No More Learning

Past defilements and present defilements place in the present series seeds that bring forth the arising of future defilement: when these seeds are abandoned, past and present defilement is abandoned: in the same way as one says that an action is exhausted when its retribution is exhausted.
The "abandoning" of future suffering and future defilement is the fact that they absolutely do not arise, given the absence of seeds.
How does one otherwise understand the abandoning of past or present suffering? There is no good reason to make an effort to destroy that which has perished or that which is perishing.
[2. The Sarvastivadins:] If unconditioned things do not exist, how
can the Sutra say "Detachment (viraga) is the best of all conditioned
be the best among the dharmas which do not exist? ?
[The Sautrantikas:] We do not say that unconditioned things do not exist. They exist in fact in the manner in which we say that they exist. Let us explain. Before sound is produced, we say "There is non-existence (of sound) prior to the sound;" after the sound has perished, we say "There is non-existence (of sound) after the sound,"
391
and unconditioned dharmas? " How can a dharma which does not exist 39
and yet it had not been proven that non-existence exists: holds for unconditioned things.
the same
Although it is non-existent, one unconditioned thing merits being praised, namely detachement (viraga), the absolute future non- existence of any wrong. This non-existent thing is the most distin- guished of all non-existent things. The Sutra praises it by saying that it
is the best, so that believers shall conceive joy and affection with regard to it.
[3. The Sarvastivadins:] If pratisarhkhyanirodha or Nirvana is non-existent, how can it be one of the Truths. How can it be the Third Noble Truth?
What should we understand by "Noble Truth" or arayasatya? Without doubt the sense of satya (Truth) is "not incorrect. " The
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Aryans see that which exists and that which does not exist in a not incorrect manner: in that which is suffering, they see only suffering, and in the non-existence of suffering, they see the non-existence of suffering. What contradiction do you find between the non-existence of suffering and pratisamkhydnirodha being a Truth?
And this non-existence is the Third Truth, because the Aryans see it and proclaim it immediately after the Second Truth.
[4. The Sarvastivadins:] But if unconditioned things are non- existent, the consciousness that has space and the two extinctions for Its object would have a non-thing for its object.
We do not see any inconvenience in this, as we shall explain in the discussion on the past and future (v. 25).
[5. The Sarvastivadins:] What harm do you see in maintaining that unconditioned things really exist? What advantage do you see in this?
This advantage that the Vaibhasika doctrine is found to be safegarded.
May the gods be charged with defending this doctrine, if they judge that it is possible! But to maintain the existence of unconditioned things in and of themselves is to affirm a non-existent thing to be real. In fact, unconditioned things are not known through direct perception (pratyaksa), as is the case for physical matter, sensation, etc. ; and they are not known through inference (anumdna), by reason of their activity, as is the case for the sense organs.
6. Furthermore, if nirodha or extinction is a thing in and of itself, how do you justify the genitive, duhkhasya nirodhah, "the extinaion of suffering," as the extinction of the defilement, or the extinaion of the object of defilement? In our system,, the extinction of a thing is simply the non-existence of this thing. "Extinaion of suffering" means that "suffering will not exist any more. " But we cannot conceive of any cause and effea relationship, of any effect and cause relationship, of a relationship of the whole to the part, etc. , between the things, that is to say, the defilements, and its extinction conceived of as an entity in itself, which would justify the genitive.
We affirm, [answer the Sarvastivadins,] that extinaion is a thing in and 6f itself. Yet we can specify extinaion as being in a relationship
? with such things (extinction of lust, etc. ), for one takes possession (prapti, ii. 37b) of extinction at the moment when one cuts off the possession of a certain thing.
But, we would answer, what is it that determines or specifies the
392 taking of possession of extinction?
[7. The Sarvastivadins:] The Sutra speaks of the Bhiksu who has
393
obtained Nirvana in this life. If Nirvana is non-existence, how could
he obtain it?
[The Sautrantikas:] The Bhiksu, through the possession of the
adverse force of the antidote, that is, through the possession of the Path, has obtained a personality (asraya) contrary to the defilements, and contrary to a new existence. This is why the Sutra says that he has obtained Nirvana.
8. Moreover we have a text that shows that Nirvana is pure
394
non-existence. The Sutra {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 88a7)
complete abandoning, the purification, the exhausting, the detach- ment, the extinction, the abatement, the definitive passing away of this suffering; and the non-rebirth, the non-grasping, the non-appearance of another suffering--this is calm, this is excellent, namely the rejection of all upadhi, the exhausting of thirst, detachment, extinction, Nirvana/'
[The Sarvastivadins:] When the Sutra says that Nirvana is the
non-appearance of a new suffering, the Sutra means that there is no
395 appearance of suffering in Nirvana.
[The Sautrantikas:] I do not see that the locative "in Nirvana" has
any force to establish that Nirvana is a thing. In what sense do you
understand the locative asmin? If this means asmin sati, "if Nirvana
exists, there is no appearance of suffering," then suffering would never
appear, since Nirvana is eternal. If this means asmin prapta, "if
Nirvana has been obtained," you would have to admit that future
suffering will not appear while the Path--by virtue of which you
suppose that Nirvana is obtained--either is, or rather has been
396 obtained.
9. Consequently the comparison of the Sutra is excellent, "The
397 deliverance of his mind is like the Nirvana of a flame. " That is to
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says, "The
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say, as the extinction of a flame is only the "passing away" of the flame and not a certain thing in and of itself, so too is the deliverance of the mind of the Blessed One.
[10. The Sautrantikas] are still warranted by the authority of the
Abhidharma wherein we read, "What are the avastuka dharmas} They 398
are the unconditioned things. " The term avastuka signifies "unreal," "without self-nature. "
[The Vaibhasikas do not accept this interpretation. ] The term
vastu, in fact, is used in five different meanings: 1. vastu in the sense of
a thing in and of itself, for example, "When one has obtained this
vastu (asubhd, vi. ll), one is in possession of the vastu* (Jndnapras-
thdna, TD 26, p. 1026cll; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 985a22); 2. vastu in the
sense of any object of consciousness, for example "All the dharmas are
known through different knowledges, each knowing its own object"
(Prakarana, TD 26, p. 713c20); 3. vastu in the sense of "bond of
attachment," for example, "Is the person who is bound to a vastu
through the bond of affection, bound to this same vastu through the
bond of hostility? " (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 298b-c); 4. vastu in the sense of
cause, for example, "What are the dharmas possessing a cause? The 3
conditioned dharmas* (Prakarana, TD 26, p. 716a4); " 5. vastu in the
sense of "act of appropriating to oneself, for example, "vastu of fields,
vastu of a house, vastu of a shop, vastu of riches: abandoning the act of
appropriating these to himself, he renounces them" (Vibhdsd, TD 27, 400
p. 288b5).
The Vaibhasikas conclude: In the passage that concerns us, vastu
has the meaning of cause; avastuka signifies "that which has no cause. " Unconditioned things, although real, always lack activity, have no cause which produces them, and produce no effects.
***
We must explain what type of result proceeds from each type of cause.
56a. Retribution is the result of the last cause.
? The last cause is the retributive cause, vipdkahetu, because the retributive cause is named last in this list. The first result, vipdkaphala (iii. 57), is the result of this cause.
402 56b. The predominating result is the result of the first.
The first cause is kdranahetu or reason for being; the last result proceeds from it.
This result is called adhipaja, arisen from predominence, or adhipata, belonging to predominance, because it is the result of the predominating cause (adhipatiphala, ii. 58c-d). The kdranahetu is considered as playing the role of a master (adhipati).
But, we say, the quality of not creating an obstacle (andvarana- bhdvamdtravasthdna, ii. 50a) suffices to constitute kdranahetu. How can one regard it as a "predominating cause? "
Kdranahetu is either a "non-efficacious cause" and one then
regards it as predominant because it creates no obstacle; or an
"efficacious cause," and one then regards it as predominant because it
possesses mastery, a predominating and generating aaivity. For
example, the ten ayatanas (form and the organ of sight, etc. ) are
predominant with regard to the five sense consciousnesses; the
collective action of living beings is predominant with regard to the
403
physical world. The organ of hearing exercises an indirect pre-
dominence (ddhipatya) with regard to the visual consciousness, for, after having understood, a person experiences the desire to see. And thus following. (See ii. 50a).
56c-d. Outflowing is the result of the similar cause and the universal cause.
An outflowing result (nisyandaphala) proceeds from sabhagahetu (ii. 52) and from sarvatragahetu (ii. 54): for the result of these two causes is similar to its causes (ii. 57c; iv. 85).
56d. The paurusa or virile result, is the result of two causes. The result of sabhagahetu (ii. 59) and samprayuktakahetu (ii. 53c) is
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called praurusa or virile, that is, the result of purusakara or virile aaivity.
Purusakara or virile activity is not distinct from the person himself, for actioiHs not distinct from him who accomplished the action. The result of virile activity (purusakdraphala) can thus be termed the virile (paurusa) result.
What do we understand by 'Virile activity? "
The activity of a dharma is termed its virile activity (purusakara), because it is similar to the aaivity of a person {purusakara). In the same way, in the world, a certain plant is called kdkajangha, because it resembles the foot of a crow; heros are called mattahastin, because they resemble an enraged elephant.
Are sarhprayuktahetu and sahabhilhetu the only causes that result in virile aaivity?
According to one opinion, all other causes have this type of result, with the exception of retributive causes (vipakahetu). This result is, in fact, either simultaneous to, or immediately following its cause; but such is not the case with a retributive result.
404
According to other Masters, a retributive cause also distantly
results in virile activity, for example the fruits reaped by a laborer. (Hence a dharma is 1) nisyandaphala, because it arises similar to its cause, 2) purusakdraphala, because it arises through the force of its
cause, and 3) adhipatiphala, because it arises by reason of the "non- obstacle" of its cause. )
***
What are the charaaeristics of the different results? 57a. Retribution is a neutral dharma.
Retribution (vipdka) is an undefiled, neutral (anivrtdvydkrta) dharma.
Among the undefiled, neutral dharmas, some belong to living beings, while others do not belong to living beings. Consequently the author specifies
? 57b. Belonging to living beings.
that is, they arise in the series of living beings.
Some of those dharmas belonging to living beings are said to be of
accumulation (aupacayika, having come from food, etc. , i. 37) and some are said to be of an outflowing (naisyandika, coming from a cause which is similar to them, i. 37, ii. 57c). Consequently the author specifies
57c. They arise later than a non-neutral dharma.
A non-neutral action is called this because it produces retribution; non-neutral actions are bad actions and good-impure (kusalasdsrava, ii. 54c-d) actions. From actions of this nature there arises later,--not at the same time, and not immediately afterwards,--the result that one terms "retributive result" or "matured result" (vipakaphala).
Why not consider the dharmas that do not form part of living beings,--mountains, rivers, etc. ,--as retributive results? Do they not arise from good or bad actions?
The dharmas that do not form part of living beings are, by nature, common in that everyone may partake of them. Now retributive results, by definition, are unique: another person never experiences the retributive results of actions that I accomplish. Action produces a "predominating result" (adhipaUphala) in addition to a retributive result: all beings experience this result in common, because the collectivity of their actions cooperate in their creation (see above, note 403).
405 57d. A result that resembles its cause is called outflowing.
A dharma resembling its cause is an outflowing result (nisyanda- phala). Two causes, the similar cause and the universal cause
(sabhagahetUy ii. 52, and sarvatragahetu, ii. 54a-b) produce an out- flowing result.
If the result of the universal cause is an outflowing result, a result similar to its cause, why not give the universal cause the name of similar cause?
A result of a universal cause is always similar to its cause 1) from
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the point of view of the stage: like it, it belongs to Kamadhatu, etc. ; and 2) from the point of view of its moral character: like it, it is defiled. But it can belong to a different category than the category of its
cause. "Category" means the method of abandoning: it is susceptible of being abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Suffering, etc. (ii. 52b). When there is a similarity between a cause and its result from this last point of view, the universal cause is at one and the same time a similar cause.
Four alternative cases present themselves:
1. A similar cause which is not a universal cause: for example, a non-universal defilement (rdga, etc. ) related to the defilements of their own category;
2. A universal cause which is not a similar cause: the universal defilements related to a defilement of another category;
3. A universal cause which is also a similar cause: the universal defilements related to a defilement of their own category;
4. All other dharmas are neither similar causes nor universal 406
causes.
57e. Extinction through intelligence is disconnection.
Disconnection (visamyoga) or visamyogaphala, "result that con- sists of disconnection" is extinction (ksaya-nirodhd) obtained by the speculative consciousness (dht=prajnd). Visamyogaphala is hence
pratisamkhyanirodha. (See above p. 280).
58a-b. A dharma is the result of the virile activity of the
dharma through the force by which it arises.
This refers to a conditioned dharma.
Examples: the absorption of the First Dhyana is the result of the virile activity of a mind in Kamadhatu which instigates it or prepares it; the absorption of the Second Dhyana is the result of the virile activity of a mind in the First Dhyana.
A pure dharma can be the result of the virile activity of an impure dharma (the laukikdgradhannas have duhkhe dharmajndnakfdnti for their result, vi. 25c-d).
? A mind that can create fictive beings (nirmdnacitta) is the result of 407
the virile activity of a mind in a Dhyana (vii. 48). And thus following. Pratisamkhyanirodha or Nirvana is considered to be a "result of virile activity;" now the definition given inKarika 58a-b does not apply
to nirodha which, being eternal, does not arise. We say then that it is the result of the virile activity of the dharma by the force of which one obtains possession of it.
58c-d. Any conditioned dharma is the predominating result {adhipatiphala) of conditioned dharmas, with the exception of
408 the dharmas that are later than it.
What difference is there between the result of virile activity and a predominating result?
The first refers to the agent; the second refers to both the agent and the non-agent.
For example, a created thing is the result of the virile activity and the predominating result of the artisan who created it; it is only the predominating result of what is not the artisan.
***
In what condition {avastha)--the past, present, or future--is each of the causes {hetu) found when they grasp and when they produce their result?
[59. Five causes grasp their results in the present; two produce
it in the present; two produce it in both past and present; and
409 one produces it in the past.
What is understood by "grasping a result" and "producing a
410 result? "
411
A dharma produces a result at the moment when it gives this result the power of arising, that is, at the moment when, the future result being turned towards arising or is ready to arise, this dharma gives it the power that causes it to enter into the present. ]
A dharma grasps a result when it become its seed
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59a-b. Five causes grasp their result in the present.
Five causes grasp their results only when they are in the present: in the past, they have already grasped their results; in the future, they have no activity (v. 25).
The same holds for karanahetu\ but the stanza does not mention it, because kdranahetu does not necessarily have a result.
59b. Two produce their result in the present.
The mutually coexistent cause (sahabhu) and the associated cause (samprayuktaka) produce their results only when they are in the present: these two causes in fact grasp and produce their results at the same time.
59c. Two produce their results in both the past and the present.
The similar cause (sabhdga) and the universal cause (sarvatraga) produce their results both when they are in the present and when they are in the past.
How can they produce their outflowing results (nisj/anda, ii. 56c) when they are in the present? We have seen (ii. 52b, 54a) that they are earlier than their results.
One says that they produce their results in the present, because
they produce them immediately. When their result has arisen, they are
past: they have already produced it; they do not produce the same
412 result twice.
***
i. It happens that, at a given moment, a good similar cause {sabhagahetu) grasps a result but does not produce a result. Four alternatives: to grasp, to produce, to grasp and to produce, and to
413 neither grasp nor to produce.
1. The possession of the roots of good that the person who has cut
off the roots of good (iv. 80a) abandons at the last moment, grasps a
414 result, but does not produce a result.
? 2. The possession of the roots of good that the person who again
takes up the roots of good (iv. 80c) acquires in the first moment,
produces a result, but does not grasp a result.
415
We must say: This same possession,--the possession abandoned
at the last moment by the person who has cut off the roots of good,-- produces its result, but does not grasp it at the moment when this person again takes up the roots of good.
3. The possession of the person whose roots of good are not cut off--with the exception of the two proceeding cases: that of the person who has achieved cutting them off, and that of the person who again takes up the roots of good--both grasp and produce.
4. In all other cases, possession neither grasps nor produces: for example, the possession of the roots of good of a person whose roots of good are cut off; the possession of the roots of good of a superior stage by a person who has fallen from this stage: these possessions have already grasped their result, and hence do not grasp it any more; they do not produce it, since the person cannot have possession of these roots at the present time.
ii. The Vibhasa establishes the same alternatives with respect to bad similar causes:
1. The possession of the bad dharmas that a person who obtains detachment from desire abandons at the last moment.
2. The possession that a person who fell from detachment acquires in the first moment.
We must say: These same possessions, when a person falls from detachment.
3. The possession of a person who is not detached, with the exception of the two preceding cases.
4. Possession in all other cases: for example the possession of a person detached and not subject to falling.
iii. There are also four alternatives regarding defiled-neutral similar causes:
1. The last possession of defiled-neutral dharmas that the saint who becomes an Arhat abandons.
2. The first possession that a fallen Arhat acquires.
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Or better: the aforementioned possession of an Arhat who has fallen.
3. The possession of a non-detached person in Bhavagra, the two preceding cases being excluded.
4. Possession in all other cases: the possession of an Arhat.
iv. When an undefiled-neutral similar cause produces its result, it grasps it (for the undefiled-neutral lasts until Nirvana), but it can grasp its result without producing it: for example, in the case of the
last skandhas of an Arhat which have no outflowing (nisyanda).
v. We have up to now considered the dharmas that are not "subject to consciousness" (salambana). If we consider the mind and its mental
states in their sucessive moments, we can establish the four following alternatives for good similar causes:
1. It grasps but does not produce. When a good mind is immediately followed by a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, this good mind, as a similar cause, grasps, that is, projects an outflowing result, namely a good future mind, which is or is not destined to arise; it does not produce an outflowing result, since the mind that follows it, defiled or undefiled-neutral, is not the outflowing of a good mind.
2. It produces but does not grasp. When a good mind immediately follows a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, a good earlier mind produces an outflowing result, namely the good mind that we have just considered; this earlier mind does not grasp a result, since it grasped it formerly.
3. It grasps and it produces. Two good minds follow one another, the first grasping and producing an outflowing result, which is the second mind.
4. It neither grasps nor produces. When defiled or undefiled- neutral minds succeed one another, the earlier good mind, as a similar cause, formerly grasped its result and shall later produce its result; but for an instant it neither grasps nor produces.
We can in like manner establish the alternatives regarding bad similar causes.
59d. One cause produces its result in the past.
? The retributive cause produces its result when it is in the past, for this result is not simultaneous to, nor immediately following its cause.
##*
Some other Masters, [the scholars of the West (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 630bl5)] say that there are four results different from the five results that we have just mentioned. These four are:
1. pratisthaphala, a base result: a circle of water is the result of the circle of wind (iii. 45) and thus following to plants, which are the result of earth;
2. prayogaphala, a result of preparatory exercise: anutpddajndna, etc. (vi. 50) is the result of subhd, etc. (vi. ll);
3. sdmagrtphala, a result of a complex: the visual consciousness is the result of the organ of sight, of a visible thing, of light and of an act of attention {Madhyarnakavrtti, 454);
4. bhavanaphala, a result of meditation: a mind capable of creating fictive beings (vii. 48) is the result of a Dhyana.
[According to the Sarvastivadins,] the first of these four results is included in the category of the predominent result; the other three are included in the category of virile result.
***
We have explained causes and results. We must now examine how many causes produce the different dharmas.
From this point of view, the dharmas are ranged into four categories: 1. defiled dharmas, that is, the defilements, the dharmas associated with a defilement, and the dharmas having their origins in a defilement (iv. 8); 2. retributive dharmas or dharmas arisen from a retributive cause (vipdkahetu, ii. 54c); 3. the first pure dharmas, that is, duhkhe dharmajndnaksdnti (i. 38b, vi. 27) and the dharmas coexistent with this ksanti\ and 4. the other dharmas, that is, the neutral dharmas, with the exception of the dharmas of retribution, and the good dharmas, with the exception of the first pure dharmas.
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60-61b. The mind and its mental states are: 1) defiled; 2) arisen from a retributive cause; 3) others; and 4) pure for the first time, arising from causes that remain when one excludes, in this order, 1) the retributive cause, 2) the universal cause, 3) these two causes, 4 ) these two causes plus the similar cause. The associated cause is further excluded with respect to the
416 dharmas that are not mind or mental states.
The mind and its mental states, 1) when they are defiled, arise from five causes excluding the retributive cause; 2) when they are retributive, they arise from five causes with the exclusion of the universal cause; 3) when they are different from these two categories and from the fourth, they arise from four causes, with the exclusion of the retributive cause and the universal cause; 4) when they are pure for the first time, they arise from three causes, with the exclusion of the aforementioned two causes and the similar cause.
The dharmas that are not mind or mental states, namely the material dharmas and the samskaras not associated with the mind (ii. 35), accordingly as they fall into one of four categories, arising from causes proper to this category with the exclusion of the associated causes are: defiled and retributive, four causes; different, three causes; pure for the first time (anasravasamvara, iv. 13), two causes.
These is no dharma that comes from a single cause: the reason for being and the mutually coexistant cause are never absent.
**#
We have explained causes (hetu). What are conditions (pratyaya)? 417
Where is this said?
In the Sutra, it says "There are four conditions (pratyayas), namely causes as a condition (hetupratyayata), an equal and immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyayata), an object as condition (alambanapratyayatd), and a predominating influence as condition (adhipatipratyayata). "
6lc. The pratyayas are said to be four.
? 418 Pratyayata means "a type of pratyaya-
***
What is "cause as a condition"?
61d. The pratyaya that bears the name of hetu is five hetus.
Excepting karanahetu, the five remaining hetus constitute hetu- pratyayata, causes as condition.
***
What is "an equal and immediately antecedent condition"?
62a-b. The mind and its mental states that have arisen, with the exception of the last ones, are an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
If one excepts the last mind and the last mental states of the Arhat at the moment of Nirvana, all minds and mental states which have arisen are an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
i. Only mind and mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions. Of what dharmas are they the equal and immediately antecedent conditions?
1. This type of condition is called samanantara (equal and immediately antecedent) because it produces equal (sama) and im- mediate (anantara) dharmas. The prefix sam is understood in the sense of equality.
419
Consequently only minds and their mental states are equal and
immediately antecedent conditions, for there is no equality between a
cause and its result with respect to the other dharmas\ for example the
material dharmas. In fact, after a rupa of the sphere of Kamadhatu,
there can arise at the same time two rupas, one of Kamadhatu, the
420
, or two rupas, one from Kamadhatu, the whereas one mind in Kamadhatu and one mind in Rupadhatu can never arise at the same time after a mind in
other from Rupadhatu
other pure;
421
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Kamadhatu. The appearance of the rupas is confused: now an equal and immediately antecedent condition does not produce confused results; hence material dharmas are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions.
Vasumitra says: A second rilpa of accumulation can arise in the
same body, without which the series of a rilpa of accumulation would
more or by less. Hence it is not an equal and immediately antecedent condition. Less arises from more: as when a great mass of straw, burned, becomes ash. More arises from less: as when a small seed produces the roots of a fig tree, its trunk, its branches, and its leaves.
2. [Objection:] When minds immediately succeed one another, do they always admit the same number of types of associated mental states? No. The earlier mind admits of a larger number of types of mental states, and the following mind, a lesser number; and vice versa. Minds, good, bad, or neutral, succeed one another; but they do not admit of the same number of associated mental states (ii. 28-30); the absorptions, which succeed one another, admit of or do not admit of vitarka and vicara (viii. 7). Hence there is no equality for the mental states as well as for the material dharmas (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 52a21).
That is true: there is a succession from less to more, and vice versa (second opinion of the Vibhasd); but only by the accumulation or the diminution of the number of types of mental states (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 50c5). There is never any inequality with respect to a determined type: more numerous sensations never arise after less numerous sensations, nor vice versa; this means that a mind accompanied by a single sensation is never followed by a mind associated with two or three sensations. The same for ideas (samjna) and the other mental states.
Thus is it only in relation to its own type that an earlier mental state is an equal and immediately antecedent condition of a later mental state? Is sensation then the equal and immediately antecedent condition of a single sensation?
be broken; hence rilpa is not an equal and immediately antecedent 422
condition.
The Bhadanta says: A rilpa dharma is immediately followed by
423
? No. In a general way the earlier mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions of the mental states that follow, and only of the mental states of their type. But there is no succession from less to more with respect to one type, and vice versa: this justifies the expression samanantara, "equal and immediate. "
3. The Abhidharmikas who take the name of Samtanasabhagikas (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 50c5) maintain on the contrary that a dharma of a certain type is only an equal and immediately antecedent condition of a dharma of that same type: mind arises from mind, sensation arises from sensation, etc.
[Objection:] In this hypothesis, when a defiled (klista=akusala or nivrtavyakrta) dharma arises after an undefiled dharma, this defiled dharma does not proceed from an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
It is a previously destroyed defilement that is the equal and immediately antecedent condition of the defilement that defiles this second dharma. The previous defilement is considered as immediately preceeding the later defilement, even though it is separated by an undefiled dharma, separation by a dharma of a different nature does not constitute separation, as the leaving-mind of the absorption of extinction (nirodhasamapatti, ii43a) has for its equal and immedi- ately antecedent condition the mind-of-entry-into-absorption which was previously destroyed: absorption does not constitute a separation.
We think that the theory of the Samtanasabhagikas is inadmissible, for, in this theory, a pure mind produced for the first time (i. 38b) would not have any equal and immediately antecedent condition.
424 4. The samskdras dissociated from the mind {viprayukta, ii. 35),
like the material dharmas, are produced disparately: hence they are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions. In fact after possession in the sphere of Kamadhatu, possession relative to the dharmas of the three spheres of existence and to pure dharmas etc. , can be produced at the same time.
ii. Why deny that the future dharmas are equal and immediately antecedent conditions?
Future dharmas are disparate: there is not, among them, any early
The lndriyas 299
? 300 Chapter Two
425
and later (see p. 266).
A. Then how does the Blessed One know that such and such a
future dharma will arise first, and that such and such a dharma will arise later? He knows the order of the arising of all that arises until the end of time.
426
1. First answer.
{anumana) drawn from the past and the present. He sees the past: "From such a type of action such a retributive result arises; such a dharma proceeds from such a dharma\ and he sees the present: "Here is such a type of action: such a retributive result shall arise in the future from this action; here is such a dharma', such a dharma shall proceed from this dharma?
However the consciousness of the Blessed One is called pranidhi- jnana (vii. 37), and is not a consciousness from inference. By means of inferences drawn from the past and from the present, the Blessed One immediately sees the dharma that resides, disparately, in the future, and he produces the consciousness, "This man, having accomplished
428 such an action, shall certainly receive such a future retribution. "
To believe you, if the Blessed One does not consider the past, then he does not know the future. Hence he is not omniscient.
His consciousness results from an inference 427
429
certain dharma which is the indication of the results which will arise in
2. According to other Masters,
the future, namely a certain samskara disassociated from the mind.
430
The Blessed One contemplates it,
without his having cultivated the Dhyanas and the Abhijnas (vii. 42; cyutyupapadajnana) for it.
The Sautrantikas: If this is the case, then the Blessed One would be
431
an interpreter of signs;
3. Consequently the Blessed One knows immediately and at his will
all things, not be inference, and not by divination. This is the opinion of the Sautrantikas, justified by the word of the Blessed One (Ekottara, TD 2, p.