No More Learning

We
passed through several apartments, lined as usual with specta-
tors upon these occasions. Upon entering the ante-chamber, the
Baron de Lynden, the Dutch Minister, who has been often here,
came and spoke with me. A Count Sarsfield, a French noble-
man, with whom I was acquainted, paid his compliments. As I
passed into the drawing-room, Lord Carmarthen and Sir Clement
Cotterel Dormer were presented to me. Though they had been
several times here, I had never seen them before. The Swedish
and the Polish Ministers made their compliments, and several
other gentlemen; but not a single lady did I know until the
Countess of Effingham came, who was very civil. There were
three young ladies, daughters of the Marquis of Lothian, who were
to be presented at the same time, and two brides. We were
placed in a circle round the drawing-room, which was very full;
I believe two hundred persons present. Only think of the task!
The royal family have to go round to every person and find small
talk enough to speak to them all, though they very prudently
speak in a whisper, so that only the person who stands next to
you can hear what is said. The King enters the room and goes
round to the right; the Queen and Princesses to the left. The
lord-in-waiting presents you to the King; and the lady-in-waiting
does the same to her Majesty. The King is a personable man;
but, my dear sister, he has a certain countenance, which you and
I have often remarked: a red face and white eyebrows. The
Queen has a similar countenance, and the numerous royal family
confirm the observation. Persons are not placed according to
their rank in the drawing-room, but promiscuously; and when the
King comes in, he takes persons as they stand. When he came


## p. 106 (#120) ############################################

106
ABIGAIL ADAMS
»
c
to me, Lord Onslow said, "Mrs. Adams; ” upon which I drew off
my right-hand glove, and his Majesty saluted my left cheek; then
asked me if I had taken a walk to-day. I could have told his
Majesty that I had been all the morning preparing to wait upon
him; but I replied, “No, Sire. ” «Why, don't you love walking ? »
“”
says he. I answered that I was rather indolent in that respect.
He then bowed, and passed on. It was more than two hours
after this before it came to my turn to be presented to the Queen.
The circle was so large that the company were four hours stand-
ing. The Queen was evidently embarrassed when I was presented
to her. I had disagreeable feelings, too. She, however, said,
“Mrs. Adams, have you got into your house? Pray, how do you
like the situation of it ? ” While the Princess Royal looked com-
passionate, and asked me if I was not much fatigued; and ob-
served, that it was a very full drawing-room. Her sister, who
came next, Princess Augusta, after having asked your niece if she
was ever in England before, and her answering « Yes,” inquired
of me how long ago, and supposed it was when she was very
young All this is said with much affability, and the ease and
freedom of old acquaintance. The manner in which they make
their tour round the room is, first, the Queen, the lady-in-waiting
behind her, holding up her train; next to her, the Princess Royal:
after her, Princess Augusta, and their lady-in-waiting behind them.
They are pretty, rather than beautiful; well-shaped, fair complex-
ions, and a tincture of the King's countenance. The two sisters
look much alike; they were both dressed in black and silver silk,
with silver netting upon the coat, and their heads full of diamond
pins. The Queen was in purple and silver. She is not well
shaped nor handsome. As to the ladies of the Court, rank and
title may compensate for want of personal charms; but they are,
in general, very plain, ill-shaped, and ugly; but don't you tell any.
body that I say so. If one wants to see beauty, one must go to
Ranelagh; there it is collected, in one bright constellation, There
were two ladies very elegant, at Court, - Lady Salisbury and
Lady Talbot; but the observation did not in general hold good
that fine feathers make fine birds. I saw many who were vastly
richer dressed than your friends, but I will venture to say that I
none neater or more elegant: which praise I ascribe to the
taste of Mrs. Temple and my mantuamaker; for, after having
declared that I would not have any foil or tinsel about me, they
fixed upon the dress I have described.
Saw


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ABIGAIL ADAMS
107
I
(Inclosure to her niece)
My Dear Betsey:
BELIEVE I once promised to give you an account of that kind
of visiting called a ladies' rout. There are two kinds; one
where a lady sets apart a particular day in the week to see
company. These are held only five months in the year, it being
quite out of fashion to be seen in London during the summer.
When a lady returns from the country she goes round and leaves
a card with all her acquaintance, and then sends them an invita-
tion to attend her routs during the season. The other kind is
where a lady sends to you for certain evenings, and the cards are
always addressed in her own name, both to gentlemen and ladies.
The rooms are all set open, and card tables set in each room, the
lady of the house receiving her company at the door of the draw-
ing-room, where a set number of courtesies are given and received,
with as much order as is necessary for a soldier who goes through
the different evolutions of his exercise. The visitor then proceeds
into the room without appearing to notice any other person, and
takes her seat at the card tablé.
«Nor can the muse her aid impart,
Unskilled in all the terms of art,
Nor in harmonious numbers put
The deal, the shuffle, and the cut.
Go, Tom, and light the ladies up,
It must be one before we sup. "
SO
At these parties it is usual for each lady to play a rubber, as
it is termed, when you must lose or win a few guineas. To give
each a fair chance, the lady then rises and gives her seat to
another set.
It is no unusual thing to have your rooms
crowded that not more than half the company can sit at once,
yet this is called society and polite life. They treat their com-
pany with coffee, tea, lemonade, orgeat, and cake. I know of
but one agreeable circumstance attending these parties, which is,
that you may go away when you please without disturbing any.
body.
I was early in the winter invited to Madame de Pinto's,
the Portuguese Minister's. I went accordingly. There were about
two hundred persons present. I knew not a single lady but by
sight, having met them at Court; and it is an established rule,
though you were to meet as often as three nights in the week,
never to speak together, or know each other unless particularly


## p. 108 (#122) ############################################

108
ABIGAIL ADAMS
introduced. I was, however, at no loss for conversation, Madame
de Pinto being very polite, and the foreign ministers being the
most of them present, who had dined with us, and to whom I
had been early introduced. It being Sunday evening, I declined
playing cards; indeed, I always get excused when I can. And
Heaven forbid I should
“Catch the manners living as they rise. ”
Yet I must submit to a party or two of this kind. Having
attended several, I must return the compliment in the same way.
Yesterday we dined at Mrs. Paradice's. I refer you to Mr.
Storer for an account of this family. Mr. Jefferson, Colonel
Smith, the Prussian and Venetian ministers, were of the com-
pany, and several other persons who were strangers. At eight
o'clock we returned home in order to dress ourselves for the ball
at the French Ambassador's, to which we had received an invi.
tation a fortnight before. He has been absent ever since our
arrival here, till three weeks ago. He has a levee every Sunday
evening, at which there are usually several hundred persons.
The Hotel de France is beautifully situated, fronting St. James's
Park, one end of the house standing upon Hyde Park.
It is a
most superb building. About half-past nine we went, and found
some company collected. Many very brilliant ladies of the first
distinction were present. The dancing commenced about ten,
and the rooms soon filled. The room which he had built for this
purpose is large enough for five or six hundred persons. It is
most elegantly decorated, hung with a gold tissue, ornamented
with twelve brilliant cut lustres, each containing twenty-four
candles. At one end there are two large arches; these were
adorned with wreaths and bunches of artificial fowers upon the
walls; in the alcoves were cornucopiæ loaded with oranges, sweet-
meats, and other trifles. Coffee, tea, lemonade, orgeat, and so
forth, were taken here by every person who chose to go for
them. There were covered seats all around the room for those
who chose to dance. In the other rooms, card tables, and a
large faro table, were set; this is a new kind of game, which is
much practiced here. Many of the company who did not dance
retired here to amuse themselves. The whole style of the house
and furniture is such as becomes the ambassador from one of the
first monarchies in Europe. He had twenty thousand guineas
allowed him in the first instance to furnish his house, and an


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HENRY ADAMS
109
annual salary of ten thousand more. He has agreeably blended
the magnificence and splendor of France with the neatness and
elegance of England. Your cousin had unfortunately taken a
cold a few days before, and was very unfit to go out. She
appeared so unwell that about one we retired without staying for
supper, the sight of which only I regretted, as it was, in style,
no doubt, superior to anything I have seen. The Prince of
Wales came about eleven o'clock. Mrs. Fitzherbert was also
present, but I could not distinguish her. But who is this lady?
methinks I hear you say. She is a lady to whom, against the
laws of the realm, the Prince of Wales is privately married, as is
universally believed. She appears with him in all public parties,
and he avows his marriage wherever he dares. They have been
the topic of conversation in all companies for a long time, and it
is now said that a young George may be expected in the course
of the summer. She was a widow of about thirty-two years of
age, whom he a long time persecuted in order to get her upon
his own terms; but finding he could not succeed, he quieted her
conscience by matrimony, which, however valid in the eye of
heaven, is set aside by the laws of the land, which forbids a
prince of the blood to marry a subject. As to dresses, I believe
I must leave them to be described to your sister. I am sorry I
have nothing better to send you than a sash and a Vandyke
ribbon. The narrow is to put round the edge of a hat, or you
may trim whatever you please with it.
1
HENRY ADAMS
(1838-)
HE gifts of expression and literary taste which have always
characterized the Adams family are most prominently rep-
resented by this historian. He has also its great memory,
power of acquisition, intellectual independence, and energy of nature.
The latter is tempered in him with inherited self-control, the mod-
eration of judgment bred by wide historical knowledge, and a pervas-
ive atmosphere of literary good-breeding which constantly substitutes
allusive irony for crude statement, the rapier for the tomahawk.
Henry Adams is the third son of Charles Francis Adams, Sr. ,
the able Minister to England during the Civil War, - and grandson


## p. 110 (#124) ############################################

IIO
HENRY ADAMS
of John Quincy Adams. He was born in Boston, February 16th, 1838,
graduated from Harvard in 1858, and served as private secretary to
his father in England. In 1870 he became editor of the North
American Review and Professor of History at Harvard, in which
place he won wide repute for originality and power of inspiring
enthusiasm for research in his pupils.
He has written several essays
and books on historical subjects, and edited others, — Essays on
Anglo-Saxon Law (1876), Documents Relating to New England Fed-
eralism' (1877), 'Albert Gallatin' (1879), 'Writings of Albert Gallatin'
(1879), John Randolph (1882) in the American Statesmen'Series,
and Historical Essays'; but his great life-work and monument is his
History of the United States, 1801-17' (the Jefferson and Madison
administrations), to write which he left his professorship in 1877, and
after passing many years in London, in other foreign capitals, in
Washington, and elsewhere, studying archives, family papers, pub-
lished works, shipyards, and many other things, in preparation for
it, published the first volume in 1889, and the last in 1891. It is in
nine volumes, of which the introductory chapters and the index make
up one.
The work in its inception (though not in its execution) is a
polemic tract — a family vindication, an act of pious duty; its sub-
title might be, A Justification of John Quincy Adams for Breaking
with the Federalist Party. ' So taken, the reader who loves historical
fights and seriously desires truth should read the chapters on the
Hartford Convention and its preliminaries side by side with the
corresponding pages in Henry Cabot Lodge's Life of George Cabot. "
If he cannot judge from the pleadings of these two able advocates
with briefs for different sides, it is not for lack of full exposition.
But the History' is far more and higher than a piece of special
pleading. It is in the main, both as to domestic and international
matters, a resolutely cool and impartial presentation of facts and
judgments on all sides of a period where passionate partisanship lies
almost in the very essence of the questions- a tone contrasting oddly
with the political action and feeling of the two Presidents. Even
where, as toward the New England Federalists, many readers will
consider him unfair in his deductions, he never tampers with or
unfairly proportions the facts.
The work is a model of patient study, not alone of what is con-
ventionally accepted as historic material, but of all subsidiary matter
necessary to expert discussion of the problems involved. He goes
deeply into economic and social facts; he has instructed himself in
military science like a West Point student, in army needs like a quar-
termaster, in naval construction, equipment, and management like
a naval officer, Of purely literary qualities, the history presents a


## p. 111 (#125) ############################################

HENRY ADAMS
II
high order of constructive art in amassing minute details without
obscuring the main outlines; luminous statement; and the results of
a very powerful memory, which enables him to keep before his
vision every incident of the long chronicle with its involved group-
ings, so that an armory of instructive comparisons, as well as of
polemic missiles, is constantly ready to his hand. He follows the
latest historical canons as to giving authorities.
The history advances many novel views, and controverts many
accepted facts. The relation of Napoleon's warfare against Hayti
and Toussaint to the great Continental struggle, and the position he
assigns it as the turning point of that greater contest, is perhaps
the most important of these. But almost as striking are his views
on the impressment problem and the provocations to the War of
1812; wherein he leads to the most unexpected deduction, — namely,
that the grievances on both sides were much greater than is generally
supposed. He shows that the profit and security of the American
merchant service drew thousands of English seamen into it, where
they changed their names and passed for American citizens, greatly
embarrassing English naval operations. On the other hand, he shows
that English outrages and insults were so gross that no nation with
spirit enough to be entitled to separate existence ought to have
endured them. He reverses the severe popular judgment on Madi-
son for consenting to the war - on the assumed ground of coveting
another term as President - which every other historian and biogra-
pher from Hildreth to Sydney Howard Gay has pronounced, and
which has become a stock historical convention; holds Jackson's
campaign ending at New Orleans an imbecile undertaking redeemed
only by an act of instinctive pugnacity at the end; gives Scott and
Jacob Brown the honor they have never before received in fair
measure; and in many other points redistributes praise and blame
with entire independence, and with curious effect on many popular
ideas. His views on the Hartford Convention of 1814 are part of the
Federalist controversy already referred to.
THE AUSPICES OF THE WAR OF 1812
From "History of the United States); copyright 1890, by Charles Scribner's Sons
HE American declaration of war against England, July 18th,
1812, annoyed those European nations that were gathering
their utmost resources for resistance to Napoleon's attack.
Russia could not but regard it as an unfriendly act, equally bad
for political and commercial interests. Spain and Portugal, whose
armies were fed largely if not chiefly on American grain imported
T":817, annoyed those European nations that were gathering


## p. 112 (#126) ############################################

II2
HENRY ADAMS
by British money under British protection, dreaded to see their
supplies cut off. Germany, waiting only for strength to recover
her freedom, had to reckon against one more element in Napo-
leon's vast military resources. England needed to make greater
efforts in order to maintain the advantages she had gained in
Russia and Spain. Even in America no one doubted the earnest-
ness of England's wish for peace; and if Madison and Monroe
insisted on her acquiescence in their terms, they insisted because
they believed that their military position entitled them to expect
it. The reconquest of Russia and Spain by Napoleon, an event
almost certain to happen, could hardly fail to force from England
the concessions, not in themselves unreasonable, which the United
States required.
This was, as Madison to the end of his life maintained, «a
fair calculation;” but it was exasperating to England, who thought
that America ought to be equally interested with Europe in over-
throwing the military despotism of Napoleon, and should not con-
spire with him for gain. At first the new war disconcerted the
feeble Ministry that remained in office on the death of Spencer
Perceval: they counted on preventing it, and did their utmost to
stop it after it was begun. The tone of arrogance which had so
long characterized government and press disappeared for the
moment. Obscure newspapers, like the London Evening Star, still
sneered at the idea that Great Britain was to be driven from
the proud pre-eminence which the blood and treasure of her sons
have attained for her among the nations, by a piece of striped
bunting flying at the mastheads of a few fir-built frigates, manned
by a handful of bastards and outlaws," - a phrase which had
great success in America, — but such defiances expressed a temper
studiously held in restraint previous to the moment when the war
was seen to be inevitable.
The realization that no escape could be found from an Ameri-
can war was forced on the British public at a moment of much
discouragement. Almost simultaneously a series of misfortunes
occurred which brought the stoutest and most intelligent English-
men to the verge of despair. In Spain Wellington, after win-
ning the battle of Salamanca in July, occupied Madrid in August,
and obliged Soult to evacuate Andalusia; but his siege of Burgos
failed, and as the French generals concentrated their scattered
forces, Wellington was obliged to abandon Madrid once more.
October 21st he was again in full retreat on Portuga The


## p. 113 (#127) ############################################

HENRY ADAMS
I13
apparent failure of his campaign was almost simultaneous with the
apparent success of Napoleon's; for the Emperor entered Moscow
September 14th, and the news of this triumph, probably decisive
of Russian submission, reached England about October 3d. Three
days later arrived intelligence of William Hull's surrender at
Detroit; but this success was counterbalanced by simultaneous
news of Isaac Hull's startling capture of the Guerrière, and the
certainty of a prolonged war.
In the desponding condition of the British people, — with a de-
ficient harvest, bad weather, wheat at nearly five dollars a bushel,
and the American supply likely to be cut off; consols at 5772,
gold at thirty per cent. premium; a Ministry without creditor
authority, and a general consciousness of blunders, incompetence,
and corruption, - every new tale of disaster sank the hopes of
-
England and called out wails of despair. In that state of mind
the loss of the Guerrière assumed portentous dimensions. The
Times was especially loud in lamenting the capture: -
“We witnessed the gloom which that event cast over high and
honorable minds.
Never before in the history of the world
did an English frigate strike to an American; and though we cannot
say that Captain Dacres, under all circumstances, is punishable for
this act, yet we do say there are commanders in the English navy
who would a thousand times rather have gone down with their colors
flying, than have set their fellow sailors so fatal an example. ”
No country newspaper in America, railing at Hull's cowardice
and treachery, showed less knowledge or judgment than the Lon-
don Times, which had written of nothing but war since its name
had been known in England. Any American could have assured
the English press that British frigates before the Guerrière had
struck to American; and even in England men had not forgotten
the name of the British frigate Serapis, or that of the American
captain Paul Jones. Yet the Times's ignorance was less unrea-
sonable than its requirement that Dacres should have gone down
with his ship,-a cry of passion the more unjust to Dacres
because he fought his ship as long as she could float. Such
sensitiveness seemed extravagant in a society which had been
hardened by centuries of warfare; yet the Times reflected fairly
the feelings of Englishmen. George Canning, speaking in open
Parliament not long afterward, said that the loss of the Guerri-
ère and the Macedonian produced a sensation in the country
scarcely to be equaled by the most violent convulsions of nature.
I
1-8


## p. 114 (#128) ############################################

114
HENRY ADAMS
“Neither can I agree with those who complain of the shock of
consternation throughout Great Britain as having been greater
than the occasion required.
It cannot be too deeply felt
that the sacred spell of the invincibility of the British navy was
broken by those unfortunate captures. ”
Of all spells that could be cast on a nation, that of believing
itself invincible was perhaps the one most profitably broken; but
the process of recovering its senses was agreeable to no nation,
and to England, at that moment of distress, it was as painful as
Canning described. The matter was not mended by the Courier
and Morning Post, who, taking their tone from the Admiralty,
complained of the enormous superiority of the American frigates,
and called them line-of-battle ships in disguise. ” Certainly the
American forty-four was a much heavier ship than the British
thirty-eight, but the difference had been as well known in the
British navy before these actions as it was afterward; and Cap-
tain Dacres himself, the Englishman who best knew the relative
force of the ships, told his court of inquiry a different story:-
«I am so well aware that the success of my opponent was owing
to fortune, that it is my earnest wish, and would be the happiest
period of my life, to be once more opposed to the Constitution,
with them (the old crew] under my command, in a frigate of
similar force with the Guerrière. ” After all had been said, the
unpleasant result remained that in future, British frigates, like
other frigates, could safely fight only their inferiors in force.
What applied to the Guerrière and Macedonian against the Con-
stitution and United States, where the British force was inferior,
applied equally to the Frolic against the Wasp, where no inferi-
ority could be shown. The British newspapers thenceforward
admitted what America wished to prove, that, ship for ship,
British were no more than the equals of Americans.
Society soon learned to take a more sensible view of the sub-
ject; but as the first depression passed away, a consciousness of
personal wrong took its place. The United States were supposed
to have stabbed England in the back at the moment when her
hands were tied, when her existence was in the most deadly peril
and her anxieties were most heavy. England never could forgive
treason so base and cowardice so vile. That Madison had been
from the first a tool and accomplice of Bonaparte was thence-
forward so fixed an idea in British history that time could not
shake it. Indeed, so complicated and so historical ha the causes
-


## p. 115 (#129) ############################################

HENRY ADAMS
115
of war become that no one even in America could explain or
understand them, while Englishmen could see only that America
required England as the price of peace to destroy herself by
abandoning her naval power, and that England preferred to die
fighting rather than to die by her own hand. The American
party in England was extinguished; no further protest was heard
against the war; and the British people thought moodily of
revenge.
This result was unfortunate for both parties, but was doubly
unfortunate for America, because her mode of making the issue
told in her enemy's favor. The same impressions which silenced
in England open sympathy with America, stimulated in America
acute sympathy with England. Argument was useless against
people in a passion, convinced of their own injuries. Neither
Englishmen nor Federalists were open to reasoning. They found
their action easy from the moment they classed the United States
as an ally of France, like Bavaria or Saxony; and they had no
scruples of conscience, for the practical alliance was clear, and the
fact proved sufficiently the intent.
The loss of two or three thirty-eight-gun frigates on the
ocean was a matter of trifling consequence to the British govern-
ment, which had a force of four ships-of-the-line and six or eight
frigates in Chesapeake Bay alone, and which built every year
dozens of ships-of-the-line and frigates to replace those lost or
worn out; but although American privateers wrought more in-
jury to British interests than was caused or could be caused by
the American navy, the pride of Engand cared little about mer-
cantile losses, and cared immensely for its fighting reputation.
The theory that the American was a degenerate Englishman -a
theory chiefly due to American teachings — lay at the bottom of
British politics. Even the late British minister at Washington,
Foster, a man of average intelligence, thought it manifest good
taste and good sense to say of the Americans in his speech of
February 18th, 1813, in Parliament, that "generally speaking,
they were not a people we should be proud to acknowledge as
our relations. ” Decatur and Hull were engaged in a social
rather than in a political contest, and were aware that the
serious work on their hands had little to do with England's
power, but much to do with her manners. The mortification of
England at the capture of her frigates was the measure of her
previous arrogance.


## p. 116 (#130) ############################################

116
HENRY ADAMS
Every country must begin war by asserting that it will never
give way; and of all countries England, which had waged innu-
merable wars, knew best when perseverance cost more than con-
cession. Even at that early moment Parliament was evidently
perplexed, and would willingly have yielded had it seen means of
escape from its naval fetich, impressment. Perhaps the perplexity
was more evident in the Commons than in the Lords; for Castle-
reagh, while defending his own course with elaborate care, visibly
stumbled over the right of impressment. Even while claiming
that its abandonment would have been vitally dangerous if not
fatal” to England's security, he added that he would be the
last man in the world to underrate the inconvenience which the
Americans sustained in consequence of our assertion of the right
of search. ” The embarrassment became still plainer when he
narrowed the question to one of statistics, and showed that the
whole contest was waged over the forcible retention of some
eight hundred seamen among one hundred and forty-five thou-
sand employed in British service. Granting the number were
twice as great, he continued, “would the House believe that there
was any man so infatuated, or that the British empire was driven
to such straits that for such a paltry consideration as seventeen
hundred sailors, his Majesty's government would needlessly irri-
tate the pride of a neutral nation or violate that justice which
was due to one country from another? ” If Liverpool's argument
explained the causes of war, Castlereagh's explained its inevitable
result; for since the war must cost England at least 10,000,000
pounds a year, could Parliament be so infatuated as to pay 10,000
pounds a year for each American sailor detained in service, when
one-tenth of the amount, if employed in raising the wages of the
British sailor, would bring any required number of seamen back
to their ships ? The whole British navy in 1812 cost 20,000,000
pounds; the pay-roll amounted to only 3,000,000 pounds; the
common sailor was paid four pounds bounty and eighteen pounds
a year, which might have been trebled at half the cost of an
American war.


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117 (#131) ############################################

HENRY ADAMS
117
1
WHAT THE WAR OF 1812 DEMONSTRATED
1
A
1
1
From History of the United States): copyright 1890, by Charles Scribner's Sons
PEOPLE whose chief trait was antipathy to war, and to any
system organized with military energy, could scarcely develop
great results in national administration; yet the Americans
prided themselves chiefly on their political capacity. Even the
war did not undeceive them, although the incapacity brought into
evidence by the war was undisputed, and was most remarkable
among the communities which believed themselves to be most
gifted with political sagacity. Virginia and Massachusetts by turns
admitted failure in dealing with issues so simple that the newest
societies, like Tennessee and Ohio, understood them by instinct.
That incapacity in national politics should appear as a leading
trait in American character was unexpected by Americans, but
might naturally result from their conditions. The better test of
American character was not political but social, and was to be
found not in the government but in the people.
The sixteen years of Jefferson and Madison's rule furnished
international tests of popular intelligence upon which Americans
could depend. The ocean was the only open field for competition
among nations. Americans enjoyed there no natural or artificial
advantages over Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Spaniards; indeed,
all these countries possessed navies, resources, and experience
greater than were to be found in the United States, Yet the
Americans developed, in the course of twenty years, a surprising
degree of skill in naval affairs. The evidence of their success was
to be found nowhere so complete as in the avowals of English-
men who knew best the history of naval progress. The Ameri.
can invention of the fast-sailing schooner or clipper was the more
remarkable because, of all American inventions, this alone sprang
from direct competition with Europe. During ten centuries of
struggle the nations of Europe had labored to obtain superiority
over each other in ship-construction; yet Americans instantly
made improvements which gave them superiority, and which
Europeans were unable immediately to imitate even after seeing
them. Not only were American vessels better in model, faster in
sailing, easier and quicker in handling, and more economical in
working than the European, but they were also better equipped.
The English complained as a grievance that the Americans


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118
HENRY ADAMS
adopted new and unwarranted devices in naval warfare; that their
vessels were heavier and better constructed, and their missiles of
unusual shape and improper use. The Americans resorted to
expedients that had not been tried before, and excited a mixture
of irritation and respect in the English service, until “Yankee
smartness » became a national misdemeanor.
The English admitted themselves to be slow to change their
habits, but the French were both quick and scientific; yet Ameri-
cans did on the ocean what the French, under stronger induce-
ments, failed to do. The French privateer preyed upon British
commerce for twenty years without seriously injuring it; but no
sooner did the American privateer sail from French ports than
the rates of insurance doubled in London, and an outcry for pro-
tection arose among English shippers which the Admiralty could
not calm. The British newspapers were filled with assertions
that the American cruiser was the superior of any vessel of its
class, and threatened to overthrow England's supremacy on the
ocean.
Another test of relative intelligence was furnished by the
battles at sea. Instantly after the loss of the Guerrière the
English discovered and complained that American gunnery was
superior to their own. They explained their inferiority by the
length of time that had elapsed since their navy had found on
the ocean an enemy to fight. Every vestige of hostile fleets had
been swept away, until, after the battle of Trafalgar, British
frigates ceased practice with their guns. Doubtless the British
navy had become somewhat careless in the absence of a danger-
ous enemy, but Englishmen were themselves aware that some
other cause must have affected their losses. Nothing showed that
Nelson's line-of-battle ships, frigates, or sloops were, as a rule,
better fought than the Macedonian and Java, the Avon and
Reindeer. Sir Howard Douglas, the chief authority on the
subject, attempted in vain to explain British reverses by the
deterioration of British gunnery.
His analysis showed only that
American gunnery was extraordinarily good. Of all vessels, the
sloop-of-war-on account of its smallness, its quick motion, and
its
accurate armament of thirty-two-pound carronades -
offered the best test of relative gunnery, and Sir Howard Douglas
in commenting upon the destruction of the Peacock and Avon
could only say:— “In these two actions it is clear that the fire of
the British vessels was thrown too high, and that the ordnance
more


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HENRY ADAMS
119
of their opponents were expressly and carefully aimed at and
took effect chiefly in the hull. ”
The battle of the Hornet and Penguin, as well as those of
the Reindeer and Avon, showed that the excellence of American
gunnery continued till the close of the war. Whether at point-
blank range or at long-distance practice, the Americans used guns
as they had never been used at sea before.
None of the reports of former British victories showed that
the British fire had been more destructive at any previous time
than in 1812, and no report of any commander since the British
navy existed showed so much damage inflicted on an opponent in
so short a time as was proved to have been inflicted on them-
selves by the reports of British commanders in the American
war. The strongest proof of American superiority was given by
the best British officers, like Broke, who strained every nerve to
maintain an equality with American gunnery. So instantaneous
and energetic was the effort that according to the British historian
of the war, “A British forty-six-gun frigate of 1813 was half as
effective again as a British forty-six-gun frigate of 1812;" and as
he justly said, “the slaughtered crews and the shattered hulks of
the captured British ships proved that no want of their old fight-
ing qualities accounted for their repeated and almost habitual
mortifications.
Unwilling as the English were to admit the superior skill of
Americans on the ocean, they did not hesitate to admit it, in
certain respects, on land. The American rifle in American hands
was affirmed to have no equal in the world. This admission
could scarcely be withheld after the lists of killed and wounded
which followed almost every battle; but the admission served to
check a wider inquiry. In truth, the rifle played but a small part
in the war.
Winchester's men at the river Raisin may have
owed their over-confidence, as the British Forty-first owed its
losses, to that weapon, and at New Orleans five or six hundred
of Coffee's men, who were out of range, were armed with the
rifle; but the surprising losses of the British were commonly due
to artillery and musketry fire. At New Orleans the artillery was
chiefly engaged. The artillery battle of January ist, according to
British accounts, amply proved the superiority of American
gunnery on that occasion, which was probably the fairest test
during the war. The battle of January 8th was also chiefly an
artillery battle: the main British column never arrived within fair
1
1
1


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I 20
HENRY ADAMS
musket range; Pakenham was killed by a grape-shot, and the
main column of his troops halted more than one hundred yards
from the parapet.
The best test of British and American military qualities, both
for men and weapons, was Scott's battle of Chippawa. Nothing
intervened to throw a doubt over the fairness of the trial Two
parallel lines of regular soldiers, practically equal in numbers,
armed with similar weapons, moved in close order toward each
other across a wide, open plain, without cover or advantage of
position, stopping at intervals to load and fire, until one line
broke and retired. At the same time two three-gun batteries,
the British being the heavier, maintained a steady fire from posi-
tions opposite each other. According to the reports, the
infantry lines in the centre never came nearer than eighty yards.
Major-General Riall reported that then, owing to severe losses,
his troops broke and could not be rallied. Comparison of official
reports showed that the British lost in killed and wounded four
hundred and sixty-nine men; the Americans, two hundred and
ninety-six. Some doubts always affect the returns of wounded,
because the severity of the wound cannot be known; but dead
men tell their own tale. Riall reported one hundred and forty-
eight killed; Scott reported sixty-one. The severity of the losses
showed that the battle was sharply contested, and proved the
personal bravery of both armies. Marksmanship decided the re-
sult, and the returns proved that the American fire was superior
to that of the British in the proportion of more than fifty per
cent. if estimated by the entire loss, and of two hundred and
forty-two to one hundred if estimated by the deaths alone.
The conclusion seemed incredible, but it was supported by the
results of the naval battles. The Americans showed superiority
amounting in some cases to twice the efficiency of their enemies
in the use of weapons.
The best French critic of the naval war,
Jurien de la Gravière, said: -“An enormous superiority in the
rapidity and precision of their fire can alone explain the differ-
ence in the losses sustained by the combatants. ” So far from
denying this conclusion, the British press constantly alleged it,
and the British officers complained of it. The discovery caused
great surprise, and in both British services much attention was
at once directed to improvement in artillery and musketry. Noth-
ing could exceed the frankness with which Englishmen avowed
their inferiority. According to Sir Francis Head, "gunnery was


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HENRY ADAMS
I 21
in naval warfare in the extraordinary state of ignorance we have
just described, when our lean children, the American people,
taught us, rod in hand, our first lesson in the art. ” The English
text-book on Naval Gunnery, written by Major-General Sir How-
ard Douglas immediately after the peace, devoted more attention
to the short American war than to all the battles of Napoleon,
and began by admitting that Great Britain had entered with too
great confidence on war with a marine much more expert than
that of any of our European enemies. ” The admission appeared
"objectionable even to the author; but he did not add, what
was equally true, that it applied as well to the land as to the sea
service.
No one questioned the bravery of the British forces, or the
ease with which they often routed larger bodies of militia; but
the losses they inflicted were rarely as great as those they suf-
fered. Even at Bladensburg, where they met little resistance, their
loss was several times greater than that of the Americans. At
Plattsburg, where the intelligence and quickness of Macdonough
and his men alone won the victory, his ships were in effect sta-
tionary batteries, and enjoyed the same superiority in gunnery.
« The Saratoga,” said his official report, “had fifty-five round-shot
in her hull; the Confiance, one hundred and five. The enemy's
shot passed principally just over our heads, as there were not
twenty whole hammocks in the nettings at the close of the action. ”
The greater skill of the Americans was not due to special
training; for the British service was better trained in gunnery, as
in everything else, than the motley armies and fleets that fought
at New Orleans and on the Lakes. Critics constantly said that
every American had learned from his childhood the use of the
rifle; but he certainly had not learned to use cannon in shooting
birds or hunting deer, and he knew less than the Englishman
about the handling of artillery and muskets. The same intelli-
gence that selected the rifle and the long pivot-gun for favorite
weapons was shown in handling the carronade, and every other
instrument however clumsy.
Another significant result of the war was the sudden develop-
ment of scientific engineering in the United States. This branch
of the military service owed its efficiency and almost its existence
to the military school at West Point, established in 1802. The
school was at first much neglected by government. The number
of graduates before the year 1812 was very small; but at the


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I 22
HENRY ADAMS
outbreak of the war the corps of engineers was already efficient.
Its chief was Colonel Joseph Gardner Swift, of Massachusetts,
the first graduate of the academy: Colonel Swift planned the
defenses of New York Harbor. The lieutenant-colonel in 1812
was Walker Keith Armistead, of Virginia, - the third graduate,
who planned the defenses of Norfolk. Major William McRee, of
North Carolina, became chief engineer to General Brown and
constructed the fortifications at Fort Erie, which cost the British
General Gordon Drummond the loss of half his army, besides the
mortification of defeat. Captain Eleazer Derby Wood, of New
York, constructed Fort Meigs, which enabled Harrison to defeat
the attack of Proctor in May, 1813. Captain Joseph Gilbert
Totten, of New York, was chief engineer to General Izard at
Plattsburg, where he directed the fortifications that stopped the
advance of Prevost's great army. None of the works constructed
by a graduate of West Point was captured by the enemy; and
had an engineer been employed at Washington by Armstrong
and Winder, the city would have been easily saved.
Perhaps without exaggeration the West Point Academy might
be said to have decided, next to the navy, the result of the war.
The works at New Orleans were simple in character, and as far
as they were due to engineering skill were directed by Major
Latour, a Frenchman; but the war was already ended when the
battle of New Orleans was fought. During the critical campaign
of 1814, the West Point engineers doubled the capacity of the
little American army for resistance, and introduced a new and
scientific character into American life.
THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE GUER-
RIÈRE
From (History of the United States): copyright 1890, by Charles Scribner's Sons
A
s BROKE's squadron swept along the coast it seized whatever
it met, and on July 16th caught one of President Jefferson's
sixteen-gun brigs, the Nautilus. The next day it came on
a richer prize. The American navy seemed ready to outstrip the
army in the race for disaster. The Constitution, the best frigate
in the United States service, sailed into the midst of Broke's five
ships. Captain Isaac Hull, in command of the Constitution, had
been detained at Annapolis shipping a new crew until July 5th,


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HENRY ADAMS
123
the day when Broke's squadron left Halifax; then the ship got
under way and stood down Chesapeake Bay on her voyage to
New York. The wind was ahead and very light. Not until July
1oth did the ship anchor off Cape Henry lighthouse, and not till
sunrise of July 12th did she stand to the eastward and northward.
Light head winds and a strong current delayed her progress till
July 17th, when at two o'clock in the afternoon, off Barnegat on
the New Jersey coast, the lookout at the masthead discovered
four sails to the northward, and two hours later a fifth sail to the
northeast. Hull took them for Rodgers's squadron. The wind
was light, and Hull being to windward determined to speak the
nearest vessel, the last to come in sight. The afternoon passed
without bringing the ships together, and at ten o'clock in the
evening, finding that the nearest ship could not answer the night
signal, Hull decided to lose no time in escaping.
Then followed one of the most exciting and sustained chases
recorded in naval history. At daybreak the next morning one
British frigate was astern within five or six miles, two more were
to leeward, and the rest of the fleet some ten miles astern, all
making chase. Hull put out his boats to tow the Constitution;
Broke summoned the boats of the squadron to tow the Shannon.
Hull then bent all his spare rope to the cables, dropped a small
anchor half a mile ahead, in twenty-six fathoms of water, and
warped his ship along. Broke quickly imitated the device, and
slowly gained on the chase. The Guerrière crept so near Hull's
lee beam as to open fire, but her shot fell short. Fortunately the
wind, though slight, favored Hull. All night the British and
American crews toiled on, and when morning came the Belvidera,
proving to be the best sailer, got in advance of her consorts,
working two kedge anchors, until at two o'clock in the afternoon
she tried in her turn to reach the Constitution with her bow
guns, but in vain. Hull expected capture, but the Belvidera
could not approach nearer without bringing her boats under the
Constitution's stern guns; and the wearied crews toiled on, towing
and kedging, the ships barely out of gunshot, till another morn-
ing came.
The breeze, though still light, then allowed Hull to
take in his boats, the Belvidera being two and a half miles in his
wake, the Shannon three and a half miles on his lee, and the
three other frigates well to leeward. The wind freshened, and
the Constitution drew ahead, until, toward seven o'clock in the
evening of July 19th, a heavy rain squall struck the ship, and by
.


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I 24
HENRY ADAMS
taking skillful advantage of it Hull left the Belvidera and Shan-
non far astern; yet until eight o'clock the next morning they
were still in sight, keeping up the chase.
Perhaps nothing during the war tested American seamanship
more thoroughly than these three days of combined skill and
endurance in the face of the irresistible enemy. The result
showed that Hull and the Constitution had nothing to fear in
these respects. There remained the question whether the superi-
ority extended to his guns; and such was the contempt of the
British naval officers for American ships, that with this experi-
ience before their eyes they still believed one of their thirty-eight-
gun frigates to be more than a match for an American forty-four,
although the American, besides the heavier armament, had proved
his capacity to outsail and out-manæuvre the Englishman. Both
parties became more eager than ever for the test. For once, even
the Federalists of New England felt their blood stir; for their
own President and their own votes had called these frigates into
existence, and a victory won by the Constitution, which had been
built by their hands, was in their eyes a greater victory over
their political opponents than over the British. With no half-
hearted spirit the seagoing Bostonians showered well-weighed
praises on Hull when his ship entered Boston Harbor, July 26th,
after its narrow escape, and when he sailed again New England
waited with keen interest to learn his fate.
Hull could not expect to keep command of the Constitution.
Bainbridge was much his senior, and had the right to a prefer-
ence in active service. Bainbridge then held and was ordered to
retain command of the Constellation, fitting out at the Wash-
ington Navy Yard; but Secretary Hamilton, July 28th, ordered
him to take command also of the Constitution on her arrival in
port. Doubtless Hull expected this change, and probably the
expectation induced him to risk a dangerous experiment; for
;
without bringing his ship to the Charlestown Navy Yard, but
remaining in the outer harbor, after obtaining such supplies as he
needed, August 2d, he set sail without orders, and stood to the
eastward. Having reached Cape Race without meeting an enemy,
he turned southward, until on the night of August 18th he spoke
a privateer, which told him of a British frigate near at hand.
Following the privateersman's directions, the Constitution the next
day, August 19th, (1812,] at two o'clock in the afternoon, latitude
41 deg. 42 min. , longitude 55 deg. 48 min. , sighted the Guerrière.
1


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HENRY ADAMS
125
The meeting was welcome on both sides. Only three days
before, Captain Dacres had entered on the log of a merchantman
a challenge to any American frigate to meet him off Sandy Hook.
Not only had the Guerrière for a long time been extremely offens-
ive to every seafaring American, but the mistake which caused
the Little Belt to suffer so seriously for the misfortune of being
taken for the Guerrière had caused a corresponding feeling of
anger in the officers of the British frigate. The meeting of Au-
gust 19th had the character of a preconcerted duel.
The wind was blowing fresh from the northwest, with the sea
running high. Dacres backed his main topsail and waited. Hull
shortened sail, and ran down before the wind. For about an
hour the two ships wore and wore again, trying to get advantage
of position; until at last, a few minutes before six o'clock, they
came together side by side, within pistol shot, the wind almost
astern, and running before it, they pounded each other with all
their strength. As rapidly as the guns could be worked, the
Constitution poured in broadside after broadside, double-shotted
with round and grape; and without exaggeration, the echo of
these guns startled the world. "In less than thirty minutes from
the time we got alongside of the enemy,” reported Hull, she
was left without a spar standing, and the hull cut to pieces in
such a manner as to make it difficult to keep her above water. ”
That Dacres should have been defeated was not surprising;
that he should have expected to win was an example of British
arrogance that explained and excused the war. The length of the
Constitution was one hundred and seventy-three feet, that of the
Guerrière was one hundred and fifty-six feet; the extreme breadth
of the Constitution was forty-four feet, that of the Guerrière was
forty feet: or within a few inches in both cases. The Consti-
tution carried thirty-two long twenty-four-pounders, the Guerri.
ère thirty long eighteen-pounders and two long twelve-pounders;
the Constitution carried twenty thirty-two-pound carronades, the
Guerrière sixteen. In every respect, and in proportion of ten to
seven, the Constitution was the better ship; her crew was more
numerous in proportion of ten to six. Dacres knew this very
nearly as well as it was known to Hull, yet he sought a duel.
What he did not know was that in a still greater proportion
the American officers and crew were better and more intelligent
seamen than the British, and that their passionate wish to repay
old scores gave them extraordinary energy. So much greater


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126
JOHN ADAMS
was the moral superiority than the physical, that while the
Guerrière's force counted as seven against ten, her losses counted
as though her force were only two against ten.
Dacres's error cost him dear; for among the Guerrière's crew
of two hundred and seventy-two, seventy-nine were killed or
wounded, and the ship was injured beyond saving before Dacres
realized his mistake, although he needed only thirty minutes of
close fighting for the purpose. He never fully understood the
causes of his defeat, and never excused it by pleading, as he
might have done, the great superiority of his enemy.
Hull took his prisoners on board the Constitution, and after
blowing up the Guerrière sailed for Boston, where he arrived on
the morning of August 30th. The Sunday silence of the Puritan
city broke into excitement as the news passed through the quiet
streets that the Constitution was below in the outer harbor with
Dacres and his crew prisoners on board. No experience of his-
tory ever went to the heart of New England more directly than
this victory, so peculiarly its own: but the delight was not confined
to New England, and extreme though it seemed, it was still not
extravagant; for however small the affair might appear on the
general scale of the world's battles, it raised the United States
in one half-hour to the rank of a first class Power in the world.
Selections used by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons, Publishers.
JOHN ADAMS
(1735-1826)
OHN ADAMS, second President of the United States, was born
at Braintree, Mass. , October 19th, 1735, and died there July
4th, 1826, the year after his son too was inaugurated Presi-
dent. He was the first conspicuous member of an enduringly pow-
erful and individual family. The Adams race have mostly been
vehement, proud, pugnacious, and independent, with hot tempers and
strong wills; but with high ideals, dramatic devotion to duty, and the
intense democratic sentiment so often found united with personal
aristocracy of feeling. They have been men of affairs first, with large
practical ability, but with a deep strain of the man of letters which
in this generation has outshone the other faculties; strong-headed and
hard-working students, with powerful memories and fluent gifts of
expression.


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JOHN ADAMS


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JOHN ADAMS.


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1


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JOHN ADAMS
127
All these characteristics went to make up John Adams; but their
enumeration does not furnish a complete picture of him, or reveal the
virile, choleric, masterful man. And he was far more lovable and far
more popular than his equally great son, also a typical Adams, from
the same cause which produced some of his worst blunders and mis-
fortunes,- a generous impulsiveness of feeling which made it impos-
sible for him to hold his tongue at the wrong time and place for
talking. But so fervid, combative, and opinionated a man was sure
to gain much more hate than love; because love results from compre-
hension, which only the few close to him could have, while hate —
toward an honest man—is the outcome of ignorance, which most of
the world cannot avoid. Admiration and respect, however, he had
from the majority of his party at the worst of times; and the best
encomium on him is that the closer his public acts are examined, the
more credit they reflect not only on his abilities but on his unselfish-
ness.
Born of a line of Massachusetts farmers, he graduated from Har-
vard in 1755. After teaching a grammar school and beginning to read
theology, he studied law and began practice in 1758, soon becoming
a leader at the bar and in public life. In 1764 he married the noble
and delightful woman whose letters furnish unconscious testimony to
his lovable qualities. All through the germinal years of the Revolu-
tion he was one of the foremost patriots, steadily opposing any
abandonment or compromise of essential rights. In 1765 he was
counsel for Boston with Otis and Gridley to support the town's
memorial against the Stamp Act. In 1766 he was selectman.
In 1768
the royal government offered him the post of advocate-general in the
Court of Admiralty, - a lucrative bribe to desert the opposition; but
he refused it. Yet in 1770, as a matter of high professional duty, he
became counsel (successfully) for the British soldiers on trial for the
« Boston Massacre. ) Though there was a present uproar of abuse,
Mr. Adams was shortly after elected Representative to the General
Court by more than three to one. In March, 1774, he contemplated
writing the “History of the Contest between Britain and America! »
On June 17th he presided over the meeting at Faneuil Hall to con-
sider the Boston Port Bill, and at the same hour was elected Repre-
sentative to the first Congress at Philadelphia (September 1) by the
Provincial Assembly held in defiance of the government. Returning
thence, he engaged in newspaper debate on the political issues till
the battle of Lexington.
Shortly after, he again journeyed to Philadelphia to the Congress
of May 5th, 1775; where he did on his own motion, to the disgust
of his Northern associates and the reluctance even of the Southern-
ers, one of the most important and decisive acts of the Revolution,-


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128
JOHN ADAMS
induced Congress to adopt the forces in New England as a national
army and put George Washington of Virginia at its head, thus
engaging the Southern colonies irrevocably in the war and securing
the one man who could make it a success. In 1776 he was a chief
agent in carrying a declaration of independence. He remained in
Congress till November, 1777, as head of the War Department, very
useful and laborious though making one dreadful mistake: he was
largely responsible for the disastrous policy of ignoring the just
claims and decent dignity of the military commanders, which lost the
country some of its best officers and led directly to Arnold's treason.
His reasons, exactly contrary to his wont, were good abstract logic
but thorough practical nonsense.
In December, 1777, he was appointed commissioner to France to
succeed Silas Deane, and after being chased by an English man-of-
war (which he wanted to fight) arrived at Paris in safety. There
he reformed a very bad state of affairs; but thinking it absurd to
keep three envoys at one court (Dr. Franklin and Arthur Lee were
there before him), he induced Congress to abolish his office, and
returned in 1779. Chosen a delegate to the Massachusetts constitu-
tional convention, he was called away from it to be sent again to
France. There he remained as Franklin's colleague, detesting and
distrusting him and the French foreign minister, Vergerines, embroil-
ing himself with both and earning a cordial return of his warmest
dislike from both, till July, 1780. He then went to Holland as volun-
teer minister, and in 1782 was formally recognized as from an inde-
pendent nation. Meantime Vergennes intrigued with all his might to
have Adams recalled, and actually succeeded in so tying his hands
that half the advantages of independence would have been lost but
for his contumacious persistence. In the final negotiations for peace,
he persisted against his instructions in making the New England fish-
eries an ultimatum, and saved them. In 1783 he was commissioned
to negotiate a commercial treaty with Great Britain, and in 1785 was
made minister to that power. The wretched state of American affairs
under the Confederation made it impossible to obtain any advantages
for his country, and the vindictive feeling of the English made his
life a purgatory, so that he was glad to come home in 1788.
In the first Presidential election of that year he was elected Vice-
President on the ticket with Washington; and began a feud with
Alexander Hamilton, the mighty leader of the Federalist party and
Chief organizer of our governmental machine, which ended in the
overthrow of the party years before its time, and had momentous
personal and literary results as well. He was as good a Federalist
as Hamilton, and felt as much right to be leader if he could; Hamil-
ton would not surrender his leadership, and the rivalry never ended


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JOHN ADAMS
129
till Hamilton's murder. In 1796 he was elected President against
Jefferson.