The law of
the State is the expression of the custom and will of the whole
community, and it is supreme over all members of the com-
munity, even over the king and prince.
the State is the expression of the custom and will of the whole
community, and it is supreme over all members of the com-
munity, even over the king and prince.
Thomas Carlyle
.
.
fazemos e
establescemos estas leyes que se
siguen. "
4 Id. id. , 52, 64: "E los pleitos e
contiendas que se non podieren librar
por las leyes dee te libro e por loe dichos
fueros, mandamos que so libren per las
leyes contenidas enlos libros delas
Siete Partidas que el Rey Don Alfonso
nuestro visauelo? mando ordenar, commo
quier que fasta aqui non se fabla que
fuesen publicadas por mandado del
Rey, nin fueron auidas, nin rescibidas
por leyes; pero nos mandamos los
rrequerir e concentar e emendar en
algunas cosas que cunplia. Et asy
concertadas e emendadas porque fueron
sacadas e tomadas delos dichos
sanctos Padres e delos derechos e dichos
de muchos sabios antiquos, e de fueros
e de costumbres antigos, de Espanns,
damos las por neustras leyes. "
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? CHAP. L] THE LAW: PRACTICE AND THEORY. 7
therefore, to make precise statements about the methods of
legislation; but it seems, from examining the collection of
Eoyal Ordinances, that, so far as these can be described as
having the nature of law, they were promulgated under the
same terms as those of the thirteenth century, by the great
council, sometimes with reference to the barons and others,
sometimes with the advice of the estates. 1
The formulas of legislation in the Empire are more explicit,
and seem to imply normally the presence of the members
of the Diet. 2
We can now turn to the general theory of the legislative
authority in the fourteenth century. It seems hardly
necessary to cite the opinions of the English writers, for it is
obvious that they adhere to, and indeed frequently simply
repeat, the opinions of Bracton.
Britton represents the king as issuing a law book, and as
commanding that it was to be obeyed in England and Ireland,
but reserves the right to repeal or annul these laws with the
consent of the barons and counts and the other members of
his council. 3 Fleta restates almost literally the judgments of
Bracton. The king has indeed no equal, but it is the law which
has made him king, and it is therefore right that he should
recognise the authority of the law. * The king can do nothing
except that which he can do lawfully, and the saying that the
prince's pleasure has the force of law must be understood
under the terms of the statement that it was from the "lex
regia" that he derived his authority, and that, therefore, it
is to be understood that that only is law which has been made
after due deliberation by the ad-vice of the " magnates " and
''Recueil des anciennes Lois Fran-
chise* '--eg. , vol. iii. p. 31S: vol. V.
PP-J, 156.
'Cf. Introduction to the Golden
Bull of 1356. Senckenburg and
Schmaus, 'Neue Sammlung der Reich-
? beehiede,' vol. i. p. 46.
1 Britton, i. Prologue: "Edouard
pu la gracei Deu Roi de Engleterre.
. . . Et volums et commandums qe par
tut Engleterre et tut Hyrelaunde soient
issi usez et tenus en tous poyntz, sauve
a nous de repeler les et de enyter
et de amenuser et de amonder a totes
les foiz, qe nous verums qe bon serra,
par le assent de nos Countes et
Bexouns et autres de noster conseyl. "
4 Fleta, i. 5, 4.
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? 8
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
the authority of the king. The king must restrain his
authority by the law which is the bridle of power, and must
live according to law, for it is the principle of human law
that laws bind the legislator. 1 This was evidently the normal
opinion of English lawyers, and there is therefore nothing
surprising in the terms used by that curious work, the
'Mirror of Justices. ' The worst of all abuses is that the
king should be against the law, for he ought to be subject
to it, as is expressed in his coronation oath. It is a grave
abuse that ordinances should be made by the king and
his clerks and others who would not venture to oppose the
king, while laws ought to be made by the common consent of
the king and his counts. 2
It is, then, from this standpoint that we can understand
the real significance of the treatment of the source of authority
of law by Marsilius of Padua in the 'Defensor Pacis. 3 He
1 Fleta, i. 17, 7: "Nec obstat, quod
dicitur, quod principi placet legia
habet poteetatem, quia sequitur, cum
lege regia quae de ejus imperio lata est,
quod est, non quicquid de voluntate
regis, tantopere praesumptum est,
sed quod magnatum suorum consilio.
Rege auctoritatem praeetaute, et
habita e? uper hoc deliberatione et trac,
tatu, recte fuorit definitum. . . . 11.
Temperent igitur reges potentiam euam
per legem quae fraenum est potentiae,
quod secundum leges vivant ; quia hoc
sanxit lex humana, quod leges suam
ligent latorem; et alibi, digna vox
majestate regnantis est, legibus alli
gatum se principem profited. "
* 'Mirror of Justices,' V. 1. : "La
preme`re e la so ver ai n abusion est qe li
Roi est contre la loi, car il doist e^stre
subject, sicom est contenu en son sere-
ment, 2. Abusion est qe ou les parle-
menta se duissent fere sur les sauvacions
des aimes des trespassoeurs e ceo a`
Londres e a`s deux fois per an, la ne se
font il ore forque rarement e a` la
volontie le roi sur eides e cueillettes
de tresor. Et ou les ordenaunces se
duissent fere de com un assent del roi
e de ses countee, la ce funt ore par le
roi e ses clers e par aliens e autres qi
noseut contreriner le Roi, einz desirent
del plere e de li conseiller as son promt,
tut ne soit mie lur conseil covenable al
com un del people, sanz appeler les
countes e saunz suire les riules de
droit, e donc plusours ordenaunces se
fondent ore plus sur la voluntie qe
sur droit. "
For a critical discussion of the date
and authorship of this work, of. the
edition of Whitaker and Maitland,
published by the Sel den Society in
1695.
* We desire to express the gratitude,
which all students of Medieval Litera-
ture must feel, to Mr Previte-Orton of
St John's College, Cambridge, and to
Professor R. Scholz of Halle, that we
have now in their editions of 1928 and
? ? 1932 a masterly criticism of the text
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? CHAP, t]
9
THE LAW: PRACTICE AND THEORY.
is not, as appears to be thought by some writers who are not
very well acquainted with mediaeval political literature, setting
out some new and revolutionary democratic doctrine, but is
rather expressing, even if in rather drastic and unqualified
terms, the normal judgment and practice of the Middle Ages:
he represents not the beginning of some modern and revolu-
tionary doctrine, but the assertion of traditional principles.
It is, however, true and not unimportant that the author
derives his doctrines from various sources, that he combines
the principles of the actual practice of the Middle Ages with
conceptions derived, on the one side, from Aristotle, and
on the other, to some extent from the Civilians.
He lays down, for instance, the principle that there is no
"politia" when the law is not supreme, and he cites in sup-
port of this some words of Aristotle1; but this doctrine
had been implied in the Assizes of Jerusalem, and asserted by
Bracton. 2 Again, he sets out with great emphasis the principle
that the source of law is the "populus" or "unrversitas
emum " or its " valencior pars," and not either one man or a
few men, for either the one or the few might make bad laws
directed to their own advantage rather than to the common
good. 3 Marsuius refers to Aristotle as having laid down this
occur. We must refer the reader to
the admirable introductions to these
editions for a full discussion of the most
interesting textual questions, as well
as for those relating to the authorship
of this work.
1 Harsilius, 'Defensor Pacis,' i. 11
(*)-
1 'Assizes of Jerusalem,' Assises
de la Cour dee Bourgeois, 26: Bracton,
'De Legibus,' i. 8, 5. Cf. vol. iii.
pp. 32, 67.
>> Marsilius of Padua, 'Defensor
Pacis,' i. 12, 3: "Nos autem dicamus
secundum veritatem atque consilium
Aristotelia 3? Politico Cap. 6? , legia
latorem seu causam legis effectivam
primam et propriam esse populum
seu civium universitatem, aut ei us
valenciorem partem, per suam elec-
cionem seu voluntatem in generali
civium congrogacione per sermonem
expressam, precipientem seu deter-
minantem aliquid fieri vel omitti circa
civiles actus humanos, sub poena vel
supplicio temporali; valenciorem in-
quam partem, considerata quantitate
personarum et qualitate m com-
muuitate ilia super quam lex fertur;
sive id fecerit universitas predicta
civium aut ejus pars valencior per se
ipsam immediate, sive id alicui vel
aliquibus commiserit faciendum, qui
legislator simpliciter non sunt, nec
esse possunt, sed solum ad aliquid et
quandoque ac secundum primi legis -
latoris auctoritatem. " Id. , i. 12, 8:
"Aut legum lacionis auctoritas ad
solam civium universitatem pertinet,
ut diximus, vel ad hominem unicum
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? 10
[PAHT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
doctrine that the universitas is the source of law, but the
principle had been suggested by some of the earliest Civilians.
We have drawn attention in the second volume to the words
of works attributed to Irnerius and Bulgarus, that it is the
"populus" or "universitas" which is the ultimate source
of law,1 and it is evident that they had learned this from the
Eoman law books. It seems reasonable to say that Marsilius
is restating the doctrine of the ancient Eoman law and of the
media)val Civilians.
But further, as we have seen, there is scarcely any trace
whatever, either in the constitutional systems or in the
writers on political theory of the Middle Ages, except in the
mediawal Civilians,. of the conception that law could be made
by any one person, even by the prince, except with the advice
and consent of the community as a whole, or those who stood
for it, whether they were the great and wise men, or the elected
representatives of the community. Bgidius Colonna stands
practically alone in suggesting that the king should rule
according to his own will and the laws which he had made,
and not according to the laws which the citizens had made. 2
So far, then, Marsilius was simply expressing in clear terms
the normal conception of the Middle Ages, but there are some
aspects of his statement which deserve further notice, and
especially the emphatic phrase which he uses about the
nut pauciores. Non ad solum unum,
propterea quae dicta sunt in 11" hujus
et in prima demonstracione quam in
hoc addun'mus; posset enim propter
ignoranciam vel malitiam, aut utrum-
que legem pravam ferre, inspiciendo
scilicet magis proprium conferens quam
commune, unde tyrampnica foret.
Propter candem vero causam non
pertinet hoc ad pauciores: possent
onim peccare in ferendo legem, ut
prius, ad quorundam, scilicet pau-
corum, et non commune conferens,
quaomadmodum videre est in olig-
archiis. Pertinet hoc igitur ad civium
univereitatem aut ejus partem valen-
ciorem, de quibus est altera et
opposita ratio. "
1 Imerius, 'De Aquitate,' 2: "Uni-
versitas id est populus, hoo habet
officium singulis scilicet hominibas
quasi membris providere. Huic de-
scendit hoo ut legem condat. "
Bulgarus, 'Comm. on Digest,' 50,
17, 176: "Vigor judiciarius ideoest in
medio constitutus ne singuli jus sibi
dioant. Non enim oompetit singulis
quod permissum est tantum univer-
sitati, vel ei qui obtinet vicem universi-
tatis, id est populi, qualis est magis-
trate. "
Of. vol. ii. p. 57.
>> Cf. vol. v. p. 74.
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? CHAP. I. ]
11
THE LAW: PRACTICE AND THEORY.
"valencior pars" of the populus. It will be observed that
he explains these words when he adds, "Valenciorem inquam
partem, considerata quantitate personarum et qualitate'in
eommunitate ilia super quam lex fertur," for there seems to be
no doubt that this is the correct reading. It seems clear that
he does not mean simply the greater number. The history,
however, of the development of the theory of the majority
in the political and ecclesiastical organisations of the Middle
Ages is one of great complexity, and we do not feel that we
are competent to discuss this subject. 1
It should also be observed that Marsilius sets out a very
important defence of the authority of the whole people in
making law. Men, he says, are more ready to maintain a law
which they have imposed upon themselves, and it is therefore
well that whatever may concern the common convenience
Bhould be known and heard by all2; and, while he admits
that the legislative power should not be entrusted to a base
and incompetent authority, he meets the contention that
the " universitas civium " is a body of this kind with a fiat
denial. For, he declares, the great mass of the citizens (civium
pluralitas) are not normally or generally base or incompetent,
rather they arejill^ or for the most part,, of sound mind and
reason, and have a right intention towards the Common-
1 We desire to draw the attention of
those who wish to study this subject
to the very careful and interesting
monographs written by Dr E. Ruffini
Avondo: "H principio Maggiori-
tario nelle eleuoni dei re e imperatori
Romano-Germanici" in "Atti della
reals Academia delle Scienze di Torino,'
vol. 60 (1924-25). "I\ principio mag-
gioritario nella storia del Diritto
Canomco" in 'Archivio Giuridico,'
vol. 93, faac. I. (Quarta Serie, vol. ix.
faac. 1). "I systemi di deliberations
eollettiva nel Medioevo Italiano" in
Collezione di Ope re Giuri-
dkbe,' n. 243. Torino, Fratelli Bocca,
1927. "D Defensor Pacts di Harsilio
di Padova," in 'Rivista Storica Itali-
aca,' faac. H. , 1924. "11 Prineipio
Maggioritario," ? Profilo Storico,'
Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1927 (an ex-
cellent summary).
* Marsilius, 'Defensor Pacis,' i. 12, 6:
"Socundam propositionem probo:
quoniam lex ilia melius observatur a
quocunque civium, quam sibi quilibet
imposuisse videtur; talis est lex lata
ex auditu et precepto universe mul-
tudinis civium . . . (i, 12, 7). Con-
venerunt enim homines ad civilem com-
municationem propter commodum et
vite sufficienciam consequendam, et
opposita doclinandum. Que igitur
omnium possunt tangere commodum
et incommodum, ab omnibus sciri
debent et sndiri, ut commodum assequi
et oppositum repellere possint. "
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? 12
[PART I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
wealth and what is necessary for its maintenance. And,
therefore, although every individual, or the greater multitude,
is not capable of devising new laws, yet everyone oan judge
and determine as to that which is devised and proposed to him
by others. 1
It seems to us, then, to be clear that the constitutional pro-
cedure and the general political theory of the fourteenth
century represent the same principles as to the source and
supremacy of the law which, as we have seen in former
volumes, were characteristic of the Middle Ages.
The law of
the State is the expression of the custom and will of the whole
community, and it is supreme over all members of the com-
munity, even over the king and prince. We shall, however, have
more to say about this in later chapters, when we deal directly
with the conception of the nature and limitation of the
authority of the prince in the fourteenth century.
1 Id. id. , i. 13, 3: "Cum ergo
primum dicebatur, 'ad pravum et in
pluribus indiscretum, non pertinot
legumlacionis auctoritas,' conceditur.
Et cum additur, universitatem civium
ease hujus modi, negandum est. Nam
civium pluralitas neque prava neque
iudiscreta est quantum ad pluralitatem
suppositorum, et in pluri tempore;
omnes enim, aut plurimi, sane mentis
ot racionis sunt et recti appetitus ad
policiam et que necessaria sunt
propter eius permanenciam, quemad-
modum leges et alia statuta vel con-
suetudines, sicut prius ostensum est.
Quamvis enim non quilibet aut
maior multitudo civium sit legum in-
ventor, potest tamen quilibet de in
ventis et ab alio sibi propositis iudicare,
addendum vel minnendum aut mutan
dum diecornere. "
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? 13
CHAPTER n.
THE LAW, ITS SOURCE AND AUTHORITY. CIVILIANS.
It remains, then, to consider the treatment of this subject by
the Civilians and Canonists, for here if anywhere we may find
some development of another kind. We have pointed out in
earlier volumes that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
there are clear traces of two and divergent movements of
opinion: that some of the Civilians seem to think that the
Roman people had so completely transferred their original
legislative authority to the emperor that they no longer
possessed it at all, while others thought that though they had
given the emperor this authority it still, also, remained with
them, and could still be reclaimed and exercised. 1 We have
now to consider how far the Civilians and Canonists of the
fourteenth century can be said to adhere to the one or the
other of these opinions.
It is well to observe at the outset that there is no question
in the minds of these Civilians that it was the people from whom
the prince derived his authority. This is very clearly set out
in a passage in the 'Commentary on the Digest' by Cynus.
(Cino of Pistoia; one of the most important of the Civilians
of the early fourteenth century. ) Cynus maintains very
dogmatically that the " hnperium " is from God, but he holds
that this is not inconsistent with the principle that the prince
was oreated by the lex regia, the emperor derives his authority
from the people, the "imperium " is from God. 2
Having made ourselves dear on this point we can consider
1 CI. vol. ii. part i. chap. 7: vol. v.
pert i. chap. 6.
1 Cynue, 'Comm. on Digest,' Rub.
iv. Fol. viii. R. : "Not. Ex lege ista
quod iura reputant imperatorem Deum,
seu personam divinam, et hoc merito;
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? 14
Lpaut i.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
an important discussion of the whole question of the legislative
authority of the people, by Cynus in his ' Commentary on the
Code,' which indicates very clearly that he was well aware
of the contention between the older Civilians about this
question. He cites the opinion of "Joannes " and of " Hos-
tiensis," that the Eoman people could not now make a law, but
also the judgment of Hugolinus to the contrary, and says
that some of the "moderni" (his contemporaries) held with
Hugolinus. Cynus himself seems to be indifferent as to the
question, but the reason he gives seems to imply that he is
thinking not of the general authority of the people of the
Eoman empire, but of the authority of the people of the city
of Eome, which would have no reality outside of the city. 1
We must, however, observe also the opinion of Cynus
quia imperium est a Deo, ut id authen.
quomodo oportet epi: in princip: De
Fide instrum: ? 1, et ab ipso Deo
immediate proceasit, unde inter 7m-
peratorem et Deum non est ponere
medium, ut in authent. constit, quae
de dignitate ? : illud. Nec obstat quod
dicitur supra 1. i. quod lege regia
dicitur Princeps creatus; quia hoc est
permiseione Divina; sicut diximus, non
est malum in civitate quod non fecerit
Dominus: nec est absurdum, quod sic
a populo est a Deo, tamquam ab
agente universale sicut alitor dicitur,
homo hominem generat: et solu. Vel
melius dico, quod imporator a populo
est, sed imperium cujus praesidatur
imperator dicitur divinum, a Deo. "
1 Cynus: Comm. on the Code,
Rub. 14, Fol. 29 R. (Cod. I. 14.
12). "Si imperial is . . . Item nota
quod soli principi licet condere legem
. . . Secundo opp. quod solus prince ps
non potest face re legem, imo populus
. . . item senatus . . . item praefectus
. . . Respondetur secundum quosdam.
Primo ad 1. normam. Quia prefect us
facit de auctoritate principis. Unde
ipse facere videtur; et idem in populo,
et sic auctoritas pendet a principe,
quod non est verum. Quid ergo dice-
mus? De hoc fuerunt dissensiones
apud nostros antiquos patres, quao
etiam et hodie vigent apud modernos.
Dixit Joannes, quod non potest hodie
populus Romanus facere legem, et hoc
tenet Hostiensis, extra de constit. C.
fin, in summa sua. Hugolinus dixit
contrarium, Glossa approbat opinion-
enem Joannis in d. c. ambigitur (Dig. I.
3, 9). Qui dam moderni tenent cum
Hug. et probant inter alia arguments.
Nam certum est quod Ulpianus fuit
tempore quo erat concessa Impera-
toribus potestas condendi leges; ut
ff. de origine juris, 1. ultima parte. Et
tamen Ulpianus dicit, Senatum posse
facere legem (Dig. I. 3, 9), non dicit
potuisse; neo potest dici quod ibi
loquatur in senatu, qui erat numero
centum, quia jus totum remanet in
uno . . . unde populus et Senatus qui
? ? regit populum potest legem facere.
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? CHaP, n. ]
15
THE LAW: CIVILIANS.
on two different bnt related questions. He discusses with
some care the meaning of the famous passage in the Code,
"Digna vox maiestate regnantis legibus alligatum se confi-
teri" (Code I. 14, 4), and maintains that, while the emperor
is not bound to observe the law "de necessitate," he feels
himself bound "de honestate. " 1 And he goes on to discuss
a question whose importance we shall have to consider in
relation to other writers, and even with regard to Bodin in
the sixteenth century. The question is, whether the emperor
xnus hie literam 'soli ' (Cod. I. 14, 12)
uno modo, prout dixit Glos. Vcl
secundum Petrum dicendum est, quod
Intra 'soli' exponatur sic, quod nullus
alius exiatena solus poteet facere legem,
nisi Imperator. Hoc non placet mihi,
quia licet populus sunt plures, tamen
pro uno reputatur. Praeterea Senatus
potest esse in uno, ut supra dixi. Item
praefectus unus est. Expone ergo,
quod litera 'soli' excludat solum
alios inferiores. Non autem illos, qui
poesunt legem facere, sicut sunt pre-
dict! ut exposuerunt Jacobus et etiam
Petrus supra'eo. 1. , I. ; et haec vera
secundum opinionem illam, quae se
habet at populus hodio possit facere
legem. Sed secundum Joannem popu-
lus hodie non poteet legem facere,
quod et qui dam alii doctores moderni
tenent, ut populus non possit legem
facere sine principe, et tone ponitur,
quod nullus existens solus potest
facere legem nisi Princeps; undo solus
princeps, id est, solus existens princeps
potest facere legem, sed solus populus
non: quia cum imperator eat caput
imperii . . . populus quantum ad regi-
men imperii nihil sine eo facere potest,
quia universitas sine capita suo nihil
agit. . . . Ipso autem, solus potest
facere, ut hie, et cum populo, et cum
senatu, et cum concilio procerum . . .
quod probat ilia littera humanum ut
ibi dixi (i. e. , his observations on Code I.
14, 8, in this work. Fol. 28, v. ).
Quid ergo dicemus. Ad 1. 'non am-
bigitur' (Dig. I. 3, 9), dicendum quod
hodie est immutata per legem iatam,
hoc non est verum, ut patet infra
Tit: n. (Dig. I. 2); vel dicendum est
quod Senatus potest facere legem, non
tamen contrarium legi principis, sicut
et prefectus ut 1. normam. Contra
iatam opinionem est manifesto lex 'de
quibus' (Dig. I. 3, 32), ubi dicitur,
quod populus potest facere consuetu-
dinem, quae legem tollit generaliter,
ergo et legem, quia nihil refert, an
verbia an factis, ut ibi. Nisi dicas quod
hodie sit restricta potestas populi per
hanc legem.
De his opinionibus tens quae magia
tibi placet quia ego non euro. Nam si
populus Romanus faceret legem vel
consuetudinem, de facto scio quod non
servaretur extra urbem. " (Confer
? ? Cynus, Comm. on Cod. 8, Rub. 53.
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? 16
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
and his successors are bound to observe an agreement (or
contract, pactum) which he has made with any "civitas,"
or baron. The question, as he says, had been propounded by
Guido de Suza, and it is not quite clear whether the discussion
of the question is that of Cynus, or whether he is stating it in
the terms of Guido, but the conclusion, at least of Guido,
seems clearly to be that the emperor is bound by such a
"pactum," and that the subjects may be entitled to resist
any unjust and manifest violence. 1
It is also important to observe that Cynus is clear that the
authority of the prince does not include the right to take
away a man's property without adequate cause. He can
indeed take it " de facto," and his action must be assumed to
be founded upon some just reason, but he cannot do this
"de jure " without reason: the laws give him no such power,
and if he does it, he commits a sin. 2
We have given these somewhat detailed quotations from
Cynus, because it appears to us that his position represents
1 Id. id. , Rub. 14 (Cod. L 14, 21),
Fol. 26 R. : "Ultimo sciendum quod
Guido de Suza formavit hie questionem;
utrum si imperator ineat aliqua pacta
cum aliqua civitate vel barone, teneatur
ea observare, tam ipse quam ejus
successor? Videtur quod non, ut 1.
establescemos estas leyes que se
siguen. "
4 Id. id. , 52, 64: "E los pleitos e
contiendas que se non podieren librar
por las leyes dee te libro e por loe dichos
fueros, mandamos que so libren per las
leyes contenidas enlos libros delas
Siete Partidas que el Rey Don Alfonso
nuestro visauelo? mando ordenar, commo
quier que fasta aqui non se fabla que
fuesen publicadas por mandado del
Rey, nin fueron auidas, nin rescibidas
por leyes; pero nos mandamos los
rrequerir e concentar e emendar en
algunas cosas que cunplia. Et asy
concertadas e emendadas porque fueron
sacadas e tomadas delos dichos
sanctos Padres e delos derechos e dichos
de muchos sabios antiquos, e de fueros
e de costumbres antigos, de Espanns,
damos las por neustras leyes. "
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? CHAP. L] THE LAW: PRACTICE AND THEORY. 7
therefore, to make precise statements about the methods of
legislation; but it seems, from examining the collection of
Eoyal Ordinances, that, so far as these can be described as
having the nature of law, they were promulgated under the
same terms as those of the thirteenth century, by the great
council, sometimes with reference to the barons and others,
sometimes with the advice of the estates. 1
The formulas of legislation in the Empire are more explicit,
and seem to imply normally the presence of the members
of the Diet. 2
We can now turn to the general theory of the legislative
authority in the fourteenth century. It seems hardly
necessary to cite the opinions of the English writers, for it is
obvious that they adhere to, and indeed frequently simply
repeat, the opinions of Bracton.
Britton represents the king as issuing a law book, and as
commanding that it was to be obeyed in England and Ireland,
but reserves the right to repeal or annul these laws with the
consent of the barons and counts and the other members of
his council. 3 Fleta restates almost literally the judgments of
Bracton. The king has indeed no equal, but it is the law which
has made him king, and it is therefore right that he should
recognise the authority of the law. * The king can do nothing
except that which he can do lawfully, and the saying that the
prince's pleasure has the force of law must be understood
under the terms of the statement that it was from the "lex
regia" that he derived his authority, and that, therefore, it
is to be understood that that only is law which has been made
after due deliberation by the ad-vice of the " magnates " and
''Recueil des anciennes Lois Fran-
chise* '--eg. , vol. iii. p. 31S: vol. V.
PP-J, 156.
'Cf. Introduction to the Golden
Bull of 1356. Senckenburg and
Schmaus, 'Neue Sammlung der Reich-
? beehiede,' vol. i. p. 46.
1 Britton, i. Prologue: "Edouard
pu la gracei Deu Roi de Engleterre.
. . . Et volums et commandums qe par
tut Engleterre et tut Hyrelaunde soient
issi usez et tenus en tous poyntz, sauve
a nous de repeler les et de enyter
et de amenuser et de amonder a totes
les foiz, qe nous verums qe bon serra,
par le assent de nos Countes et
Bexouns et autres de noster conseyl. "
4 Fleta, i. 5, 4.
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? 8
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
the authority of the king. The king must restrain his
authority by the law which is the bridle of power, and must
live according to law, for it is the principle of human law
that laws bind the legislator. 1 This was evidently the normal
opinion of English lawyers, and there is therefore nothing
surprising in the terms used by that curious work, the
'Mirror of Justices. ' The worst of all abuses is that the
king should be against the law, for he ought to be subject
to it, as is expressed in his coronation oath. It is a grave
abuse that ordinances should be made by the king and
his clerks and others who would not venture to oppose the
king, while laws ought to be made by the common consent of
the king and his counts. 2
It is, then, from this standpoint that we can understand
the real significance of the treatment of the source of authority
of law by Marsilius of Padua in the 'Defensor Pacis. 3 He
1 Fleta, i. 17, 7: "Nec obstat, quod
dicitur, quod principi placet legia
habet poteetatem, quia sequitur, cum
lege regia quae de ejus imperio lata est,
quod est, non quicquid de voluntate
regis, tantopere praesumptum est,
sed quod magnatum suorum consilio.
Rege auctoritatem praeetaute, et
habita e? uper hoc deliberatione et trac,
tatu, recte fuorit definitum. . . . 11.
Temperent igitur reges potentiam euam
per legem quae fraenum est potentiae,
quod secundum leges vivant ; quia hoc
sanxit lex humana, quod leges suam
ligent latorem; et alibi, digna vox
majestate regnantis est, legibus alli
gatum se principem profited. "
* 'Mirror of Justices,' V. 1. : "La
preme`re e la so ver ai n abusion est qe li
Roi est contre la loi, car il doist e^stre
subject, sicom est contenu en son sere-
ment, 2. Abusion est qe ou les parle-
menta se duissent fere sur les sauvacions
des aimes des trespassoeurs e ceo a`
Londres e a`s deux fois per an, la ne se
font il ore forque rarement e a` la
volontie le roi sur eides e cueillettes
de tresor. Et ou les ordenaunces se
duissent fere de com un assent del roi
e de ses countee, la ce funt ore par le
roi e ses clers e par aliens e autres qi
noseut contreriner le Roi, einz desirent
del plere e de li conseiller as son promt,
tut ne soit mie lur conseil covenable al
com un del people, sanz appeler les
countes e saunz suire les riules de
droit, e donc plusours ordenaunces se
fondent ore plus sur la voluntie qe
sur droit. "
For a critical discussion of the date
and authorship of this work, of. the
edition of Whitaker and Maitland,
published by the Sel den Society in
1695.
* We desire to express the gratitude,
which all students of Medieval Litera-
ture must feel, to Mr Previte-Orton of
St John's College, Cambridge, and to
Professor R. Scholz of Halle, that we
have now in their editions of 1928 and
? ? 1932 a masterly criticism of the text
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? CHAP, t]
9
THE LAW: PRACTICE AND THEORY.
is not, as appears to be thought by some writers who are not
very well acquainted with mediaeval political literature, setting
out some new and revolutionary democratic doctrine, but is
rather expressing, even if in rather drastic and unqualified
terms, the normal judgment and practice of the Middle Ages:
he represents not the beginning of some modern and revolu-
tionary doctrine, but the assertion of traditional principles.
It is, however, true and not unimportant that the author
derives his doctrines from various sources, that he combines
the principles of the actual practice of the Middle Ages with
conceptions derived, on the one side, from Aristotle, and
on the other, to some extent from the Civilians.
He lays down, for instance, the principle that there is no
"politia" when the law is not supreme, and he cites in sup-
port of this some words of Aristotle1; but this doctrine
had been implied in the Assizes of Jerusalem, and asserted by
Bracton. 2 Again, he sets out with great emphasis the principle
that the source of law is the "populus" or "unrversitas
emum " or its " valencior pars," and not either one man or a
few men, for either the one or the few might make bad laws
directed to their own advantage rather than to the common
good. 3 Marsuius refers to Aristotle as having laid down this
occur. We must refer the reader to
the admirable introductions to these
editions for a full discussion of the most
interesting textual questions, as well
as for those relating to the authorship
of this work.
1 Harsilius, 'Defensor Pacis,' i. 11
(*)-
1 'Assizes of Jerusalem,' Assises
de la Cour dee Bourgeois, 26: Bracton,
'De Legibus,' i. 8, 5. Cf. vol. iii.
pp. 32, 67.
>> Marsilius of Padua, 'Defensor
Pacis,' i. 12, 3: "Nos autem dicamus
secundum veritatem atque consilium
Aristotelia 3? Politico Cap. 6? , legia
latorem seu causam legis effectivam
primam et propriam esse populum
seu civium universitatem, aut ei us
valenciorem partem, per suam elec-
cionem seu voluntatem in generali
civium congrogacione per sermonem
expressam, precipientem seu deter-
minantem aliquid fieri vel omitti circa
civiles actus humanos, sub poena vel
supplicio temporali; valenciorem in-
quam partem, considerata quantitate
personarum et qualitate m com-
muuitate ilia super quam lex fertur;
sive id fecerit universitas predicta
civium aut ejus pars valencior per se
ipsam immediate, sive id alicui vel
aliquibus commiserit faciendum, qui
legislator simpliciter non sunt, nec
esse possunt, sed solum ad aliquid et
quandoque ac secundum primi legis -
latoris auctoritatem. " Id. , i. 12, 8:
"Aut legum lacionis auctoritas ad
solam civium universitatem pertinet,
ut diximus, vel ad hominem unicum
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? 10
[PAHT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
doctrine that the universitas is the source of law, but the
principle had been suggested by some of the earliest Civilians.
We have drawn attention in the second volume to the words
of works attributed to Irnerius and Bulgarus, that it is the
"populus" or "universitas" which is the ultimate source
of law,1 and it is evident that they had learned this from the
Eoman law books. It seems reasonable to say that Marsilius
is restating the doctrine of the ancient Eoman law and of the
media)val Civilians.
But further, as we have seen, there is scarcely any trace
whatever, either in the constitutional systems or in the
writers on political theory of the Middle Ages, except in the
mediawal Civilians,. of the conception that law could be made
by any one person, even by the prince, except with the advice
and consent of the community as a whole, or those who stood
for it, whether they were the great and wise men, or the elected
representatives of the community. Bgidius Colonna stands
practically alone in suggesting that the king should rule
according to his own will and the laws which he had made,
and not according to the laws which the citizens had made. 2
So far, then, Marsilius was simply expressing in clear terms
the normal conception of the Middle Ages, but there are some
aspects of his statement which deserve further notice, and
especially the emphatic phrase which he uses about the
nut pauciores. Non ad solum unum,
propterea quae dicta sunt in 11" hujus
et in prima demonstracione quam in
hoc addun'mus; posset enim propter
ignoranciam vel malitiam, aut utrum-
que legem pravam ferre, inspiciendo
scilicet magis proprium conferens quam
commune, unde tyrampnica foret.
Propter candem vero causam non
pertinet hoc ad pauciores: possent
onim peccare in ferendo legem, ut
prius, ad quorundam, scilicet pau-
corum, et non commune conferens,
quaomadmodum videre est in olig-
archiis. Pertinet hoc igitur ad civium
univereitatem aut ejus partem valen-
ciorem, de quibus est altera et
opposita ratio. "
1 Imerius, 'De Aquitate,' 2: "Uni-
versitas id est populus, hoo habet
officium singulis scilicet hominibas
quasi membris providere. Huic de-
scendit hoo ut legem condat. "
Bulgarus, 'Comm. on Digest,' 50,
17, 176: "Vigor judiciarius ideoest in
medio constitutus ne singuli jus sibi
dioant. Non enim oompetit singulis
quod permissum est tantum univer-
sitati, vel ei qui obtinet vicem universi-
tatis, id est populi, qualis est magis-
trate. "
Of. vol. ii. p. 57.
>> Cf. vol. v. p. 74.
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? CHAP. I. ]
11
THE LAW: PRACTICE AND THEORY.
"valencior pars" of the populus. It will be observed that
he explains these words when he adds, "Valenciorem inquam
partem, considerata quantitate personarum et qualitate'in
eommunitate ilia super quam lex fertur," for there seems to be
no doubt that this is the correct reading. It seems clear that
he does not mean simply the greater number. The history,
however, of the development of the theory of the majority
in the political and ecclesiastical organisations of the Middle
Ages is one of great complexity, and we do not feel that we
are competent to discuss this subject. 1
It should also be observed that Marsilius sets out a very
important defence of the authority of the whole people in
making law. Men, he says, are more ready to maintain a law
which they have imposed upon themselves, and it is therefore
well that whatever may concern the common convenience
Bhould be known and heard by all2; and, while he admits
that the legislative power should not be entrusted to a base
and incompetent authority, he meets the contention that
the " universitas civium " is a body of this kind with a fiat
denial. For, he declares, the great mass of the citizens (civium
pluralitas) are not normally or generally base or incompetent,
rather they arejill^ or for the most part,, of sound mind and
reason, and have a right intention towards the Common-
1 We desire to draw the attention of
those who wish to study this subject
to the very careful and interesting
monographs written by Dr E. Ruffini
Avondo: "H principio Maggiori-
tario nelle eleuoni dei re e imperatori
Romano-Germanici" in "Atti della
reals Academia delle Scienze di Torino,'
vol. 60 (1924-25). "I\ principio mag-
gioritario nella storia del Diritto
Canomco" in 'Archivio Giuridico,'
vol. 93, faac. I. (Quarta Serie, vol. ix.
faac. 1). "I systemi di deliberations
eollettiva nel Medioevo Italiano" in
Collezione di Ope re Giuri-
dkbe,' n. 243. Torino, Fratelli Bocca,
1927. "D Defensor Pacts di Harsilio
di Padova," in 'Rivista Storica Itali-
aca,' faac. H. , 1924. "11 Prineipio
Maggioritario," ? Profilo Storico,'
Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1927 (an ex-
cellent summary).
* Marsilius, 'Defensor Pacis,' i. 12, 6:
"Socundam propositionem probo:
quoniam lex ilia melius observatur a
quocunque civium, quam sibi quilibet
imposuisse videtur; talis est lex lata
ex auditu et precepto universe mul-
tudinis civium . . . (i, 12, 7). Con-
venerunt enim homines ad civilem com-
municationem propter commodum et
vite sufficienciam consequendam, et
opposita doclinandum. Que igitur
omnium possunt tangere commodum
et incommodum, ab omnibus sciri
debent et sndiri, ut commodum assequi
et oppositum repellere possint. "
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? 12
[PART I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
wealth and what is necessary for its maintenance. And,
therefore, although every individual, or the greater multitude,
is not capable of devising new laws, yet everyone oan judge
and determine as to that which is devised and proposed to him
by others. 1
It seems to us, then, to be clear that the constitutional pro-
cedure and the general political theory of the fourteenth
century represent the same principles as to the source and
supremacy of the law which, as we have seen in former
volumes, were characteristic of the Middle Ages.
The law of
the State is the expression of the custom and will of the whole
community, and it is supreme over all members of the com-
munity, even over the king and prince. We shall, however, have
more to say about this in later chapters, when we deal directly
with the conception of the nature and limitation of the
authority of the prince in the fourteenth century.
1 Id. id. , i. 13, 3: "Cum ergo
primum dicebatur, 'ad pravum et in
pluribus indiscretum, non pertinot
legumlacionis auctoritas,' conceditur.
Et cum additur, universitatem civium
ease hujus modi, negandum est. Nam
civium pluralitas neque prava neque
iudiscreta est quantum ad pluralitatem
suppositorum, et in pluri tempore;
omnes enim, aut plurimi, sane mentis
ot racionis sunt et recti appetitus ad
policiam et que necessaria sunt
propter eius permanenciam, quemad-
modum leges et alia statuta vel con-
suetudines, sicut prius ostensum est.
Quamvis enim non quilibet aut
maior multitudo civium sit legum in-
ventor, potest tamen quilibet de in
ventis et ab alio sibi propositis iudicare,
addendum vel minnendum aut mutan
dum diecornere. "
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? 13
CHAPTER n.
THE LAW, ITS SOURCE AND AUTHORITY. CIVILIANS.
It remains, then, to consider the treatment of this subject by
the Civilians and Canonists, for here if anywhere we may find
some development of another kind. We have pointed out in
earlier volumes that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
there are clear traces of two and divergent movements of
opinion: that some of the Civilians seem to think that the
Roman people had so completely transferred their original
legislative authority to the emperor that they no longer
possessed it at all, while others thought that though they had
given the emperor this authority it still, also, remained with
them, and could still be reclaimed and exercised. 1 We have
now to consider how far the Civilians and Canonists of the
fourteenth century can be said to adhere to the one or the
other of these opinions.
It is well to observe at the outset that there is no question
in the minds of these Civilians that it was the people from whom
the prince derived his authority. This is very clearly set out
in a passage in the 'Commentary on the Digest' by Cynus.
(Cino of Pistoia; one of the most important of the Civilians
of the early fourteenth century. ) Cynus maintains very
dogmatically that the " hnperium " is from God, but he holds
that this is not inconsistent with the principle that the prince
was oreated by the lex regia, the emperor derives his authority
from the people, the "imperium " is from God. 2
Having made ourselves dear on this point we can consider
1 CI. vol. ii. part i. chap. 7: vol. v.
pert i. chap. 6.
1 Cynue, 'Comm. on Digest,' Rub.
iv. Fol. viii. R. : "Not. Ex lege ista
quod iura reputant imperatorem Deum,
seu personam divinam, et hoc merito;
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? 14
Lpaut i.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
an important discussion of the whole question of the legislative
authority of the people, by Cynus in his ' Commentary on the
Code,' which indicates very clearly that he was well aware
of the contention between the older Civilians about this
question. He cites the opinion of "Joannes " and of " Hos-
tiensis," that the Eoman people could not now make a law, but
also the judgment of Hugolinus to the contrary, and says
that some of the "moderni" (his contemporaries) held with
Hugolinus. Cynus himself seems to be indifferent as to the
question, but the reason he gives seems to imply that he is
thinking not of the general authority of the people of the
Eoman empire, but of the authority of the people of the city
of Eome, which would have no reality outside of the city. 1
We must, however, observe also the opinion of Cynus
quia imperium est a Deo, ut id authen.
quomodo oportet epi: in princip: De
Fide instrum: ? 1, et ab ipso Deo
immediate proceasit, unde inter 7m-
peratorem et Deum non est ponere
medium, ut in authent. constit, quae
de dignitate ? : illud. Nec obstat quod
dicitur supra 1. i. quod lege regia
dicitur Princeps creatus; quia hoc est
permiseione Divina; sicut diximus, non
est malum in civitate quod non fecerit
Dominus: nec est absurdum, quod sic
a populo est a Deo, tamquam ab
agente universale sicut alitor dicitur,
homo hominem generat: et solu. Vel
melius dico, quod imporator a populo
est, sed imperium cujus praesidatur
imperator dicitur divinum, a Deo. "
1 Cynus: Comm. on the Code,
Rub. 14, Fol. 29 R. (Cod. I. 14.
12). "Si imperial is . . . Item nota
quod soli principi licet condere legem
. . . Secundo opp. quod solus prince ps
non potest face re legem, imo populus
. . . item senatus . . . item praefectus
. . . Respondetur secundum quosdam.
Primo ad 1. normam. Quia prefect us
facit de auctoritate principis. Unde
ipse facere videtur; et idem in populo,
et sic auctoritas pendet a principe,
quod non est verum. Quid ergo dice-
mus? De hoc fuerunt dissensiones
apud nostros antiquos patres, quao
etiam et hodie vigent apud modernos.
Dixit Joannes, quod non potest hodie
populus Romanus facere legem, et hoc
tenet Hostiensis, extra de constit. C.
fin, in summa sua. Hugolinus dixit
contrarium, Glossa approbat opinion-
enem Joannis in d. c. ambigitur (Dig. I.
3, 9). Qui dam moderni tenent cum
Hug. et probant inter alia arguments.
Nam certum est quod Ulpianus fuit
tempore quo erat concessa Impera-
toribus potestas condendi leges; ut
ff. de origine juris, 1. ultima parte. Et
tamen Ulpianus dicit, Senatum posse
facere legem (Dig. I. 3, 9), non dicit
potuisse; neo potest dici quod ibi
loquatur in senatu, qui erat numero
centum, quia jus totum remanet in
uno . . . unde populus et Senatus qui
? ? regit populum potest legem facere.
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? CHaP, n. ]
15
THE LAW: CIVILIANS.
on two different bnt related questions. He discusses with
some care the meaning of the famous passage in the Code,
"Digna vox maiestate regnantis legibus alligatum se confi-
teri" (Code I. 14, 4), and maintains that, while the emperor
is not bound to observe the law "de necessitate," he feels
himself bound "de honestate. " 1 And he goes on to discuss
a question whose importance we shall have to consider in
relation to other writers, and even with regard to Bodin in
the sixteenth century. The question is, whether the emperor
xnus hie literam 'soli ' (Cod. I. 14, 12)
uno modo, prout dixit Glos. Vcl
secundum Petrum dicendum est, quod
Intra 'soli' exponatur sic, quod nullus
alius exiatena solus poteet facere legem,
nisi Imperator. Hoc non placet mihi,
quia licet populus sunt plures, tamen
pro uno reputatur. Praeterea Senatus
potest esse in uno, ut supra dixi. Item
praefectus unus est. Expone ergo,
quod litera 'soli' excludat solum
alios inferiores. Non autem illos, qui
poesunt legem facere, sicut sunt pre-
dict! ut exposuerunt Jacobus et etiam
Petrus supra'eo. 1. , I. ; et haec vera
secundum opinionem illam, quae se
habet at populus hodio possit facere
legem. Sed secundum Joannem popu-
lus hodie non poteet legem facere,
quod et qui dam alii doctores moderni
tenent, ut populus non possit legem
facere sine principe, et tone ponitur,
quod nullus existens solus potest
facere legem nisi Princeps; undo solus
princeps, id est, solus existens princeps
potest facere legem, sed solus populus
non: quia cum imperator eat caput
imperii . . . populus quantum ad regi-
men imperii nihil sine eo facere potest,
quia universitas sine capita suo nihil
agit. . . . Ipso autem, solus potest
facere, ut hie, et cum populo, et cum
senatu, et cum concilio procerum . . .
quod probat ilia littera humanum ut
ibi dixi (i. e. , his observations on Code I.
14, 8, in this work. Fol. 28, v. ).
Quid ergo dicemus. Ad 1. 'non am-
bigitur' (Dig. I. 3, 9), dicendum quod
hodie est immutata per legem iatam,
hoc non est verum, ut patet infra
Tit: n. (Dig. I. 2); vel dicendum est
quod Senatus potest facere legem, non
tamen contrarium legi principis, sicut
et prefectus ut 1. normam. Contra
iatam opinionem est manifesto lex 'de
quibus' (Dig. I. 3, 32), ubi dicitur,
quod populus potest facere consuetu-
dinem, quae legem tollit generaliter,
ergo et legem, quia nihil refert, an
verbia an factis, ut ibi. Nisi dicas quod
hodie sit restricta potestas populi per
hanc legem.
De his opinionibus tens quae magia
tibi placet quia ego non euro. Nam si
populus Romanus faceret legem vel
consuetudinem, de facto scio quod non
servaretur extra urbem. " (Confer
? ? Cynus, Comm. on Cod. 8, Rub. 53.
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? 16
[PABT I.
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.
and his successors are bound to observe an agreement (or
contract, pactum) which he has made with any "civitas,"
or baron. The question, as he says, had been propounded by
Guido de Suza, and it is not quite clear whether the discussion
of the question is that of Cynus, or whether he is stating it in
the terms of Guido, but the conclusion, at least of Guido,
seems clearly to be that the emperor is bound by such a
"pactum," and that the subjects may be entitled to resist
any unjust and manifest violence. 1
It is also important to observe that Cynus is clear that the
authority of the prince does not include the right to take
away a man's property without adequate cause. He can
indeed take it " de facto," and his action must be assumed to
be founded upon some just reason, but he cannot do this
"de jure " without reason: the laws give him no such power,
and if he does it, he commits a sin. 2
We have given these somewhat detailed quotations from
Cynus, because it appears to us that his position represents
1 Id. id. , Rub. 14 (Cod. L 14, 21),
Fol. 26 R. : "Ultimo sciendum quod
Guido de Suza formavit hie questionem;
utrum si imperator ineat aliqua pacta
cum aliqua civitate vel barone, teneatur
ea observare, tam ipse quam ejus
successor? Videtur quod non, ut 1.
