No More Learning

1 Ep. ad Ammaeum i 4 p. 725, 14 R, Thirlwall v 374-6,
ASchaefer ii 70--32, Blass III i 3002, Blass-Rehdantz p. 328.
On Dionysius' division of the speech into two parts see ASchaefer
ii 692, and note on 4 ? 30.
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? PHILIP AND 0L YNTHUS 1i
Though the speech had been delivered in the spring
of 351, it was not until October that any force was
sent against Philip, and even then it was only the
mercenary commander Charidemus who was sent to
the Chersonesus with only ten triremes and five
talents in money and no soldiers (3 ? 5).
Meanwhile, at Olynthus, there had been a change
of feeling. Athens had ceased to inspire alarm, but
the vast increase in the power of Philip excited the
liveliest apprehension. His encroachment made it
clear that he would not allow Chalcidice to be held
much longer by free Greek communities. Accord-
ingly, after the great victory of Philip over the
Phocians in Thessaly, in the first half of 352, the
Olynthians had seceded from their alliance with him,
and, before November 352, concluded a peace with
Athens which had every prospect of ripening into an
alliance (23 ? 109). No wonder that a few months
afterwards, at the date of the First Philippic, Philip
had made an inroad into the territory of Olynthus,
though without any vigorous prosecution of war.
Athens, in the meantime, had proposed to Olynthus
a scheme of definite alliance against Philip (1 ? 7,
3 7, 16). But the Olynthians were afraid to be
the first to provoke a contest. Mistrust on both
sides continued for several months, till at length
Philip began serious operations against Olynthus,
apparently towards the middle of 349.
The power of Olynthus depended mainly on her
position as the head of a confederacy including most
of the Greek cities of Chalcidice. Philip began a
series of intrigues in Olynthus and her confederate
cities. He may even have expected to incorporate
the Chalcidic confederacy in his own empire without
serious difficulty and without resorting to real war
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? lii THE FIRST OLYNTHIAG I ? ? 1--3
(1 ? 21). If so, he was disappointed, as there is
ground for believing that he encountered considerable
resistance. Philip at first disclaimed all purposes
injurious to Olynthus (9 11). The Olynthians,
however, sent envoys to Athens proposing alliance
and asking for aid to be sent to Chalcidice. The
Athenians readily accepted the alliance and promised
to send a force to co-operate against Philip.
V The Olynthiacs of Demosthenes
It was after the above recognition of Olynthus
as an ally of Athens that Demosthenes delivered
his three Olynthiac Oratilms, all of them probably
during the last seven months of 349. 1 Their
'oxwgmxbs ,1 chronological sequence has been much
3491M disputed. An abstract of each will
now be given in the usual order, and the order
itself will be considered afterwards.
The First Olynthiac
I feel sure you would give much to know what is
the true policy for the present crisis. You will therefore
A "mommy naturally be willing to listen to counsel,
(ewordimfll whether it has been preconsidered, or
Immuctm' has suggested itself on the spur of the
moment (1).
The present crisis is an eloquent call to action. My
own opinion is that you ought to vote the proposed
3, 6,165"ng succours immediately and make the speediest
possible preparations for despatching them
? ? 2_27. from Athens, and that you should also
15215317332? send envoys to announce the fact and to
mwlim? ? 2-15- watch the course of events (2). There is
real danger that Philip's adroitness and unscrupulousness
1 Grote c. 88 viii 69--75.
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? I ? 4-19 THE FIRST 0L Y N THIA C' liii
may wrest to his own purposes some of our vital in-
terests (3). Yet the very source of his own strength is
really favourable to yourselves. For purposes of war,
his autocracy is a great advantage ; but, for purposes of
peace with Olynthus, it is the very opposite (4). The
Olynthians plainly see that the peril in which they stand
involves the ruin and servitude of their country. They
know what has happened to Amphipolis and to Pydna;
and, like other free states, they mistrust a despotic power
on their borders (5). Now, if ever, you must apply your-
selves vigorously to the war by contributing promptly,
by serving personally, and by leaving nothing undone (6).
Had we acted promptly in the case of Amphipolis,
Pydna, Poteidaea, Methone, Pagasae, we should have found
Philip far easier to attack and less strong than now.
At the present moment, another crisis has come (8, 9).
If we allow Philip to reduce Olynthus, what is to prevent
his marching where he pleases (12)? If it be his
principle always to do more than before, and yours to
apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, the war which
is now at a distance will soon be at our very doors
(14, 15).
At the present crisis I advise you to send succours
in two ways z--firstly, by despatching a body of troops
to Olynthus for the express purpose of pro- II wpe? Qegtg
tecting her confederate towns ; and, secondly, P%fi$'$b_
by employing at the same time another Pom" ? ? 16--20-
force of troops and triremes to act aggressively against
Philip's own territory (17). If you neglect either of
these measures, I fear the expedition will fail. As to
pecuniary resources, you have more money than other
people, but you appropriate it yourselves according to your
good pleasure. Now, if you pay that money to soldiers
on service it is sufficient for the purpose; otherwise,
you need a further fund, or rather you have none at
all to begin with. I shall be asked whether I propose
to apply the festival-fund to military purposes. I propose
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? liv THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC I ? ? 20--28
nothing of the kind (19). I merely say that soldiers
must be raised, and that those who do the work should
receive the pay, whereas your practice is to take the public
money, without any such condition, for the festivals. The
only alternative is an extraordinary war-tax. In any case,
you must act vigorously while you still have the chance
(20).
Let us now consider Philip's present position.
Firstly, he is disappointed at not having carried every-
m "(u-T"; thing before him in Chalcidice (21).
%%? ":}lot),;e Secondly, he is ill at ease about the treacher-
urgency anfithe one condition of Thessaly, on which he
gateway relies for funds (22). Thirdly, he knows
poms ? ? 21--7- that the Paeonians and Illyrians can-
not abide his rule (23). If Olynthus holds out, you
will carry on the war there, and enjoy your own homes
in peace ; but if Philip takes that city, who is to check
him in his advance hither? (25). Neither the Thessalians
nor the Phocians can do so (26); and if there were a
war in Attica itself, it would be attended with enormous
damage and (what is worse) disgrace (27).
Therefore we must all unite in lending our aid and
keeping the war at a distance (in the interest of all
a e? flmovos classes), so that the rich may, by a small
(peroratio). expenditure, enjoy the residue of their re-
conclwon' sources in security; those of military age
gain experience in the territory of Philip and become
redoubtable defenders of the integrity of their native
land; and our public speakers be able to give a good
account of their statesmanship. May heaven grant that
the result of your measures may in every way be
prosperous (28).
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? "$143 TIJE 8Ec'oaw 0L YNTHIAO' iv
The Second Olynthiac
It appears to me to be a remarkably providential
circumstance that We find a co le read . ,
for a. war with Philip who arI; liis neighy- magi? B
hours and who not only have some con- ----
siderable power but are implacable in their A" hostility towards him (1). We must make Introduction
good use of the allies and the advantages ? ? 1'2'
thus provided us (2).
I shall not incite you to your duty by dilating on
Philip's power. That would be too much of a com-
pliment to him, too much of a disparage- B, rim-63ers",-
ment of you (3). The source of his power is I(e? i"? $x? c);s
not in himself, but here (in the devotion of (Hermite)-
his partisans and in your own remissness) "$3,702"
(4). I propose to prove Philip's faithlessness 55 3-10-
by examining his conduct, and also to show that he has
now exhausted all the devices by which he rose to great-
ness (5). His power in itself is founded on perjury and
wrong. He has deceived yourselves, he has deceived the
Poteidaeans, he has deceived the Tliessalians, in fact, all
who have ever had any dealings with him (6, '7). Forts
and havens will not enable Philip to hold his own:
what he needs is the good-will and the common interest
of all his allies. When any one has grown strong, like
Philip, by an aggressive and a dishonest policy, the
slightest reverse is enough to 'overthrow his power. A
solid and durable power cannot possibly be acquired
by means of injustice and perjury and falsehood (9, 10).
My own opinion is that we should at once aid the
Olynthians, and that we should also send
envoys to Thessaly (11) ; but it will not be I? J$? ? gis
enough for these envo s to make s eeclies Theomm's I'm-
(12); you must act ypromptly and) serve poms ? ? 11--13'
personally, and the weakness of Philip's power will soon
be revealed (13).
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? lvi THE SECOND 0L YNTHIAC' II ? ? 14--27
The power of Macedonia, as has been repeatedly
proved by experience, is useful as a make-weight to
111 "(was turn the scale, but is feeble as an inde-
P,_Og? '$bfh'i'2-TM_ pendent force (14). Philip's power has been
livability and made less secure by the very operations
"9,3253%? " which appear to constitute his greatness.
? ? 14-3? - Philip and his subjects have not the same
predilections. His ambition is to lead a. life of adventure
and peril in quest of a glory in which they have no
share (15, 16). I know on good authority, that his
mercenaries and guards are no better than others (17),
that he is jealous of any experience in war, that he
thrusts aside any who are too virtuous to tolerate his
daily vices (18). He is surrounded by a band of
brigands, a troop of flatterers, bufi'oons and jesters (19).
His past good fortune lends to all his real weakness a
fallacious air of strength; but, on any mischance, his
weak points will be exposed to view (20, 21). If any
of you think that Philip is formidable because he is so
fortunate, I admit that fortune has a preponderance, is in
fact everything, in human affairs. But I should prefer
our own good fortune to Philip's, if you would, even to
a moderate extent, do your duty (22). Yet here you are,
sitting still, doing nothing. The idler cannot ask even his
friends to work for him, much less the gods. No wonder
that Philip, always in the field, always on the move,
doing everything for himself and never letting any
opportunity slip, prevails over you who merely talk, and
ask questions, and pass votes, without acting (23). In
bygone days, men of Athens, you lavished your treasure
and bore the brunt of battle, to secure the rights of
others: yet now you are loath to serve, and slow to con-
tribute, even in defence of your own possessions (24).
I say then that you must levy an extraordinary war-tax,
must serve in person with alacrity, and do your own
duty before scrutinising the conduct of others (27). Why
do all your commanders avoid this war and seek out
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? u ? ? 23_~31 THE SECOND OLYNTHIAO 1m
wars of their ownl Because here the prizes of war are
yours, while, in l: e other case, the risks are fewer, and
the gains belong to the commanders and soldiers (28).
When you see how badly things are going, you impeach
the commanders ; and, when they urge these strong pleas,
you acquit them. The result is that, while some hold
one opinion and some another, the public interests suffer.
You must get rid of rival factions (29), and be yourselves
again. You must restore once more a general liberty of
counsel, speech and action (30).
To sum up, you must all contribute fairly according
to your means; all take your turns of service till
all have been afield; give every speaker 0' "flows
8. hearing, and adopt the best advice, (Pev'waqivl
no matter who gives it. If you act thus, mmwn'
you will not merely praise the speaker at the moment,
but yourselves afterwards, when your general prospects
have improved (31).
After the delivery of the first two Olynthiacs,
a body of mercenary troops was sent by Athens to
the aid of the Olynthians and Chalcidians. The
wealthier citizens voluntarily contributed to the cost
of the outfit of this expedition ; but the very point
that Demosthenes had insisted on was neglected.
None of the Athenians served in person, nor was
any money whatsoever assigned for the pay of the
mercenaries. Presently a victory was gained over
Philip or his generals, and the news was sent to
Athens, where it inspired the people with the empty
hope that they were now in a fair way of taking
revenge on Philip. But Demosthenes himself was
not deceived.
He clearly discerned that it was only
a partial success in no way decisive of the war as
a whole. He accordingly felt himself 'oxweuxbs Y'
constrained to address the people once 349 8-0'
more with a view to warning them against losing
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? lviii THE THIRD 0L YNTHIAG III ? ? 1-8
sight of the peril in which Olynthus was still
standing.
The Third Olynthiac
The language that I hear about ' taking vengeance on
A 6 Philip' is inconsistent with the facts. The
18283375)? " facts compel us to look to our personal
I'l'TO'i'we? io" safety. There was a time when we might
' ' have held our own and punished Philip
too ; but now our first care must be the security of our
allies (1, 2).
The present crisis calls for anxious deliberation. I
B. 61686,"; have no doubt as to your dutypmy only
I (e? ffl'zlatiol doubt is how to address you upon it. Most
Suiwnlfffe' of your losses have been due to inaction and
"mum" "3'5" not to ignorance. If I speak my mind, I
must ask you to be patient (3).
I must beg you not to make the same mistake as you
made three years ago. When Philip was besieging a
stronghold in Thrace, you energetically resolved in
November (362) to send an expedition against him Presently, there were reports that he was ill, and that
he was dead. Accordingly, you only despatched Chari-
demus with ten empty ships and five talents. If you
had promptly executed your first resolve, Philip would
have given you no further trouble (5). But the past cannot
be altered now: I mention it only to warn you against
making the same mistake in the present crisis. If you
do not send aid to Olynthus 'with all your might and
main,' you will prove to have manoeuvred everything for
Philip's benefit (6). You have long been eager to get
the Olynthians into war with Philip, and this has actually
come to pass (7). You have now no alternative except
to aid them vigorously and promptly. You will be
covered with shame, if you do not; and, besides, if
Philip conquers Olynthus, there is the fear of his invading
Attica~ There is, in fact, nothing to hinder him: the
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? 111? ? 9-16 T111; THIRD OLYNTHIAC lix
Phooians have exhausted their funds, and the Thebans
are your toes (8).
But, I shall be told, 'we have unanimously resolved
on succouring Olynthus, and succour it we shall ; we only
want you to tell us how. ' You will per-
haps be surprised, gentlemen, at my answer. 3,13%;ng
I would have you appoint an extraordi- The m'fllfu's 1W-
. . . posul ? ? 10-131
nary commission to rewse your statute-book.
At its meetings, I would have you enact no new statutes,
for you have enough already; but simply repeal those
that are at present injurious (10). I mean, speaking
plainly, those which concern the festival-fund, and some
. of those which concern our military service. By the
former you hand over to those who stay at home, money
which ought to go to soldiers on service. By the latter,
you indemnify deserters and discourage those who desire
to do' their duty. When you have repealed these statutes,
and made the path of salutary counsel safe, then, and
not till then, you may look for some one to propose what
you all know to be desirable (11); but, until you do
this, you must not expect any one to make the best
proposals in your interests, with the certainty of being
ruined by you for his pains. Moreover, it is the states-
men who proposed these statutes, who should also repeal
them (12) ; for it is unfair that their authors should enjoy
a. popularity that is mischievous to the commonwealth, while
the unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all falls on
the head of the reformer. Till you set this right, you
cannot expect any one to be either powerful enough to
infringe these laws with impunity, or foolish enough to
plunge into manifest ruin (13).
Remember, again, that a decree is worthless, unless
you are ready to act (14). When will you m "5"";
do your duty, if not now? Has not Philip Awrobatito);
got possession of all our strongholds? Is 81$?
he not our enemy 'l is he not a barbarian? POW? ? 14'32'
is he not--anything you please to call him? (16).
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? 1x THE THIRD 0L YNTHIAO' III ? ? 17-24
. . . _____-_/
After allowing him, after almost aiding him to accomplish
all this, shall we then inquire who is to blame? I know
we shall none of us blame ourselves. Oh no! On the
field of battle no runaway ever blames himself (17). In
your deliberations, again, do not blame your advisers,
but follow the best advice, however unpalatable it may
prove (18). I may possibly be asked, whether it would
not be better to propose supplies for our troops without
touching the festival-fund. Doubtless, if it were possible ;
but you know, gentlemen, you cannot waste your money
on useless expenses, and still have it for useful purposes
(19). To deceive one's self to the contrary is the easiest
thing in the world: the wish is father to the thought.
But you must really look the facts in the face; you
must arrange to take the field and have supplies for pay.
It is at once unwise and ignoble to bear the disgrace of
neglecting military operations for want of money; and
to be ready at a moment's notice to march against
Corinthians and Megarians, and yet allow Philip to
enslave Hellenic cities for lack of provision for your
troops (20). I have not spoken for the idle purpose of
giving offence. I hold that an upright citizen should
prefer the interests of the State to the gratification of his
audience. These were the principles of Aristeides, of
Nicias, of my namesake, and of Pericles (21). But, since
the appearance of these public speakers who ask the
people 'what is your pleasure? what can I propose to
oblige you ? ' the public interests are complimented away
for a momentary popularity, and the speakers thrive,
while you are disgraced (22). Our forefathers, who were
not caressed by their counsellors, for five and forty years
ruled over a willing Hellas ; more than 10,000 talents
they brought into the Acropolis; they won many a
glorious victory by fighting in person on land and sea;
and they are the only people in the world who have left
behind them a renown beyond the reach of envy (24).
At home, their public buildings and all the beauty of
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? 1n ssas-st TflE THIRD OLYNTHIAO' lxi
their temples and their dedicated offerings have never
been surpassed; While their private life was so modest,
so true to the spirit of our constitution (25), that the
house once occupied by Aristeides, or Miltiades, or the
most illustrious men of that day, is (as you know) no
grander than that next to it. The policy of our ancestors
was not the making of money; it was the personal
promotion of the glory of the commonwealth. It was
the spirit of loyalty to Greece, of reverence towards
heaven, and of brotherhood among themselves, that was
the natural source of their high prosperity (26).
But now, even in the utter absence of competitors,
when we might easily hold our own securely and also
arbitrate on the claims of others (27), we have been kept
out of the possession of our rightful territory, and have
spent more than 1500 talents to no purpose whatsoever.
Allies won in the time of war have been lost to us in the
time of peace ; and we have trained up against us a most
formidable fee (28). But some one will say, 'Well, sir,
our foreign policy may be in a bad way, but surely in
the home-department things are now improving? ' To
what then can we point? Is it to the parapets that we
whitewash ; the roads that we repair ; and the fountains,
and all the other fooleries? These are the fruits of
the policy of statesmen who have risen from beggary to
opulence, from obscurity to distinction, whose private
mansions are more splendid than our public buildings,
and whose fortunes are exalted in exact proportion to the
decline of the interests of the State (29). What is the
cause of all this change? The simple fact, gentlemen,
that formerly the people, having the courage to act, and
to see service in person, controlled our statesmen and was
master of all our emoluments; and any of the citizens
in general was content to receive from the people his own
share of honour or office or advantage (30); whereas
now, it is the statesmen that dispose of our emoluments ;
it is through their agency that everything is done ; while
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? lxii THE THIRD OLYNTIIIACv III ? ? 31--34
you, the people, gentlemen, reft of all your strength,
stripped of your treasure and your allies, have become
mere underlings and appendages, and are satisfied if your
statesmen present you with a dole from the festival-fund,
and (the manliest part of all I) you are even grateful for
receiving from them what is your own all the while.
They coop you up in the city, and entice you to your
pleasures, and make you tame and submissive to their
hands (31). But it is impossible (as I hold) to have
a high and noble spirit, while engaged in petty and
mean pursuits: men's pursuits must necessarily have an
influence on their character. I should not be surprised
if, for merely mentioning these matters, I were to suffer
more than those who are themselves responsible for this
state of things. It is not every subject on which you
permit your boasted liberty of speech: I even wonder
that you have permitted it to-day (32).
But if, gentlemen, you would only renounce these
practices, and be ready to take the field, and would employ
your domestic superfluities as a meansfor gain-
; ing advantage abroad, you might, you might
Uggggg" perhaps, secure some solid and important
' advantage. You might also get rid of these
perquisites which are like a sick man's diet which gives no
strength to the patient, but merely keeps him alive (33). '
Some one will say: 'are you proposing a system of pay
for service'l' Yes, I would immediately have the same
arrangement for all, that each citizen may receive his
share of the public funds, in return for doing the duty which
the State demands. Is peace possible? He will be all
the better for staying at home, and being under no
temptation to act dishonestly through indigence. Is there
any crisis like the present? It will be better for him to
be a soldier, as he ought, in his country's cause, while
he is supported by those very same allowances. Is any
one beyond the military age? What he now receives
irregularly without doing anyaservice I would have him
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? H
mggm" T E THIRD OLYNTHIAG lxiii
receive by an equmible organisation in return for super-
intending and I'Tansacting public business (34). In short,
without any material diminution or addition, simply by
removing a slight irregularity, I now propose to bring
things into order by establishing a uniform rule, making
the receipt of money depend on serving in war, on
sitting on juries, in fact, on doing individually what is
appropriate to each several citizen's time of life and to
the exigencies of the hour. I have never advised giving
to idlers the wages of the industrious. I have never
advised your folding your hands and sitting at leisure,
passive and pauperised, and inquiring (as you do now) for
news of the victory of somebody's mercenaries (35). Not
that I blame any commander who does you good service :
I only call upon yourselves to perform on your own
account those duties for which you honour others, and
not to desert that post of duty which your ancestors won
by many a glorious battle, and bequeathed to you.
I have said nearly all that I deem for the best: heaven
grant that you may adopt the course that is best for the
State and for all of yourselves (36).
In the Third Olynthiac, justly regarded by Grrote1
as one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered,
Demosthenes showed signal courage in combating the
prevailing sentiment. The partial advantage which
had been gained was much over-rated, and the ardour
of Athens in aiding Olynthus was already beginning
to cool: ' Courage, wisdom and dexterity ' are shown
in the masterly manner in which he discharged an
unpopular duty.
VI The order of the Olynthiacs
A fragment of Philochorus (fl. 306--260 B. O. ), pre-
1 e. 88 viii 85 f.
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? lxiv THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIAOS
served by Dionysius in his First letter to Ammaeus,1
The order of the assigns the Olynthian war to the archon-
Olyn'm'ws' ship of Callimachus (01. 107, 4 = 349~8
110. ); and describes three successive expeditions as
sent by Athens in response to three successive appeals
on the part of Olynthus. The first expedition con-
sisted of a mercenary force of 2000 peltasts and 30
triremes (with a further squadron of eight triremes)
under the command of Ohares; the second, a mercenary
force of 4000 peltasts, 150 horse, and 18 triremes,
under Charidemus; and the third, a citizen-force of
2000 hoplites, 300 horse and 17 triremes, under
Chares.
Dionysius2 accordingly places all the three Olyn-
thiacs in the same year (349--8). But he further
regards the three speeches as severally occasioned
by the three successive appeals of Olynthus, and
as leading in turn to the three expeditions above-
mentioned? ' The order in which he places the
speeches, as distinguished by their opening words,
is as fOllOWS: (l) e'1ri wohhdiv (0T. 2); (2) ofixi raii'ra
(Or. 3); (3) 01er rohhtiiv (Or. 1). His reason for
placing Or. 2 first in order of time was two-fold, (l)
the exultant and hopeful tone of the prooemium, (2)
certain chronological considerations. ' The latter can
only refer to the date of Philip's siege of 'Hpaiov
112on (Nov. 352), the date of Or. 3 being known to
be rather less than three years later (3 ? 4), or
about Oct. 349. As Or. 3 thus fell t00 early in the
Attic year to be likely to correspond to the last of
1 c. 9 p. 734 R, ed. Herwerden 1861.
2 ad Amm. i c. 4 p. 72611.
3 Schol. quoted by ASchaefer ii 1602 n. 4.
4 $01101. to Dem. p. 71, 1 Dind.