No More Learning

3 This summary agrees closely with a formula drawn up by Sir Reginald Craddock,
then Home Member of the Government of India, in 1916, printed at p. 262, Cd. 123 of
1919.


## p. 589 (#629) ############################################

DECLARATION OF 1917
589
a
а
Sir Austen Chamberlain, who was then secretary of state, was
sceptical of the value of these proposals. He was not prepared to be
more precise in the matter of a formula “than to avow an intention
to foster the gradual development of free institutions with a view to ,
self-government”. In regard to details he criticised the increase in
the number of elected members of a legislative council without giving
them any real control. While discussion of the method of advance was
remitted to committees in India and in England for examination, the
question of a formula was pursued. Mr E. S. Montagu, who had
succeeded Sir Austen Chamberlain, produced a draft resembling his
predecessor's views, and this was redrafted by Lord Curzon in its
final form as follows:
The policy of His Majesty's government, with which the Government of India
are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every
branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing
institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government
in India as an integral part of the British Empire.
The formula continues with a statement that progress can be achieved
only by successive stages, controlled by the British government and
the Government of India, which must be guided by the co-operation
received, and the extent to which it is found that confidence can be
reposed. Immediately after the announcement of this policy in
parliament, a controversy arose as to the interpretation of the phrase
responsible government". Lord Curzon and other statesmen had
always accepted Lord Morley's assertion that the scheme of 1909 was
not intended to lead to a parliamentary form of government in India,
though they feared it would have that effect. A year later, when it was
pointed out to Lord Curzon that his formula led in that direction he
was shocked, but the conclusion was irrésistible. Lord Morley himself,
at a later stage, when the new proposals had been developed, saw no
objection to them on this account, and admitted that his disclaimer
had been due to the difficulty of obtaining the consent of the House
of Lords to his own scheme. 2
While these discussions took place privately at Simla and in
Whitehall, Indian politicians were drafting their own proposals.
A society known as the Madras parliament drafted a “Common-
wealth of India" act which suggested the constitution in provinces
of legislative assemblies. Three members were to be elected in each
district by persons qualified to vote in elections for local bodies; each
chamber of commerce and trades association was to elect two mem-
bers, and landed proprietors paying land-revenue not less than
1 Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, ii, 167.
See letters to The Ťimes, 3 November, 1928 (Sir R. Burn), 9 November (Sir Theodore
Morison) and 17 November (Sir R. Burn).
3 This was connected with Mrs Besant's Home Rule League (c' ap. xxxii, p. 584),
which subsequently split into three, vide questions 1439, 1692 and 2142, evidence before
Joint Select Committce.
3


## p. 590 (#630) ############################################

590
THE REFORMS OF 1919
Rs. 250 were to send six members. Considerable minorities were to
be represented in proportion to their number. The parliament of
India was to consist of 200 members elected half by members of the
provincial assemblies, and half to represent the landed, trading,
commercial, financial and industrial associations, with a member
from each university. Separate representation was to be provided for
important minorities. After a period of ten years a more democratic
system was to be devised. A cabinet of ten members was to include
five appointed by the viceroy and five elected by parliament. Nine-
teen of the elected members of the Indian legislative council made
similar suggestions in October, 1916. 1 In November representatives
of the Muslim League and the congress came to an agreement at
Calcutta, which was confirmed by meetings of both bodies at Luck-
now a month later. This scheme provided a legislative council of 125
in a major province, or fifty to seventy-five in a minor province, four-
fifths of the members to be elected directly by voters on a wide
franchise. The imperial council was to include 150 members with the
same proportion elected, partly by the elected members of the pro-
vincial councils and partly direct. Except in regard to certain
specified heads of income and expenditure which were reserved as
imperial, the provincial councils were to have full control, though
the imperial council could deal with matters in regard to which
uniform legislation for the whole of India was desirable, and a vague
general power of supervision and superintendence was reserved for
the Government of India. At the head of each province there was to
be appointed a governor who should not ordinarily be a member of
a permanent service. Half of his executive council were to be Indians
elected by the elected members of the provincial council. All legisla-
tive councils were to elect their own president. There was to be more
freedom in the putting of supplementary questions, and motions for
adjournment were to be permitted. Resolutions passed were to bind
the government unless vetoed by the governor in council, and if passed
again after an interval of not less than a year were to be absolutely
binding. The most striking feature of the scheme was, however, an
agreement that Muslims should be represented through special
electorates in certain specified proportions, which substantially ex-
ceeded their share of the population in provinces where they were in
a minority. This was subject to a proviso that they should not, às
they did in the Morley-Minto scheme, also have an opportunity
of obtaining seats in electorates other than their own. Another
qualification was that opposition by three-quarters of the members
of either community (Muslim or non-Muslim) to a bill, a clause of
a bill, or a resolution affecting that community would block it com-
pletely.
A further contribution to the attempts to solve the problem was due
Speeches and documents on Indian Policy, 11, 116.


## p. 591 (#631) ############################################

ROUND TABLE SCHEME
591
a
to the “Round Table" group of students of politics, some of whom
had previously played a part in bringing about the union of South
Africa in 1909. When war broke out in 1914 they had been examining
the question “how a British citizen in the dominions can acquire the
same control of foreign policy as one domiciled in the British Isles”.
In 1915 they began to examine the case of India, and felt that Indians
could not be invested with responsibility for imperial policy until
they had some responsible share in their own government; and early
in 1916 the late Sir William Duke, who had been a member of council
a
in Bengal, and was then on the Council of India, drew up a note as
a basis of discussion. In that he suggested that certain departments
and functions might be administered by some form of responsible as
distinct from merely administrative government. Mr L. Curtis, a
member of the group, arrived in India in the autumn of 1916, and
for a year was engaged actively by correspondence and conference in
examining and testing this suggestion. Though his intention of forming
groups representing all shades of opinion to study the problem was
frustrated by the malicious distortion of a phrase in a private letter
which had been abstracted and published, his studies attracted much
notice. A recent writer has criticised the use of the term "responsible'
in the declaration of August, 1917, as vague and capable of various
interpretations. Mr Curtis pointed out that an alternative expression
‘self-government” was used in India in at least four senses, and early
in 1917 in a published letter to the people of India he expressed his
belief in a policy of the gradual conferment of responsible government,
which he defined as meaning that the final authority in Indian affairs
will have been transferred to an Indian parliament. His proposal for
the immediate future was to begin by constituting elective assemblies
with an executive consisting of members able to command a majority
in the assembly. As existing provinces had taken shape merely
through administrative convenience and contained very large popu-
lations often speaking different languages, and even subject to different
laws, he suggested that smaller, more homogeneous areas should be
carved out, in each of which a responsible government would be
formed. Only certain functions of government, for example, public
works, primary education, local self-government, etc. , would be
entrusted to these bodies, and the rest would remain under the control
of the old provincial governments, to be transferred gradually and
not necessarily at the same rate in all areas. The general outlines of
this scheme were commended in an address from a number of in-
fluential Europeans and Indians to the viceroy and secretary of state,
towards the close of 1917. It was, however, not approved by the
congress, which then met at Calcutta and reaffirmed its desire for
the plan it had passed a year before, with complete provincial
autonomy and half the executive councillors of the viceroy elected.
1 Sir R. Craddock, The Dilemma in India, p. 169.


## p. 592 (#632) ############################################

592
THE REFORMS OF 1919
The resolution urged strongly that while this first instalment should
be granted at once, the statute to be passed should also lay down an
early time-limit within which full responsible government should be
granted, without even the slender precautions included in the
congress plan.
Instead of appointing a royal commission to take evidence and
draft proposals for carrying out the reform briefly announced in
August, 1917, the government deputed Mr E. S. Montagu, secretary
of state, with a small committee (the Earl of Donoughmore, Sir
William Duke, Mr Bhupendranath Basu and Mr Charles Roberts,
M. P. ), to consult the Indian Government and politicians. Such a
method has the obvious defect that it prevents the public discussion
of matters which are complicated and benefit by ventilation, and
criticism, among men of widely different temperaments. On the
other hand it produces a scheme more quickly, and, the ground
having been prepared, a report was signed by Lord Chelmsford and
Mr Montagu within six months from the date on which the latter
arrived in India. It contains an admirable account of political con-
ditions in India, coloured in parts by optimistic hopes of the effects
of democratic experiments on a collection of people divided by race,
sect and religion, who from time immemorial had known no method
of rule but autocracy before the cautious association of Indian with
British legislators which has been described. The report analysed the
meaning of responsible institutions as Mr Curtis had done, and sug-
gested that the first step to be taken was to introduce partial responsi-
bility in the provincial governments. The Government of India was
to remain, as it had been hitherto, responsible through the secretary
of state to the British parliament, though measures were suggested to
give greater opportunities for independent criticism of its actions and
projects. In many respects the congress scheme was held to be
unsuitable. Full provincial autonomy was premature. Election of
members of the executive council by the legislative council was
without any reputable precedent, and their responsibility to the
electors in constituencies could be secured in other ways. The proposal
to give to the councils complete control over provincial finance and
legislation was impossible until the executive was entirely responsible
to them. To make a government amenable to resolutions amounted
to controlling the executive by direct orders on points of detail, and
would lead to confusion.
If responsibility in provincial governments were to be clear from
the beginning, two methods were possible, excluding the congress
scheme, which demanded a complete grant. Mr Curtis's scheme set
up legislatures with executives responsible to them which were to deal
with specified functions in the areas under their control, other func-
tions being performed by the old provincial governments. The report
objected to this as likely to lead to excessive friction and to prejudice.


## p. 593 (#633) ############################################

MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT
593
It therefore suggested that the head of each province, who was to be
a governor in all cases, should have an executive council consisting
of two members, one of whom should invariably be an Indian. The
governor in council would deal with certain reserved functions of the
government. Other subjects would be transferred to the governor
acting with one or more ministers chosen from the elected members
of the legislative council. It was not intended that in relation to his
ministers the governor should at once occupy the position of a purely
constitutional governor, bound to accept their decision, but he was
expected to refuse assent to their proposals only when the conse-
quences of acquiescence would be serious. A hope was expressed that
the executive would cultivate the habit of associated deliberation, and
would present a united front. Such discussion might in fact be com-
pulsory as a decision on either a reserved or a transferred subject
could affect the part of the government which was not concerned with
the decision. A list attached to the report suggested subjects which
might be transferred, the most important being taxation for provincial
purposes, local self-government, education (except university), medical
and sanitary, agriculture, public works (except major irrigation
works), and excise.
In addition to this vital change in executive government, the report
suggested large increases in the non-official membership of the legis-
lative councils, with direct elections wherever possible. Separate
(communal) representation was condemned as inconsistent with
democratic government, though it was to be tolerated in the special
case of Muslims. Lord Morley's disclaimer of an intention to pave
the way for a parliamentary system in India was haltingly explained
as due to his insistence on the sovereignty of the British parliament
and his acceptance of Lord Minto's advice that only limited con-
stituencies and indirect franchises were possible, and it was admitted
that the reforms of 1909 moved towards the stage at which a question
of responsible government was bound to present itself. More freedom
to local bodies was recommended, and parliament was warned that
the grant of greater freedom to governments in India would involve
a relaxation of its own control.
Published in England and India in July, 1918, this report drew
much criticism. The moderate politicians and the big land-holders
were the only sections to approve of the dual principle in provincial
governments. The former also asked that the same system should be
introduced in the Government of India, and the latter claimed special
representation for themselves, and that further progress should be
directed to changing the status of leading land-holders to that of ruling
chiefs. Extreme politicians held by the congress scheme, and desired
full responsibility in the provinces, with the governor a purely con-
stitutional official in relation to his ministers. Official opinion which
was strongly opposed to the system of dyarchy (a terın revived to
OHI VI
38


## p. 594 (#634) ############################################

594
THE REFORMS OF 1919
apply to the dual form of provincial government) has often been
misrepresented as a reluctance to give up place and power. It was
due to the natural pride of a body of men in charge of a complicated
machine of government to the perfecting of which they had devoted
the best part of their lives, and which they honestly believed to be
endangered if its working were abruptly transferred to inexperienced
hands. Even in the transition stage they believed that the proposals
would establish an oligarchy which would not in the most favourable
conditions work smoothly with the official side. The heads of pro-
vinces, some of whom had severely criticised dyarchy, were summoned
to Delhi to formulate an alternative scheme, and five of them in
January, 1919, signed a minute formulating it. On the vital question
of dyarchy the opinion was expressed that the report had improperly
emphasised the doctrine of responsibility, and that it was more correct
to put an increased association of Indians in the foreground, as could
be inferred from the wording of the announcement of August, 1917,
The alternative suggested was an executive council with an equal
number of officials and non-officials, the latter to be selected from
elected (in the Panjab also from nominated) members. There was to
be no division of functions, and government would thus be unitary,
it being left to the governor to distribute portfolios among the members
of his executive council. Such a scheme, as was admitted in the
minute, fixed no responsibility on individual members. It provided
for later expansion only by increasing the number of functions en-
trusted to non-official members, by increasing the number of the
latter class, and by gradual disuse of the arbitrary powers of over-
ruling his council entrusted to the governor in both schemes during
a transition period. The crux of the problem was thus the meaning
of the announcement. Two heads of provinces (Lord Ronaldshay and
Sir E. A. Gait) felt that to reject the wider interpretation in the report
would be treated as a breach of faith and therefore accepted it as the
most reasonable scheme which had been suggested. Both the Govern-
ment of Indial and the home government, which had issued the
declaration, held strongly that it was essential to begin the fixing of
responsibility, and preferred the dual scheme of the report to the
alternatives suggested.
Vague statements in ancient texts have sometimes been relied on
to show that Indians were not unused to personal representation by
election. Among the lower castes of Hindus social and religious
questions affecting a particular caste, or more often a section of it, are
frequently decided by a small popular assembly of the caste or section.
Headmen of villages, or parts of villages, who in North India
collected the land-revenue and arranged for the necessary expenses,
were also chosen by the people themselves. But the matters thus
arranged were circumscribed and of a personal rather than a civic
1 Cd. 203 of 1919, p. 1.


## p. 595 (#635) ############################################

JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE
595
nature. The caste council is judicial, and the headman the managing
director of a company. In the various systems of government which
the British found working in the eighteenth century, there was no
element of popular government in the occidental sense. Local self-
government had since made a beginning, and the direct election in
a few constituencies under the Morley-Minto scheme, especially those
of Muslims, had given a little experience. In accordance with a sug-
gestion in the report a special committee, presided over by Lord
Southborough, toured in India to enquire into the framing of con-
stituencies and the settlement of franchises. Proposals were placed
before this committee by the local governments, based on the
material conditions of the population and on the facilities for polling
which varied widely. In rural tracts the object was to get the sub-
stantial well-to-do peasant as a voter, and the franchise varied from
province to province or even within a province. For certain classes,
and in particular the lowest castes, it was found impossible to arrange
by election, and one limitation on the franchise was the need for
framing it so that votes could be polled by the staff available.
A bil embodying the scheme of the report was introduced and
examined by a joint select committee of both houses of parliament
from July to October, 1919, presided over by Lord Selborne. It
examined 1 about seventy witnesses representing various shades of
opinion and thus to some extent remedied the previous defect in
publicity. In a report of great value the committee pressed strongly
the argument that a generous opportunity must be given to the people
of India of learning
the actual business of government and of showing,
by their conduct of it, to some future parliament, that the time had
come for further extension of power. The act was quickly passed and
became law on 23 December, 1919. 8 It changed the status of the
heads of the United Provinces, the Panjab, Bihar and Orissa, the
Central Provinces and Assam from that of lieutenant-governor to
governor, and provided an executive council for each. Though no
change was made in the maximum number of members admissible
(four) it was understood that ordinarily there would be only two, and
it was provided that only one instead of two must have been for at
least twelve years in the service of the crown in India, so that the other
could be an Indian. Responsibility was partially introduced in the
provinces, as suggested in the report, by giving the governor power
to appoint from among the elected members of his legislative council
one or more ministers, to hold office during his pleasure. Rules could
be made dividing the functions of government for two purposes. One
was the distinction of subjects into “central”, which were controlled
· Cd. 97 (1919) and Cd. 203 (1919).
• Lord Sydenham, a member of the committee, has pointed out (My Working Life,
P: 370) that no Indian who could not speak English was called, so that the rural and würhing
classes, the land-holders and fighting races were not heard.
og and so Geo. V, c. 101.
>
3-2


## p. 596 (#636) ############################################

596
THE REFORMS OF 1919
>
by the Government of India, and "provincial”, while the other
divided provincial subjects into “transferred”, which were placed in
the control of the governor acting with his ministers, and “reserved”,
which were to be disposed of by the governor in council. In the
reports both of Mr Montagu and Lord Chelmsford (para. 221) and
of the joint select committee (clause 6) the greatest possible stress was
laid on the necessity for joint deliberation by the two parts of a
provincial government. However careful the separation of trans-
ferred and reserved subjects may be, some overlapping is inevitable.
Thus a restrictive policy of excise (transferred) may raise serious
questions of law and order (reserved). Even where there is no such
intimate contact, free discussion between experienced officials and
ministers in close relation with the elected members of the legislative
council was likely to lead to accommodation. Where it was doubtful
into which category a topic fell the decision was to be made in
accordance with rules. After discussion, however, the order issued
was to bear on its face a clear indication showing that it was the
decision of the governor in council or of the governor acting with
his ministers. So far as public action in the debates of the legislative
council was concerned, the select committee advised that members
of the executive council should act together, and similarly ministers
should act together. Where both sections of the government were in
agreement members and ministers should be free to speak and vote
for each other's proposals. There should, however, be no compulsion
on a member or minister to support by speech or vote a proposal
made by the section to which he did not belong, if he disagreed
with it.
Important changes were made in the matter of supply and legisla-
tion. As explained elsewhere,1 an Indian budget at this period did not
require an annual finance bill as in England, because rates of taxation
were altered, especially so far as they affected provincial revenues,
only at comparatively long intervals. Discussion in the legislative
council was thus chiefly concerned with a proper allocation of
existing revenues. From the enlargement of the popular element in
these provircial bodies, larger demands for expenditure, especially on
the transferred subjects, were inevitable, and two problems arose for
decision. The first was the question whether provincial revenues
should be definitely allocated between the reserved and transferred
sides, forming what was called in the later discussions “the separate
purse”, or whether the purse should remain joint, and the needs of
each side of the government decided annually. Mr Montagu and
Lord Chelmsford favoured the latter method (para. 256) while the
Government of India were strongly in favour of a separate purse, such
as had been familiar in India as between the central and provincial
governments. Indian non-official witnesses, before the joint select
· P. 572, supra.
Cd. 123, p. 28.


## p. 597 (#637) ############################################

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
597
committee, preferred the joint purse and it was suggested 1 that this
was because they hoped that through it the ministers could exercise
more influence over the reserved subjects. Briefly the question was
whether greater acerbity would be caused by a public division of
funds for a term of years, or by an annual discussion within the
government. Faced by this difficulty the committee recommended a
joint purse, holding that ordinarily common sense and reasonableness
would bring about agreement. If the governor at any time found
serious disagreement between his executive council and the ministers,
he was to have power to make an allocation. This, however, was to
be made, not by a division of sources of revenue, but by apportioning
definite fractions of the total receipts and the balance. The committee
emphasised a warning that the budget should not be capable of being
used by ministers or a majority in the legislative council to direct the
policy on reserved subjects. The decision in favour of a joint purse
was unfortunate. Indian popular opinion has always regarded the
treasury as containing unlimited funds, which would be made
available if the jealousy of its guardians permitted, and the sense of
responsibility would have been quickened by a definite provision of
sources of income, with the knowledge that, if they did not suffice,
fresh taxation would be necessary.
The second problem was that of the responsibility for new taxation.
In the report (para. 257) it was suggested that after any contribution
payable to the Government of India had been set aside, and full
provision made for the reserved subjects, the balance should be at the
disposal of the ministers. If it were not sufficient, the onus would lie
on ministers to suggest new taxation. The Government of India
showed that this might bring about the impossible situation that
ministers would have to propose taxation which was really required
for expenditure on reserved subjects although they did not approve
of it, the alternative being that the transferred subjects in which they
were deeply interested would not receive the funds they needed. This
was, in fact, one of the chief arguments in favour of the separate purse.
The matter was not discussed by the select. committee which appears
to have covered it by expressing general confidence in good will, and
the recommendation that power should be taken to make a division
of funds in case of need.
There remains the question, how the executive government of a
province was to secure the passing of legislation or the voting of
supplies which it considered necessary for thc, reserved services.
Various alternatives are discussed in the joint report (paras. 247-53),
such as the passing by the Indian legislature of bills rejected by a
provincial legislature, or the making of ordinances by the governor-
general, alone or in council, or by the provincial governor. All these
were rejected as savouring too much of the autocratic methods which
1 Question 7002.
2. Clause 1.


## p. 598 (#638) ############################################

598
THE REFORMS OF 1919
were being superseded. Where a governor had doubts of his ability
to get through the council a bill dealing with a reserved subject which
was of importance, he was to certify that it was a measure “essential
to the discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquillity of
the province or any part thereof, or for the discharge of his responsi-
bility for the reserved subjects". Such a bill after introduction and
discussion would be automatically referred to a grand committee
numbering 40 to 50 per cent. of the council and partly elected by the
elected members of the council. The governor would have power to
Dominate a bare majority, exclusive of himself, but not more than
two-thirds of the nominated members could be officials. Although
most of the governments in India approved of this scheme, it was
strongly opposed by the government of Madras which pointed out
that the non-official nominees of the governor would be subject to
strong pressure by opponents of a measure and would be in a most
difficult and invidious position.
It suggested that where a bill of
vital importance was rejected or modified, the government should
have power to return it to the legislative council for reconsideration,
and subsequently the governor might set aside amendments which
were not acceptable to him and declare the bill to have passed. The
late Lord Carmichael, who had been governor of Victoria, and of two
presidencies in India, strongly supported this method of fixing re-
sponsibility on the governor personally, instead of using the obnoxious
official bloc with additional nominees of uncertain stability, and the
joint committee accepted the change (clause 13). Similarly it sug-
gested that the governor should have power to restore a provision for
a reserved subject in the budget which the council had reduceu and
which the governor considered essential for proper administration
(clause 11). And it recommended that the governor, if so advised
by his ministers, would be justified in asking the council to review
an alteration in the provision for a transferred subject.
In the Government of India no measure of responsibility was
introduced. The executive council consisted of six ordinary members
and the commander-in-chief. Of the ordinary members three must
have had ten years' service under the crown in India and one must
be a barrister of five years' standing. The joint report suggested the
abolition of these statutory limitations, to secure elasticity, and also
the early appointment of a second Indian as member, which was
possible without legislation. The joint committee removed the limit
on the total numbers, retained the official qualifications for at least
three members, and widened the legal qualification by making it
include lawyers who were pleaders of a High Court in India. It
also thought that not less than three members of council should be
Indians.
In addition to their proposals for admitting Indians more freely to
i Cd. 123, p. 163.
· Questions 5689-95.
.
a
1


## p. 599 (#639) ############################################

COUNCIL OF STATE
599
the executive government, the authors of the joint report desired to
provide greater opportunities for discussion in a popular assembly.
They attached considerable importance to this as paving the way for
social legislation which might impinge on religious matters, and in
the past had always been undertaken with reluctance by the alien
government. With this object they suggested an enlargement of the
legislative council (now called the legislative assembly) and the addi-
tion of a new chamber called the Council of State. As two-thirds of
the former body was to be elected, it was necessary in the Government
of India also to provide for the case where vital government measures
or supply had been denied. It was proposed to do this through the
council of state, which was to include only twenty-one elected members
out of fifty, with officials up to twenty-five and four non-official
nominated members. Government bills were ordinarily to be intro-
duced and passed in the assembly and then go to the council of state.
Amendments made by the latter which were not accepted by the
assembly were to be discussed by a joint session of both houses. If
the assembly refused leave to the introduction of a bill, or rejected
one, the governor-general in council might certify. that the bill was
essential to the interests of peace, order or good government. It vould
then be introduced in the council of state, and, when passed there,
become law without further reference to the assembly. Lastly to save
time in an emergency a certified bill might be passed into law in the
council of state alone, and merely reported to the assembly.
While provincial councils were to pass budgets, subject to the
power of the governor to restore grants for reserved subjects, the
imperial legislature was to be empowered only to pass resolutions
which were not binding, though they would have enhanced significance
from the wider representation in the assembly compared with the
former legislative council.
These devices appeared to the joint committee as objectionable
as the similar' methods proposed in the provinces. It increased
popular representation in the council of state and proposed that it
should be a real second chamber (clause 18), while reserving powers
of certification, for both finance and legislation, to the governor-
general in council where necessary for the discharge of his responsi-
bility (clauses 25 and 26).
The legislative councils as framed by the act contained more than
twice as many members as those of the old councils, the number
ranging from 11 to 125 in the four larger provinces and from fifty.
three to ninety-eight in four others. These numbers might be enlarged
by rules, subject to the provision that not more than 20 per cent
should be official members and at least 70 per cent should be elected.
The council of state contained sixty members of whom not more than
a third might be officials, while the legislative assembly had 140, of
whom 100 were elected and twenty-six officials, and, if the number


## p. 600 (#640) ############################################

600
THE REFORMS OF 1919
was increased, the same proportions should be maintained. With
these increases in numbers and responsibilities, it was decided that
the governor-general or head of a province should no longer preside
over his legislature. The governor-general appointed a president of
the council of state from among its members. Presidents of the
legislative assembly and the provincial councils were first appointed
by the governor-general or governor for a term of four years, but
were afterwards to be elected by the members. The recommendation
of the joint committee that the first president of the legislative assembly
should be a person “qualified by experience of the House of Commons
and a knowledge of parliamentary procedure, precedents and con-
ventions" (clause 20) was accepted, and a similar appointment was
made in the legislative council of Bengal.
Most of the proposals of the franchise committee were accepted by
the joint committee. It demurred, however, to the suggestion that
non-officials members of both the council of state and legislative
assembly should be elected by the same group of persons and it
preferred direct election to the latter instead of indirect (clauses 18
and 19). Separate (communal) representation was condemned in the
joint report as contrary to the principles of responsible government,
without precedent except in a few minor states, and bad because it
encouraged members of a state to think of themselves primarily as
citizens of any smaller unit than itself, and tended to stereotype
existing relations (paras. 227–9). Reluctantly the authors acquiesced
in the principle so far as Muslims were concerned, because of the
arrangements made in 1909 (which they regretted), the agreement
between political leaders in the Lucknow Congress of 1916, and
because they knew that Muslims were anxious about their position
under a system of popular government (para. 231). Though history
affords few precedents for such a system, it has many to show that
minorities not so protected have remained for long periods with no
representation. Besides the Muslims other communities urged their
claims. In Madras it was shown that Brahmans, who numbered only
3 per cent. of the population, had almost monopolised representation
and occupied three times as many of the higher posts in the services
as other Hindus and more than all other communities together. The
select committee recommended that seats should be reserved for the
non-Brahman Hindus in Madras and for the Marathas in the Bombay
Presidency who had also failed to secure representation. They also
suggested that rural areas and the depressed classes should receive a
larger share than was allotted by Lord Southborough's committee.
Female suffrage, which they rightly pointed out went deep into the
social system and susceptibilities of India, was left to be decided by
the legislative councils when they were constituted. 2 Disqualifications
1 The rules drawn up in the Panjab also reserved seats for Sikhs in that province.
: Female suffrage was gradually voted by the councils.


## p. 601 (#641) ############################################

POSITION OF SECRETARY OF STATE
601
(as has been shown in chapter XXXI) had been a source of much
discussion, and their application to individuals had caused much
soreness, while exemption had been an invidious task. It was now
proposed that dismissal from government service should no longer be
a bar, but that a criminal conviction entailing a sentence of more than
six months' imprisonment should disqualify for five years from the
date of the expiration of the sentence. As suggested by the franchise
committee, a residential qualification for a candidate in his con-
stituency was imposed only in the provinces of Bombay, the Panjab
and the Central Provinces.
These organic changes in the governments in India involved
altering their relations with the secretary of state in council. It was
pointed out in the joint report (para. 291) that delegation to re-
sponsible ministers implied that parliament must set certain bounds
to its own responsibility for the internal administration of the country,
so far as transferred subjects were concerned, and might reasonably
sanction delegation in regard to reserved subjects. A committee,
presided over by Lord Crewe, examined these questions. Indian
politicians had often criticised the secretary of state's council on the
ground, that the retired officials were usually opposed to reforms.
Lord Crewe's committee suggested that this body should become
purely advisory, and that one-third of its members should be chosen
by the secretary of state from persons domiciled in India, whose
names had been placed on a panel by the votes of non-official members
of the Indian legislative council. The secretary of state, no longer
bound as in the past by the votes of the council in questions of finance,
would refer to it what matters he pleased. While hitherto his previous
sanction had been required in all important new departures and in
certain specified cases, a principle of previous consultation should be
substituted. Joint approval by the Government of India and a
majority of the non-official members of the legislative assembly should
ordinarily carry with it, in either legislative or administrative action,
the assent of the secretary of state unless he felt that
his responsibility to parliament for the peace, good order and good government
of India, or paramount considerations of imperial policy, required him to secure
reconsideration of the matter at issue by the legislative Assembly.
The select committee (clause 31) held that no statutory change
should be made so long as the governor-general remained responsible
to parliament, but it was in favour of a growing convention that
the secretary of state might “reasonably consider that only in ex-
ceptional circumstances should he be called upon to intervene in
matters of purely Indian interest where the government and the
legislature of India are in agreement”. Protective tariffs had long
been asked for in India, and, in the dislocation of finance caused by
the late war, changes of a protective character had been made in the


## p. 602 (#642) ############################################

602
THE REFORMS OF 1919
customs-duties. The committee recommended this case specially as
one for relaxation of control, to remove the suspicion, sometimes
justified in the past, that India's fiscal policy was subjected to the
interests of British trade. The only remedy was to grant liberty to
devise tariff arrangements which seemed best fitted to the needs of
the inhabitants of India, both consumers and manufacturers, as an
integral part of the British Empire. Control over transferred subjects
was to be restricted to the narrowest possible limits, and the con-
vention of deference to combined agreement between the government
and legislature was ordinarily to be extended to reserved matters in
the provinces.
So far as the Council of India was concerned the committee did not
favour abolition (clause 3). Advice would still be needed, and a
formal council was preferable to an informal one. It was, however,
suggested that the Indian element should be increased and the term
of office shortened to ensure a constant flow of fresh experience from
India and to relieve Indian members from long exile. In accordance
with these recommendations the number of members now varies
between eight and twelve, half of whom must have served or resided
in India for at least ten years, and have not left India more than five
years before the date of their appointment. Their tenure of office is
five years, though reappointment for a similar term is possible, the
special reasons of public advantage which justify this being recorded
and laid before parliament. A member who at the time of his appoint-
ment is domiciled in India receives a special allowance of £600 a year
in addition to the ordinary salary of £1200. Slight changes were made
in the powers of the secretary of state to arrange the conduct of
business in his council, but the drastic alterations proposed in 1914
(see chapter XI) to enable the secretary of state to withdraw many
classes of questions from his council were not pursued.
Lord Crewe's committee had, however, recommended that those
functions performed by the secretary of state in council which were
akin to the duties of high commissioners of the self-governing do-
minions, should be arranged for separately, and a high commissioner
was appointed for India in October, 1920. The debit to India of the
salary of the secretary of state had long been a grievance, and the act
laid down that it should now be paid out of moneys provided by
parliament, while the salaries of his under-secretaries and
any
other
expenses of his department might also be met in the same way.
It was clearly impossible for parliament to legislate in full detail
for all the numerous matters which required legislation. The act
therefore provided that many of these should be governed by rules.
Although these were to be made by the secretary of state, or by the
governor-general in council with the former's sanction, they were
to be brought to the formal notice of parliament. The most important
class of rules, by which the powers of superintendence, direction and
control over the Government of India, vested in the secretary of state


## p. 603 (#643) ############################################

IMPORTANCE OF THE REFORMS
603
(with or without his council), might be regulated or restricted, re-
quired the previous sanction of both houses of parliament, if they
affected subjects which had not been transferred to popular control
in the provinces. Rules for the classification of subjects as central or
provincial, for fixing the size of legislative bodies and governing the
qualifications of members, franchise and elections, or for the conduct
of business in these bodies, must be laid on the table in both houses,
and if an adverse address is passed by either house His Majesty in
council may annul them. Other rules that must be laid for informa-
tion include those for admission to the Indian Civil Service, and for
appointment to that service of persons domiciled in India, or for
laying down the qualifications of persons domiciled in British India
and born of parents habitually resident there who may be appointed
to fill posts ordinarily reserved for the Indian Civil Service.
None of the constitutional changes made in other parts of the
British Empire had, in Lord Selborne's opinion, been more. important
than these reforms in India. The size of the country, its vast popula-
tion with complexities due to divisions of caste and religion, the rule
by foreigners who made no attempt at assimilation, and the absence
of indigenous representative institutions, were factors which combined
to suggest caution and the need of full control over the experiment.
It was therefore provided that at the expiration of ten years a com-
mission should be appointed to enquire into the working of the
system of government, the growth of education, and the development
of representative institutions in British India, and to report whether
and to what extent it was desirable to establish the principle of re-
sponsible government; or to extend, modify or restrict whatever
degree then existed. An attempt to ensure more concentrated atten.
tion on Indian topics coming before parliament was made by ap-
pointing Indian standing committees. The royal proclamation issued
on the passing of the act contained a recognition of the magnitude
of the experiment, fortified by reliance on the good will and honest
purpose of all who would have to deal with it.
The path will not be easy and in the march towards the goal there will be need
of perseverance and of mutual forbearance between all sections and races of my
people in India. I am confident that these high qualities will be forthcoming.
I rely on the new popular assemblies to interpret wisely the wishes of those whom
they represent and not to forget the interests of the masses who cannot yet be
admitted to franchise. I rely on the leaders of people, the ministers of the future,
to face responsibility, and endure misrepresentations, to sacrifice much for the
common interest of the state, remembering that true patriotism transcends party
and communal boundaries, and, while retaining the confidence of the legislatures,
to co-operate with my officers for the common good in sinking unessential differences
and in maintaining the essential standards of a just and generous government.
Equally do I rely upon my officers to respect their new colleagues and to work
with them in harmony and kindliness; to assist the people and their representatives
in an orderly advance towards free institutions; and to find in these new tasks
a fresh opportunity to fulfil, as in the past, their highest purpose of service to my
people.
1 Questions 4077-83, Cd. 97 (1919).


## p. 604 (#644) ############################################

CHAPTER XXXIV
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 to 1969
GOVERNMENT of India Act, 1919: It was on 8 February 1921
that the Duke of Connaught opened the new central Indian legis-
lature and read the following message from King Emperor George
V: “For years, patriotic and loyal Indians have dreamed of Swaraj
(Home Rule) for their motherland. To-day you have the begin-
ning of Swaraj within my empire and the widest scope and ample
opportunity for progress to the liberty which my other Dominions
enjoy. ” This central legislature was provided in the Government
of India Act, 1919 whose preamble was in these words:
“Whereas it is the declared policy of the Parliament to provide
for the increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian
administration, and for gradual development of self-governing insti-
tutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible
government in British India as an integral part of the Empire;
“And whereas progress, in giving effect to this policy, can only
be achieved by successive stages, and it is expedient that substan-
rial steps in this direction should now be taken;
“And whereas the time and manner of each advance can be
determined only by Parliament upon whom responsibility lies for
the welfare and advancement of the Indian people;
“And whereas the action of Parliament in such matters should
be guided by the cooperation received from those on whom new
opportunities of service will be conferred, and by the extent to
which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of
responsibility;
“And whereas concurrently with the development of self-govern-
ing institutions in the Provinces of India, it is expedient to give to
those provinces in provincial matters the highest measure of inde-
pendence of the Government of India, which is compatible with
the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities. ”
Formerly the Secretary of State for India used to be paid out
of the Indian revenues. The new Act provided that in future he
was to be paid out of the British revenues. Some of his functions
were taken away from him and given to the High Commissioner
for India who was to be appointed by the Government of India
and paid by the Government of India. He was to act as the agent
of the Governor-General-in-Council. He was to be incharge of
the Stores Department, the Indian Students Department, etc. The


## p. 605 (#645) ############################################

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1919
605
control of the Secretary of State was reduced in the provincial sphere
in so far as the Transferred Departments were concerned, but it
remained as complete as before in so far as the Reserved Depart-
ments were concerned. The Secretary of State was to possess and
exercise the power of superintendence, direction and control over
the affairs of India and it was the duty of the Government of India
to carry out his orders.
The Act set up a bicameral legislature at the Centre in place of
the Imperial Legislative Council. The names of the two Houses
were the Council of State and Central Legislative Assembly. The
Council of State consisted of 60 members out of which 33 were
elected and 27 nominated by the Governor-General. The Assembly
consisted of 145 members out of which 103 were elected and the
rest were nominated. Out of the nominated members, 25 were
officials and the rest non-officials. Out of the 103 elected members.
51 were elected by the general constituencies, 32 by communal
constituencies (30 by the Muslims and 2 by the Sikhs) and 20 by
special constituencies (7 by landholders, 9 by Europeans and 4 by
Indian Commerce). The life of the Central Assembly was 3 years
and that of the Council of Siate 5 years. However, the same could
be extended by the Governor-General. As a matter of fact, the
last Assembly sat for 11 years. The first Speaker of the Assembly
was nominated by the Government but the subsequent Speakers
were elected by the members of the Assembly. The Governor-
General was given the power to summon, prorogue and dissolve
both Houses of the Legislature. He was given the authority io
address the members of both Houses of the Central Legislature.
The Franchise Committee recommended a system of indirect
elections to the Central Assembly on the ground that direct elec-
tions, though preferable, were impracticable on account of the
unwieldy character of the constituencies. However, the Govern-
ment of India decided in favour of direct elections for both Houses
of the Central Legislature. The franchise was very much restrict-
ed. In 1920, the total number of voters for the Council of State
was 17,364 and for the Central Assembly 9,09,874.
The Central Legislature was given very wide powers. It could
make laws for the whole of British India, for the subjects of His
Majesty and Services of the Crown in other parts of India, for
the Indian subjects of His Majesty wherever they may happen to
be and for all persons employed in His Majesty's defence forces. It
could also repeal or amend laws for the time being in force in British
India or applicable to persons mentioned in the preceding sentence.
However, the previous sanction of the Secretary of State-n-Council
was required to pass any legislation abolishing any high Court.


## p. 606 (#646) ############################################

606 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
9
The Central Legislature had no power to amend or repeal any
Parliamentary statute relating to British India or to do anything
affecting the authority of Parliament or the written laws or Consti-
tution of the United Kingdom. The previous sanction of the
Governor-General was also required to introduce bills concerning
the public debt . or public revenues of India, religion or religious
rites and usages of the British subjects in India, discipline or main-
tenance of His Majesty's military, naval and air forces, relations of
the Government of India with foreign states or Indian states and
any measure which repealed or amended any Act of a Legislature
or any ordinance made by the Governor-General, etc. The Gover-
nor-General was also given the power of preventing the considera-
tion, at any stage, of a bill or a part of a bill in either Chamber
of the Central Legislature if in his opinion it "affects the safety or
tranquillity of British India or any part thereof. " The Governor-
General was given the power to enact laws which were considered
essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India or
any part thereof if either Chamber refused or failed to pass them.
Every Act so passed required the assent of His Majesty. The
Governor-General was given the power of making and promulgat-
ing ordinances for the peace and quiet Government of British India
in case of emergency. An ordinance issued by the Governor-
General was to have the same force of law as a law passed by the
Central Legislature and was to last for 6 months. The Governor-
General was given the power of returning any measure passed by
the two Houses of Central Legislature for reconsideration before
signifying his assent or dissent. The assent of the Governor-General
was essential before a bill passed by the Legislature could become
law. He was given the power to give his assent or reserve a Bill
for approval by His Majesty. The Crown was given the power of
disallowing any Act made by the Central Legislature or the Gover-
nor-General. This power of veto was not only in theory but was
actually exercised by the Governor-General on many occasions.
The members of both houses of the Central Legislature were
given the right of putting interpellations and supplementary ques-
tions and moving resolutions and motions of adjournment accord-
ing to rules. They were also given the right of freedom of speech.
The Government was to submit proposals for appropriations, in
the form of demands, for the vote of the Central Assembly. How-
ever, there were certain non-votable items in the budget which
were not open to discussion in either Chamber "unless the Gover-
nor-General otherwise directs”. All other items of expenditure
were to be submitted to the vote of the Assembly which "may assent
or refuse its assent to any demand or may reduce the amount


## p. 607 (#647) ############################################

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA -ACT, 1919
607
referred to in any demand by a reduction of the whole grant. ” If
the Governor-General was satisfied that any demand which had
been refused by the Assembly was essential for the discharge of
his responsibilities, he could restore the grant even if it was rejected
by the Assembly. In cases of emergency, the Governor-General
was given the power “to authorise such expenditure as may; in his
opinion, be necessary for the safety and tranquillity of British India
or any part thereof. " It is obvious that the Central Legislature
was helpless before the Governor-General who was not only inde-
pendent of the Legislature, but was also given the power of over-
riding it in almost all respects.
It is rightly pointed out that the Government of India Act, 1919
introduced responsive and not responsible Government at the Centre.
The members of the Executive Council of the Governor-General
were nominated members and the people had neither any hand in
their appointment nor in their removal. No vote of no-confidence
by Legislature could turn them out. However, as a matter of fact,
the members of the Executive Council did respond to the wishes
of the members of the Central Legislature and through them to the
people of the country. Some of the members of the Central Legisla-
ture were members of the Standing Committees such as Finance
Committee, Committee on Public Accounts, etc. , and in that capa-
city they had an opportunity to influence the Government. The
members could expose the Government by putting them. questions,
supplementary questions and moving motions of adjournment.
They could reject the budget and move and pass resolutions
against the Government. It is these factors which made the Gov-
ernment respond to the wishes of the members of the Legislature.
Even the most irresponsible Executive Councillors could not afford
to ignore the wishes of the members of the Legislature. Thus it
was that although the Executive was independent of the Legisla-
ture, the latter could influence its decisions to a certain extent.
The large majority given to the elected members of the Central
Assembly made things hot for the Government and the only way
to improve matters was to carry on the administration according
to the wishes of the people.
The Government of India Act, 1919 provided for two lists of
subjects: Central List and Provincial List. The principle underly-
ing this division of subjects was that matters in regard to which
uniformity in legislation was necessary or desirable for the whole
of India or in more than one province were given to the centre and
matters in which the provinces in general were interested were
given to Provinces. The items included in the Central List were
defence, foreign and political relations, public debt, tariffs and


## p. 608 (#648) ############################################

608 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
customs, posts and telegraphs, patents and copyright, currency and
coinage, communications, commerce and shipping, civil and crimi-
nal law and procedure, major ports, etc. The Provincial subjects
were local self-government, public health and sanitation and medi-
cal administration, education, public works, water supply and irri-
gation, land revenue administration, famine relief, agriculture,
forests, cooperative societies, law and order, etc. The residuary
subjects were divided between the centre and the provinces on the
same principle on which the Lists were drawn. The division was
not clear-cut or definite. There was a lot of over-lapping. While
subjects like commerce and law regarding property were placed in
the Central List, important subjects like excise and laws regarding
land revenue were given to the provinces. Although all subjects
in the Provincial List were provincial for purposes of administra-
tion, that was not the case in legislation. Certain parts of them
in regard to which uniformity in legislation was considered desir-
able, were made “subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature”.
Those were borrowing and tasing powers of local self-governing
bodies, infectious and contagious diseases of men, animals and
plants, water supply and irrigation, industrial matters including
factories, electricity, settlement of labour disputes, control of news-
papers, printing presses, etc.
The size of the provincial Legislative Councils was considerably
enlarged. While about 70% of the members of the provincial
Legislatures were elected, about 30% were nominated by the Gover-
nor. Some of the nominated members were officials and the others
were non-officials. The life of the Council was fixed at 3 years,
but the same could be extended. The members were given the
right of asking questions and supplementary questions. They were
also given the power of rejecting the budget although the Gover-
nor was given the power of restoring the same.
DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES
Dyarchy was introduced in the provinces. The subjects given
in the Provincial List were divided into two parts, reserved and
transferred subjects. The reserved subjects were to be adminis-
iered by the Governor as before with the help of the Executive
Council. The change now made was that the transferred sub-
jects were to be dealt with by the Governor in future with the help
of his ministers. While the members of the Executive Council were
nominated by the Governor, the ministers were chosen by him from
the members of the Legislature. The reserved subjects were the
administration of justice, police, irrigation and canals, drainage


## p. 609 (#649) ############################################

DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES
609
and embankments, water storage and water power, land revenue
administration, land improvement and agricultural loans, famine
relief, control of newspapers, books and printing presses, prisons
and reformatories, borrowing money on the credit of the province,
forests except in Bombay and Burma, factory inspection, settlement
of industrial disputes, industrial insurance and housing. The trans-
ferred subjects were local self-government including matters relat-
ing to municipal corporations and district boards, public health,
sanitation and medical administration including hospitals and
asylums and provision for medical education, education of Indians
with some exceptions, public works including roads, bridges and
municipal tramways, but excluding irrigation, agriculture and
fisheries, cooperative societies, excise, forests in Bombay anad Burma
only, development of industries including industrial research and
technical education. The Governor was not to act as a constitu-
tional head. He was given special responsibilities. He was given
the authority to over-rule his ministers and the members of the
Executive Council if that was considered necessary for the discharge
of his responsibilities.