Pascal, for instance, wished to risk nothing, and
remained
Christian.
Nietzsche - Works - v15 - Will to Power - b
?
(3)
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337
made concerning the problem of the highest value of his nature.
Fasting--In every sense--even as a means of maintaining the capacity for taking pleasure in all good things (for instance, to give up reading for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease from being amiable for a while: one ought also to have fast days for one's virtues).
The monastery--Temporary isolation with severe seclusion from all letters, for instance; a kind of profound introspection and self-recovery, which does not go out Of the way of "temptations," but out of the way of "duties"; a stepping out of the daily round of one's environment; a detach ment from the tyranny of stimuli and external influences, which condemns us to expend our power only in reactions, and does not allow it to gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous
activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely: they only think reflexively, i. e. they must first read before they can think).
(4) Feasts. --A man must be very coarse in order not to feel the presence ofI Christians and Christian values as oppressive, so oppressive as to send all festive moods to the devil. By feasts we under stand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of all kinds Of seriousness and Philistinism; a divine saying Of Yea to one's self, as the result of physical
plenitude and perfection--all states to which the
Christian cannot honestly say Yea. A feast is a pagan thing par excellence.
(5) The courage of one's own nature: dressing up in morality. ---To be able to call one's passions
v01, 11. Y
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THE WILL TO POWER.
good without the help of a moral formula: this is the standard which measures the extent to which a man is able to say Yea to his own nature, namely, how much or how little he has to have recourse to morality.
(6) Death--The foolish physiological fact must be converted into a moral necessity. One should live in such a way that one may have the will to die at the right time !
917.
T0 feel one's self stronger--or, expressed other wise: happiness always presupposes a comparison (not necessarily with others, but with one's self, in the midst of a state of growth, and without being conscious that one is comparing).
? accentuation: whether by means of exciting chemicals or exciting errors (" halluci
nations")
Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of
security; he feels himself strong in his confidence, in his patience, and his resignation : this artificial accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is pro tected by a God. Take the feeling of superiority, for instance: as when the Caliph of Morocco sees only globes on which his three united kingdoms cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling of uniqueness, for instance: as when the European
imagines that culture belongs to Europe alone, and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged cosmic process; or, as when the Christian makes all existence revolve round the " Salvation of man. "
The question where does one begin feel the
Artificial
? ? is,
to
? aggressive powers
THE ORDER OF RANK.
339
of constraint: it is thus that different
pressure
degrees are ascertained. A philosopher,forinstance, in the midst of the coolest and most transmontane feats of abstraction feels like a fish-that enters its element: while colours and tones oppress him; not to speak of those dumb desires--of that which others call " the ideal. "
918.
A healthy and vigorous little boy will look sarcastically if he be asked: "Wilt thou become virtuous? "--but he immediately becomes eager if he be asked: " Wilt thou become stronger than thy comrades? "
*
How does one become stronger P--By deciding slowly; and by holding firmly to the decision
- once it is made. Everything else follows of itself. Spontaneous and changeable natures : both species
of the weak. We must not confound ourselves with them; we must feel distance--betimes!
Beware of good-natured people ! Dealings with them make one torpid. All environment is good which makes one exercise those defensive and
up
? which are instinctive in man. All. one's inventiveness should apply itself to - putting one's power of will to the test. . . . Here 'the determining factor must be recognised as something which is not knowledge, astuteness, or
wit.
One must learn to command betimes,--likewise
to obey. A man must learn modesty and tact in
? ? ? 340
THE WILL TO POWER.
modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to honour where modesty is displayed; he must like wise distinguish and honour wherever he bestows his confidence.
*
What does one repent most? One's modesty; the fact that one has not lent an ear to one's most individual needs; the fact that one has mistaken one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self low; the fact that one has lost all delicacy of
hearing in regard to one's instincts--This want of reverence in regard to one's self is avenged by all sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being, pride, cheerfulness, freedom, determination, cour age. A man never forgives himself, later on, for this want of genuine egoism: he regards it as an
Objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his
? real ego. ,
s
919
I should like man to begin by respecting himself: everything else follows of itself. Naturally a man ceases from being anything to others in this way: for this is precisely what they are least likely to forgive. " What? a man who respects himself? " '
This is something quite different from the blind instinct to love one's self. Nothing is more common in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is
* Cf. Disraeli in Tancred: "Self-respect, too, is a super? stition of past ages. . . . It is not suited to these times ; it is much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is important enough to have self-respect nowadays" (book iii. chap. v. ). --TR.
? ? ? '
Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in
THE ORDER OF RANK.
341
called ego, than a certain contempt for that which is loved: the fatalism of love.
920.
"I will have this or that "; "I would that this or that were so "; "I know that this or that is so "--the degrees of power: the man of will, the man of desire, the man of fate.
921.
The means by which a strong species maintains
itself :--
It grants itself the right of exceptional actions,
as a test of the power of self-control and
of freedom.
It abandons itself to states in which a man is
not allowed to be anything else than a
barbarian.
It tries to acquire strength of will by every
kind of asceticism.
It is not expansive; it practises silence; it
is cautious in regard to all charms.
It learns to obey in such a way that obedi ence provides a test of self-maintenance.
? regard to points of honour.
It never argues, " What is sauce for the goose
is sauce for the gander,"-but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay, as a privilege, as a distinction.
It does not covet other people's virtues.
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THE WILL TO POWER
922.
The way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of dispensing with barbarous methods, becomes Obvious, in practice, when one is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such as the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's mastery over barbarians.
923
Warlike and peaceful people--Art thou a man who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord, " freedom," " equal rights ": these things are but names and steps for one and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary for them to defend themselves,--such men become discon
tented with themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain create circum~ stances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all these things are better than waging war--thus does the Christian's instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born
warrior's character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in the development Of every one Of his qualities: weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised by the former.
? ? ? ? THE ORDER OF RANK.
What expedients and what virtues do the un armed and the undefended require in order to survive--and even to conquer?
924.
What will become of a man who no longer has any reasons for either defence or attack? What will remain of his passions when he has lost those which form his defence and his weapons?
925.
A marginal note to a niaiserie anglaise: " Do not to others that which you would not that they
should do unto you. " This stands for wisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very
basis of morality--as "a golden maxim. "
Stuart Mill believes in it (and what Englishman does not . . . But the maxim does not bear investigation. The argument, "Do not as you would not be done by," forbids action which pro duce harmful results; the thought behind always
that an action invariably requited. What some one came forward with the "Principe" in his hands, and said " We must do those actions alone which enable us to steal march on others,-- and which deprive others of the power of doing the same to us "? --On the other hand, let us re member the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does not desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the proba bility of getting one, does not deter him from
343
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? ? a
:
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is
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? ).
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THE WILL TO POWER.
vindicating his honour. . . . And in all really de cent actions are we not intentionally indifl'erent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which might have harmful results,--that would be tantamount to forbidding all decent actions in general.
Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a certain type qf man: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates itself through him,--we are equal, we regard each other as equal : as I am to thee so art thou to me. --In this com
of actions is really believed in --an equivalence which never under any circum
stances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible to requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not exist, consequently there can be no such thing as "requital. " . . . When I do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do anything at all like it: the action belongs to me. . . . Nobody can pay me back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the victim of another action.
926.
Against john Stuart Mill--I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says: " What is right for one man is right for another"; " Do not to others that which you would not that they should do unto you. " Such principles would fain establish the
whole of human traflic upon mutual services, so that every action would appear to be a cash pay ment for something done to us. The hypothesis
munity equivalence
? ? ? ? equivalent
remunerated).
THE ORDER OF RANK.
345
here is ignoble to the last degree: it is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value between my actions and thine; the most per sonal value Of an action is simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no
and which cannot be
"Reciprocity" is a piece of egregious vulgarity; the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not be done by another, that there is no such thing as equivalence (except in those very select circles where one actually has one's equal, inter pares), that in a really profound sense a man never re quites because he is something unique in himself and can only do unique things,--this fundamental conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloof
' ness from the mob, because the latter believes in equality,and consequently in the feasibility of equiva lence and " reciprocity. "
927.
The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts " useful" and " harmful" is well founded; it is the necessary point of view of a community which is only able to see and survey immediate and proximate consequences.
The State and the political man are already in
need of a more super-moral attitude of because they have to calculate concerning a much more complicated tissue of consequences. An eco nomic policy for the whole world should be possible which could look at things in such broad perspec tive that all its isolated demands would seem for
the moment not only unjust, but arbitrary.
? mind:
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THE WILL TO POWER.
928.
" Should one follow one's feelings? "--To set one's life at stake on the impulse of the moment, and actuated by a generous feeling, has little worth, and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is alike in being capable of this--and in behaving in this way with determination, the criminal, the bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the
honest man.
A higher degree of excellence would be to over
come this impulse, and to refrain from performing an heroic deed at its bidding--and to remain cold, raisonnable, free from the tempestuous surging of concomitant sensations of delight. . . . The same holds good of pity: it must first be sifted through reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous
'
generosity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these passions--on the contrary, a man should possess them to a terrible
'degree: but he should lead them by the bridle . . and even this he should not do out of love of con trol, but merely because. . . .
929
" To give up one's life for a cause "--very effec tive. But there are many things for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, will be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger, or to revenge--it matters not from
? as any other passion.
The blindyielding to a passion, whether it be
? ? ? THE ORDER OF RANK.
347
the point of view of value. How many have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls--and even what worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively chooses the most dangerous things: one philosopher, for in stance, one chooses the adventures Of speculation;
one virtuous, one chooses immorality. One
kind of man will risk nothing, another kind will
risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the contrary, what we seek life raised to higher power, life in danger. . But, let me re peat, we do not, on that account, wish to be more virtuous than Others.
Pascal, for instance, wished to risk nothing, and remained Christian. That perhaps was virtuous--A man always sacrifices something.
? '
93?
How many advantages does not man sacrifice To how small an extent does he seek his own
All his emotions and passions wish to assert their rights, and how remote passion from that cautious utility which consists in personal profit "
profit!
A man does not strive after
must be an Englishman to be able to believe that
man always seeking his own advantage. Our desires long to violate things with passion-- their overflowing strength seeks obstacles.
931
All passions are generally useful, some directly, others indirectly; in regard to utility abso
happiness one
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. __'___ MM
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? THE WILL To POWER.
lutely impossible to fix upon any gradation of values,--however certainly the forces of nature in general may be regarded as good (i. e. useful), from an economic point of view, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much
that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that the mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger sources of power exist.
932.
All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind have not come to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they are the conditions peculiar to rifh souls who are able to
' bestow and whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the eyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of self-denial, of hatred of self, of " Pascalism. "
933
In short, what we require is to dominate the passions and not to weaken or to extirpate them l--The greater the dominating power of the will, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions. "
magnificent monsters into its service.
The " good man " in every stage of civilisation
is at one and the same time the least dangerous
348
? The "great man
is so, owing to the free scope which he gives _to his desires, and to the still greater power which knows how to enlist these
? ? ? ally
THE ORDER or RANK
349
and the most useful: a sort of medium ; the idea formed of such a man by the common mind is that he is some one whom one has no reason tofear, but whom one must not therefore despise.
Education : essentially a means of mining ex ceptions in favour of the rule. Culture: essenti
the means of directing taste against the exceptions in favour of the mediocre.
Only when a culture can dispose of an overflow of force, is it capable of being a hothouse for the luxurious culture of the exception, of the experi ment, of the danger, of the nuance: this is the tendency of every aristocratic culture.
934-
All questions of strength: to what extent ought one to try and prevail against the preservative measures of society and the latter's prejudices ? -- to what extent ought one to unfetter one's terrihk qualities, through which so many go to the dogs ? -- to what extent ought one to run counter to truth, and take up sides with its most questionable aspects ? --to what extent ought one to oppose suiTering, self-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when it is always open to question whether one can ever master them (what does not kill us makes us stronger . . . ) ? ---and, finally, to what extent ought one to acknowledge the rights of the rule,
of the common-place, of the petty, of the good, of the upright, in fact of the average man, without thereby allowing one's self to become vulgar? . . . The strongest test of character is to resist being
? ? ? ? THE WILL To POWER.
ruined by the seductiveness of goodness. Good ness must be regarded as a luxury, as a refine
350
ment, as a vice.
-
3. THE NOBLE MAN.
935
Type: real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul, as the result of vital wealth: which does not give in order to receive--and which has no desire to elevate itself by being good ;--squandering is typical of genuine goodness ; vita! personal wealth is its prerequisite.
936.
Aristocracy. ----Gregarious ideals--at present culminating in the highest standard of value for society. It has been attempted to give them a cosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value--I defend aristocracy against them.
Any society which would of itself preserve a feeling of respect and de'licatesse in regard to freedom, must consider itself as an exception, and
have a force against it from which it distinguishes itself, and upon which it looks down with hostility. The more rights I surrender and the more I level myself down to others, the more deeply do I sink into the average and ultimately into the greatest number. The first condition which an aristocratic society must have in order to maintain a high degree of freedom among its members, is
that extreme tension which arises from the pres
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ence of the most antagonistic instincts in all its units: from their will to dominate. . . .
If ye would fain do away with strong contrasts and differences of rank, ye will also abolish strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the feeling of individuality.
Concerning the actual psychology of societies based upon freedom and equality. ---What that tends to diminish in such society?
The will to be responsible for one's self (the loss of this sign of the decline of autonomy); the ability to defend and to attack, even in spiritual matters; the power Of command; the sense of reverence, of subservience, the ability to be silent;
great passion, great achievements, tragedy and cheerfulness.
93
In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Mont losier had said in his work, De la Monarchiefran guise: he answered with cry of indignation, and set himself to his task. That emigrant had said: "Race d'afi'ranchis, race d'esclaves arrache's de nos mains, peuple tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous
fut octroye? e d'e? tre libres, et non pas nous d'e'tre nobles pour nous tout est de droit, pour vous tout est de grdce, nous ne sommes point de votre com munaute'; nous sommes un tout par nous memes. "
938.
How constantly the aristocratic world shears and weakens itself ever more and more! By
351
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is it
? 352
THE WILL TO POWER.
means of its noble instincts it abandons its privileges, and owing to its refined and excessive culture, it takes an interest in the people, the weak, the poor, and the poetry of the lowly, etc.
939
There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous form of carelessness, which allows of profound conclusions and insight: the carelessness of the self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has never troubled itself about friends, but which knows only hospitality and knows how to practise it; whose heart and house are open to all who will enter-- beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability: he who is capable of it has hundreds of " friends," but probably not one friend.
94?
";The teaching p. 118e? v dryau applies to men with overflowing strength,--not to the mediocre. xpe? -reia and damn: are only steps to higher things. Above them stands "golden N ature. "
" Thou shalt "----unconditional obedience in Stoics, in Christian and Arabian Orders, in Kant's philosophy immaterial whether this obedience
? shown to superior or to
Higher than " Thou shalt" stands "I will"
(the heroes)
higher than " will" stands "I am "
(the gods of the Greeks).
Barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure
of restraint,---they are neither simple, nor light hearted, nor moderate.
concept).
? ? ;
is
I
a
is
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? THE ORDER OF RANK.
353
94!
The essence of our gardens and palaces (and to the same extent the essence of all yearning after riches) is the desire to rid the eye of disorder ana vulgarity, and to build a home for our soul's nobility.
The majority of people certainly believe that they will develop higher natures when those beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon them : hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travel ling, etc. , and all reading and visits to theatres. People want to be formed--that is the kernel of their labours for culture ! But the strong, the mighty, would themselves have a hand in the form ing, and wouldfain have nothing strange about them I
It is for this reason, too, that men go to open Nature, not to find themselves, but to lose them selves and to forget themselves. The desire " to get away from one's self" is proper to all weaklings, and to all those who are discontented with themselVes.
942
The only nobility is that of birth and blood. (I do not refer here to the prefix "Lord" and L'almanac de Gotha: this is a parenthesis for donkeys. ) Wherever people speak of the" aristo cracy of intellect," reasons are generally not lacking for concealing something; it is known to be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect alone does not ennoble; on the contrary, some thing is always needed to ennoble intellect--What
then is needed ? ---Blood.
vOL. 11. Z
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THE WILL 'ro POWER.
943
What is noble?
--Extemal punctiliousness; because this punc
tiliousness hedges a man about, keeps him at a distance, saves him from being confounded with somebody else.
--A frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and bearing, with which stoical hardness and self control protect themselves from all prying inquisi tiveness or curiosity.
---A slow step and a slow glance. There are not too many valuable things on earth: and these come and wish to come of themselves to him who has value. We are not quick to admire.
--We know how to bear poverty, want, and even illness.
---We avoid small honours owing to our mis trust of all who are over-ready to praise: for the man who praises believes he understands what he praises: but to understand--Balzac, that typical man of ambition, betrayed the fact--comprendre
e'est ejgaler.
--Our doubt concerning the communicativeness
of our hearts goes very deep; to us, loneliness is not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon us.
---We are convinced that we only have duties to our equals, to others we do as we think best: we know that justice is only to be expected among equals (alas! -this will not be realised for some
time to come).
--We are ironical towards the "gifted"; we
hold the belief that no morality is possible with out good birth.
? ? ? ? THE ORDER OF RANK.
355
--We always feel as if we were those who had to dispense honours: while he is not found too frequently who would be worthy of honouring us.
---We are always disguised: the higher a man's nature the more is he in need of remaining incog nito. If there be a God, then out of sheer decency He ought only to show Himself on earth in the form of a man.
--We are capable of otiurn, of the uncondi tional conviction that although a handicraft does not shame one in any sense, it certainly reduces one's rank. However much we may respect " in dustry," and know how to give it its due, we do not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense, or after the manner of those insatiable and cackling artists who, like hens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again.
--We protect artists and poets and any one who happens to be a master in something; but as creatures of a higher order than those, who only know how to do something, who are only "pro ductive men," we do not confound ourselves with them.
'--We find joy in all forms and ceremonies; we would fain foster everything formal, and we are convinced that courtesy is one of the greatest virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind of laisser alter, including the freedom of the press and of thought; because, under such conditions, the intel lect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches its limbs.
--We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate, and more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to meet creatures
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THE WILL To POWER.
who have only dancing and nonsense and finery in their minds! They have always been the de light of every tense and profound male soul, whose life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.
--We take pleasure in princes and in priests, because in big things, as in small, they actually up hold the belief in the difference of human values, even in the estimation of the past, and at least symbolically.
--We are able to keep silence: but we do not breathe a word of this in the presence of listeners.
--We are able to endure long enmities: we lack the power of easy reconciliations.
--We have a loathing of demagogism, of en lightenment, of amiability, and plebeian familiarity.
--We collect precious things, the needs of
? and fastidious souls; we wish to possess nothing in common. We want to have our own books, our own landscapes.
higher
--We protest against evil and fine experiences, and take care not to generalise too quickly. The individual case: how ironically we regard it when it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule!
-We love that which is naif, and naif people, but as spectators and higher creatures; we think Faust is just as simple as his Margaret.
---We have a low estimation of good people, because they are gregarious animals: we know how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness lies concealed beneath the most evil, the most malicious, and the hardest exterior, and that this single grain outweighs all the mere goody-goodi ness of milk-and-watery souls.
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357
---We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted by his vices, nor by his tomfooleries. We are well aware that we are not recognised with ease, and that we have every reason to make our foreground very prominent.
944
What is noble ? --The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing a part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one is forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the
greatest number: the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue, of comfort, and of
I
? la Spencer. That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsi
Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness,d
bilities. That one knows how to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That one contradicts the greatest number, not in words at all, but by continually behaving diflerently from them.
945
Virtue (for instance, truthfulness) is our most noble and most dangerous luxury. We must not decline the disadvantages which it brings in its
train.
946
We refuse to be praised : we do what serves our purpose, what gives us pleasure, or what we are obliged to do.
947 -
What is chastity in a man? It means that his taste in sex has remained noble; that in eroticis
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he likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor the clever.
948
The concept of honour is founded upon the belief in select society, in knightly excellences, in the Obligation of having continually to play a part. In essentials it means that one does not take one's life too seriously, that one adheres unconditionally to the most dignified manners in one's dealings with everybody (at least in so far as they do not belong to " us "); that one is neither familiar, nor
good-natured, nor hearty, nor modest, except inter pares; that one is always playing a part.
949
The fact that one sets one's life, one's health, and one's honour at stake, is the result of high spirits and of an overflowing and spendthrift will : it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact that every danger kindles our curiosity concern ing the measure Of our strength, and provokes our courage.
950.
" Eagles swoop down straight "--nobility of soul is best revealed by the magnificent and proud foolishness with which it makes its attacks.
95! .
War should be made against all namby-pamby ideas of nobility ! ---A certain modicum of brutality
358
'
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THE ORDER OF RANK.
337
made concerning the problem of the highest value of his nature.
Fasting--In every sense--even as a means of maintaining the capacity for taking pleasure in all good things (for instance, to give up reading for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease from being amiable for a while: one ought also to have fast days for one's virtues).
The monastery--Temporary isolation with severe seclusion from all letters, for instance; a kind of profound introspection and self-recovery, which does not go out Of the way of "temptations," but out of the way of "duties"; a stepping out of the daily round of one's environment; a detach ment from the tyranny of stimuli and external influences, which condemns us to expend our power only in reactions, and does not allow it to gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous
activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely: they only think reflexively, i. e. they must first read before they can think).
(4) Feasts. --A man must be very coarse in order not to feel the presence ofI Christians and Christian values as oppressive, so oppressive as to send all festive moods to the devil. By feasts we under stand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of all kinds Of seriousness and Philistinism; a divine saying Of Yea to one's self, as the result of physical
plenitude and perfection--all states to which the
Christian cannot honestly say Yea. A feast is a pagan thing par excellence.
(5) The courage of one's own nature: dressing up in morality. ---To be able to call one's passions
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THE WILL TO POWER.
good without the help of a moral formula: this is the standard which measures the extent to which a man is able to say Yea to his own nature, namely, how much or how little he has to have recourse to morality.
(6) Death--The foolish physiological fact must be converted into a moral necessity. One should live in such a way that one may have the will to die at the right time !
917.
T0 feel one's self stronger--or, expressed other wise: happiness always presupposes a comparison (not necessarily with others, but with one's self, in the midst of a state of growth, and without being conscious that one is comparing).
? accentuation: whether by means of exciting chemicals or exciting errors (" halluci
nations")
Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of
security; he feels himself strong in his confidence, in his patience, and his resignation : this artificial accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is pro tected by a God. Take the feeling of superiority, for instance: as when the Caliph of Morocco sees only globes on which his three united kingdoms cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling of uniqueness, for instance: as when the European
imagines that culture belongs to Europe alone, and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged cosmic process; or, as when the Christian makes all existence revolve round the " Salvation of man. "
The question where does one begin feel the
Artificial
? ? is,
to
? aggressive powers
THE ORDER OF RANK.
339
of constraint: it is thus that different
pressure
degrees are ascertained. A philosopher,forinstance, in the midst of the coolest and most transmontane feats of abstraction feels like a fish-that enters its element: while colours and tones oppress him; not to speak of those dumb desires--of that which others call " the ideal. "
918.
A healthy and vigorous little boy will look sarcastically if he be asked: "Wilt thou become virtuous? "--but he immediately becomes eager if he be asked: " Wilt thou become stronger than thy comrades? "
*
How does one become stronger P--By deciding slowly; and by holding firmly to the decision
- once it is made. Everything else follows of itself. Spontaneous and changeable natures : both species
of the weak. We must not confound ourselves with them; we must feel distance--betimes!
Beware of good-natured people ! Dealings with them make one torpid. All environment is good which makes one exercise those defensive and
up
? which are instinctive in man. All. one's inventiveness should apply itself to - putting one's power of will to the test. . . . Here 'the determining factor must be recognised as something which is not knowledge, astuteness, or
wit.
One must learn to command betimes,--likewise
to obey. A man must learn modesty and tact in
? ? ? 340
THE WILL TO POWER.
modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to honour where modesty is displayed; he must like wise distinguish and honour wherever he bestows his confidence.
*
What does one repent most? One's modesty; the fact that one has not lent an ear to one's most individual needs; the fact that one has mistaken one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self low; the fact that one has lost all delicacy of
hearing in regard to one's instincts--This want of reverence in regard to one's self is avenged by all sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being, pride, cheerfulness, freedom, determination, cour age. A man never forgives himself, later on, for this want of genuine egoism: he regards it as an
Objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his
? real ego. ,
s
919
I should like man to begin by respecting himself: everything else follows of itself. Naturally a man ceases from being anything to others in this way: for this is precisely what they are least likely to forgive. " What? a man who respects himself? " '
This is something quite different from the blind instinct to love one's self. Nothing is more common in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is
* Cf. Disraeli in Tancred: "Self-respect, too, is a super? stition of past ages. . . . It is not suited to these times ; it is much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is important enough to have self-respect nowadays" (book iii. chap. v. ). --TR.
? ? ? '
Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in
THE ORDER OF RANK.
341
called ego, than a certain contempt for that which is loved: the fatalism of love.
920.
"I will have this or that "; "I would that this or that were so "; "I know that this or that is so "--the degrees of power: the man of will, the man of desire, the man of fate.
921.
The means by which a strong species maintains
itself :--
It grants itself the right of exceptional actions,
as a test of the power of self-control and
of freedom.
It abandons itself to states in which a man is
not allowed to be anything else than a
barbarian.
It tries to acquire strength of will by every
kind of asceticism.
It is not expansive; it practises silence; it
is cautious in regard to all charms.
It learns to obey in such a way that obedi ence provides a test of self-maintenance.
? regard to points of honour.
It never argues, " What is sauce for the goose
is sauce for the gander,"-but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay, as a privilege, as a distinction.
It does not covet other people's virtues.
? ? ? 342
THE WILL TO POWER
922.
The way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of dispensing with barbarous methods, becomes Obvious, in practice, when one is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such as the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's mastery over barbarians.
923
Warlike and peaceful people--Art thou a man who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord, " freedom," " equal rights ": these things are but names and steps for one and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary for them to defend themselves,--such men become discon
tented with themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain create circum~ stances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all these things are better than waging war--thus does the Christian's instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born
warrior's character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in the development Of every one Of his qualities: weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised by the former.
? ? ? ? THE ORDER OF RANK.
What expedients and what virtues do the un armed and the undefended require in order to survive--and even to conquer?
924.
What will become of a man who no longer has any reasons for either defence or attack? What will remain of his passions when he has lost those which form his defence and his weapons?
925.
A marginal note to a niaiserie anglaise: " Do not to others that which you would not that they
should do unto you. " This stands for wisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very
basis of morality--as "a golden maxim. "
Stuart Mill believes in it (and what Englishman does not . . . But the maxim does not bear investigation. The argument, "Do not as you would not be done by," forbids action which pro duce harmful results; the thought behind always
that an action invariably requited. What some one came forward with the "Principe" in his hands, and said " We must do those actions alone which enable us to steal march on others,-- and which deprive others of the power of doing the same to us "? --On the other hand, let us re member the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does not desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the proba bility of getting one, does not deter him from
343
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? ? a
:
is
is
if
? ).
? 344
THE WILL TO POWER.
vindicating his honour. . . . And in all really de cent actions are we not intentionally indifl'erent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which might have harmful results,--that would be tantamount to forbidding all decent actions in general.
Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a certain type qf man: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates itself through him,--we are equal, we regard each other as equal : as I am to thee so art thou to me. --In this com
of actions is really believed in --an equivalence which never under any circum
stances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible to requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not exist, consequently there can be no such thing as "requital. " . . . When I do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do anything at all like it: the action belongs to me. . . . Nobody can pay me back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the victim of another action.
926.
Against john Stuart Mill--I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says: " What is right for one man is right for another"; " Do not to others that which you would not that they should do unto you. " Such principles would fain establish the
whole of human traflic upon mutual services, so that every action would appear to be a cash pay ment for something done to us. The hypothesis
munity equivalence
? ? ? ? equivalent
remunerated).
THE ORDER OF RANK.
345
here is ignoble to the last degree: it is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value between my actions and thine; the most per sonal value Of an action is simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no
and which cannot be
"Reciprocity" is a piece of egregious vulgarity; the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not be done by another, that there is no such thing as equivalence (except in those very select circles where one actually has one's equal, inter pares), that in a really profound sense a man never re quites because he is something unique in himself and can only do unique things,--this fundamental conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloof
' ness from the mob, because the latter believes in equality,and consequently in the feasibility of equiva lence and " reciprocity. "
927.
The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts " useful" and " harmful" is well founded; it is the necessary point of view of a community which is only able to see and survey immediate and proximate consequences.
The State and the political man are already in
need of a more super-moral attitude of because they have to calculate concerning a much more complicated tissue of consequences. An eco nomic policy for the whole world should be possible which could look at things in such broad perspec tive that all its isolated demands would seem for
the moment not only unjust, but arbitrary.
? mind:
? ? ? 346
THE WILL TO POWER.
928.
" Should one follow one's feelings? "--To set one's life at stake on the impulse of the moment, and actuated by a generous feeling, has little worth, and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is alike in being capable of this--and in behaving in this way with determination, the criminal, the bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the
honest man.
A higher degree of excellence would be to over
come this impulse, and to refrain from performing an heroic deed at its bidding--and to remain cold, raisonnable, free from the tempestuous surging of concomitant sensations of delight. . . . The same holds good of pity: it must first be sifted through reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous
'
generosity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these passions--on the contrary, a man should possess them to a terrible
'degree: but he should lead them by the bridle . . and even this he should not do out of love of con trol, but merely because. . . .
929
" To give up one's life for a cause "--very effec tive. But there are many things for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, will be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger, or to revenge--it matters not from
? as any other passion.
The blindyielding to a passion, whether it be
? ? ? THE ORDER OF RANK.
347
the point of view of value. How many have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls--and even what worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively chooses the most dangerous things: one philosopher, for in stance, one chooses the adventures Of speculation;
one virtuous, one chooses immorality. One
kind of man will risk nothing, another kind will
risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the contrary, what we seek life raised to higher power, life in danger. . But, let me re peat, we do not, on that account, wish to be more virtuous than Others.
Pascal, for instance, wished to risk nothing, and remained Christian. That perhaps was virtuous--A man always sacrifices something.
? '
93?
How many advantages does not man sacrifice To how small an extent does he seek his own
All his emotions and passions wish to assert their rights, and how remote passion from that cautious utility which consists in personal profit "
profit!
A man does not strive after
must be an Englishman to be able to believe that
man always seeking his own advantage. Our desires long to violate things with passion-- their overflowing strength seeks obstacles.
931
All passions are generally useful, some directly, others indirectly; in regard to utility abso
happiness one
? ? it is
";
is! a
. __'___ MM
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if is
is
!
is
a a
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.
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? THE WILL To POWER.
lutely impossible to fix upon any gradation of values,--however certainly the forces of nature in general may be regarded as good (i. e. useful), from an economic point of view, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much
that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that the mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger sources of power exist.
932.
All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind have not come to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they are the conditions peculiar to rifh souls who are able to
' bestow and whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the eyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of self-denial, of hatred of self, of " Pascalism. "
933
In short, what we require is to dominate the passions and not to weaken or to extirpate them l--The greater the dominating power of the will, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions. "
magnificent monsters into its service.
The " good man " in every stage of civilisation
is at one and the same time the least dangerous
348
? The "great man
is so, owing to the free scope which he gives _to his desires, and to the still greater power which knows how to enlist these
? ? ? ally
THE ORDER or RANK
349
and the most useful: a sort of medium ; the idea formed of such a man by the common mind is that he is some one whom one has no reason tofear, but whom one must not therefore despise.
Education : essentially a means of mining ex ceptions in favour of the rule. Culture: essenti
the means of directing taste against the exceptions in favour of the mediocre.
Only when a culture can dispose of an overflow of force, is it capable of being a hothouse for the luxurious culture of the exception, of the experi ment, of the danger, of the nuance: this is the tendency of every aristocratic culture.
934-
All questions of strength: to what extent ought one to try and prevail against the preservative measures of society and the latter's prejudices ? -- to what extent ought one to unfetter one's terrihk qualities, through which so many go to the dogs ? -- to what extent ought one to run counter to truth, and take up sides with its most questionable aspects ? --to what extent ought one to oppose suiTering, self-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when it is always open to question whether one can ever master them (what does not kill us makes us stronger . . . ) ? ---and, finally, to what extent ought one to acknowledge the rights of the rule,
of the common-place, of the petty, of the good, of the upright, in fact of the average man, without thereby allowing one's self to become vulgar? . . . The strongest test of character is to resist being
? ? ? ? THE WILL To POWER.
ruined by the seductiveness of goodness. Good ness must be regarded as a luxury, as a refine
350
ment, as a vice.
-
3. THE NOBLE MAN.
935
Type: real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul, as the result of vital wealth: which does not give in order to receive--and which has no desire to elevate itself by being good ;--squandering is typical of genuine goodness ; vita! personal wealth is its prerequisite.
936.
Aristocracy. ----Gregarious ideals--at present culminating in the highest standard of value for society. It has been attempted to give them a cosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value--I defend aristocracy against them.
Any society which would of itself preserve a feeling of respect and de'licatesse in regard to freedom, must consider itself as an exception, and
have a force against it from which it distinguishes itself, and upon which it looks down with hostility. The more rights I surrender and the more I level myself down to others, the more deeply do I sink into the average and ultimately into the greatest number. The first condition which an aristocratic society must have in order to maintain a high degree of freedom among its members, is
that extreme tension which arises from the pres
? ? ? ? THE ORDER or RANK.
ence of the most antagonistic instincts in all its units: from their will to dominate. . . .
If ye would fain do away with strong contrasts and differences of rank, ye will also abolish strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the feeling of individuality.
Concerning the actual psychology of societies based upon freedom and equality. ---What that tends to diminish in such society?
The will to be responsible for one's self (the loss of this sign of the decline of autonomy); the ability to defend and to attack, even in spiritual matters; the power Of command; the sense of reverence, of subservience, the ability to be silent;
great passion, great achievements, tragedy and cheerfulness.
93
In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Mont losier had said in his work, De la Monarchiefran guise: he answered with cry of indignation, and set himself to his task. That emigrant had said: "Race d'afi'ranchis, race d'esclaves arrache's de nos mains, peuple tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous
fut octroye? e d'e? tre libres, et non pas nous d'e'tre nobles pour nous tout est de droit, pour vous tout est de grdce, nous ne sommes point de votre com munaute'; nous sommes un tout par nous memes. "
938.
How constantly the aristocratic world shears and weakens itself ever more and more! By
351
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is it
? 352
THE WILL TO POWER.
means of its noble instincts it abandons its privileges, and owing to its refined and excessive culture, it takes an interest in the people, the weak, the poor, and the poetry of the lowly, etc.
939
There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous form of carelessness, which allows of profound conclusions and insight: the carelessness of the self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has never troubled itself about friends, but which knows only hospitality and knows how to practise it; whose heart and house are open to all who will enter-- beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability: he who is capable of it has hundreds of " friends," but probably not one friend.
94?
";The teaching p. 118e? v dryau applies to men with overflowing strength,--not to the mediocre. xpe? -reia and damn: are only steps to higher things. Above them stands "golden N ature. "
" Thou shalt "----unconditional obedience in Stoics, in Christian and Arabian Orders, in Kant's philosophy immaterial whether this obedience
? shown to superior or to
Higher than " Thou shalt" stands "I will"
(the heroes)
higher than " will" stands "I am "
(the gods of the Greeks).
Barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure
of restraint,---they are neither simple, nor light hearted, nor moderate.
concept).
? ? ;
is
I
a
is
a (it
e'fy
? THE ORDER OF RANK.
353
94!
The essence of our gardens and palaces (and to the same extent the essence of all yearning after riches) is the desire to rid the eye of disorder ana vulgarity, and to build a home for our soul's nobility.
The majority of people certainly believe that they will develop higher natures when those beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon them : hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travel ling, etc. , and all reading and visits to theatres. People want to be formed--that is the kernel of their labours for culture ! But the strong, the mighty, would themselves have a hand in the form ing, and wouldfain have nothing strange about them I
It is for this reason, too, that men go to open Nature, not to find themselves, but to lose them selves and to forget themselves. The desire " to get away from one's self" is proper to all weaklings, and to all those who are discontented with themselVes.
942
The only nobility is that of birth and blood. (I do not refer here to the prefix "Lord" and L'almanac de Gotha: this is a parenthesis for donkeys. ) Wherever people speak of the" aristo cracy of intellect," reasons are generally not lacking for concealing something; it is known to be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect alone does not ennoble; on the contrary, some thing is always needed to ennoble intellect--What
then is needed ? ---Blood.
vOL. 11. Z
? .
? ? ? 354
THE WILL 'ro POWER.
943
What is noble?
--Extemal punctiliousness; because this punc
tiliousness hedges a man about, keeps him at a distance, saves him from being confounded with somebody else.
--A frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and bearing, with which stoical hardness and self control protect themselves from all prying inquisi tiveness or curiosity.
---A slow step and a slow glance. There are not too many valuable things on earth: and these come and wish to come of themselves to him who has value. We are not quick to admire.
--We know how to bear poverty, want, and even illness.
---We avoid small honours owing to our mis trust of all who are over-ready to praise: for the man who praises believes he understands what he praises: but to understand--Balzac, that typical man of ambition, betrayed the fact--comprendre
e'est ejgaler.
--Our doubt concerning the communicativeness
of our hearts goes very deep; to us, loneliness is not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon us.
---We are convinced that we only have duties to our equals, to others we do as we think best: we know that justice is only to be expected among equals (alas! -this will not be realised for some
time to come).
--We are ironical towards the "gifted"; we
hold the belief that no morality is possible with out good birth.
? ? ? ? THE ORDER OF RANK.
355
--We always feel as if we were those who had to dispense honours: while he is not found too frequently who would be worthy of honouring us.
---We are always disguised: the higher a man's nature the more is he in need of remaining incog nito. If there be a God, then out of sheer decency He ought only to show Himself on earth in the form of a man.
--We are capable of otiurn, of the uncondi tional conviction that although a handicraft does not shame one in any sense, it certainly reduces one's rank. However much we may respect " in dustry," and know how to give it its due, we do not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense, or after the manner of those insatiable and cackling artists who, like hens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again.
--We protect artists and poets and any one who happens to be a master in something; but as creatures of a higher order than those, who only know how to do something, who are only "pro ductive men," we do not confound ourselves with them.
'--We find joy in all forms and ceremonies; we would fain foster everything formal, and we are convinced that courtesy is one of the greatest virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind of laisser alter, including the freedom of the press and of thought; because, under such conditions, the intel lect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches its limbs.
--We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate, and more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to meet creatures
? ? ? ? 356
THE WILL To POWER.
who have only dancing and nonsense and finery in their minds! They have always been the de light of every tense and profound male soul, whose life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.
--We take pleasure in princes and in priests, because in big things, as in small, they actually up hold the belief in the difference of human values, even in the estimation of the past, and at least symbolically.
--We are able to keep silence: but we do not breathe a word of this in the presence of listeners.
--We are able to endure long enmities: we lack the power of easy reconciliations.
--We have a loathing of demagogism, of en lightenment, of amiability, and plebeian familiarity.
--We collect precious things, the needs of
? and fastidious souls; we wish to possess nothing in common. We want to have our own books, our own landscapes.
higher
--We protest against evil and fine experiences, and take care not to generalise too quickly. The individual case: how ironically we regard it when it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule!
-We love that which is naif, and naif people, but as spectators and higher creatures; we think Faust is just as simple as his Margaret.
---We have a low estimation of good people, because they are gregarious animals: we know how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness lies concealed beneath the most evil, the most malicious, and the hardest exterior, and that this single grain outweighs all the mere goody-goodi ness of milk-and-watery souls.
? ? ? THE ORDER OF RANK.
357
---We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted by his vices, nor by his tomfooleries. We are well aware that we are not recognised with ease, and that we have every reason to make our foreground very prominent.
944
What is noble ? --The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing a part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one is forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the
greatest number: the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue, of comfort, and of
I
? la Spencer. That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsi
Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness,d
bilities. That one knows how to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That one contradicts the greatest number, not in words at all, but by continually behaving diflerently from them.
945
Virtue (for instance, truthfulness) is our most noble and most dangerous luxury. We must not decline the disadvantages which it brings in its
train.
946
We refuse to be praised : we do what serves our purpose, what gives us pleasure, or what we are obliged to do.
947 -
What is chastity in a man? It means that his taste in sex has remained noble; that in eroticis
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER
he likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor the clever.
948
The concept of honour is founded upon the belief in select society, in knightly excellences, in the Obligation of having continually to play a part. In essentials it means that one does not take one's life too seriously, that one adheres unconditionally to the most dignified manners in one's dealings with everybody (at least in so far as they do not belong to " us "); that one is neither familiar, nor
good-natured, nor hearty, nor modest, except inter pares; that one is always playing a part.
949
The fact that one sets one's life, one's health, and one's honour at stake, is the result of high spirits and of an overflowing and spendthrift will : it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact that every danger kindles our curiosity concern ing the measure Of our strength, and provokes our courage.
950.
" Eagles swoop down straight "--nobility of soul is best revealed by the magnificent and proud foolishness with which it makes its attacks.
95! .
War should be made against all namby-pamby ideas of nobility ! ---A certain modicum of brutality
358
'
? ? ? ?
