No More Learning

(For the treatment of pangs of conscience I
recommend Mitchell's Treatment. *)
234.
A pang of conscience in a man is a sign that
his character is not yet equal to his deed. There
is such a thing as a pang of conscience after good
deeds : in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their
incompatibility with an old environment.
235.
Against remorse. I do not like this form of
cowardice in regard to one's own actions, one
must not leave one's self in the lurch under the
pressure of sudden shame or distress, Extreme
pride is much more fitting here. What is the
good of it all in the end!
No deed gets
undone because it is regretted, no more than
because it is forgiven" or "expiated. ” A man must
be a theologian in order to believe in a power that
erases faults: we immoralists prefer to disbelieve
in “ faults. " ” We believe that all deeds, of what
kind soever, are identically of the same value at
root; just as deeds which turn against us may
* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. -In The New Sydenham Society's
Lexicon of Medicine and the Allied Sciences, the following
description of Mitchell's treatment is to be found : “A
method of treating cases of neurasthenia and hysteria .
by removal from home, rest in bed, massage twice a day,
electrical excitation of the muscles, and excessive feeding,
at first with milk. ”


## p. 193 (#217) ############################################

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
193
be useful from an economical point of view, and
even generally desirable. In certain individual
cases, we admit that we might well have been
spared a given action; the circumstances alone
predisposed us in its favour. Which of us, if
favoured by circumstances, would not already
have committed every possible crime? . . . That
is why one should never say: “ Thou shouldst
never have done such and such a thing," but only :
“How strange it is that I have not done such and
such a thing hundreds of times already! "-As a
matter of fact, only a very small number of acts
are typical acts and real epitomes of a personality,
and seeing what a small number of people really
are personalities, a single act very rarely character-
ises a man. Acts are mostly dictated by circum-
stances; they are superficial or merely reflex
movements performed in response to a stimulus,
long before the depths of our beings are affected
or consulted in the matter. A fit of temper, a
gesture, a blow with a knife: how little of the
individual resides in these acts ! -A deed very
often brings a sort of stupor or feeling of con-
straint in its wake: so that the agent feels almost
spellbound at its recollection, or as though he
belonged to it, and were not an independent
creature. This mental disorder, which is a form
of hypnotism, must be resisted at all costs: surely
a single deed, whatever it be, when it is compared
with all one has done, is nothing, and may be
deducted from the sum without making the
account wrong.
The unfair interest which society
manifests in controlling the whole of our lives
VOL. I.
N


## p. 194 (#218) ############################################

194
THE WILL TO POWER.
in one direction, as though the very purpose of its
existence were to cultivate a certain individual
act, should not infect the man of action : but
unfortunately this happens almost continually.
The reason of this is, that every deed, if followed
by unexpected consequences, leads to a certain
mental disturbance, no matter whether the con-
sequences be good or bad. Behold a lover who
has been given a promise, or a poet while he is
receiving applause from an audience: as far as
intellectual torpor is concerned, these men are in
no way different from the anarchist who is
suddenly confronted by a detective bearing a
search warrant,
There are some acts which are unworthy of us:
acts which, if they were regarded as typical, would
set us down as belonging to a lower class of man.
The one fault that has to be avoided here, is to
regard them as typical. There is another kind of
act of which we are unworthy: exceptional acts,
born of a particular abundance of happiness and
health; they are the highest waves of our spring
tides, driven to an unusual height by a storm
-an accident: such acts and “deeds
are also
not typical. An artist should never be judged
according to the measure of his works.
236.
A. In proportion as Christianity seems necessary
to-day, man is still wild and fatal.
B. In another sense, it is not necessary, but
extremely dangerous, though it is captivating and
.


## p. 195 (#219) ############################################

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
195
seductive, because it corresponds with the morbid
character of whole classes and types of modern
humanity,. . . they simply follow their inclinations
when they aspire to Christianity—they are de-
cadents of all kinds.
A and B must be kept very sharply apart.
In the case of A, Christianity is a cure, or at least
a taming process (under certain circumstances
it serves the purpose of making people ill: and
this is sometimes useful as a means of subduing
savage and brutal natures). In the case of B, it
is a symptom of illness itself, it renders the state
of decadence more acute; in this case it stands
opposed to a corroborating system of treatment, it
is the invalid's instinct standing against that which
would be most salutary to him.
>
237.
On one side there are the serious, the dignified,
and reflective people: and on the other the bar. .
barous, the unclean, and the irresponsible beasts :
it is merely a question of taming animals and
in this case the tamer must be hard, terrible, and
awe-inspiring, at least to his beasts.
All essential requirements must be imposed upon
the unruly creatures with almost brutal distinct-
ness—that is to say, magnified a thousand times.
Even the fulfilment of the requirement must
be presented in the coarsest way possible, so
that it may command respect, as in the case of
the spiritualisation of the Brahmins.
*


## p. 196 (#220) ############################################

196
THE WILL TO POWER.
The struggle with the rabble and the herd. If
any degree of tameness and order has been
reached, the chasm separating these purified and
regenerated people from the terrible remainder
must have been bridged. . .
This chasm is a means of increasing self-respect
in higher castes, and of confirming their belief in
that which they represent—hence the Chandala.
Contempt and its excess are perfectly correct
psychologically — that is to say, magnified a
-
hundred times, so that it may at least be felt.
238.
The struggle against brutal instincts is quite
different from the struggle against morbid instincts;
it may even be a means of overcoming brutality
by making the brutes ill. The psychical treatment
practised by Christianity is often nothing more
than the process of converting a brute into a sick
and therefore tame animal.
The struggle against raw and savage natures
must be a struggle with weapons which are able
to affect such natures: superstitions and such means
are therefore indispensable and essential.
.
239.
Our age, in a certain sense, is mature (that is to
say, decadent), just as Buddha's was. . . . That
is why a sort of Christianity is possible without
all the absurd dogmas (the most repulsive offshoots
of ancient hybridism).


## p. 197 (#221) ############################################

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
197
240.
As a
Supposing it were impossible to disprove Chris-
tianity, Pascal thinks, in view of the terrible
possibility that it may be true, that it is in the
highest degree prudent to be a Christian.
proof of how much Christianity has lost of its
terrible nature, to-day we find that other attempt
to justify it, which consists in asserting, that even
if it were a mistake, it nevertheless provides the
greatest advantages and pleasures for its adherents
throughout their lives :—it therefore seems that
this belief should be upheld owing to the peace
and quiet it ensures- not owing to the terror of
a threatening possibility, but rather out of fear of a
life that has lost one of its charms. This hedonistic
turn of thought, which uses happiness as a proof,
is a symptom of decline: it takes the place of the
proof resulting from power or from that which
to the Christian mind is most terrible—namely,
fear. With this new interpretation, Christianity
is, as a matter of fact, nearing its stage of
exhaustion. People are satisfied with a Christianity
which is an opiate, because they no longer have the
strength to seek, to struggle, to dare, to stand
alone, nor to take up Pascal's position and to
share that gloomily brooding self-contempt, that
belief in human unworthiness, and that anxiety
which believes that it “may be damned. ”
“
Christianity the chief object of which is to soothe
diseased nerves, does not require the terrible
solution consisting of a “God on the cross"; that
a
But a


## p. 198 (#222) ############################################

198
THE WILL TO POWER.
is why Buddhism is secretly gaining ground all
over Europe.
241.
The humour of European culture: people
regard one thing as true, but do the other. For
instance, what is the use of all the art of reading
and criticising, if the ecclesiastical interpretation
of the Bible, whether according to Catholics or
Protestants, is still upheld!
242,
No one is sufficiently aware of the barbarity of
the notions among which we Europeans still live,
To think that men have been able to believe that
the “Salvation of the soul” depended upon a
book! . . . And I am told that this is still
believed.
What is the good of all scientific education, all
criticism and all hermeneutics, if such nonsense as
the Church's interpretation of the Bible has not
yet turned the colours of our bodies permanently
into the red of shame?
243.
Subject for reflection: To what extent does the
fatal belief in “Divine Providence -the most
paralysing belief for both the hand and the under-
standing that has ever existed—continue to pre-
vail; to what extent have the Christian hypothesis
and interpretation of Life continued their lives


## p. 199 (#223) ############################################

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
199
6
under the cover of terms like “Nature," " Progress,"
“perfectionment,” “ Darwinism," or beneath the
superstition that there is a certain relation between
happiness and virtue, unhappiness and sin ? That
absurd belief in the course of things, in “Life”
and in the "instinct of Life"; that foolish resig-
nation which arises from the notion that if only
every one did his duty all would go well-all this
sort of thing can only have a meaning if one
assumes that there is a direction of things sub
specie boni. Even fatalism, our present form of
philosophical sensibility, is the result of a long
belief in Divine Providence, an unconscious result:
as though it were nothing to do with us how
everything goes! (As though we might let things
take their own course; the individual being only
a modus of the absolute reality. )
244.
It is the height of psychological falsity on the
part of man to imagine a being according to his
own petty standard, who is a beginning, a “thing-
a
in-itself," and who appears to him good, wise,
mighty, and precious; for thus he suppresses in
thought all the causality by means of which every
kind of goodness, wisdom, and power comes into
existence and has value. In short, elements of
the most recent and most conditional origin were
regarded not as evolved, but as spontaneously
generated and "things-in-themselves," and perhaps
as the cause of all things. . Experience
teaches us that, in every case in which a man has


## p. 200 (#224) ############################################

200
THE WILL TO POWER.
elevated himself to any great extent above the
average of his fellows, every high degree of power
always involves a corresponding degree of freedom
from Good and Evil as also from true and
"false," and cannot take into account what good-
ness dictates: the same holds good of a high
degree of wisdom-in this case goodness is just
as much suppressed as truthfulness, justice, virtue,
and other popular whims in valuations. In fact,
is it not obvious that every high degree of goodness
itself presupposes a certain intellectual myopia
and obtuseness ? as also an inability to dis-
tinguish at a great distance between true and false,
useful and harmful not to mention the fact that
a high degree of power in the hands of the highest
goodness might lead to the most baleful conse-
quences (“the suppression of evil"). In sooth it
is enough to perceive with what aspirations the
“God of Love” inspires His believers: they ruin
mankind for the benefit of "good men. "
“
In
practice, this same God has shown Himself to be
a God of the most acute myopia, devilry, and im-
potence, in the face of the actual arrangement of
the universe, and from this the value of His con-
ception may be estimated.
Knowledge and wisdom can have no value in
themselves, any more than goodness can: the goal
they are striving after must be known first, for
then only can their value or worthlessness be
judged—a goal might be imagined which would
make excessive wisdom a great disadvantage (if,
for instance, complete deception were a prerequisite
to the enhancement of life; likewise, if goodness


## p. 201 (#225) ############################################

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
201
were able to paralyse and depress the main springs
of the great passions). . .
Taking our human life as it is, it cannot be
denied that all “truth,” “goodness," "holiness,"
and “Godliness" in the Christian sense, have
hitherto shown themselves to be great dangers—
even now mankind is in danger of perishing owing
to an ideal which is hostile to life.
"
245.
Let any one think of the loss which all human
institutions suffer, when a divine and transcend-
ental, higher sphere is postulated which must first
sanction these institutions! By recognising their
worth in this sanction alone (as in the case of
marriage, for instance) their natural dignity is
reduced, and under certain circumstances denied.
. . Nature is spitefully misjudged in the same
ratio as the anti-natural notion of a God is held
in honour. “ Nature" then comes to mean no more
than "contemptible," " bad. ”
The fatal nature of a belief in God as the reality
of the highest moral qualities: through it, all real
values were denied and systematically regarded
as valueless. Thus Anti-Nature ascended the
throne. With relentless logic the last step was
reached, and this was the absolute demand to deny
Nature
9)
»
246.
By pressing the doctrine of disinterestedness
and love into the foreground, Christianity by no


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202
THE WILL TO POWER.
means elevated the interests of the species above
those of the individual, Its real historical effect,
its fatal effect, remains precisely the increase of
egotism, of individual egotism, to excess to the
extreme which consists in the belief in individual
immortality). The individual was made SO
important and so absolute, by means of Christian
values, that he could no longer be sacrificed, despite
the fact that the species can only be maintained
by human sacrifices. All "souls” became equal
before God: but this is the most pernicious of all
valuations! If one regards individuals as equals,
the demands of the species are ignored, and a
process is initiated which ultimately leads to its
ruin. Christianity is the reverse of the principle of
selection. If the degenerate and sick man (“the
Christian") is to be of the same value as the
healthy man (“the pagan"), or if he is even to be
valued higher than the latter, as Pascal's view of
health and sickness would have us value him, the
natural course of evolution is thwarted and the
unnatural becomes law. . . . In practice this
general love of mankind is nothing more than
deliberately favouring all the suffering, the botched,
and the degenerate : it is this love that has reduced
and weakened the power, responsibility, and lofty
duty of sacrificing men. According to the scheme
of Christian values, all that remained was the
alternative of self-sacrifice, but this vestige of
human sacrifice, which Christianity conceded and
even recommended, has no meaning when regarded
in the light of rearing a whole species. The pro-
sperity of the species is by no means affected by
.


## p. 203 (#227) ############################################

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
203
the sacrifice of one individual (whether in the
monastic and ascetic manner, or by means of crosses,
stakes, and scaffolds, as the "martyrs” of error).
What the species requires is the suppression of
the physiologically botched, the weak and the
degenerate: but it was precisely to these people
that Christianity appealed as a preservative force,
it simply strengthened that natural and very strong
instinct of all the weak which bids them protect,
maintain, and mutually support each other. What
is Christian “virtue” and “love of men,” if not
precisely this mutual assistance with a view to
survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting
of selection ? What is Christian altruism, if it is
not the mob-egotism of the weak which divines
that, if everybody looks after everybody else,
every individual will be preserved for a longer
period of time? . . . He who does not consider
this attitude of mind as immoral, as a crime against
life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also
shares their instincts. . . Genuine love of man-
kind exacts sacrifice for the good of the species
- it is hard, full of self-control, because it needs
human sacrifices. And this pseudo-humanity
which is called Christianity, would fain establish
the rule that nobody should be sacrificed.
.
247.
Nothing could be more useful and deserves
more promotion than systematic Nihilism in action.
--As I understand the phenomena of Christianity
and pessimism, this is what they say: "We are


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204
THE WILL TO POWER.
ripe for nonentity, for us it is reasonable not to be. "
This hint from “reason” in this case, is simply
the voice of selective Nature.
On the other hand, what deserves the most
rigorous condemnation, is the ambiguous and
cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like
Christianity, or rather like the Church,—which,
instead of recommending death and self-destruction,
actually protects all the botched and bungled, and
encourages them to propagate their kind.
Problem: with what kind of means could one
lead up to a severe form of really contagious
Nihilism—a Nihilism which would teach and prac-
tise voluntary death with scientific conscientious-
ness (and not the feeble continuation of a vegetative
sort of life with false hopes of a life after death) ?
Christianity cannot be sufficiently condemned
for having depreciated the value of a great cleansing
Nihilistic movement (like the one which was pro-
bably in the process of formation), by its teaching
of the immortality of the private individual, as
also by the hopes of resurrection which it held out:
that is to say, by dissuading people from perform-
ing the deed of Nihilism which is suicide. . . . In
the latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and
gradually a puny, meagre, but durable life ; gradu-
ally a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre life,
etc.
248.
Christian moral quackery. --Pity and contempt
succeed each other at short intervals, and at the
sight of them I feel as indignant as if I were in


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CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
205
the presence of the most despicable crime. Here
error is made a duty—a virtue, misapprehension
has become a knack, the destructive instinct is
systematised under the name of "redemption ";
here every operation becomes a wound, an amputa-
tion of those very organs whose energy would be
the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the
best of cases no cure is effected; all that is done
is to exchange one set of evil symptoms for another
set. . . . And this pernicious nonsense, this system-
atised profanation and castration of life, passes for
holy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an
instrument of this art of healing—that is to say,
to be a priest, is to be rendered distinguished,
reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have
been the Author of this supreme art of healing;
redemption is only possible as a revelation, as an
act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the
Creator Himself.
Proposition I. : Spiritual healthiness is regarded
as morbid, and creates suspicion. . .
Proposition II. : The prerequisites of a strong,
exuberant life-strong desires and passions—are
reckoned as objections against strong and ex-
uberant life.
Proposition III. : Everything which threatens
danger to man, and which can overcome and ruin
him, is evil, must be rejected—and should be torn
root and branch from his soul.
Proposition IV. : Man converted into a weak
creature, inoffensive to himself and others, crushed
by humility and modesty, and conscious of his
weakness,- in fact, the “sinner," - this is the
-


## p. 206 (#230) ############################################

206
THE WILL TO POWER.
desirable type, and one which one can produce by
means of a little spiritual surgery.
.
249.
What is it I protest against ? That people
should regard this paltry and peaceful mediocrity,
this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing of
the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength,
as something high, or possibly as the standard of
all things.
Bacon of Verulam says: Infimarum virtutum
apud vulgus laus est, mediarum admiratio, supre-
marum sensus nullus. Christianity as a religion,
however, belongs to the vulgus: it has no feeling
for the highest kind of virtus.
250.
Let us see what the "genuine Christian " does
with all the things which his instincts forbid :-he
covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy,
knowledge, and power with suspicion and mud-
in short, all culture: his object is to deprive the
latter of its clean conscience.
251.
The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto,
have been not only timid but false. So long as
Christian morality was not felt to be a capital
crime against Life, its apologists had a good time.
The question concerning the mere "truth” of
2)


## p. 207 (#231) ############################################

CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
207
Christianity—whether in regard to the existence
of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin,
not to speak of its astronomy and natural science
-is quite beside the point so long as no inquiry
is made into the value of Christian morality. Are
Christian morals worth anything, or are they a
profanation and an outrage, despite all the arts of
holiness and seduction with which they are en-
forced ? The question concerning the truth of
the religion may be met by all sorts of subterfuges ;
and the most fervent believers can, in the end,
avail themselves of the logic used by their
opponents, in order to create a right for their side
to assert that certain things are irrefutable—that
is to say, they transcend the means employed to
refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is
called "Kantian Criticism”).
252.
Christianity should never be forgiven for having
ruined such men
This is precisely
what should be combated in Christianity, namely,
that it has the will to break the spirit of the
strongest and noblest natures. One should take
no rest until this thing is utterly destroyed :—the
ideal of mankind which Christianity advances, the
demands it makes upon men, and its "Nay" and
“Yea" relative to humanity. The whole of the
remaining absurdities, that is to say, Christian
fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and
principles, and Christian theology, do not concern
us; they might be a thousand times more absurd
as Pascal.


## p. 208 (#232) ############################################

208
THE WILL TO POWER.
and we should not raise a finger to destroy them.
But what we do stand up against, is that ideal
which, thanks to its morbid beauty and feminine
seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and slanderous
eloquence, appeals to all the cowardices and
vanities of wearied souls,—and the strongest have
their moments of fatigue,-as though all that
which seems most useful and desirable at such
moments—that is to say, confidence, artlessness,
modesty, patience, love of one's like, resignation,
submission to God, and a sort of self-surrender-
were useful and desirable per se; as though the
puny, modest abortion which in these creatures
takes the place of a soul, this virtuous, mediocre
animal and sheep of the flock—which deigns to
call itself man, were not only to take precedence
of the stronger, more evil, more passionate, more
defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who by
virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a
hundred times more dangers than the former, but
were actually to stand as an ideal for man in
general, as a goal, a measure—the highest de-
sideratum. The creation of this ideal was the
most appalling temptation that had ever been put
in the way of mankind; for, with it, the stronger
and more successful exceptions, the lucky cases
among men, in which the will to power and to
growth leads the whole species "man" one step
“
farther forward, this type was threatened with
disaster. By means of the values of this ideal,
the growth of such higher men would be checked
at the root. For these men, owing to their
superior demands and duties, readily accept a


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CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
209
more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is
a case of an increase in the costs of the under-
taking coinciding with a greater chance of failure).
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it
aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their
spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness
and debility, at converting their proud assurance
into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows
how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect
them with disease, until their strength, their will
to power, turns inwards, against themselves
until the strong perish through their excessive
self-contempt and self-immolation : that gruesome
way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most
famous example.
VOL. I.


## p. 210 (#234) ############################################

II,
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
I. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.
253.
This is an attempt at investigating morality
without being affected by its charm, and not
without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling
beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world
which we can admire, which is in keeping with
our capacity for worship—which is continually
demonstrating itself—in small things or in large :
this is the Christian standpoint which is common
to us all.
But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in
our mistrust, and in our scientific spirit (also
through a more developed instinct for truth, which
again is due to Christian influence), this interpre-
tation has grown ever less and less tenable for us.
The craſtiest of subterfuges : Kantian criticism.
The intellect not only denies itself every right to
interpret things in that way, but also to reject the
interpretation once it has been made. People
are satisfied with a greater demand upon their
credulity and faith, with a renunciation of all


## p. 211 (#235) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
211
<
ever
right to reason concerning the proof of their
creed, with an intangible and superior “Ideal”
(God) as a stop-gap.
The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the
Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and
at the same time a symptom of the historical
sense of a new power: “Spirit" itself is the “ self-
revealing and self-realising ideal”: we believe
that in the “process of development” an
greater proportion of this ideal is being mani-
fested—thus the ideal is being realised, faith is
vested in the future, into which all its noble
needs are projected, and in which they are being
worshipped.
In short:
(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be
demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning
behind the whole of the epistemological move-
ment);
(2) God may be demonstrated, but as some-
thing evolving, and we are part of it, as our
pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).
It should be observed that criticism is never
levelled at the ideal itself, but only at the
problem which gives rise to a controversy con-
cerning the ideal—that is to say, why it has not
yet been realised, or why it is not demonstrable
in small things as in great.
*
It makes all the difference : whether a man
recognises this state of distress as such owing to


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212
THE WILL TO POWER.
a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether
it comes home to him as a problem which he
arrives at only by straining his thinking powers
and his historical imagination to the utmost.
Away from the religious and philosophical
points of view we find the same phenomena.
Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises
the origin of moral valuations, though it believes
in them just as much as the Christian does.
(What guilelessness! As if morality could remain
when the sanctioning deity is no longer present !
The belief in a “Beyond” is absolutely necessary,
if the faith in morality is to be maintained. )
Fundamental problem i whence comes this
almighty power of Faith? Whence this faith in
morality ? (It is betrayed by the fact that
even the fundamental conditions of life are
falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our
knowledge of plants and animals.
“ Self-preser-
vation”: the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia-
tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles. )
254.
An inquiry into the origin of our moral
valuations and tables of law has absolutely
nothing to do with the criticism of them, though
people persist in believing it has; the two
matters lie quite apart, notwithstanding the fact
that the knowledge of the pudenda origo of a
valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre-
pares the way to a critical attitude and spirit
towards it.


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
213
What is the actual worth of our valuations and
tables of moral laws ? What is the outcome of their
dominion ? For whom? In relation to what?
answer: for Life. But what is Life? A new and
more definite concept of what “Life” is, becomes
necessary here. My formula of this concept is:
Life is Will to Power.
What is the meaning of the very act of valuing ?
Does it point back to another, metaphysical
world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed,
who lived in a period which preceded the great
historical movement. ) In short: what is its
origin? Or had it no human "origin"? -
“
Answer: moral valuations are a sort of explana-
ation, they constitute a method of interpreting.
Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite
physiological conditions, as also of a definite
spiritual level of ruling judgments.
What is it
that interprets ? –Our passions.
255.
All virtues should be looked upon as physio-
logical conditions : the principal organic functions,
more particularly, should be considered necessary
and good. All virtues are really refined passions
and elevated physiological conditions.
Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the
developments of sexual relations-justice as the
development of the passion for revenge,—virtue
as the love of resistance, the will to power,
honour as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of
an equally powerful, force.


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214
THE WILL TO POWER.
256.
Under “Morality" I understand a system of
valuations which is in relation with the conditions
of a creature's life.
257.
Formerly it was said of every form of morality,
“ Ye shall know them by their fruits. ” I say of
every form of morality: “It is a fruit, and from
it I learn the Soil out of which it grew. "
258.
I have tried to understand all moral judgments
as symptoms and a language of signs in which
the processes of physiological prosperity or the
reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions
of preservation and growth, are betrayed—a
mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology,
prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races,
communities, and different stages of existence, as,
for instance, youth or decay, etc. ).
Applying this principle to the morality of
Christian Europe more particularly, we find that
our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis-
belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes-
simism.
My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral
phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of
phenomena. The origin of this interpretation
itself lies beyond the pale of morality.
What is the meaning of the fact that we have


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
215
imagined a contradiction in existence? This is
of paramount importance: behind all other
valuations those moral valuations stand com-
mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according
to what standard shall we then measure ? And
then of what value would knowledge be, etc.
etc. ? ? ?
259.
:.
A point of view : in all valuations there is a
definite purpose: the preservation of an individ-
ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a
belief, or a culture. —Thanks to the fact that
people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one
and the same man may swarm with a host of
contradictory valuations, and therefore with a host
of contradictory impulses. This is the expression
of disease in man as opposed to the health of
animals, in which all the instincts answer certain
definite purposes.
This creature full of contradictions, however,
has in his being a grand method of acquiring
knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself to Justice—that is to say, to the ascertain-
ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil.
The wisest man would thus be the richest in
contradictions, he would also be gifted with
mental antennæ wherewith he could understand
all kinds of men ; and with it all he would have
his great moments, when all the chords in his
being would ring in splendid unison—the rarest
of accidents even in us! A sort of planetary
movement.


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216
THE WILL TO POWER,
260.
“ To will” is to will an object. But “object,”
as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do
valuations originate? Is a permanent norm,
"pleasant or painful,” their basis ?
But in an incalculable number of cases we
first of all make a thing painful, by investing it
with a valuation.
The compass of moral valuations: they play a
part in almost every mental impression. To us
the world is coloured by them.
We have imagined the purpose and value of
all things: owing to this we possess an enormous
fund of latent power : but the study of compara-
tive values teaches us that values which were
actually opposed to each other have been held in
high esteem, and that there have been many
tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have
been worth anything per se).
The analysis of individual tables of laws re-
vealed the fact that they were framed (often very
badly) as the conditions of existence for limited
groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.
Upon examining modern men, we found that
there are a large number of very different values
to hand, and that they no longer contain any
creative power—the fundamental principle: "the
condition of existence" is now quite divorced
from the moral values. It is much more super-
fluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an
arbitrary matter. Chaos.
Who creates the goal which stands above man-


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
217
kind and above the individual ? Formerly
morality was a preservative measure: but nobody
wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to
preserve.
Thus we are reduced to an experi-
mental morality, each must postulate a goal for
himself.
261.
What is the criterion of a moral action ? (1) Its
disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation,
etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must
be studied and observed, and, in each case, the
criterion must be discovered, as also the thing
it expresses: a belief such as: “This particular
attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal
condition of our existence. " Immoral means "that
which brings about ruin. " Now all societies in
which these principles were discovered have met
with their ruin: a few of these principles have
been used and used again, because every newly
established community required them; this was
the case, for instance, with “Thou shalt not steal. ”
In ages when people could not be expected to
show any marked social instinct (as, for instance,
in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was,
religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of
“spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance,
towards "the greatest happiness. " For even the
philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for
their πόλις.
262.
0
The necessity of false values. --A judgment
may be refuted when it is shown that it was


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218
THE WILL TO POWER.
conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is
not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more
eradicate false values than they can alter astig-
matism in a man's eyes.
The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing
to do with reasoning.
263
To see and reveal the problem of morality
seems to me to be the new task and the principal
thing of all. I deny that this has been done by
moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world! Here to have no eye; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's
mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or conscious-
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that “evil” has really and seriously
been christened “good” and vice versa. I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the
words “ Sittlichkeit der Sitte. " Even conscience
*
The morality of custom.


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
219
has changed its sphere: formerly there was such
a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
266.
.
A. Morality as the work of Immorality.
1. In order that moral values may attain to
supremacy, a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.
2. The establishment of moral values is the
work of immoral passions and considera-
tions.
B. Morality as the work of error.
C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital—Truthfulness, Doubt, étoxń, Judging.
-The “Immorality” of belief in morality.
The steps:
1. Absolute dominion of morality: all bio-
logical phenomena measured and judged
according to its values.
2. The attempt to identify Life with morality
(symptom of awakened scepticism : mor-
ality must no longer be regarded as
the opposite of Life); many means are
sought-even a transcendental one.
3. The opposition of Life and Morality.
Morality condemned and sentenced by
Life.
D. To what extent was morality dangerous to
Life?
(a) It depreciated the joy of living and the
gratitude felt towards Life, etc.


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220
THE WILL TO POWER.
(6) It checked the tendency to beautify and
to ennoble Life.
(c) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(d) It checked the unfolding of Life, because
it tried to set the highest phenomena
thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the usefulness of morality
to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure
for the general whole, it may be a pro-
cess of uniting dispersed members: it
is useful as an agent in the production
of the man who is a “ tool. "
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure
mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to “mediocre people. ”
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure
resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness : it is
useful to the "sufferers. "
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure
opposed to the terrible outbursts of the
mighty: it is useful to the “lowly. "
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the
expressions “right" and "wrong” in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance
in the sentence: “Do right and fear no one"
*
*“Thue Recht und scheue Niemand. "


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
221
-that is to say, to do one's duty, according to
the rough scheme of life within the limit of which
a community exists.