No More Learning

"lMAriadne's lament . . .
Women circa 1900were no longer the Woman, who, without writing herself, made men speak, and they were no longer feminine consumers, who at best wrote down the fruits of their reading. A new wisdom gave them the word, even if it was for the dictation of a master's discourse.
NIETZSCHE 199
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Whenever the hermit of Sils went out among people, he consorted with emancipated women-that is, with women who wrote. For their part, from 1885on they traveled to Engadine "only in order to make the ac- quaintance of Professor Nietzsche, who nonetheless seemed to them to be the most dangerous enemy of women. "'"' The quiet mountain valley thus witnessed the future of our educational institutions. Whereas until 1908 Prussia's bureaucratic university held fast to its founding exclusion, Swit- zerland had long admitted women to the university. 'IMLou von Salomi is only the most well known among them; aside from her and other women students, at least three women Ph. D. S appeared in Nietzsche's circle: Meta von Salis, Resa von Schirnhofer (to whom Nietzsche vainly recom- mended himself as a dissertation t~pic),'a"n~d one of the first women to earn a doctorate after the great historical turning point, Helene Drus- kowitz. Yet this context of Nietzsche's writing remains as unanalyzed as it is decisive. '" With writing women as with writing machines, the man of many failed experiments was the first to use discursive innovations.
The text that Nietzsche first composed and then transferred into Ariad- ne's lament came from Lou Salome. One has only to exchange "enigma" or "enigmatic life" for "Dionysus" in the "Hymn to Life," and the woman's verse "If you have no happiness left to give me, good then, you still have pain! " becomes Nietzsche-Ariadne's "No! Come back! With all your martyring! " The dithyramb (to say nothing of the rest of Nietzsche's rela- tionship to Salomk) thus remains quite close to what suffragettes called "the language of woman. " In a letter to his sister from Zurich, where Druskowitz was a student, Nietzsche reports:
This afternoon I took a long walk with my new friend Helene Druscowia, who lives with her mother a few houses up from the Pension Neptune: of all the women I have come to know she has read my books with the most seriousness, and not for nothing. Look and see what you think of her latest writing (Three English Poetesses, among them Eliot, whom she greatly esteems, and a book on
Shelley). . . .
my "philosophv. " I""
I would say she is a noble and honest creature, who does no harm to
A woman (Nietzsche'ssister) is thus written that other women write- particularly about other women, who without disparagement are called "poetesses. " She reads further that writing women are the most serious of Nietzsche's readers, without any doubt about their independence. There is no longer any talk about the ravages of feminine reading mania. Nietzsche learned with great care the negative lesson of the Pforta school, where pupils could become acquainted with everything but women. His "philosophy," therefore set between quotation marks, reversed the uni- versity discourse. Out of the exclusion of the other sex came, circa 1900, an inclusion. "I am your labyrinth," says Dionysus to one who in the
? Cretan cultic dance was herself the mistress of the labyrinth. Not only because Nietzsche exploded the interpretation rules of 1800 is it unneces- sary to identify Ariadne with Cosima Wagner, as so often occurs. The enigma at the origin of all discourse has been played out; henceforth "women" count only insofar as they are known to Nietzsche and are ac- quainted with Nietzsche's writing.
Women are neither One nor all, but rather, like signifiers, a numbered multitude, or with Leporello, rnill'e tre. Accordingly, their relation to Nietzsche's "philosophy" is ordered by selection. George's male circle, which would implement a reduction of books and book distribution, was not the first to put an end to the classical proliferation of texts. First, Zu~uthustruwas already, in a direct reversal of the reception aesthetics of 1800, A Book for Everyone and No One. Second, Zaruthustru con- cluded with a secret fourth part, carefully planned as a private edition. Third, Nietzsche dispatched this private edition with all the wiliness of a Dionysus, who passed his wiliness on only to certain women. One copy went to Helene Druskowitz, who, however, "took it to be a loan and soon returned the book to Ktiselitz's address, which made Nietzsche and Koselitz quite happy, for Nietzsche later-correctly-characterized his trust of her as 'stupidity. '"""
Whether knowledge of a stupidity or stupidity of a knowledge, there arises a type of book distribution that was not distribution at all. The public shrinks to private printings and private addresses, to books as loans, even misunderstood ones. In the war between the sexes, any means is justified to select women with small ears out of an open group. Only for a time did Druskowitz belong to the happy few who read Nietzsche without any harm to Nietzsche. Once she was called ''my new friend," another time "that little literature-ninny Druscowitz," anything but "my pupil. ""' Dionysus, too, once praises Ariadne for her small ears; another time he asks her why she doesn't have larger Unstable circum- stances, dictated by physiology and chance, confronted writing men and writing women circa 1900. The philosopher who had come up with pro- vocative theses on woman as truth and untruth recommended to women (as if to realize as quickly as possible his well-known dream of chairs in Zarathustra studies) doctoral work on these theses. But when the women philosophers then-as in the books Druskowitz wrote after her disserta- tion-wrote about and against Zarathustra, Zarathustra's dispatcher had to wonder for once whether he were not the long-eared jackass. As long as women write books, there is no longer any guarantee that their torment and pleasure will consist in receiving wise words.
Druskowitz, when Nietzsche was in an insane asylum, rose in the titles of her books to "Doctor of World Wisdom" and (as if to parody F W v
NIETZSCHE 2 0 1
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Nietzky) into the aristocracy. But that was not enough: before she herself vanished into an insane asylum, she also published only "for the freest spirits. " Thus was issued an answer to Dionysus and Zarathustra, who, after all, approached women with declarations of war, whips, and tor- ture. Druskowitz's last book deals with "the male as a logical and tem- poral impossibility and as the curse of the world":
Throughout the entire organic world, the superiority claimed on behalf of the male sexual form has been lost by the human male in two senses: ( I ) as regards the more attractive part of the animal kingdom, ( 2 ) as regards his feminine com- panion. The she-goat and female ape would more deserve to be called his natural companions. For he is horribly made and carries the sign of his sex, in the shape of a sewer pump, before him like a criminal. "'
The feminist, despite Nietzsche'sdenial, just might be a true pupil. "Must we not first hate each other, if we are to love one another? " The polarity of the sexes in 1800 unified mothers, writers, and feminine readers in One Love, but now twoscare tacticians, as hostile as they are equal, enter the scene. The language of man and the language of woman deny one another with the charge that everything said by one side is determined by what is said by the other. Dissuasion includes "askinrbehind," a phrase coined by Niensche. Druskowitz sees in his philosophy only a dusty love of the Greeks, determined by his neohumanist education; Nietzsche, per- haps because he recommends his philosophy to women as a dissertation topic, sees in their books only a gymnasium-determined, stinking alpha- betism. "For heaven's sake don't let us transmit our gymnasium educa- tion to girls! An education that so often takes spirited, knowledge-thirsty, passionate young people and makes of them-images of their teachers! '""
"Asking-behind'' can be precarious. No sooner has one traced certain discourses of others to the Discourse of the Other, than the topic turns to boys who are images of their teachers and who are thus precisely the Dis- course of the Other in that they are also images of the star pupil who writes. The escalation of scare tactics in the war between the two sexes can thus only end in dithyrambic self-scorn.
Ha! Herauf, Wiirde! Tugend-Wiirde! Europser-Wiirde! Blase, blase wieder,
Blasebalg der Tugend!
Ha!
Noch Ein Mal briillen,
Moralisch briillen,
Als moralischer L6we
Vor den Tochtern der Wiiste briillen! -Denn Tugend-Geheul,
Ihr allerliebsten Madchen,
? 1st mehr als Alles
Europaer-hbrunst, Europier-Heisshunger! Und da stehe ich schon,
AIS Europier,
lch kann nicht anders, Gott helfe mir! Amen!
Ha! Upward, dignity!
Virtue-dignity! The European's dignity!
blow, blow again
bellows of virtue!
Ha!
Roar once more,
the moral roar,
roar like a moral lion
before the daughters of the desert!
-For virtue-wailing,
you dearest girls,
is more than anything
the European's ardor, the European's craving! And there I am,
as a European,
I have no choice, God help me!
Amen! "'
This was the riskiest of experiments, and therefore it remained on paper. Before the daughters of the desert, one prostitutes a discourse, which as the Discourse of the Other rules animals and can make them speak. What the Pforta school denied to its star pupil is realized in the desert: women appear, very different from gymnasium pupils and their emancipated copies. They neither speak nor write; a moralistic howling monkey, although he calls himself the labyrinth of women, finds that Dudu and Suleika, these "mute, ominous she-cats," "resphinx" him. The enigma of sexual difference, the phallus that Nietzsche transfigures into a Dionysian instrument of torture and that "Ema (Dr. Helene von Drus- kowitz)" proclaimed was a stigma in the shape of a sewer pump-in the desert its only invitation is to play.
Diese schiinste Luft trinkend,
Mit Niistern geschwellt gleich Bechern,
Ohne Zukunft, ohne Erinnerungen,
So sitze ich hier, ihr
Allerliebsten Freundinnen,
Und sehe der Palme zu,
Wie sie, einer Tanzerin gleich
Sich biegt und schmiegt und in der Hiifte wiegt -man thut es mit, sieht man lange zu!
Einer Tanzerin gleich, die, wie mir scheinen will,
NIETZSCHE 203
? 2. 04 1900
Zu lange schon, gefshrlich lange
Immer, immer nur auf Einem Beine stand? -Da vergass sie darob, wie mir scheinen will, Das andre kin?
Vergebens wenigstens
Suchte ich das vermisste
Zwillings-Kleinod
-namlich das andre Bein-
In der heiligen Nahe
Ihres allerliebsten, allerzierlichsten
Facher- und Flatter- und Flitterriickchens.
Drinking this finest air,
with nostrils filled like Chalices,
without future, without memories,
here I sit, you
dearest friends,
and watch the palm tree,
how like a dancer
she plays and sways her hip
-one dances along if one watches for long! Like a dancer, who, it seems to me,
stands too long, dangerously long,
always, always only on One Leg?
-She forgot, it seems to me,
that other leg?
I at least
have looked in vain
for the missing twin jewel
-the other leg, namely-
in sacred nearness
to her dearest, most graceful
sparkling, fluttering, fanlike dress.
The phallus is missing or forgotten or there, where it is not: on women. The palm tree, instead of immediately becoming a piece of paper, as under the conditions of northern culture, dances the erection. Even the howling monkey, instead of merely learning to read and write from women as from palm trees, succumbs to the rhythmical imperative. The music that Nietzsche had vainly awaited from Wagner, Bizet, Koselitz, or Gast arises after all: a music equal to the brown sunsets of the desert. Women who are daughters of the desert, and therefore do not exist in the singular at all, place writing on the unmeasured ground without which signs and media would not exist. The despot's dream of being able to fix words as purely and simply as incessant pain would bum itself in evaporates in the emptiness that reduces words to small, amusing accidents. (The howling monkey himself mocks the word resphinx as a sin against language. ) "Un coup de d 6 jamais n'abolira le hasard. "
? In the desert of chance there is neither future nor memory. Fixed ideas might once more excite the European's ardor, but circa 1900an opposite symptom grounds the act of writing: the flight of ideas. Having become a lion or howling monkey, the philosopher can finally partake of the privi- lege of animals-an active forgethlness, which does not merely forget this or that, but forgets forgetting itself. 'I6Mnemonic technique, simply by being called technique rather than being, like memory, an inborn fac- ulty, exists only as a resistance to the incessant and thought-fleeing inno- cence of speech.
The dithyrambic, flight-of-ideas wish to be out of Europe and in the desert, to lose one's head among its daughters, was not unfulfilled. In an- other desert, the institute for the cure and care of the insane in Jena, the ex- professor demonstrated this fulfillment in front of experts. What "came to" the psychiatrists writing the case report and listening to Nietzsche's speech was what always occurred to them circa 1900:"flight of ideas. ""'
NIETZSCHE 2 0 5
? The Great Lalula
In the discourse network of 1900,discourse is produced by RANDOM GENERATORS. Psychophysics constructed such sources of noise; the new technological media stored their output.
Psychophysics
Two years before Nietzsche argued that mnemonic techniques were the genealogy of morals, a professor of psychology in Breslau, Hermann Ebbinghaus, published a short but revolutionary work entitled O n Mem- ory. Whereas the last philosopher ended the history of Western ethics by reducing history and ethics to machines, Ebbinghaus made a new, that is, technological contribution to knowledge of an age-old phenomenon. And whereas the philosopher and man of letters described the scene of writing with every line he wrote until such autoreferentiality issues in a megalomaniacal scream (or the book Ecce Homo)and brought psychia- trists into the picture, Ebbinghaus was quite reticent about the subject of his painful autoexperiment of memory quantification. This silence makes it possible to turn the great words of the ex-professor into science. Where the one had come to his end with psychiatrically defined flight of ideas, the other risked the same fate experimentally; his text, however, records only numbers, not a word of pain or pleasure. Yet numbers are the only kind of information that remains relevant beyond all minds, whether insane or professorial: as an inscription in the real. '
"During two periods, in the years 1879-80 and 1883-84," Ebbing- haus daily conducted autoexperiments, beginning at varied times of the
? day in the first period but using the early afternoon during the second. "Care was taken that the objective conditions of life during the period of the tests were so controlled as to eliminate too great changes or irregu- larities. "' Who might have created such chaos-servants or wives, stu- dents or colleagues-remains unspecified. What matters is that a German professor modified his life during specified periods in order to be able to count something that was previously deemed common knowledge and therefore beneath notice: his own memory capacity.
How does the disappearance of the ability to reproduce, forgetfulness, depend upon the length of time during which no repetitions have taken place? What pro- portion does the increase in the certainty of reproduction bear to the number of repetitions? How do these relations vary with the greater or lessintensity of the interest in the thing to be reproduced? These and similar questions no one can answer.
This inability does not arise from a chance neglect of investigation of these relations. We cannot say that tomorrow, or whenever we wish to take time, we can investigate these problems. On the contrary, this inability is inherent in the nature of the questions themselves. Although the conceptions in question- namely, degrees of forgetfulness, of certainty and interest-are quite correct, we have no means of establishing such degrees in our experience except at the ex- tremes. We feel therefore that we are not at all in a condition to undertake the investigation. . . . For example, to express our ideas concerningtheir [memories'] physical basis we use different metaphors-stored-up ideas, engraved images, well-beaten paths. There is only one thing certain about these figures of speech and that is that they are not accurate. '
What seems most familiar to introspection here becomes an object of research. And the customary metaphors and images of psychology can- not be eradicated without mortification. Nietzsche had derived the most spiritual of memories from the body and its suffering; psychophysics ap- proached the same enigma mathematically, with methods that H. L. F. von Helmholtz and G. T. Fechner had developed to measure perception. ' A shift in paradigms occurred: Nietzsche and Ebbinghaus presupposed forgetfulness, rather than memory and its capacity, in order to place the medium of the soul against a background of emptiness or erosion. A zero value is required before acts of memory can be quantified. Ebbinghaus banned introspection and thus restored the primacy of forgetting on a theoretical level. On the one hand, there was Nietzsche's delirious joy at forgetting even his forgetfulness; on the other, there was a psychologist who forgot all of psychology in order to forge its algebraic formula. This is the relation of the Discourse of the Master to that of the university, of Nietzschean command to technological execution. Rather than give a philosophical description of mnemonic inscription and practice it in dithyrambs, Ebbinghaus took the place of Nietzsche's victim or experi-
THE GREAT LALUa 207
? 208 r9oo
mental subject and then retroactively became the observer of his own ex- perience in order to quantify what he had suffered.
Reading aloud at a tempo dictated by the ticking of his pocket watch, the professor spent years reading line after line of meaningless syllables, until he could recite them from memory. "His idea of using meaningless syllables as experimental material solved in a single stroke the introspec- tionist problem of finding meaning-free sensation^. "^ From that point on, the bare relation of numbers could serve as a measure for the force of psychophysical inscription. Lines of seven syllables can be learned in- stantly, lines of twelve syllables have to be read sixteen times, and lines of twenty-six syllables have to be read fifty-five times before the mechanism of reproducible memorization clicks on. It was not always easy, however, to exclude self-fulfilling prophecies in the numerical results; the forget- ting of forgetting remains as paradoxical as the effort "to rid oneself of a thought and by that very attempt foster that thought. "" After three quar- ters of an hour of uninterrupted memory exercises, "occasionally exhaus- tion, headache, and other symptoms," set in, "which if continued would have complicated the conditions of the experiment. "- Psychophysics is thus quite real, particularly for its inventor, for whom it (likeall mnemonic techniques, according to Nietzsche) causes physical discomfort. It was known in the classical age that "such a dreadfully one-sided application of so subordinate a mental power as memory can derange human rea- son";' but for this reason Anselmus circumvented mechanical repetition through hermeneutics. In 1900the opposite is necessary. A subordinate mental function becomes the most fundamental, because it is quantifi- able. ' Forthesakeofafewformulas,Ebbinghaussacrificed(asNietzsche did for the desert) his subject of knowledge. '"Dizzy, numbed by all the syllables, his mind became a tabula rasa. "
The test's individual conditions all contributed to such emptiness. Lan- guage was artificially reduced to a raw state. First, Ebbinghaus did not allow "the meaningless syllables to be connected with any associated meanings,asischaracteristicofcertainmnemonictechniques. ',I* Second, the empty page he had become was cleansed of memories and his native language. To isolate memory from all other cultural practices, Ebbing- haus eliminated signifieds from the beginning, because they might have provoked hermeneutic activity. "Associations tending in different direc- tions, differing degrees of interest, the recollection of particularly striking or beautiful verses, etc. ," all such ordinarily sanctioned mental activity amounted only to "disturbing influences. " ' I With his head spinning, Ebbinghaus achieved an unthinkable distance where nothing, but nothing, means anything. He instituted the flight of ideas.
? There is nothing exotic in distance, and the great kingdom of nonsense is no exception. In order to prove that recollecting meaningless material was the rule, Ebbinghaus conducted counter experiments. As if to test Nieasche's thesis of the basic utility of metrics, Ebbinghaus memorized cantos from Byron's Don Juan under the same experimental conditions as before. Even he was surprised by the result. "From this point of view it almost seems as if the difference between sense and nonsense material were not nearly so great as one would be inclined a priori to imagine. "" Thus the great doctrine bestowed by the discourse network of 1800 on its reformed primers is shaken: namely, the notion that readers would learn signifieds, because of their immanence in the mind, with much greater speed than they would learn signifiers by rote. To the contrary, pure non- sense reveals certain specific aspects of attention that hermeneutics could not even conceive. "The homogeneity of the series of syllables falls con- siderably short of what might be expected of it. The series exhibit very important and almost incomprehensible variations as to the ease or diffi- culty with which they are learned. "" Just beyond the purpose of the test, then, there is something that no longer concerns Ebbinghaus but that will interest Freud and the writers; it is the differentiality that precedes all meaning: the naked, elementary existence of signifiers. If "from this point of view" the difference between sense and nonsense dwindles, then the kingdom of sense-that is, the entire discourse network of I goo-sinks to the level of a secondary and exceptional phenomenon.
Neither under- standing nor the previously fundamental capacity of "inwardizing" or recollection has any significant effect on the mechanics of memory.
If signifiers obey laws that are as fundamental as they are incomprehen- sible, it is essential to have the test material expressed in strict, statistical terms. Long before the expressionist "language eroticism" [Spracherorik] that "first must demolish language" and "establish the chaotic, originary condition, the absolute homogeneity of the material," I6 Ebbinghaus went to work on the same project. The nonsense that he spent hours, days, weeks, and years memorizing was never picked up from any native speak- ers in any locality. It was generated by a calculation at the beginning of every test series. Through an exhaustive combination of eleven vowels, nineteen beginning consonants, and (for the sake of pronunciation) only eleven end consonants, there came to be "ca. 2,300" or (asanyone might calculate) 2,299 tripthong syllables. " The random generator can not keep a few meaningful German words from appearing in a series, "doscbpiim
. "In
feu. lot. .
lor five seconds ago) and that have little effect. "Among many thousand combinations there occur scarcely a few dozen that have a meaning and
These, however, are exceptions that can be read over (like
THEGREATLALUU 209
? 210 1900
among these there are again only a few whose meaning was realized while they were being memorized. ""
Never before had such passion been devoted to syllables. Of course, Reformation primers did, to the dismay of the classical age, play through single vowel-consonant combinations of the second order. But their ab eb ib ob ub / bu be bibo bu was only an example; the goal was not a mathe- matically guaranteed completeness of assembly. The discourse network of 1900 was the first to establish a treasury of the signifier whose rules were entirely based on randomness and combinatorics. '" It is not that, with Ebbinghaus's numbered sounds and sound combinations or Mallarmk's twenty-four letters, an old-European discursive practice returns from its repression circa 1800. ~'The fact that combinatory groups do not neces- sarily produce sense also applied to the letters and words of the miserable scribes of 1736. But not even Liscov's satire had the scribes systematically avoid "agreement among the letters" the way Ebbinghaus did. The differ-
ence between the polyphonic line and the twelve-tone technique is simi- jar; the latter not only revives all contrapuntal-combinatory arts, but also avoids all accidental harmonic effects just as counterpoint had avoided all d'issonance.
The homologies between dodecaphony and Ebbinghaus, who began a whole positivist movement, are so far-reaching that a search for fac- tual cross-connections would be worthwhile (though it would not be merely the investigation into the ambience of Viennese coffee houses that Adorno's philosophy of modem music in all seriousness proposes). First, Ebbinghaus memorized the meaningless syllables in groups of seven to twenty-six, which, like Schonberg's twelve tones, are called series. Sec- ond, he eliminated the disturbing effects of easily learned syllables by put- ting aside the syllables from the available supply of 2,299 combinations that had already been memorized until all the other combinations had been gone through. zZDodecaphony proceeded in the same way with se- rial tones that had already been employed: these were taboo until the re- maining eleven had been tun through. Third, in order to refute the doc- trine of free association taught in 1800, Ebbinghaus produced a very complicated demonstration showing that the interconnection of members of a row facilitates memorization; for example, if an already memorized series dosch pam f a r lot . . . ,is reordered into the series lot pam few dosch . . . . Accordingly, "not only are the original terms associated with their immediate sequents," that is, those following in either direction, but "connections are also established between each term and those which fol- low it beyond several intervening members. "" Schonberg proceeded in the same manner by bypassing certain notes in a melody and transferring
them to parallel ~oices. ~In' both cases a combinatorics presented in the
? original material is subjected to a further combinatorics of the series and column.
Permutations of permutations eliminate any natural relation. Non- sense syllables or chromatic tones of equal value constitute media in the modern sense: material produced by random generation, selected and grouped into individual complexes. The fact that these materials always join discrete elements and do not develop in continuous genesis from an unarticulated nature distinguishes them from minimal signifieds. To Ebbinghaus the unique "oh" would simply be one among the 209 pos- sible dipthong combinations. It would not take until the year 2407, as Christian Morgenstern's Gingunz announces, for "the great paper- shredding snow centrifuge of the American Nature Theater Company Ltd. of Brotherson & Sann" to take the place of organically grown snow crystals. L'
If a syllable such as mu does not grow out of a mother-child love tran- scending words and then glide into the first word of the high idiom, Mama, but rather is thrown out like dice, it forfeits any ranking above the countless other syllables that are and remain meaningless. On the contrary, the effect of meaning, greeted by Tiedemann and Stephani as a revelation from beyond all language, becomes a disturbance that troubles the pure flightofideas with memories and associations. Thinking and in- tending, however, are the imaginary acts that led the philosophers of
1800to assert the primacy of the oral. In contrast to the technologies of the letter, only speaking-an externalization that immediately dis- appears-could figure as the frictionless unification of Spirit and Nature. But orality, together with thought, vanishes from randomly generated language material. Of course, Ebbinghaus worked with phonemes in order to be able to read aloud, but they were presented to him as writing. Syllable after syllable comes out of the random generator, onto the desk and into the file of worked-through alternatives, until all 2,299 have been used and output and input can begin again.
Memory tests in which the experimental subject necessarily thinks nothing and abandons the position of knowing subject have an equally subjectless observer, who is not as far from Nietzsche's new god as hasty distinctions between myth and positivism would have it. The two me- chanicalmemoriesoneithersideofthetabularasaEbbinghaus-the one generating the syllables and the other recording them after they have passed before him-form a writing machine that forgets nothing and stores more nonsense than people ever could: 2,299 nonsense syllables. This is the necessary condition for a psychophysical investigation of memory: memory is taken from people and delegated to a material orga- nization of discourse. The discourse network of 1800played the game
THE GREAT LALUU 21I
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of not being a discourse network and pretended instead to be the in- wardness and voice of Man; in 1900a type of writing assumes power that does not conform to traditional writing systems but rather radicalizes the technology of writing in generaLZ6
The most radical extrapolation from a discourse network of writing is to write writing. "All letters that have ever been written by man count. "'- Given an assortment of letters and diacritical signs, like a typewriter key- board (even, after 1888, in its standardized form), then in principle it is possible to inscribe more and different sorts of things than any voice has ever spoken. Of course, such notations have no purpose beyond notation itself; they need not and cannot be dematerialized and consumed by a hermeneutics; their indelible and indigestible existence on the page is all that the page conveys.
THE GREAT LALULA
Kroklokwafzi? Semernemi! Seiokrontro-prafriplo: Bifzi, bafzi; hulalemi: quasti basti bo. . .
Lalu lalu lalu lalu la!
Hontraruru rnirornente zasku zes rii rii? Entepente, leiolente klekwapufzi Iii?
Lalu lalu lalu lalu la!
Sirnarar kos rnalzipernpu silzuzankunkrei (;)!
Majornar dos: Quernpu Lempu Siri Suri Sei [I!
Lalu lalu lalu lalu la!
Before Morgenstem's 1905collection Gdows Songs, no poem had existed as a small discourse network. Literary historians have sought classical-romantic models for these poems and have found some non- sense verse here and there. **But even the "Wien ung quatsch, Ba nu, Ba nu n'am tsche fatsch," sung by a dark-skinned cook in Clemens Brentano's Several Millers of Sorrow, if it is not pidgin Rumanian, is at least speak- able. " No voice, however, can speak parentheses that enclose a semicolon (as specified in "The Great Lalulii") or even-to demonstrate once and for all what media are-brackets that surround an empty space. System- atic nonsense, which demands inhuman storage capacities, exists only in writing. The fact that Morgenstern's syllables owe their existence not to a combinatory method but, at first sight at least, to lovely chance doesn't
? make them all that different from Ebbinghaus's series. "The Great Lalulii" is also material without an author; the more chance enters, the more liter- ally does the imperative in the motto of the Gallows Songs apply: "Let the molecules roar / whatever they dice together! "
Clearly, the discourse network of 1900is a dice game with "serially ordered discrete unities,'"" which in the lyric are called letters and punc- tuation signs, and to which writers since Mallarmi have ceded the ini- tiative. More anarchic than Liscov's miserable scribes, who can at least discard a bad dice throw, less Faustian than all poetae minores of 1800, who produced quantities of meaning in inverse relation to their stature, literature throws out signifiers. "The Great Lalulii" says that, in the be- ginning and in the end, language is Blabla. "You can say what you like, people more often than not do nothing but-bark, cackle, crow, bleat, etc. Just listen for once to the animal conversations in a bar. ""
What remains is the enigma of the signifiers' use. To write down script that is simply script had no appeal for hermeneutic interpreters or for philosophers, whose chief concern is "naturally the stress on the factor of meaning" and therefore "naturally" German Poetry. " "Lalulii" is more useful to cryptographers (of whom more will be said). But psychophysics would have the greatest use for such writing. There are people in whom Morgenstern's nonsense "lives on as a fount of citation"-the most cer- tain "sign for what we call a classic poet" "-though one does not know how such mnemonic technique works. Because "new creation in lan- guage has something in common with the invention of undreamed-of physical phenomena,"" the "Lalulii" would be an occasion for readers to instigate autoexperiments in memory, especially since Ebbinghaus him- self fudged things a bit. In order to measure eventual differences between sense and nonsense, the psychophysicist introduced verses by Byron and thus determinants supplementary to meaning: rhyme and meter. In "Lalul5," by contrast, only these two redundancies, with no meaning, re- strict chance. As a missing link between the syllabic hodgepodge and the lyric form, "Lalulii" could bring experimental clarification to the contro- versial question whether rhyme and meter, in their mnemonically conve- nient conspicuousness, represent the identity of signifieds or are the effects of signifiers. " In this way one could distinguish those functions that, in Byron, remain clumped together as "unified strains of sense, rhythm, rhyme, and membership in a single language. " Nietzsche's doc- trine of the utility of poetry, which stressed mnemonic technique and questioned rather than supported the possibility of the transmission of meaning, could be brought to bear on The ScientificFoundations of Po- etry more materially through "The Great Lalulii" than the apostle of naturalism, Wilhelm Bolsche, had intended in his title.
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Following the heroic autoexperiments of Ebbinghaus, breaking down discourses into single and discrete functions became the task of an en- tire psychophysics of complex cultural practices. These functions have nothing to do with one another or with any unity imposed by conscious- ness; they are automatic and autonomous. "We may sum up the experi- ment by saying that a large number of acts ordinarily called intelligent, such as reading, writing, etc. , can go on quite automatically in ordinary people. "" In 1900speaking and hearing, writing and reading were put to the test as isolated functions, without any subject or thought as their shadowy supports. "Between finitude and infinity the word has ample room to be able to d o without any help from thought. "'* Rather than the long genetic path of the word from its beginning in nature to its end in culture, what counts is the signifier's mechanism and how it runs under either normal or pathological circumstances. Psychophysics is not a peda- gogy that takes necessary truths from Mother Nature for mothers and teachers; rather, it inventories previously unresearched particulars. Cul- ture [Bildung],the great unity in which speaking, hearing, writing, and reading would achieve mutual transparency and relation to meaning, breaks apart. Even if schoolmen draw massive conclusions from the in- ventory, the experimenters are at the wheel. Pedagogic reforms are only applications; they apply to only one cultural practice; indeed, they tend to make instruction in reading or writing into a somewhat muddled order of research. Thus even in its own field, in the "psychology of reading," "the competence of pedagogy" ends. " Exit Stephani.
The victory of psychophysics is a paradigm shift. Instead of the classi- cal question of what people would be capable of if they were adequately and affectionately "cultivated," one asks what people have always been capable of when autonomic functions are singly and thoroughly tested. " Because this capability is not a gift of productive nature, but as simple as either spelling or writing "Lalulii," it has no ideal completion or end- point. There is no universal norm (inwardness, creative imagination, high idiom, Poetry) transcending the particular functions. Each has a standard only in relation to defined experimental subjects and conditions.
When ten pupils from each of ten gymnasium classes read aloud and as quickly as possible one hundred connected words from E p o n t , the measured average reading time for those in the sixth class is 55 seconds, for those in the fifth class 43 seconds, and for those in the first class 23 seconds? ' These standards mean nothing to educationally bureaucratized lovers of Goethe. Ebbinghaus adds to these numbers his own, namely 0. 16 seconds per word of Goethe, thus leveling any distinction in rank between pupils and professors, empirical evidence and norm. To measure one's own reading pace as well as that of the sixth class means methodi-
? cally disposing of culture [Bildung]. Thus Ebbinghaus does not announce any record, because "the numbers continue to diminish with further practice in reading. "" So the transcendental norm falls into an endless series, at whose irreal end might be someone who could only speedread. If psychophysical standards had ideals rather than provisional records, those ideals would resemble the genius of Kafka's hunger artist. Indeed, the first German graphologist took such interest in cripples who wrote with their mouths or feet that he attempted to do so himself and re- produced facsimiles of his efforts. " Psychophysics ceased subjecting cul- tural practices to a dichotomy of the normal and pathological, the devel- oped and underdeveloped. It investigated capabilities that in everyday life would have to be called superfluous, pathological, or obsolete.
Ebbinghaus, having been alphabetized, could read silently, without moving his mouth, but for test series he preferred the old-fashioned method of reading aloud at a tempo that could be mechanically di- rected. " Of course, typewriters that eliminated all the individuality of script had recently appea~ed:~but a psychophysical graphology arose in a counter movement and focused on the difference between standardized letters and unconscious-automatic hands that write. It was concerned with what under normal conditions would be considered a ''superfluous addition to the letters. "" If "it is emphasized-and rightly so-that a pupil should not learn material that is meaningless to him,"" each psycho- physical experimental subject-from the infant to the psychology pro- fessor-is an exception to such pedagogical norms. All the abilities and inabilities despised in I 800 return, not as simple regressions from an erst- while culture, but as objects of analysis and decomposition.
The cultural-technological standards do not represent Man and his Norm. They articulate or decompose bodies that are already dismem- bered. Nature does its own work before any experimenter arrives? ' Apo- plexy, bullet wounds to the head, and paralysis made possible the funda- mental discoveries upon which every connection drawn between cultural practices and physiology is based. In 1861 Paul Broca traced motoric aphasia, or the inability to pronounce words despite unimpaired con- sciousness and hearing, to lesions in a circumscribed area of the cerebral cortex. In I 874 Karl Wernicke made the mirroring discovery that sensory aphasia, or the inability to hear words despite unimpaired speech capac- ity, corresponded to a deficit in other areas of the brain. The method of isolating and measuring cultural practices by reference to deficiencies led finally to the decomposition of discourse into single parameter^. '^ Circa 1900 optical disturbances corresponding to the acoustical disturbances investigated by Broca and Wernicke, the alexias or agraphias, also be- came familiar. Further, a certain reversal in relation to linguistic reference
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and its agnosias was discovered, for there turned out to be an oral, and then a graphic asymbolia, or the inability "to find the verbal image of an object" even when the doctor would show it to the patient. '" Diverse sub- routines finally had to be distinguished within each cultural practice; for example, writing included "dictation, copying, written description, and spontaneous writing" "-and each of the subroutines might lead to dif- ferent results. What we ordinarily call language is thus a complex linkage of brain centers through no less numerous direct and indirect nerve con- nections. As Nietzsche had prophesied and, as a paralytic, demonstrated to his psychiatrist Theodor Ziehen, language breaks down into individual elements: into optical, acoustical, sensory, and motoric nervous impulses and only then into signifier/signified/referent.
Research into aphasia marked a turning point in the adventures of speech. Disturbances in language no longer converged in the beautiful wordlessness of the romantic soul. If there are "as many sources of lan- guagedisturbanceasthereareorgansofspeechwantingtospeak,"" then the single "oh" becomes only an incidental case. s' The Poetry that lis- tened to or inspired that "oh" is replaced by sciences. Only on the basis of psychophysics does it make terminological sense for Saussure, in found- ing a new linguistics, to decompose the linguistic sign into the notion of a concept (signified) and an acoustic-sensory image (signifier),'' or for Freud, more copied than understood by his students, similarly to divide "thing representation" [Sucbvorstellung] from "word representation" [Wortvorstellung]. "
The cultural goal of universal alphabetization fades away with the "oh" of the soul. The pedagogy of 1900,because it was applied physi- ology, was preoccupied with standardizing, individually and successively, the brain regions of its pupils. The center of concrete representations, the motoric and sensorial centers for speech and writing-all had to be approached separately. "The reading-writing method in no way corre- sponds to the state of contemporary science. "'" Because not every local center has direct nerve connections to every other, there is no unity of the transcendental signified capable of organically developing speaking and hearing, writing and reading out of one another. The pedagogical un- coupling of the cultural-technological subroutines simply followed cuts made by the scalpel. Children circa 1900learned to read without under- standing and to write without thinking. The investigation of aphasia is always already its production.
In 1913Wassily Kandinsky published a volume of poems in German. He accompanied the title Sounds with some very practical tips. He meant not romantic primal sounds, but "inner sounds" that remain when one has repeated words until they become senseless-a proven and oft-employed
? THE GREAT LALUa 217
means of simulating aphasia. Thus Kandinsky's poetry isolated the sound images of words physiologically with the exactness that his painting iso- lated colors and forms. That does not hinder Germanists from attacking him in the name of a linguistics that grew out of the same premises. '' But alexia seems to haunt the books of its forgotten investigators . . .
In 1902Hofmannsthal's A Letter appeared with a self-diagnosis of the sender.
And could I, if otherwise I am still the same person, have lost from my inscrutable self all traces and scars of this creation of my most intensive thinking-lost them so completely that in your letter now lying before me the title of my short treatise stares at me strange and cold? At first 1 could not comprehend it as the familiar image of conjoined words, hut had to study it word by word, as though these Latin terms thus strung together were meeting my eye for the first time. "
One who writes that he is hardly able to read any more is virtually for- mulating a case of sensory and near-amnesiac alexia. But the person is Phillip Lord Chandos, and the pile of letters that refuses to coalesce into the images of words is the title of a Latin tract that Chandos has recently written. In the meantime he has not lost the ability to write (say letters). But he has lost a part of his ability to read, and he suffers from a thor- oughly physiological "dullness" of the "brain. "" Whereas Ofterdingen or Guido could give to even the most foreign books their own titles, the writer of 1902can no longer even understand his own title. We can read "Chandos" in place of "the patient" when a great physiologist describes the symptoms of alexia:
T'he patient can see the letters sharply enough, he can write them spontaneously, eventually he can even copy them without error-and yet he is unahle to read anything printed or written, even the words he had just clearly and correctly writ- ten (notes, short letters). . . . Thealexic recognizes single letters or even syllables, but he cannot grasp them successively and retain them as complete words so as to arrive a t an understanding of what he has read, even for single words. "'
The solidarity of physiology and literature extends to concrete details. One isolates the symptoms to which the other attests. Nietzsche praised the half-blindness that kept him from reading and allowed only the writ- ing of signifiers. Chandos experiences a similar blindness vis-A-vis sig- nifieds, but he develops a new discourse out of alexia (just as sensory lan- guage disturbances often influence the motoric aspect of language):b' he avoids "even pronouncing" signifieds, above all the transcendental ones ("Spirit, soul, or body"), and envisions instead "a language in which not one word is known to me, a language in which mute things speak to rne. ""I In much the same way, pedagogues versed in psychophysics sepa- rated reading and writing, because neither should be confused with sig-
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nifieds and referents, from wordless observational or practical instruc- ti~n. ~As' if he were a pupil in their school, the Lord finds that "a dog in the sun, an old churchyard, a cripple" and so on are "sublime revelations" beyond all wordsMThis is not surprising in the cripple he himself is. Be- cause they switch off medial operations of selection, aphasia and alexia necessarily present the nameless and formless. In aphasics, Nietzsche's terrible voice returns to the physiology of everyday life. "Speaking, whis- tling, clapping the hands, etc. , everything is to their ears the same in- comprehensible noise. " *'
Aphasia, alexia, agraphia, agnosia, asymbolia-in this long list of dys- functionalities the noise that precedes every discourse becomes at once theme and method. The products of decomposed language observed in the experimental subjects are as usable as the material provided by the experimenters. What terrified Nietzsche and Chandos discovered as a wondrous, foreign realm can also be transmitted. Discursive manipula- tions in the discourse network of 1900were quite extensive. Psycho- physics transmits white noise through a certain filter so that what comes across is, say, pink noise; whatever the eyes and ears of the receiver make of this is then the experimental result.
Ebbinghaus further tested his nonsense syllables on others. But some- thing remarkable occurred, for not all experimental subjects had his com- mand of the flight of ideas. For some,
at least in the begmning, it is hardly possible to refrain from the learning aids of all sorts of memory supports, to perceive the syllables as mere letter combinations and memorize them in a purely mechanical fashion. Without any effort o r voli- tion on their part, all kinds of associated representations constantlv fly toward them from individual syllables. Something occurs to them, indeed a motley of things: a syllabic assonance, relations among letters, similar sounding meaningful words or the names of persons, animals, and so forth, meanings in a foreign lan- guage, etc. .