No More Learning

They do not wish to see the symbol of their ideal
in a king; but only a means to their own ends.
That's the whole truth.


## p. 188 (#218) ############################################

188
THE WILL TO POWER.
726.
I am trying to grasp the absolute sense of the
communal standard of judgment and valuation,
naturally without any intention of deducing morals.
The degree of psychological falsity and dense-
ness required in order to sanctify the emotions
essential to preservation and expansion of power,
and to create a good conscience for them.
The degree of stupidity required in order that
general rules and values may remain possible
(including education, formation of culture, and
training).
The degree of inquisitiveness, suspicion, and in-
tolerance required in order to deal with exceptions,
to suppress them as criminals, and thus to give
them bad consciences, and to make them sick
with their own singularity.
727
Morality is essentially a shield, a means of
defence; and, in so far, it is a sign of the im-
perfectly developed man (he is still in armour;
he is still stoical).
The fully developed man is above all provided
with weapons: he is a man who attacks.
The weapons of war are converted into weapons
of peace (out of scales and carapaces grow feathers
and hair).
728.
The very notion," living organism,” implies that
there must be growth,—that there must be a


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
189
striving after an extension of power, and therefore
a process of absorption of other forces. Under the
drowsiness brought on by moral narcotics, people
speak of the right of the individual to defend himself;
on the same principle one might speak of his right
to attack: for bothm and the latter more than the
former-are necessities where all living organisms
are concerned: aggressive and defensive egoism
are not questions of choice or even of “free will,"
but they are fatalities of life itself.
In this respect it is immaterial whether one
have an individual, a living body, or "an ad-
vancing society” in view. The right to punish (or
society's means of defence) has been arrived at
only through a misuse of the word "right": a
right is acquired only by contract,—but self-
defence and self-preservation do not stand upon
the basis of a contract. A people ought at least,
with quite as much justification, to be able to regard
its lust of power, either in arms, commerce, trade,
or colonisation, as a right—the right of growth,
perhaps. When the instincts of a society
ultimately make it give up war and renounce
conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy
and the rule of shopkeepers. In the majority of
cases, it is true, assurances of peace are merely
stupefying draughts.
.
729.
The maintenance of the military State is the
last means of adhering to the great tradition of
the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive it.
By means of it the superior or strong type of


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190
THE WILL TO POWER. '
man is preserved, and all institutions and ideas
which perpetuate enmity and order of rank in
States, such as national feeling, protective tariffs,
etc. , may on that account seem justified.
730.
In order that a thing may last longer than a
person (that is to say, in order that a work may
outlive the individual who has created it), all
manner of limitations and prejudices must be
imposed upon people. But how? By means of
love, reverence, gratitude towards the person who
created the work, or by means of the thought
that our ancestors fought for it, or by virtue of
the feeling that the safety of our descendants will
be secured if we uphold the work-for instance,
the polis. Morality is essentially the means of
making something survive the individual, because
it makes him of necessity a slave. Obviously
the aspect from above is different from the aspect
from below, and will lead to quite different inter-
pretations. How is organised power maintained?
-By the fact that countless generations sacrifice
themselves to its cause.
731.
Marriage, property, speech, tradition, race,
family, people, and State, are each links in a chain
-separate parts which have a more or less high
or low origin. Economically they are justified
by the surplus derived from the advantages of
uninterrupted work and multiple production, as


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
191
weighed against the disadvantages of greater
expense in barter and the difficulty of making
things last. (The working parts are multiplied,
and yet remain largely idle. Hence the cost of
producing them is greater, and the cost of main-
taining them by no means inconsiderable. ) The
advantage consists in avoiding interruption and
incident loss. Nothing is more expensive than
a start. “ The higher the standard of living, the
greater will be the expense of maintenance,
nourishment, and propagation, as also the risk
and the probability of an utter fall on reaching
the summit. ”
732.
no
In bourgeois marriages, naturally in the best
sense of the word marriage, there is no question
whatsoever of love any more than there is of
money.
For on love institution can be
founded. The whole matter consists in society
giving leave to two persons to satisfy their sexual
desires under conditions obviously designed to
safeguard social order. Of course there must be
a certain attraction between the parties and a
vast amount of good nature, patience, compati-
bility, and charity in any such contract. But the
word love should not be misused as regards such
a union. For two lovers, in the real and strong
meaning of the word, the satisfaction of sexual
desire is unessential; it is a mere symbol. For
the one side, as I have already said, it is a symbol
of unqualified submission : for the other, a sign
of condescension-a sign of the appropriation of


## p. 192 (#222) ############################################

192
THE WILL TO POWER.
a
property. Marriage, as understood by the real
old nobility, meant the breeding forth of the race
(but are there any nobles nowadays ? Quæritur),
—that is to say, the maintenance of a fixed definite
type of ruler, for which object husband and wife
were sacrificed. Naturally the first consideration
here had nothing to do with love; on the con-
trary! It did not even presuppose that mutual
sympathy which is the sine qua non of the bour-
geois marriage. The prime consideration was the
interest of the race, and in the second place
came the interest of a particular class. But in
the face of the coldness and rigour and calculating
lucidity of such a noble concept of marriage as
prevailed among every healthy aristocracy, like
that of ancient Athens, and even of Europe
during the eighteenth century, we warm-blooded
animals, with our miserably oversensitive hearts,
we "moderns,” cannot restrain a slight shudder.
That is why love as a passion, in the big meaning
of this word, was invented for, and in, an aristo-
cratic community-where convention and abstin-
ence are most severe.
733.
Concerning the future of marriage. -A super-
tax on inherited property, a longer term of
,
military service for bachelors of a certain mini-
mum age within the community.
Privileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish
boys upon the world, and perhaps plural votes
as well.


## p. 193 (#223) ############################################

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
193
A medical certificate as a condition of any
marriage, endorsed by the parochial authorities,
in which a series of questions addressed to the
parties and the medical officers must be answered
(“family histories").
As a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its
ennoblement, I would recommend leasehold
marriages (to last for a term of years or months),
with adequate provision for the children.
Every marriage to be warranted and sanctioned
by a certain number of good men and true, of
the parish, as a parochial obligation.
734.
Another commandment of philanthropy. —There
are cases where to have a child would be a crime
--for example, for chronic invalids and extreme
neurasthenics. These people should be converted
to chastity, and for this purpose the music of
Parsifal might at all events be tried. For Parsifal
himself, that born fool, had ample reasons for not
desiring to propagate. Unfortunately, however,
one of the regular symptoms of exhausted stock
is the inability to exercise any self-restraint in the
presence of stimuli, and the tendency to respond
to the smallest sexual attraction. It would be
quite a mistake, for instance, to think of Leopardi
as a chaste man. In such cases the priest and
moralist play a hopeless game: it would be far
better to send for the apothecary. Lastly, society
here has a positive duty to fulfil, and of all the
demands that are made on it, there are few more
N
VOL II.


## p. 194 (#224) ############################################

194
THE WILL TO POWER.
urgent and necessary than this one. Society as
the trustee of life, is responsible to life for every
botched life that comes into existence, and as it
has to atone for such lives, it ought consequently
to make it impossible for them ever to see the light
of day: it should in many cases actually prevent
the act of procreation, and may, without any
regard for rank, descent, or intellect, hold in
readiness the most rigorous forms of compulsion
and restriction, and, under certain circumstances,
have recourse to castration, The Mosaic law,
“Thou shalt do no murder," is a piece of in-
genuous puerility compared with the earnestness
of this forbidding of life to decadents, “Thou shalt
not beget”! ! ! . . . For life itself recognises no
solidarity or equality of rights between the healthy
and unhealthy parts of an organism. The latter
must at all cost be eliminated, lest the whole fall
to pieces. Compassion for decadents, equal rights
for the physiologically botched—this would be
the very pinnacle of immorality, it would be
setting up Nature's most formidable opponent as
morality itself!
735.
There are some delicate and morbid natures,
the so-called idealists, who can never under any
circumstances rise above a coarse, immature crime:
yet it is the great justification of their anæmic
little existence, it is the small requital for their
lives of cowardice and falsehood to have been for
one instant at least-strong. But they generally
collapse after such an act. ,


## p. 195 (#225) ############################################

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
195
736.
In our civilised world we seldom hear of any
but the bloodless, trembling criminal, overwhelmed
by the curse and contempt of society, doubting
even himself, and always belittling and belying
his deeds—a misbegotten sort of criminal; that
is why we are opposed to the idea that all great
men have been criminals (only in the grand style,
and neither petty nor pitiful), that crime must be
inherent in greatness (this at any rate is the
unanimous verdict of all those students of human
nature who have sounded the deepest waters of
great souls). To feel one's self adrift from all
questions of ancestry, conscience, and duty-this
is the danger with which every great man is
confronted. Yet this is precisely what he desires :
he desires the great goal, and consequently the
means thereto.
737.
In times when man is led by reward and
punishment, the class of man which the legislator
has in view is still of a low and primitive type:
he is treated as one treats a child. In our latter-
day culture, general degeneracy removes all sense
from reward and punishment. This determina-
tion of action by the prospect of reward and
punishment presupposes young, strong, and
vigorous races. In effete races impulses are so
irrepressible that a mere idea has no force what.
ever. Inability to offer any resistance to a stimulus,
and the feeling that one must react to it: this


## p. 196 (#226) ############################################

196
THE WILL TO POWER.
excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all
such systems of punishment and reform altogether
senseless.
The idea “ amelioration” presupposes a norma
and strong creature whose action must in some
way be balanced or cancelled if he is not to be
lost and turned into an enemy of the community.
738.
The effect of prohibition. -Every power which
forbids and which knows how to excite fear in
the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience.
(That is to say, a person has a certain desire but
is conscious of the danger of gratifying it, and is
consequently forced to be secretive, underhand,
and cautious. ) Thus any prohibition deteriorates
the character of those who do not willingly
submit themselves to it, but are constrained
thereto.
739.
Punishment and reward. ”—These two things
stand or fall together. Nowadays no
one will
accept a reward or acknowledge that any authority
should have the power to punish. Warfare has
been reformed. We have a desire: it meets with
opposition: we then see that we shall most easily
obtain it by coming to some agreement—by draw-
ing up a contract. In modern society where
every one has given his assent to a certain con-


## p. 197 (#227) ############################################

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
197
tract, the criminal is a man who breaks that
contract. This at least is a clear concept. But
in that case, anarchists and enemies of social
order could not be tolerated.
740.
Crimes belong to the category of revolt against
the social system. A rebel is not punished, he
A
is simply suppressed. He may be an utterly
contemptible and pitiful creature; but there is
nothing intrinsically despicable about rebellion
in fact, in our particular society revolt is far from
being disgraceful. There are cases in which a
rebel deserves honour precisely because he is
conscious of certain elements in society which
cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us
from our slumbers. When a criminal commits
but one crime against a particular person, it does
not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him
to make a stand against the whole social system.
His isolated act is merely a symptom.
The idea of punishment ought to be reduced
to the concept of the suppression of revolt, a
weapon against the vanquished (by means of long
or short terms of imprisonment). But punish-
ment should not be associated in any way with
contempt. A criminal is at all events a man who
has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake;
he is therefore a man of courage.
Neither should
punishment be regarded as penance or retribution,
as though there were some recognised rate of
exchange between crime and punishment. Punish-


## p. 198 (#228) ############################################

198
THE WILL TO POWER.
ment does not purify, simply because crime does
not sully.
A criminal should not be prevented from
making his peace with society, provided he does
not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter
case, however, he should be opposed even before
he has committed an act of hostility. (As soon
as he gets into the clutches of society the first
operation to be performed upon him should be
that of castration. ) A criminal's bad manners
and his low degree of intelligence should not be
reckoned against him. Nothing is more common
than that he should misunderstand himself (more
particularly when his rebellious instinct—the ran-
cour of the unclassed has not reached conscious-
ness simply because he has not read enough). It
is natural that he should deny and dishonour his
deed while under the influence of fear at its failure.
All this is quite distinct from those cases in which,
psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to
an incomprehensible impulse, and attributes a
motive to his deed by associating it with a merely
incidental and insignificant action (for example,
robbing a man, when his real desire was to take
his blood).
The worth of a man should not be measured by
any one isolated act. Napoleon warned us against
this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are more
particularly insignificant. If we have no crime-
let us say no murder—on our conscience; why is
it ? It simply means that a few favourable circum-
stances have been wanting in our lives.
posing we were induced to commit such a crime
a
And sup-


## p. 199 (#229) ############################################

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
199
As a
would our worth be materially affected ?
matter of fact, we should only be despised, if we
were not credited with possessing the power to kill a
man under certain circumstances. In nearly every
crime certain qualities come into play without
which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky
was not far wrong when he said of the inmates of
the penal colonies in Siberia, that they constituted
the strongest and most valuable portion of the
Russian people. The fact that in our society the
criminal happens to be a badly nourished and
stunted animal is simply a condemnation of our
system. In the days of the Renaissance the
criminal was a flourishing specimen of humanity,
and acquired his own virtue for himself. Virtue in
the sense of the Renaissance—that is to say, virtù ;
free from moralic acid.
It is only those whom we do not despise that
we are able to elevate. Moral contempt is a far
greater indignity and insult than any kind of crime.
741.
Shame was first introduced into punishment
when certain penalties were inflicted on persons
held in contempt, such as slaves. It was a de-
spised class that was most frequently punished, and
thus it came to pass that punishment and contempt
were associated.
742.
In the ancient idea of punishment a religious con-
cept was immanent, namely, the retributive power


## p. 200 (#230) ############################################

200
THE WILL TO POWER.
of chastisement. Penalties purified : in modern
society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment
is a form of paying off a debt: once it has been
paid, one is freed from the deed for which one was
so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power
of punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feel-
ing of relief and lightheartedness results, which is
not so very far removed from a state of conval-
escence and health. One has made one's peace
with society, and one appears to one's self more
dignified—"pure. " . . To-day, however, punish-
ment. isolates even more than the crime; the fate
behind the sin has become so formidable that it is
almost hopeless. One rises from punishment still
.
an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet
another enemy against it. The jus talionis may
spring from the spirit of retribution (that is to say,
from a sort of modification of the instinct of re-
venge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it
is the need of having some equivalent in order to
do penance, or to become free in a religious sense.
743
My pretty radical note of interrogation in
the case of all more modern laws of punish-
ment is this: should not the punishment fit the
crime? —for in your heart of hearts thus would
you have it. But then the susceptibility of the
particular criminal to pain would have to be taken
into account. In other words, there should be no
such thing as a preconceived penalty for any crime
-no fixed penal code. But as it would be no


## p. 201 (#231) ############################################

· SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
201
easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness
of each individual criminal, punishment would have
to be abolished in practice? What a sacrifice !
a
Is it not ? Consequently
744.
Ah! and the philosophy of jurisprudence! That
is a science which, like all moral sciences, has not
even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet. Even
among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the
oldest and most valuable significance of punish-
ment is still misunderstood-it is not even known.
So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a
new foundation-on history and comparative an-
thropology-it will never cease to quarrel over the
fundamentally false abstractions which are fondly
imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which
have nothing whatever to do with modern man.
The man of to-day, however, is such a complicated
woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he
allows of the most varied interpretation,
745.
An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that
when mighty empires were doomed they began to
have numberless laws.
746.
Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions cast-
rated, and all geese shut up in convents. But from


## p. 202 (#232) ############################################

202
THE WILL TO POWER.
what point of view would this be desirable? The
rascal has at least this advantage over other men-
that he is not mediocre; and the fool is superior
to us inasmuch as he does not suffer at the sight
of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the
gulf—that is to say, roguery and stupidity should
be increased. In this way human nature would
become broader . .
. . but, after all, this is Fate, and
it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy
and roguery are increasing: this is part of modern
progress.
747.
Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and
reticence, and of good-natured respect for other
people's rights—even for the exactions of strangers.
To an even greater degree is there a certain charit-
able and instinctive depreciation of the worth of man
as shown by all manner of trustful habits. Respect
for men, and not only for the most virtuous, is
perhaps the real parting of the ways between us
and the Christian mythologists. We also have our
good share of irony even when listening to moral
sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases
himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical.
Liberal-mindedness regarding morality is one of
the best signs of our age. In cases where it is
most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a
morbid condition (the case of Carlyle in England,
of Ibsen in Norway, and Schopenhauer's pessimism
throughout Europe). If there is anything which
can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the
amount of immorality which it allows itself without


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
203
falling in its own estimation-very much the re-
verse! In what, then, does the superiority of culture
over the want of culture consist of the Renais-
sance, for instance, over the Middle Ages? In this
alone: the greater quantity of acknowledged im-
morality. From this it necessarily follows that the
very senith of human development must be regarded
by the moral fanatic as the non plus ultra of cor-
ruption in this connection let us recall Savona-
rola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of
Athens under Pericles, Luther's condemnation of
Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against the society of
Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe).
748.
A little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This
ridiculous condition of Europe must not last any
longer.
Is there a single idea behind this bovine
nationalism ? What possible value can there be in
encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when every-
thing to-day points to greater and more common
interests at a moment when the spiritual de-
pendence and denationalisation, which are obvious
to all, are paving the way for the reciprocal
rapprochements and fertilisations which make up
the real value and sense of present-day culture !
And it is precisely now that "the new German
Empire” has been founded upon the most thread-
bare and discredited of ideas—universal suffrage
and equal right for all.
Think of all this struggling for advantage among
conditions which are in every way degenerate: of
1


## p. 204 (#234) ############################################

204
- THE WILL TO POWER.
this culture of big cities, of newspapers, of hurry and
scurry, and of “aimlessness”! The economic unity
of Europe must necessarily come—and with it, as
a reaction, the pacivist movement.
A pacivist party, free from all sentimentality,
which forbids its children to wage war; which
forbids recourse to courts of justice; which for-
swears all fighting, all contradiction, and all perse-
cution: for a while the party of the oppressed, and
later the powerful party :this party would be op-
posed to everything in the shape of revenge and
resentment.
There will also be a war party, exercising the
same thoroughness and severity towards itself, which
will proceed in precisely the opposite direction.
749.
The princes of Europe should really consider
whether as a matter of fact they can dispense with
our services with us, the immoralists. We are
to-day the only power which can win a victory
without allies : and we are therefore far and away
the strongest of the strong. We can even do with-
out lying, and let me ask what other power can
dispense with this weapon? A strong temptation
fights for us; the strongest, perhaps, that exists
--the temptation of truth. . . Truth? How do
I come by this word? I must withdraw it: I must
repudiate this proud word. But no. We do not
even want it- we shall be quite able to achieve our
victory of power without its help. The real charm
which fights for us, the eye of Venus which our
-


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
205
opponents themselves deaden and blind this
charm is the magic of the extreme. The fascina-
tion which everything extreme exercises : we
immoralists—we are in every way the extremists.
750.
The corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling
into evil odour. The State administration of justice
is a piece of cowardice, because the great man
who can serve as a standard is lacking. At last
the feeling of insecurity becomes so great that
men fall in the dust before any sort of will-power
that commands.
751.
“The will to power" is so loathed in democratic
ages that the whole of the psychology of these ages
seems directed towards its belittlement and slander.
The types of men who sought the highest honours
are said to have been Napoleon! Cæsar! and
Alexander ! -as if these had not been precisely
the greatest scorners of honour.
And Helvetius would fain show us that we strive
after power in order to have those pleasures which
are at the disposal of the mighty—that is to say,
according to him, this striving after power is the
will to pleasure-hedonism !
1
-
752.
According as to whether a people feels : "the
rights, the keenness of vision, and the gifts of lead-
ing, etc. , are with the few” or “with the many"-
"


## p. 206 (#236) ############################################

206
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
it constitutes an oligarchic or a democratic com-
munity.
Monarchy represents the belief in a man who
is completely superior a leader, a saviour, a
demigod.
Aristocracy represents the belief in a chosen
few-in a higher caste.
Democracy represents the disbelief in all great
men and in all élite societies : everybody is every-
body else's equal " At bottom we are all herd
and mob. ”
753.
I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams
ingenuously of “goodness, truth, beauty, and
equal rights" (anarchy pursues the same ideal,
but in a more brutal fashion).
I am opposed to parliamentary government
and the power of the press, because they are the
means whereby cattle become masters.
»
754.
The arming of the people means in the end
the arming of the mob.
755.
Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes,
because of their absurd optimism concerning the
"good man" who is supposed to be waiting in their
cupboard, and who will come into being when the
present order of society has been overturned and
has made way for natural instincts. But the


## p. 207 (#237) ############################################

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
207
opposing party is quite as ludicrous, because it
will not see the act of violence which lies beneath
every law, the severity and egoism inherent in
every kind of authority. “I and my kind will
rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be
either expelled or annihilated. ”—This was the
fundamental feeling of all ancient legislation.
The idea of a higher order of man is hated
much more profoundly than monarchs themselves.
Hatred of aristocracy always uses hatred of
monarchy as a mask.
756.
How treacherous are all parties! They bring
to light something concerning their leaders which
the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept hidden
beneath a bushel with consummate art.
757.
Modern Socialism would fain create a profane
counterpart to Jesuitism: everybody a perfect
instrument. · But as to the object of it all, the
purpose of it—this has not yet been ascertained.
758.
The slavery of to-day : a piece of barbarism.
Where are the masters for whom these slaves
work? One must not always expect the
simultaneous appearance of the two complement-
ary castes of society.
Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life.


## p. 208 (#238) ############################################

208
THE WILL TO POWER.
“The blessing of work” is an ennobling phrase
for slaves. Incapacity for leisure.
759.
There is no such thing as a right to live, a
right to work, or a right to be happy: in this
respect man is not different from the meanest
worm.
760.
We must undoubtedly think of these things
as uncompromisingly as Nature
does: they
preserve the species.
761.
We should look upon the needs of the masses
with ironic compassion: they want something
which we have got-Ah!
762.
European democracy is only in a very slight
degree the manifestation of unfettered powers.
It represents, above all, the unfettering of laziness,
fatigue, and weakness.
763.
Concerning the future of the workman. --Work-
men should learn to regard their duties as soldiers
do. They receive emoluments, incomes, but they
do not get wages !
There is no relationship between work done
and money received; the individual should,


## p. 209 (#239) ############################################

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
209
according to his kind, be so placed as to perform
the highest that is compatible with his powers.
764
Noblemen ought one day to live as the bour-
geois do now -- but above them, distinguishing
themselves by the simplicity of their wants-
the superior caste will then live in a poorer
and simpler way and yet be in possession of
power.
For lower orders of mankind the reverse
valuations hold good: it is a matter of implanting
“ virtues ” in them. Absolute commands, terrible
compulsory methods, in order that they may rise
above mere ease in life. The remainder may
obey, but their vanity demands that they may
feel themselves dependent, not upon great men,
but upon principles.
765.
“ The Atonement of all Sin. "
People speak of the “profound injustice” of
the social arrangement, as if the fact that one man
is born in favourable circumstances and that
another is born in unfavourable ones—or that
one should possess gifts the other has not, were
on the face of it an injustice. Among the more
honest of these opponents of society, this is what
is said: “We, with all the bad, morbid, criminal
qualities which we acknowledge we possess, are
only the inevitable result of the oppression for
O
VOL. II.


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210
THE WILL TO POWER.
ages of the weak by the strong"; thus they insinu-
ate their evil natures into the consciences of the
ruling classes. They threaten and storm and curse.
They become virtuous from sheer indignation-
they don't want to have become bad men and
canaille for nothing. The name for this attitude,
which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am
not mistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism
which is the outcome of indignation. It is in this
attitude of mind that history is judged, that it
is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that
responsibility and even guilt is discovered in it.
For the great desideratum is to find guilty people
in it. The botched and the bungled, the de-
cadents of all kinds, are revolted at themselves,
and require sacrifices in order that they may not
slake their thirst for destruction upon themselves
(which might, indeed, be the most reasonable
procedure). But for this purpose they at least
require a semblance of justification, i. e. a theory
according to which the fact of their existence, and
of their character, may be expiated by a scapegoat.
This scapegoat may be God, --in Russia such
resentful atheists are not wanting, or the order
of society, or education and upbringing, or the
Jews, or the nobles, or, finally, the well-constituted
of every kind. “It is a sin for a man to have been
born in decent circumstances, for by so doing
he disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he
imposes upon them the curse of vice and of
work. . . How can I be made answerable
for my misery; surely some one must be respons-
ible for it, or I could not bear to live. "
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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
211
In short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible
parties in order to create a pleasurable sensation
for itself-revenge.
“Sweeter than honey”-
thus does even old Homer speak of revenge.
*
The fact that such a theory no longer meets with
understanding—or rather, let us say, contempt-
is accounted for by that particle of Christianity
which still circulates in the blood of every one
of us; it makes us tolerant towards things simply
because we scent a Christian savour about them. . . .
The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts;
this is their really refined piece of cleverness. .
Thanks to Christianity, we have now grown
accustomed to the superstitious concept of a
soul-of an immortal soul, of soul monads,
which, as a matter of fact, hails from somewhere
else, and which has only become inherent in
certain cases—that is to say, become incarnate
in them-by accident: but the nature of these
cases is not altered, let alone determined by it.
The circumstances of society, of relationship, and
of history are only accidents for the soul, perhaps
misadventures : in any case, the world is not their
work. By means of the idea of soul the individual
is made transcendental; thanks to it, a ridiculous
amount of importance can be attributed to him.
As a matter of fact, it was Christianity which
first induced the individual to take up this position
of judge of all things. It made megalomania
almost his duty: it has made everything temporary
and limited subordinate to eternal rights ! What


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212
THE WILL TO POWER.
is the State, what is society, what are historical
laws, what is physiology to me? Thus speaks
something from beyond Becoming, an immutable
entity throughout history: thus speaks something
immortal, something divine--it is the soul !
Another Christian, but no less insane, concept
has percolated even deeper into the tissues of
modern ideas : the concept of the equality of all
souls before God. In this concept the prototype of
all theories concerning equal rights is to be found.
Man was first taught to stammer this proposition
religiously : later, it was converted into a moral;
no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it
seriously, to take it practically ! —that is to say,
politically, socialistically, resento-pessimistically.
Wherever responsible circumstances or people
have been looked for, it was the instinct of revenge
that sought them.
This instinct of revenge
obtained such an ascendancy over man in the
course of centuries that the whole of metaphysics,
psychology, ideas of society, and, above all,
morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished
this idea of responsibility to such an extent that
he has introduced the bacillus of vengeance into
everything. By means of it he has made God
Himself ill, and killed innocence in the universe,
by tracing every condition of things to acts of
will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The
whole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that
has ever existed in psychology hitherto, was
invented essentially for the purpose of punishment.
It was the social utility of punishment that lent
this concept its dignity, its power, and its truth.


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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
213
The originator of that psychology, that we shall
call volitional psychology, must be sought in
those classes which had the right of punishment
in their hands; above all, therefore, among the
priests who stood on the very pinnacle of ancient
social systems: these people wanted to create for
themselves the right to wreak revenge they
wanted to supply God with the privilege of
vengeance. For this purpose; man was declared
"free": to this end every action had to be re-
garded as voluntary, and the origin of every deed
had to be considered as lying in consciousness.
But by such propositions as these ancient psych-
ology is refuted.
To-day, when Europe seems to have taken the
contrary direction; when we halcyonians would
fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept of
guilt and punishment with all our might from the
world; when our most serious endeavours are
concentrated upon purifying psychology, morality,
history, nature, social institutions and privileges,
and even God Himself, from this filth; in whom
must we recognise our most mortal enemies?
Precisely in those apostles of revenge and
resentment, in those who
are par excellence
pessimists from indignation, who make it their
mission to sanctify their filth with the name of
righteous indignation. ” . . . We others, whose
one desire is to reclaim innocence on behalf of
Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of a
purer thought, namely, that no one is responsible
for man's qualities; neither God, nor society, nor
his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself—in fact,
66
i
!


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214
THE WILL TO POWER.
that no one is to blame for him . . . The being
who might be made responsible for a man's exist-
ence, for the fact that he is constituted in a
particular way, or for his birth in certain circum-
stances and in a certain environment, is absolutely
lacking. –And it is a great blessing that such a
being is non-existent. . . . We are not the result
of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there
is no attempt being made with us to attain to an
“ideal of perfection,” to an “ideal of happiness,"
to an “ideal of virtue,"—and we are just as little
the result of a mistake on God's part in the
presence of which He ought to feel uneasy (a
thought which is known to be at the very root
of the Old Testament). There is not a place
nor a purpose nor a sense to which we can
attribute our existence or our kind of existence.