). In this respect, there are various human laws
according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to
the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is "monarchy," i. e. when the state
is governed by one; and then we have "Royal Ordinances. " Another form
is "aristocracy," i. e. government by the best men or men of highest
rank; and then we have the "Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa
Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate" [Senatus consulta]. Another form
is "oligarchy," i. e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and
then we have "Praetorian," also called "Honorary," law. Another form of
government is that of the people, which is called "democracy," and
there we have "Decrees of the commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also
tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore,
has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made
up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law
sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v,
4, seqq. ).
Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human
actions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which the
law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named
after their authors: thus we have the "Lex Julia" about adultery, the
"Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this
way, not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to
which they refer.
Reply to Objection 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way,
natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is
derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very
remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto.
Nevertheless it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is
distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals.
The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been
said.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?
(2) Whether human law should repress all vices?
(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?
(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?
(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?
(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of
the law?
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Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the
individual?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for the
community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts
of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of
decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed
about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the
community, but also for the individual.
Objection 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated
above ([2035]Q[90], AA[1],2). But human acts are about individual
matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community,
but rather for the individual.
Objection 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as
stated above ([2036]Q[90], AA[1],2). But a measure should be most
certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no
general proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual
cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for
individual cases.
On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii,
art. ii; De legibus, etc. ) that "laws should be made to suit the
majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may
possibly happen in an individual case. "
I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that
end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says
(Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit,
but for the common good of all the citizens. " Hence human laws should
be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many
things. Wherefore law should take account of many things, as to
persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the community of the
state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many
actions; nor is it established to endure for only a short time, but to
last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal
just, i. e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid
down simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these
he says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter of
indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing
of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the community in one
respect, and individuals in another. These are called "privileges,"
i. e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard private persons,
although their power extends to many matters; and in regard to these,
he adds, "and further, all particular acts of legislation. " Other
matters are legal, not through being laws, but through being
applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees
which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he adds "all
matters subject to decrees. "
Reply to Objection 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to
many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all
things belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the
principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as
there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use,
since their use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law
would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single
act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of
prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions;
whereas law is a general precept, as stated above ([2037]Q[92], A[2],
OBJ[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in
all things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as
natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as
being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and less
frequently it fail.
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Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?
Objection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all
vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order
that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check. " But it
would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were
repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils.
Objection 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the
citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from
all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all
vices.
Objection 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as
stated above ([2038]Q[95], A[2]). But all vices are contrary to the law
of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices.
On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the
law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits
these things, and that Divine providence punishes them. " But Divine
providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly
allows some vices, by not repressing them.
I answer that, As stated above ([2039]Q[90], AA[1],2), law is framed as
a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous
with that which it measures, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since
different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws
imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as
Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to
nature, and according to the customs of the country. " Now possibility
or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since
the same thing is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as
is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child as
to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the
same as for adults, since many things are permitted to children, which
in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In
like manner many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue,
which would be intolerable in a virtuous man.
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all
vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous
vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and
chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition
of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law
prohibits murder, theft and such like.
Reply to Objection 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of
others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's
neighbor is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to
virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the
multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already
virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these
imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out
into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): "He that
violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; and (Mat. 9:17) that
if "new wine," i. e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old
bottles," i. e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, and the wine
runneth out," i. e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from
contempt, break into evils worse still.
Reply to Objection 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the
eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the
government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are
punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do
everything, is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it does. "
Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything that is
forbidden by the natural law.
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Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of
all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But
human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above [2040](A[2]).
Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue
is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under
a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated
above ([2041]Q[90], A[2]). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to
the common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not
prescribe all acts of virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law
"prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the
acts of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in
like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the
former, forbidding the latter. "
I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their
objects, as explained above ([2042]Q[54], A[2];[2043] Q[60],
A[1];[2044] Q[62], A[2]). Now all the objects of virtues can be
referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common
good of the multitude: thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either
for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a friend,
and in like manner with the other virtues. But law, as stated above
([2045]Q[90], A[2]) is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is
no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless
human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue:
but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common
good---either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for
the common good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain
things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in
the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.
Reply to Objection 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by
the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of
virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes
some acts of each virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two
ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the
act of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do
brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue.
Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way
in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from
virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the end at
which every lawgiver aims.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to
the common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately.
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Whether human law binds a man in conscience?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in
conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of
higher power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath
the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in a
Divine court, such as is the court of conscience.
Objection 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the
commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made void by
human laws, according to Mat. 15:6: "You have made void the commandment
of God for your tradition. " Therefore human law does not bind a man in
conscience.
Objection 3: Further, human laws often bring loss of character and
injury on man, according to Is. 10:1 et seqq. : "Woe to them that make
wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor
in judgment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of My people. "
But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore
human laws do not bind man in conscience.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 2:19): "This is thankworthy, if
for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully. "
I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be
just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal
law whence they are derived, according to Prov. 8:15: "By Me kings
reign, and lawgivers decree just things. " Now laws are said to be just,
both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common
good---and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made
does not exceed the power of the lawgiver---and from their form, when,
to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of
proportion and with a view to the common good. For, since one man is a
part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs to
the community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole;
wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in order to save the
whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose
proportionate burdens, are just and binding in conscience, and are
legal laws.
On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being
contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned
above---either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on
his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but
rather to his own cupidity or vainglory---or in respect of the author,
as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to
him---or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally
on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like are
acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. i, 5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all. "
Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order
to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even
yield his right, according to Mat. 5:40,41: "If a man . . . take away
thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee
one mile, go with him other two. "
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good:
such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to anything else
contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be
observed, because, as stated in Acts 5:29, "we ought to obey God rather
than man. "
Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1,2), all human
power is from God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in
matters that are within its scope, "resisteth the ordinance of God"; so
that he becomes guilty according to his conscience.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of laws that are contrary
to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power.
Wherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of a law that inflicts
unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not
extend to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey
the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous
hurt.
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Whether all are subject to the law?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For
those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:9): "The law is not made for the just man. "
Therefore the just are not subject to the law.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]:
"He that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by
the public law. " Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of
the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom it is said (Rom.
8:14): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of
God. " Therefore not all men are subject to human law.
Objection 3: Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff. , tit.
3, De Leg. et Senat. ] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws. " But
he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all
are subject to the law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Let every soul be
subject to the higher powers. " But subjection to a power seems to imply
subjection to the laws framed by that power. Therefore all men should
be subject to human law.
I answer that, As stated above ([2046]Q[90], AA[1],2; A[3], ad 2), the
notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human
acts; secondly, that it has coercive power. Wherefore a man may be
subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the
regulator: and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject
to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one
is not subject to a power. In one way, by being altogether free from
its authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound
by the laws of the sovereign of another city or kingdom, since they are
not subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet
higher law; thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his
command, but not in those matters in which the subject receives his
orders from the emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the
mandate of the lower authority, since he is directed by that of a
higher. In this way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a
subject thereto in certain matters, in respect of which he is ruled by
a higher law.
Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is
subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous are not
subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence
are contrary to the will: but the will of the good is in harmony with
the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it.