No More Learning

This our first definition: is conscious- yields cynicism enlightenedfalse
ness. It is the modernized, unhappy consciousness, atwhich Enlighten- ment has simultaneously labored successfully and in vain. It has learnt
? its lesson in Enlightenment,but it has not implementedit and prob- ablywasnotevenabletodo so. Well-placedandmiserableatthesame
time, this consciousnessis no longer vulnerableto any critiqueof
ideology;its falsenessis alreadyreflexivelybuffered.
'Enlightened false consciousness': such a formulation seems to
strike a blow against the tradition of Enlightenment. The sentence itselfiscynicisminacrystallinestate. Nonetheless, itclaimsobjective
validity;its content and its necessity are developed in this essay. Logical-
ly, we are dealing with a paradox, for how could enlightened con- sciousness be false? This is precisely the issue.
Acting against one's own better knowledge is the global situation in the superstructure today. One knows oneself to be without illusions
and yet dragged down by the 'power of things. ' What appears in reality as an objective state of affairs is thus what we consider in logic a
paradox and in literature a joke. This shapes a new consciousness
of 'objectivity. '
'Enlightened false consciousness' should not be understood as an
incidental phrase but as a systematic approach, as diagnostic model. It thus commits itself to a revision of enlightenment; it must uncover its
relationtothatwhichistraditionallycalled'falseconsciousness. ' Fur- ther, it must revise the course of Enlightenment and the labor of ideol- ogy critique, which made it possible for 'false consciousness' to re- absorb Enlightenment. If this essay had historical intentions, it would be to describe the modernization of false consciousness. However, my intention is not historical but physiognomic: the focus is the structure of a reflexively buffered false consciousness. I nevertheless want to demonstrate that this structure cannot be grasped without placing it in
a political history of polemical reflections.
Without sarcasm modern-day Enlightenment can have no healthy
relation to its own history. We can only choose between a pessimism -
reminiscent of decadence - loyal to its beginnings and a light-hearted
disrespect in pursuit of original tasks. As things stand, the only loyalty to Enlightenment consists in disloyalty. This can be partlyunderstood from the position of the heirs, who look back on 'heroic' times and are
necessarily more skeptically disposed to the results. To be an heir always carries a certain 'status-cynicism' with it, as we know from
stories about inheritance of family capital. The retrospective position, however, does not itself explain the particular tone of modern cyni- cism. Disillusionment with the Enlightenment is not merely a sign that epigones may and must be more critical than the founders. The pecu- liar hautgoutof modern cynicism is fundamental: a consciousness dis- eased with Enlightenment and instructed by historical experience refuses cheap optimism. New values? No thanks! With the passing of
PeterSloterdijk 193
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Cynicism
defiant hopes, the listlessness of egoisms pervades. In the new cyni- cism, we see a detached negativity which scarcely allows itself any
hope, at most a little irony and self-pity.
In the final analysis, it is a matter of the social and existential limits of
Enlightenment. The pressures to survive and the desire to assert one- self have humbled enlightened consciousness. It is ill from the com- pulsion to accept existing conditions which it doubts, to accommodate itself to them and finally even to conduct their business.
In order to survive, one has to attend the school of reality. Certainly. Those who mean well call it growing up, and there is some truth to that. But that is not all of it. Always a bit unsettled and irritable, the col- laborating consciousness looks around for its lost na;vetes, to which there is no return, since the attainment of consciousness is irrevers- ible.
Gottfried Benn, himself one of the prominent voices of modern
cynicism, has probably uttered the cynical formulation of the century, lucid and insolent: "To be stupid and have a job, that's happiness. "
Only the converse of the sentence reveals its full content: to be intelli- gent and to perform one's work in spite of it, that is unhappy con- sciousness in its modernized form, ill with Enlightenment. Being
"stupid" and trusting are no longer options, and innocence cannot be regained. Unhappy consciousness clings to the belief in the sheer weight of things, to which it is bound by its instinct for self-preserva- tion. In for a penny, in for a pound. At two thousand marksnet a month,
the counter-enlightenment quietly begins; it banks on the fact that everyone who has something to lose comes to terms privatelywith his
unhappy consciousness or engulfs it with 'engagements. ' Preciselybecause it is lived as a privatedisposition which absorbs the
world situation, the new cynicism is not as strikingly noticeable as
would befit its concept. It surrounds itself with discretion, as we shall
see, a key word of charmingly mediated alienation. The accommoda-
tion which knows about itself, having sacrificed its better knowledge to
'objective determinations,' no longer sees any need to expose itself
offensively and spectacularly. There is a nakedness which no longer has an unmasking effect and in which no 'bare fact' appears on whose
ground one could stand with spirited realism. The neo-cynical accom- modation to the given has an aura of plaintiveness; it no longer is self- confidently naked. For this reason it is also methodologically difficult to render this diffuse, hazy cynicism articulate. It has withdrawn into a mournful detachment which has internalized its knowl-
(Abgeklirtheit)
edge, useless for attacks, like a curse. The great offensives of cynical
impudence have become a rarity;ill humor has taken their place, and there is no energy left for sarcasm. Gehlen even thought that not even
? Peter Sloterdijk 195
the English can be cutting any more because the supplies of dissatisfac- tion have been used up and the rationing of stocks has begun. The peevishness which follows the offensives doesn't open its mouth wide
enough for enlightenment to take a step forward.
That is one of the reasons why, in the second part of this book, a dis-
proportionate amount of'cynical material' is taken from the Weimar Republic - aside from the older documents that are also given atten-
tion. In the historical section entitled TheWeimar I Symptom, attempt
a physiognomy of an epoch, a characterization of a decade whose first
heir was fascism and whose second heir we are.
Speaking of the Weimar Republic still means dealing with social
experience of the self. For citable reasons the Weimar culture was
cynically disposed to a highly unusual degree; it yielded an abundance of brilliantlyarticulatedcynicisms, which readliketextbook examples.
It experienced the pain of modernization more violently and ex-
pressed its disillusionment more coldly and more sharply than any
present could ever do. We discover in it strikingformulations of mod-
ern unhappy consciousness, burningly relevant even today. Indeed,
perhaps we can only today comprehend them in their full validity. A critique of cynical reason would remain an academic game with
glass beads if it failed to pursue the connection between the problem of survivaland the danger of fascism. In fact, the question of'survival,' of
self-preservation and self-assertion - to which all cynicisms provide answers - touches on the central problem of defending the status quo
and planning for the future in modern nation states. From various approaches, I attempt to determine the logical locus of German Fas- cism in the convolutions of modern, self-reflexive cynicism. So much can be said in anticipation; in German Fascism typically modern
dynamics of psycho-cultural fears of breakdown, regressive self-asser- tion and new-objective, rational coldness combined with a venerable
strain of military cynicism, which on German, and especially Prussian, soil enjoys an equally macabre and deep-rooted tradition.
Perhaps these thoughts on cynicism as the fourth configuration of false consciousness will help to overcome the peculiar speechlessness
of genuinely philosophical critique regarding so-called fascist ideol-
ogy. Philosophy as a ',discipline' does not have its own theory of 'theoretical fascism' because the latter is considered beneath all cri-
tique. The explanations of fascism as nihilism (Rauschning, etal. ) or as
the product of "totalitarianthinking" remain sweeping and imprecise. The "inauthentic," bastardized nature of fascist ideology has been suf-
ficiently emphasized, and all contents that it "represented" have long since been subjected to a critique by the individual sciences: psychol-
ogy, political science, sociology, historiography. For philosophy, the
? 196 Cynicism
programmatic statements of fascism do "not even" rate as serious, substantial ideology which would pose a serious challenge to a reflec- tive critique. But precisely here lies the weakness of the critique. Fix-
ated on 'serious opponents,' it neglects the taskof comprehending the
ideological pattern of'unserious,' shallow 'systems. ' To this day cri- tique is no match for the modern mixture of opinion and cynicism. But
since questions of social and individual self-preservation are discussed precisely in such combinations, there are good reasons to study their
composition. One has to approach questions of self-preservation in the same language as those of self-annihilation. The same logic of the
repudiation of morality seems to be effective in them. I call this the
of the structure,' of the self-denial of the ethics of 'cynical i. e. ,
logic
culture. Clarifying this will elucidate what it means to choose life.
high
Whoever speaks of cynicism draws attention to the limits of Enlight- enment. In this respect, the concern with the salient featuresof Weimar
cynicism - aside from the advantage of clarity - also promises to be
fruitful for the philosophy of history. The Weimar Republic represents in the course of German history not only the belated development of a
nation-state - heavily burdened by the Wilhelminian legacy, the spirit of a cynically illiberal government - but also a paradigm for 'failed
enlightenment. '
It has often been shown that, and why, the protagonists of repub-
lican Enlightenment at that time could not have been anything else but
a desperate, well-meaning minority (representatives of reason) vis-a- vis almost insurmountable odds: massive currents of anti-Enlighten-
ment and hatred of the intelligentsia; an arrayof anti-democratic and authoritarian ideologies which knew how to use the press to achieve their desired objectives; an aggressive nationalism bent on revenge; an unenlightenable mixture of hard-headed conservatisms, extended
petit-bourgeois (Biedermeiera)ttitudes, messianic sects, apocalyptic
political tendencies, and equally realistic and psychopathic rejections of the impositions of an uncomfortable modernity. The sores of the
World War became infected again and again in the smoldering crisis; Nietzscheanism flourished as the most developed style of thinking marked by a German-narcissistic irritabilityand a moody, arrogant, 'protestant'relation to the 'bad reality. 'In a climate of crisis-likeexcite-
ment there developed a pervasive psycho-political atmosphere of resentment and anxiety about the future, of tenuous pseudo-realisms
and makeshift spiritual responses. If there was ever an era which
as Conversatio-n Enlightenment
IdeologyCritiqueas Continuationofa MiscarriedConversatiownithOtherMeans
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demanded an historical psychopathology, it is the one and a half decades between the fall of the Kaiserreichand the establishment of National Socialism.
First impressions must be given their due here: whoever sought to
carry on enlightenment in such a society was fighting a losing battle. The forces of enlightenment were too weak, for a number of precise
reasons. The Enlightenment had never been able to form an effective
alliance with the mass media, and was political maturity (Miindigkeit)
never an ideal of the industrial monopolies and their associations. How could it have been?
Obviously, the Enlightenment is defeated by forces opposed to it. However, it would be wrong to view this only as a question of the
arithmetics of power. For Enlightenment is also defeated by a qualita- tiveresistance located in the consciousness of its enemies. The latter, outraged, resist the invitation to discussion, to the "decadent" (zerset- zend)talk about truth; even talking itself is resented, because it ques- tions conventional views, values and forms of self-assertion. The inter- pretation of this resistance as the basis of ideology has become one of the main motifs of Enlightenment.
Modernity is not the firsthistorical context in which Enlightenment faces an opposing consciousness which is increasingly resilient to it. In principle, the front can be traced back to the days of the Inquisition. If it is true, as the workers' movement taught, that knowledge is power, then it is also true that not every knowledge is welcomed with open arms. Because there are no truths which can be occupied without a struggle, and because every knowledge must choose its place amidst dominant and oppositional forces, the means by which knowledge is accorded validity seem almost more important than the knowledge itself. In modernity, Enlightenment is revealed as a tactical complex. The demand that what is reasonable also be generalizable draws
Enlightenment into the maelstrom of politics, pedagogy and pro-
paganda. Here Enlightenment consciously represses the acid realism of older doctrines of wisdom, which considered it a certainty that
stupidity belonged to the masses and reason only to the few. Modern elitism has to encode itself democratically.
It is not our task to unfold historically the darkening of the Enlight-
enment. We know that in the 18th and 19th centuries, in spite of much
resistance and contradiction, it knew how to deal mostly productively and with an eye to the future with the ferment of self-doubt as it con-
sidered its own achievements and plans. In spite of all hardships and setbacks it could still believe it had the law of progress on its side. Great names of that time stand for great achievements: Watt, Pasteur, Koch, Siemens. One can reject their achievements but that would be more a
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Cynicism
gesture of ill humor than of justice. The press, the railway, social welfare, penicillin - who could deny that these are remarkable in- novations in the 'garden of humanity'? However, since the technical horrors of the 20th century, from Verdun to the Gulag, from Ausch- witz to Hiroshima, experience mocks optimism. Historical conscious- ness and pessimism seem to boil down to the same thing. And the catastrophes which have not yet happened, which smolder in the undergrowth, feed the omnipresent doubts about civilization. The late 20th century rides on a wave of negative futurism. "The worst was
expected," it "only" has to happen.
I would like first to focus on the theme of on unfulfilledEnlightenment
one point: the question concerning the means of power available to Enlightenment vis-a-vis an opposing consciousness. It is already in a
certain way incorrect to ask about "means of power," since Enlighten- ment is essentially concerned with free consent. That is the "lesson" which cannot be learned under a pressure thatlies outside reason. One of its axes is reason; the other is the free conversation of those striving for reason. Voluntaryconsensus is both its methodological kernel and its moral ideal. This means the opposing consciousness changes its position under no other influence than that of cogent argument.
This is a sublimely peaceful event, when, under the fire of plausible
reasons, old, superceded opinions are surrendered. Enlightenment thus harbors within itself, so to speak, an original utopia - an epis- temological idyl of peace, a beautiful and academic vision: that of free
dialogue among those freely interested in knowledge. Here, impartial individuals, not enslaved to their own consciousness, not repressed by social conditions, come together for a dialogue aiming at truth, under the laws of reason. The truth which Enlighteners want to disseminate arises through the force, without coercion, of stronger arguments. The protagonist or discoverer of an enlightened thought took this step only earlier and usually by surrendering a former opinion of his own.
Accordingly, Enlightenment proceeds in two steps: the acceptance
of the better position and the departure from the previous opinion. This gives rise to an emotional ambivalence: gain and loss. The utopia
of a gentle, critical dialogue foresees this difficulty. The loss becomes bearable in the consciousness that it can be accepted voluntarily and
collegially as the price of commonality. The 'loser' may view himself as the realwinner. The conversation of Enlightenment is thus essentially
a struggle of opinions and an exploratory dialogue among persons who, from the start,submit themselves to rules of peace, since they can
emerge from the encounter only as winners, winners in knowledge and
solidarity. For this reason, the surrender of one's preconceptions is considered bearable.
? PeterSloterdijk 199
An academic idyl, as I said; at the same time, it remains the regula- tive idea of any enlightenment which does not want to surrender the
goal of reconsiliation. The fact that reality is different will come as no
surprise. In Enlightenment's confrontations with preceding con- sciousnesses, truth is the last thing at issue: hegemony, class interests, established doctrines, desires, passions, and the defense of'identities. '
These preconditions affectthe conversationof Enlightenment so strong- ly that it would be more appropriate to talk of a war of consciousness
than of a dialogue of peace. The opponents have not agreed to a peace treaty, but rather confront one another in a competition aimed at re-
pression and annihilation. And they are not free in relation to the powers which make their consciousness speakjust so and in no other
way.
Faced with these sober facts, the conversation model consciously
behaves unrealistically. It allows the arch-pragmatic statement,primum
vivere, to hold For at least it knows deindephilosophari, only conditionally.
that situations will recur again and again where the only thing which
can help life further is 'philosophizing. '
It is inviting to poke fun at the 'methodological anti-realism' of the
dialogue idea, and part of this book indeed tries to give the derisory laughter about every form of foolish idealism its due. However, when all contradicitons have been taken into account, one will return to this beginning, of course with a consciousness which has gone through all the hells of realism. One of the last tasks of philosophy is to preserve the healing fiction of a free dialogue.
Of course, Enlightenment itself is the first to realize that rational and verbal dialogue alone will not see it through. No one can feel the stagnations, the distorted conditions of life, the ruptures, the mis-
carriage of conversation more keenly. At the beginning of ideology critique there is also astonishment about the opponent's stubborn
resistance to hearing - an astonishment which quickly gives way to a
realistic awakening. Whoever does not want to hear lets others know it.
Enlightenment is reminded how easily speaking one's mind can lead
to and cannot be with so easi- camps prisons. Hegemonicpowers* spoken
*In thisbookI uniformlydesignateeverypowerwhichrulesashegemonicpower,in orderto indicatethatthispoweris nevera powerin itselfbutalways'rides,'so to speak,
on thebackof anoppositionalpower. Ina realistictheoryof power,omnipotenceand impotenceoccuronlyasquasi-'mathematicaild'easofpower,astheinfinitelygreat andtheinfinitelysmallwithinpower. Omnipotenceandimpotencecannotconfront one another,buthegemonicpowerandoppositionalpowercan. Thatwhichexists possessespower,a positivequantumof energy,whichis centeredin consciousbodies andwhichextendsitselfthroughappropriatetools andweapons. Forthisreason,the
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Cynicism
ly, and do not come voluntarily to the negotiating table with their
whom
would
behind bars. Buteven if tradition,
they
one may speak of it allegorically, has no initial interest in granting
Enlighteners a right to exert influence. From the dawn of time, the old
has been held to be true, while the new has always been suspect. This
'archaic' feeling for truth had to be overcome by the Enlightenment
before anything new could be plausibly presented as truth. Earlier,
one took for granted that political and intellectual hegemonic powers were allied in a conservative front, disinclined to all innovations.
Wherever religious reforms took place (I have in mind above all the monastical movements of the Middle Ages and the religious upheavals of the 16th Century), they understood themselves as 'conservative revolutions' which obeyed a call to return to the origins. Finally, beside
hegemonic powers and traditions, people's heads - already too full - constitute a third instance which does not like to listen to the spirit of
Enlightenment innovation. They meet Enlightenment with the resis- tance of ingrained habits and time-honored attitudes which occupy
their consciousness and which can be brought to listen to a reason other than conventional wisdom only in exceptional circumstances. But the vessel of knowledge cannot be filled twice. Enlightenment as
critique recognizes in everything which is 'already there' in people's heads its inner arch-enemy; it contemptuously designates these con- tents:prejudices. '
The threefold polemic of a critique of power, a struggleagainst tradi- tion and an attackon prejudices belongs to the accepted understand-
ing of Enlightenment. All three imply a struggle with opponents disinclined to dialogue. Enlightenment wants to talk to them about
things which hegemonic powers and traditions prefer to keep silent: reason, justice, freedom, truth, exploration. The status quo is better served by silence. In speaking, one pursues an uncertain future. En-
lightenment enters this dialogue with almost empty hands, with the fragile offer of free consent to the better argument. If it could impose itselfbyforce,itwould notbeEnlightenment, butratheravariationon an unfree consciousness. So, it is true: as a rule, people adhere to old
logic of all-or-nothing is dangerous in the field of politics, even fatal. In Sieyes' state- ment, "Whatis the Third Estate? Nothing. Whatdoes itwant to become? Everything," we see disastrous self-characterization of the oppositional power, a false logification of
political struggle, through which the part wants to make itself into the whole. In con- tent, this false all-or-nothing logic has been reproduced in Marxism, which wanted to make the proletariat 'everything. ' Is this false concept of power a general legacy of the
Leftist opposition? Even the French New Philosophy fails due to this. Walking old
paths, it confuses omnipotence with hegemonic power and imposes aManicheanontol- ogy onto an evil state of power.
opponents,
prefer
? PeterSloterdijk 201
positionsfor anythingbut well-foundedreasons. Whatcan be done?
Enlightenmenthas triedto makethe best of this situation. Sinceit
wasnevergivenanybreaks,it developedalmostfromthe beginning,in additionto thefriendlyinvitationto conversation,a second,comba- tivestance. Itisbeatenup,soitstrikesback. Someexchangesofblows aresooldthatitwouldbesenselesstoaskwhostartedit. Thehistoryof
ideologycritiquecomprisesforalargepartthehistoryofthissecond, polemicalgesture,thehistoryofagreatcounter-offensiveS. uchacriti-
as serves in a twofold as a theoryofstruggle, Enlightenment way:
que,
weapon against a hardened, conservativelycomplacent conscious- ness, and as an instrumentfor practiceand self-assurance. The op-
ponent's refusal to engage in dialogue creates such an enormous
problemthatithastobedealtwiththeoreticallyW.
hoeverwantsno
part of Enlightenmentmust have his reasons, and probablyothers than he is willing to admit. Resistanceitself becomes an object of
Enlightenment. The opponent thus necessarilybecomes a 'case,'his consciousnessanobject. Becausehedoesnotwanttotalkwithus,we
haveto talkabout him. As in everycombativeattitude,however,the
opponent is no longer thought of as an ego, but as an apparatusin which, partlyopenly, partlysecretly,a mechanismof resistanceis at workwhichmakesit unfreeand binds it to errorsand illusions.
meansthe continuationthemiscarried Ideologcyritique polemical of dialogue
withothermeansI. t declaresa warof consciousness,evenwhen it pre- tendsto be oh so seriousand'non-polemical. 'Therulesof peaceare objectivelyforced into abeyance. At this point it becomes clearthat there is no inter-subjectivitywhich is not inter-objectivityas well. In hittingand being hit, both partiesbecome subjectiveobjectsfor each other.
Moreexactly,ideologycritiquedoes not merelywantto 'hit,'but to operatewithprecision,inthesurgicalasinthemilitarysense:toout- flankthe opponent, expose him, revealhis intentions. Exposingim- plies uncoveringthe mechanismof falseand unfreeconsciousness.
In principle,Enlightenmentknowsonlytwogroundsforfalsehood: erroranbdadfaithO. nlythelattercanpossesstheworthinessofasubject,
for only when the opponent lies consciouslydoes the 'falseopinion' haveanego. Ifone insinuatesanerror,thenthefalseopinionrestsnot on anego buton amechanismwhichfalsifieswhatistrue. Onlyalie carriesresponsibilityforitself,whereasanerror,becauseit is mechani- cal,remainsin relative'innocence. 'Error,however,quicklysplitsinto twodifferentphenomena:the simpleerror,basedon logicalor per- ceptualillusionand relativelyeasilycorrected;and the persistent,sys- tematic error, which clings to its own conditions of existence, i. e. ,
In this the classicalseriesof falseconsciousnessarises:lie, ideology. way,
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Cynicism
errori,deology.
Every struggle leads necessarily to a reciprocal reification of sub- jects. Since Enlightenment cannot surrender its aim of helping a self-
obstructingconsciousness tobetterinsights,inthelastanalysis,itmust
'operate' behindthe opponent's consciousness. Ideology critique thus acquires a cruel characteristic,which, if it admits to being cruel at all, desirestobenothingbutareactiontotheatrocitiesof'ideology. ' Here we see more clearly than elsewhere that 'philosophical' ideology criti- que is basically the heir of a great satiricaltradition, in which the motif
of unmasking, exposing, stripping, has always served as a weapon. Modern ideology critique, however - this is my thesis - has dan-
gerously cut itself off from the powerful traditions of laughter within satirical knowledge, which have their philosophical roots in ancient
kynicism. Modern ideology critique appears in the wig of seriousness, and in Marxism and especially in psychoanalysis has even put on suit
and tie so as to assume a complete air of bourgeois respectability. It has shed its life as satire in order to conquer its position as 'theory' in
books. From the lively form of biting polemic it has retreated to
positions wihtin a cold war of consciousness. Heinrich Heine was one
of the last authors of the classical enlightenment to defend literarily,in
open satire, the right of ideology critique to commit 'just atrocities. '
The public sphere did not follow him in this regard. The bourgeoisi- fication of satire to ideology critique was as inevitable as the bour-
geoisification of society in toto,including that of its oppositional forces.
Serious ideology critique imitates surgical procedure: it cuts open
the patient with the critical scalpel and operates under impeccably sanitized conditions. The incision into the opponent is made in public,
until the mechanism of his error is laid bare. The upper skin of de- lusion and the nerve endings of'real' motives are hygienically severed
and embalmed. Having come this far, Enlightenment is, it is true, not satisfied, but it is better armed in its insistence on its own claims for the distant future. Ideology critique is no longer concerned with winning the dissected opponent over to its own side; it is concerned with the 'corpse,' with the critical extract of his ideas, which is preserved in the libraries of Enlighteners where one can effortlessly read up on how false they were. It is obvious that one does not come any closer to the
opponent this way. Whoever did not originally want to engage in Enlightenment will want to do so even less, once he has been cut open
and exposed by the opponent. Of course, according to the logic of the game, the Enlightener will at least have one victory: sooner or later, he
will force his opponent to speak in self-defense.
Irritated by the attacks and 'unmaskings,' the counter-Enlightener will one day begin to propagate his own 'enlightenment' about the
? Peter Sloterdijk 203
Enlighteners, in order to denounce them as human beings and to criminalize them socially. They are then usually called 'elements. ' The
word is unintentionally well chosen, for it does not seem promising to fight the elements. It will prove inevitable that the hegemonic powers will begin to blabber out of line in their counter-critiques. Then,
increasingly irritated, they reveal something of their secrets; generally
acknowledged values of high culture are thereby cunningly suspen- ded. In the compulsion of the weakened hegemonic powers to make
confessions, as remains to be shown, lies one of the roots of the mod- ern cynical structure.
Without really wanting to, 'dissatisfied Enlightenment' has in turn taken refuge behind this front. Threatened by its own fatigue and undermined by the need for seriousness, it often contents itself with
from its In time, the having wrung involuntary confessions opponent.
practiced gaze will decipher 'confessions' everywhere, and even when the hegemonic power shoots instead of negotiating, one will not have
any trouble interpreting the bullets as signs of a fundamental weak- ness. This is how powers express themselves who have no more ideas and can only cling to their strong nerves and executive organs to save themselves.
Arguing behind the opponent's back and through his head has its
paradigm in modern critique. The gesture of exposure characterizes
ideology critique, from the critique of religion in the 18th Century to the critique of fascism in the 20th. Everywhere one discovers extra-
rational mechanisms of opinion: interests, passions, fixations, illu- sions. That helps somewhat to lessen the scandalous contradiction between the postulated unity of truth and the factual plurality of opinions - as long as the contradiction cannot be removed. Under
these assumptions, a true theory would be one which not only ground- ed its own theses best, but also knew how to disarm with ideology
critiqueallessentialandpersistentcounter-positions. Inthisregard,as one can easily see, official Marxism has the greatest ambition, since the
major part of its theoretical energy is dedicated to outflanking and
exposing all non-Marxist theories as 'bourgeois ideologies. ' Only
through this continual one-upmanship are the ideologists able to
"live" with the plurality of ideologies. De facto, ideology critique
implies the attempt to construct a hierarchy between exposing and exposed theory; in the war of consciousness one desires to be on top,
that is, to attain a synthesis of claims to power and better insights. Since critique, contraryto academic custom, does not hesitate to use
personal arguments, the universities have probably approached ideol- ogy critique with deliberate caution. For the attackfrom the flank, the
argumentumadpersonami,s despised within the 'academic community. '
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Cynicism
Serious critique meets its opponent in its best form; it honors itself when it overcomes its rival in the full armor of its rationality. For as long as possible, the community of scholars has tried to defend its integrity against the arm-to-arm combat of ideology critique. "Do not unmask, so that you yourself will not be unmasked," could be the unspoken rule. It is no accident that the great representatives of criti- que - the French Moralists, the Encyclopedists, the socialists, indi- vidually Heine, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud - remain outside the
republic of scholars. They all have a satirical, polemical component which can scarcely be hidden under the mask of scientific seriousness.
These signals of a holy non-seriousness, still one of the sure indices of
truth, will be used here as signposts leading toward the critique of cyni- cal reason. We discover a reliably unreliable travelling companion in Heinrich Heine who better than any other managed to combine theory and satire, knowledge and good cheer. Following in his tracks,I shall try to reunite the capacities for truth in literature, satire and art
with those of'scientific discourse. '
The right of ideology critique to argue personally was acknowledged even by the strictestabsolutist of reason, J. G. Fichte - aptly compared
to Napoleon by Heine - when he says that the kind of philosophy one chooses depends on what kind of person one is. This critique intrudes
into the conditionality of human opinion either with compassionate lightheartedness or cruel seriousness. It seizes error from behind and
pulls up its roots in practicallife. This procedure is not exactly modest,
but it excuses its immodesty by insisting on the principle of the unity of truth. What dissection brings to light is the everlasting embarrassment
of ideas in face of the underlying interests: human, all too human;
egoisms, class privileges, resentments, persistence of hegemonic
powers. Under such illumination, the oppositional subject appears
not only psychologically but also socio-politically undermined. Accor- dingly, one can not understand its standpoint until one complements
its own self-portrayal with whatever truths lie hidden behind and beneath it. Ideology critique thus makes a claim which links it to her- meneutics: the claim to understand an 'author' better than he under- stands himself. What at first sounds arrogant can be methodologically
justified. The other often perceives things in me which really do escape my attention - and vice versa. He has the advantage of distance, from
which I can profit only retrospectively through dialogical mirroring. This of course would presuppose a functioning dialogue, which in the process of ideology critique is precisely that which does not take place.
An ideology critique, however, which does not clearly accept its identity as satire, can easily be transformed from an instrument in the
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searchfor truthinto one of "beingright. "All too often, it hindersthe conversationinsteadof openingit to newpaths. Leavinggeneralanti- scholasticand anti-intellectualattitudesaside, this explains some of the currentdissatisfactionwith ideology critique.
Thus it happensthatan ideologycritiquewhichpresentsitselfas science, because it is not allowed to be satire,becomes increasingly
entangledinseriousradicalsolutions. Oneoftheseisitsstrikingten-
dencyto seekrefugein psychopathology. Falseconsciousnessappears firstof allassickconsciousness. Almostallimportantworksof the20th
centuryon the phenomenon of ideology do this - from Sigmund Freudto WilhelmReichto RonaldLaingand DavidCooper, not to
mentionJosephGabel,who hasdrawnthemostextensiveanalogybe-
tween ideology and schizophrenia. Preciselythose posturesare sus- pectedofbeingsickwhichloudlyproclaimthemselvestobethemost
healthy,normal and natural. A critiquebased on psychopathology,
althoughprobablyin substancejustified,risksalienatingopponents more and more deeply;it reifiesand abrogatesthe other'sreality. In
theend,theideologycriticstandsbeforetheopposingconsciousness
likeone of themodern,highlyspecializedpathologistswho,admitted-
ly, can preciselydiagnose the pathologicaldisturbance,but knows nothing about therapies,because that falls outside his area of com-
petence. Suchcritics,similarto some doctorscorruptedby theirpro- fession, are interestedin the diseasesand not in the patients.
The most humorless reificationof every opposing consciousness hasgrownoutoftheideologycritiqueconnectedwithMarx(andIwill notcommentwhetherthisisacaseoflegitimateuseorofmisuse). The radicalreificationof theopponenthasbeen inanycaseafactualconse- quenceofthepolit-economicalrealismwhichcharacterizesMarxian theory. However,anadditionalmotifcomesintoplayhere:ifallother exposureslead falseconsciousnessbackto darkelementsof the hu-
man totality (lies, nastiness, egoism, repression, division, illusion, wishful thinking,etc. ), then the Marxianexposure comes up against
non-subjectiveelements,the lawsof the polit-economicalprocessas a whole. One does not uncover'humanweaknesses'when one criticizes
ideologiesfromtheperspectiveof politicaleconomy. Rather,one hits on an abstractsocialmechanismin whichindividuals,as membersof
classes,havedistinctfunctions:as capitalist,as proletarian,as inter-
mediatefunctionarya,stheoreticalstoogeofthesystem. Butneitherin
the head nor in the limbs of the systemis thereanyclarityaboutthe
natureof thewhole. Eachmemberis mystifiedin awaythatcorresponds
to its Eventhe in of his with position. capitalist, spite practicaelxperience
seesnotrue of thetotal butremainsa
capital, picture network, necessarily
deluded epiphenomenon of the processof capital.
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Cynicism
A second shoot of modern cynicism grows here. As soon as I
assume, using Marx'sformulation, a'necessarily false consciousness,' the spiralofreification turnsfurther. The heads of humans would then be filled with precisely the errors which have to be there for the system to function - towards its collapse. In the gaze of the Marxist critic
there glitters an irony which is a prioridoomed to cynicism. For he admits that the ideologies which, from an external point of view, are
false consciousness, are precisely the right consciousness when seen
from the inside. Ideologies appear simply as the appropriate errors in the corresponding heads: 'correct false consciousness. ' One recalls the
definition of cynicism in my firstpreliminary reflection. The difference is that the Marxist critic accords 'correct false consciousness' the chance to enlighten itself or to be enlightened - by Marxism. Then it would have become "true" consciousness, not'enlightened false con- sciousness,' as the cynicism formula reads. Theoretically, the option of emancipation is kept open.
Every sociological systems theory which treats 'truth' functional-
istically carries with it an immense cynical potential. And since every
contemporary intelligence is caught up in the process of such socio-
logical theories, it becomes ineluctably entangled in the latent or open master cynicism inherent in these forms of thinking. Marxism, at least
in its origins, maintained an ambivalence between reifying and eman-
cipatory perspectives. Non-Marxist systems theories of society aban- don the last traceof such reservations. In alliancewith neo-conservative
trends, they proclaim that useful members of society must internalize certain 'correct illusions' once and for all, because without them nothing functions properly. The naivete of others should be planned, "capitalfixbeingmanhimself. "It is always a good investment to make use of a naive will to work, never mind for what. After all, the systems theoreticians and maintenance strategistsare beyond naive belief from the start. However, for those who are supposed to believe a ban on reflection and a call for stable values are in effect.
Whoever provides the means of liberating reflection and invites others to use them strikes the conservatives as an unscrupulous and power-hungry idler, whom they accuse of letting "others do the work. " Well then, for whom?
TranslatedbyMichaelEldredandLeslieA.