5:14): "Arise from the dead and Christ shall
enlighten thee.
enlighten thee.
Summa Theologica
Reply to Objection 2: The material sun sheds its light outside us; but
the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural
light bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are
enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this
there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as
surpass natural knowledge.
Reply to Objection 3: We always need God's help for every thought,
inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to
understand anything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin.
xiv, 7).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can wish or do any good without grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can wish and do good without grace.
For that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is master of
his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above ([2165]Q[1],
A[1];[2166] Q[13], A[6]). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good
without the help of grace.
Objection 2: Further, man has more power over what is according to his
nature than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against his
nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of
virtue are according to his nature, as stated above ([2167]Q[71],
A[1]). Therefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good.
Objection 3: Further, the understanding's good is truth, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intellect can of itself know
truth, even as every other thing can work its own operation of itself.
Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and wish good.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him that
willeth," namely, to will, "nor of him that runneth," namely to run,
"but of God that showeth mercy. " And Augustine says (De Corrept. et
Gratia ii) that "without grace men do nothing good when they either
think or wish or love or act. "
I answer that, Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its
integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is
corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states
human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any
good whatsoever, as stated above [2168](A[1]). But in the state of
integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by
his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his
nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good,
as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man
falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to
fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not
altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good,
even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural
endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant
vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it,
so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make
some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of
one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured.
And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength
superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order to do and
wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt
nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry
out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this,
in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act
well.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is master of his acts and of his willing or
not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one
side or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not
deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and
since it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that
man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the
human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chapter "On
Good Fortune" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man still
unweakened is not so much master of its act that it does not need to be
moved by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened by sin,
whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good
which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every
created thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is
nothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which
pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of
itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot even know truth without Divine help,
as stated above [2169](A[1]). And yet human nature is more corrupt by
sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge
of truth.
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Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above
all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above
all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things
is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself
possess charity, since the "charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," as is said Rom. 5:5.
Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all
things.
Objection 2: Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God
above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help
of grace no created nature can love God above itself.
Objection 3: Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best
love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man
is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise
it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his
natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things.
On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made with only natural
endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to some
extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than
himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above
himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more
than himself and above all things.
I answer that, As was said above ([2170]FP, Q[60], A[5]), where the
various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set
forth, man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do
the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift,
though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above
all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but
irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of
love which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that
it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are
naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since "all things act according
as they are naturally fit" as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest
that the good of the part is for the good of the whole; hence
everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good
on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God.
Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God leads everything to love
of Himself. " Hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love
of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end;
and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in
the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of
his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God's grace, follows
its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we
must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift
of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God above
all things naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it;
but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help
of grace to heal his nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity loves God above all things in a higher
way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as
He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves
Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a
spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of
God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of
virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason
of a man who has not the habit of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above
itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any
object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural
knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural
knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to
an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above
all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every creature, as
was said above.
Reply to Objection 3: Love is said to be best, both with respect to
degree of love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode
of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity
loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above.
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Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the
commandments of the Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own
natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle
says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature
those things that are of the Law. " Now what a man does naturally he can
do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of
the Law without grace.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [*Symboli
Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome:
now ascribed to Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has laid
impossibilities upon man. " Now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is
impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of
himself.
Objection 3: Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest
is this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" (Mat.
27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by
loving God above all things, as stated above [2171](A[3]). Therefore
man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part
of the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man can
fulfil all the Divine commandments. "
I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the
Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does
works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man
in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the
Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to
sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in
the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the Divine
commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the
law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act,
but also as regards the mode of acting, i. e. their being done out of
charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor
in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the
law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having
stated that "without grace men can do no good whatever," adds: "Not
only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do
lovingly what they know. " Beyond this, in both states they need the
help of God's motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated
above ([2172]AA[2],3).
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), "do
not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that
are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore
in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made. "
Reply to Objection 2: What we can do with the Divine assistance is not
altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
3): "What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by
ourselves. " Hence Jerome [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the
supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius] concedes
that "our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still
require God's help. "
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments,
fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above [2173](A[3]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can merit everlasting life without
grace. For Our Lord says (Mat. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into life,
keep the commandments"; from which it would seem that to enter into
everlasting life rests with man's will. But what rests with our will,
we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting
life of himself.
Objection 2: Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by
God on men, according to Mat. 5:12: "Your reward is very great in
heaven. " But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to
his works, according to Ps. 61:12: "Thou wilt render to every man
according to his works. " Hence, since man is master of his works, it
seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life.
Objection 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life.
Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end.
Much more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his natural
endowments, without grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is
life everlasting. " And as a gloss says, this is said "that we may
understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life. "
I answer that, Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the
end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and
hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring
about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is
proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding
the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said
above ([2174]Q[5], A[5]). Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot
produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for
this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus
without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can perform
works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as "to toil in the
fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends," and the like, as
Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians [*Hypognosticon iii,
among the spurious works of St. Augustine].
Reply to Objection 1: Man, by his will, does works meritorious of
everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it
is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.
Reply to Objection 2: As the gloss upon Rom. 6:23, "The grace of God is
life everlasting," says, "It is certain that everlasting life is meter
to good works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God's
grace. " And it has been said [2175](A[4]), that to fulfil the
commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may
be meritorious, requires grace.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of
man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of
grace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a
man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better
disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the
Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12).
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Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepare
himself for grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man, by himself and without the
external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing
impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (A[4], ad 1). But it is
written (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you. " Now
to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it
seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can
prepare himself for grace.
Objection 2: Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is
in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny
him grace, for it is written (Mat. 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit
"to them that ask Him. " But what is in our power is in us to do.
Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.
Objection 3: Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for
grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the
first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems
that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of
himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that "it is the part
of man to prepare the soul. " Now an action is said to be part of a man,
when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can
prepare himself for grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:44): "No man can come to Me
except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him. " But if man could
prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man
cannot prepare himself without the help of grace.
I answer that, The preparation of the human will for good is twofold:
the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God;
and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual
gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated
above [2176](A[5]). There is a second way in which the human will may
be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in
order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not
necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul,
otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a
gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the
good wish. For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, as
stated above ([2177]AA[2],3). Now that we need the help of God to move
us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause
must direct is effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is
according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the
last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by
the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of the
soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader
of the army---and towards following the standard of a regiment by the
motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the First Mover,
simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks to be likened to God
in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all
to Himself. " But He directs righteous men to Himself as to a special
end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps.
72:28, "it is good for Me to adhere to my God. " And that they are
"turned" to God can only spring from God's having "turned" them. Now to
prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God; just as,
whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun, prepares
himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards the
sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the
light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him
inwardly.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus
man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned
to God, when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: "Convert me and I
shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God"; and Lam. 5:21:
"Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted. "
Reply to Objection 2: Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according
to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me, you can do nothing. " Hence when a man is said
to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according
as he is moved by God.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection regards habitual grace, for which
some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition
in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be
moved by God, no further motion is presupposed since God is the First
Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.
Reply to Objection 4: It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since
he does this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the
help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help
of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without grace.
But to rise to sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace; since
it is written (Eph.
5:14): "Arise from the dead and Christ shall
enlighten thee. " Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.
Objection 2: Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as
stated above ([2178]Q[71], A[1], ad 3). Now, man, by force of his
nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of
medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from
which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal
reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of
sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.
Objection 3: Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the
act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural
coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural
movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself
can return from sin to the state of justice.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf. Gal. 3:21): "For if
there had been a law given which could give life---then Christ died in
vain," i. e. to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a
nature, whereby he can he justified, "Christ died in vain," i. e. to no
purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he
cannot be justified, i. e. he cannot return from a state of sin to a
state of justice.
I answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the
help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in
its guilt, as stated above ([2179]Q[87], A[6]), to rise from sin is not
the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that
man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a
triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above ([2180]Q[85],
A[1];[2181] Q[86], A[1];[2182] Q[87], A[1]), viz. stain, corruption of
natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he
forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good
is corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not
being subject to God's; and this order being overthrown, the
consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered.
Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man
deserves everlasting damnation.
Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by
God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of Divine
light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light
anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of
grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i. e. man's
will can only be subject to God when God draws man's will to Himself,
as stated above [2183](A[6]). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment
can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed
and Who is man's Judge. And thus in order that man rise from sin there
is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift, and as
regards the internal motion of God.
Reply to Objection 1: To man is bidden that which pertains to the act
of free-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise
from sin. Hence when it is said, "Arise, and Christ shall enlighten
thee," we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes
the enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved
by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying
grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural reason is not the sufficient
principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace. This
principle is grace which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be
restored by himself; but he requires the light of grace to be poured
upon him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its
resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: When nature is perfect, it can be restored by
itself to its befitting and proportionate condition; but without
exterior help it cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And
thus human nature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer
perfect, but corrupted, as stated above ([2184]Q[85]); nor can it be
restored, by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the
supernatural good of justice.
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Whether man without grace can avoid sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin.
Because "no one sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine says (De
Duab. Anim. x, xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal
sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin,
which is impossible.
Objection 2: Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If
therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem
to be given to no purpose; which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18): "Before man is
life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be
given him. " But by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still
in his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without
grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): "Whoever denies
that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation' (and they
deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to
man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human
will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be
anathematized by the tongues of all. "
I answer that, We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of
perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the
state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid
sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than
to stray from what is according to our nature---and in the state of
perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not have
done it without God's help to uphold him in good, since if this had
been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into
nothingness.
But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature
in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life
this healing is wrought in the mind---the carnal appetite being not yet
restored. Hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:25) says in the person of one who
is restored: "I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with
the flesh, the law of sin. " And in this state man can abstain from all
mortal sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as stated above
([2185]Q[74], A[5]); but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on
account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man
can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful
and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting one,
another may arise, and also because the reason is always alert to avoid
these movements, as was said above ([2186]Q[74], A[3], ad 2).
So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by
justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since
it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it
cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence
Gregory says (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that " a sin not at once taken away
by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins": and this
because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so
should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of
its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be
regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the
movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as
inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring
since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since
man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that
many disorders occur in the reason. For when man's heart is not so
fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of
finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the
achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks His
commandments, and thus sins mortally: especially since, when surprised,
a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing
habits, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with
premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of
his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a
man cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring
that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless,
by grace, he is quickly brought back to the due order.
Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid each but every act of sin, except
by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own
shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact
that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Correction is useful "in order that out of the
sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he
who is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the
noise of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by
hidden inspirations is inwardly causing to will," as Augustine says (De
Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact
that man's will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet it is not
sufficient without God's help. Hence it is written (Eccles. 7:14):
"Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath
despised. "
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the
spurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of
man in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of
sin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a man
wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God's
assistance.
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Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without
further help of grace, do good and avoid sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace, can
by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin.
For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was
given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from
sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is
either useless or imperfect.
Objection 2: Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according
to 1 Cor. 3:16: "Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that
the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? " Now since the Spirit of God is
omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us
from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two
things without any further assistance of grace.
Objection 3: Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid
of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with
equal reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has
obtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity;
which is impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of
grace in order to do righteously and to keep free from sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that "as the
eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is helped by
the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he is most
righteous, live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of
justice. " But justification is by grace, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being
justified freely by His grace. " Hence even a man who already possesses
grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.
I answer that, As stated above [2187](A[5]), in order to live
righteously a man needs a twofold help of God---first, a habitual gift
whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is
lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which
exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace
in order to be moved by God to act.
Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further
help of grace, e. g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of
grace in another way, i. e. in order to be moved by God to act
righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason
that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the
Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason---the condition of the
state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet
it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves "the
law of sin," Rom. 7:25. In the intellect, too, there seems the darkness
of ignorance, whereby, as is written (Rom. 8:26): "We know not what we
should pray for as we ought"; since on account of the various turns of
circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we
cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: "For
the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain. "
Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all
things. For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been
born again as sons of God, to say: "Lead us not into temptation," and
"Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven," and whatever else is
contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this.
Reply to Objection 1: The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given
to us that we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature
needs to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after
having received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be
concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect,
since man will need the Divine help even in the state of glory, when
grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent
imperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and
protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it
causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father and
the Son, moves and protects us.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument merely proves that man needs no
further habitual grace.
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Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to
persevere?
Objection 1: It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help to
persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as
continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7,9). Now
since man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace in
order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he need the help
of grace to have perseverance.
Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But
perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together
with grace, perseverance is given to the other infused virtues.
Objection 3: Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20) more was restored
to man by Christ's gift, than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam
received what enabled him to persevere; and thus man does not need
grace in order to persevere.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. ii): "Why is perseverance
besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking
request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power
without His giving it? " Now perseverance is besought by even those who
are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we say "Hallowed be Thy
name," which Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et
Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs perseverance
to be given to him by God.
I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to signify a
habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he be moved by
the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is
to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, perseverance may be called
a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good unto the
end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused together with
grace, even as continence and the other virtues are. Thirdly,
perseverance is called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in
order to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need another
habitual grace, but he needs the Divine assistance guiding and guarding
him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from the preceding
article. And hence after anyone has been justified by grace, he still
needs to beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he
may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For to many grace is
given to whom perseverance in grace is not given.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection regards the first mode of
perseverance, as the second objection regards the second.
Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xliii)
[*Cf. De Correp. et Grat. xii]: "in the original state man received a
gift whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him.
But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace
whereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering," and
thus Christ's gift is greater than Adam's fault. Nevertheless it was
easier for man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of
innocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit,
than it is now. For the restoration by Christ's grace, although it is
already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it
will be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere but
will be unable to sin.
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OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace implies something in the soul?
(2) Whether grace is a quality?
(3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue?
(4) Of the subject of grace.
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Whether grace implies anything in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the
soul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of
man. Hence it is written (Gn. 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph
"grace [Douay: 'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the
prison. " Now when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing
is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance is
implied in him whose favor he has. Hence when we say that a man has the
grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul; but we merely signify the
Divine acceptance.
Objection 2: Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken
the soul; hence it is written (Dt. 30:20): "He is thy life. " Now the
soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as a
medium between God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in
the soul.
Objection 3: Further, on Rom. 1:7, "Grace to you and peace," the gloss
says: "Grace, i. e. the remission of sins. " Now the remission of sin
implies nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the
sin, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath
not imputed sin. " Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.
On the contrary, Light implies something in what is enlightened. But
grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia
xxii): "The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law,
and those who have been thus deserted become blind. " Therefore grace
implies something in the soul.
I answer that, According to the common manner of speech, grace is
usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are
accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king,
i. e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any
gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of
grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given
"gratis," inasmuch as we are said to be "grateful" for benefits. Of
these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows
something on another "gratis" from the love wherewith he receives him
into his good "graces. " And from the second proceeds the third, since
from benefits bestowed "gratis" arises "gratitude. "
Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something
in him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the
acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must
be noted between the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the
creature's good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature
flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On
the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in
things; and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the
thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is
clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused
in the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love.