No More Learning

62 It may. But it is better to contradict a Sastra than a Sutra.
ii. How does this explanation lack the proper meaning of the different terms?
Because it gives the characteristics of different minds--dis- tracted, sunken-down, small, not calm, non-absorbed, uncultivated, and undelivered on the one hand, and concentrated, well in hand,
63 etc. , on the other hand--without noting their differences.
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It is false that we do not indicate the special sense of the different terms. The quality of "defiled" of distracted minds, etc. , is the same; but we explain the particular defects of these different defiled minds. In the same way we explain the particular qualities of the different good minds, in which their good qualities are not differentiated.
We answer that the meaning of the different terms is not correctly established because you fail to eliminate the objection of
The Knowledges 1103
? 64
contradiction with the Sutra. [The Sutra, in fact, says that a mind
accompanied by torpor and laziness is concentrated. A mind united with laziness, and defiled through union with torpor, is concen- trated, but it cannot be good, for torpor is a klesamahdbhumika. ]
And if, [as the Vaibhasikas believe], the Sutra designates, by
65
the sunken-down mind,
separately of a sunken-down mind and a small mind. Now it distinguishes them, for it says, "When the mind is sunken down, or fears becoming sunken down, this is not a proper time to cultivate the prasrabdhi, samddhi, and upeksa parts of Bodhi. When the mind is small or fears becoming small, this is not a fitting moment
66 to cultivate the dharmavicaya, virya, and priti parts of Bodhi. "
Objection [of the Vaibhasikas:] Is the cultivation of the parts of
67
Bodhi partial in the case which concerns us? [Must we believe
a small mind, it would not speak
that at a certain moment one cultivates prasrabdhi, samddhi, 69
upeksa, and at another moment dharmavicaya, virya, and priti? ]
No. When the text says "cultivation", it does not signify the fact of actualizing, but the fact of fixing the attention on, or taking as an object.
69
[Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] The mind in which indolence
dominates and in which frivolity is reduced is called "sunken
down" (lina). The mind in which frivolity dominates and in which
indolence is reduced is called "small" {uddhata). These two minds
are therefore distinct, and the Sutra can speak of them separately
without contradicting our system. But, taking into consideration
the fact that these two defilements, indolence and frivolity, coexist
in a single mental heap, we say that the mind which is sunken
70 down is small.
71
We do not pretend to challenge a text of intentional meaning; but such is not the intention of the Sutra [i. e. , to designate a mind in which indolence dominates as sunken down. . . ]
***
? In the thesis presented above (p. 1099, line 23) that all minds "united with craving" (rdgasamyukta) "possess craving" (sardga), what is the meaning of the expression rdgasamyukta, united with craving?
1. If a mind is united with craving, and as a consequence possesses craving, because the possession of craving continues in the series in which this mind is produced, then the mind of an imperfect saint or Saiksa, even when it is pure, will be termed "possessing craving", since the craving has not been completely
72 expelled from the series of the Saiksa.
2. If a mind is both united with craving and possesses craving
through the fact of being the object (dlambana) of the "active 73
craving" ,thentheimpuremindofanArhatwillpossesscraving,
since this mind can be the object of the craving of another
74 person.
If you do not admit that the mind of an Arhat can be grasped as an object through the craving of another person, how can this mind be termed impure?
Would you say that it is impure, not because it is the object of the craving of another, but because it is the object of a "general defilement" (sdmdnyaklesa, v. 12, namely of ignorance or delusion) of another? In this hypothesis, do not say that this mind is sardga, that it "possesses craving"; say rather that it is samoha, that it "possesses moha," since it is the object of the moha or ignorance of another.
But, we would say, none of these proposed explanations is valid. In fact the knowledge of the mind of another does not bear on the "possessions" which can be found in the series of another. Consequently when I know that the mind of another person possesses craving, this mind of another does not possess craving because it is "united with craving" in the sense that it is accompanied by the possession of craving, or in the sense that it is found in the series in which this possession has not been expelled.
The knowledge of the mind of another no longer knows the craving which would be the object of the mind of another.
? 1106 Chapter Seven
Therefore a mind is not termed saraga through the fact of ragasamyoga, through the fact of being "united with raga" in the proposed twofold sense.
[Objection:]
75
***
If this is the case, what is a saraga mind?
[Vasubandhu:] One should determine the intention of the Sutra. A saraga mind or one "possessing craving" is not a ragasarhyukta mind, a mind "united to craving", but a ragasarh- prayukta mind, a mind "associated with craving," a mind in which craving presently exists. Vigataraga, "without craving" is a mind which is not associated with craving, even when this mind will be accompanied by the possession of craving.
[Objection:] The expression vigataraga cannot have this meaning; for another Sutra says that a mind which is without craving {vigataraga), without anger (vigatadvesa), and without ignorance (vigatamoha), does not fall back into threefold existence. Now if this mind is accompanied by the possession of craving, etc. , it will fall back again.
[Vasubandhu:] In this other Sutra, "a mind without craving" (vigataraga citta) signifies "a mind which is not accompanied by the possession of craving" (vigatardgaprdpti citta).
[Objection:] Have you not refuted your own opinion? We said in fact (page 1100, line 5) that if one calls a mind without craving vigataraga, that is, a mind in which craving is not presently active, then one should term all minds associated with another defilement vigataraga. But one does not say that a mind associated with hatred is vigataraga, "without craving. "
[Vasubandhu:] There is nothing wrong with saying that a mind without craving is vigataraga. But one does not consider a mind without craving but associated with hatred as being vigataraga, but rather as "possessing hatred" (sadvesa), distin- guishing it through its specific characteristic which is one of being
? "associated with hatred. "
When the knowledge of the mind of another attains its object, namely the mind of another person, does it attain this mind of another as this latter knows it?
No. When one knows the mind of another, one does not see the object of this mind; one does not see this mind as it itself knows something: one knows only that it is defiled, etc. ; one does not know the object, color, etc. , by reason of which it is defiled. If it were otherwise, the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on rupa, etc. , and would no longer be the knowledge of the mind of another; the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on itself: for the person whose mind I know can at the same moment know my mind.
The characteristics of the knowledge of the mind of another are set: it knows the individual characteristics of a thing (the dravya-svalaksana) but not its general, conventionally true characteristics (its samvrtisat-sdmdnyalaksana)\ it knows mind and mental states but not physical matter, the present but not the past or future, of another but not of oneself, of the sphere of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu, but not of Ampyadhatu; or rather the pure mind and mental states, of the category to which he himself belongs: pure, he knows a pure mind and mental states; impure, he knows an impure mind and mental states. The knowledge of the mind of another is incompatible with the Path of Seeing and the Uninterrupted Path (dnantaryamdrga), with the Samadhi of Emptiness and the Samadhi of No-Marks, and with the Knowl- edge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. Other conditions are not excluded: the knowledge of the mind of another is compatible with the Path of Meditation (the Path of Liberation, vimuktimdrga, and the Path of Distinction, visesamdrga), with the Uncommitted Samadhi (apranihitasamddhi), etc.
The teaching of the knowledge of the mind of another is ended.
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12a-b. The other has fourteen aspects by excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self.
The "others" are the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
Both have fourteen aspects (vii. 13a), excluding the aspect of
emptiness and the aspect of non-self. In fact, these two Knowl-
76
edges, even though they are of the absolute level of truth, are also
77
included in the conventional level of truth (vi. 4);
therefore foreign to the aspects of emptiness and non-self. When an ascetic departs from the contemplation in which the knowl- edges of the absolute truth are realized, through the force of these
78
knowledges, later knowledges
conventional level of truth: "my births are cut off, the religious life has been fully cultivated, I have done what should have been done,
79
and I do not know of any more existences for me. " The two
knowledges, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, therefore participate in the conventional level of truth, not in and of themselves or through definition, but through their outflowing.
Are there any pure aspects outside of these sixteen aspects?
12c. There are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
The Masters of Kasmir say that there are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
12d. Some others, according to the Sustra, affirm that there are.
are produced which are of the
they are
? _ The Knowledges 1109
The Foreign Masters maintain the opposite opinion. [For the opinion of "the other masters," see p. 1094, line 27].
80
The Mulasdstra says,
belonging to Kamadhatu through a mind not included among the Dhutus (that is to say, pure)? One can distinguish them as they are, as impermanent, suffering, empty, impersonal, cause, proximate cause, near cause, specificing cause; there is this characteristic (sthdna), there is this cause (vastu). "
One should thus consider the specific aspects through the expressions asty etat sthdnam, asty etad vastu, as two pure aspects which are added to the eight aspects of suffering and origin.
According to the Masters of Kasmir, the Sastra does not teach the existence of these two additional aspects. One should understand, ". . . it is fitting (asty ayarh yogah) that a pure mind distinguish these dharmas as impermanent. . . "
The Foreign Masters answer that this interpretation is not
admissible. For, if the Sastra employs the terms asty etat sthdnam. . .
without referring to the pure aspects, but only through simple
phraseology, it would also employ them in a parallel passage,
namely when it explains, "Can one distinguish the dharmas
belonging to Kamadhatu by a mind susceptible of being abandoned
by Seeing the Truths? Yes, one can distinguish them, namely, one
becomes attached to, one hates, one prides oneself, one errs, one
erroneously distinguishes these dharmas as self, mine (-kdyadrsti),
as eternal or perishable (-antagrdhadrsti), as non-cause, non-ac-
tion, nonexistent (-mithyddrsti), as supreme, excellent, distin-
guished, superior (=drstipardmarsa), as purification, deliverance,
"Can one distinguish the dharmas
salvation (-stlavratapardmarsa), with anxiety, disagreement, or 81
doubt. " This text should have the expressions asty etat sthd- nam. . . , if they solely signify asty ayam yogah, in the sense that it is fatal that a mind susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths considers the dharmas as self, mine. . .
#**
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How many things constitute the sixteen aspects?
82
Certain masters said that the aspects, sixteen in name, are only seven in fact. The four aspects of the Truth of Suffering are in fact distinct from one another. The aspects of the other Truths, in their fourfold name, only constitute one thing for each Truth: hetu (material cause), samudaya (arising or origin), prabhava (appear- ance), and pratyaya (efficient condition) are synonyms and are only one aspect; in the same way that Sakra, Indra, and Purariidara are different names for one and the same personage. Ascetics contemplate, separately, the four aspects of the Truth of Suffering, and any one of the aspects, material cause, etc. , of the three other Truths.
But [the Vaibhasikas] maintain that the sixteen aspects exist in
83
1. Impermanence, because it arises dependent upon efficient causes.
2. Suffering, because it is painful by nature (vi. 3).
3. Empty, as it opposes the belief in the view of things pertaining to self.
4. No soul, as it opposes the belief in a self.
II. For the Truth of Origin:
1. Cause {hetu), because it has the characteristic of a seed (bijadharmayogena). The hetu is a distant or material cause. The word yoga signifies nydya or truth.
2. Arising, as it produces. This is the near cause, that from which a dharma immediately arises or originates.
13a. The aspects are sixteen things.
fact, [for they should be contemplated one by one].
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
3. Successive appearance, which constitutes the series: seed,
? shoot, stalk. . .
4. Efficient conditions (pratyaya), as realizing an effect in joint causation; for example, the coming together of efficient condition- s--earth, stick, wheel, twine, water, etc. --produces a jug (see ii. 64).
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, by reason of the destruction of the [impure]
skandhas.
2. Calm, by reason of the extinction of the three fires, craving, anger, and delusion (viii. 26c).
3. Excellent, by reason of the absence of all pain.
4. Salvation, because it is disassociated from all causes of pain. IV. For the Truth of the Path:
1. Path, because one traverses it (towards Nirvana. )84
2. Truth, because it is yogayukta, that is to say, endowed with proofs, endowed with resources or means.
3. Obtaining, because it brings about correct obtaining, that is to say one obtains (Nirvana through it. )
4. Definitive release, because it causes one to pass beyond in a definitive manner.
There is a second exegesis:
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
1. Impermanent (anitya), because it is not definitive {anatyan- tika).
2. Suffering, because it resembles a burden.
3. Empty, because it is empty of purusa (agent, etc. ). 4. No-soul, because it does not obey the will. 85
II. For the Truth of Origin:
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1. Cause (hetu), because it comes about from that (the root hi
signifies gati; hetu signifies hinoty asmdt).
2. Arising (samudaya), because there is emergence: (the
86 dharma emerges from the future).
3. Appearance (prabhava), as it is a procession (prasarana).
4. Condition {pratyaya) or foundation, that is, the essential
element from the action of generation.
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, because of the cessation of the former suffering and of the non-continuation of subsequent suffering.
2. Calm, because it is delivered from the three conditioned characteristics {samskrtalaksanas. ii. 45c).
3.
Excellent, because it is absolutely good (pdramdrthasubha, iv. 8c).
87 4. Salvation, because it supremely strengthens (9v. 8b).
IV. For the Truth of the Path:
1. Path, because it is opposed to the wrong path.
2. Truth, because it is opposed to non-truth.
3. Obtaining, because it is not in contradiction with the city of
88 Nirvana.
4. Definitive release, because it abandons existence in the Three Dhatus.
***
Since ancient explanations differ, we are permitted to present a third explanation:
I. For the Truth of Suffering:
1. Impermanent, because it arises and perishes.
? 2. Suffering, because it is repugnant to the mind of Aryans (vi. English trans, p. 898).
3. Empty, because no dtman is found in it.
4. No soul, because this is not an dtman.
II. For the Truth of Origin: the four aspects of the Second
Truth, cause (hetu), arising (samudaya), appearance (prabhava),
and condition (pratyaya), are: explained according to the Sutra,
"The five upddanaskandhas (impure skandhas, i. 8a) are chandamu-
laka, chandasamudaya, chandajatiya, chandaprabhava," that is to
say they have chanda (=desire=frJr>>^=thirst) for their root (mula)
or hetu, which brings about their arising (samudaya), for their
condition (chandajatiya-chandapraty aya), for their appearance 9
(prabhava)* The only difference between the Sutra and the Sastra is that the latter places the condition (pratyaya) aspect in first
90 place, and not the appearance (prabhava) aspect.
***
What is the difference between these four types of "proces- sions"?
A. One should distinguish four states (avasthd) of desire (chanda): 1. the affection that one experiences for oneself when one thinks, "I am", without otherwise distinguishing an actual "self," without thinking of a past or future self; 2. the desire for re-existence without any other specification; 3. the desire for a certain re-existence; 4. the desire for reincarnation, a desire which makes one accomplish a certain action.
The first desire is the initial cause of suffering--as the seed is
91 the initial cause of the fruit--; it is called hetu.
The second desire is that which brings about re-existence--as the production of the shoot, stalk, etc. , is a casual process or arising (samudaya) which brings about fruit; it is therefore called samudaya, a cause which brings forth.
? The third desire is the cause which determines the quality of suffering,--as the field, the water, the fertilizer, etc. , determine the virility, the ripening, the appearance of the fruit; it is therefore called pratyaya, or condition. 92
The fourth desire is the cause from whence the fruit appears-- as the flower is the cause of the fruit; it is therefore called prabhdva, or appearance.
The fourth desire is the immediate or direct cause; the other three are the mediate or indirect causes.
B. And again, according to the Sutra,93 there are two groups of five "modes of desire" (trsndvicdritas), and two groups of four, which are, respectively, the four desires studied above. The first two desires are of five aspects, and the last two are of four.
a. When one thinks asmi, "I am,'* general affection for one's own person without determination is produced, which is fivefold: I am such; I am the same [as formerly]; I am different; I am something that is; I am something that is not.
b. When one thinks bhavisydmi, "I shall be," there is produced a general desire for re-existence without determination, which is also fivefold: "I shall be such, I shall be thus, I shall be different, I shall exist, and I shall not exist. "
? There is produced particularized desire for re-existence, which is fourfold: "May I be; may I be such; may I be the same; may I be different. "
d. There is produced a desire for reincarnation, which is fourfold: "It is absolutely necessary that I may be, that I may be such, the same, different. 94
The first desires are the initial cause of suffering; they are therefore the hetu. . . The rest as above.
III. For the Truth of Extinction:
1. Extinction, because it cuts off transmigration. 95
2. Calm, because it is cessationof all suffering; thus it is said,
? "All the samskdras, Oh Bhiksus, are suffering; only Nirvana alone 96
is absolute calm. "
3. Excellent, because it is the highest.
4. Definitive salvation, because it is without returning. IV. For the Truth of the Path:
1. Path, because it resembles the right path.
2. Truth, because it is true.
3. Obtaining, because it is determined; that is to say one arrives by this path and not by another, as it is said, "This path leads to purity, other systems do not lead to it. "
4. Definitive release, because it is definitive separation from threefold existence.
97
[Fourth explanation. ]
[I. For the Truth of Suffering:]
Furthermore, it is in order to cure persons who nourish views
of permanence, bliss, of things pertaining to the self, and a soul
that the aspects of impermanence, suffering, empty, and no-soul
98
[II. For the Truth of Arising:]
1. The cause aspect is opposed to the view, "There is only one cause" {nasti hetuh, v. 7, English trans, p. 777).
2. The arising aspect is opposed to the view, "There is only one cause"--be it Isvara, or pradhdna (ii. 64). Cause is a complex.
3. The appearance aspect is opposed to the idea of evolution (parindmadrsti), the theory that bhdva, or existence, existing
99
initially, transforms itself: rather, bhdva begins.
4. The condition aspect is opposed to the view that the world is
created by an intelligent being {buddhipurvakrtadrsfi, iv. 1): things
100 arise from a multiplicity of causes.
are established.
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? 1116 Chapter Seven
[III. For the Truth of Extinction:]
1. The extinction aspect is opposed to the view that there is no deliverance.
2. The calm aspect is opposed to the view that deliverance is suffering.
3. The excellent aspect is opposed to the view that the happiness of the dhydnas and samapdttis is excellent (v. 7, English trans, p. 777).
4. The definitive release aspect is opposed to the view that deliverance is subject to falling, that it is not definitive.
[IV. For the Truth of the Path. ]
The Path, truth, cultivation, and definitive release aspects oppose, respectively, the views that there is no path, that a false path is the Path, that there is another path, and that the Path is subject to falling.
101 13b. The aspects are prajnd.
The aspects are by their nature mental prajnd or discernment. (ii. 24).
But, we would say, if this is so, then prajnd, the knowledge that
discerns the dharmas, will not be endowed with the aspects, for
prajnd cannot be associated {samprayukta) with prajnd. It is
therefore correct to say [--with the Sautrantikas--] that "aspect"
is a mode of perceiving {grahana) objects by the mind and mental 102
states.
Is it solely prajnd which perceives the different, unique
characteristics {visesa, i. 14c) of objects?
13b-c. Everything that has an object perceives.
? Prajnd and all the other dharmas which have an object m
13d. Everything that exists is the object of perception.
Everything that exists is perceived by the dharmas which have an object.
We have therefore three more or less large categories: 1. prajnd is aspect, subject, and object; 2. the other minds and mental states, which are associated with prajnd, are subject and object; and
3. all the other dharmas, conditioned or unconditioned, are only 104
object.
***
We have explained the aspects of the ten knowledges; we must now explain their natures, the sphere which serves as their support (bhumi), and the person {dsraya) in whom they arise.
14a. The first is of three natures; the others are good.
"The first" is worldly, conventional knowledge, because this
105
knowledge is named first in the Karika (vii. 2b)
types, good, bad, or neutral. The nine other knowledges are only good.
14b. The first exists in all spheres.
It exists in all spheres, from Kamadhatu up to Bhavagra
{-naivasamjndndmjndyatana).
(salamba) perceive.
14c. In six, the knowledge named dharma.
, and is of three
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A knowledge of the dharmas is obtained in or through the Four Dhyanas, and in Anagamya and Dhyanantara.
14c-d. In nine, that which is called anvaya (inferential). Inferential knowledge is obtained in the six spheres which
have been mentioned, and furthermore, in three Arupyas.
I4d. So too six jnanas.
When one considers them together, some six knowledges,-- the knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, the Path, Destruction, and Non-Arising--are obtained in nine spheres; when they form part of the knowledge of dharmas, they are obtained in six spheres; when they form part of inferential knowledge, they are obtained in nine spheres.
15a. The knowledge of the mind of another exists in the Four Dhyanas.
The knowledge of the mind of another is only obtained in the Four Dhyanas, and nowhere else.
15b. It has for its support a person either in Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
Beings in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu realize the knowledge of the mind of another.
106
15c. The knowledge of dharmas, a person in Kamudhatu. The knowledge of dharmas can only be realized by a person in
Kamadhatu, and not by a person in either Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu.
15d. Others, in persons of the three spheres.
? What are the other knowledges?
They are the eight knowledges with the exception of the
knowledge of the mind of another and the knowledge of dharmas. ***
We have explained the spheres in which one acquires the knowledges, and the sphere to which the persons who can acquire the knowledges belong. Let us explain the relationship of the knowledges with the four applications of mindfulness (vi. 15).
16a. The knowledge of Extinction is an application of mindfulness.
The knowledge of Extinction is an application of mindfulness which relates to a dharma.
16b. The knowledge of the mind of another is threefold.
The knowledge of the mind of another, related to the mind of another, necessarily relates to vedand, samjnd, and the samskdras.
16c. The others, four.
By excluding the knowledge of Extinction and the knowledge of the mind of another, the other eight knowledges have the four applications of mindfulness for their nature [The knowledge of Suffering, in fact, sometimes relates to the body. . . ; the knowledge
107 application of mindfulness related to the body].
of the Path, when it has pure discipline
for its object, is an
***
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The different knowledges are the object of how many other knowledges?
16d. Nine knowledges are the object of a knowledge of
dharmas.
Excluding inferential knowledge.
17a. Nine are the object of inferential knowledge and knowledge of the Path.
Excluding the knowledge of dharmas in inferential knowledge; by excluding worldly conventional knowledge in the knowledge of the Path, because it does not form part of the Path.
17b. Two are the object of the knowledge of Suffering and Origin.
Worldly conventional knowledge and the part of the knowl- edge of the mind of another which is impure, are the object of a knowledge of Suffering and of Origin.
17c. Ten, of four.
Ten knowledges are the object of worldly conventional knowledge, a knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
17c. None are the object of one.
No knowledge is the object of the knowledge of Extinction whose only object is Extinction obtained through conscious effort (pratisamkhydnirodba).
***
? How many dharmas constitute in their totality the object of the ten knowledges? How many dharmas constitute the object of each
108 knowledge?
109 17d. The totality of their object is ten dharmas.
What are these ten dharmas?