No More Learning

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not
obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And
Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being
thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one,
cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient
to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And
therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave
cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude;
nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man,
or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man,
to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their
Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man
dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty
to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him,
they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.
Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or
punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment,
as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And
because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be
punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust.
And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their
Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also
is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some
body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant,
who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with
God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that
it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly
disposition.




2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given
to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and
not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the
part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any
pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which
is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is
manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as
one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with
every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as
yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants
as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd,
because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach
thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done
in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant
made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of
his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach,
there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns
therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of
Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they
had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by
way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his
Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want
of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and
breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man,
but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands
of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose
actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them
all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then
no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for
no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made
a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such
conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the
Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and
in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that
are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to
participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.




3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The

Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. Thirdly,
because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne;
he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented
to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the
rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that
were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore
tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and
therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against
any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore
unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his
consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or
be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might
without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.




4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the
Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor
ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any
thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose
authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every
particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently
he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that
whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man
but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones
selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne
power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper
signification.




5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath
Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner
by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the
actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions
committed by himselfe.




6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace

And Defence Of His Subjects

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of
them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means;
it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the
Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence;
and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do
whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the
preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and
Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the
recovery of the same. And therefore,




And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions
and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently,
on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall,
in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines
of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed
from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth
the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and
Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded
but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by
Peace. For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace
and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in
a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of
Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally
received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most
sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never
breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that
are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or
introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace,
but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live
as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth
therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or
constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to
Peace, thereby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.




7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May

Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject

Can Without Injustice Take It From Him

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may
enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of
his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before
constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had
right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this
Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power,
is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of
Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull
in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the
lawes of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law
be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which
being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were
in these parts the Civill Law.




8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature

And Decision Of Controversies:

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that
is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise
concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For
without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one
Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and
Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and
necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting
himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and
contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.




9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and
Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of
Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to
be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the
Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the
people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength
of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which
Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command
of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it
Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that
hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.




10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,

Both Of Peace, And Warre:

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all
Councellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and
War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the
common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such
Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.




11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No

Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding
with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath
formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge
most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or
deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.




12. And Of Honour And Order

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they
value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation,
Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one
another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It
is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the
worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the
Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to
put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not
onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the
Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the
Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to
appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what
signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to
one another.




These Rights Are Indivisible

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which
are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly
of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are
incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of
the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in
Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the
Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if
he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want
of execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the Power of raising
Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of
doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of
Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall
presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no
effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all
Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is
said, "A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:" For unlesse this
division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If
there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of
England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords,
and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and
fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed
in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of
Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right,
that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights
are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next
return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and
no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto
been.




And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct

Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes
renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to
him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he
can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably
annexed thereunto.




The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The Presence

Of The Power Soveraign

This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than
every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse
power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not
the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One,
signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together,
they understand them as one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,)
then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power;
and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough,
when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch
they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in
whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty
is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and
Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants
are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the
presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse,
when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more
than the Starres in presence of the Sun.




Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,

And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not

Submitting Readily, To A Lesse

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very
miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions
of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And
commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy;
and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other
Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of
Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect
enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate
of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the
greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the
people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and
horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute
condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a
coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge: nor
considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours,
proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the
dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth
their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence,
make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can
in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or
sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men
are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their
Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a
great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely
Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang
over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.



CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,

AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER




The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three

The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the
Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the
Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an
Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath
right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the
rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For
the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it
is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One
man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that
will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth:
when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY.
Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or
More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be
indivisible) entire.




Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy, And Aristocracy

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of
Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other
Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that
are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are
displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which
find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which
signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that
want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same
reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when
they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the
Governours.




Subordinate Representatives Dangerous

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they
please, give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as
well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and
consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch,
as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is
already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative
of the same people, but onely to certain particular ends, by the
Soveraign limited. For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every
man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one
another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace)
is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of
Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And
therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting
the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power
to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such
Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of
the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. And
I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little
observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent
of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from
every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them
for their King; was notwithstanding never considered as their
Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title
of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry
their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which
may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute
Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that
Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall
Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge
the truth committed to them.




Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes

The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth
not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or
Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end
they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may
observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or
is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall
Person. And though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure
the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the
private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the
most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he
preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent
than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and
private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most
advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the
publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from
the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can
be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or
contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a
war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the
publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one
that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a
treacherous action, or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he
pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the
matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and
as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will.
But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted
but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the
most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition
of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long
discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but
not governe them in it. For the Understanding is by the flame of the
Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time,
wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of
their owne Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other
Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that
of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence
of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme,
(which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or
the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day,
all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or
interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce
a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and
inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the
Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and
they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as
a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve
one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the
Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous,
than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which
cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators,
that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have
great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse
Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than
absolution more resembles Justice.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie
may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and
Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the
hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by
his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person,
and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of
the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is
to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and
Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must
arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great
honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that
this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call
Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed
who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely
by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custome in that
case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be
attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of
the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are
not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is
the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for
such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient
rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most
interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom
least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every
man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant
into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction,
or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient provision
being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under a
Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace,
it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition
of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is
no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly,
which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of
Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For
as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and
is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he
is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the
counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need
of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also
(in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers
and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of Dictators, or
Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs;
to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power;
and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than
Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three;
that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where
the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is
in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished
from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes
that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce
them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other
Formes, arising from these mingled together. As for example, Elective
Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands
for a time; of Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which
Governments, are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise
if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies
Countrie, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or
other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a
Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For
Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne;
nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the
Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a
Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or
Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to
his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to
certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans;
If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but
Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there
is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect
a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and
returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power
to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the
Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which
they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think
good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the
decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is
obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor,
to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing
into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was,
when elected, a Soveraign absolute.

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is
not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore
was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and
by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or
Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge
to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea
(for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy;
because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of
them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were
not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their
Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the
people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to
the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the
government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed
by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are
governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not
of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.




Of The Right Of Succession

Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not
onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for
an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall
Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly,
should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they
that are governed by One man, as soon as their Governour dyeth. This
Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the
Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other
particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may
be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right
is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new
choyce; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him
that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute
the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security.

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude
that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of
Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of
another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to
whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that
which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth,
as Author. And though the Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others,
to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their
Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the
publique shall require it) be recalled.

The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The greatest
difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the
difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest
who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he
hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact
ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question,
who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign
Authority; that is to say, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the
Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that
either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession,
or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the death
of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude
without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in
whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at
all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch;
every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks
best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne
sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of
every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had
its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution
of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the
Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the
Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance
of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or
by other tacite signes sufficient.




Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;

By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life
time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared
who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe
imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man
shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate.
If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his
Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the
decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.




Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;

But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall
signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And
therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely
succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession;
for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise,
he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise
where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth,
there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male,
for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the
Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does
not, it is a naturall signe he would have that Custome stand.




Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is
to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government
remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in
himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be
preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined
by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other
men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are
naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly,
where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so
still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote, because it is
alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and
'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour
from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.




To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King Of Another Nation,

Not Unlawfull

But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words
of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:
for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which,
because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same
government, not speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one
another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed
a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the
subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the
Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore
the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government
digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they
thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes
to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the
Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the
Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it
our most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of
his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained,
had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those
Kingdomes at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to
the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though
by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient.
Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever
inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive
also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may
descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.



CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL


A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is
acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or
many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do
authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their
lives and liberty in his Power.




Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By Institution

And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by
Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it
for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this
case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases
they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such
Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if
it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged
to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or
acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no
Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the
Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because
he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he
may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of
the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign.
Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh:
But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is
acquitted by him that exorted the promise, as by the Author of such
absolution.




The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both

But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both.
His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He
cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of
Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary
for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme
Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre,
and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours,
Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of
Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are
the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same
Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.




Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By Generation, But By Contract

Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The
right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over
his Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the
Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child
because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or
by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God
hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally
Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to
both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man
can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to
the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it.
For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between
the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War.
In Common-wealths, this controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and
for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the
Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by
the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lyeth
now in the state of meer Nature; where there are supposed no lawes
of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of
Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and
to their children. In this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents
between themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract;
or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right
passeth according to the Contract. We find in History that the Amazons
Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had
recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back, but the
Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was
in the Mother.




Or Education;

If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the
condition of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it
cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother:
and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her
will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the
power of the Mother; so as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she
nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to
obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over
it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the
Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom
it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which
one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise
obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.




Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents To The Other

If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers
power: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign
Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother;
because the Father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child,
and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of
the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion
followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Soveraign
of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.

He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over their
Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man,
hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a
Title, without the effect.




The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of The Rights Of Possession

The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same
manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have
already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.




Despoticall Dominion, How Attained

Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some
Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or
Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this
Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd
the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by
other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and
the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use
thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished
is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be
derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave
to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in
prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him
of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men,
(commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their
bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master,
justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him;
and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is
trusted by him.
Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The Vanquished

It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over
the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is
Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but
because he commeth in, and submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor
obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to
spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the
Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.

And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which
the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of
the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome,
or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given,
but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on
condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in
security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his
corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it
not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact
the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his
servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he
holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is,
of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case
the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise
punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same;
and cannot accuse him of injury.

In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and Despoticall
Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution;
and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent
chapter. So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he
hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and
in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular,
to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other,
from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of
ignorance of the Rights of Soveraignty. For the Soveraign is absolute
over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every
man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which
is the condition of war.




Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom

By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some
Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little
Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of
a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants
together: wherein the Father of Master is the Soveraign. But yet a
Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by
its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without
the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to
defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of
danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to
the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a very small
company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their armes,
and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And
thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and
deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and designes
of men, in erecting of Commonwealths, and putting themselves under
Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their
protection.




The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To
Moses, the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19) "Speak thou to
us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye. "
This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God
himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c. ) "This
shall be the Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He
shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his
horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and
to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall
take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He
shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give
them to his servants. He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and
give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall
take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your
youth, and employ them in his businesse. He shall take the tyth of your
flocks; and you shall be his servants. " This is absolute power, and
summed up in the last words, "you shall be his servants. " Againe, when
the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented
thereto, and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c. ) "We will be as all other nations,
and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to conduct our
wars. " Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have, both to the
Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power,
as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of
King Salomon to God, was this. (1 Kings 3. 9) "Give to thy servant
understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between Good and
Evill. " It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and
to praescribe the Rules of Discerning Good and Evill; which Rules are
Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought
the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his
Servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9)
"God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of
God. " For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) "Servants
obey your masters in All things," and, (Verse. 22) "Children obey your
Parents in All things. " There is simple obedience in those that are
subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion. Again, (Math. 23. 2,3)
"The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre and therefore All that
they shall bid you observe, that observe and do. " There again is simple
obedience. And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) "Warn them that they subject
themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey
them. " This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe
acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed,
where he sayes, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;" and payed such
taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing
from any subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that
need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to
take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, (Mat.
21. 2,3) "Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a
shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me.
And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need
of them: And they will let them go. " They will not ask whether his
necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that
necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) "You
shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. " and verse 11. "Who told thee
that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded
thee thou shouldest not eat? " For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good
and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of
Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divell to enflame the
Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull,
told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and
Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them
Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new
ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that
having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that
place, as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the
meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse
(wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being
ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith,
"Hast thou eaten, &c. " as if he should say, doest thou that owest me
obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is
cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of
them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be
censured, nor disputed.




Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute

So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and
Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in
Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall
Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make
it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is
perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The
condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but
there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what
proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,
from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking
Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject
himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where,
and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may
ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from
Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have
been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the
Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an
argument for the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom,
and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths,
and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance
thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should
lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be
inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining
Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and
Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither
poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have
hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.



CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS




Liberty What

Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition;
(by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may
be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to
Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move,
but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition
of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And
so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained,
with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks,
or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we
use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without
those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of
motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to
say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth
still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.




What It Is To Be Free

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the
word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength
and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will
to. " But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but
Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not
subject to Impediment: And therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The
way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk
in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant
any liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any
law, or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the
liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath
obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the
word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or
inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that
he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination
to doe.




Feare And Liberty Consistent

Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into
the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very
willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the
action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for
Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining,
was the action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men
doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers
had Liberty to omit.




Liberty And Necessity Consistent

Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not
only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise
in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed
from their will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of
mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause,
which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of
God the first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him
that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of all
mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that
seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of man
in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity of doing that
which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things,
which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they
can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods
will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans
will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty
of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and
Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of
that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.




Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so
also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they
themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips
of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power;
and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature
but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not
by the difficulty of breaking them.




Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the
Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world,
for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being
a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of
actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what
their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves.
For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that
is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men
to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe,
if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd,
for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may
be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they
demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them,
without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to
be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only
in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath
praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise
contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet,
their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves
think fit; & the like.




Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the
Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For
it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative
can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the
Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise,
than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe
the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in
Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of
the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha
caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases,
he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is
neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also
in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For
though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to
Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an
Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe
what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God, because
David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of
Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact,
evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned. " In the same
manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of
their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice;
and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he
would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and
every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written
with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall
accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of
Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a
Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens
wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to
be Just.




The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of Soveraigns;

Not Of Private Men

The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in
the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in
the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all
their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular
men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with
that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws,
nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as
amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against
his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect
from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a
full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and
Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not
every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is
to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge)
most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition
of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their
frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours
round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free
Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist
their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie
to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of
the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet
no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie,
or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in
Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the
Freedome is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name
of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for
their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the
Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of
men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if
it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne
parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the
Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and
other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived
those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them
into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths, which
were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of
the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of
Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them
from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and
all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it
down in his Politiques,(lib. 6. cap. 2) "In democracy, Liberty is to be
supposed: for 'tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other
Government. " And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have
grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were
taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their
Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards
by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors,
men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of
Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the
actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers,
with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there
was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought
the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.




Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is
to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he
may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider,
what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is
all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions
(without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For
in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and
our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from
thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from
some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And
because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, "I
Authorise all his Actions," or from the Intention of him that submitteth
himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End
for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject,
is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or
else from the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace
of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common
Enemy.




Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies,

Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them

First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of
every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of
the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest,
that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof
cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14.
Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd.
Therefore,




Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;

If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill,
wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or
to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing,
without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning
a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon)
to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can
be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in
these words, "I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;" in which
there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty:
For by allowing him to Kill Me, I am not bound to Kill my selfe when
he commands me. "'Tis one thing to say 'Kill me, or my fellow, if you
please;' another thing to say, 'I will kill my selfe, or my fellow. '" It
followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or
any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes
have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or
dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but
on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When
therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the
Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise
there is.




Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake It

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against
the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall
with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice;
as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this
case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is
allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of
whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine
courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running
away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not
esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to
avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth
himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of
a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell,
but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the
Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that
are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the
Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or
courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man,
guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes
away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore
destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many
men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or
committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth
death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and
assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend
their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There
was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of
Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is
no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not
unjust at all. But the offer of Pardon taketh from them, to whom it
is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in
assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.




The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On The Silence Of The Law


As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases
where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath
the liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And
therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in
some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the
Soveraignty shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was
a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land,
(and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force. But in
after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was taken away by a Statute
made (by the King) in Parliament. And is some places of the world, men
have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not
allowed.

If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt, or
of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service
required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or
pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty to sue
for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges,
as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demandeth
by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth
thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that
Law. The sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign;
and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of
his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or
take any thing by pretence of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no
action of Law: for all that is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is
done by the Authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings
an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of
his Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their
safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre
the Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been
his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and
did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant
proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and
the Soveraign Power; and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned;
and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising
thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of
appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest
named in the 18th Chapter.




In What Cases Subjects Absolved Of Their Obedience To Their Soveraign

The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as
long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to
protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves,
when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The
Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from
the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end
of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in
his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and
his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention
of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not
only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through
the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very
institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.




In Case Of Captivity

If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of
life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall
Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath
Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject
of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himselfe.
The case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a
forreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not
trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be understood to be
bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his
escape by any means whatsoever.




In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government From Himself And Heyrs

If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and
his heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature;
because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the
nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said
in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will
have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the
same, if he dye without known Kindred, and without declaration of
his Heyre. For then there can no Heire be known, and consequently no
Subjection be due.




In Case Of Banishment

If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not
Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is
still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue
of the covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers
dominion, is Subject to all the Lawes thereof; unless he have a
privilege by the amity of the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.




In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To Another

If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his
Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged
to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty
of his own Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of
Soveraigntie; and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience
to the Magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name,
but in his. For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the
Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates and Officers; which,
if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he
himself had formerly appointed.



CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE




The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People

Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I
am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systemes,
which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall. By
SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one
Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular are
those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative
of the whole number. All other are Irregular.

Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but
their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have
spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters. Others are Dependent;
that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which every one,
as also their Representative is Subject.

Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private.