Since then we must not say that the world will remain
imperfect
when it
is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals
will remain.
is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals
will remain.
Summa Theologica
Therefore the heavenly
movement will cease at length.
Further, it is shown in De Gener. ii that "the movement of the heaven
is for the sake of continual generation in this lower world. " But
generation will cease when the number of the elect is complete.
Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.
Further, all movement is for some end (Metaph. ii). But all movement
for an end ceases when the end is obtained. Therefore either the
movement of the heaven will never obtain its end, and thus it would be
useless, or it will cease at length.
Further, rest is more noble than movement, because things are more
likened to God, Who is supremely immovable, by being themselves
unmoved. Now the movement of lower bodies terminates naturally in rest.
Therefore since the heavenly bodies are far nobler, their movement
terminates naturally in rest.
I answer that, There are three opinions touching this question. The
first is of the philosophers who assert that the movement of the heaven
will last for ever. But this is not in keeping with our faith, which
holds that the elect are in a certain number preordained by God, so
that the begetting of men will not last for ever, and for the same
reason, neither will other things that are directed to the begetting of
men, such as the movement of the heaven and the variations of the
elements. Others say that the movement of the heaven will cease
naturally. But this again is false, since every body that is moved
naturally has a place wherein it rests naturally, whereto it is moved
naturally, and whence it is not moved except by violence. Now no such
place can be assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more
natural to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to move
away from it, wherefore either its movement would not be altogether
natural, or its movement would not naturally terminate in rest. Hence
we must agree with others who say that the movement of the heaven will
cease at this renewal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause,
but as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, like
other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways above mentioned
[5120](A[1]): and hereafter in the state of glory man will no longer
need one of these services, that namely in respect of which the
heavenly bodies serve man for the sustenance of his bodily life. Now in
this way the heavenly bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as
by the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants and
animals needful for man's use generated, and the temperature of the
atmosphere rendered conducive to health. Therefore the movement of the
heavenly body will cease as soon as man is glorified.
Reply to Objection 1: These words refer to the earth in its present
state, when it is able to be the principle of the generation and
corruption of plants. This is evident from its being said there: "All
the days of the earth, seed time and harvest," etc. And it is simply to
be granted that as long as the earth is fit for seed time and harvest,
the movement of the heaven will not cease.
We reply in like manner to OBJ 2 that the Lord is speaking there of the
duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the present state. This
is evident from the words: "Then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so
as not to be a nation before Me for ever. " For after this state there
will be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which He had
mentioned will cease after this state.
Reply to Objection 3: The end which is there assigned to the heavenly
bodies is their proximate end, because it is their proper act. But this
act is directed further to another end, namely the service of man,
which is shown by the words of Dt. 4:19: "Lest perhaps lifting up thy
eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of
heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which
the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations, that are
under heaven. " Therefore we should form our judgment of the heavenly
bodies from the service of man, rather than from the end assigned to
them in Genesis. Moreover the heavenly bodies, as stated above, will
serve glorified man in another way; hence it does not follow that they
will remain without a purpose.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not belong to the perfection of a
heavenly body, except in so far as thereby it is the cause of
generation and corruption in this lower world: and in that respect also
this movement makes the heavenly body participate in the Divine
goodness by way of a certain likeness of causality. But movement does
not belong to the perfection of the substance of the heaven, which
substance will remain. Wherefore it does not follow that, when this
movement ceases, the substance of the heaven will lose something of its
perfection.
Reply to Objection 5: All the elemental bodies will have in themselves
a certain clarity of glory. Hence though part of the surface of the
earth be not lit up by the sun, there will by no means be any darkness
there.
Reply to Objection 6: A gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 8:22, "Every creature
groaneth," etc. says explicitly that "all the elements labor to fulfill
their offices: thus the sun and moon fill the places appointed to them
not without work: this is for our sake, wherefore they will rest when
we are taken up to heaven. " This work, in my opinion, does not signify
that any stress or passion occurs to these bodies from their movement,
since this movement is natural to them and nowise violent, as is proved
in De Coelo et Mundo i. But work here denotes a defect in relation to
the term to which a thing tends. Hence since this movement is ordained
by Divine providence to the completion of the number of the elect, it
follows that as long as the latter is incomplete, this movement has not
reached the term whereto it was ordained: hence it is said
metaphorically to labor, as a man who has not what he intends to have.
This defect will be removed from the heaven when the number of the
elect is complete. Or it may refer to the desire of the future renewal
which it awaits from the Divine disposal.
Reply to Objection 7: In a heavenly body there is no potentiality that
can be perfected by place, or that is made for this end which is to be
in such and such a place. But potentiality to situation in a place is
related to a heavenly body, as the craftsman's potentiality to
construct various houses of one kind: for if he construct one of these
he is not said to have the potentiality uselessly, and in like manner
in whatever situation a heavenly body be placed, its potentiality to be
in a place will not remain incomplete or without a purpose.
Reply to Objection 8: Although a heavenly body, so far as regards its
nature, is equally inclined to every situation that it can possibly
occupy, nevertheless in comparison with things outside it, it is not
equally inclined to every situation: but in respect of one situation it
has a more noble disposition in comparison with certain things than in
respect of another situation; thus in our regard the sun has a more
noble disposition at daytime than at night-time. Hence it is probable,
since the entire renewal of the world is directed to man, that the
heaven will have in this renewal the most noble situation possible in
relation to our dwelling there. Or, according to some, the heaven will
rest in that situation wherein it was made, else one of its revolutions
would remain incomplete. But this argument seems improbable, for since
a revolution of the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete,
it would follow that the world must last that length of time, which
does not seem probable. Moreover according to this it would be possible
to know when the world will come to an end. For we may conclude with
probability from astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were
made, by taking into consideration the number of years that have
elapsed since the beginning of the world: and in the same way it would
be possible to know the exact number of years it would take them to
return to a like position: whereas the time of the world's end is
stated to be unknown.
Reply to Objection 9: Time will at length cease, when the heavenly
movement ceases. Yet that last "now" will not be the beginning of the
future. For the definition quoted applies to the "now" only as
continuous with the parts of time, not as terminating the whole of
time.
Reply to Objection 10: The movement of the heaven is said to be
natural, not as though it were part of nature in the same way as we
speak of natural principles; but because it has its principle in the
nature of a body, not indeed its active but its receptive principle.
Its active principle is a spiritual substance, as the Commentator says
on De Coelo et Mundo; and consequently it is not unreasonable for this
movement to be done away by the renewal of glory, since the nature of
the heavenly body will not alter through the cessation of that
movement.
We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary sense, namely
the first three, because they conclude in due manner. But since the
remaining two seem to conclude that the movement of heaven will cease
naturally, we must reply to them. To the first, then, we reply that
movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel
to, and does not accompany the movement. Now the purpose of the
heavenly movement, according to philosophers, accompanies that
movement, namely the imitation of the Divine goodness in the causality
of that movement with respect to this lower world. Hence it does not
follow that this movement ceases naturally.
To the second we reply that although immobility is simply nobler than
movement, yet movement in a subject which thereby can acquire a perfect
participation of the Divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject
which is altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For
this reason the earth which is the lowest of the elements is without
movement: although God Who is exalted above all things is without
movement, by Whom the more noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is
that the movements of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual,
so far as their natural power is concerned, and never to terminate in
rest, although the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased at this
renewal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the brightness of the heavenly bodies
will not be increased at this renewal. For this renewal as regards the
lower bodies will be caused by the cleansing fire. But the cleansing
fire will not reach the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies
will not be renewed by receiving an increase of brightness.
Objection 2: Further, just as the heavenly bodies are the cause of
generation in this lower world by their movement, so are they by their
light. But, when generation ceases, movement will cease as stated above
[5121](A[2]). Therefore in like manner the light of the heavenly bodies
will cease rather than increase.
Objection 3: Further, if the heavenly bodies will be renewed when man
is renewed, it follows that when man deteriorated they deteriorated
likewise. But this does not seem probable, since these bodies are
unalterable as to their substance. Therefore neither will they be
renewed when man is renewed.
Objection 4: Further, if they deteriorated then it follows that their
deterioration was on a par with the amelioration which, it is said,
will accrue to them at man's renewal. Now it is written (Is. 30:26)
that "the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun. "
Therefore in the original state before sin the moon shone as much as
the sun does now. Therefore whenever the moon was over the earth, it
made it to be day as the sun does now: which is proved manifestly to be
false from the statement of Gn. 1:16 that the moon was made "to rule
the night. " Therefore when man sinned the heavenly bodies were not
deprived of their light; and so their light will not be increased, so
it seems, when man is glorified.
Objection 5: Further, the brightness of the heavenly bodies, like other
creatures, is directed to the use of man. Now, after the resurrection,
the brightness of the sun will be of no use to man: for it is written
(Is. 60:19): "Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day,
neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee," and (Apoc.
21:23): "The city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in
it. " Therefore their brightness will not be increased.
Objection 6: Further, it were not a wise craftsman who would make very
great instruments for the making of a small work. Now man is a very
small thing in comparison with the heavenly bodies, which by their huge
bulk surpass the size of man almost beyond comparison: in fact the size
of the whole earth in comparison with the heaven is as a point compared
with a sphere, as astronomers say. Since then God is most wise it would
seem that man is not the end of the creation of the heavens, and so it
is unseemly that the heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, or that
it should be bettered when he is glorified.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 30:26): "The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be
sevenfold. "
Further, the whole world will be renewed for the better. But the heaven
is the more noble part of the corporeal world. Therefore it will be
altered for the better. But this cannot be unless it shine out with
greater brightness. Therefore its brightness will be bettered and will
increase.
Further, "every creature that groaneth and travaileth in pain, awaiteth
the revelation of the glory of the children of God" [*'The creature
also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into
the liberty of the children of God. For we know that every creature
groaneth and travaileth in pain,' etc. ] (Rom. 8:21,22). Now such are
the heavenly bodies, as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore
they await the glory of the saints. But they would not await it unless
they were to gain something by it. Therefore their brightness will
increase thereby, since it is their chief beauty.
I answer that, The renewal of the world is directed to the end that,
after this renewal has taken place, God may become visible to man by
signs so manifest as to be perceived as it were by his senses. Now
creatures lead to the knowledge of God chiefly by their comeliness and
beauty, which show forth the wisdom of their Maker and Governor;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:5): "By the greatness of the beauty
and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known
thereby. " And the beauty of the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in
light; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 43:10): "The glory of the stars
is the beauty of heaven, the Lord enlighteneth the world on high. "
Hence the heavenly bodies will be bettered, especially as regards their
brightness. But to what degree and in what way this betterment will
take place is known to Him alone Who will bring it about.
Reply to Objection 1: The cleansing fire will not cause the form of the
renewal, but will only dispose thereto, by cleansing from the vileness
of sin and the impurity resulting from the mingling of bodies, and this
is not to be found in the heavenly bodies. Hence although the heavenly
bodies are not to be cleansed by fire, they are nevertheless to be
Divinely renewed.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement does not denote perfection in the thing
moved, considered in itself, since movement is the act of that which is
imperfect: although it may pertain to the perfection of a body in so
far as the latter is the cause of something. But light belongs to the
perfection of a lightsome body, even considered in its substance: and
consequently after the heavenly body has ceased to be the cause of
generation, its brightness will remain, while its movement will cease.
Reply to Objection 3: A gloss on Is. 30:26, "The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun," says: "All things made for man's
sake deteriorated at his fall, and sun and moon diminished in light. "
This diminishment is understood by some to mean a real lessening of
light. Nor does it matter that the heavenly bodies are by nature
unalterable, because this alteration was brought about by the Divine
power. Others, however, with greater probability, take this
diminishment to mean, not a real lessening of light, but a lessening in
reference to man's use; because after sin man did not receive as much
benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies as before. In the same
sense we read (Gn. 3:17,18): "Cursed is the earth in thy work . . .
Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee"; although it would
have brought forth thorns and thistles before sin, but not as a
punishment to man. Nor does it follow that, supposing the light of the
heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially through man
sinning, it will not really be increased at man's glorification,
because man's sin wrought no change upon the state of the universe,
since both before and after sin man had an animal life, which needs the
movement and generation of a corporeal creature; whereas man's
glorification will bring a change upon the state of all corporeal
creatures, as stated above (Q[76], A[7]). Hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 4: This diminution, according to the more probable
opinion, refers not to the substance but to the effect. Hence it does
not follow that the moon while over the earth would have made it to be
day, but that man would have derived as much benefit from the light of
the moon then as now from the light of the sun. After the resurrection,
however, when the light of the moon will be increased in very truth,
there will be night nowhere on earth but only in the center of the
earth, where hell will be, because then, as stated, the moon will shine
as brightly as the sun does now; the sun seven times as much as now,
and the bodies of the blessed seven times more than the sun, although
there be no authority or reason to prove this.
Reply to Objection 5: A thing may be useful to man in two ways. First,
by reason of necessity, and thus no creature will be useful to man
because he will have complete sufficiency from God. This is signified
(Apoc. 21:23) by the words quoted, according to which that "city hath
no need of the sun," nor "of the moon. " Secondly, on account of a
greater perfection, and thus man will make use of other creatures, yet
not as needful to him in order to obtain his end, in which way he makes
use of them now.
Reply to Objection 6: This is the argument of Rabbi Moses who endeavors
to prove (Dux errantium iii) that the world was by no means made for
man's use. Wherefore he maintains that what we read in the Old
Testament about the renewal of the world, as instanced by the
quotations from Isaias, is said metaphorically: and that even as the
sun is said to be darkened in reference to a person when he encounters
a great sorrow so as not to know what to do (which way of speaking is
customary to Scripture), so on the other hand the sun is said to shine
brighter for a person, and the whole world to be renewed, when he is
brought from a state of sorrow to one of very great joy. But this is
not in harmony with the authority and commentaries of holy men.
Consequently we must answer this argument by saying that although the
heavenly bodies far surpass the human body, yet the rational soul
surpasses the heavenly bodies far more than these surpass the human
body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the heavenly bodies were
made for man's sake; not, however as though this were the principal
end, since the principal end of all things is God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the elements will be renewed by an addition of brightness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the elements will not be renewed by
receiving some kind of brightness. For just as light is a quality
proper to a heavenly body, so are hot and cold, wet and dry. qualities
proper to the elements. Therefore as the heaven is renewed by an
increase of brightness, so ought the elements to be renewed by an
increase of active and passive qualities.
Objection 2: Further, rarity, and density are qualities of the
elements, and the elements will not be deprived of them at this
renewal. Now the rarity and density of the elements would seem to be an
obstacle to brightness, since a bright body needs to be condensed, for
which reason the rarity of the air seems incompatible with brightness,
and in like manner the density of the earth which is an obstacle to
transparency. Therefore it is impossible for the elements to be renewed
by the addition of brightness.
Objection 3: Further, it is agreed that the damned will be in the
earth. Yet they will be in darkness not only internal but also
external. Therefore the earth will not be endowed with brightness in
this renewal, nor for the same reason will the other elements.
Objection 4: Further, increase of brightness in the elements implies an
increase of heat. If therefore at this renewal the brightness of the
elements be greater than it is now, their heat will likewise be
greater; and thus it would seem that they will be changed from their
natural qualities, which are in them according to a fixed measure: and
this is absurd.
Objection 5: Further, the good of the universe which consists in the
order and harmony of the parts is more excellent than the good of any
individual creature. But if one creature be bettered, the good of the
universe is done away, since there will no longer be the same harmony.
Therefore if the elemental bodies, which according to their natural
degree in the universe should be devoid of brightness, were to be
endowed with brightness, the perfection of the universe would be
diminished thereby rather than increased.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 21:1): "I saw a new heaven and a
new earth. " Now the heaven will be renewed by an increase of
brightness. Therefore the earth and likewise the other elements will
also.
Further, the lower bodies, like the higher, are for man's use. Now the
corporeal creature will be rewarded for its services to man, as a gloss
of Ambrose seems to say on Rom. 8:22, "Every creature groaneth," and a
gloss of Jerome on Is. 30:26, "And the light of the moon shall be,"
etc. Therefore the elements will be glorified as well as the heavenly
bodies.
Further, man's body is composed of the elements. Therefore the
elemental particles that are in man's body will be glorified by the
addition of brightness when man is glorified. Now it is fitting that
whole and part should have the same disposition. Therefore it is
fitting that the elements themselves should be endowed with brightness.
I answer that, Just as there is a certain order between the heavenly
spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so is there an order between
heavenly bodies and earthly bodies. Since then the corporeal creature
was made for the sake of the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows
that corporeal things are dealt with similarly to spiritual things. Now
in this final consummation of things the lower spirits will receive the
properties of the higher spirits, because men will be as the angels in
heaven (Mat. 22:30): and this will be accomplished by conferring the
highest degree of perfection on that in which the human spirit agrees
with the angelic. Wherefore, in like manner, since the lower bodies do
not agree with the heavenly bodies except in the nature of light and
transparency (De Anima ii), it follows that the lower bodies are to be
perfected chiefly as regards brightness. Hence all the elements will be
clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, but according
to their mode: for it is said that the earth on its outward surface
will be as transparent as glass, water as crystal, the air as heaven,
fire as the lights of heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [5122](A[1]), the renewal of the
world is directed to the effect that man even by his senses may as it
were see the Godhead by manifest signs. Now the most spiritual and
subtle of our senses is the sight. Consequently all the lower bodies
need to be bettered, chiefly as regards the visible qualities the
principle of which is light. On the other hand, the elemental qualities
regard the touch, which is the most material of the senses, and the
excess of their contrariety is more displeasing than pleasant; whereas
excess of light will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety, except
on account of a weakness in the organ, such as will not be then.
Reply to Objection 2: The air will be bright, not as casting forth
rays, but as an enlightened transparency; while the earth, although it
is opaque through lack of light, yet by the Divine power its surface
will be clothed with the glory of brightness, without prejudice to its
density.
Reply to Objection 3: The earth will not be glorified with brightness
in the infernal regions; but instead of this glory, that part of the
earth will have the rational spirits of men and demons who though weak
by reason of sin are nevertheless superior to any corporeal quality by
the dignity of their nature. or we may say that, though the whole earth
be glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness,
since even the fire of hell, while shining for them in one respect,
will be unable to enlighten them in another.
Reply to Objection 4: This brightness will be in these bodies even as
it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat, because these
bodies will then be unalterable, as the heavenly bodies are now.
Reply to Objection 5: The order of the universe will not be done away
by the betterment of the elements, because all the other parts will
also be bettered, and so the same harmony will remain.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the plants and animals will remain in
this renewal. For the elements should be deprived of nothing that
belongs to their adornment. Now the elements are said to be adorned by
the animals and plants [*Cf. Gn. 1:11,12,20,21,24,25]. Therefore they
will not be removed in this renewal.
Objection 2: Further, just as the elements served man, so also did
animals, plants and mineral bodies. But on account of this service the
elements will be glorified. Therefore both animals and plants and
mineral bodies will be glorified likewise.
Objection 3: Further, the universe will remain imperfect if anything
belonging to its perfection be removed. Now the species of animals,
plants, and mineral bodies belong to the perfection of the universe.
Since then we must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it
is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals
will remain.
Objection 4: Further, animals and plants have a more noble form than
the elements. Now the world, at this final renewal, will be changed for
the better. Therefore animals and plants should remain rather than the
elements, since they are nobler.
Objection 5: Further, it is unseemly to assert that the natural
appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural appetite animals and
plants desire to be for ever, if indeed not as regards the individual,
at least as regards the species: and to this end their continual
generation is directed (De Generat. ii). Therefore it is unseemly to
say that these species will at length cease to be.
On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, either all of
them will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb animals, which
had previously died, will have to rise again just as men will rise
again. But this cannot be asserted for since their form comes to
nothing, they cannot resume the same identical form. On the other hand
if not all but some of them remain, since there is no more reason for
one of them remaining for ever rather than another, it would seem that
none of them will. But whatever remains after the world has been
renewed will remain for ever, generation and corruption being done
away. Therefore plants and animals will altogether cease after the
renewal of the world.
Further, according to the Philosopher (De Generat. ii) the species of
animals, plants and such like corruptible things, are not perpetuated
except by the continuance of the heavenly movement. Now this will cease
then. Therefore it will be impossible for those species to be
perpetuated.
Further, if the end cease, those things which are directed to the end
should cease. Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human
life; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): "Even as the green herbs have
I delivered all flesh to you [*Vulg. : 'have I delivered them all to
you']. " Therefore when man's animal life ceases, animals and plants
should cease. But after this renewal animal life will cease in man.
Therefore neither plants nor animals ought to remain.
I answer that, Since the renewal of the world will be for man's sake it
follows that it should be conformed to the renewal of man. Now by being
renewed man will pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility
and to a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (1 Cor.
15:53): "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal
must put on immortality"; and consequently the world will be renewed in
such a way as to throw off all corruption and remain for ever at rest.
Therefore it will be impossible for anything to be the subject of that
renewal, unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the
heavenly bodies, the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by
their very nature incorruptible both as to their whole and as to their
part: the elements are corruptible as to their parts but incorruptible
as a whole: while men are corruptible both in whole and in part, but
this is on the part of their matter not on the part of their form, the
rational soul to wit, which will remain incorrupt after the corruption
of man. on the other hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and all
mixed bodies, are corruptible both in their whole and in their parts,
both on the part of their matter which loses its form, and on the part
of their form which does not remain actually; and thus they are in no
way subjects of incorruption. Hence they will not remain in this
renewal, but those things alone which we have mentioned above.
Reply to Objection 1: These bodies are said to adorn the elements,
inasmuch as the general active and passive forces which are in the
elements are applied to specific actions: hence they adorn the elements
in their active and passive state. But this state will not remain in
the elements: wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to
remain.
Reply to Objection 2: Neither animals nor plants nor any other bodies
merited anything by their services to man, since they lack free-will.
However, certain bodies are said to be rewarded in so far as man
merited that those things should be renewed which are adapted to be
renewed. But plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of
incorruption, as stated above. Wherefore for this very reason man did
not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can merit for
another, or even for himself that which another or himself is incapable
of receiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited by serving
man, it would not follow that they are to be renewed.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as several kinds of perfection are ascribed
to man (for there is the perfection of created nature and the
perfection of glorified nature), so also there is a twofold perfection
of the universe, one corresponding to this state of changeableness, the
other corresponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and
animals belong to its perfection according to the present state, and
not according to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable
thereof.
Reply to Objection 4: Although animals and plants as to certain other
respects are more noble than the elements, the elements are more noble
in relation to incorruption, as explained above [*Cf. [5123] Q[74],
A[1], ad 3].
Reply to Objection 5: The natural desire to be for ever that is in
animals and plants must be understood in reference to the movement of
the heaven, so that they may continue in being as long as the movement
of the heaven lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to
last longer than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of movement
in the first movable body, plants and animals cease as to their
species, it does not follow that the natural appetite is frustrated.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED* (THREE
ARTICLES) [*Cf. FP, Q[12]]
In the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after
the general judgment. We shall consider: (1) Their vision of the Divine
essence, wherein their bliss consists chiefly; (2) Their bliss and
their mansions; (3) Their relations with the damned; (4) Their gifts,
which are contained in their bliss; (5) The crowns which perfect and
adorn their happiness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints will see God in His essence?
(2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body?
(3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to
the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (Jn. 1:18): "No man
hath seen God at any time"; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (Hom.
xiv in Joan. ) that "not even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim
and Seraphim, have ever been able to see Him as He is. " Now, only
equality with the angels is promised to men (Mat. 22:30): "They . . .
shall be as the angels of God in heaven. " Therefore neither will the
saints in heaven see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius argues thus (Div. Nom. i): "Knowledge
is only of existing things. " Now whatever exists is finite, since it is
confined to a certain genus: and therefore God, since He is infinite,
is above all existing things. Therefore there is no knowledge of Him,
and He is above all knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (De Myst. Theol. i) shows that the most
perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God is when it is
united to Him as to something unknown. Now that which is seen in its
essence is not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to
see God in His essence.
Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach. ) that "the
darkness"---for thus he calls the abundance of light---"which screens
God is impervious to all illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge:
and if anyone in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not God
Himself, but one of those things that are His. " Therefore no created
intellect will be able to see God in His essence.
Objection 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad Hieroth. ) "God is
invisible on account of His surpassing glory. " Now His glory surpasses
the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is
invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.
Objection 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection
of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible
and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there
is no possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence,
since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will
be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the
created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise
attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our
intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something
actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object
understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual
operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of
heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by
means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot
be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must needs
have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our intellect in
essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed
in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed by God on our
intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to
the knowledge of God except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its
cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God except
through His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see Him
in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 9: Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our
intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna
(Metaph. iii), "the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does
not imply that its essence is in our intellect," because in that case
our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an
accident, "but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect. "
Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us,
except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But this
impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for
since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it degenerates
to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to
degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person
in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a
black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said
to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God
in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this
impression.
Objection 10: Further, "In things devoid of matter that which
understands is the same as that which is understood" (De Anima iii).
Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which
is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible
for our intellect to see God in His essence.
Objection 11: Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as to
what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only
what He is not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. i) declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 12: Further, every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But
God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown.
Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a
created intellect.
Objection 13: Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii):
"God is by nature invisible. " Now that which is in God by nature cannot
be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His
essence.
Objection 14: Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in another
way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in
another way by the saints in heaven: for He according to His own mode,
but will be seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He
will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in
His essence.
Objection 15: Further, that which is seen through a medium is not seen
in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which
is the light of glory, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall
see light. " Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.
Objection 16: Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see
him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through
His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. " Now that which is seen
face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His
essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear we shall be
like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is. " Therefore we shall see
Him in His essence.
Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have delivered up the
kingdom to God and the Father," says: "Where," i. e. in heaven, "the
essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to
the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss. " Therefore the
blessed will see God in His essence.
Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me shall be loved
of My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him. "
Now that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will
be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of Ex. 33:20,
"Man shall not see Me and live," disapproves of the opinion of those
who said that "in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but
not in His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature. " But His
nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.
Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now
the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according
to Ex. 33:13, "Show me Thy glory"; Ps. 79:20, "Show Thy face and we
shall be saved"; and Jn. 14:8, "Show us the Father and it is enough for
us. " Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.
I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man's life
is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man's ultimate
happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their
being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers
and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference
of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can
never come to understand separate substances. thus Alfarabius expresses
himself at the end of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his
book On the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In
like manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never
attain to the vision of God in His essence. on either side they were
moved by the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine
essence and from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is
somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would seem
difficult to understand how the created intellect is made to be an
uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan. ): "How
can the creature see the uncreated? " Those who hold the passive
intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as being a
power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty not
only as regards the vision of God but also as regards the vision of any
separate substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First,
because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture,
as Augustine declares (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, because,
since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that
his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected
in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the
intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect
man does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to
something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other
than God is the object of man's happiness: and since the ultimate
perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it
follows that something other than God is the effective principle of
man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the
philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate
substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these
substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our
intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence,
and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of
separate substances.
It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like
Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our
intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to
the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two
arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not
diversified in various individuals, except as united to various
individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in
me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary
forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea
understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity
understood, which is one and the same in the various persons
understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance.
Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any
intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the
separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that
our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all
intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it
abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a
quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of
the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate
substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the
quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says
(Met. iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this
particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that
the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and
consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some
quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a
separate quiddity [*Cf. [5124]FP, Q[88], A[2]].
But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the
quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is
not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and
consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities
of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows
the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence,
which more than any other is of a different nature from any created
quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature,
nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the
knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most
remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect
unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as
an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially:
and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence
to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the
essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him
in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in
his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understanding separate
substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by us by
means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images
of their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are
immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems
inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that
"whatever is received into any thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient": and consequently the likeness of the Divine essence
impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our
intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect
reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may
occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is
a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the
same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such
is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in
comparison with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet
more defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but
only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an
orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In
another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not
attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or
proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a
being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is
defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in order that the
sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive the likeness of
whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to
the same manner of being because the form has a manner of being in the
sense other from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for
if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not
be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order that the intellect
understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness
according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not
be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in
the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to
its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio
with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness
received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that His
essence be seen immediately.
movement will cease at length.
Further, it is shown in De Gener. ii that "the movement of the heaven
is for the sake of continual generation in this lower world. " But
generation will cease when the number of the elect is complete.
Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.
Further, all movement is for some end (Metaph. ii). But all movement
for an end ceases when the end is obtained. Therefore either the
movement of the heaven will never obtain its end, and thus it would be
useless, or it will cease at length.
Further, rest is more noble than movement, because things are more
likened to God, Who is supremely immovable, by being themselves
unmoved. Now the movement of lower bodies terminates naturally in rest.
Therefore since the heavenly bodies are far nobler, their movement
terminates naturally in rest.
I answer that, There are three opinions touching this question. The
first is of the philosophers who assert that the movement of the heaven
will last for ever. But this is not in keeping with our faith, which
holds that the elect are in a certain number preordained by God, so
that the begetting of men will not last for ever, and for the same
reason, neither will other things that are directed to the begetting of
men, such as the movement of the heaven and the variations of the
elements. Others say that the movement of the heaven will cease
naturally. But this again is false, since every body that is moved
naturally has a place wherein it rests naturally, whereto it is moved
naturally, and whence it is not moved except by violence. Now no such
place can be assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more
natural to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to move
away from it, wherefore either its movement would not be altogether
natural, or its movement would not naturally terminate in rest. Hence
we must agree with others who say that the movement of the heaven will
cease at this renewal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause,
but as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, like
other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways above mentioned
[5120](A[1]): and hereafter in the state of glory man will no longer
need one of these services, that namely in respect of which the
heavenly bodies serve man for the sustenance of his bodily life. Now in
this way the heavenly bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as
by the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants and
animals needful for man's use generated, and the temperature of the
atmosphere rendered conducive to health. Therefore the movement of the
heavenly body will cease as soon as man is glorified.
Reply to Objection 1: These words refer to the earth in its present
state, when it is able to be the principle of the generation and
corruption of plants. This is evident from its being said there: "All
the days of the earth, seed time and harvest," etc. And it is simply to
be granted that as long as the earth is fit for seed time and harvest,
the movement of the heaven will not cease.
We reply in like manner to OBJ 2 that the Lord is speaking there of the
duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the present state. This
is evident from the words: "Then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so
as not to be a nation before Me for ever. " For after this state there
will be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which He had
mentioned will cease after this state.
Reply to Objection 3: The end which is there assigned to the heavenly
bodies is their proximate end, because it is their proper act. But this
act is directed further to another end, namely the service of man,
which is shown by the words of Dt. 4:19: "Lest perhaps lifting up thy
eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of
heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which
the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations, that are
under heaven. " Therefore we should form our judgment of the heavenly
bodies from the service of man, rather than from the end assigned to
them in Genesis. Moreover the heavenly bodies, as stated above, will
serve glorified man in another way; hence it does not follow that they
will remain without a purpose.
Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not belong to the perfection of a
heavenly body, except in so far as thereby it is the cause of
generation and corruption in this lower world: and in that respect also
this movement makes the heavenly body participate in the Divine
goodness by way of a certain likeness of causality. But movement does
not belong to the perfection of the substance of the heaven, which
substance will remain. Wherefore it does not follow that, when this
movement ceases, the substance of the heaven will lose something of its
perfection.
Reply to Objection 5: All the elemental bodies will have in themselves
a certain clarity of glory. Hence though part of the surface of the
earth be not lit up by the sun, there will by no means be any darkness
there.
Reply to Objection 6: A gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 8:22, "Every creature
groaneth," etc. says explicitly that "all the elements labor to fulfill
their offices: thus the sun and moon fill the places appointed to them
not without work: this is for our sake, wherefore they will rest when
we are taken up to heaven. " This work, in my opinion, does not signify
that any stress or passion occurs to these bodies from their movement,
since this movement is natural to them and nowise violent, as is proved
in De Coelo et Mundo i. But work here denotes a defect in relation to
the term to which a thing tends. Hence since this movement is ordained
by Divine providence to the completion of the number of the elect, it
follows that as long as the latter is incomplete, this movement has not
reached the term whereto it was ordained: hence it is said
metaphorically to labor, as a man who has not what he intends to have.
This defect will be removed from the heaven when the number of the
elect is complete. Or it may refer to the desire of the future renewal
which it awaits from the Divine disposal.
Reply to Objection 7: In a heavenly body there is no potentiality that
can be perfected by place, or that is made for this end which is to be
in such and such a place. But potentiality to situation in a place is
related to a heavenly body, as the craftsman's potentiality to
construct various houses of one kind: for if he construct one of these
he is not said to have the potentiality uselessly, and in like manner
in whatever situation a heavenly body be placed, its potentiality to be
in a place will not remain incomplete or without a purpose.
Reply to Objection 8: Although a heavenly body, so far as regards its
nature, is equally inclined to every situation that it can possibly
occupy, nevertheless in comparison with things outside it, it is not
equally inclined to every situation: but in respect of one situation it
has a more noble disposition in comparison with certain things than in
respect of another situation; thus in our regard the sun has a more
noble disposition at daytime than at night-time. Hence it is probable,
since the entire renewal of the world is directed to man, that the
heaven will have in this renewal the most noble situation possible in
relation to our dwelling there. Or, according to some, the heaven will
rest in that situation wherein it was made, else one of its revolutions
would remain incomplete. But this argument seems improbable, for since
a revolution of the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete,
it would follow that the world must last that length of time, which
does not seem probable. Moreover according to this it would be possible
to know when the world will come to an end. For we may conclude with
probability from astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were
made, by taking into consideration the number of years that have
elapsed since the beginning of the world: and in the same way it would
be possible to know the exact number of years it would take them to
return to a like position: whereas the time of the world's end is
stated to be unknown.
Reply to Objection 9: Time will at length cease, when the heavenly
movement ceases. Yet that last "now" will not be the beginning of the
future. For the definition quoted applies to the "now" only as
continuous with the parts of time, not as terminating the whole of
time.
Reply to Objection 10: The movement of the heaven is said to be
natural, not as though it were part of nature in the same way as we
speak of natural principles; but because it has its principle in the
nature of a body, not indeed its active but its receptive principle.
Its active principle is a spiritual substance, as the Commentator says
on De Coelo et Mundo; and consequently it is not unreasonable for this
movement to be done away by the renewal of glory, since the nature of
the heavenly body will not alter through the cessation of that
movement.
We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary sense, namely
the first three, because they conclude in due manner. But since the
remaining two seem to conclude that the movement of heaven will cease
naturally, we must reply to them. To the first, then, we reply that
movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel
to, and does not accompany the movement. Now the purpose of the
heavenly movement, according to philosophers, accompanies that
movement, namely the imitation of the Divine goodness in the causality
of that movement with respect to this lower world. Hence it does not
follow that this movement ceases naturally.
To the second we reply that although immobility is simply nobler than
movement, yet movement in a subject which thereby can acquire a perfect
participation of the Divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject
which is altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For
this reason the earth which is the lowest of the elements is without
movement: although God Who is exalted above all things is without
movement, by Whom the more noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is
that the movements of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual,
so far as their natural power is concerned, and never to terminate in
rest, although the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased at this
renewal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the brightness of the heavenly bodies
will not be increased at this renewal. For this renewal as regards the
lower bodies will be caused by the cleansing fire. But the cleansing
fire will not reach the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies
will not be renewed by receiving an increase of brightness.
Objection 2: Further, just as the heavenly bodies are the cause of
generation in this lower world by their movement, so are they by their
light. But, when generation ceases, movement will cease as stated above
[5121](A[2]). Therefore in like manner the light of the heavenly bodies
will cease rather than increase.
Objection 3: Further, if the heavenly bodies will be renewed when man
is renewed, it follows that when man deteriorated they deteriorated
likewise. But this does not seem probable, since these bodies are
unalterable as to their substance. Therefore neither will they be
renewed when man is renewed.
Objection 4: Further, if they deteriorated then it follows that their
deterioration was on a par with the amelioration which, it is said,
will accrue to them at man's renewal. Now it is written (Is. 30:26)
that "the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun. "
Therefore in the original state before sin the moon shone as much as
the sun does now. Therefore whenever the moon was over the earth, it
made it to be day as the sun does now: which is proved manifestly to be
false from the statement of Gn. 1:16 that the moon was made "to rule
the night. " Therefore when man sinned the heavenly bodies were not
deprived of their light; and so their light will not be increased, so
it seems, when man is glorified.
Objection 5: Further, the brightness of the heavenly bodies, like other
creatures, is directed to the use of man. Now, after the resurrection,
the brightness of the sun will be of no use to man: for it is written
(Is. 60:19): "Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day,
neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee," and (Apoc.
21:23): "The city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in
it. " Therefore their brightness will not be increased.
Objection 6: Further, it were not a wise craftsman who would make very
great instruments for the making of a small work. Now man is a very
small thing in comparison with the heavenly bodies, which by their huge
bulk surpass the size of man almost beyond comparison: in fact the size
of the whole earth in comparison with the heaven is as a point compared
with a sphere, as astronomers say. Since then God is most wise it would
seem that man is not the end of the creation of the heavens, and so it
is unseemly that the heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, or that
it should be bettered when he is glorified.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 30:26): "The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be
sevenfold. "
Further, the whole world will be renewed for the better. But the heaven
is the more noble part of the corporeal world. Therefore it will be
altered for the better. But this cannot be unless it shine out with
greater brightness. Therefore its brightness will be bettered and will
increase.
Further, "every creature that groaneth and travaileth in pain, awaiteth
the revelation of the glory of the children of God" [*'The creature
also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into
the liberty of the children of God. For we know that every creature
groaneth and travaileth in pain,' etc. ] (Rom. 8:21,22). Now such are
the heavenly bodies, as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore
they await the glory of the saints. But they would not await it unless
they were to gain something by it. Therefore their brightness will
increase thereby, since it is their chief beauty.
I answer that, The renewal of the world is directed to the end that,
after this renewal has taken place, God may become visible to man by
signs so manifest as to be perceived as it were by his senses. Now
creatures lead to the knowledge of God chiefly by their comeliness and
beauty, which show forth the wisdom of their Maker and Governor;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:5): "By the greatness of the beauty
and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known
thereby. " And the beauty of the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in
light; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 43:10): "The glory of the stars
is the beauty of heaven, the Lord enlighteneth the world on high. "
Hence the heavenly bodies will be bettered, especially as regards their
brightness. But to what degree and in what way this betterment will
take place is known to Him alone Who will bring it about.
Reply to Objection 1: The cleansing fire will not cause the form of the
renewal, but will only dispose thereto, by cleansing from the vileness
of sin and the impurity resulting from the mingling of bodies, and this
is not to be found in the heavenly bodies. Hence although the heavenly
bodies are not to be cleansed by fire, they are nevertheless to be
Divinely renewed.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement does not denote perfection in the thing
moved, considered in itself, since movement is the act of that which is
imperfect: although it may pertain to the perfection of a body in so
far as the latter is the cause of something. But light belongs to the
perfection of a lightsome body, even considered in its substance: and
consequently after the heavenly body has ceased to be the cause of
generation, its brightness will remain, while its movement will cease.
Reply to Objection 3: A gloss on Is. 30:26, "The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun," says: "All things made for man's
sake deteriorated at his fall, and sun and moon diminished in light. "
This diminishment is understood by some to mean a real lessening of
light. Nor does it matter that the heavenly bodies are by nature
unalterable, because this alteration was brought about by the Divine
power. Others, however, with greater probability, take this
diminishment to mean, not a real lessening of light, but a lessening in
reference to man's use; because after sin man did not receive as much
benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies as before. In the same
sense we read (Gn. 3:17,18): "Cursed is the earth in thy work . . .
Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee"; although it would
have brought forth thorns and thistles before sin, but not as a
punishment to man. Nor does it follow that, supposing the light of the
heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially through man
sinning, it will not really be increased at man's glorification,
because man's sin wrought no change upon the state of the universe,
since both before and after sin man had an animal life, which needs the
movement and generation of a corporeal creature; whereas man's
glorification will bring a change upon the state of all corporeal
creatures, as stated above (Q[76], A[7]). Hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 4: This diminution, according to the more probable
opinion, refers not to the substance but to the effect. Hence it does
not follow that the moon while over the earth would have made it to be
day, but that man would have derived as much benefit from the light of
the moon then as now from the light of the sun. After the resurrection,
however, when the light of the moon will be increased in very truth,
there will be night nowhere on earth but only in the center of the
earth, where hell will be, because then, as stated, the moon will shine
as brightly as the sun does now; the sun seven times as much as now,
and the bodies of the blessed seven times more than the sun, although
there be no authority or reason to prove this.
Reply to Objection 5: A thing may be useful to man in two ways. First,
by reason of necessity, and thus no creature will be useful to man
because he will have complete sufficiency from God. This is signified
(Apoc. 21:23) by the words quoted, according to which that "city hath
no need of the sun," nor "of the moon. " Secondly, on account of a
greater perfection, and thus man will make use of other creatures, yet
not as needful to him in order to obtain his end, in which way he makes
use of them now.
Reply to Objection 6: This is the argument of Rabbi Moses who endeavors
to prove (Dux errantium iii) that the world was by no means made for
man's use. Wherefore he maintains that what we read in the Old
Testament about the renewal of the world, as instanced by the
quotations from Isaias, is said metaphorically: and that even as the
sun is said to be darkened in reference to a person when he encounters
a great sorrow so as not to know what to do (which way of speaking is
customary to Scripture), so on the other hand the sun is said to shine
brighter for a person, and the whole world to be renewed, when he is
brought from a state of sorrow to one of very great joy. But this is
not in harmony with the authority and commentaries of holy men.
Consequently we must answer this argument by saying that although the
heavenly bodies far surpass the human body, yet the rational soul
surpasses the heavenly bodies far more than these surpass the human
body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the heavenly bodies were
made for man's sake; not, however as though this were the principal
end, since the principal end of all things is God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the elements will be renewed by an addition of brightness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the elements will not be renewed by
receiving some kind of brightness. For just as light is a quality
proper to a heavenly body, so are hot and cold, wet and dry. qualities
proper to the elements. Therefore as the heaven is renewed by an
increase of brightness, so ought the elements to be renewed by an
increase of active and passive qualities.
Objection 2: Further, rarity, and density are qualities of the
elements, and the elements will not be deprived of them at this
renewal. Now the rarity and density of the elements would seem to be an
obstacle to brightness, since a bright body needs to be condensed, for
which reason the rarity of the air seems incompatible with brightness,
and in like manner the density of the earth which is an obstacle to
transparency. Therefore it is impossible for the elements to be renewed
by the addition of brightness.
Objection 3: Further, it is agreed that the damned will be in the
earth. Yet they will be in darkness not only internal but also
external. Therefore the earth will not be endowed with brightness in
this renewal, nor for the same reason will the other elements.
Objection 4: Further, increase of brightness in the elements implies an
increase of heat. If therefore at this renewal the brightness of the
elements be greater than it is now, their heat will likewise be
greater; and thus it would seem that they will be changed from their
natural qualities, which are in them according to a fixed measure: and
this is absurd.
Objection 5: Further, the good of the universe which consists in the
order and harmony of the parts is more excellent than the good of any
individual creature. But if one creature be bettered, the good of the
universe is done away, since there will no longer be the same harmony.
Therefore if the elemental bodies, which according to their natural
degree in the universe should be devoid of brightness, were to be
endowed with brightness, the perfection of the universe would be
diminished thereby rather than increased.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 21:1): "I saw a new heaven and a
new earth. " Now the heaven will be renewed by an increase of
brightness. Therefore the earth and likewise the other elements will
also.
Further, the lower bodies, like the higher, are for man's use. Now the
corporeal creature will be rewarded for its services to man, as a gloss
of Ambrose seems to say on Rom. 8:22, "Every creature groaneth," and a
gloss of Jerome on Is. 30:26, "And the light of the moon shall be,"
etc. Therefore the elements will be glorified as well as the heavenly
bodies.
Further, man's body is composed of the elements. Therefore the
elemental particles that are in man's body will be glorified by the
addition of brightness when man is glorified. Now it is fitting that
whole and part should have the same disposition. Therefore it is
fitting that the elements themselves should be endowed with brightness.
I answer that, Just as there is a certain order between the heavenly
spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so is there an order between
heavenly bodies and earthly bodies. Since then the corporeal creature
was made for the sake of the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows
that corporeal things are dealt with similarly to spiritual things. Now
in this final consummation of things the lower spirits will receive the
properties of the higher spirits, because men will be as the angels in
heaven (Mat. 22:30): and this will be accomplished by conferring the
highest degree of perfection on that in which the human spirit agrees
with the angelic. Wherefore, in like manner, since the lower bodies do
not agree with the heavenly bodies except in the nature of light and
transparency (De Anima ii), it follows that the lower bodies are to be
perfected chiefly as regards brightness. Hence all the elements will be
clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, but according
to their mode: for it is said that the earth on its outward surface
will be as transparent as glass, water as crystal, the air as heaven,
fire as the lights of heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [5122](A[1]), the renewal of the
world is directed to the effect that man even by his senses may as it
were see the Godhead by manifest signs. Now the most spiritual and
subtle of our senses is the sight. Consequently all the lower bodies
need to be bettered, chiefly as regards the visible qualities the
principle of which is light. On the other hand, the elemental qualities
regard the touch, which is the most material of the senses, and the
excess of their contrariety is more displeasing than pleasant; whereas
excess of light will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety, except
on account of a weakness in the organ, such as will not be then.
Reply to Objection 2: The air will be bright, not as casting forth
rays, but as an enlightened transparency; while the earth, although it
is opaque through lack of light, yet by the Divine power its surface
will be clothed with the glory of brightness, without prejudice to its
density.
Reply to Objection 3: The earth will not be glorified with brightness
in the infernal regions; but instead of this glory, that part of the
earth will have the rational spirits of men and demons who though weak
by reason of sin are nevertheless superior to any corporeal quality by
the dignity of their nature. or we may say that, though the whole earth
be glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness,
since even the fire of hell, while shining for them in one respect,
will be unable to enlighten them in another.
Reply to Objection 4: This brightness will be in these bodies even as
it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat, because these
bodies will then be unalterable, as the heavenly bodies are now.
Reply to Objection 5: The order of the universe will not be done away
by the betterment of the elements, because all the other parts will
also be bettered, and so the same harmony will remain.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal?
Objection 1: It would seem that the plants and animals will remain in
this renewal. For the elements should be deprived of nothing that
belongs to their adornment. Now the elements are said to be adorned by
the animals and plants [*Cf. Gn. 1:11,12,20,21,24,25]. Therefore they
will not be removed in this renewal.
Objection 2: Further, just as the elements served man, so also did
animals, plants and mineral bodies. But on account of this service the
elements will be glorified. Therefore both animals and plants and
mineral bodies will be glorified likewise.
Objection 3: Further, the universe will remain imperfect if anything
belonging to its perfection be removed. Now the species of animals,
plants, and mineral bodies belong to the perfection of the universe.
Since then we must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it
is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals
will remain.
Objection 4: Further, animals and plants have a more noble form than
the elements. Now the world, at this final renewal, will be changed for
the better. Therefore animals and plants should remain rather than the
elements, since they are nobler.
Objection 5: Further, it is unseemly to assert that the natural
appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural appetite animals and
plants desire to be for ever, if indeed not as regards the individual,
at least as regards the species: and to this end their continual
generation is directed (De Generat. ii). Therefore it is unseemly to
say that these species will at length cease to be.
On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, either all of
them will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb animals, which
had previously died, will have to rise again just as men will rise
again. But this cannot be asserted for since their form comes to
nothing, they cannot resume the same identical form. On the other hand
if not all but some of them remain, since there is no more reason for
one of them remaining for ever rather than another, it would seem that
none of them will. But whatever remains after the world has been
renewed will remain for ever, generation and corruption being done
away. Therefore plants and animals will altogether cease after the
renewal of the world.
Further, according to the Philosopher (De Generat. ii) the species of
animals, plants and such like corruptible things, are not perpetuated
except by the continuance of the heavenly movement. Now this will cease
then. Therefore it will be impossible for those species to be
perpetuated.
Further, if the end cease, those things which are directed to the end
should cease. Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human
life; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): "Even as the green herbs have
I delivered all flesh to you [*Vulg. : 'have I delivered them all to
you']. " Therefore when man's animal life ceases, animals and plants
should cease. But after this renewal animal life will cease in man.
Therefore neither plants nor animals ought to remain.
I answer that, Since the renewal of the world will be for man's sake it
follows that it should be conformed to the renewal of man. Now by being
renewed man will pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility
and to a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (1 Cor.
15:53): "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal
must put on immortality"; and consequently the world will be renewed in
such a way as to throw off all corruption and remain for ever at rest.
Therefore it will be impossible for anything to be the subject of that
renewal, unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the
heavenly bodies, the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by
their very nature incorruptible both as to their whole and as to their
part: the elements are corruptible as to their parts but incorruptible
as a whole: while men are corruptible both in whole and in part, but
this is on the part of their matter not on the part of their form, the
rational soul to wit, which will remain incorrupt after the corruption
of man. on the other hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and all
mixed bodies, are corruptible both in their whole and in their parts,
both on the part of their matter which loses its form, and on the part
of their form which does not remain actually; and thus they are in no
way subjects of incorruption. Hence they will not remain in this
renewal, but those things alone which we have mentioned above.
Reply to Objection 1: These bodies are said to adorn the elements,
inasmuch as the general active and passive forces which are in the
elements are applied to specific actions: hence they adorn the elements
in their active and passive state. But this state will not remain in
the elements: wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to
remain.
Reply to Objection 2: Neither animals nor plants nor any other bodies
merited anything by their services to man, since they lack free-will.
However, certain bodies are said to be rewarded in so far as man
merited that those things should be renewed which are adapted to be
renewed. But plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of
incorruption, as stated above. Wherefore for this very reason man did
not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can merit for
another, or even for himself that which another or himself is incapable
of receiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited by serving
man, it would not follow that they are to be renewed.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as several kinds of perfection are ascribed
to man (for there is the perfection of created nature and the
perfection of glorified nature), so also there is a twofold perfection
of the universe, one corresponding to this state of changeableness, the
other corresponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and
animals belong to its perfection according to the present state, and
not according to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable
thereof.
Reply to Objection 4: Although animals and plants as to certain other
respects are more noble than the elements, the elements are more noble
in relation to incorruption, as explained above [*Cf. [5123] Q[74],
A[1], ad 3].
Reply to Objection 5: The natural desire to be for ever that is in
animals and plants must be understood in reference to the movement of
the heaven, so that they may continue in being as long as the movement
of the heaven lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to
last longer than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of movement
in the first movable body, plants and animals cease as to their
species, it does not follow that the natural appetite is frustrated.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED* (THREE
ARTICLES) [*Cf. FP, Q[12]]
In the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after
the general judgment. We shall consider: (1) Their vision of the Divine
essence, wherein their bliss consists chiefly; (2) Their bliss and
their mansions; (3) Their relations with the damned; (4) Their gifts,
which are contained in their bliss; (5) The crowns which perfect and
adorn their happiness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints will see God in His essence?
(2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body?
(3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to
the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (Jn. 1:18): "No man
hath seen God at any time"; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (Hom.
xiv in Joan. ) that "not even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim
and Seraphim, have ever been able to see Him as He is. " Now, only
equality with the angels is promised to men (Mat. 22:30): "They . . .
shall be as the angels of God in heaven. " Therefore neither will the
saints in heaven see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius argues thus (Div. Nom. i): "Knowledge
is only of existing things. " Now whatever exists is finite, since it is
confined to a certain genus: and therefore God, since He is infinite,
is above all existing things. Therefore there is no knowledge of Him,
and He is above all knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (De Myst. Theol. i) shows that the most
perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God is when it is
united to Him as to something unknown. Now that which is seen in its
essence is not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to
see God in His essence.
Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach. ) that "the
darkness"---for thus he calls the abundance of light---"which screens
God is impervious to all illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge:
and if anyone in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not God
Himself, but one of those things that are His. " Therefore no created
intellect will be able to see God in His essence.
Objection 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad Hieroth. ) "God is
invisible on account of His surpassing glory. " Now His glory surpasses
the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is
invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.
Objection 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection
of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible
and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there
is no possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence,
since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will
be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the
created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise
attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our
intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something
actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object
understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual
operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of
heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by
means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot
be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must needs
have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our intellect in
essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed
in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed by God on our
intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to
the knowledge of God except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its
cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God except
through His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see Him
in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 9: Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our
intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna
(Metaph. iii), "the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does
not imply that its essence is in our intellect," because in that case
our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an
accident, "but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect. "
Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us,
except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But this
impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for
since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it degenerates
to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to
degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person
in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a
black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said
to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God
in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this
impression.
Objection 10: Further, "In things devoid of matter that which
understands is the same as that which is understood" (De Anima iii).
Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which
is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible
for our intellect to see God in His essence.
Objection 11: Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as to
what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only
what He is not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. i) declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in
His essence.
Objection 12: Further, every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But
God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown.
Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a
created intellect.
Objection 13: Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii):
"God is by nature invisible. " Now that which is in God by nature cannot
be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His
essence.
Objection 14: Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in another
way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in
another way by the saints in heaven: for He according to His own mode,
but will be seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He
will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in
His essence.
Objection 15: Further, that which is seen through a medium is not seen
in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which
is the light of glory, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall
see light. " Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.
Objection 16: Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see
him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through
His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. " Now that which is seen
face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His
essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear we shall be
like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is. " Therefore we shall see
Him in His essence.
Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have delivered up the
kingdom to God and the Father," says: "Where," i. e. in heaven, "the
essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to
the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss. " Therefore the
blessed will see God in His essence.
Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me shall be loved
of My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him. "
Now that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will
be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of Ex. 33:20,
"Man shall not see Me and live," disapproves of the opinion of those
who said that "in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but
not in His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature. " But His
nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.
Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now
the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according
to Ex. 33:13, "Show me Thy glory"; Ps. 79:20, "Show Thy face and we
shall be saved"; and Jn. 14:8, "Show us the Father and it is enough for
us. " Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.
I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man's life
is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man's ultimate
happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their
being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers
and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference
of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can
never come to understand separate substances. thus Alfarabius expresses
himself at the end of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his
book On the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In
like manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never
attain to the vision of God in His essence. on either side they were
moved by the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine
essence and from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is
somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would seem
difficult to understand how the created intellect is made to be an
uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan. ): "How
can the creature see the uncreated? " Those who hold the passive
intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as being a
power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty not
only as regards the vision of God but also as regards the vision of any
separate substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First,
because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture,
as Augustine declares (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, because,
since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that
his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected
in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the
intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect
man does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to
something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other
than God is the object of man's happiness: and since the ultimate
perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it
follows that something other than God is the effective principle of
man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the
philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate
substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these
substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our
intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence,
and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of
separate substances.
It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like
Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our
intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to
the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two
arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not
diversified in various individuals, except as united to various
individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in
me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary
forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea
understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity
understood, which is one and the same in the various persons
understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance.
Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any
intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the
separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that
our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all
intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it
abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a
quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of
the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate
substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the
quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says
(Met. iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this
particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that
the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and
consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some
quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a
separate quiddity [*Cf. [5124]FP, Q[88], A[2]].
But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the
quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is
not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and
consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities
of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows
the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence,
which more than any other is of a different nature from any created
quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature,
nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the
knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most
remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect
unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as
an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially:
and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence
to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the
essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him
in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in
his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understanding separate
substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by us by
means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images
of their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are
immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems
inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that
"whatever is received into any thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient": and consequently the likeness of the Divine essence
impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our
intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect
reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may
occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is
a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the
same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such
is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in
comparison with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet
more defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but
only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an
orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In
another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not
attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or
proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a
being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is
defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in order that the
sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive the likeness of
whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to
the same manner of being because the form has a manner of being in the
sense other from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for
if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not
be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order that the intellect
understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness
according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not
be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in
the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to
its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio
with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness
received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that His
essence be seen immediately.
