No More Learning

-- Assertion: The eye and so forth are inherently existent because one experiences consciousness, their effect.
-- Answer: A visual consciousness does not exist before looking at a form, for prior to that the conditions which produce it are incomplete. Alternatively if it exist after looking at the form, it follows that the eye consciousness is of no use in looking at the form, because looking takes place before it exists. As a third possibility one might think that that which looks and consciousness are simultaneous. It would then follow that the instrument of looking would be of no use in the production of that visual consciousness because the two would exist simultaneously and would be unrelated. )
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L9: [3: Refuting the eye as agent]
L9: [a: Absurdity if the eye travels to look at visible form]
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\ ###
\ 313.
\ If the eye travels, that which is
\ Distant would take long to see.
\ Why are extremely close
\ And very distant forms not clear?
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(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. Now the hypothesis is that it is the light (radiation) that travels between the object and the eyes. And it proves that we are seeing only parts of an object and assuming the rest. This also applies to our so called elementary components of matter. )
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(. . . and whether the eye goes toward its object or not . . . If no motion is involved, all objects should be equally visible.
-- Assertion; The eye is the instrument of looking.
-- Answer: When the eye looks at a form, does it look after traveling to the object or without doing so? In the first case, if when the eye looked at a form there were motion of traveling toward the object, it should take longer to see distant objects. If the eye perceived through contact, why would the eye ointment and spatula, which are extremely close, and very distant forms not be equally clear? It follows that they would be because of being perceived through contact. )
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L9: [b: Purposelessness if it travels to look at the form after it is seen]
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\ 314.
\ If the eye travels when the form is seen
\ Its movement is of no benefit.
\ Alternatively it is false to say
\ What it intends to view is ascertained.
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(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. )
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( -- If the eye traveled to the form after seeing it, its movement would be of no benefit, for though it does so to view the form, that form has already been seen. Alternatively, if it approached without seeing the form which it intended to view, it would be false to say it had definitely been seen, for it approaches what is to be viewed without seeing it, like a blind man. )
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L9: [c: Consequence that all objects would be seen if the eye by way of its own entity perceived form without traveling]
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\ ###
\ 315.
\ If the eye perceives without traveling
\ It would see all these phenomena.
\ For that which does not travel there is
\ Neither distance not obscuration.
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(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. )
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( -- To avoid these errors one might assert that it perceives form by way of its own entity without traveling. In that case the eye which stays here see all of these phenomena: the close, as well as the obscured and unobscured. For an eye which does not approach the object there should be no difference between close or distant, obscured or unobscured objects. )
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L9: [4: Consequence that the eye is an instrument of looking in relation to the eye]
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\ ###
\ 316.
\ If the nature of all things
\ First appears in themselves,
\ Why would the eye not
\ Be perceived by the eye itself?
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(i. e. There is no true direct perceiver because the eye cannot see itself: The old theories could not explain why the eye cannot see itself - it should if there were true direct perception. )
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(-- If the eye were an inherent instrument of perception, its function would not depend on a multitude of other factors. In that case it should also see itself. None of the factors involved in the process of perception -- neither objects, sense organs nor their related perception -- exist inherently or operate independently.
-- Just as the fragrance of the magnolia or blue lotus is first found at its source and afterwards, through contact, on a sesame seed and so forth, it is the way of all things that their nature first appears in themselves. Since it cannot relinquish its nature even in relation to itself, if it is an instrument of looking by way of its own entity, why does the eye not perceive itself? It follows that it should since the eye organ even with the eye as its object cannot give up its nature as an instrument of looking. Yet valid cognition negates that the eye perceives itself. Thus the subject, the eye, is not an instrument of looking at form by way of its own entity, because it does not look at itself. )
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L9: [5: Refuting a combination of three factors as the instrument of looking at visible form]
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\ ###
\ 317.
\ The eye does not have consciousness
\ And consciousness lacks that which looks.
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\ If form has neither of these,
\ How can they see form?
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(i. e. The theory of the contact between the three: the sense organ, the object perceived, and the consciousness of a sense, doesn't make sense when looked at in details. It should not be taken as an absolute truth; it is just another skillful means. Those three could not exist independently of each other nor be the same. They are also co-dependently arisen concepts. This is explained in more details in the Karikas. )
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(-- Assertion: The eye alone does not have the ability to view form. The form is seen in dependence upon a combination of three factors.
-- Answer: Since the eye is matter it is not conscious of the object. Consciousness is not that which looks at the object. The form, the objective condition, is neither that which looks nor consciousness. How can form be seen by way of its own entity through a combination of these three factors? It follows that it is not feasible because visible form which is none of them has no ability to see. )
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L7: [(2) Refuting truly existent auditory objects]
L8: [(a) Refutation by examining whether sound is a maker of noise]
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\ ###
\ 318.
\ If sound makes a noise as it travels
\ Why should it not be a speaker?
\ Yet if it travels noiselessly, how could
\ Awareness arise in relation to it?
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(i. e. The case of sounds: There is also no direct perception of sounds; sounds are also not existing on their own, inherently existing, independently of anything else. )
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(-- A similar investigation is then carried out in relation to sound and its perception. Does sound emit noise or travel silently?
-- Just as form cannot be looked at in terms of its own suchness, sound too cannot be listened to in this way.
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When sound is heard, does hearing occur because it approaches as an object of that which listens or not? In the first case, if it approaches as an object of auditory consciousness, does it do so emitting sound or silently? If it travels toward auditory consciousness making a noise as it travels, why is it not a speaker, since like Devadatta it travels, emitting sounds? If this is accepted, it follows that it would not be sound. Alternatively, if it travels toward auditory consciousness noiselessly, how could awareness focusing on the sound be produced, since no sound is emitted? )
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L8: [(b) Refutation by examining whether or not sound is apprehended through contact]
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\ ###
\ 319.
\ If sound is apprehended through contact,
\ What apprehends the beginning of sound?
\ If sound does not come alone,
\ How can it be apprehended in isolation?
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(i. e. The theory of the contact between the three: the sense organ, the object perceived, and the consciousness of a sense, doesn't make sense when looked at in details. It should not be taken as an absolute truth; it is just another skillful means. Those three could not exist independently of each other nor be the same. They are also co-dependently arisen concepts. This is explained in more details in the Karikas. )
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(-- Is it apprehended through contact or not?
-- Furthermore, if sound is apprehended through contact with the ear organ, what apprehends the beginning of sound before contact occurs? It follows that there is nothing with which to apprehend it, since neither the ear organ nor any other does so. If this is accepted, it follows that it would not be sound. Sound consists of nine substances and thus since it does not come alone, how can sound in isolation be apprehends? It follows that smell and so forth which are inseparably combined with it would also not be apprehended, for according to you they must, like the sound, have
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contact with the ear organ. ) .
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L8: [(c) Showing the flaws of this contention]
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\ ###
\ 320.
\ While sound is not heard, it is not sound.
\ It is impossible
\ For that which is not sound
\ Finally to turn into sound.
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(i. e. There is no inherently existing sounds: it is dependent on many factors among which is the mind perceiving it, and its accumulated karma. )
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(-- Question: What is wrong if the beginning of sound is not apprehended?
-- Answer: It would fail to be sound. Until it is heard it is not sound because, like smell, it is not the ear's object. It becomes sound when it is heard. If initially it was not sound but later became sound, it would follow that smell and so forth could do so too, but that is unacceptable with regard to permanent functional thing. Sutra says:
~ For instance, in dependence upon the strings and wood
~ And the hand's effort -- through these three together --
~ Sound is produced and issues from
~ Instruments like the vina and flute. ~.
~ When the wise investigate and think
~ From where it has come and where it has gone,
~ Searching in the main and intermediate directions,
~ They find no coming nor going of sound. ) .
L6: [b. Refuting apprehension by mental consciousness]
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\ ###
\ 321.
\ Without the sense organs what will mind
\ Do after it has gone?
\ If it were so, why would that which lives
\ Not always be without mind?
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(i. e. There is no truly existing consciousness: As for consciousnesses of the senses, that is also a false assumption. There could be no such thing as a truly existing consciousness of a sense. This is also another co-dependently arisen concept. Consciousness of an object is happening after having labeled the objects, after having received all the stimuli, comparing with memory patterns, assuming a lot by filtering them though accumulated karma . . . It is an illusion of something inherently existing based on accumulated karma. )
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(-- Does the mind travel toward objects or not? What is the mind's relationship to the senses?
-- Assertion: The mind apprehends objects after traveling to them.
-- Answer: That is incorrect. Auditory consciousness does not travel to the object along with the ear organ, for the organs remain in the body.
-- Even if mind, such as an auditory consciousness, approached its object without the sense organs, how could it perform the functions of listening, looking and so forth, since like a blind person it would lack the ability to perceive its objects? If it were so, why would that which lives, i. e. the self, not always be without mind? When one investigates in this way by means of reasoning, neither sense organs not consciousnesses have by way of their own entity the ability to apprehend objects. )
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\ ###
\ 322.
L4: [B. Refuting true existence of that which perceives objects] L5: [1. Defining the aggregate of recognition]
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\ An object already seen
\ Is perceived by mind like a mirage.
\ That which posits all phenomena
\ Is called the aggregate of recognition.
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(i. e. The Middle Way about the perceiver, perception and the objects of perception: There is no inherently existing perceive, no true direct perception, no objects of perception existing on their own; but that doesn't mean that they are all completely non-existent, or that everything is completely from the mind only. There is no need for inherently existing perceivers, perception, and objects of perception to support relative perception based on accumulated karma and conventions. Their emptiness doesn't deny completely perception, the teachings of dependent origination, the Wheel of life, samsara, and the possibility for Liberation. )
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(-- How does recognition, which identifies things, function if things do not exist inherently?
-- Objection: If sense organs and their objects do not exist inherently, the aggregate of recognition which discerns what is exclusive to them will be non-existent.
-- Answer: Although they do not exist when analyzed by reasoning, they are not conventionally non-existent (i. e. they exist conventionally, they are dependently arisen), for mental consciousness apprehends the exclusive aspects of an object such as a visible form which has already been perceived.
-- For instance, though a mirage does not contain even a drop of water, a recognition of water occurs.
Likewise that which perceives the exclusive aspects of an object, a mental factor positing the exclusive signs of all phenomena is called the aggregate of recognition. Phenomena are simply posited by recognition and do not exist by way of their own entity. )
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L5: [2. Refuting it true existence]
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\ ###
\ 323.
\ In dependence upon the eye and form
\ Mind arises like an illusion.
\ It is not reasonable to call
\ Illusory that which has existence.
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(i. e. Even the mind itself is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen: not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither - inseparability of appearances and emptiness, inseparability of the Two Truths -- dependent origination and emptiness. A flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. Like an illusion, but not a complete illusion. Dependent on the mind, but not from the mind only. )
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(-- In each case the conclusion is the same: nothing is findable nor can be pin-pointed under such analysis. Yet events, objects and perception occur, arising in dependence on a combination of many different factors.
-- Objection: If the aggregate of recognition does not exist inherently, it is impossible to posit phenomena.
-- Answer. There is no such error.
-- Even though it does not exist by way of its own entity, mind arises like a magical illusion in dependence upon the eye and visible form. Any phenomena whose existence is existence by way of its own entity cannot be called illusory, just as women who exist in the world are not called illusory. )
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L4: [C. Showing that lack of true existence is, like magic, a cause for amazement]
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\ ###
\ 324.
\ When there is nothing on earth
\ That does not amaze the wise,
\ Why think cognition by the senses
\ And suchlike are amazing.
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(i. e. The Middle Way: although things do not inherently exist, they are not completely not-existent (nor both together, nor neither). Their true way of existence is beyond all conceptualization, but meanwhile it is useful to see them as: empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen and functional. Those two - dependent origination and emptiness - are not in real opposition, separate, different, nor are they one. They are said to be non-dual in expressions
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like "inseparability of appearances and emptiness", "the Union of The Two Truths", "inseparability of the three kayas or of the three Gems", "the need to combine method to wisdom", etc. Seeing this is true Nirvana. But, here, non-dual means: not two, not one. It points toward transcendence of the duality by directly seeing it real nature: not accepting it, not rejecting it. )
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(-- Assertion: It is amazing to claim that the sense organs can in no way whatever apprehend objects and that visual consciousness is produced in dependence upon the eye and visible form.
-- Answer: That alone is no cause for amazement.
-- Although when analyzed by reasoning a sprout and so forth neither comes into existence from a seed which has ceased nor from one which has not ceased, [sprouts are produced in dependence upon seeds]. When to the wise there is nothing on earth which is not as amazing as magic, why should one think that recognition of objects by sense consciousnesses which do not have true existence and such-like are amazing, for this applies equally to everything. )
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L3: [II. Showing that emptiness of true existence is like magical illusions and so forth]
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\ ###
\ 325.
\ The firebrand's ring are magical creations,
\ Dreams, illusions, and the moon in water,
\ Mists, echoes, mirages, clouds
\ And worldly existence are alike.
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(i. e. There is no direct or objective perception, everything is like an illusion: Everything is merely imputed by the mind, but not from the mind only. Like figures seen on a cloud, like swirls on the surface of the ocean. All empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen and functional. All perceptions are dependent on accumulated karma. )
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( -- Thus all dependently arising phenomena are like the ring formed by a firebrand which is whirled quickly. Though the woman created through meditative stabilization and the dream body do not have true existence, they act as causes for erroneous attachment to the self. Although the illusory maiden conjured by a magician does not have true existence, she confuses the mind. Similarly the moon in the water, mists and echoes resounding from mountain clefts and caves give rise to a distorted perception of them as they appear to be. A mirage causes mistaken perception, and clouds in the distance seem like mountains. Worldly existence consisting of environments and living beings, while empty of inherent existence, is able to function. Understand that it is like these analogies.
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Sutra says:
~ 1. In a young girl's dream she sees
~ A youth arrive then die, and feels
~ Happy when he arrives, unhappy when he dies.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 2. Those who conjure illusions create forms
~ Of various kinds -- horses, elephants and chariots.
~ They are not at all as they appear.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 3. The reflection of the moon shining
~ In the sky appears in a clear pool,
~ Yet the moon does not enter the water.
~ Understand the nature of all phenomena is like this. ~.
~ 4. Echoes arise in dependence upon
~ Caves, mountain, forts and river gorges.
~ Understand all products are like this.
~ Phenomena are all like illusions and mirages. ~.
~ 5. A person who is tormented by thirst
~ In summer at noon -- that transmigrator
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~ Sees mirages as a body of water.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 6. Although a mirage contains no water
~ Confused beings want to drink it.
~ Unreal water cannot be drunk.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 7. Instantaneously in a cloudless sky
~ A circle of clouds appears,
~ But try to find from where they came --
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 8. Like mirages and smell-eaters' cities,
~ Like magical illusions and like dreams,
~ Objects of meditation are empty of a real entity.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ) .
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
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\ ###
\ Thus in the illusory city of the three false worlds
\ Manipulated by the puppeteer of karmic action
\ The smell-eater maiden performs her illusory dance.
\ Amazing that desire should chase a mirage!
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(i. e. It is about directly seeing the real nature of the three inseparable worlds: All the objects of the three worlds (desire, form, formless; or body, speech and mind; or the seven consciousnesses, the alayavijnana and the neutral alaya) are empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. There is no direct perception of anything. All perceptions are dependent on accumulated karma. Everything in samsara is like an illusion. -- Our goal is to follow a gradual path of more and more subtle methods and wisdom that will permit us to directly realize the real nature of the objects of the three realms, and their inseparability. This threesome purification of our body, speech and mind is what can lead us to the inseparable trikaya of a Buddha. Once we directly realize the real non-dual nature of our own mind, and thus of everything in the three realms, then automatically all attachments and fears are dropped off, no more karma is produced and we are free from any accumulated karma because we see its real nature. Then seeing the non- duality of everything, everything is seen as pure, the Buddha-nature is directly seen and it is true Nirvana. )
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\ ###
\ This is the thirteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects.
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This concludes the commentary on the thirteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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L2: [Chapter 14 - Refuting Extreme Conceptions [of inherent existence and complete non-existence . . . ] -
The perfection of wisdom: non-duality of dependent origination and emptiness - P. 265]
-- SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF EXTREME CONCEPTIONS. -- Refuting extreme conceptions.
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L3: [I. Proving that functional things are empty of inherent existence] L4: [A. Brief exposition]
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\ ###
\ 326.
\ IF A THING DID NOT DEPEND
\ ON ANYTHING ELSE AT ALL
\ IT WOULD BE SELF-ESTABLISHED,
\ BUT SUCH A THING EXISTS NOWHERE.
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(i. e. Everything in the three realms is dependently arisen, thus everything is empty of inherent existence. There is no exception at all - not even for the permanent basic elements described in the Abhidharma, not even for karma, dependent origination or emptiness itself, not even for the Buddha-nature, not even for the a primary awareness. Dependently arisen means dependent on its causes and conditions, on its parts or characteristics, on the mind perceiving or labeling it, on accumulated karma. Empty of inherent existence doesn't mean complete non-existence; that would be jumping to the other extreme: nihilism. Nor does it mean both existence and non-existence together (dualism), nor neither existence nor non-existence (monism). Everything is merely imputed by the mind, but still not from the mind only. The Middle Way between all extremes consists of staying away from all extreme conceptions, thinking that any view is the absolute final truth, or rejecting them all thinking they are all useless (that is also an extreme). )
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(-- The fourteenth chapter continues by refuting extreme conceptions of reified existence and total non-existence. If phenomena were inherently existent, they should be independent and findable when sought by a reasoning consciousness analyzing their final mode of existence, but they are neither. Emphasis is placed on the fact that ultimate or inherent existence is being refuted, and that this should not be misinterpreted to mean that things do not have valid conventional existence. The reason of not being inherently one or many is first presented concisely and then applied to refute non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist contentions, in order to establish that neither what is imputed nor its basis of imputation has true existence.
-- Question: If, like the ring formed by a firebrand and so forth, worldly existence, because of being dependent arising, does not exist inherently, what has inherent existence?
-- Answer: Not the slightest thing has inherent existence.
-- Anything existing by way of its own entity would not rely on anything else at all, but not the least thing is independent or exists without relying on something else. If anything existed inherently, independence would be established as its nature when examined by the reasoning which investigates the ultimate, yet this does not exist anywhere. A mode of existence of phenomena not merely posited by nominal convention is known as independent existence, existence by way of their entity, existence by way of their character, inherent existence and true existence. This clearly indicates the object of negation through whose refutation there is no focus for conceptions of true existence. Since Candrakirti's commentary repeatedly mentions qualifying the object of negation when refuting fabrications of true existence, one should not deprecate the Madhyamika view. )
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L4: [B. Extensive explanation]
L5: [1. Refuting a truly existent composite by examining the four possibilities [same, different, one owning the other or vice versa]]
L6: [a. Exposition]
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\ ###
\ 327.
\ "The form is a pot" -- they are not one.
\ The pot that has form is not separate.
\ The pot does not have form,
\ Not does the form have a pot.
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Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
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(i. e. Interdependence of an object and its basic characteristics or parts: We usually assume there is a real object existing on its own out there, and that it has real characteristics that we can directly perceived. By analyzing the relations between the object and its characteristics with these assumptions we find that it turns into complete absurdity. Taking the pot and its form as example, we find that a pot cannot first exist on its own and then have a form that could also exist on its own. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. So there is no inherently existing (independent) object or characteristics. Everything is dependently arisen, thus empty of inherent existence. )
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(The pot and the form, not one, not separate:
-- The text first examine whether the pot and its constituents, like visual form, are inherently one or different. If they were inherently one, there should be a pot wherever there is a visual form. Alternatively, if the pot possessed visual form as something inherently different from itself, the two would be unrelated, and we should be able to see a pot without necessarily seeing its form.
-- If the composite known as "pot" exists by way of its own entity, are the visible form and the pot one or different?
-- In the first case it follows that the pot in the statement "The form is a pot" are not inherently one, otherwise there would be a pot wherever there was a visible form. One might think that the pot which is something distinct from visible form possessed form the way Devadatta possesses a cow, as something separate. However it follows that the pot which has form is not inherently separate from the form, otherwise it would be apprehensible independently of its form. The pot does not have form as something apart which depends upon it, nor does the form have a pot dependent upon it, like a dish and its contents, because neither exists inherently. )
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L6: [b. Explanation]
L7: [(1) Refuting other sectarians]
L8: [(a) Refuting the characteristics]
L9: [1: Refuting the substantial entity as basis for a distinct generality]
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\ ###
\ 328.
\ Since the two are seen to have dissimilar
\ Characteristics, if the pot is separate
\ From existence, why would existence
\ Not also be separate from the pot?
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(i. e. The case of an object and existence: Another example of an object and its basic characteristics: "existence". A pot cannot exist or not and then have the characteristic of "existence" added to it. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other.