Knowledge of the
External
World
Natural Religion
.
Natural Religion
.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
MACMILLAN AND CO. , Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • MADRAS MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
OF CANADA, Limited TORONTO
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
Eegakded simply as a historical discipline, the history of thought might fairly claim a prominent place in education, and an equal share of the attention now given to comparative and historical (todies. The evolution of an idea is in itself as interesting and rouble an object of study as the evolution of a word, of an insti tution, of a state, or of a vegetable or animal form.
But aside from this interest which it has in common with other historical sciences, the history of philosophy has a peculiar value of its own. For the moment we attempt any serious thinking in any field, — natural science, history, literature, ethics, theology, or any other, — we find ourselves at the outset quite at the mercy of the word* and ideas which form at once our intellectual atmosphere and the instruments with which we must work. We cannot speak, for example, of mind or matter, of cause or force, of species or indi vidual, of universe or God, of freedom or necessity, of substance or erolation, of science or law, of good or true or real, without involv ing a host of assumptions. And the assumptions are there, even though we may be unconscious of them, or ignore them in an effort to dispense with metaphysics. To dispense with these conceptions ss impossible. Our only recourse, if we would not beg our questions io advance, or remain in unconscious bondage to the instruments of oar thought, or be slaves to the thinking of the past generations that have forged out our ideas for us, is to " criticise our categories. " Aad one of the most important, if not the only successful, means to thii end is a study of the origin and development of these categories. We can free ourselves from the past only by mastering it. We may not hope to see beyond Aristotle or Kant until we have stood
vi
Translator's
Preface.
on their shoulders. We study the history of philosophy, not so much to learn what other men have thought, as to learn to think.
For an adequate study of the history of thought, the mam requi sites are a careful study of the works of the great thinkers — a requisite that need not be enlarged on here, although such study is a comparatively recent matter in both Britain and America, with a few notable exceptjitfisVaiUra aLt«kbbokfe>aid. Ti3. in singling out the important problems, tracing their development, disentangling their complications, and sifting "out "what is of permanent value. To meet this second need is the especial aim of the present work, and, with all the excellencies of the three chief manuals already in use, it can scarcely be questioned that the need is a real one. Those
with the work here translated (W. Windelbaud's Ge schichte der Philosophic, Freiburg i. B. , 1892) have no hesitation in thinking that it is an extremely valuable contribution toward just this end. The originality of its conception and treatment awaken an interest that is greater in proportion to the reader's acquaintance with other works on the subject. The author shows not only historical learning and vision, but philosophical insight ; and in his hands the comparative treatment of the history of thought proves as suggestive and fruitful as the same method applied to other subjects in recent times. A work like the present could only have been written with some such preparation as has come in this case from the previous treatment of Greek and Modern Philosophy at greater length, and in presenting it to English readers I am confident that it will meet the wants, not only of special students of philosophy, but also of all who wish to understand the development of thought Teachers will, I think, find it very valuable in connection with lecture courses.
As regards the work of the Translator, little need be said. "He has tried — like many others — to make a faithful translation into intelligible English, and is fully conscious that it has been with varying success. Of course translation in the strict sense is often impossible, and I cannot hope to have adopted the happiest com promise or found the most felicitous rendering in all cases,
Being" (spelled with capital) used for""*5ein. '""' Where "the German Form " seemed to differ enough from the ordiiiaiy'EtV^fsh
acquainted
"
j"'
a
is
Translator $ Preface. vii
vas* of the word to make " form " misleading, 1 have spelled it -Form," and the same course has been taken with "Real," " Re- •. at," where the German seemed to desire to distinguish them from - rirtitea," which has been translated sometimes by " real," some- •-asi by " actual. " " Vorstellung " is usually rendered by " idea," • Jiving Locke's usage, except in connection with the system of IfSaaz, where " representation " is necessary to bring out his thought.
•Hm? in the Platonic and Kantian use, is rendered "Idea" (spelled rsb a capital). The convenient word "Geschehen" has no exact ■ mterport, and has been variously rendered, most frequently per- hips by " cosmic processes. " In the additions made to the bibliog- apoT, no attempt has been made to be exhaustive ; I have simply •Tti to indicate some works that might aid the student. It is nicely necessary to say that any corrections or suggestions will > rntefully received and utilised if possible. Material in square sockets is added by the translator.
la conclusion, I desire to express my indebtedness to my col-
Professors Shorey, Strong, and Cutting, and Dr. Schwill t helpful suggestions. My chief indebtedness, however, is to the ■•>il taste and unwearied assistance of my wife. If I have in
ut degree succeeded in avoiding German idioms, it is largely due tcier.
>i$«e*.
Cnraaarrr or Chicago, Mr. iaa
JAMES H. TUFTS.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
! « preparing this second edition all changes made by the author i '. be second German edition have been incorporated either in the >« w in the appendix at the close. In addition, I have included a
*>f notice (pp. 663-670) of certain aspects of recent English Ooajht, which naturally have more interest for the readers of ^» translation than for those of the original.
Csrrnumr or Cmcaoo, May. 1901.
JAMES H. TUFTS.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
After many painful delays and interruptions I now present at last the conclusion of the work whose first sheets appeared two years ago.
The reader will not confuse this with the compendiums which bare very likely sometimes been prepared by dressing out lecture notes on the general history of philosophy. What I offer is a serious text-book, which is intended to portray in comprehensive and compressed exposition the evolution of the ideas of European
with the aim of showing through what motives the principles, by which we to-day scientifically conceive and judge the universe and human life, have been brought to consciousness and developed in the course of the movements of history.
This end has determined the whole form of the book. The literary-historical basis of research, the biographical and biblio graphical material, were on this account necessarily restricted to the smallest space and limited to a selection that should open the »»y to the best sources for the reader desiring to work farther. The philosophers' own expositions, too, have been referred to in the nain, only where they afford a permanently valuable formulation °r rationale of thoughts. Aside from this there is only an occa- uotul citation of passages on which the author supports an inter- prrtation differing from that ordinarily adopted. The choice of material has fallen everywhere on what individual thinkers have produced that was new and fruitful, while purely individual turns °f thought, which may indeed be a welcome object for learned rnearch, but afford no philosophical interest, have found at most » brief mention.
philosophy,
ix
x Author's
Preface.
As is shown even by the external form of the exposition, chief emphasis has been laid upon the development of what is weightiest from a philosophical standpoint: the history of problems and concej- tions. To understand this as a connected and interrelated whole has been my chief purpose. The historical interweaving of the various lines of thought, out of which our theory of the world and life has grown, forms the especial object of. my work, and I am convinced that this problem is to be solved, not by any a priori logical construction, but only by an all-sided, unprejudiced investi gation of the facts. If in this exposition a relatively large part of the whole seems to be devoted to antiquity, this rests upon the
conviction that for a historical understanding of our intellectual existence, the forging out of the conceptions which the Greek mind wrested from the concrete reality found in Nature and human life, is more important than all that has since been thought —the Kantian philosophy excepted.
The task thus set required, however, a renunciation which no one can regret more than myself. The purely topical treatment of the historical movement of philosophy did not permit of giving to the personality of the philosophers an impressiveness corre sponding to their true worth. This could only be touched upon where it becomes efficient as a causal factor in the combination and transformation of ideas. The aesthetic fascination which dwells in the individual nature of the great agents of the movement, and which lends its especial charm to the academic lecture, as well as to the more extended exposition of the history of philosophy, l»ad to be given up here in favour of a better insight into the pragmatic necessity of the mental process.
Finally, I desire to express at this place also my lively gratitude to my colleague, Dr. Hensel, who has not only aided me with a part of the proofs, but has also essentially increased the usefulness of the book by a subject index.
Stkassbuko, November, 1891.
WILHELM WINDELBAND.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION •<*«<o.
A lahoe edition of my History of Philosophy had been exhausted more than two years ago, and in the meantime its use had been further extended by English and Russian translations. This per mits me to assume that the new treatment which I gave to the subject has filled an existing gap, and that the synoptical and criti cal method which I introduced
principle is concerned. While therefore I could leave the book unhanged in its main outlines when preparing this new edition, I could be all the more careful in making evidently needed improve ments and in fulfilling certain specific requests.
L'nder the head of improvements I have undertaken such correc tions, condensations, and expansions upon particular points as are requisite for a text-book which seeks to represent the present condi tion of investigation, and in this work the literature which has appeared since the first edition has been utilised. In consequence '■f the great condensation of material the exposition had become sometimes difficult to follow, and 1 have aimed in many cases to give more fluent form to the expression by breaking up some of the longer sentences, and occasionally omitting what was of merely sec ondary importance.
A desire has been expressed by readers of the book for a more extended notice of the personalities and personal relations of the I'tnlosophers. In the preface to my first edition I had myself r*i-'<mised the justice of this demand, but had disclaimed the inten tion of satisfying it because the special plan of my work and the
limitations of space prevented. Now I have sought to fulfil this demand so far as it has seemed possible within the bait of my work, by giving brief and precise characterisations of the most important thinkers.
A desire for a more extended treatment of the philosophers of the nineteenth century has also been reckoned with. The few pages originally accorded to the subject have been expanded to three times the former compass, and I hope that although one will miss one
necessary
has gained approval so far as the
xii Author's
Preface.
topic and another another, it will nevertheless be possible to gain fairly complete general view of the movements of philosophy dow to the more immediate present, in so far as this is to be expecte
from a history of principles. >
Finally, I have remade the subject index, and so expanded i
•
that in connection with the text it may, as I hope, have the value c a dictionary of the history of philosophy. This gives to my work second distinctive feature; namely, that of a work of reference c a systematic and critical sort.
By all these expansions the size of the book has been considerabl increased, and I express here to my esteemed publisher, Dr. Siebecl my heartiest gratitude for the cordial response with which he ha made possible these essential improvements.
Strassbubq, September, 1900.
WILHELM WINDKLBAND.
INTRODUCTION.
$ I. Name and Conception of Philosophy
■2•. The History of Philosophy
? 3. Division of Philosophy and of its History
PiOI
18 . . . . . . . . . 1
$ 9. { 10. 1 11. 1 12. S 13.
Metaphysics grounded anew by Epistemology and Ethics . 104 The System of Materialism 109 The System of Idealism 116 The Aristotelian Logic 182 The System of Development 139
PART II.
CONTENTS.
PART I.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.
ImoDUCTiOH
Ciatter I. The Cosmological Period
{ 4. Conceptions of Being
f 5. Conceptions of the Cosmic Processes or Becoming { 8. Conceptions of Cognition
Chapter II. The Anthropological Period
§ 7. The Problem of Morality { 8. The Problem of Science .
Chapter III. The Systematic Period
8
23 . . . 27 31
47 57
•. . 66
72 87
09
THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY. Ietrodoction 155 Cramer I. The Ethical Period 159
f 14. f 15. 1 16.
i 17.
The Ideal of the Wise Man 163 Mechanism and Teleology 178 The Freedom of the Will and the Perfection of the Uni
verse
The Criteria of Truth
xiii
180 197
xiv
Contents.
Chapter
§ 18. § 19. § 20. § 21.
II. The
Religious
run Period 210
Authority and Revelation 219 Spirit and Matter 229 God and the World 235 The Problem of the World's History 255
•. PART III.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. Introduction
263
Chapter
. . . . . . . 270 276
287 301
. . . . 310 328 The Problem of Individuality . 337
PART IV.
First Period
22. The Metaphysics of Inner Experience
The Controversy over Universals 24. The Dualism of Body and Soul
§23.
Chapter II. Second Period
i" "^
25. 26.
$27.
The Realm of Nature and the Realm of Grace . . . . . 318
The Primacy ot the Will or of the Intellect
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. Introduction
Chapter The Humanistic Period
28. The Struggle between the Traditions 29. Macrocosm and Microcosm
Chapter
30.
§31. 32.
II. The Natural Science Period
The Problem of Method Substance and Causality Natural Right
. . PARTV.
337 36(3
37>
383 300 425
437
• .
. 48*5
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT. Introduction
Chapter
Theoretical Questions
. . . . . . . . 447 4<>».
33. Innate Ideas
34.
Knowledge of the External World
Natural Religion
. . . . . ;449
§35.
. ; . . . .
'. . . . * 348 352
:
:
§§§§§§§§§
§
I.
I.
I.
,
■") "i
Content* x\
PAGE Chapter II. Practical Questions 500
i 36. The Principles of Morals 502 $ 37. The Problem of Civilisation 518
PART VI.
THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.
I. vrtoDfCTio. v 629 Chapter I. Kant's Critique of the Reason 532
§ 3K. § 39. § 40.
The Object of Knowledge 537 The Categorical Imperative 551 Natural Purposiveness 559
Chapter II. The Development of Idealism 568
f 41. 5 42. J 43.
The Thing-in-itself 573 The System of Reason 590
The Metaphysics of the Irrational 615
PART VII.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. I. xtrodcction 623
j 44. 5 45. i 46.
A moron Inu
The Controversy over the Soul 634 Nature and History 648 The Problem of Values 660
68=5 699
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
INTRODUCTION.
$ 1. The Name and Conception of Philosophy.
K. Haym, Art. Philosophic in Ersch und Grllber's Encyclopadie, III. Abth. , Bd. 24.
W. Windelband, PraeludUn (Freiburg i. B. , 1884), 1 £f. [A. Seta, Art. Philosophy In Enc. Brit. ']
[G. T. Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy. N. Y. 1891. ]
By philosophy present usage understands the scientific treatment of the general questions relating to the universe and human life. Individual philosophers, according to the presuppositions with
which they have entered upon their work, and the results which they have reached in have sought to change this indefinite idea common to all, into more precise definitions,1 which in part diverge so widely that the common element in the conception of the science may seem lost But even the more general meaning given above
itself limitation and transformation of the original significance which the Greeks connected with the name philosophy, — limita tion snd transformation brought about by the whole course of the in tellectual and spiritual life of the West, and following along with the same.
While in the first appearance in literature' of the words ^AarD^cTr" and 4*A<xro(£i'a the simple and at the same time indefinite meaning, striving after wisdom," may still be recognised, the word '• philosophy " in the literature after Socrates, particularly in the school of Plato and Aristotle, acquired the fixed significance accord-
Ched in detail in Ueberweg-Heinze, Grundriss der GeschichU der Philoso- t*>*. [Eng. trans. Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, trans, by G. S.
Mark N. Y. 1871. ]
Herodotus, 30 and 60 Thucydides, n. 40 and frequently also even in
Has, «. #. Apol. 29 Lysis, 218 A Symp. 202 ff.
; 1
I. ;
K
;
;
it,
11
1-
§L a 1.
a
is
2 Introduction.
ing to which it denotes exactly the same as the German wor
gated and known. 3
With this first theoretical meaning of the word "philosophy"
second was very early associated. The development of Gree philosophy came at the time when the naive religious and ethics consciousness was in process of disintegration. This not onl made the questions as to man's vocation and tasks more and mor important for scientific investigation (cf. below, Part I. ch. 2), bn also made instruction in the right conduct of life appear as a essential aim, and finally as the main content of philosophy o science. Thus philosophy in the Hellenistic period received th practical meaning of an art of life, based upon scientific principles * - a meaning for which the way had already been prepared by th Sophists and Socrates.
In consequence of this change, purely theoretical interest passe over to the particular " philosophies," which now in part assume the names of their special subjects of research, historical or belong ing to natural science, while mathematics and medicine kept all th more rigorously that independence which they had possessed froi the beginning with relation to science in general. 5 The name o philosophy, however, remained attached to those scientific effort which hoped to win from the most general results of human know! edge a conviction for the direction of life, and which finally culm nated in the attempt (made by Neo-Platonism) to create from sue a philosophy a new religion to replace the old that had been lost. '
" Wissenschaft. " '
According to this meaning philosophy in general is the methodical work of thought, through which we are to kno' that which "is"; individual "philosophies" are the particular sc ences in which individual realms of the existent are to be invest
1 A conception which it is well known is of much greater compass than tl English and French " science. " [In this translation the words " science " an " scientific " are used in this larger sense. The term " natural science " will I used for the narrower meaning which " science " alone often has. If it she ml serve to remind the beginner that philosophy and scientific thought should t one, and that natural science is not ali of science, it may be of value. ]
a Plato, Rep. 480 B ; Aristotle, Met. VI. 1, 102Ba 18.
8 Plato, Thecal. 143 D. Aristotle sets the doctrine "of Being as such" (tl
later so-called Metaphysics) as " First Philosophy " over against the othi "philosophies," and distinguishes further theoretical and practical " philosi phy. " In one passage {Met. I. 6, 087 a 29) he applies the plural <t>i\oao<plai ah to the different systems of science which have followed in historical successioi as we should speak of the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, etc.
* Cf. the definition of Epicurus in Sex,. Emp. Adv. Math. XI. 169, and c the other hand that of Seneca, Epist. 89.
6 Cf. below, Part I.
6 Hence Proclus, for example, would prefer to have philosophy calls theology.
i . j Name and Conception of Philosophy. 3
There was at first little change in these relations, when the remains ■f wcient science passed over into the culture of the present peoples "f Europe as the determining forces of their intellectual life. Con- tat and task of that which the Middle Ages called philosophy coin- oied with the conception held by later antiquity. 1 And yet the
^<ining of philosophy underwent an essential change by finding pklosophy's task already performed, in a certain sense, by religion. For religion, too, afforded not only a sure conviction as a rule for •. . » guidance of personal life, but also in connection with this, a gen-
enl theoretical view of all reality, which was the more philosophical a its character, as the dogmas of Christianity had been formulated entirely under the influence of ancient philosophy. Under these
—umstances, during the unbroken dominance of Church doctrine, '■beet remained for philosophy, for the most part, only the position at i handmaid to ground, develop, and defend dogma scientifically. fat just by this means philosophy came into a certain opposition to xhfoiogy as regards method ; for what the latter taught on the cmaad of divine revelation, the former was to win and set forth by was of human knowledge. 1
Bat the infallible consequence of this relation was, that the freer mfandual thinking became in its relation to the Church, the more "sdependently philosophy began the solution of the problem which the had in common with religion ; from presentation and defence of 4-Ktriae she passed to its criticism, and finally, in complete inde pendence of religious interests, sought to derive her teaching from thftoorce* which she thought she possessed in the "natural light"
'■naian reason and experience. 3 The opposition to theology, as '-Zkidi methods, grew in this way to an opposition in the subject saner, and modern philosophy as " world-wisdom " set itself over ajvact Church dogma. 4 However manifold the aspects which this •>ac. n took on, shading from a clinging attachment to a passionate 'toiict, the office of " philosophy " remained always that which
•ft. , for example, Augustine. Solil. I. 7 ; Cnnf. V. 7; Scotus Erigena, De :•' hrnUn I. 1 (MUjne. 358) ; Anselm Pmalog. , ch. 1. (Migne, I. 227) ; I'naid. Imtrod. in Theol. II. 3 ; Raymundus Lullus, De Quinque Sap. 8.
: 7V. ma» Aquinas, Xumma Theol. I. 32, 1 ; Contr. Gent. I. 8 II. ff. '•-. a Voto. . . . Op. Or. qu. Durand de l'ourcain, In Sent- Prol. , qu. t-irniadiu of Sabunde, Theol. Natur. Prooem.
"-tar. Valla. Dialect. Dirp. III. 9; B. Telesio, De Ant. Her. Prooem. ; Ft. ^=i. De Auym. III. (Works, Spedding, 639 = 111. 336); Taurellus, <***-« Triumph. 1; Paracelsus, Paragr. (ed. JBuser) II. 23 G. Bruno, '*■-« '«■*«. etc. , IV. 107 (Lagarde,«I. it*) HoBbe\De Corpor. (Works, ■ «w»ima,
and
"karaetrristic definitions, on the one hand, in Gottsched, Ertte Griinde drr
f. ).
r**m*un WeltireUheit (Leips. 1756), pp. 97 ff. on the other hand, in the *"■*» naotophie, in the Encyrloprdie (Vol.