No More Learning

According to another opinion,--ours,--faith is a belief in qualities: affection is produced from this belief. Affection is then not faith, but the result of faith.
32c. Respect is hrt.
m
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As we have explained above (32a), respect is veneration, etc.
1. All hri is not respect, namely hri with respect to the Truths of 164
Suffering and the Origin of Suffering.
2. H n with respect to the Truths of the Extinction of Suffering and
the Path is also respect.
According to another opinion, respect is veneration; shame is born
from respect and this shame is called hri. Hence respect, the cause of hri, is not hri.
There are four alternatives concerning affection and respect:
1. Affection which is not respect, namely affection with regard to
wife, to children, to companions in the religious life, to pupils.
2. Respect which is not affection, namely respect with regard to
someone else's master, to a person endowed with qualities, etc.
3. Respect which is affection, namely respect with regard to one's
master, one's father, mother, etc.
4. Neither respect nor affection for other persons.
32d. Both exist in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu.
Affection and respect do not exist in Arupyadhatu.
But you have said that affection is faith, and that respect is hri: now faith and hri are kusalamahdbhumikas (ii. 25): hence affection and respect should exist in Arupyadhatu.
Affection and respect are of two types: relative to dharmas and relative to persons. The text refers to the second type; the first type does exist in all three spheres of existence.
33a-b. Vitarka and vicara are grossness and subtlety of the 165
mind.
The grossness, that is, the gross state of the mind is termed vitarka\ the subtlety, that is, the subtle state of the mind is termed vicara. How can vitarka and vicara be associated with the mind at one and the same time? Can the mind, at one and the same time, be both gross and subtle?
166
According to one opinion, we may compare vicara to cold water,
the mind to cheese which floats on the surface of this cold water, and
? vitarka to the heat of the sun which operates on this cheese. By reason of the water and sun, the cheese is not too runny nor too hard. In this same way, vitarka and vicdra are associated with the mind: it is neither too subtle, by reason of vitarka, nor too gross, by reason of vicdra.
But, we would say, it follows from this explanation that vitarka and vicdra are not grossness and subtlety of mind, but the cause of its grossness and its subtlety: the cold water and the warm light of the sun are not the hard or the runny state of the cheese, but rather the cause of these states.
Other objections present themselves. Grossness and subtlety of
mind are relative things. They admit of many degrees: a mind of the
First Dhyana is subtle in comparison with a mind in Kamadhatu, but
gross in comparision with a mind in the Second Dhyana; the qualities
and the defilements can be more or less gross or subtle in one and the
same stage, for they are divided into nine categories. Thus, if vitarka
and vicdra are grossness and subtlety of the mind, we would have to 167
admit that they both exist up to the highest stage of Arupyadhatu. Now they cease at the Second Dhyana, and adding to this the fact that no specific or generic differences can be established between grossness and subtlety, one then cannot differentiate vitarka and vicdra.
According to another opinion, [that of the Sautrantikas,] vitarka 168
and vicdra are the "factors of voice. " The Sutra says in fact, "It is after having examined, after having judged (vitarkya, vicdrya) that one
169 speaks, not without having examined, not without having judged. "
The factors of voice that are called gross are called vitarkas; those that are subtle are called vicaras. (According to this explanation, we should understand vitarka and vicdra not as two distinct dhannas, but rather a collection of mind and mental states which provoke speech, and which is sometimes gross, sometimes subtle. )
[The Vaibhasikas:] What contradiction is there in two dharmas, the first (vitarka) gross, and the second (vicdra) subtle, being associated with the same mind?
[The Sautrantikas:] There would not be any contradiction if these two dharmas were specifically different; for example, sensations and ideas--although the first are gross and the second subtle (i. 22)--can
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coexist. But two states of the same species, one in a strong state and the other in a weak state, one gross and one subtle, cannot coexist.
[The Vaibhasikas:] But there is a specific difference between vitarka and vicdra.
[The Sautrantikas:] What is this difference?
[The Vaibhasikas:] This difference is inexpressible; but it is
17 manifested through the force or the weakness of the mind. ?
[The Sautrantikas:] The force and the weakness of the mind do not demonstrate the presence of two specifically different dharmas, for the same species is sometimes strong, sometimes weak.
According to another opinion,--ours,--vitarka and vicdra are not
m
associated with one and the same mind. They exist in turn. Vaibhasikas would object that the First Dhyana has five parts (viii. 7) among which are vitarka and vicdra. We would answer that the First Dhyana has five parts in the sense that five parts are possible in the First Dhyana: but any given moment of the First Dhyana possesses only four parts, namely priti, sukha, and samddhi, plus vitarka or vicdra.
***
What difference is there between mdna (pride) and mada (pride- intoxication) (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 223a6)?
33b. Mdna, the error of pride, is arrogance. But mada, pride- intoxication, is the abolition of the mind of one who is enamoured with his own qualities.
It is arrogance of mind (cetas# unnatih) with respect to others. Measuring (ma) the superiority of qualities that one has, or that one believes to have over others, one becomes haughty and depreciates others.
Be reason of its attachment to its own qualities, the mind becomes
172
puffed up, exhaults itself, and abolishes itself. According to other
Masters, in the same way that wine produces a certain joyous excitation that is called intoxication, so too does the attachment that a person has
The
? 173 for his own qualities.
***
We have defined the mind (citta, i. 16) and its mental states. We have seen in what categories the mental states are placed, in what numbers they are generated together, and what their different characteristics are. The mind and its mental states receive, in the Scriptures, different names.
34a-b. The names mind (citta), spirit (manas), and conscious-
174
ness (vijndna) designate the same thing
The mind is termed citta because it accumulates (cinoti); it is
176
termed manas because it knows (manute) and it is termed vijndna
because it distinguishes its object (dlambanam vijndndti).
Some say that the mind is termed citta because it is spotted {citta)
177
by good and bad elements;
(dsrayabhuta) of the mind that follows, it is manas (i. 17); and to the extent that it grasps the support through the organ and its object (dsritabhutd), it is vijndna.
Hence these three names express different meanings, but they designate the same object; in this same way
34b-d. The mind and its mental states "have a support/' "have an object," "have an aspect," and are "associated. "
These four different names, "have a support," etc. , designate the same object.
The mind and its mental states "have a support" because they rely
on the organs (organ of sight, etc. , mental organ); "have an object"
(sdlambana, i. 34) or "a subject of consciousness," because they grasp
their "sphere;" "have an aspect," because they take form according to
178
their object; and are "associated," that is, similar and united, because
they are similar to one another and are not separated from each other. How are they samprayukta or associated, that is, "similar and
united? "
to the extent that it is the support
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34d. In five ways.
The mind and its mental states are associated by reason of five equalities or identities, identity of support (dsraya), of object (dlambana),of aspect (dkara),of time (kola),and equality in the number of dravyas. That is: the mental states (sensation, etc. ) and the mind are associated (1-3) because they have the same support, the same object, and the same aspect; (4) because they are simultaneous; and (5) because, in this association, each type is represented by only one individual substance (dravya): in any given moment there can be only one mind produced; to this one, unique mind there is found associated one sensation, one idea, or one mental state of each type (see ii. 53c-d).
We have explained the mind and its mental states, in full, with
179 their characteristics.
***
[iv. The dharmas not associated with the mind] What are the samskdras not associated with the mind?
35-36a. The dharmas "not associated, with the mind" are prdpti, aprapti, sabhd^dta, dsamjnika, and two absorptions, life,
180 characteristics, namakdya, etc. , and that which is of this type.
These dharmas are not associated with the mind; they are not of the nature of rupa or physical matter; they are included within the samskdraskandha (i. 15): they are called the cittaviprayukta samskdras,
(1) because they are disjoined from the mind, and (2) because, being non-material, they resemble the mind.
181 36b. Prdpti is acquisition and possession.
Prdpti is of two types: (1) acquisition of that which has not been obtained (prdpta) or of that which had been lost; and (2) possession of that which, having been obtained, has not been lost.
Aprapti is the opposite.
? 36c. There is prapti and aprapti of dharmas that belong to the
182
,?
1. When a conditioned dharma falls into the personal series,"
there is prapti or aprapti of this dharma, but not if it falls into the
series of another person, for no one possesses the dharmas of another;
nor if it does not fall into any series, for no one posseses the dharmas
183
"which are not of a living being" (asattvdkhya, U0b).
2. As for unconditioned dharmas, there is prapti of pratisamkhyd-
nirodha and apratisamkhydnirodha (i. 6, ii. 55). 36d. And of the two extinctions.
a. All beings possess the apratismkhyanirodha of the dharmas that do not arise without a cause.
b. The Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1022a) expresses itself in this way: "Who possesses pure dharmas? All beings possess pratisamkhydnirodha with the exception of the sakalabandhana- ddiksanasthas, that is, with the exception of the Aryans bound with all the bonds and who are found in the first moment of the Path, and with the exception of the Prthagjanas bound by all the bonds. The others,
184 both Aryans and Prthagjanas, possess pratisamkhyanirodha! *
c. No one possesses space (dkdsa). Hence there is no prapti of space.
[According to the Vaibhasikas,] prapti and aprapti are in opposi- tion: everything that is susceptible of prapti is also susceptible of aprapti. As shall be explained, the stanza does not speak of this in a straightforward manner.
[The Sautrantikas] deny the existence of a dharma called prapti or possession.
[1. How do the Sarvastivadin-Vaibhasikas prove the existence of a
185
substance (dravyadharma) termed prapti? ]
[The Sarvastivadins:] A Sutra (Madhyamdgama, TD 1, p. 735b29
and following? ) says, "Through the production, the acquisition, and the
possession of ten dharmas belonging to an Arhat, the Saint becomes a
186
person 'having abandoned five things. '"
[The Sautrantikas:] If you conclude from this text that prapti
person himself,
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exists, we would remark that one "possesses" dhannas "that do not
belong to living beings," and also dharmas that do belong to another.
In fact, a Sutra (=the Cakravartisutra) says, "Know, Oh Bhiksus, that 187
the Cakravartin King possesses seven jewels . . . " Now, among the jewels, there are the jewels of a wheel, a wife, etc
[The Sarvastivadins:] In this text, the expression "to possess"
(samanvdgata) signifies "master of. " One says that the Cakravartin
King enjoys mastery over jewels, for they go as he wishes. But in the
Sutra on the Possession of the Ten Dharmas of an Arhat (Dasa-
saiksadharmasamanvagamasutra), the word "possession" designates a 188
thing in and of itself.
2. [The Sautrantikas:] If the word "possession" signifies "mastery"
in the Cakravartisutra, how do you ascertain that, in another Sutra, this same word designates a supposed prapti, a thing in and of itself? In fact 1. ) this prapti is not directly perceived, as is the case for color, sound, etc. , and as is the case for lust, anger, etc. ; 2. ) one cannot conclude the existence of prapti by reason of its effects, as is the case for the sense organs, the organ of sight, etc. (i. 9): for a similar effect is not perceived.
[The Sarvastivadins:] Error! Possession has an effect. It is the 189
cause of the arising of the dharmas.
[The Sautrantikas:] This answer is unfortunate. 1. You maintain
that one can posses the two extinctions; now these, being uncondi-
tioned, do not arise: only conditioned things are "caused" (i. 7d). 2. As
for the conditioned dharmas, there is not now, in any given person, 190
possession of the dharmas that he has not yet acquired, nor does he
any longer possess the dharmas whose possession he has abandoned
through his changing of his sphere of existence or through "detach-
191
ment:"
possession of the second has perished. Hence how can these dharmas arise if the cause of their arising is prapti}
[The Sarvastivadins:] The arising of these dharmas has for its cause a prapti which arises at the same time as they do.
[The Sautrantikas:] An unfortunate answer! If the dharmas arise by virtue of prapti, 1. ) arising and the arising-of-arising (ii. 45c) have
the possession of the first has never existed, and the
? no use; 2. ) the dharmas "that do not belong to living beings" do not arise; and 3. ) how does one explain the difference in the degree of defilement,--weak, medium, and strong defilement,--among persons who are 'bound to all bonds? : all in fact possess the same prdptis of all the defilements of Kamadhatu. Would you say that this difference
proceeds from causes distinct from prapti)
We would answer that these causes are the only cause of weak,
medium, or strong defilements; why would one want to assign it to
prapti?
3. [The Sarvastivadins:] Who maintains that prapti is the cause of
the arising of dharmas} Such is not the role that we attribute to it. For us, prapti is the cause that determines the state or condition of beings. Let us explain. Let us suppose the non-existence of prapti: what difference would there be between an Aryan at the moment in which he produces a mundane thought and a Prthagjana? Now the difference consists solely in that the Aryan, even when he has a worldly thought, is in possession (prapti) of a certain number of pure dharmas.
[The Sautrantikas]: For us, there is this difference that the first has abandoned certain defilements, while the second has not yet aban- doned them.
[The Sarvastivadins:] Without doubt; but if we suppose the non- existence of prapti, how can we say that a defilement is abandoned or not abandoned? There can only be the abandoning of a defilement through the disappearance of the prapti of this defilement; the defilement is not abandoned as long as its prapti lasts.
4. [The Doctrine of the Sautrantikas:] To us, the abandoning or the non-abandoning of a defilement consists of a certain condition of the person (asraya, ii. 5 and 6, 44d). The personality of the Aryan is modified, becoming different from what it was through the power of the Path (Seeing the Truths, Meditation). The defilement, once it has been destroyed through the force of the Path, cannot be manifested again. Like seed which is burned by fire and which becomes different from what it once was, and is no longer capable of germinating, we say that the Aryan has abandoned the defilement, because his person no longer maintains the seeds capable of producing a defilement. The
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worldly path does not definitively destroy the defilement; it only damages it or disturbs it: one would say that a Prthagjana--who is able to practice only the worldly path--has abandoned the defilement when his person no longer contains even the seeds of defilement damaged by this path. Contrarily one says that a person has not abandoned defilement when the seeds are neither burnt nor damaged. One says that a person is in possession of the defilement when he has not "abandoned" them in the manner that we have just explained; we say that he is in non-possession of the defilements when he has not abandoned it. "Possession" and "non-possession" are not things in and of themselves, but designations.
This then concerns possession and non-possession of defilement. But concerning the possession and non-possession of good dharmas, we must distinguish 1. ) the innate good dharmas, which do not entail any effort, and 2. ) the good dharmas that are obtained through effort or cultivation (prayogika, ii. 71b).
We say that a person possesses the first when his person possesses intact the quality of being a seed of these good dharmas. When this quality is damaged, we say that the person does not possess the good
dharmas. In fact, while the seeds of defilement can be destroyed completely and definitively, as is the case among the Aryans, good dharmas never have their roots definitively cut off, with the restriction that one says of a person who has cut off the roots of good through false views (samucchinnakufalamula, iv. 79c) that he has only aban- doned these roots, because the quality of being a seed of these roots, a quality that belongs to his person, has been damaged through false views.
We say that a person possesses the second--the good dharmas produced through effort, through hearing, reflection, and medita- tion--when, these dharmas having arisen, his capacity to produce them [anew] is not damaged.
Hence what we understand by "possession" or the "fact of being endowed with" (samanvagama) is not a dharma constituting a separate thing in and of itself, namely the supposed prapti of the Sarvastivadins, but a certain condition of the person: 1. the seeds of
? defilement have not been uprooted through the Path of the Saints; 2. the seeds of defilement have not been damaged by means of the worldly path; 3. the seeds of innate good have not been damaged through false views; and 4. the seeds of good "obtained through effort" are in good condition at the moment when one wants to produce this good. When the person is in such a condition, this is what we call "possession of defilements," etc.
***
But what should we understand by "seeds" [ask the Sarvasti- vadins]?
By seeds we understand ndmarupa (iii. 30), that is, the complex of the five skandhas, capable of generating a result, either immediately or mediately, by means of the parindma-visesa of its series.
The series is the samskdras of the past, the present and the future, in relation to causality, that constitutes an uninterrupted series.
The parindma, or the evolution of the series, is the modification of this series, the fact that this series arises differently from itself at each moment.
The visesa, or culminating point of this evolution, is the moment of this series that possesses the capacity of immediately producing a
192 result.
[The Vaibhasikas object:] The Sutra says, "He who is in possession of greed is not capable of producing the foundations of mindfulness {smrtyupasthdnas, vi. 14). "
[The Sautrantikas:] In this text, we must understand by "posses- sion" of greed the "consenting to greed," or "not rejecting greed. " The Sutra does not say that a person who has the seeds of greed in him is incapable of producing the foundations of mindfulness; it says rather that active greed renders this person presently incapable of producing these spiritual exercises.
In short, in whichever manner it is that we understand possession, either as "cause of the arising of the dharmas" or as "origin of the condition of beings," or as "special state of the person," or as
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"consenting to," possession appears to us, not as an entity, a thing in and of itself, but as a "dharma of designation. " This same holds for non-possession, which is purely and simply the negation of possession.
***
The Vaibhasikas say that prdpti and aprdpti are things in and of themselves.
Why?
Because this is our teaching.
37a. There is threefold prdpti of the dharmas of the three periods.
and future. The same for present and future dharmas.
37b. There is good prdpti, etc. , of good dharmas, etc.
193
Past dharmas can be the object of a threefold prdpti, past, present, 194
The prdpti of good, bad, or neutral dharmas is, respectively, good, bad, or neutral.
37c. The prdptis of the dharmas belonging to the spheres of 193
The dharmas belonging to the spheres of existence are impure dharmas. The prdpti of a dharma in Kamadhatu is, itself, in Kama- dhatu; and thus following.
37d. There is fourfold prdpti of the dharmas that do not belong 19<s
In general, the prdpti of these dharmas--the pure dharmas--is fourfold: it belongs to the three spheres, and it is pure. But there are distinctions:
1. The prdpti of apratisamkhydnirodha (see ii. 36c-d) is of the sphere to which the person who obtains it belongs.
existence are of their spheres.
to the spheres of existence.
2. The prdpti of pratisamkhyanirodha is of Rupadhatu, of Arupya-
? 197 dhatu, and pure.
of the Asaiksa dharmas is Asaiksa. But there is
38a. Threefold prdpti of the dharmas which are neither Saiksa nor Asaiksa.
These dharmas--the naivasaiksandsaiksas, vi. 45b--are the impure dharmas and the unconditioned dharmas\ they are called this because they differ from the dharmas of the Saiksa and from the dharmas of the Asaiksa.
In general, the prdpti of these dharmas is threefold. Their distinctions are:
1. The prdpti of the impure dharmas is neither-Saiksa-nor Asaiksa; 2. In this same way the prdpti of apratisarhkhydnirodha and the
199 prdpti of pratisamkhydnirodha are obtained by a non-Aryan;
3. The prdpti of pratisamkhyanirodha is Saiksa when this nirodha is obtained through the path of the Saiksas; it is Asaiksa when this nirodha is obtained through the path of the Asaiksas.
***
The prdpti of the dharmas to be abandoned either through Seeing, or through Meditation, is destroyed, respeaively, either through Seeing or through Meditation; it belongs then, from the point of view of abandoning them, to the category of these dharmas (ii. 33).
As for the dharmas which should not be abandoned, their prdpti presents difficulties:
38b. There is twofold prdpti of the dharmas that should not be abandoned.
These dharmas are the pure dharmas (i. 40b, i l l 3d).
The prdpti of apratisarhkhydnirodha is abandoned through the Path of Meditation.
3. The prdpti of the Path (mdrgasatya, vi. 25d) is Saiksa; the prdpti 198
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The same for the prdpti of pratisamkhyanirodha obtained by the non-Aryan.
But the prdpti of pratisamkhyanirodha obtained through the Path is pure and should not be abandoned. The same for the prdpti of the
200
Path.
We have established the general principal that the dharmas of the
three periods are susceptible of a threefold prdpti (ii. 37a). We must be more precise.
38c. The prdpti of a neutral dharma is simultaneous to it.
The prdpti of an undefiled-neutral dharma is simultaneous to this
dharma: one possesses it when it is present, not when it is past or
future. When it is past, the prdpti is past, and when it is future, the 201
prdpti is future: this by reason of the weakness of this dharma, 38d. With the exception of the two supernormal faculties and
apparition.
This rule does not apply to all undefiled-neutral dharmas. The supernormal faculties of seeing and hearing (caksurabhijnd, srotra- bhijnd, vii. 45) and the mind capable of creating apparitional beings (nirmdnacitta, ii. 72) are strong, for they are realized through a special effort; consequently one possesses them in the past, the present, and
202
the future. Certain Masters maintain that the undefiled-neutral
dharmas "of craftsmanship" and "of attitude" (airydpathika, ii. 72), when they have been the object of an intense practice are also possessed in the past and future.
39a. The same for the prdpti of defiled rupa.
The prdpti of defiled-neutral rupa is only simultaneous to this rupa. This rupa is bodily action and vocal action resulting from a defiled-neutral mind. This action, even through produced by a strong mind, is incapable, as is the mind itself, of creating avijnapti (iv. 7a); hence it is weak. Thus one possesses it in the present, but not in the past or the future.
***
? Is the tritemporal character of the prdpti of the good and the bad dharmas subject to any restriction, as is the case with the prdpti of the neutral dharmas?
39b. The prdpti of the rupa of Kamadhatu is not previous to this rupa.
This rupa, good or bad, for example the prdtimoksa-samvara (iv. 19 and following), is not possessed previous to its being produced. The prdpti is simultaneous and later, but not earlier.
***
Can non-possession be, like prdpti, good, bad, or neutral? 203
39c. Aprdpti is undefiled-neutral. Aprdpti is always anivrtdvyakrta (ii. 66).
39d. Aprdpti of the dharmas of the past or the future is threefold.
Aprdpti of past or future dharmas can be past, present, or future. But one necessarily possesses the present dharmas: hence the aprdpti of present dharmas can be only past or future.
40a. Aprdpti of the dharmas forming part of the spheres of existence, and of the immaculate dharmas, is threefold
Aprdpti of the dharmas of the sphere of Kamadhatu belong either to Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu, or Arupyadhatu accordingly as the person endowed with this aprdpti belongs to such a sphere of existence. The same for the aprdpti of pure dharmas.
In fact, aprdpti is never pure. Why?
40b-c. According to the School, a Prthagjana is a person who
204
has not acquired the Path.
1. As it says in the Mulasastra (Jndnaprasthana, TD 26, p. 928c5;
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Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 232b9), "What is the state of Prthagjana? The non-possession of the dharmas of the Aryans (dryadharmandm alabhah)! ' Now the state of Prthagjana is not pure; hence their non- possession (aprdpti=aldbha) is not pure.
Let us examine this definition. When the Sastra says that the state of Prthagjana is the non-possession of the dharmas of the Aryans, which dharmas of the Aryans does it mean?
The dharmas beginning with duhkhe dharmajnanaksanti and including the whole pure path or the Path of the Aryans (vi. 25).
[The Sarvastivadins:] The Sastra means all these dharmas, since it does not specify any.
Be careful! To believe you, a person in possession of duhkhe ksanti would be a Prthagjana if he did not possess all of the other Aryan dharmas.
[The Sarvastivadins:] The Sastra means the non-possession that is not accompanied by possession: the person of whom you speak, although not possessing the other dharmas of the Aryans, is not a Prthagjana because the non-possession of these other dharmas is accompanied by the possession of the ksanti. This is quite evident, for, in the contrary interpretation, the Buddha the Blessed Onfc, not possessing the dharmas of the "family" of the Sravakas and Pratyeka- buddhas (vi. 23), would be a Prthagjana.
Very well. But then the Sastra would say "The state of Prthagjana is the absolute non-possession (aldbha eva) of the Aryan dharmas" and not ". . . the non-possession (alabha) . . . "
[The Sarvastivadins:] The Sastra expresses itself very well, for the
ekapadas (Nirukta, 2. 2) permit a restrictive sense and the particle eva
is not necessary: for example abbhaksa signifies "that which lives
solely on water," and vdyubhaksa, "that which lives solely on wind. " 205
2. According to another opinion, the state of Prthagjana is the non-possession of the first stage of the Path of Seeing, duhkhe dharmajnanaksanti and its concomitant dharmas (vi. 25).
[Objection. ] In this hypothesis, at the sixteenth moment
(marge'nvayajndna), the saint will be a Prthagjana and not an Aryan,
206 for at this moment, the initial ksanti is lost.
? No, for the non-possession of the ksanti which constitutes the state of Pfthagjana has been absolutely destroyed in the first stage.
[Objection. ] The ksanti in question is threefold: of the family of the Sravakas, of the family of the Pratyekabuddhas, and of the family of the Buddhas (vi. 23). Of which of these three types are you speaking in your definition of the state of Prthagjana?
We mean to speak of three types of ksanti.
Be careful! The Buddha, not possessing the three types of ksanti^ would then be a Prthagjana!
We intend to speak of the non-possession of the ksanti which is not accompanied by possession . . . and thus following, as above, to the example "that which lives solely on water,'" "that which lives solely on wind. "
Hence the effort attempted in order to avoid the objection: "Be careful! To believe you, a person in possession of duhkhe dharma- jnanaksanti would be a Prthagjana . . . " is in vain. The best explana- tion is that of the Sautrantikas. To them, the state of Prthagjana is a
series in which the dharmas of the Aryans have not arisen. ***
How does non-possession perish?
40c-d It is abandoned through acquisition (prdpti), and through passing to another stage.
For example, the non-possession of the Path, which constitutes the
207 and (2) when one passes to another stage. The same holds for the
state of Pjrthagjana, is abandoned (1) when one acquires the Path, 208
209 non-possession of the other dharmas.
[Objection:] Non-possession is abandoned (1) when one produces the non-possession of non-possession, that is to say, when, changing one's stage of existence, one ceases to possess the state of Prthagjana; and (2) when the possession of non-possession is cut off, that is to say, when, acquiring the Path, one cuts off the state of Prthagjana.
Does this mean that there is possession of possession and non-
The lndriyas 217
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possession, and that there is non-possession of possession and non- possession?
Yes. There is possession and non-possession of possession and non-possession, which is called "secondary possession" (anuprapti), or "secondary non-possession. " One then distinguishes between mula- prdti and anuprdpti or prdptiprdpti.
Doesn't this doctrine lead to infinite progression?
No, for one possessess possession through the fact of possession of
possession and vice versa. There is possession of the one through the
fact of the other. Let us explain. When a certain dharma is produced in
a given person, three dharmas arise together, namely: 1) this dharma
itself, which is called the muladharma', 2) the prdpti of this mula-
dharma', and. 3) the prdpti of this prdpti. The person in question
possesses the muladharma and the prdpti of the prdpti by the fact of
the arising of the prdpti', he possesses this prdpti by the fact of the
arising of the prdpti. TM Hence there is no infinite progression. When a 211
good or a defiled dharma arises, at this very moment three dharmas arise together, inclusive of this good or defiled dharma, namely: the
211 muladharma, its prdpti, and the prdpti of this prdpti which is the
prdpti of the prdptiprdpti of the first moment, plus three anuprdptis through the fact that one is in possession of the three aforementioned prdptis. In this third moment eighteen dharmas arise together, namely nine prdptis: the prdptis of the three dharmas produced in the first moment, prdptis of the six dharmas produced in the second moment, plus nine anuprdptis through the fact that one in in possession of the nine aforementioned prdptis.
Thus the prdptis continue increasing in number from moment to
213
moment.
upaklesa), and of innate {upapattildbhika, ii. 71b) good dharmas with the dharmas that are associated (samprayukta, ii. 53c-d) and co-existent {sahabhu, ii. 50b) with them throughout beginningless and endless transmigration, arise, from moment to moment, in an infinite number. If one considers the series of one single being in the course of transmigration, those prdptis which arise at each moment are infinite in number. Considering all beings together, they (i. e. , the prdptis) are
The prdptis of present and future defilements (klesa and
? without measure, and without limit. Happily, they possess a great quality: they are non-material, and give way one to the other. If they were material, there could not be found enough room in the universe for the praptis of one single being, and even less for the prdptis of two beings!
214
What is "genre" or sameness of class designation?
41a. Sabhdgatd is that which causes resemblance between living
215
beings.
1. There exists an entity called sabhdgatd, a dhanna by virtue of which living beings, as well as the dharmas "that fall into the series of living beings" (sattvasamkhydta, i. 10), have resemblence between them (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p.