simul more solito convo-
centur, et inter eos fiat propositio,
consultatio et reformatio de statutis
fiendis .
centur, et inter eos fiat propositio,
consultatio et reformatio de statutis
fiendis .
Thomas Carlyle
di (Gratian Decretum.
D.
9).
Quod
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? CHAP, n. ]
25
THE LAW: CIVILIANS.
cardinals, nor kings and princes without the consent of the
"Probi," for that which concerns all should be approved by
all. 1
Joannes Andreae, another important Canonist of the first
half of the fourteenth century, disousses the authority of
custom, and denies that it can change the "lex communis,"
canonical or civil, but admits that it may " derogate " from it
in some particular province or place, and create a " munioipal''
law, if this is permitted by the Pope or the prince. 2
It will be, we think, evident that the Civilians and Canonists
can hardly be said to express any very dear judgments upon
the general question of legislative power. They are, in the
main, rather endeavouring to expound the tenets of the
Civil Law than stating the actual and working principles of
the political society of the time. At times at least they are
even thinking rather of the powers of the actual citizens of
the city of Eome than of the people of the empire. This
1 Id. id. , I. 4: "Verum cum scriba-
tur Proverb 11, quod ibi sal us ubi mult a
consilia, et Innocens Papa scribit
quod facilius invenitur illud, quod a
pluribus senioribus quaeritur; 20 di.
de quibus (Gratian Dec. : D. 20, 3)
. . . et exemplum habemus in vetere
teetamento de Moyse, qui ad consilium
Jethro cognati sui, 72 Seniores secum
assumpsit. . . . Videretur esse salubre
pro republica et pro diet is adminis-
tra. tori bus reipublicae, quod sic sub
ratione, ut premissum est in rubricis
prozimis, limitaretur potestas eorun-
tlem, quod absque cert o consilio domin-
orum cardinalium, dominus papa, et
reges ac principes absque aliorum
proborum consilio, sicut hactenus in
republica servabatur, non uterentur
praerogativa bujusmodi potestatis, po-
tissime aliquid concedendo contra
concilia et contra jura approbate com-
mnniter. Et quod contra . . .
concilia et jura nihil possunt de novo
rtatuere, vel concedere, nisi generali
concilio convocata; quum illud quod
omnes tangit, secundum juris utriusque
regulam ab omnibus debeat com-
muniter approbari. "
* Joanne>> Andreae, ' Commentary on
the Decretals,' I. 4, 11 (fol. 61):
"Quarto sic opponitur, illius est tollere
legem positivam, cujus est inducere, vel
sui majoris, minoris non. . . . sed
lex communis, canonica vel civilis,
inducitur a Papa vel a Principe: oon-
suetudo insurgit ex actibus privatorum,
qui sunt minores; ergo ipsorum actus
legem etiam positivam tollere non
possunt. Sol. Fateor quod usus vol
actus privatorum unius regni, vel pro-
vinciae, vel loci, legem communem
abrogare, i. ubique tollere, non possunt;
sed derogare possunt in eo regno,
provincia, vel loco, ut sicut ibi legem
municipalem facere, possunt, sio et
consuetudinem inducere: et tamen
ad objectionis solutionem fateri oportot,
quod nec in loco id possent, nisi quia
? ? Papa vel Princeps id expresse per-
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? 26
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
is in strong contrast with their judgments when they turn
from the general principles of constitutional law to the con-
ception of the municipal laws of the Italian cities. We have
already, but only incidentally, observed some of the references
to these: we must now very briefly consider them.
We may begin by observing a general statement of Bartolus
in his Comment on Gaius' famous phrase, as cited in Dig. I.
1, 9: "Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim
suo proprio, partem communi omnium hominum iure utuntur. "
Some argue that only the emperor could make law, but this
is an error: any people can make its own law, "jus civile
proprium," while only the prince can make "jus civile
commune. "1
This, however, raises the question, what is the relation of
these municipal laws or statutes to the general law. There
is an important statement on this by Bartolus, in an opinion
(consilium) which he gave on the question of the validity of
a will by which a certain citizen of Arezzo had left his property
to his illegitimate son, born of a concubine, while his wife was
alive. We are not concerned with the merits of the case,
but with the reason why Bartolus advised that the will was
void. He cites, and seems to agree with, the opinion that only
the prince could legitimatise, and that the "jus commune"
prohibited the legitimisation of " spurii," in this case the child
was born in adultery, and concludes with the judgment that
the people only made laws by the permission of the prince, and
cannot therefore make them contrary to his prohibition. 2
1 Bartolus, Comm. on Digest I. 1, 9
(p. 16): "Secundo opp. et videtur
quod solus prinoeps possit facere legem.
. . . Hie autem dicitur, omnes populi
qui legibus, ete. , ergo male, cum
innuat quemlibet populum posse legem
condere. . . . Item jus civile proprium
potest constitui a populo, ut hio, sed
jus civile commune constituit solus
princeps. " Cf. Jo. Faber, Comm. on
Inst. , I. 2 (fol. 6), and Albericus a
Roeate,' Comment, de Statutis,' I. 9, 3.
* Bartolus, 'Consiliorum,' Lib. II. ,
'Consilium' 105: "Civitas non potest
statutum condere super eo quod Impera>
tor prohibet etiam sibi ipsi . . . ergo
dictum statutum non valet. "
'Consilium ' 106: "Quia soli principi
competit restituere natalibus, non
autem ordini civitatum. . . . Idem
consuluit Do-Cynus . . . ergo vult
quod per civitatem non posset legiti-
mari. "
Bartolus also cites Jo. Butrigarius:
"qui consuluit super isto puncto per
rationem, quia in casu a jure communi
prohibito statutum non valet. . . .
Sed legitimare epurium est prehibi-
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? chap, n. ]
27
THE LAW: CIVILIANS.
Albericus of Eosate discusses the question in general terms
and asks whether, if the statute of the Civitas contradicted
the " jus commune," it is valid; he points out that there was
much difference of opinion about the question, but he concludes
that the general opinion was that the statute was valid for
those who made it (inter statuentes) as long as it was not
"specialiter derogatoria de statute" He adds, however,
that a city could not make a statute to the prejudice of the
empire, or of those who were not subject to it. 1
It is important, also, to consider the form under which the
Civitates made their statutes. Bartolus discusses the question
in the later part of the passage of which we have before cited
the first words. If, he says, the statutes are made by the
"judioes maiores" or the lords of the cities, it is well that
this should be done with the consent of the wise men; they
oan, however, do it "proprio motu. " If the statutes are
made by the people, this should be done by an assembly of
the whole people, or of those who form the council of the
people, and represent it, and the assembly should be called
together by the Podesta, or some other magistrate. Another
method is that some definite proposal should be put before the
people, and the decision of the majority should become law. 2
tum. . . . Praeterea populus non quod non teneretur ad tributa vel alia
condit legem nisi autoritate principie, jura Imperialia, vel quod alitor esset in
ergo non condit in casu prohibito a pre judicium non sibi subditorum, non
principe. " valeret, et ita possent intelligi jura
1 Albericus a Rosate, 'Comm. de superiufl ad hoo deducta. "
Statutis,' I. 7,1: "Sed quid si statutum * Bartolus, Comm. on Digest I. 1, 9
eivitatis contradicat juri communi, an (p. 18): "Quaero secundo principaliter,
valeat. Communis opinio est quod sic, qualiter statuta fiant. Et si quidem
per praeallegatam, 1. omnes populi, ff. judices majores vel domini hoo faciant,
De jure et justicia (Dig. I. 1, 9). . . . humanum est quod faciant consilio
Quid in tanta varietate tenebimus? sapientum. . . . Sed si volunt, pos-
. . . Communis opinio quam soquitur sunt hoc facere proprio motu. et hoc
totus mundus, ut predixi, licet forte subditis divulgare. . . . Si vero sta-
predict>> de stricto jure sit vera, est, tuta Sunt a populo, talis est ordo, quod
quod statutum inter statuentes valeat, convocetur totus populus, seu homines
etiam contra jus commune, dummodo qui sunt de consilio populi, qui repre-
lex non sit spetialiter derogatoria de sentant populum. . . . Et haeo con-
1tatuto, ut predixi. Non tamen potest vocatio net auctoritate Potestatis, vel
ci vitas vel populus statuere in pre- alterius magistratus, solemniter, hoo
judicium Imperii, vol non sibi subdi- est sono tubae, vel pulsata campana,
torum. Unde si civitas statuerit, vel voce praeconis. . . . Alius modus
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? 28
fPABT t.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
Albericus a Eosate also states three methods of making
statutes. The first is by the authority of the -whole people
or "universitas " in a public " parliamentum," to whom the
"Eector" or magistrate is to put the question whether they
desire to make statutes, and what statutes, and by whom they
are to be made; and these questions are to be decided by the
voice of the majority. This method, Albericus says, was now
rarely used. The second method was that they should be
made by the "decuriones," whose place was now taken by
the Councillors of the city. The third method was that the
"universitas," the "decuriones," or Councillors of the city
should elect certain expert persons and give them power to
make statutes, and these should be valid, as though they had
been made by the " universitas. " This method also, Albericus
says, was now not much in use, and he seems thus to mean
that normally in his time the statutes were made by the
Council of the city. 1
We regret that we cannot in this work discuss the constitu-
tional forms developed in the Italian cities and their relations
to the empire, nor the munioipal constitutions of Northern
Europe. The subject is of too great importance and complexity
to be treated summarily, and it has a very large modern as
well as mediaeval literature. 2
est, quod fiat propoeitio certa et limi-
tata, an placeat populo quod sit talis
lex vel statutum . . . tunc quod
placuerit majori parti, illud erit
firmum. "
1 Albericus a Rosate, 'Comment, de
Statutis,' I. 4: "Item, quaero qualiter
civitas tacit statuta? Die, quod
tribus modis: primo, congregato populo
seu universitate civitatis in publico
parliamento secundum morem civi-
tatis, et ibi facta propositione per
rectorem seu magistratum civitatis,
an velint statuta facere, et qualia, et
per quos, et quod obtinebitur per mai-
crem partem, valebit. . . . Et iste
modus raro servatur. . . . Secundus
modus est quod decuriones civitatis
qui habent administrationem civitatis,
quorum loco hodie successerunt con-
ciliarii . . .
simul more solito convo-
centur, et inter eos fiat propositio,
consultatio et reformatio de statutis
fiendis . . . . et iste modus magi a
servatur; et talis propositio fieri debet
cum authoritate vel presentia rectoris
civitatis vel universitatis. . . . 5
Tertius modus est quod universitas,
decuriones seu conciliarii oligant aliquos
peritos, quibus dent potestatem statuta
condendi, et quod statuta per eos
vali nut, ao si statuta forent per uni-
versitatem. . . . sed neque iste modus
est magis in usu. "
* It will be evident that we have
made no attempt in this work to deal
with the great and important history
of the development of the political inde-
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? CHAP, n. ]
29
THE LAW: CIVILIANS.
We have given what may seem to some of our readers a
disproportionate space in this chapter to the political ideas
expressed or implicit in the work of the Civilians and Canonists
of the fourteenth century,"for, as will now be apparent, we do
not think that those writers added much to the conceptions of
the Civilians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is
necessary, however, to consider to what extent and in what
way the revived study of the Eoman Law may have ultimately
contributed to the development of the monarchical as con-
trasted with the constitutional conceptions of Western Europe,
and we shall deal further with this when we come to the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. We have therefore been
compelled to examine the nature of the development of the
political conception of the Civilians, even when they have
little immediate relation to the actual conditions of Europe
outside of Italy.
As far as the fourteenth century is concerned, we do not
think that there is any reason to say that they exercised any
appreciable influence upon the political theory of the rest of
Europe, except so far as it may be thought that they confirmed
the judgment that all authority in the State was ultimately
derived from the community.
penuence of the Italian cities. This is
not because we think that this was of
little importance, on the contrary, as
wo think it represents one of the most
important developments of the human
spint. We have not attempted to
deal with it for two reasons: in the
first place, because it is far too large
and complex a subject to be dealt
with, except in detail and at length;
and in the second place, because it has
been treated with great learning and
care in a number of historical and legal
works. Among the most important
of these in recent years have been
C. N. Woolf's 'Bartolus of Sasso-
forato' and Professor Ercole'a 'Da
Bartolo all' Althusio. ' We desire to
express our great obligation to both
these admirable works.
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? 30
CHAPTER III.
THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF THE AUTHORITY
OF THE RULER.
We have in the last chapters discussed the theories of the
source and authority of the law of the State. It is with these
in our minds that we can now turn to the conceptions of the
political theorists of this time with regard to the prince or
ruler.
We turn first to a group of English works of the later
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries--that is, to Fleta,
Britton, the 'Mirror of Justice,' and the 'Modus tenendi
Parliamentum. '
The work of Fleta would be of the very first importance,
if it were not that in most essentials it does little more than
re-state the principles of Bracton, with which we have dealt
in a previous volume,1 but even so, it is important to observe
that these principles were understood and reasserted; and
there are a few points in which Fleta goes beyond the genuine
text of Bracton. It is only necessary in these circumstances
to summarise very briefly his statements. The king has no
equal or superior in the kingdom, except God and the law;
but it is the law which has made him king, and ho should
therefore recognise the " dominium and potestas " of the law,
and his rule is evil when it represents a will different from that
of the law. 2 The king has in his hand all jurisdiction, but he
is the Vicar of God and must give to every man what is his;
1 Cf. vol. iii. part i. chsps. 2, * Fleta, i. 5, i (cf. Bracton, 'Do
3, 4. Legibus,' i. 8, 5).
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? chap, m. ]
31
THE AUTHORITY OP THE RULER.
he cannot do anything but that which he can do by law. 1 It is
said that what is the prince's pleasure has the authority of
law, but this does not mean that everything which the king
wills has the force of law, but only that which has been laid
down by the king's authority with the counsel of the magnates,
and after due deliberation. 2 So far Fleta is only re-stating
Bracton's position, of which the essence is that the law is
not the arbitrary creation of the king, and that it is supreme
over him. But now we come to an important deviation from
the original text of Bracton. Fleta says that no one is to
presume to dispute about the action of the king, and to go
against it; but he adds that the king has two superiors in
ruling his people: the law, by which he has been made king,
and his Curia--that is, his counts and barons. The counts
are so-called "a comitiva," and if they see that the king is
without a bridle, they are bound to impose a bridle on him.
And, he adds, kings should moderate their power by the law,
which is the bridle of power; they should live according to
law, for the human law declares that laws bind the legislator;
and elsewhere it is said (i. e. , Cod. I. 14, 4) that it becomes
the majesty of the ruler that the prince should profess that he
is bound by the law. 3
As we have pointed out in dealing with Bracton, it seems
most probable that this passage was not in the original
text of Bracton, but was interpolated by a later hand. It
does not seem very probable that it has also been inter-
polated in Fleta, though it must be observed that the text of
Fleta has not been revised by any very modern editor. If,
then, we assume that this passage does not belong to the
original text of Bracton, it is very important to observe that
1 Id. , i. 17. 3 and 7 (cf. Bracton,
iii. 9, 3).
> Id. , i. 17, 7 (cf. Bracton, iii. 9, 3).
>> Fleta, i. 17, 9: "Nemo enim de
facto regis presumat disputare, neo
contra factum euum venire. Ye rum
tamen in populo regendo superiores
ha bet, ut legem, per quam f actus est
Rex, et curiam suam, videlicet comites
<<t barones; comites enim a comitiva
dicuntur, qui cum viderint Re gem
sine fraeno, fraenum sibi apponere
tenentur. . . . 11. Temperent igitur
reges potentiam suam per legem, quod
fraenum est potentiae, quod secundum
leges vivant, quia hoo sanxit lex
humana, quod leges euum ligent
latorem, et alibi, digna vox majostate
regnantis est, logibus alligatum so
principem profiteri. "
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? 32
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
whether Fleta found it in his text of Bracton, or it was his
own doctrine, it is obviously a principle of high import-
ance, for it means that not only was the prince bound by the
law, but that there was a legal process by which this could be
enforced.
The statement of the principle is sharp and clear, but it
must not be considered as anomalous or eccentric. For, as
we have pointed out, it was the judgment of all feudal law
that a lord could not be judge in a question between himself
and his vassal, and Bracton, in another passage whose genuine
ness has not so far been contested, says that some at least
maintained that in the last resort, if the king refused to do
justice, this should be done by the "universitas regni et
baronagium suum in curia. " 1
There is another passage in Fleta which, as far as we have
seen, does not correspond precisely with anything in Bracton,
and which is important. It is a passage in which he repeats
Bracton's legal doctrine, that there is no remedy against the
king by way of the Assize (of Novel Disseisin), but he goes on
to say that the aggrieved person may have recourse to one
of two remedies: he may proceed by way of a supplication
addressed to the king, as Bracton had said, but he may also
proceed directly against the " spoliator," but without bringing
in the king's name. If the "spoliator " says that he cannot
reply without the king, in whose name he acted, the process
under the Assize is not to be postponed. If the "spoliator"
has manifest grounds for his action, judgment is to be post-
poned till the king has been consulted; if not, the plaintiff
is to receive seizin with double damages, both against the
escheator, the sheriff, and the other royal officers, as well as
against any private persons. 2
1 Cf. vol. iii. p. 73.
* Id. , iv. 2, 20: "Contra dominum
vero Regem non habetur remedium per
Assisam, quamvis in elections epoliati
sit, vel providers sibi persupplicationem
versus ipsum Regem, vel quod omnino
proeedat Assisa versus spoliatorem, hoc
exccpto, quod ipse Rox in Assisa non
comprehendatur. Et si spoliator dixit
quod sine Rege respondere non poterit,
cujus nomine fecit id quod fecit, non
propter hoc differatur Assiza, sed
capiatur. Et si spoliator evidentem
rationem et manifestam ha beat, dif-
feratur in judicium donee cum Roge
fuorit inde tractatum; sin autem, eeis-
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? chap, m. ]
33
THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
The work of Britton contains some important statements
on the nature and source of law, which we have already
mentioned, and on the nature of the royal authority. The
introductory statement which is put into the mouth of
King Edward declares in the first place that there can be
no peace among his people without law, and he has therefore
caused the laws which have been in use in the kingdom to
be written down. In the second place, he declares that the
king has power to repeal or to annul these laws when he
thinks this to be desirable, but only with the consent of
his counts and barons and the other members of his
council. 1
In another passage Britton sets out the principle that the
royal jurisdiction is over all other jurisdictions, but later he
adds a very important passage, in which Edward is repre-
sented as laying down the general doctrine that no man can
be judge in his own cause, and adds that in cases where
he (the king) is a party--that is in cases concerning felony or
treason against the king--the court is to be the judge, and not
the king. 2
The curious tract called the ' Mirror of Justices ' has been
carefully edited and criticised by Mr Westlake and Professor
Maitland, and the circumstances of its origin discussed. The
? nam recuperet cum dampnia duplicatia
vereua tam Escaetorem, Vicecomitem
et alios ministros Kegis, quam versus
quascunque privates peraonas. "
1 Britton, i. , Introduction: "Eduard
par la grace Deu, roi de Engleterre,
. . . Desirauntz pes entre le poeple qe
est en ncetre proteccioun, par la suf-
fraimce de Deu, la quele pes ne poot
mte ben estre sauntz leys, si avoma les
leys, qe hom ad use en noster reaume
avant ces hores, fet mcttro en escrit
solum ceo qe cy est ordeyne? . Et volums
e commandums qe par tut Engleterre
at tut Hyrelaunde aoint iasi usez et
tcnus en touz poyntz, sauve a nous de
repeler les et de enoyter et de amenuser
et de amender a totes lee f oiz qe nous
VOL. VI.
verums qe bon sorra, par le assent de
nos countes et barouns et autres do
noster conseyl, sauve les usages a coux
qe par prescripcioun de tens ont autre-
ment use en taunt qe lour usages ne
soynt mie descordauntz a dreiture. "
? Id. , i. 23, 8: "Et quant a la juris-
diccioun put-il dire, qe il n'est mie
tonu a respoundre en place ou le jugo
est partie, disium nul jugement ne se
put fere de meyna qe de DTI. porsone. M,
ceo est a saver de un juge, de un
pleyntif, et de un defendaunts; et en
cas ou nous sums partie, voloms nous
qe not re court soit juge, sicum countes
et barouns en tens de Parlement. " Cf.
vol. iii. part i. chap. 4.
0
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? 34
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
work undoubtedly represents a very individual and eccentric
point of view. But it is not without value, when it agrees
with other judgments of the time, even though it may express
these in sharper terms than more careful writers would have
done.
In one Book the author discusses a series of what he
calls "Abusions," and the first and chief of these is, as we
have seen, that the king should be over the law, for he ought
to be under it, in accordance with his oath. 1 The king, he
says in another place, has to swear at his coronation that he
will maintain the Christian Faith and that he will guide his
people according to law, without regard of persons, and be
liable to judgment in law, like any of his people. 2 And
again, the king's court is open to all suitors against the king
or the queen, as much as against other persons, except with
regard to "vengeance" of life or limb. 3 In the Book on
the "Abusions," he says that it is an "abusion" that a
man should not have remedy for a wrong inflicted by the
king or queen, except by the will of the king. *
In another place, again, he asserts that, while the king
should have no equal in his land, neither the king nor the
king's commissioners can be judges in the case of a wrong
(tort) done by the king to one of his subjects, and it is therefore
law that the king should have companions who should hear
and determine in the Parliament the complaints about such
injuries done by the king or queen or their children, or
"leur especiaus"; these companions are, ho says, called
1 * Mirror of Justices,' s. v. 1: "Abu-
sion ost desus ou mesus do droits usages,
tournsnt on abusions
1. La premere et la soverein abusion
est qe li Roi est outre la lei ou il
dois estre subject, sicom est contenu
en son serement. "
Cf. p. 8, and Bracton, 'De Legibus,'
iii. 9, 2.
* Id. , i. 2: "Al corounement le firent
jurer q'il meintendreit la sainte foi
cristiene a tut son poer, e son poeple
guieroit par droit, saunz regard a
nule persone, e serreit obeissant a
Seint Eglise, e justisiable a suftrir
droit com autre de son poeple. "
* Id. , i. 3: "Ordene fu qe la curt
le Rei fust overte a touz pleintifs,
par quei il usent aanz delai brefs
remedials aussi sur le Rei ou sur la
Heine comme sur autre del poeple, de
choscun injurie, forpris en vengeance
de vie ou de membre, ou pleint tient
leu sans bref. "
4 Id. , v. 1. 153: "Abusion est que
nul ne ad reooverer del tort le Rei
ou de la Reine si non a la voluntie
le Rei. "
?
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? CHAP, n. ]
25
THE LAW: CIVILIANS.
cardinals, nor kings and princes without the consent of the
"Probi," for that which concerns all should be approved by
all. 1
Joannes Andreae, another important Canonist of the first
half of the fourteenth century, disousses the authority of
custom, and denies that it can change the "lex communis,"
canonical or civil, but admits that it may " derogate " from it
in some particular province or place, and create a " munioipal''
law, if this is permitted by the Pope or the prince. 2
It will be, we think, evident that the Civilians and Canonists
can hardly be said to express any very dear judgments upon
the general question of legislative power. They are, in the
main, rather endeavouring to expound the tenets of the
Civil Law than stating the actual and working principles of
the political society of the time. At times at least they are
even thinking rather of the powers of the actual citizens of
the city of Eome than of the people of the empire. This
1 Id. id. , I. 4: "Verum cum scriba-
tur Proverb 11, quod ibi sal us ubi mult a
consilia, et Innocens Papa scribit
quod facilius invenitur illud, quod a
pluribus senioribus quaeritur; 20 di.
de quibus (Gratian Dec. : D. 20, 3)
. . . et exemplum habemus in vetere
teetamento de Moyse, qui ad consilium
Jethro cognati sui, 72 Seniores secum
assumpsit. . . . Videretur esse salubre
pro republica et pro diet is adminis-
tra. tori bus reipublicae, quod sic sub
ratione, ut premissum est in rubricis
prozimis, limitaretur potestas eorun-
tlem, quod absque cert o consilio domin-
orum cardinalium, dominus papa, et
reges ac principes absque aliorum
proborum consilio, sicut hactenus in
republica servabatur, non uterentur
praerogativa bujusmodi potestatis, po-
tissime aliquid concedendo contra
concilia et contra jura approbate com-
mnniter. Et quod contra . . .
concilia et jura nihil possunt de novo
rtatuere, vel concedere, nisi generali
concilio convocata; quum illud quod
omnes tangit, secundum juris utriusque
regulam ab omnibus debeat com-
muniter approbari. "
* Joanne>> Andreae, ' Commentary on
the Decretals,' I. 4, 11 (fol. 61):
"Quarto sic opponitur, illius est tollere
legem positivam, cujus est inducere, vel
sui majoris, minoris non. . . . sed
lex communis, canonica vel civilis,
inducitur a Papa vel a Principe: oon-
suetudo insurgit ex actibus privatorum,
qui sunt minores; ergo ipsorum actus
legem etiam positivam tollere non
possunt. Sol. Fateor quod usus vol
actus privatorum unius regni, vel pro-
vinciae, vel loci, legem communem
abrogare, i. ubique tollere, non possunt;
sed derogare possunt in eo regno,
provincia, vel loco, ut sicut ibi legem
municipalem facere, possunt, sio et
consuetudinem inducere: et tamen
ad objectionis solutionem fateri oportot,
quod nec in loco id possent, nisi quia
? ? Papa vel Princeps id expresse per-
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? 26
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
is in strong contrast with their judgments when they turn
from the general principles of constitutional law to the con-
ception of the municipal laws of the Italian cities. We have
already, but only incidentally, observed some of the references
to these: we must now very briefly consider them.
We may begin by observing a general statement of Bartolus
in his Comment on Gaius' famous phrase, as cited in Dig. I.
1, 9: "Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim
suo proprio, partem communi omnium hominum iure utuntur. "
Some argue that only the emperor could make law, but this
is an error: any people can make its own law, "jus civile
proprium," while only the prince can make "jus civile
commune. "1
This, however, raises the question, what is the relation of
these municipal laws or statutes to the general law. There
is an important statement on this by Bartolus, in an opinion
(consilium) which he gave on the question of the validity of
a will by which a certain citizen of Arezzo had left his property
to his illegitimate son, born of a concubine, while his wife was
alive. We are not concerned with the merits of the case,
but with the reason why Bartolus advised that the will was
void. He cites, and seems to agree with, the opinion that only
the prince could legitimatise, and that the "jus commune"
prohibited the legitimisation of " spurii," in this case the child
was born in adultery, and concludes with the judgment that
the people only made laws by the permission of the prince, and
cannot therefore make them contrary to his prohibition. 2
1 Bartolus, Comm. on Digest I. 1, 9
(p. 16): "Secundo opp. et videtur
quod solus prinoeps possit facere legem.
. . . Hie autem dicitur, omnes populi
qui legibus, ete. , ergo male, cum
innuat quemlibet populum posse legem
condere. . . . Item jus civile proprium
potest constitui a populo, ut hio, sed
jus civile commune constituit solus
princeps. " Cf. Jo. Faber, Comm. on
Inst. , I. 2 (fol. 6), and Albericus a
Roeate,' Comment, de Statutis,' I. 9, 3.
* Bartolus, 'Consiliorum,' Lib. II. ,
'Consilium' 105: "Civitas non potest
statutum condere super eo quod Impera>
tor prohibet etiam sibi ipsi . . . ergo
dictum statutum non valet. "
'Consilium ' 106: "Quia soli principi
competit restituere natalibus, non
autem ordini civitatum. . . . Idem
consuluit Do-Cynus . . . ergo vult
quod per civitatem non posset legiti-
mari. "
Bartolus also cites Jo. Butrigarius:
"qui consuluit super isto puncto per
rationem, quia in casu a jure communi
prohibito statutum non valet. . . .
Sed legitimare epurium est prehibi-
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? chap, n. ]
27
THE LAW: CIVILIANS.
Albericus of Eosate discusses the question in general terms
and asks whether, if the statute of the Civitas contradicted
the " jus commune," it is valid; he points out that there was
much difference of opinion about the question, but he concludes
that the general opinion was that the statute was valid for
those who made it (inter statuentes) as long as it was not
"specialiter derogatoria de statute" He adds, however,
that a city could not make a statute to the prejudice of the
empire, or of those who were not subject to it. 1
It is important, also, to consider the form under which the
Civitates made their statutes. Bartolus discusses the question
in the later part of the passage of which we have before cited
the first words. If, he says, the statutes are made by the
"judioes maiores" or the lords of the cities, it is well that
this should be done with the consent of the wise men; they
oan, however, do it "proprio motu. " If the statutes are
made by the people, this should be done by an assembly of
the whole people, or of those who form the council of the
people, and represent it, and the assembly should be called
together by the Podesta, or some other magistrate. Another
method is that some definite proposal should be put before the
people, and the decision of the majority should become law. 2
tum. . . . Praeterea populus non quod non teneretur ad tributa vel alia
condit legem nisi autoritate principie, jura Imperialia, vel quod alitor esset in
ergo non condit in casu prohibito a pre judicium non sibi subditorum, non
principe. " valeret, et ita possent intelligi jura
1 Albericus a Rosate, 'Comm. de superiufl ad hoo deducta. "
Statutis,' I. 7,1: "Sed quid si statutum * Bartolus, Comm. on Digest I. 1, 9
eivitatis contradicat juri communi, an (p. 18): "Quaero secundo principaliter,
valeat. Communis opinio est quod sic, qualiter statuta fiant. Et si quidem
per praeallegatam, 1. omnes populi, ff. judices majores vel domini hoo faciant,
De jure et justicia (Dig. I. 1, 9). . . . humanum est quod faciant consilio
Quid in tanta varietate tenebimus? sapientum. . . . Sed si volunt, pos-
. . . Communis opinio quam soquitur sunt hoc facere proprio motu. et hoc
totus mundus, ut predixi, licet forte subditis divulgare. . . . Si vero sta-
predict>> de stricto jure sit vera, est, tuta Sunt a populo, talis est ordo, quod
quod statutum inter statuentes valeat, convocetur totus populus, seu homines
etiam contra jus commune, dummodo qui sunt de consilio populi, qui repre-
lex non sit spetialiter derogatoria de sentant populum. . . . Et haeo con-
1tatuto, ut predixi. Non tamen potest vocatio net auctoritate Potestatis, vel
ci vitas vel populus statuere in pre- alterius magistratus, solemniter, hoo
judicium Imperii, vol non sibi subdi- est sono tubae, vel pulsata campana,
torum. Unde si civitas statuerit, vel voce praeconis. . . . Alius modus
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? 28
fPABT t.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
Albericus a Eosate also states three methods of making
statutes. The first is by the authority of the -whole people
or "universitas " in a public " parliamentum," to whom the
"Eector" or magistrate is to put the question whether they
desire to make statutes, and what statutes, and by whom they
are to be made; and these questions are to be decided by the
voice of the majority. This method, Albericus says, was now
rarely used. The second method was that they should be
made by the "decuriones," whose place was now taken by
the Councillors of the city. The third method was that the
"universitas," the "decuriones," or Councillors of the city
should elect certain expert persons and give them power to
make statutes, and these should be valid, as though they had
been made by the " universitas. " This method also, Albericus
says, was now not much in use, and he seems thus to mean
that normally in his time the statutes were made by the
Council of the city. 1
We regret that we cannot in this work discuss the constitu-
tional forms developed in the Italian cities and their relations
to the empire, nor the munioipal constitutions of Northern
Europe. The subject is of too great importance and complexity
to be treated summarily, and it has a very large modern as
well as mediaeval literature. 2
est, quod fiat propoeitio certa et limi-
tata, an placeat populo quod sit talis
lex vel statutum . . . tunc quod
placuerit majori parti, illud erit
firmum. "
1 Albericus a Rosate, 'Comment, de
Statutis,' I. 4: "Item, quaero qualiter
civitas tacit statuta? Die, quod
tribus modis: primo, congregato populo
seu universitate civitatis in publico
parliamento secundum morem civi-
tatis, et ibi facta propositione per
rectorem seu magistratum civitatis,
an velint statuta facere, et qualia, et
per quos, et quod obtinebitur per mai-
crem partem, valebit. . . . Et iste
modus raro servatur. . . . Secundus
modus est quod decuriones civitatis
qui habent administrationem civitatis,
quorum loco hodie successerunt con-
ciliarii . . .
simul more solito convo-
centur, et inter eos fiat propositio,
consultatio et reformatio de statutis
fiendis . . . . et iste modus magi a
servatur; et talis propositio fieri debet
cum authoritate vel presentia rectoris
civitatis vel universitatis. . . . 5
Tertius modus est quod universitas,
decuriones seu conciliarii oligant aliquos
peritos, quibus dent potestatem statuta
condendi, et quod statuta per eos
vali nut, ao si statuta forent per uni-
versitatem. . . . sed neque iste modus
est magis in usu. "
* It will be evident that we have
made no attempt in this work to deal
with the great and important history
of the development of the political inde-
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? CHAP, n. ]
29
THE LAW: CIVILIANS.
We have given what may seem to some of our readers a
disproportionate space in this chapter to the political ideas
expressed or implicit in the work of the Civilians and Canonists
of the fourteenth century,"for, as will now be apparent, we do
not think that those writers added much to the conceptions of
the Civilians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is
necessary, however, to consider to what extent and in what
way the revived study of the Eoman Law may have ultimately
contributed to the development of the monarchical as con-
trasted with the constitutional conceptions of Western Europe,
and we shall deal further with this when we come to the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. We have therefore been
compelled to examine the nature of the development of the
political conception of the Civilians, even when they have
little immediate relation to the actual conditions of Europe
outside of Italy.
As far as the fourteenth century is concerned, we do not
think that there is any reason to say that they exercised any
appreciable influence upon the political theory of the rest of
Europe, except so far as it may be thought that they confirmed
the judgment that all authority in the State was ultimately
derived from the community.
penuence of the Italian cities. This is
not because we think that this was of
little importance, on the contrary, as
wo think it represents one of the most
important developments of the human
spint. We have not attempted to
deal with it for two reasons: in the
first place, because it is far too large
and complex a subject to be dealt
with, except in detail and at length;
and in the second place, because it has
been treated with great learning and
care in a number of historical and legal
works. Among the most important
of these in recent years have been
C. N. Woolf's 'Bartolus of Sasso-
forato' and Professor Ercole'a 'Da
Bartolo all' Althusio. ' We desire to
express our great obligation to both
these admirable works.
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? 30
CHAPTER III.
THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF THE AUTHORITY
OF THE RULER.
We have in the last chapters discussed the theories of the
source and authority of the law of the State. It is with these
in our minds that we can now turn to the conceptions of the
political theorists of this time with regard to the prince or
ruler.
We turn first to a group of English works of the later
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries--that is, to Fleta,
Britton, the 'Mirror of Justice,' and the 'Modus tenendi
Parliamentum. '
The work of Fleta would be of the very first importance,
if it were not that in most essentials it does little more than
re-state the principles of Bracton, with which we have dealt
in a previous volume,1 but even so, it is important to observe
that these principles were understood and reasserted; and
there are a few points in which Fleta goes beyond the genuine
text of Bracton. It is only necessary in these circumstances
to summarise very briefly his statements. The king has no
equal or superior in the kingdom, except God and the law;
but it is the law which has made him king, and ho should
therefore recognise the " dominium and potestas " of the law,
and his rule is evil when it represents a will different from that
of the law. 2 The king has in his hand all jurisdiction, but he
is the Vicar of God and must give to every man what is his;
1 Cf. vol. iii. part i. chsps. 2, * Fleta, i. 5, i (cf. Bracton, 'Do
3, 4. Legibus,' i. 8, 5).
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? chap, m. ]
31
THE AUTHORITY OP THE RULER.
he cannot do anything but that which he can do by law. 1 It is
said that what is the prince's pleasure has the authority of
law, but this does not mean that everything which the king
wills has the force of law, but only that which has been laid
down by the king's authority with the counsel of the magnates,
and after due deliberation. 2 So far Fleta is only re-stating
Bracton's position, of which the essence is that the law is
not the arbitrary creation of the king, and that it is supreme
over him. But now we come to an important deviation from
the original text of Bracton. Fleta says that no one is to
presume to dispute about the action of the king, and to go
against it; but he adds that the king has two superiors in
ruling his people: the law, by which he has been made king,
and his Curia--that is, his counts and barons. The counts
are so-called "a comitiva," and if they see that the king is
without a bridle, they are bound to impose a bridle on him.
And, he adds, kings should moderate their power by the law,
which is the bridle of power; they should live according to
law, for the human law declares that laws bind the legislator;
and elsewhere it is said (i. e. , Cod. I. 14, 4) that it becomes
the majesty of the ruler that the prince should profess that he
is bound by the law. 3
As we have pointed out in dealing with Bracton, it seems
most probable that this passage was not in the original
text of Bracton, but was interpolated by a later hand. It
does not seem very probable that it has also been inter-
polated in Fleta, though it must be observed that the text of
Fleta has not been revised by any very modern editor. If,
then, we assume that this passage does not belong to the
original text of Bracton, it is very important to observe that
1 Id. , i. 17. 3 and 7 (cf. Bracton,
iii. 9, 3).
> Id. , i. 17, 7 (cf. Bracton, iii. 9, 3).
>> Fleta, i. 17, 9: "Nemo enim de
facto regis presumat disputare, neo
contra factum euum venire. Ye rum
tamen in populo regendo superiores
ha bet, ut legem, per quam f actus est
Rex, et curiam suam, videlicet comites
<<t barones; comites enim a comitiva
dicuntur, qui cum viderint Re gem
sine fraeno, fraenum sibi apponere
tenentur. . . . 11. Temperent igitur
reges potentiam suam per legem, quod
fraenum est potentiae, quod secundum
leges vivant, quia hoo sanxit lex
humana, quod leges euum ligent
latorem, et alibi, digna vox majostate
regnantis est, logibus alligatum so
principem profiteri. "
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? 32
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
whether Fleta found it in his text of Bracton, or it was his
own doctrine, it is obviously a principle of high import-
ance, for it means that not only was the prince bound by the
law, but that there was a legal process by which this could be
enforced.
The statement of the principle is sharp and clear, but it
must not be considered as anomalous or eccentric. For, as
we have pointed out, it was the judgment of all feudal law
that a lord could not be judge in a question between himself
and his vassal, and Bracton, in another passage whose genuine
ness has not so far been contested, says that some at least
maintained that in the last resort, if the king refused to do
justice, this should be done by the "universitas regni et
baronagium suum in curia. " 1
There is another passage in Fleta which, as far as we have
seen, does not correspond precisely with anything in Bracton,
and which is important. It is a passage in which he repeats
Bracton's legal doctrine, that there is no remedy against the
king by way of the Assize (of Novel Disseisin), but he goes on
to say that the aggrieved person may have recourse to one
of two remedies: he may proceed by way of a supplication
addressed to the king, as Bracton had said, but he may also
proceed directly against the " spoliator," but without bringing
in the king's name. If the "spoliator " says that he cannot
reply without the king, in whose name he acted, the process
under the Assize is not to be postponed. If the "spoliator"
has manifest grounds for his action, judgment is to be post-
poned till the king has been consulted; if not, the plaintiff
is to receive seizin with double damages, both against the
escheator, the sheriff, and the other royal officers, as well as
against any private persons. 2
1 Cf. vol. iii. p. 73.
* Id. , iv. 2, 20: "Contra dominum
vero Regem non habetur remedium per
Assisam, quamvis in elections epoliati
sit, vel providers sibi persupplicationem
versus ipsum Regem, vel quod omnino
proeedat Assisa versus spoliatorem, hoc
exccpto, quod ipse Rox in Assisa non
comprehendatur. Et si spoliator dixit
quod sine Rege respondere non poterit,
cujus nomine fecit id quod fecit, non
propter hoc differatur Assiza, sed
capiatur. Et si spoliator evidentem
rationem et manifestam ha beat, dif-
feratur in judicium donee cum Roge
fuorit inde tractatum; sin autem, eeis-
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? chap, m. ]
33
THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
The work of Britton contains some important statements
on the nature and source of law, which we have already
mentioned, and on the nature of the royal authority. The
introductory statement which is put into the mouth of
King Edward declares in the first place that there can be
no peace among his people without law, and he has therefore
caused the laws which have been in use in the kingdom to
be written down. In the second place, he declares that the
king has power to repeal or to annul these laws when he
thinks this to be desirable, but only with the consent of
his counts and barons and the other members of his
council. 1
In another passage Britton sets out the principle that the
royal jurisdiction is over all other jurisdictions, but later he
adds a very important passage, in which Edward is repre-
sented as laying down the general doctrine that no man can
be judge in his own cause, and adds that in cases where
he (the king) is a party--that is in cases concerning felony or
treason against the king--the court is to be the judge, and not
the king. 2
The curious tract called the ' Mirror of Justices ' has been
carefully edited and criticised by Mr Westlake and Professor
Maitland, and the circumstances of its origin discussed. The
? nam recuperet cum dampnia duplicatia
vereua tam Escaetorem, Vicecomitem
et alios ministros Kegis, quam versus
quascunque privates peraonas. "
1 Britton, i. , Introduction: "Eduard
par la grace Deu, roi de Engleterre,
. . . Desirauntz pes entre le poeple qe
est en ncetre proteccioun, par la suf-
fraimce de Deu, la quele pes ne poot
mte ben estre sauntz leys, si avoma les
leys, qe hom ad use en noster reaume
avant ces hores, fet mcttro en escrit
solum ceo qe cy est ordeyne? . Et volums
e commandums qe par tut Engleterre
at tut Hyrelaunde aoint iasi usez et
tcnus en touz poyntz, sauve a nous de
repeler les et de enoyter et de amenuser
et de amender a totes lee f oiz qe nous
VOL. VI.
verums qe bon sorra, par le assent de
nos countes et barouns et autres do
noster conseyl, sauve les usages a coux
qe par prescripcioun de tens ont autre-
ment use en taunt qe lour usages ne
soynt mie descordauntz a dreiture. "
? Id. , i. 23, 8: "Et quant a la juris-
diccioun put-il dire, qe il n'est mie
tonu a respoundre en place ou le jugo
est partie, disium nul jugement ne se
put fere de meyna qe de DTI. porsone. M,
ceo est a saver de un juge, de un
pleyntif, et de un defendaunts; et en
cas ou nous sums partie, voloms nous
qe not re court soit juge, sicum countes
et barouns en tens de Parlement. " Cf.
vol. iii. part i. chap. 4.
0
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? 34
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
work undoubtedly represents a very individual and eccentric
point of view. But it is not without value, when it agrees
with other judgments of the time, even though it may express
these in sharper terms than more careful writers would have
done.
In one Book the author discusses a series of what he
calls "Abusions," and the first and chief of these is, as we
have seen, that the king should be over the law, for he ought
to be under it, in accordance with his oath. 1 The king, he
says in another place, has to swear at his coronation that he
will maintain the Christian Faith and that he will guide his
people according to law, without regard of persons, and be
liable to judgment in law, like any of his people. 2 And
again, the king's court is open to all suitors against the king
or the queen, as much as against other persons, except with
regard to "vengeance" of life or limb. 3 In the Book on
the "Abusions," he says that it is an "abusion" that a
man should not have remedy for a wrong inflicted by the
king or queen, except by the will of the king. *
In another place, again, he asserts that, while the king
should have no equal in his land, neither the king nor the
king's commissioners can be judges in the case of a wrong
(tort) done by the king to one of his subjects, and it is therefore
law that the king should have companions who should hear
and determine in the Parliament the complaints about such
injuries done by the king or queen or their children, or
"leur especiaus"; these companions are, ho says, called
1 * Mirror of Justices,' s. v. 1: "Abu-
sion ost desus ou mesus do droits usages,
tournsnt on abusions
1. La premere et la soverein abusion
est qe li Roi est outre la lei ou il
dois estre subject, sicom est contenu
en son serement. "
Cf. p. 8, and Bracton, 'De Legibus,'
iii. 9, 2.
* Id. , i. 2: "Al corounement le firent
jurer q'il meintendreit la sainte foi
cristiene a tut son poer, e son poeple
guieroit par droit, saunz regard a
nule persone, e serreit obeissant a
Seint Eglise, e justisiable a suftrir
droit com autre de son poeple. "
* Id. , i. 3: "Ordene fu qe la curt
le Rei fust overte a touz pleintifs,
par quei il usent aanz delai brefs
remedials aussi sur le Rei ou sur la
Heine comme sur autre del poeple, de
choscun injurie, forpris en vengeance
de vie ou de membre, ou pleint tient
leu sans bref. "
4 Id. , v. 1. 153: "Abusion est que
nul ne ad reooverer del tort le Rei
ou de la Reine si non a la voluntie
le Rei. "
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