No More Learning

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Reaction of the Crusade on Italy
375
לל
King of France to himself and separate him from Conrad in the Eastern
enterprise. He knew that Conrad was in secret treaty with the Emperor
Manuel for an alliance against himself, and he wished to isolate him.
His envoys left France predicting the harm that the fraud of the Greeks
would occasion to the crusaders, and they were not false prophets.
Eugenius III, who had set out for France, sent messengers to Conrad
with letters in which he could not refrain from complaining that the king
had decided to take the Cross without consulting him. Conrad justified
himself by alleging the irresistible impulse to which he had suddenly
yielded. “The Holy Ghost,” he wrote to the Pope, “Who breatheth
where He listeth, Who cometh on a sudden, did not allow me to delay
that I might take your counsel or that of any other, but in a moment
touched my heart to follow Him. " Understanding that the Pope needed
reassuring, he announced to him that he had made arrangements for the
time of his absence, and had had his son Henry crowned king, who
would govern in his stead; he invited the Pope to proceed to Germany
from France for an interview with him, and to treat personally of the
affairs of the realm and the Crusade.
Eugenius did not accept the invitation, but he could not undo what
had been done, and it only remained for him to push on events in the
best manner possible. He met Louis VII in France, and had leisure to
confer with him before he started for the expedition, on which Conrad III
had already preceded him. But the history of this disastrous Crusade
does not belong to this chapter; and we must contine ourselves to
recording the consequences it had for Italy and the relations of the
Empire and the Papacy.
The chief reaction on Italy from the Crusade was felt in its relations
with the Byzantine Empire and with the African coasts of the Mediter-
ranean. King Roger of Sicily did not fail to seize the occasion of draw-
ing advantage from a movement which was bound to occupy the forces
and the solicitude of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus. The continuous
increase of Roger's power had been from its commencement a cause of
suspicion and disquietude to the Byzantine monarchs, who saw in it a
menace to their possessions and influence in the Adriatic, and also
looked on the steady expansion of the Sicilian domination on the African
coasts and Roger's pretensions to the principality of Antioch as perilous
to themselves. The policy of the Comneni necessarily tended to oppose
the ambitions of the Norman prince, and to try if it were possible to
wreck them and substitute for his realm a restored Byzantine dominion,
or at least a marked influence, in South Italy. Roger, aware of this
policy, and of the negotiations for an alliance against him which had
several times taken place between Manuel and Conrad III, thought that
it was time to act. Preparing a powerful feet, he undertook an energetic
expedition by sea, seized on and fortified Corfù, and placed there a
Norman garrison to secure its permanent possession. Setting sail again,
OH. XI.


## p. 376 (#422) ############################################

376
Diplomacy of the Emperor Manuel I
he became master of Cape Malea and the island of Cerigo, both of which
he also fortified; then, penetrating the Gulf of Corinth, his troops
sacked Corinth, and marching by land reached Thebes, which underwent
the same fate. From Thebes, which then was flourishing through the
silk manufacture, he took not only plunder but some artificers, who were
brought to Sicily and afterwards aided there in the development of the
silk industry. Having thus displayed its standards in the Grecian seas,
Roger's fleet, loaded with booty, returned to Sicily about the beginning
of 1148.
The Emperor Manuel Comnenus was grievously and profoundly
moved by these events, and he actively bestirred himself in devising a
remedy. After his overtures for an alliance with Louis VII, who was
still in Asia, had failed, he turned with better results to the Venetians,
who also took umbrage at the growing extension of the Norman power
in the Adriatic and willingly became his allies. The result of this alliance
was a long and chequered sea-campaign, in which Manuel succeeded in
recovering Corfù (summer of 1149). Encouraged by this success, Manuel
thought of closing on Roger and realising his plans in South Italy.
After the disastrous ending of the Crusade, the Byzantine Emperor
turned with many blandishments to Conrad III, whose presence in the
East no longer inspired him with any fear, and renewed and com-
pleted the negotiations for an alliance which had been often begun
and interrupted. It was a formidable league, and Roger, who saw the
danger, employed all his sagacity to hinder its effects and to turn it from
himself. Profiting by the inner dissensions of Germany, he attempted,
even by giving subsidies, to raise against Conrad a league of German
barons, which should force the King of the Romans, immediately on his
return to Europe, to hasten to Germany and turn away from any
enterprise against Sicily. At the same time Roger sought a rapproche-
ment with the papal party at Rome by means of its chief, the powerful
baron Cencio Frangipane. Thus he might separate from Conrad the
Pope, who was displeased with the Byzantine alliance, and induce him
to favour the German barons, who were opposed to their sovereign.
The history of the relations of the Popes with their Norman neigh-
bours consists of an alternation of hostility and rapprochements occasioned
by the perpetual alternation of the mutual distrust and political necessities
of the two parties. Eugenius III, after the departure of the crusaders
for the Holy Land, had sojourned in France and Germany, occupied
with the ecclesiastical affairs of the two countries, and awaiting the
opportune moment for re-entering Italy. He held several councils, and
in them, especially at Rheims where the opinions of Bishop Gilbert
de la Porrée were laboriously discussed, there was manifested all the
anxiety of the Church to secure the orthodoxy of theological doctrines
from the subtle perils which were created by the extension of philo-
sophic thought, by a pronounced tendency towards investigation, and


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The Pope and Roger II
377
by a bold and restless desire for speculation. Meanwhile, there arrived
gloomy news from the East. The disastrous result of the Crusade, pro-
claimed with such assurance of victory, as if God Himself had directly
inspired its initiation, turned against Eugenius and St Bernard the
minds of the peoples who most felt the weight of the calamity. Eugenius
saw that a sojourn in France and Germany, both embittered by their
disillusion, was no longer suitable for him, and took the road for return.
In July 1148 he held a council at Cremona, in which he confirmed the
decrees of the Council of Rheims. It is probable that in it he also treated
of the conditions of the Church of Rome, where Arnold of Brescia was
exercising his influence. Certain it is that a few days later at Brescia the
Pope, in a warning addressed to the Roman clergy, complained that
some Roman ecclesiastics, following the errors of the schismatic Arnold,
were refusing obedience to the cardinals and their other superiors; and
he ordered that all contact with Arnold should be avoided. Thus from
the moment he put foot again in Italy, Eugenius aimed at Rome, and
frankly renewed the struggle.
Quitting Lombardy in October 1148, the Pope halted some time at
his native city of Pisa, which he drew to his support for his imminent
action against Rome, and then went to resume his residence at Viterbo.
The league concluded between Manuel Comnenus and Conrad troubled
him, and, on the other hand, he was oppressed by the necessity of
prompt aid to return to his see. Roger of Sicily, wholly intent on his secret
manoeuvres against Conrad, found at this moment a readier hearing from
the Pope. Eugenius, supported by the Frangipani and the other Roman
barons, who were impatient of the rule of the democracy in the Capitol,
had at great expense collected troops to attempt the re-conquest of
Rome. To gain the Pope for his schemes, Roger offered him a contingent
in aid; but in spite of this rapprochement, it is not easy to say how far
the Pope shewed himself disposed to support the King of Sicily and the
German barons who were conspiring against Conrad. Undoubtedly
Eugenius, while outwardly reconciled to his powerful neighbour, was
obliged to be reserved and wary. Nor did he abandon his reserve when
the King of France, on his return by way of Roger's dominions from
the Crusade, met him at Tusculum, and disclosed to him the project
of a new crusade, including the formation of a league destined to strike
at the heart of the Byzantine Empire, which Louis VII held to be the
principal cause of his own disasters. The diplomacy of the Roman Curia
saw at once that such a league would increase Roger's power too much,
and let the proposal drop. Nevertheless, ever intent on regaining full
possession of Rome, Eugenius with the help of the soldiers of the Sicilian
king succeeded in seating himself by force in the Lateran; but the
Roman Senate did not therefore submit, and maintained its power in the
face of the Pope: it upheld the rights it had acquired and its protection
of Arnold of Brescia, who remained in the city.
CH, .


## p. 378 (#424) ############################################

378
The attitude of Conrad III
Meanwhile, scarcely had Conrad III left the East, when he moved with
the greatest speed towards Germany with a view to restoring order to the
realm, vexed by dissensions and revolt. Shortly after his arrival he was
attacked by an illness which lasted six months; but his presence induced
an improvement, and a defeat which his son, the young King Henry,
inflicted on the rebel barons (1 February 1150) secured the fortunes of
the kingship and raised its diminished prestige. There then began a very
active interchange of diplomatic moves, which tended both to form and
to break up alliances, to insinuate and to dissipate distrust and suspicion.
Conrad, fixed in the idea of destroying Roger's power, endeavoured to
confirm the agreement made with Manuel Comnenus for common action
in South Italy, and asked at Constantinople for the hand of a Greek
princess for his son King Henry. The Pope, while attempting to erase
the unfavourable impression occasioned by his momentary rapprochement
with Roger, sought for means to estrange Conrad from the Byzantines;
but on this point the king gave vague and evasive replies. The Romans,
by repeated letters and embassies to Conrad, strove to emphasise the
Pope's relations with the King of Sicily and the German rebels, and to
increase to their own profit his distrust of the Roman Curia. Meanwhile,
Roger, supported by Louis VII, who thought of retrieving his defcats in
Asia, importuned Conrad to induce him to change his policy and turn
against Constantinople.
Thus Conrad became still more an uncertain element in the various
currents of European politics; and amid such alternation of contrary
proposals he did not let himself be moved. The ardour that was mani-
fested in France for a new crusade left him cold. The exhortations sent
him by some eminent French ecclesiastics, such as St Bernard and Peter
of Cluny, only aroused his suspicions of Rome, so that the Pope had to
hasten to declare that those personages had acted of their own motion,
and that he was quite a stranger to their overtures. Conrad and his
counsellors saw clearly that the King of France was a tool of Roger
for thwarting his plans in Italy and for making war on Constantinople;
and the Pope himself, although he could not oppose it openly, had no
faith in the possibility of a fresh expedition to the East.
Constrained after a few months' residence to quit Rome anew and
retire near to Roger's borders, the Pope met the Sicilian king at Ceprano,
and there they discussed many ecclesiastical questions in regard to the
Regno, which were in great part adjusted. But on an essential point,
the full recognition of Roger's sovereignty, they did not reach an under-
standing; and they parted with outward friendship but now definitely
alienated from one another. The Pope could only turn, without further
vacillation, to a complete understanding with Conrad, who also recognised
the importance of such an accord for the preparation of his expedition
to Italy, and for the securing of results from it. The king sent the Pope
an embassy, which was to settle the basis of the agreement. Doubtless it


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Conrad's preparations for his Italian expedition 379
was then determined that the king should receive the imperial crown at
Rome, and, in return, force the Romans into subjection to the Pope. It
was bound to be more difficult to arrive at an understanding concerning
Conrad's alliance with Manuel Comnenus, which had been the principal
reason that the Pope had leant towards the King of Sicily; but the dis-
patch of the Cardinals Jordan of Santa Susanna and Octavian of Santa
Cecilia as legates to Germany shewed that the Pope was resolved to smooth
over every difficulty in order to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclu-
sion. Both these cardinals were notable personages of the Curia, and one
of them, Octavian, was later destined, as the anti-Pope Victor IV, to play
an important part in the relations of Papacy and Empire. Nobly born,
fond of pomp and show, free with his money and liberal in granting
favours, he aimed perhaps already at the Papacy, and sought to win the
good-will of the Germans, just as he had sought, though without much
success, to win that of Rome. On this occasion he became acquainted with
Frederick, the young Duke of Swabia, and thus established relations with
the future Emperor who was to become his mainstay. The two legates
stayed long in Germany, arranging many pending ecclesiastical questions,
and treating with Conrad concerning his Italian expedition. This was
solemnly announced at the diet of Würzburg in September 1151 ; but
time was necessary if it was to be undertaken energetically and with
durable results. On the one hand, a large force was needful to control the
autonomous tendencies of the free communes and to destroy Roger's
power; and on the other, it was necessary to be sure that Germany was in
such order as to permit a long absence of the king and his most powerful
adherents without harm. A year was allotted for the preparations, and
it was decided that Conrad with his army should start on 11 September
1152 to cross the Alps. There was still a serious task for the king to
perform in Germany before his departure, for Henry the Lion, Duke of
Saxony, was in full revolt, and it was necessary to subdue him and leave
him incapable of doing harm. While attending to this, Conrad yet took
the utmost pains to prepare for his descent into Italy, which now occupied
the chief place in his thoughts. A little previously he had suffered a
grievous blow in the death of his son, the youthful King Henry; for him
he had been negotiating that marriage with a Byzantine princess which
was to draw tighter still the bonds of the alliance with the Eastern Court.
Since the son who was left him was a mere child, Conrad, although he
was getting into years, thought of resuming the negotiations on his own
behalf, and for that end sent an embassy to Constantinople.
At the same time he sent ambassadors into Italy, his chancellor
Arnold, Archbishop-elect of Cologne, Wibald, Abbot of Stablo, and the
notary Henry, all three trusty counsellors experienced in State affairs.
They were sent to the Pope, but were commissioned to conduct negotia-
tions on their road which would assure the unhampered progress of the
expedition. They bore a royal letter to Pisa, with which they were
CH. XI.


## p. 380 (#426) ############################################

380
Death of Conrad III
especially to negotiate for the preparation of a feet to be employed
against the King of Sicily. Taking the opportunity of this embassy,
Conrad at last accorded a reply to the letters which the Romans had
repeatedly addressed to him. It was a reply of mingled condescension
and
arrogance, in which he skilfully announced his speedy arrival with
large forces in Italy, and recommended to them his ambassadors, from
whom the Romans would learn with certainty his will and intentions.
In reality, his envoys, and especially Wibald, were charged to mediate
concerning conditions of peace between the Pope and the Romans. In
the very valuable collection of Wibald's letters is found a kind of draft
of these conditions, from which we can infer the existence of the negotia-
tions which must have taken place under the circumstances. But the
Pope, relying on the hope of Conrad's coming, did not profit by Wibald's
intervention, and did not follow his counsels of moderation, missing
thereby the opportunity of reconciling himself with the Romans. Perhaps
he was convinced that a peaceful solution of the controversy would not
be lasting, and trusted only to the argument of victorious force. Now
that he was entirely alienated from the King of Sicily, he was determined
to smooth Conrad's road and thus facilitate in every way his early arrival
in Rome; the ambassadors took their leave elated with concessions and
promises.
But they were not to bring back to their master the messages
of the
Pope. While still on their journey, they received the news that Conrad
had died on 15 February 1152 at Bamberg, whither he had gone to hold
a diet. All the preparations for the Italian expedition were thus un-
expectedly interrupted. The relations between Germany and Italy, the
condition of Germany itself, not yet issued from a long period of confusion
and discord, and the consolidation of the Empire, might relapse into a
state of danger and incertitude if a firm and vigorous hand did not
succeed in taking the reins and steadfastly guiding the realm. Conrad III
on his death-bed understood the needs of the moment, and indicated as
his successor his nephew Frederick of Swabia, to whom he entrusted the
royal insignia and the wardship of his child son. The magnates of the
realm followed Conrad's counsel, and on 4 March 1152 Frederick of
Hohenstaufen was elected at Frankfort. With him the star of the
Empire was to shine with renewed lustre.


## p. 381 (#427) ############################################

381
CHAPTER XII.
FREDERICK BARBAROSSA AND GERMANY.
The campaigns of Frederick Barbarossa in Italy form the most
celebrated feature of his reign; they reveal his great qualities as a soldier
and as a statesman in times both of victory and of defeat; they form a
part, and a very important part, of the great contest between Empire and
Papacy. The peculiar interest attached to this side of Frederick's
activities has often led historians to under-estimate the value of his work
in his native kingdom. Yet it is in Germany that the enduring marks of
his boundless energies are to be sought. He succeeded to the throne of a
kingdom in a state of complete disintegration; a great family feud
divided the land into factions in open hostility; internal discord and
wide-spread unrest prevailed everywhere; the country was exhausted by
civil war and by the plundering and burning which accompanied it, the
people by famine and want which was its natural consequence. The royal
authority in the hands of Conrad was too weak to check the lawlessness
of the nobility, hopelessly incapable of dealing with the crucial question
of the position of the Welfs. Within four years of his coronation
Frederick, by his masterful rule, had transformed Germany. Feuds were
healed, enemies reconciled; Landfrieden were proclaimed in all the duchies,
and offenders were dealt with by stern punishments. Order was restored
and the rule of law was established.
Conrad's elder son Henry had died two years before, and the dying
king realised that where he had so signally failed his younger son
Frederick, a boy of but six years old, was unlikely to succeed. He
therefore designated as his successor his nephew Frederick of Swabia and
entrusted to him the royal insignia. He was a man of remarkable promise,
of suitable age, and with a distinguished career behind him; and what
was of still greater importance he was connected by equal ties of kinship
to the two rival houses of Hohenstaufen and Welf. His father was the
late King Conrad's elder brother Frederick; his mother, Judith, was the
sister of Henry the Proud. He had already on more than one occasion
acted as mediator between the two parties; his sympathies were equally
divided; indeed no man was more favourably circumstanced for healing
the quarrel which had for so long disturbed the peace of Germany.
Seldom during the Middle Ages has a king been chosen to rule Germany
with greater unanimity on the part of his subjects. The formalities of
1 Henry, Archbishop of Mayence, appears to have raised objections to Frederick's
election (see the passage in the royal chronicle of Cologne, SGUS, ed. Waitz, p. 89);
but evidently he was unable to press them far. Cf. Simonsfeld, Jahrbücher, pp. 19 sq.
CH. XII.


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382
Character of Frederick Barbarossa
election were carried through with scarcely a hint of opposition, and with
a promptness and ease truly amazing considering the state of the country
at the moment of Conrad's death. On 15 February 1152 the king was
dead; on 4 March Frederick was chosen king by the princes at Frankfort;
on the next day he set out for his coronation, travelling by boat down
the Main and the Rhine as far as Sinzig and so by road to Aix-la-Chapelle.
There on 9 March he was crowned by Arnold, Archbishop of Cologne.
Immediately after the event, emissaries-Eberhard, Bishop of Bamberg,
Hillin, Archbishop-elect of Trèves, and Adam, Abbot of Ebrach—were
dispatched to Rome with letters to Pope Eugenius III in which the king
announced his election, promised his obedience, and declared his readiness
to protect the Holy See.
The man thus chosen to rule Germany was in the prime of life, some
thirty years old, vigorous in mind and body, a fine figure of a man of
rather more than middle height, and of perfect proportions; his personal
appearance was remarkably attractive, with his fine features, his reddish
curly hair, and his expression so genial that, we are told by Acerbus
Morena who knew him well, he gave one the idea that he always wanted
to laugh; even when moved to anger he would conceal his indignation
beneath a smile. Brave, fearless, a superb fighter, he regarded war as the
best of games; he gloried in the hardly-contested battle; he was the very
embodiment of medieval chivalry. Though no scholar, he was not with-
out intellectual tastes; he could understand, if he could not speak, Latin,
and in his native tongue he was even fuent; he was interested in history,
in the deeds of his ancestors. With the qualities necessary for ruling a
great empire he was singularly well endowed: shrewd judgment, rapid
power of decision, untiring energy, the highest sense of justice. Frederick
was no respecter of persons; though normally his temper was of the
gentlest, he was inexorable towards wrong-doers, and even on the festive
day of his coronation he is said to have refused forgiveness to a malefactor;
“I outlawed you not out of malice,” he declared, “but in accordance with
the dictates of justice; therefore there is no ground for pardon. ” A
friend of distinguished Roman lawyers he was himself a lawgiver of no
slight ability, and his public acts bulk large in the volumes of Constitu-
tions of medieval Emperors'
. Not only among writers of his own country
or of his own way of thinking is Frederick regarded as nearly reaching to
human perfection according to the ideals of the time. German and
foreigner, friend and foe, have but one opinion on the character of the
great Emperor; they must go back in their histories to Charles the Great
to find a worthy parallel.
At the time of the coronation, so Abbot Wibald reports to the Pope,
1 Some idea of the amount of his legislative work may be gained from the fact
that his Constitutions and Public Acts occupy no less than 273 quarto pages of the
Monumenta Germaniae Historica, whereas those of his predecessors from Henry the
Fowler to Conrad III occupy together only 190.


## p. 383 (#429) ############################################

Landfrieden
383
years.
there was talk among the bishops of an immediate expedition to Italy.
The more prudent counsel of the lay princes, however, prevailed; and
the new king turned his first attention to the more pressing and no less
difficult problems of his German kingdom. The promulgation of a general
land-peace was the preliminary step in this direction. This ordinance is
a striking advance on the meagre, temporary, local enactments of former
kings; it was universal in its application to all parts of Germany, it was
intended to be permanent, it was comprehensive in character. Breaches
of the peace were punishable by the strictest penalties: murder and theft
(when the value of the stolen goods exceeded five shillings) were punished
with death; smaller offences, such as assault and petty larceny, by fines,
mutilation, or flogging. There were reforms too in criminal procedure
and in the settlement of disputes over possession of land. The price of
corn was to be fixed annually after the harvest by the count of the dis-
trict and a committee of seven; selling above the fixed price was hence-
forth to be treated as a breach of the peace. This regulation was intended
to remedy the abuse of forcing up the price by holding back the grain in
times of shortage. In 1158 at the Diet of Roncaglia a peace constitution
was issued not only for Germany but for the whole Empire; all persons
between the ages of eighteen and seventy were bound to swear to maintain
the
peace, and their oath was to be renewed every
five
The most significant feature in this legislation was its treatment of
private war. The Landfrieden had grown up in the early years of the
twelfth century with the object of checking unjustifiable feuds. The
principle emerges that private war, so characteristic of medieval social
life, was only permissible under certain prescribed conditions; otherwise
it was a crime, a violation of the Landfrieden, a breach of the peace. In
the Constitutio pacis of 1158 it was forbidden altogether. Presumably,
however, the machinery of justice and modes of redress were still too
rudimentary to admit of so sweeping a reform; and in the last of
Frederick's peace enactments, the Constitution against Incendiaries
promulgated at the Nuremberg Diet in 1186, the feud was once more
conditionally permitted. Perhaps these constitutions do not bear the
stamp of originality; they were based no doubt on previous enactments
of a like nature; so for example the Nuremberg Constitution may
have
its origin in those issued against incendiaries by Innocent II, Eugenius III,
and Alexander III. But it was not so much in their novelty as in the
fact that they gave uniformity in the penal law and procedure throughout
the Empire that their true value lies. Nevertheless, in spite of this com-
prehensive general legislation, the old provincial land-peace was not
entirely superseded. Frederick himself confirmed many local peaces: in
the first year of his reign he confirmed a Swabian land-peace at Ulm;
and after the settlement of the Bavarian question at Ratisbon in 1156
one was sworn for that duchy. The peace promulgated at Weissenburg
in 1179 for Rhenish Franconia, which in character is not unlike the
CH. XII.


## p. 384 (#430) ############################################

384
Relations with Henry the Lion
Treuga Dei, has a special interest attaching to it: it professes to be the
renewal of a peace which has existed from time immemorial, for so long
indeed that it has come to rank as an ordinance of Charles the Great.
The legislative achievement of Frederick bears a favourable comparison
with that of his great English contemporary, Henry II. The uncom-
promising measures employed in its execution are thus summarised by the
chronicler: “much blood was shed by King Frederick for securing peace,
very many persons were hanged, many churches, towns, and castles were
destroyed by fire. ” But if we deplore the crude violence of the method,
we can only praise the result, for, we are told, he so successfully crushed
the disturbers of the peace that in a very short time the firmest peace
was restored by the fear of his coming.
During the royal progress the work of reconciliation went on apace.
Acting on the dying wish of King Conrad, he enfeoffed his young cousin,
Frederick of Rothenburg, with the duchy of Swabia, and created his uncle
Welf VI Marquess of Tuscany and Duke of Spoleto. A feud between
the bishop and the townsmen of Utrecht, which Conrad's efforts had
failed to determine, was immediately ended at his first diet at Merseburg;
he arbitrated between the rival candidates for the Danish throne, and
extended the authority of the house of Zähringen over Burgundy and
Provence; at Constance in March 1153 he concluded a close alliance with
Pope Eugenius III; and before the first year of his reign had drawn to
a close he had approached the most difficult problem of all — the position
of the Welfs.
Hitherto Frederick had shewn favour but not undue partiality to his
cousin Henry; and in a dispute in which the latter became involved with
Albert the Bear over the inheritances of two Saxon nobles, Hermann of
Winzenburg and Bernard of Plötske, he had decided the matter in the
most equitable manner by assigning one inheritance to each of the dis-
putants. But with wide and ambitious schemes in view he could not
afford to delay a settlement of the vital question of the Bavarian duchy.
The success of his plans moreover depended in no small measure on the
full co-operation of the powerful head of the house of Welf, to whose
influence, perhaps, he partly owed his crown! The first years were occu-
pied with tentative negotiations rendered difficult by the uncompromising
attitude of Henry Jasomirgott, who, by the late king's arrangement, was
in possession of the Bavarian duchy. Diet followed diet in rapid succes-
sion, resulting only in delay and postponement. Henry Jasomirgott,
summoned to Würzburg in October 1152, failed to appear; he was
1 So Haller, Der Sturz Heinrichs des Löwen, p. 297, on the authority of the late
(written c. 1230) Chronicon S. Michaelis Luneburgensis, MGH, Script. xxi, 396,
*qui (Henricus) eum ad imperialem promoverat celsitudinem. ' But cf. Simonsfeld,
Jahrbücher, p. 26. It is, however, possible that Henry had come to an understanding
with Frederick before his election that he would satisfy Henry's claim to Bavaria.
See Giesebrecht, v, p. 9.


## p. 385 (#431) ############################################

Settlement of the duchy of Bavaria
385
summoned twice in the following year before the Court, at Worms
(Whitsuntide) and at Spires (December), but in each case he evaded a
decision by finding a flaw in the summons. At last on 3 June 1154 the
princes, wearied by the seemingly interminable proceedings, met at Goslar
and resolved to bring the matter to a conclusion. The elder Henry was
again absent; his continued defiance of the royal authority was sufficient
pretext for depriving him of his position. Henry the younger, who had
already assumed the title of Duke of Bavaria and Saxony, was now there-
fore duly awarded the vacant duchy. After his return with the Emperor
from the Italian expedition (1154-5), in which he had conspicuously
distinguished himself, he was formally invested with the dukedom of
Bavaria at Ratisbon (October 1155). But the settlement lacked finality.
Henry Jasomirgott obstinately refused to yield to the conciliatory ad-
vances of Frederick. It was not until a year later that an arrangement
satisfactory to both parties was concluded at Ratisbon on 17 September
1156. It was a diet of the first importance, for it established the power
of Henry the Lion and it created the duchy of Austria.
The ex-duke did not enter the town; he set up a magnificent encamp-
ment some two miles from its walls, and there the solemn scene, which
witnessed the end of the long drawn-out struggle, took place. The details
had already been prepared and the terms engrossed in a document read
aloud to the assembled princes by Vladislav II of Bohemia. Henry the
elder surrendered the seven flags, the insignia of the Bavarian dukedom;
these in turn were handed over to Henry the younger, who forthwith
returned two to the Emperor, relinquishing by this act all claim to the
Austrian March. With this insignia the Emperor enfeoffed Henry
Jasomirgott with the now created duchy of Austria.
With it the new
duke received an enviable list of privileges, such indeed as no other prince
of the Empire might enjoy. The duchy was granted in fee to Henry and
his wife Theodora jointly, and to their children whether male or female;
if they should die without issue, they had the right of bequeathing the
duchy by willa; no one was permitted to exercise jurisdiction within the
duchy except with the consent of the duke; furthermore the duke was
only liable for attendance at diets held in Bavaria and for military service
in Austria or in its neighbourhood”.
Frederick's policy towards the great princes of Germany was at first
therefore to strengthen their position with the hope that they would
reward his confidence with their loyalty and co-operation. The duchy of
Bavaria was not the only accretion to the power of the house of Welf.
There were claims also to Italian territories. A Welfic heiress four
1 MGH, Const. 1, 220, the privilegium minus which is the genuine document. The
privilegium maius, ibid. 1, 683, is a forgery of Rudolf IV of Austria made in the winter
1358-9, see Huber, SKAW, xxxiv, pp. 17 sq.
2 According to W. Erben, Das Privilegium Friedrichs I für den Herzogtum Oester-
reich (1902), these clauses were later interpolations.
25
C. MED, H. VOL. V. CH. XII.


## p. 386 (#432) ############################################

386
The Danish civil war
generations back, Cunegunda, sister of the childless Welf III, had married
Azzo, Marquess of Este, and through her the line descended. While the
imperial army was encamped near Verona, Henry the Lion had a meeting
with his Italian cousin and acquired the family inheritance in return for
a payment of 200 marks. At the same time his uncle Welf VI, with
Frederick behind him, was able to make good his claim to the wide pos-
sessions of the Countess Matilda.
Heinricus Leo dux Bawariae et Saxoniae : such was the name now
borne by the great Welf. He ruled an imperium in imperio, but he did
not abuse his privileged position; his rule for the twenty years which
followed the settlement of Ratisbon was beneficial to Germany, if it was
detrimental to the interests of individual princes. Henry threw himself
with all his energy into the work of German expansion, the promotion
of commercial enterprise, the development of municipal life.
The northern frontier had been disturbed for ten years past by a civil
war in Denmark. Eric III died in 1146, and Svein the son of Eric II and
Canute the son of Magnus disputed for the throne. The rivals had laid
their pretensions before Frederick at his first diet at Merseburg (18 May
1152), but the decision had satisfied the successful hardly more than the
defeated candidate; for Svein in return for the recognition of his claims
had had to acknowledge himself the vassal of the German king, and to
compensate his opponent with the island of Zealand. Their feud unap-
peased, the rival claimants continued their war of devastation, now one,
now the other, gaining a temporary advantage. In 1154 Svein, alienated
from his subjects on account of his cruelty, and at the end of his re-
sources, fled to Saxony, where he lived for upwards of two years with his
father-in-law, Count Conrad of Wettin. In 1156, when the latter with-
drew to a monastery which he had founded at Lauterberg, Svein again
went in search of help to recover his lost throne. He found the Saxon
princes ready for the enterprise; the services of Henry, just returned
triumphant from the Diet of Ratisbon, were easily secured in considera-
tion of a subsidy. The campaign was opened with success ; Schleswig
and Ripen fell into Svein's hands; but a national resistance and the
treachery of the Slavs serving in the German host checked its progress.
They withdrew therefore with hostages from the captured towns. Henry,
however, did not relinquish his efforts on behalf of his allies ; with the
help of the Slavonic prince Niclot and by judicious bribery he once more
gained a foothold on Danish territory. Thus matters stood when the
Danish Church under the guidance of the Bishop of Ripen exercised its
influence to end the terrible disorders by means of compromise. There
were now three aspirants to the throne, for Waldemar, the son of Canute,
the late Duke of Schleswig', had recently advanced his claim. Among
these three the country was equally partitioned. Three days later, 7 May
1157, Svein's character was revealed in its true colours. Suddenly, at
1 See supra, p. 344.
I


## p. 387 (#433) ############################################

Disturbances in the diocese of Mayence
387
a feast held in honour of the reconciliation, he fell upon his opponents :
Canute was killed, Waldemar, though wounded, managed to escape under
cover of darkness. Svein's conduct effectively disposed of his chances of
the throne. His disgusted supporters deserted in numbers to Waldemar,
who was able to win a decisive victory at Viborg. Svein was killed in
the battle, and Waldemar, the sole survivor of the three rivals, became
the undisputed sovereign of Denmark.
In the exhausted state of the country the new king was powerless to
withstand the constant attacks of the Slavonic pirates upon the Danish
coasts. He put himself therefore under the protection of the man most
capable of defending his kingdom, Duke Henry. In this way Henry
established that influence in Danish politics which was to continue for
more than twenty years. The influence certainly was not always con-
genial to Waldemar, who on one occasion even took arms against his
protector. He had in 1168 with the help of Henry's vassals captured
the island of Rügen ; Henry demanded in accordance with an alleged
covenant a half-share in the conquest. The king's refusal caused a war
which lasted till 1171. Then at a conference on the Eider the old alliance
was restored ; Waldemar yielded to the duke's demands, and the relations
were drawn still closer by the marriage of their children, Canute and
Gertrude, the widow of Frederick of Rothenburg.
In the intervals between his Italian campaigns Frederick paid hurried
visits to Germany to set in order what had gone amiss during his absence.
While he was in the kingdom the peace was well kept, but when he was
safely beyond the Alps the old feuds broke out once more; private war
for the righting of wrongs, for the settlement of disputes, was too much
engrained in the feudal nobility to be crushed out in a moment by peace
ordinances or by the rule of a strong but absent Emperor. The diocese
of Mayence affords a good example of this. Archbishop Arnold soon
after his election quarrelled with the nobles of the surrounding country,
at the head of whom was Herman of Stahleck, Count-Palatine of the
Rhine; on his return from his first Italian expedition Frederick sup-
pressed the rebellion with strong measures at the Christmas court (1155)
at Worms. There was an old custom among the Franks by which men
found guilty of offences of this kind were obliged to undergo the ignominy
of carrying certain objects varying according to their rank: for the noble
it was a dog, for the ministerialis a saddle, for the rustic the wheel of
a plough. It was this penalty that Frederick imposed on the Count-
Palatine; he and ten other counts, his accomplices, carried dogs for
a full German mile. When, we are told, this dreadful punishment was
made known, “all were seized with such terror that they preferred to
live at peace than to devote themselves to the turbulence of war. Soon
after, the Count-Palatine died, and Frederick strengthened his own re-
sources by conferring the Palatinate on his half-brother Conrad, who,
since the death of the old “one-eyed” Duke Frederick II of Swabia, had
CH. XII.
25-2


## p. 388 (#434) ############################################

388
Feuds among the German princes
come into the Hohenstaufen patrimony in Rhenish Franconia. The
difficulties of the Archbishop of Mayence were not, however, at an end;
in 1158, when somewhat reluctantly he had obeyed the imperial summons
to take part in the second Italian campaign, Arnold imposed a war tax
on the ministeriales and citizens of Mayence. Again there was rebellion
and terrible disorders throughout the city. The climax was reached when
the archbishop returned triumphant after the fall of Milan. He laid
the city under an interdict, but the trouble continued; he prepared for
war, but was himself attacked; he sought sanctuary at the monastery of
St James, but the monastery was put to the flames and he was butchered
at the gates by the infuriated mob (1160)”. Not only the perpetrators
but the whole town suffered punishment for the infamous act when the
Emperor returned from Italy in 1163; many were fined, the city was
deprived of its privileges, and its walls were destroyed. Two elections to
the see were quashed before a man was found who met with the Emperor's
approval; and even he, Conrad of Wittelsbach, had afterwards to be re-
moved for the offence of espousing the cause of Pope Alexander III. The
diocese of Mayence had a stormy history until in 1165 it fell into the
capable hands of Archbishop Christian.
During the third Italian expedition the peace of Germany was dis-
turbed by a feud between Duke Welf and Hugh of Tübingen, the latter
supported by Frederick of Rothenburg, Duke of Swabia; the Emperor
settled the affair when he was back in Germany in the autumn of 1164,
but he was no sooner off again to Italy than it broke out afresh with
renewed vigour and on a wider field, for now the house of Zähringen was
enlisted on the side of Welf and the King of Bohemia lent aid to Hugh.
It was not until 1166 that the Emperor, by severe punishments, forced
Hugh to submit. These are but instances; there were many other similar
quarrels : Rainald of Dassel against the Count-Palatine of the Rhine,
Henry the Lion against the rival princes of Saxony. They were the
inevitable consequence in these times of the absence of a king from his
kingdom. A king was accounted to have done well if he succeeded in
maintaining the peace when he was at home and was strong enough to
restore order when he returned after an absence.
The border countries of Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary had been
the source of much trouble to Frederick's predecessors; their rulers found,
however, that disobedience to Frederick was a more serious matter. In
Poland, Boleslav, having driven out his refractory elder brother Vladislav
(Wladisław), had acquired the government himself (1146); he now refused
to pay homage and the accustomed tribute of 500 marks. In the summer
of 1157 Frederick set out across the Elbe to punish him for his defiance;
in a letter to Wibald of Stablo he describes the difficulties of the journey
through the dense forests, the surprise and dismay of the Poles when
1 Cf. Vita Arnoldi Archiepiscopi, ed. Jaffé, Bibl. rer. Germ. it; and for the value
of this source, P Amandus G’sell, OSB, in Neu. Arch. xlni, 1920-1.


## p. 389 (#435) ############################################

Relations with Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary 389
they saw the German army reach the Oder and the soldiers in their
eagerness leaping into the great river and swimming across; he describes
the flight and the pursuit to Posen and the humble submission of the
duke. Boleslav had to pay a heavy price for his rashness: he not only
had to do homage, but also to pay large fines, 2000 marks of gold to
the Emperor, 1000 to the princes, 20 to the Empress, and 200 marks
of silver to the court. He had further to allow his brother to return
from exile and to bring the complaint he had against him before the
imperial court at Magdeburg the following Christmas; finally he engaged
himself to accompany Frederick on the forthcoming Italian expedition.
The Emperor then returned, taking with him hostages as an assurance
of the duke's good faith. Gésa II of Hungary, who had been for some
time past on bad terms with the Empire, voluntarily presented himself at
a diet at Würzburg and promised to join the Italian expedition. In re-
turn for the cession of Bautzen and the elevation of his duchy into a
kingdom, Vladislav II (I) of Bohemia made a similar promise of assistance.
He alone of the three princes who had promised to take part in the second
Italian campaign fulfilled his engagement.
During the rest of his reign Frederick had need to pay little attention
to the affairs of his eastern neighbours. In 1172 he was called upon to
settle an internal feud in Poland and a disputed succession in Hungary:
but in each case he managed to avoid recourse to armed interference. In
Bohemia the cordial relations established in 1158 continued till the ap-
pointment in 1168 of Vladislav's son, Adalbert, to the archbishopric of
Salzburg. Adalbert, being a supporter of Alexander III, was soon deposed,
and an estrangement sprang up between the two courts. Without con-
sulting the Emperor or the Bohemian nobles, Vladislav abdicated in
favour of his son Frederick; the Emperor cancelled the arrangement and
appointed Soběslav II, the son of that Soběslav who preceded Vladislav II
in the Bohemian duchy, as the successor to the dukedom. But he was so
unpopular among his subjects, and made himself so troublesome to his
neighbours, that not long after he was removed from his position. Vladis-
lav's son Frederick was now raised to the dukedom with the Emperor's
approval and was duly enfeoffed. Peace was thus satisfactorily restored.
The German kings had never succeeded in making their authority felt
in their Burgundian kingdom. Lothar had improved the position by be-
stowing on the powerful Swabian house of Zähringen the title and duties
of rector Burgundiae (1127), and Duke Conrad had striven hard to se-
cure the interests of Germany; but Conrad was dead (1152), and his son
Berthold IV had not yet been able to establish his influence in Burgundy.
Trouble arose in the county of Burgundy. Count Rainald died leaving
only a daughter Beatrix; his brother Count William of Mâcon not only
seized the custody of the inheritance but thrust the heiress into prison
and tried to get her possessions permanently into his own hands. It was
to the interest of Frederick no less than of Berthold that strong measures
CH, XII.


## p. 390 (#436) ############################################

390
Frederick's marriage with Beatrix of Burgundy
should be taken. At the Diet of Merseburg in 1152 the authority of
Berthold as Rector was confirmed and extended; he was to be practically
autonomous in Burgundy and Provence in the absence of the Emperor; for
his part he agreed to assist Frederick in the projected Italian campaign with
a Burgundian contingent of 500 heavy-armed knights and 50 archers. The
difficulties with regard to the Count of Mâcon were to be settled by the
judgment of the princes when Frederick should himself visit Burgundy
in the following year. In accordance with this plan, in February 1153
Frederick held his court at Besançon; many Burgundian nobles assembled
to do him homage, and among them William of Mâcon; but whether any
action was taken against the latter on this occasion, or who retained
possession of the countship of Burgundy, is a matter of uncertainty. It
appears at any rate that the bargain made at Merseburg was not carried out.
It was not till the troublesome Count William was dead that Frederick
inaugurated any real change in his Burgundian relations, and the motive
was a new one. Some years previously, at Constance in 1153, the Emperor,
under circumstances none too creditable it would seem, divorced his first
wife Adelaide of Vohburg. He turned to Burgundy in 1156 with the object
of making the rich and attractive Beatrix his wife. The pair were married
in gala fashion at Whitsuntide in the town of Würzburg. The lands which
thus came under his sway by right of his wife became the nucleus of a real
imperial power over Burgundy; an independent authority such as the
Zähringen had possessed no longer suited the Emperor's schemes, and the
compact of 1152 remained unfulfilled; by way of compensation Berthold
received the advocateship of the three sees of Lausanne, Geneva, and Sion.
The eventful Diet of Besançon in October 1157, with its brilliant
gathering of representatives from all parts of Italy, from France, England,
and Spain, was no doubt held with a view of impressing upon the in-
habitants of the newly-acquired county a sense of the imperial power.
The papal legates brought with them letters from Pope Hadrian com-
plaining of an outrage which had been perpetrated against Eskil, the
Archbishop of Lund, in imperial territory. The aged prelate, while
journeying homewards after visiting the Pope, was attacked by bandits;
his property was seized, he himself, after some rough handling, was carried
off into captivity. Hadrian's letter complains of the fact that, although
he had informed the Emperor of these distressing events, the perpetrators
remained unpunished. The Pope continues by reminding Frederick of his
previous kindness towards him in those famous words which hastened on
the rupture of the friendly relations which till now had existed between
Pope and Emperor. He speaks of “conferring the imperial crown” and
of his willingness to bestow upon him “even greater beneficia if it were
possible,” and concludes by imputing the blame for Frederick’s lapses to evil
counsellors—a dark reference no doubt to the Chancellor, Rainald of
Dassel, Archbishop of Cologne. Now the words conferre and beneficium
have technical meanings: they are the terms used in feudal phraseology


## p. 391 (#437) ############################################

Diet of Besançon
391
to connote the grant of a fief by a lord to his vassal. It will never be known
what Hadrian himself meant to imply. If he intended his words to be
interpreted in the sense that he had bestowed the Empire upon Frederick
as a papal fief, there was an end to all amicable relations between the
ecclesiastical and secular lords of Christendom. And such indeed was the
interpretation put upon it by one of his envoys, in all likelihood Cardinal
Roland: “From whom then does he hold it if not from the Pope? " Feeling
ran high among the outraged German princes, and Otto of Wittelsbach
would have run the audacious prelate through the body had not Frederick
himself interposed to prevent the shedding of blood. The Emperor was,
however, deeply incensed; the legates were sent packing to Italy with all
haste. He realised that a rupture with the Papacy was imminent, and took
steps to secure the loyalty of the German Church by stating his case in a
letter. He relates the episode of the Besançon diet; he tells how he has
searched the baggage of the cardinals and has found many other letters
of a similar tenour and even blank mandates, sealed by the papal Chancery,
for the legates to fill in arbitrarily to supply a sanction for their nefarious
work of despoiling the churches of Germany? Frederick concludes by
refuting the papal claims of overlordship and by stating his own theory
of the Empire: it is the doctrine of the two swords, the Empire is an in-
dependent and divinely instituted lordship held direct “from God alone
by the election of the princes. ” Frederick's attitude was upheld by the
German bishops; their reply to Hadrian's letter soliciting their support,
though moderate in tone, was an emphatic assertion of their belief in the
Emperor's right. Hadrian did not feel sufficiently prepared for the contest
which he had brought upon himself, more especially as he could not count
on the support of the clergy beyond the Alps; more tactful legates were
dispatched, who, after suffering capture and robbery at the hands of Alpine
brigands, ultimately succeeded in reaching the Emperor's court at Augs-
burg. Frederick, like Hadrian, had no wish to precipitate a struggle. He
was willing enough to listen to the conciliatory letter read out by Bishop
Otto of Freising: beneficium, the letter stated, in Rome, as in the Scriptures,
had not the technical feudal sense; it implied simply a bonum factum, a
good deed; the crowning of the Emperor was admittedly “a good deed. ”
When we say “we have conferred” the crown, we merely mean “we have
imposed” the crown upon the royal head. By such quibbles the Emperor's
anger was appeased, and the legates returned to their master loaded with
gifts and messages of friendship.
Ever since the time of Gregory VII extreme papalists had been arguing
1 Cf. H. Schrörs, Untersuchungen zum Streite Kaiser Friedrichs 1 mit Papst
Hadrian IV (1157-1158), Bonn. Univ. Progr. 1915. The Curia, following on the success-
ful advance made in its position in the time of Conrad III, proposed to undertake a wide
visitation of the churches in the Empire by its legates. This fact helps to explain
the blank mandates with which the legates were armed. Frederick's measures were
directed against further encroachments of papal influeuce.
CH, XII.


## p. 392 (#438) ############################################

392
Ecclesiastical policy
the theory of the feudal subjection of the Empire to the Papacy. Pope
Innocent II had caused the coronation of Lothar III to be commemorated
in a picture hung in the palace of the Lateran. The Emperor was portrayed
kneeling and receiving the crown from the enthroned Pontiff; below was
inscribed this significant couplet:
Rex venit ante fores, iurans prius Urbis honores,
Post homo fit Papae, sumit quo dante coronam.
A picture and inscription so derogatory to the imperial dignity was, we
need scarcely remark, destroyed at Barbarossa’s instance; but it revealed
a tendency, and with this in our minds it is difficult to avoid the inference
that the Curia, in dispatching the famous letter, had intended to set a
subtle trap into which it was hoped the Emperor would fall and, by
accepting the letter, would tacitly acknowledge the papal overlordship
claimed in those both vague and technical phrases. Frederick’s legal mind
and his astute Chancellor Rainald were not to be so easily caught, and the
Curia had to recede along the path of verbal sophistry.
The royal influence in ecclesiastical matters had sensibly diminished
during the reigns of Lothar and Conrad III. St Bernard had jealously
guarded the Church's interests, and even the rights left to the king by the
Worms Concordat were by no means always enforced. Gerhoh of Reichers-
perg, the powerful champion of Church pretensions, was able to write in
Conrad's time: “Thanks to God, episcopal elections now take place without
the presence of the king. "1 But Bernard died in 1153, and a man was on
the throne of Germany who would brook no interference with his rights
or what he deemed to be his rights, would suffer no encroachments upon
the position the law allowed him. Frederick was determined that his in-
Auence should be felt in the elections of bishops and abbots. Within two
months of his accession he interfered, and interfered with success, in the
election to the vacant see of Magdeburg. The votes of the Chapter were
divided between the provost, Gerhard, and the dean, Azzo. Frederick him-
self appeared in the midst of the wrangling electors and recommended
Wichmann, Bishop of Zeitz, who was duly chosen and immediately invested
with the regalia of his see. It was a bold stroke, justified, it is true, so
far as interference in a disputed election went, by the Concordat; but
his action was open to attack on other grounds: it was contrary to Canon
Law to translate a bishop without a licence from the Pope. Wichmann's
election, though upheld by the German bishops at Ratisbon, was denied at
Rome. Eugenius III remained firm till his death in the summer of 1153;
but his more compliant successor Anastasius IV yielded, and granted the
pallium to the archbishop of Frederick's choice. But the king would
not often disturb the electoral gathering with his presence; he would
rather work through trustworthy representatives, or he would send letters
indicative of his will. So on the death of Rainald he wrote to the electors
1 Gerhoh, MGH, Libelli de Lite, ui, 280.


## p. 393 (#439) ############################################

Frederick's claims
393
of Cologne recommending his Chancellor Philip of Heinsberg as his
successor, “him only and no other we wish to be elected without delay";
Arnold was appointed to the archbishopric of Trèves in succession to
Hillin “at the suggestion or advice of the Emperor. ” The Concordat
had also conceded to the king the right of deciding disputed elections—a
right which Conrad had allowed to slip from his grasp. As we have seen,
Frederick had exercised his authority in this respect in the case of the
disputed election to the see of Magdeburg soon after his own accession,
and had established a practice known as Devolutionsrecht to meet such
cases, whereby the nomination devolved upon the Emperor; both can-
didates were set aside and a third, his own nominee, was chosen.
This policy, boldly and successfully carried out, completely changed the
character of the German episcopate. The bishops of Frederick's choice are
men of practical experience, of administrative ability, men trained in the
imperial Chancery; Philip, the Chancellor, is appointed to the metropolitan
see of Cologne for his skill in statecraft. Frederick's bishops are politicians
first, and only in the second place good churchmen. But they are never-
theless distinguished men-Rainald of Dassel and Christian of Mayence
are notable examples; they are men capable of governing the extensive
dioceses of Germany.
Moreover he made the weight of his influence felt in other spheres of
the Church's work; he claimed certain powers of jurisdiction over the
clergy. In the peace ordinance of 1152 it is laid down that a clerk com-
mitted for breach of the peace shall be punished in the local lay court, that
of the count of the district, and in case of disobedience he shall be deprived
of his office and benefice. At Ulm in the same year it was decreed that a man
accused of damaging the property of the Church shall only be punished if
he is found guilty in the lay court. He clung tenaciously to the rights of
regalia and spolia. A doctrine had been growing up that property once
bestowed upon the Church belonged to the Church for ever without the
re-grant to a new bishop'; this theory made the investiture of the regalia
by the Emperor a matter of mere formality. Frederick determined that
it should be a real thing, and heavily fined a bishop, Hartwig of Ratisbon,
for disposing of the fiefs of his church before he had been duly invested
with them. Further, he claimed that what he had granted he could like-
wise take away from those who did not fulfil their duties of vassalship.
So in 1154 he deprived Hartwig of Bremen and Ulrich of Halberstadt
of the regalia for refusing to perform their military service on the Italian
campaign. He appropriated the revenues of vacant churches and the move-
able property of deceased bishops, and in the exercise of this last right,
the ius spolii, caused much bitterness among the bishops; nevertheless,
though strongly attacked by Urban III, the vexatious practice continued.
These measures and these claims are characteristic of Frederick's whole
attitude towards the relations of Church and State; the exercise of a certain
1 Gerhoh, loc. cit.
CH. XII.


## p. 394 (#440) ############################################

394
The German clergy and the Schism
control over the affairs of the Church was part of his duty as Emperor.
His ecclesiastical policy was essentially conservative: he wished only to
recover and to retain that authority over the Church which had been
wielded by his predecessors; he looked back to the tradition of the great
Emperors of the past, of Henry III, of Otto I, perhaps even of Charles the
Great whom he caused to be canonised in 1166. We are struck by the
boldness of such a policy, but more surprising still is the ready compliance
with which it was received by the German episcopate, and the compara-
tively mild treatment meted out by the Curia. The legates at Constance
in March 1153 had no doubt their own axe to grind, but it is indeed ex-
traordinary to find them a month or two later sanctioning the deposition
of Henry of Mayence on the sole ground that he had opposed the election
of Frederick Barbarossa; moreover the royal nominee, the king's own
Chancellor Arnold, was raised to the thus vacated archbishopric without
the slightest demur. Several others on purely political grounds were re-
moved from their sees, Henry of Minden, Burchard of Eichstätt, Bernard
of Hildesheim. Frederick began his reign with a definite and reactionary
Church policy, and he carried it through with remarkably little opposition.
The Gregorian party could count but few sympathisers among the German
bishops; those who, like Eberhard of Salzburg or Eberhard of Bamberg,
approved of the hierarchical views of the Curia, were unfitted to organise
and lead a great political party; they were not militant, they were not
politicians, perhaps they were too loyal. At any rate Frederick in these
early years was able to establish his control firmly over the German Church,
firmly enough to be able to count on its support when at a later time he
was to create a schism in Europe. The schism, it is true, roused Eberhard
of Salzburg to declare himself openly on the side of Alexander III, and
his example was followed by the Bishops of Brixen and Gurk; but his
influence did not penetrate beyond the boundaries of his province. The
rest of Germany stood firmly by Frederick and his Pope Victor IV till the
latter's death in April 1164.