Objection
3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr.
Summa Theologica
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Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the
damned. For pity proceeds from charity [*Cf. SS, Q[30]]; and charity
will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most
especially pity the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity
as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore
He is said to be merciful.
On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his
unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore
they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.
I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways:
first by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed
there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the
reason's choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except
by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's
choice when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled: wherefore
in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be
dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in
this world they are in such a state that without prejudice to the
Divine justice they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and
sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is possible to have
compassion on them both by the choice of the will---in which sense God,
the angels and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their
salvation---and by passion, in which way they are pitied by the good
men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will
be impossible for them to be taken away from their unhappiness: and
consequently it will not be possible to pity their sufferings according
to right reason. Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on
the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is
possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's
unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it
would be contrary to Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not
prove.
Reply to Objection 2: God is said to be merciful, in so far as He
succors those whom it is befitting to be released from their
afflictions in accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as
though He pitied the damned except perhaps in punishing them less than
they deserve.
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Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the
punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to
hatred. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will
not rejoice in the unhappiness of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest
degree conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions.
Therefore neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the
damned.
Objection 3: Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no
place whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a
wayfarer to take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy
to grieve for them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the
punishment of the damned.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 57:11): "The just shall rejoice
when he shall see the revenge. "
Further, it is written (Is. 56:24): "They shall satiate [*Douay: 'They
shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh. '] the sight of all flesh. " Now
satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore the blessed will
rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.
I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First
directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints
will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly,
by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints
will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein
the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill
them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance
will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the
punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to
hatred, but not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something
annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when
we rejoice in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: "My
brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations"
(James 1:2).
Reply to Objection 2: Although God rejoices not in punishments as such,
He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice
in another's afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice
in them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a
wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions
often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions
are praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in
the case of shame pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a
comprehensor there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment
of reason.
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OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED (FIVE ARTICLES) [*The Latin 'dos' signifies a
dowry. ]
We must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed?
(2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude?
(3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts?
(4) Whether this is competent to the angels?
(5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned?
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Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that no gifts should be assigned as dowry to
the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v, 12, De jure dot. 20: Dig. xxiii, 3,
De jure dot. ) is given to the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens
of marriage. But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride,
as being members of the Church. Therefore they receive no dowry.
Objection 2: Further, the dowry is given not by the bridegroom's
father, but by the father of the bride (Cod. v, 11, De dot. promiss. ,
1: Dig. xxiii, 2, De rit. nup. ). Now all the beatific gifts are
bestowed on the blessed by the father of the bridegroom, i. e. Christ:
"Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above coming down from
the Father of lights. " Therefore these gifts which are bestowed on the
blessed should not be called a dowry.
Objection 3: Further, in carnal marriage a dowry is given that the
burdens of marriage may be the more easily borne. But in spiritual
marriage there are no burdens, especially in the state of the Church
triumphant. Therefore no dowry should be assigned to that state.
Objection 4: Further, a dowry is not given save on the occasion of
marriage. But a spiritual marriage is contracted with Christ by faith
in the state of the Church militant. Therefore if a dowry is befitting
the blessed, for the same reason it will be befitting the saints who
are wayfarers. But it is not befitting the latter: and therefore
neither is it befitting the blessed.
Objection 5: Further, a dowry pertains to external goods, which are
styled goods of fortune: whereas the reward of the blessed will consist
of internal goods. Therefore they should not be called a dowry.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great sacrament:
but I speak in Christ and in the Church. " Hence it follows that the
spiritual marriage is signified by the carnal marriage. But in a carnal
marriage the dowered bride is brought to the dwelling of the
bridegroom. Therefore since the saints are brought to Christ's dwelling
when they are beatified, it would seem that they are dowered with
certain gifts.
Further, a dowry is appointed to carnal marriage for the ease of
marriage. But the spiritual marriage is more blissful than the carnal
marriage. Therefore a dowry should be especially assigned thereto.
Further, the adornment of the bride is part of the dowry. Now the
saints are adorned when they are taken into glory, according to Is.
61:10, "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation . . . as a
bride adorned with her jewels. " Therefore the saints in heaven have a
dowry.
I answer that, Without doubt the blessed when they are brought into
glory are dowered by God with certain gifts for their adornment, and
this adornment is called their dowry by the masters. Hence the dower of
which we speak now is defined thus: "The dowry is the everlasting
adornment of soul and body adequate to life, lasting for ever in
eternal bliss. " This description is taken from a likeness to the
material dowry whereby the bride is adorned and the husband provided
with an adequate support for his wife and children, and yet the dowry
remains inalienable from the bride, so that if the marriage union be
severed it reverts to her. As to the reason of the name there are
various opinions. For some say that the name "dowry" is taken not from
a likeness to the corporeal marriage, but according to the manner of
speaking whereby any perfection or adornment of any person whatever is
called an endowment; thus a man who is proficient in knowledge is said
to be endowed with knowledge, and in this sense ovid employed the word
"endowment" (De Arte Amandi i, 538): "By whatever endowment thou canst
please, strive to please. " But this does not seem quite fitting, for
whenever a term is employed to signify a certain thing principally, it
is not usually transferred to another save by reason of some likeness.
Wherefore since by its primary signification a dowry refers to carnal
marriage, it follows that in every other application of the term we
must observe some kind of likeness to its principal signification.
Consequently others say that the likeness consists in the fact that in
carnal marriage a dowry is properly a gift bestowed by the bridegroom
on the bride for her adornment when she is taken to the bridegroom's
dwelling: and that this is shown by the words of Sichem to Jacob and
his sons (Gn. 34:12): "Raise the dowry, and ask gifts," and from Ex.
22:16: "If a man seduce a virgin . . . and lie with her, he shall endow
her, and have her to wife. " Hence the adornment bestowed by Christ on
the saints, when they are brought into the abode of glory, is called a
dowry. But this is clearly contrary to what jurists say, to whom it
belongs to treat of these matters. For they say that a dowry, properly
speaking, is a donation on the part of the wife made to those who are
on the part of the husband, in view of the marriage burden which the
husband has to bear; while that which the bridegroom gives the bride is
called "a donation in view of marriage. " In this sense dowry is taken
(3 Kings 9:16) where it is stated that "Pharoa, the king of Egypt, took
Gezer . . . and gave it for a dowry to his daughter, Solomon's wife. "
Nor do the authorities quoted prove anything to the contrary. For
although it is customary for a dowry to be given by the maiden's
parents, it happens sometimes that the bridegroom or his father gives
the dowry instead of the bride's father; and this happens in two ways:
either by reason of his very great love for the bride as in the case of
Sichem's father Hemor, who on account of his son's great love for the
maiden wished to give the dowry which he had a right to receive; or as
a punishment on the bridegroom, that he should out of his own
possessions give a dowry to the virgin seduced by him, whereas he
should have received it from the girl's father. In this sense Moses
speaks in the passage quoted above. Wherefore in the opinion of others
we should hold that in carnal marriage a dowry, properly speaking, is
that which is given by those on the wife's side to those on the
husband's side, for the bearing of the marriage burden, as stated
above. Yet the difficulty remains how this signification can be adapted
to the case in point, since the heavenly adornments are given to the
spiritual spouse by the Father of the Bridegroom. This shall be made
clear by replying to the objections.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in carnal marriage the dowry is given to
the bridegroom for his use, yet the ownership and control belong to the
bride: which is evident by the fact that if the marriage be dissolved,
the dowry reverts to the bride according to law (Cap. 1,2,3, De donat.
inter virum et uxorem). Thus also in spiritual marriage, the very
adornments bestowed on the spiritual bride, namely the Church in her
members, belong indeed to the Bridegroom, in so far as they conduce to
His glory and honor, yet to the bride as adorned thereby.
Reply to Objection 2: The Father of the Bridegroom, that is of Christ,
is the Person of the Father alone: while the Father of the bride is the
whole Trinity, since that which is effected in creatures belongs to the
whole Trinity. Hence in spiritual marriage these endowments, properly
speaking, are given by the Father of the bride rather than by the
Father of the Bridegroom. Nevertheless, although this endowment is made
by all the Persons, it may be in a manner appropriated to each Person.
To the Person of the Father, as endowing, since He possesses authority;
and fatherhood in relation to creatures is also appropriated to Him, so
that He is Father of both Bridegroom and bride. To the Son it is
appropriated, inasmuch as it is made for His sake and through Him: and
to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is made in Him and according to Him,
since love is the reason of all giving [*Cf. [5137]FP, Q[38], A[2]].
Reply to Objection 3: That which is effected by the dowry belongs to
the dowry by its nature, and that is the ease of marriage: while that
which the dowry removes, namely the marriage burden which is lightened
thereby, belongs to it accidentally: thus it belongs to grace by its
nature to make a man righteous, but accidentally to make an ungodly man
righteous. Accordingly, though there are no burdens in the spiritual
marriage, there is the greatest gladness; and that this gladness may be
perfected the bride is dowered with gifts, so that by their means she
may be happily united with the bridegroom.
Reply to Objection 4: The dowry is usually settled on the bride not
when she is espoused, but when she is taken to the bridegroom's
dwelling, so as to be in the presence of the bridegroom, since "while
we are in the body we are absent from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Hence the
gifts bestowed on the saints in this life are not called a dowry, but
those which are bestowed on them when they are received into glory,
where the Bridegroom delights them with His presence.
Reply to Objection 5: In spiritual marriage inward comeliness is
required, wherefore it is written (Ps. 44:14): "All the glory of the
king's daughter is within," etc. But in carnal marriage outward
comeliness is necessary. Hence there is no need for a dowry of this
kind to be appointed in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage.
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Whether the dowry is the same as beatitude*? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[7], ad 1;
FS, Q[4], A[3]]
Objection 1: It would seem that the dowry is the same as beatitude. For
as appears from the definition of dowry [5138](A[1]), the dowry is "the
everlasting adornment of body and soul in eternal happiness. " Now the
happiness of the soul is an adornment thereof. Therefore beatitude is a
dowry.
Objection 2: Further, a dowry signifies something whereby the union of
bride and bridegroom is rendered delightful. Now such is beatitude in
the spiritual marriage. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (In Ps. 92) vision is "the
whole essence of beatitude. " Now vision is accounted one of the
dowries. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.
Objection 4: Further, fruition gives happiness. Now fruition is a
dowry. Therefore a dowry gives happiness and thus beatitude is a dowry.
Objection 5: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii),
"beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good
things. " Now the state of the blessed is perfected by the dowries.
Therefore the dowries are part of beatitude.
On the contrary, The dowries are given without merits: whereas
beatitude is not given, but is awarded in return for merits. Therefore
beatitude is not a dowry.
Further, beatitude is one only, whereas the dowries are several.
Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.
Further, beatitude is in man according to that which is principal in
him (Ethic. x, 7): whereas a dowry is also appointed to the body.
Therefore dowry and beatitude are not the same.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that beatitude and dowry are the same in reality but differ in aspect:
because dowry regards the spiritual marriage between Christ and the
soul, whereas beatitude does not. But seemingly this will not stand,
since beatitude consists in an operation, whereas a dowry is not an
operation, but a quality or disposition. Wherefore according to others
it must be stated that beatitude and dowry differ even in reality,
beatitude being the perfect operation itself by which the soul is
united to God, while the dowries are habits or dispositions or any
other qualities directed to this same perfect operation, so that they
are directed to beatitude instead of being in it as parts thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an adornment
of the soul, but something resulting from the soul's adornment; since
it is an operation, while its adornment is a certain comeliness of the
blessed themselves.
Reply to Objection 2: Beatitude is not directed to the union but is the
union itself of the soul with Christ. This union is by an operation,
whereas the dowries are gifts disposing to this same union.
Reply to Objection 3: Vision may be taken in two ways. First, actually,
i. e. for the act itself of vision; and thus vision is not a dowry, but
beatitude itself. Secondly, it may be taken habitually, i. e. for the
habit whereby this act is elicited, namely the clarity of glory, by
which the soul is enlightened from above to see God: and thus it is a
dowry and the principle of beatitude, but not beatitude itself. The
same answer applies to OBJ 4.
Reply to Objection 5: Beatitude is the sum of all goods not as though
they were essential parts of beatitude, but as being in a way directed
to beatitude, as stated above.
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Whether it is fitting that Christ should receive a dowry?
Objection 1: It would seem fitting that Christ should receive a dowry.
For the saints will be conformed to Christ through glory, according to
Phil. 3:21, "Who will reform the body of our lowness made like to the
body of His glory. " Therefore Christ also will have a dowry.
Objection 2: Further, in the spiritual marriage a dowry is given in
likeness to a carnal marriage. Now there is a spiritual marriage in
Christ, which is peculiar to Him, namely of the two natures in one
Person, in regard to which the human nature in Him is said to have been
espoused by the Word, as a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. i,
40] has it on Ps. 18:6, "He hath set His tabernacle in the sun," etc. ,
and Apoc. 21:3, "Behold the tabernacle of God with men. " Therefore it
is fitting that Christ should have a dowry.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii) that
Christ, according to the Rule [*Liber regularum] of Tyconius, on
account of the unity of the mystic body that exists between the head
and its members, calls Himself also the Bride and not only the
Bridegroom, as may be gathered from Is. 61:10, "As a bridegroom decked
with a crown, and as a bride adorned with her jewels. " Since then a
dowry is due to the bride, it would seem that Christ ought to receive a
dowry.
Objection 4: Further, a dowry is due to all the members of the Church,
since the Church is the spouse. But Christ is a member of the Church
according to 1 Cor. 12:27, "You are the body of Christ, and members of
member, i. e. of Christ," according to a gloss. Therefore the dowry is
due to Christ.
Objection 5: Further, Christ has perfect vision, fruition, and joy. Now
these are the dowries. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, A distinction of persons is requisite between the
bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there is nothing personally
distinct from the Son of God Who is the Bridegroom, as stated in Jn.
3:29, "He that hath the bride is the bridegroom. " Therefore since the
dowry is allotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem
unfitting for Christ to have a dowry.
Further, the same person does not both give and receive a dowry. But it
is Christ Who gives spiritual dowries. Therefore it is not fitting that
Christ should have a dowry.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that
there is a threefold union in Christ. One is the union of concord,
whereby He is united to God in the bond of love; another is the union
of condescension, whereby the human nature is united to the Divine; the
third is the union whereby Christ is united to the Church. They say,
then, that as regards the first two unions it is fitting for Christ to
have the dowries as such, but as regards the third, it is fitting for
Him to have the dowries in the most excellent degree, considered as to
that in which they consist, but not considered as dowries; because in
this union Christ is the bridegroom and the Church the bride, and a
dowry is given to the bride as regards property and control, although
it is given to the bridegroom as to use. But this does not seem
congruous. For in the union of Christ with the Father by the concord of
love, even if we consider Him as God, there is not said to be a
marriage, since it implies no subjection such as is required in the
bride towards the bridegroom. Nor again in the union of the human
nature with the Divine, whether we consider the Personal union or that
which regards the conformity of will, can there be a dowry, properly
speaking, for three reasons. First, because in a marriage where a dowry
is given there should be likeness of nature between bridegroom and
bride, and this is lacking in the union of the human nature with the
Divine; secondly, because there is required a distinction of persons,
and the human nature is not personally distinct from the Word; thirdly,
because a dowry is given when the bride is first taken to the dwelling
of the bridegroom and thus would seem to belong to the bride, who from
being not united becomes united; whereas the human nature, which was
assumed into the unity of Person by the Word, never was otherwise than
perfectly united. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should say that
the notion of dowry is either altogether unbecoming to Christ, or not
so properly as to the saints; but that the things which we call dowries
befit Him in the highest degree.
Reply to Objection 1: This conformity must be understood to refer to
the thing which is a dowry and not to the notion of a dowry being in
Christ: for it is not requisite that the thing in which we are
conformed to Christ should be in the same way in Christ and in us.
Reply to Objection 2: Human nature is not properly said to be a bride
in its union with the Word, since the distinction of persons, which is
requisite between bridegroom and bride, is not observed therein. That
human nature is sometimes described as being espoused in reference to
its union with the Word is because it has a certain act of the bride,
in that it is united to the Bridegroom inseparably, and in this union
is subject to the Word and ruled by the Word, as the bride by the
bridegroom.
Reply to Objection 3: If Christ is sometimes spoken of as the Bride,
this is not because He is the Bride in very truth, but in so far as He
personifies His spouse, namely the Church, who is united to Him
spiritually. Hence nothing hinders Him, in this way of speaking, from
being said to have the dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but the
Church.
Reply to Objection 4: The term Church is taken in two senses. For
sometimes it denotes the body only, which is united to Christ as its
Head. In this way alone has the Church the character of spouse: and in
this way Christ is not a member of the Church, but is the Head from
which all the members receive. In another sense the Church denotes the
head and members united together; and thus Christ is said to be a
member of the Church, inasmuch as He fulfills an office distinct from
all others, by pouring forth life into the other members: although He
is not very properly called a member, since a member implies a certain
restriction, whereas in Christ spiritual good is not restricted but is
absolutely entire [*Cf. [5139]TP, Q[8], A[1]], so that He is the entire
good of the Church, nor is He together with others anything greater
than He is by Himself. Speaking of the Church in this sense, the Church
denotes not only the bride, but the bridegroom and bride, in so far as
one thing results from their spiritual union. Consequently although
Christ be called a member of the Church in a certain sense, He can by
no means be called a member of the bride; and therefore the idea of a
dowry is not becoming to Him.
Reply to Objection 5: There is here a fallacy of "accident"; for these
things are not befitting to Christ if we consider them under the aspect
of dowry.
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Whether the angels receive the dowries?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels receive dowries. For a gloss
on Canticle of Canticles 6:8, "One is my dove," says: "One is the
Church among men and angels. " But the Church is the bride, wherefore it
is fitting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Therefore
the angels have the dowries.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:36, "And you yourselves like to
men who wait for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding,"
says: "Our Lord went to the wedding when after His resurrection the new
Man espoused to Himself the angelic host. " Therefore the angelic hosts
are the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they
should have the dowries.
Objection 3: Further, the spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual
union. Now the spiritual union between the angels and God is no less
than between beatified men and God. Since, then, the dowries of which
we treat now are assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would
seem that they are becoming to the angels.
Objection 4: Further, a spiritual marriage demands a spiritual
bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by nature more
conformed than men to Christ as the supreme spirit. Therefore a
spiritual marriage is more possible between the angels and Christ than
between men and Christ.
Objection 5: Further, a greater conformity is required between the head
and members than between bridegroom and bride. Now the conformity
between Christ and the angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head
of the angels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to be
called their bridegroom.
On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the prologue to his
commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, namely "the
bridegroom with the bride, the young maidens, and the companions of the
bridegroom": and he says that "the angels are the companions of the
bridegroom. " Since then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would
seem that the dowries are not becoming to the angels.
Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation and Passion:
wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words (Ex. 4:25), "A bloody
spouse thou art to me. " Now by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was
not otherwise united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do
not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as spouse.
Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the angels.
I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to the endowments
of the soul is befitting to the angels as it is to men. But considered
under the aspect of dowry they are not as becoming to the angels as to
men, because the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the
angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of nature between
bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should be of the same species.
Now men are in conformity with Christ in this way, since He took human
nature, and by so doing became conformed to all men in the specific
nature of man. on the other hand, He is not conformed to the angels in
unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as to His human nature.
Consequently the notion of dowry is not so properly becoming to angels
as to men. Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not
necessary to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that
one thing is not to be said of another metaphorically on account of
some lack of likeness; and consequently the argument we have adduced
does not prove that the dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels,
but only that they are not so properly befitting to angels as to men,
on account of the aforesaid lack of likeness.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are included in the unity of
the Church, they are not members of the Church according to conformity
of nature, if we consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not
properly fitting for them to have the dowries.
Reply to Objection 2: Espousal is taken there in a broad sense, for
union without conformity of specific nature: and in this sense nothing
prevents our saying that the angels have the dowries taking these in a
broad sense.
Reply to Objection 3: In the spiritual marriage although there is no
other than a spiritual union, those whose union answers to the idea of
a perfect marriage should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does
not properly befit the angels.
Reply to Objection 4: The conformity between the angels and Christ as
God is not such as suffices for the notion of a perfect marriage, since
so far are they from agreeing in species that there is still an
infinite distance between them.
Reply to Objection 5: Not even is Christ properly called the Head of
the angels, if we consider the head as requiring conformity of nature
with the members. We must observe, however, that although the head and
the other members are parts of an individual of one species, if we
consider each one by itself, it is not of the same species as another
member, for a hand is another specific part from the head. Hence,
speaking of the members in themselves, the only conformity required
among them is one of proportion, so that one receive from another, and
one serve another. Consequently the conformity between God and the
angels suffices for the notion of head rather than for that of
bridegroom.
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Whether three dowries of the soul are suitably assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul three
dowries, namely, "vision," "love" and "fruition. " For the soul is
united to God according to the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity
in respect of the memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the
will, and vision the understanding. Therefore there should be something
corresponding to the memory, since fruition regards not the memory but
the will.
Objection 2: Further, the beatific dowries are said to correspond to
the virtues of the way, which united us to God: and these are faith,
hope, and charity, whereby God Himself is the object. Now love
corresponds to charity, and vision to faith. Therefore there should be
something corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to
charity.
Objection 3: Further, we enjoy God by love and vision only, since "we
are said to enjoy those things which we love for their own sake," as
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). Therefore fruition should not
be reckoned a distinct dowry from love.
Objection 4: Further, comprehension is required for the perfection of
beatitude: "So run that you may comprehend" (1 Cor. 9:24). Therefore we
should reckon a fourth dowry
Objection 5: Further, Anselm says (De Simil. xlviii) that the following
pertain to the soul's beatitude: "wisdom, friendship, concord, power,
honor, security, joy": and consequently the aforesaid dowries are
reckoned unsuitably.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) that "in that
beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without wearying, praised
untiringly. " Therefore praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries.
Objection 7: Further, Boethius reckons five things pertaining to
beatitude (De Consol. iii) and these are: Sufficiency which wealth
offers, joy which pleasure offers, celebrity which fame offers,
security which power offers, reverence which dignity offers.
Consequently it seems that these should be reckoned as dowries rather
than the aforesaid.
I answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries of the soul, in
different ways however. For some say that the three dowries of the soul
are vision, love, and fruition. others reckon them to be vision,
comprehension, and fruition; others, vision, delight, and
comprehension. However, all these reckonings come to the same, and
their number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said
[5140](A[2]) that a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and
directing it to the operation in which beatitude consists. Now two
things are requisite in this operation: its essence which is vision,
and its perfection which is delight: since beatitude must needs be a
perfect operation. Again, a vision is delightful in two ways: first, on
the part of the object, by reason of the thing seen being delightful;
secondly, on the part of the vision, by reason of the seeing itself
being delightful, even as we delight in knowing evil things, although
the evil things themselves delight us not. And since this operation
wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs be most perfect, this
vision must needs be delightful in both ways. Now in order that this
vision be delightful on the part of the vision, it needs to be made
connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it to be
delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are necessary,
namely that the visible object be suitable, and that it be united to
the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on its own part a
habit is required to elicit the vision, and thus we have one dowry,
which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two things
are necessary. First, suitableness, which regards the affections---and
in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, others fruition (in so far
as fruition regards the affective part) since what we love most we deem
most suitable. Secondly, union is required on the part of the visible
object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which is nothing else than
to have God present and to hold Him within ourself [*Cf. [5141]FS,
Q[4], A[3]]; while others reckon fruition, not of hope, which is ours
while on the way, but of possession [*Literally "of the reality: non
spei . . . sed rei"] which is in heaven.
Thus the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues,
namely vision to faith, comprehension (or fruition in one sense) to
hope, and fruition (or delight according to another reckoning to
charity). For perfect fruition such as will be had in heaven includes
delight and comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one,
and some for the other.
Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the three powers of the
soul, namely vision to the rational, delight to the concupiscible, and
fruition to the irascible, seeing that this fruition is acquired by a
victory. But this is not said properly, because the irascible and
concupiscible powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive
part, whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.
Reply to Objection 1: Memory and understanding have but one act: either
because understanding is itself an act of memory, or---if understanding
denote a power---because memory does not proceed to act save through
the medium of the understanding, since it belongs to the memory to
retain knowledge. Consequently there is only one habit, namely
knowledge, corresponding to memory and understanding: wherefore only
one dowry, namely vision, corresponds to both.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it
includes comprehension which will take the place of hope: since we hope
for that which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on
account of the distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not
remain in heaven [Cf. [5142]SS, Q[18], A[2]] but will be succeeded by
comprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Fruition as including comprehension is distinct
from vision and love, but otherwise than love from vision. For love and
vision denote different habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the
other to the affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as
denoting comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those
two, but the removal of the obstacles which made it impossible for the
mind to be united to God by actual vision. This is brought about by the
habit of glory freeing the soul from all defects; for instance by
making it capable of knowledge without phantasms, of complete control
over the body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result
in our being pilgrims from the Lord.
Reply OBJ 4 is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the dowries are the immediate
principles of the operation in which perfect beatitude consists and
whereby the soul is united to Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do
not answer to this description; but they are such as in any way
accompany or follow beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom,
to Whom "wisdom" alone of the things mentioned by him refers, but also
in relation to others. They may be either one's equals, to whom
"friendship" refers as regards the union of affections, and "concord"
as regards consent in actions, or one's inferiors, to whom "power"
refers, so far as inferior things are ordered by superior, and "honor"
as regards that which inferiors offer to their superiors. Or again
(they may accompany or follow beatitude) in relation to oneself: to
this "security" refers as regards the removal of evil, and "joy" as
regards the attainment of good.
Reply to Objection 6: Praise, which Augustine mentions as the third of
those things which will obtain in heaven, is not a disposition to
beatitude but rather a sequel to beatitude: because from the very fact
of the soul's union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows
that the soul breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the
necessary conditions of a dowry.
Reply to Objection 7: The five things aforesaid mentioned by Boethius
are certain conditions of beatitude, but not dispositions to beatitude
or to its act, because beatitude by reason of its perfection has of
itself alone and undividedly all that men seek in various things, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7; x, 7,8). Accordingly Boethius
shows that these five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they
are what men seek in temporal happiness. For they pertain either, as
"security," to immunity from evil, or to the attainment either of the
suitable good, as "joy," or of the perfect good, as "sufficiency," or
to the manifestation of good, as "celebrity," inasmuch as the good of
one is made known to others, or as "reverence," as indicating that good
or the knowledge thereof, for reverence is the showing of honor which
bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that these five should not
be called dowries, but conditions of beatitude.
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OF THE AUREOLES (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there
are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward?
(2) Whether they differ from the fruit?
(3) Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only?
(4) Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of
continence?
(5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins?
(6) Whether it is due to martyrs?
(7) Whether it is due to doctors?
(8) Whether it is due to Christ?
(9) Whether to the angels?
(10) Whether it is due to the human body?
(11) Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned?
(12) Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest?
(13) Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another?
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Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called the
aurea?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the
essential reward which is called the "aurea. " For the essential reward
is beatitude itself. Now according to Boethius (De Consol. iii),
beatitude is "a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods. "
Therefore the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven;
so that the aureole is included in the "aurea. "
Objection 2: Further, "more" and "less" do not change a species. But
those who keep the counsels and commandments receive a greater reward
than those who keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their
reward differ, except in one reward being greater than another. Since
then the aureole denotes the reward due to works of perfection it would
seem that it does not signify something distinct from the "aurea. "
Objection 3: Further, reward corresponds to merit. Now charity is the
root of all merit. Since then the "aurea" corresponds to charity, it
would seem that there will be no reward in heaven other than the
"aurea. "
Objection 4: Further, "All the blessed are taken into the angelic
orders" as Gregory declares (Hom. xxxiv in Evang. ). Now as regards the
angels, "though some of them receive certain gifts in a higher degree,
nothing is possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in
all of them, though not equally, because some are endowed more highly
than others with gifts which, however, they all possess," as Gregory
says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang. ). Therefore as regards the blessed, there
will be no reward other than that which is common to all. Therefore the
aureole is not a distinct reward from the "aurea. "
Objection 5: Further, a higher reward is due to higher merit. If, then,
the "aurea" is due to works which are of obligation, and the aureole to
works of counsel, the aureole will be more perfect than the "aurea,"
and consequently should not be expressed by a diminutive [*"Aureola,"
i. e. a little "aurea"]. Therefore it would seem that the aureole is not
a distinct reward from the "aurea. "
On the contrary, A gloss [*Ven. Bede, De Tabernaculis i, 6] on Ex.
25:24,25, "Thou shalt make . . . another little golden crown [coronam
aureolam]," says: "This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins
alone sing in the presence of the Lamb. " Wherefore apparently the
aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially to some: whereas
the aurea is awarded to all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is
distinct from the "aurea. "
Further, a crown is due to the fight which is followed by victory: "He
. . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" (2 Tim. 2:5). Hence
where there is a special kind of conflict, there should be a special
crown. Now in certain works there is a special kind of conflict.
Therefore they deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an
aureole.