" Now the symbol is published by the
authority of the universal Church.
authority of the universal Church.
Summa Theologica
ii).
Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of
the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in
the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at
the outset of this work ([2266]FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration
must know them first of all by faith.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we
have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one
and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i. e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same
object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner,
one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith,
the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same
object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either
opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is
incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason
that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be
otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should
be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy
Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude,
cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous
to distinguish certain articles of faith.
Objection 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied
indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the
formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated
above [2267](A[1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith
cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no
notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of
Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth
concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief. " Now belief is a
voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ), "no man
believes against his will. " Therefore it seems that matters of faith
should not be divided into articles.
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto. " Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which
the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes. "
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above [2268](A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason,
is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known
or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God
suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead,
wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article
of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the
same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to
accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
Reply to Objection 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists
in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is
the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things
are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life.
Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition
reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc. ], the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of
faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to
our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation
of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that
a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like,
which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the
Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not
form distinct articles.
Reply to Objection 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be
taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus
there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First
Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from
our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is
that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are
various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 11:6).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1),
"faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. " Now the same things
are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same
things are to be believed.
Objection 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised
by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of
faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated
in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God. " Since then there can be no lack
of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was
perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.
Objection 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly
fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a
beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).
Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect
things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it
most perfectly.
Objection 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us
through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of
faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,
according to Dt. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee. "
Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for
"they received them more fully than others, even as they received them
earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the
first fruits of the Spirit. " Therefore it seems that knowledge of
matters of faith has not increased as time went on.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech. ) that "the knowledge
of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they
were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the
mysteries of salvation. "
I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the
doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on
natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so
that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are
reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing
cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher
states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are
contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's
existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to
Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a
rewarder to them that seek Him. " For the existence of God includes all
that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness
consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things
which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way
to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which
follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption
of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion
and so forth.
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on:
since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained,
albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But
there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly,
since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly
which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence
the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God
of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg. : 'I am the Lord that appeared to
Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not
show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100): "I have had understanding
above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of
Christ, "in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to
His holy apostles and prophets. "
Reply to Objection 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped
for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through
Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the
further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle
says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having
received the promises, but beholding them afar off. " Now the further
off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were
nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good
things to be hoped for.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First,
on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in
knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes
place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner;
thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver
it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not
be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's
capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men
made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the
Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to
childhood.
Reply to Objection 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation
can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the
active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way
nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is
not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in
existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the
imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the
active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is
likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among
men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to
perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active
causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation
of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1
Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers
who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time
for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected
by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of
fulness [*Vulg. : 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were
nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after,
like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;
for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of
manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more perfect,
whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do
not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above
(A[5] ). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many
other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there
is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
Objection 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should
believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to
be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points
some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should
have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His
omnipotence.
Objection 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know
the Son, according to Jn. 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father
also. " Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and
Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
Objection 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the
Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several
articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the
Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the
Person of the Father.
Objection 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation,
of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too
is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets. "
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated
to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
Objection 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have
been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that
there is not a sufficient number of articles.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.
I answer that, As stated above ([2269]AA[4],6), to faith those things
in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal
life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are
proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons
of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is
eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus
Christ Whom Thou hast sent. " Wherefore the first distinction in matters
of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others
pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery
of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are
proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the
first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which
three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly,
the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order
of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is
proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to
which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in
one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in
relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the
resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven
articles referring to the Godhead.
In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His
Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the
fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,
to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
articles.
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the
three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into
one article.
Reply to Objection 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance
His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,
all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of
watching over things, as stated in the [2270]FP, Q[13], A[8]. Now in
beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and
knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal
knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence
over them.
Reply to Objection 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the
relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,
include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a
Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view,
there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the
three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain
points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error,
looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the
three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of
the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and
consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the
Person of the Son in order to settle this point. In like manner it was
necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy
Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way Christ's conception and
birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one
point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are
ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be
distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special
difficulty.
Reply to Objection 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent
to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be
believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of
the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is
never sent, as we stated in the [2271]FP, Q[43], A[4].
Reply to Objection 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and
its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity,
which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom,
which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by
appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of
the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this
respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is
that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is
included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are
ascribed to God's almighty power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of
faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since
it is written (Dt. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to
you, neither shall you take away from it. " Therefore it was unlawful to
make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been
published.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but
"one faith. " Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is
not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
Objection 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in
the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.
Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in
the words: "I believe in one God. "
Objection 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of
faith, as stated above [2272](A[8]). But the descent into hell is not
mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is
expressed inadequately.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan. ) expounding the
passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (Jn. 14:1) says: "We
believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God. " Since
then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting
to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. "
Objection 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of
faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that
publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers,
should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the
articles of faith in a symbol.
On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed
by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's
promise to His disciples (Jn. 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is
come, He will teach you all truth.
" Now the symbol is published by the
authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing
defective.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is. " Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be
proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of
faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be
proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through
ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of
faith that the symbol [*The Greek {symballein}] takes its name.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,
diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely,
so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one
needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who
require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for
study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather
together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed
to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but
something taken from it.
Reply to Objection 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the
symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about
the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded
persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the
necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one
another, save that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one
contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.
Reply to Objection 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol
in the person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united
together by faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since
such is the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not
only outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is
expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living
faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they
should endeavor to acquire it.
Reply to Objection 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen
among heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that
point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers,
but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a
subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it
expound it, as stated above (ad 2).
Reply to Objection 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this
must be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the
Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe
in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church. " But it is better and more in
keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the
holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost. ]
observes.
Reply to Objection 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation
of the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was
already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is
sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the
Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the
faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as
though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated
above [2273](A[9]). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith
were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of
faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated
above [2274](A[7]). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of
the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and
more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.
Objection 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden
under pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden
under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition
of the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of
Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council
had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to
utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by
the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this
under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by
Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A. D. 451, known as
the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope. ] The same was repeated in
the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it
seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new
edition of the symbol.
Objection 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but
patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in
the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the
symbol.
On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such
a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5].
Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw
up a symbol.
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ 1), a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise.
Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that
authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so
that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to
the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and
more difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred," as
stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence our Lord said to
Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for
thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted,
confirm thy brethren. " The reason of this is that there should be but
one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all
speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this
could not be secured unless any question of faith that may arise be
decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole
Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the
sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the
symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as
to convoke a general council and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in
the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet.
3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching
and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was
necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against
the errors which arose.
Reply to Objection 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was
intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide
matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not take
away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of
the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with
greater explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a
subsequent council would expound matters more fully than the preceding
council, if this became necessary through some heresy arising.
Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority
the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed.
Reply to Objection 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not
under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of
doctrine, as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained
briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2)
the external act.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?
(2) In how many ways is it expressed?
(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above
natural reason?
(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable
by natural reason?
(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things
explicitly?
(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?
(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation?
(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity
explicitly?
(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?
(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
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Whether to believe is to think with assent?
Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent.
Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a research, for
"cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to "coagitare," i. e. "to
discuss together. " Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that faith is
"an assent without research. " Therefore thinking has no place in the
act of faith.
Objection 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show
further on (Q[4], A[2]). Now to think is an act of the cogitative
power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the
[2275]FP, Q[78], A[4]. Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith.
Objection 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its
object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect,
but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above ([2276]FS, Q[15],
A[1], ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.
On the contrary, This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine (De
Praedest. Sanct. ii).
I answer that, "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a
general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now the
faculty whereby we understand when thinking. " Secondly, "to think" is
more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is
accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect's
arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of
sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of
God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought
realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word.
Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the
part of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be
unformed. " In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of
the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear
sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one
of deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the
intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the
sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for an
act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the
cogitative power.
Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the first
sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely what is
meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with assent
even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is certain
knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration. ], or
understands. If, on the other hand, "to think" be understood in the
second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the act of
believing. For among the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a
firm assent without any such kind of thinking, as when a man considers
the things that he knows by science, or understands, for this
consideration is already formed. But some acts of the intellect have
unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they incline to
neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or incline to one side rather
than the other, but on account of some slight motive, as in one who
"suspects"; or incline to one side yet with fear of the other, as in
one who "opines. " But this act "to believe," cleaves firmly to one
side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and
understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of
clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence
it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of
believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect,
which are about the true or the false.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason
which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things
whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have
been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.
Reply to Objection 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the
cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to
one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is
taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by
the will.
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Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God,
believing in a God and believing in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably
distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in
God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is
one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three
acts of faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should
not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe
God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the
First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from
certain other acts of faith.
Objection 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be
called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a
God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.
Objection 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will,
whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of
the will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which
implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of
that act.
On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this
distinction (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. lxi---Tract. xxix in Joan. ).
I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of
that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A[1], ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part
of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
be observed in the object of faith, as stated above ([2277]Q[1], A[1]).
One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of
faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above ([2278]Q[1],
A[1]) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is
referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of
faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as stated
above ([2279]Q[1], A[1]) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to
whatever he believes.
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in God. "
For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect
of an end.
Reply to Objection 1: These three do not denote different acts of
faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the
object of faith.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God"
as we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not
believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines;
hence they do not truly believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher
observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things defectively is
not to know them at all. "
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ([2280]FS, Q[9], A[1]) the will
moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in
this respect an act of faith is "to believe in God. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural
reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe
anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of
a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now
matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things
unseen as stated above ([2281]Q[1], A[4]). Therefore to believe seems
unnecessary for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters,
wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true
or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words? " Now
a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he
cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments
are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters.
Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps.
36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord. " Now "the
invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according
to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the
understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not
necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God. "
I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find
that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one
of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the
other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by
its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while
according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb
and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from
west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first
heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the created
rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other
creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something
particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in "being"
only, as inanimate things, or also in "living," and in "knowing
singulars," as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as
much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is
immediately related to the universal principle of being.
Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only
in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which
it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness.
Hence it was said above ([2282]FS, Q[3], A[8]) that man's ultimate
happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man
cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every
one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me. " Now
man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by
little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one
who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire
science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De
Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a learner to believe. "
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the
master who is teaching him.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher
nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some
supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the
natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of
virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way,
by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to
matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently
"there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are in Christ
Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.
Reply to Objection 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible
things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to
God from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many
things are shown to thee above the understandings of man. "
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Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by
natural reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which
can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is
superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can
be known by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the
object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object,
as stated above ([2283]Q[1], AA[4],5). Since therefore all things that
can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that
there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is
certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of
them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others
should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not
necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural
reason.
On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and
incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive
more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to
whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of
all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other
sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would
arrive at the knowledge of God.
Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of
the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in
the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at
the outset of this work ([2266]FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration
must know them first of all by faith.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we
have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one
and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i. e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same
object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner,
one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith,
the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same
object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either
opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is
incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason
that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be
otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should
be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of
faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible
to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about
the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as
stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy
Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude,
cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous
to distinguish certain articles of faith.
Objection 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied
indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the
formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated
above [2267](A[1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith
cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no
notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.
Objection 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of
Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth
concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief. " Now belief is a
voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ), "no man
believes against his will. " Therefore it seems that matters of faith
should not be divided into articles.
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto. " Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which
the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes. "
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above [2268](A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason,
is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known
or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God
suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead,
wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article
of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the
same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to
accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
Reply to Objection 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists
in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is
the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things
are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life.
Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition
reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc. ], the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of
faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to
our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation
of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that
a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like,
which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the
Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not
form distinct articles.
Reply to Objection 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be
taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus
there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First
Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from
our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is
that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are
various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares
(Heb. 11:6).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1),
"faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. " Now the same things
are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same
things are to be believed.
Objection 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised
by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of
faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated
in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God. " Since then there can be no lack
of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was
perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.
Objection 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly
fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a
beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).
Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect
things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it
most perfectly.
Objection 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us
through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of
faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,
according to Dt. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee. "
Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for
"they received them more fully than others, even as they received them
earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the
first fruits of the Spirit. " Therefore it seems that knowledge of
matters of faith has not increased as time went on.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech. ) that "the knowledge
of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they
were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the
mysteries of salvation. "
I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the
doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on
natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so
that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are
reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing
cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher
states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are
contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's
existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to
Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a
rewarder to them that seek Him. " For the existence of God includes all
that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness
consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things
which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way
to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which
follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption
of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion
and so forth.
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on:
since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained,
albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But
there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly,
since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly
which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence
the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God
of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg. : 'I am the Lord that appeared to
Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not
show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100): "I have had understanding
above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of
Christ, "in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to
His holy apostles and prophets. "
Reply to Objection 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped
for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through
Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the
further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle
says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having
received the promises, but beholding them afar off. " Now the further
off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were
nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good
things to be hoped for.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First,
on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in
knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes
place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner;
thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver
it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not
be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's
capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men
made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the
Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to
childhood.
Reply to Objection 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation
can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the
active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way
nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is
not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in
existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the
imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the
active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is
likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among
men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to
perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active
causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation
of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1
Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers
who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time
for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected
by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of
fulness [*Vulg. : 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were
nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after,
like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;
for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of
manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more perfect,
whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do
not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above
(A[5] ). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many
other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there
is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
Objection 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should
believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to
be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points
some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should
have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His
omnipotence.
Objection 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know
the Son, according to Jn. 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father
also. " Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and
Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
Objection 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the
Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several
articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the
Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the
Person of the Father.
Objection 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation,
of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too
is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets. "
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated
to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
Objection 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have
been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that
there is not a sufficient number of articles.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.
I answer that, As stated above ([2269]AA[4],6), to faith those things
in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal
life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are
proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons
of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is
eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus
Christ Whom Thou hast sent. " Wherefore the first distinction in matters
of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others
pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery
of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are
proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the
first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which
three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly,
the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order
of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is
proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to
which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in
one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in
relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the
resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven
articles referring to the Godhead.
In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His
Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the
fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,
to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
articles.
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the
three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into
one article.
Reply to Objection 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance
His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,
all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of
watching over things, as stated in the [2270]FP, Q[13], A[8]. Now in
beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and
knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal
knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence
over them.
Reply to Objection 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the
relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,
include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a
Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view,
there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the
three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain
points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error,
looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the
three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of
the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and
consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the
Person of the Son in order to settle this point. In like manner it was
necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy
Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way Christ's conception and
birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one
point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are
ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be
distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special
difficulty.
Reply to Objection 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent
to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be
believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of
the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is
never sent, as we stated in the [2271]FP, Q[43], A[4].
Reply to Objection 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and
its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity,
which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom,
which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by
appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of
the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this
respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is
that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is
included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are
ascribed to God's almighty power.
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Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of
faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since
it is written (Dt. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to
you, neither shall you take away from it. " Therefore it was unlawful to
make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been
published.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but
"one faith. " Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is
not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
Objection 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in
the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.
Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in
the words: "I believe in one God. "
Objection 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of
faith, as stated above [2272](A[8]). But the descent into hell is not
mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is
expressed inadequately.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan. ) expounding the
passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (Jn. 14:1) says: "We
believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God. " Since
then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting
to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. "
Objection 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of
faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that
publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers,
should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the
articles of faith in a symbol.
On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed
by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's
promise to His disciples (Jn. 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is
come, He will teach you all truth.
" Now the symbol is published by the
authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing
defective.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is. " Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be
proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of
faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be
proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through
ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of
faith that the symbol [*The Greek {symballein}] takes its name.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,
diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely,
so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one
needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who
require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for
study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather
together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed
to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but
something taken from it.
Reply to Objection 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the
symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about
the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded
persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the
necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one
another, save that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one
contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.
Reply to Objection 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol
in the person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united
together by faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since
such is the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not
only outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is
expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living
faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they
should endeavor to acquire it.
Reply to Objection 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen
among heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that
point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers,
but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a
subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it
expound it, as stated above (ad 2).
Reply to Objection 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this
must be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the
Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe
in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church. " But it is better and more in
keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the
holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost. ]
observes.
Reply to Objection 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation
of the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was
already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is
sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the
Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the
faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as
though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
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Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated
above [2273](A[9]). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith
were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of
faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated
above [2274](A[7]). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of
the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and
more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.
Objection 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden
under pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden
under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition
of the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of
Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council
had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to
utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by
the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this
under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by
Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A. D. 451, known as
the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope. ] The same was repeated in
the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it
seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new
edition of the symbol.
Objection 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but
patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in
the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the
symbol.
On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such
a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5].
Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw
up a symbol.
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ 1), a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise.
Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that
authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so
that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to
the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and
more difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred," as
stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence our Lord said to
Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for
thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted,
confirm thy brethren. " The reason of this is that there should be but
one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all
speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this
could not be secured unless any question of faith that may arise be
decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole
Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the
sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the
symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as
to convoke a general council and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in
the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet.
3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching
and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was
necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against
the errors which arose.
Reply to Objection 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was
intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide
matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not take
away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of
the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with
greater explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a
subsequent council would expound matters more fully than the preceding
council, if this became necessary through some heresy arising.
Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority
the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed.
Reply to Objection 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not
under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of
doctrine, as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained
briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2)
the external act.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?
(2) In how many ways is it expressed?
(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above
natural reason?
(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable
by natural reason?
(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things
explicitly?
(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?
(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation?
(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity
explicitly?
(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?
(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
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Whether to believe is to think with assent?
Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent.
Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a research, for
"cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to "coagitare," i. e. "to
discuss together. " Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that faith is
"an assent without research. " Therefore thinking has no place in the
act of faith.
Objection 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show
further on (Q[4], A[2]). Now to think is an act of the cogitative
power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the
[2275]FP, Q[78], A[4]. Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith.
Objection 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its
object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect,
but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above ([2276]FS, Q[15],
A[1], ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.
On the contrary, This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine (De
Praedest. Sanct. ii).
I answer that, "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a
general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now the
faculty whereby we understand when thinking. " Secondly, "to think" is
more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is
accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect's
arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of
sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of
God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought
realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word.
Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the
part of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be
unformed. " In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of
the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear
sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one
of deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the
intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the
sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for an
act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the
cogitative power.
Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the first
sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely what is
meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with assent
even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is certain
knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration. ], or
understands. If, on the other hand, "to think" be understood in the
second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the act of
believing. For among the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a
firm assent without any such kind of thinking, as when a man considers
the things that he knows by science, or understands, for this
consideration is already formed. But some acts of the intellect have
unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they incline to
neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or incline to one side rather
than the other, but on account of some slight motive, as in one who
"suspects"; or incline to one side yet with fear of the other, as in
one who "opines. " But this act "to believe," cleaves firmly to one
side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and
understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of
clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence
it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of
believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect,
which are about the true or the false.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason
which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things
whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have
been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.
Reply to Objection 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the
cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to
one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is
taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by
the will.
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Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God,
believing in a God and believing in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably
distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in
God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is
one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three
acts of faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should
not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe
God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the
First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from
certain other acts of faith.
Objection 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be
called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a
God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.
Objection 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will,
whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of
the will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which
implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of
that act.
On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this
distinction (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. lxi---Tract. xxix in Joan. ).
I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of
that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A[1], ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part
of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
be observed in the object of faith, as stated above ([2277]Q[1], A[1]).
One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of
faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above ([2278]Q[1],
A[1]) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is
referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of
faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as stated
above ([2279]Q[1], A[1]) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to
whatever he believes.
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in God. "
For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect
of an end.
Reply to Objection 1: These three do not denote different acts of
faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the
object of faith.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God"
as we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not
believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines;
hence they do not truly believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher
observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things defectively is
not to know them at all. "
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ([2280]FS, Q[9], A[1]) the will
moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in
this respect an act of faith is "to believe in God. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural
reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe
anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of
a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now
matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things
unseen as stated above ([2281]Q[1], A[4]). Therefore to believe seems
unnecessary for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters,
wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true
or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words? " Now
a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he
cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments
are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters.
Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps.
36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord. " Now "the
invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according
to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the
understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not
necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God. "
I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find
that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one
of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the
other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by
its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while
according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb
and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from
west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first
heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the created
rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other
creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something
particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in "being"
only, as inanimate things, or also in "living," and in "knowing
singulars," as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as
much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is
immediately related to the universal principle of being.
Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only
in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which
it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness.
Hence it was said above ([2282]FS, Q[3], A[8]) that man's ultimate
happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man
cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every
one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me. " Now
man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by
little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one
who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire
science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De
Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a learner to believe. "
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the
master who is teaching him.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher
nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some
supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the
natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of
virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way,
by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to
matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently
"there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are in Christ
Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.
Reply to Objection 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible
things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to
God from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many
things are shown to thee above the understandings of man. "
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Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by
natural reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which
can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is
superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can
be known by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the
object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object,
as stated above ([2283]Q[1], AA[4],5). Since therefore all things that
can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that
there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is
certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of
them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others
should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not
necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural
reason.
On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and
incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive
more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to
whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of
all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other
sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would
arrive at the knowledge of God.