Therefore
insensibility
is a vice.
Summa Theologica
Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to
remain firm in the good of reason.
Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature
bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear,
which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring,
which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good,
so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly
concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz.
desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from
the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects
of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the
aforesaid pleasures.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3438]FS, Q[23], AA[1],2;
[3439]FS, Q[25], A[1]), when we were treating of the passions, those
passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions
pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible
presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance
directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards
good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch
as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the
passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is
moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things
he desires.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards
the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind
from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which
fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and
fortitude about fears.
Reply to Objection 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions
of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of
the internal passions.
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Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that
"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which
draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from
the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is
the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular
praise. " Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire
for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the
other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and
again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is
written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay
version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is
the root of all evils. " Therefore temperance is not only about desires
of pleasures of touch.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who
is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is
temperate, but he is not magnificent. " Now honors, whether small or
great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of
touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only
about desires for pleasures of touch.
Objection 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to
pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now
all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they
all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the
pleasures of the body, as stated above ([3440]FS, Q[31], A[5]) in the
treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the
state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance,
through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised
man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and
evil. " Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
Objection 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur
in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance
is properly about desires of pleasures of touch. "
I answer that, As stated above [3441](A[3]), temperance is about
desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and
daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the
greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers
of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of
the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and
drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense
of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of
touch.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes
temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as
concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and
this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply
that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he
control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to
temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily
other pleasures.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting
moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which
is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's
emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a
different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals
pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to
sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to
hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives
pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on
account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore
temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to
pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far
as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of
their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized
sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be
referred to them antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature
greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the
senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive
appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by
moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly
speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no
control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
hindrance to another greater and more binding.
Reply to Objection 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the
preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that
temperance is about all pleasures of touch.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to
the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which
are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard
the touch. But according to what has been said [3442](A[4]), temperance
is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life.
Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than
about those proper to the touch.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than
about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch
is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food,
whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the
pleasing quality of the food. " Therefore temperance is about the taste
rather than about the touch.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and
intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy
pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors
which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about
pleasures proper to the taste.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly
temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the
taste. "
I answer that, As stated above [3443](A[4]), temperance is about the
greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life
either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain
things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The
principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman
who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and
drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while
the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure
annexed thereto.
In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use
more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing
savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the
pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these
necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch.
Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures
of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of
these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things
that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to
the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more
about the taste than about the other senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially
results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold,
wet or dry. " To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make
the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being
suitable for nourishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional,
so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the
use of food and drink.
Reply to Objection 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the
food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in
which it is served.
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Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend
on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated
according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is
above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not
depend on the needs of the body.
Objection 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the
needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin
against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required
by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem
unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the
need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in
using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the
sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the
body is not the rule of temperance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both
Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding
him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable
for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things
with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far
as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station. "
I answer that, As stated above [3444](A[1]; Q[109], A[2]; Q[123],
A[12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of
reason: because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as
Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is
that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good
of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of
end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now
all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to
some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes
the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which
it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life
requires.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the need of this life is
regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed
that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,
thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes
the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of
temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it
makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for
life is subordinate.
Reply to Objection 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways.
First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term
"necessary" to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food
is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not
only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound
condition of body. " Other things that are not necessary for this
purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to
health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not
use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others
are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses
moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping
with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things,"
those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of
body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need
according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the
requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external
things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements
of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the
temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they
be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also
that they be not inconsistent with good," i. e. good conduct, nor
"beyond his substance," i. e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib.
Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of
this life" but also "of his station. "
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Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.
For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about
those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about
pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii,
10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it
to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be
more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it
is written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it
breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one
provoked? " Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence
of desire and concupiscence, as stated above ([3445]FS, Q[25], A[4]).
But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore,
seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which
controls concupiscence.
On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues
(Moral. ii, 49).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a
principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost
claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite
for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite
in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch,
with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are
most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them,
and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more
necessary to the present life, as stated above [3446](A[4]). For this
reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The longer the range of its operation, the
greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very
fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are
furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This
is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an
accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes,
although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of
the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause,
wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its
control regards a more principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of
desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the
irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the
appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
virtue.
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Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and
the regard for what is beautiful. " Now virtue deserves praise for being
honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the
virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of
touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater
virtue than justice.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death
which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur
every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude.
Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest
virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason
we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just. "
I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of
the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it
is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than
temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man
and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are
endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident
that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance:
while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.
Reply to Objection 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to
temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to
temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from
which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the
lower animals.
Reply to Objection 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good,
the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein
temperance excels.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is general because it regards the many
conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general
because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way,
temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although
in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than
fortitude but also than justice.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?
(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;
(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
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Whether insensibility is a vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those
are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of
touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether
deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan. 10:2,3): "In those
days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread,
and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was I anointed
with ointment. " Therefore insensibility is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason,"
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all
pleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of
reason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who took
pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and
understanding in every book and wisdom. " Therefore insensibility, which
rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.
Objection 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding
sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in
avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we deny ourselves
pleasures we are less liable to sin. " Therefore there is nothing
vicious in insensibility.
On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now
insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11).
Therefore insensibility is a vice.
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious.
Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are
necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man
should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for
man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual
or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to
the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's
preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature.
And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.
It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and
even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures
as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's
health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex;
as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and
soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil
their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover
health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind
of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to
contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal
things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of
insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through
any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some
praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of
contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text
goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately
afterwards.
Reply to Objection 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his
sensitive powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the [3447]FP,
Q[84], AA[7],8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use
his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that
afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he
abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the
body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the
powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is
commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to
contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind
of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures,
but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and
carnal procreation.
Reply to Objection 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned,
not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity
requires.
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Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For
Jerome in commenting on Mat. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and become
as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger, is
unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,"
all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not
a childish sin.
Objection 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in
respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish
sin.
Objection 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished:
whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is
concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col.
3:5, "Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . .
concupiscence" [*Vulg. : 'your members which are upon the earth,
fornication . . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a
childish sin.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we apply
the term intemperance* to childish faults. " [*{Akolasia} which
Aristotle refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense
would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint. ']
I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First,
because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean
that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by
way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are
said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked
concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as
rewards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence
desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing
is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully
says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness is twofold," that
"the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence in so
far as his nature differs from other animals. " Now a child does not
attend to the order of reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does
not listen to reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are
alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes
more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not
broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become
headstrong. " So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength:
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a
custom, and custom not resisted became necessity. " Thirdly, as to the
remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being
restrained; hence it is written (Prov. 23:13,14): "Withhold not
correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and
deliver his soul from Hell. " In like manner by resisting concupiscence
we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates
this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to
spiritual things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom,"
i. e. carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is
gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though
not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it. "
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to
live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
concupiscible to accord with reason. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as
denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the
sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways.
First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance
are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and
sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a
desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing
that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does
not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for
nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin
in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to
quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to
natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity [*Cf.
Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the
adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things
much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given
above.
Reply to Objection 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and
fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in
them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
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Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]
Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the
good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more
excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above [3448](A[2]; Q[141],
A[8]). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the
less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,
if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains. "
Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other
passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that "it is more
difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would
seem to be stronger than fear. " Therefore intemperance, which is
overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is
overcome by fear.
Objection 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to
be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which
pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin than
intemperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice. "
Therefore it is more sinful.
I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to
avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life.
On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which
is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated
above (A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed
pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the
more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore
intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the
object or motive matter.
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more
grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are
demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death,
stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of
intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it
is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice
has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done
through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent,
so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply
voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate
man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For
no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual
pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most
effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the
consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters
relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes
itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his
shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary,
for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more
voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place,
is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more
voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is
easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since
pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of
everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by
frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers
of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to
encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
Reply to Objection 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with
temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard
to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed
to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view
cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by
cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good. Secondly,
with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure
dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from
this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of
intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not
succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a
stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker
force, is the proof of a greater vice.
Reply to Objection 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which
one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures
whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of
life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of
death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although
the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear,
occasioned by certain other evils.
Reply to Objection 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a
general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we
have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
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Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to
sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance
murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins.
Objection 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are
seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now
sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things
connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen
to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most
disgraceful.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance
and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and
pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the
most disgraceful of sins.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices. "
I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now
honor is due to excellence, as stated above ([3449]Q[103], A[1]), and
glory denotes clarity ([3450]Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Accordingly
intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is
most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common
to us and the lower animals, as stated above ([3451]Q[141], AA[2],3).
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did
not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made
like to them. " Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's clarity
or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of
intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as
being most slavish.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], "the sins
of the flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance,
although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that
culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while
disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the
unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the
shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as
regards the nature of the vices themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that intemperance is most
disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely,
that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in
conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of
human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are
apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of excess:
for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in committing
the unnatural vice.
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OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these
same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
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Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
be "continence, mildness, and modesty. " For continence is reckoned to
be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is
comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But
temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as
stated above ([3452]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore mildness is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the
Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men. " Now
external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above
([3453]Q[58], A[8]). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than
of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more
parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
sobriety, purity. " Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the
companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity,
refinement, method, contentment. " [*'Per-se-sufficientiam' which could
be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that this is taken in
a bad sense. See[3454] Q[169], A[1]. ] Therefore it seems that Tully
insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have
three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The
integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which
are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral
parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the
disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and "honesty," whereby one
loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above ([3455]Q[141],
A[2], ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a
certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in
disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a
virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter
or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two
kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards
meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is
"sobriety. " Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation,
and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of
procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to
the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling,
we have "purity. "
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues:
for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal
matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation
is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures
of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue
that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains
the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part
of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul;
secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in
outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which
temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements
towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement
of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement
is restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that, although a
man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to
them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of
hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained
by "humility. " The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards
revenge, and this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness. "
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint
is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus, has three
parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what
not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we
do: this he assigns to "method. " The second is that a man observe
decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to "refinement. " The
third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between
a man and his friends, and this is called "gravity.