To stay in balance means not evading any
necessary
fights and not provoking unnecessary ones.
Sloterdijk - Rage and Time
What made ascending communism spooky and what lent it the power to attract the paranoid reflexes of its adversaries was its ability, which could be detected early, to convincingly threaten the status quo with its downfall.
When it had lost its capacity to threaten, it was finished as a ghost as well—and no
214
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
animation of philosophical congresses will provide the hollow pumpkin with new haunting power.
After the collapse of communism the business of world-directed revenge and, generally speaking, the business of a universal balance of suffering had to slip out of the hands of human agencies. Consequently there were good reasons the Catholic Church could present itself as authentic after the fall of communism, even as the soul of an authentic and spiritual communism. To see and seize this opportunity was Karol Wojtyla's theatrical message. The Catholic message, of course, includes the return to the classical mor- ally conservative attitude according to which the man of the present would need to free himself from rage and revolt in order to rediscover what he had lost as a consequence of the events of 1789: patience and humility. What is most of the time overlooked concerning these recommendations is that highly praised virtues stand on shaky grounds if they are not supported by the threatening force of a convincingly delivered theology of the Day of Judgment.
These remarks suggest that Hegel's figure of a cunningness of reason still has a certain pragmatic appeal, however ascetic the expectations of a hid- den reason in history might be today. If one had to step back to sum up the achievements of communism, one would most importantly mention its external effects, which many times surpassed its internal effects in terms of productivity. These external effects were, to be sure, so paradoxical that they were hardly ever addressed. It is not necessary here to once again call to mind the much-appreciated efforts of the Soviet Union in the war on the armies of the National Socialist invader. The most important external effect of communism unfolded only after 1945, when an unprecedented chance opened up to expand the European welfare-state system against the back- ground of the saber-rattling regime of Stalin and its Middle and West Euro- pean outposts.
It is ironic that the communist world bank of rage achieved its most important success in the form of an unintended side effect. By accumulat- ing a truly intimidating political and ideological threat potential, it helped its former main adversaries, the Western, moderate socialists and social democrats, to reach the high point of their historical ability. It made it easy for the parliamentarily integrated socialist parties in Europe to extort an unprecedented amount of concessions from the liberal and conservative managers of capital in redistributing wealth and extending social networks. Within this constellation, it seemed plausible to the social partners of the
215
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
Western world to transform large parts of their national industries, in par- ticular in France and Great Britain, to government control.
If it is correct to say that sovereignty refers to the capacity to convincingly threaten someone, then it is also true that the Western workers' parties and unions achieved their highest effects of sovereignty because of an indirect threat of class struggle, which they were able to include in the negotiations of the bargaining parties without having to clench the fist themselves. It suf- ficed for them to consider the realities ofthe Second World to make it clear to the employers that social peace has its price. It can be asserted without exag- geration that the social achievements of postwar Europe, in particular the often-cited Rhenish form of capitalism with its extensively extended welfare state and the excessive culture of therapy, were presents from Stalinism— grapes of wrath that, it needs to be said, could only ripen and taste sweet after being exported to a freer climate.
The expenditures for social peace in the West needed to be recalculated from scratch when the threat potential of the left irresistibly continued to decline—not least because the Soviet Union was increasingly difficult to take seriously as a threat to the West. The ultimate phase of the Brezhnev era was the latest that the preconditions for some kind of successful missionary and expansionist activity from Moscow existed. Maoism outside of China never meant more than a straw fire of peasant romanticism in the Third World (think of Che Guevara's confused excursions to Africa and Bolivia) and the waywardness of wealth in Western universities. It was already evi- dent that the East—because of its dogmatic ignorance of the question of property—could not possibly win the confrontation between competing systems. Furthermore, the Russian army provided the proof during its futile ten-year campaign against the Afghan franc-tireurs, who were supported by the United States (1979-1989), how little it was able to live up to its former reputation.
Under these circumstances, the organs of the workers of the West lost their privilege of profiting from the fear of communism from the perspec- tive of capital without any effort. The liberal-conservative camp was able to understand: during the wage-negotiation talks it sat next to a debilitated, if not degenerated, counterpart. On the one hand, the latter was out of shape because of its relative level of saturation; on the other hand, it succumbed to a creeping paralysis that resulted from the ideological deflation of the left.
Since the early 1980s, this sense of exhaustion has determined the psy- chopolitical atmosphere of the West—its results multiply with the climate-
216
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
changing fallout of September 11. It appears that a neo-authoritarian turn of capitalism with a liberal-bellicist background is more and more likely. The year 1979 needs to be seen from today's perspective as the key time of the twentieth century. The entry into the postcommunist situation begins then in a threefold sense: the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union after the invasion of its armies into Afghanistan, the accession to power of Margaret Thatcher, and the consolidation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini.
What is called neoliberalism was in fact nothing but a recalculation of the costs of inner peace in the countries of European capitalist and social- democratic "mixed economy" or of American-style "regulatory capital- ism. "26 This necessarily led to the result that Western entrepreneurialism had paid too high a price to attain social peace under passing political and ideological pressure from the East. The time for cost-reducing measures had come, measures that aimed to switch priorities from the primacy of full employment to that of corporate dynamics. In fact, a downright reversal of the Zeitgeist was brought about: it moved ever quicker away from the revolting and control-centered ethics of comfort during the decades after the war (which survived only in France) in order to give preference to a neo-entrepreneurial risk ethic.
The "market revolution" in Great Britain, which was designed by Joseph Keith and, starting in 1979, realized by Margaret Thatcher (a revolution that would soon spread to the Continent and large parts of the Western world, especially Reagan's and Clinton's America), makes clear how precisely the above diagnosis captures the situation and how radical were the conse^ quences that are to be drawn from it. This shows itself most strikingly in the permanent trend of neoliberalism—the long march to mass unemployment that has set the tone from a social-political perspective. The new circum- stances brought with it what could have hardly been imagined until then: unemployment rates of 10 percent and more are accepted more or less with- out a fight by the populations of European nations—even the increasingly visible decrease of welfare benefits has so far not provokes a flaring-up of the fire of class struggle. The relationships of sovereignty have been reversed overnight: organizations of employees have little power to threaten, because the privilege to threaten has, rather one-sidedly, passed onto the business side. The latter can now plausibly claim that everything will become much worse if the other side refuses to understand and abide by the new rules of the game.
217
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
THE THIRD COLLECTION: CAN POLITICAL ISLAM SET UP A NEW WORLD BANK OF DISSIDENCE?
IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP THIS SCENARIO IN MIND IN ORDER TO understand the conditions under which Islamic terrorism could celebrate its rise to become a power with the capacity to exert threats. Initially, the Islamists did not seem to be more than parasites of the postcommunist constellation. No one would have thought at the time of Islamism's first appearance that one was witnessing something like a third Catholicism or an Eastern alternative to communism. Nevertheless, day by day the Islamist activists successfully imposed themselves as the new enemy of the West, ini- tially the United States, and then helpless Europe. In this role they have been interpreted ambivalently from the beginning. For tragic-minded polit- ical scientists, who are convinced of the need to always have an enemy, the anger of Islamism seemed like a present from heaven. Although Islamism was initially not especially dangerous in a material sense (as long as its agents did not gain access to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the control of migration remained sufficiently strict), it keeps the psycho- political tone of irritated collectives in the West at the desired level. For the adherents of the liberal idyll, on the other hand, Islamist terror remains an unwelcome guest—a crazy graffiti sprayer who disfigures the facades of enemy-free societies with obscene messages.
However one may evaluate the ambivalent reception of the new terror by its Western addressees, it would never have advanced beyond the level of an irritating marginal phenomenon if it had not become an interesting asset in the recalculation of the costs for social peace in Western societ- ies. While the communist threat led to a significant increase in the social costs of peace, the threat of Islamist terror brings with it, at the bottom line, effects that help lower the costs. By exerting imaginary stressful pressure on the attacked collective, it contributes to a feeling of belonging to a real com- munity, a belonging based on solidarity, a survival unit wrestling for its own future in spite of recently severely deepened social differences. Addition- ally, the new terror creates, because of its undifferentiated hostility against Western forms of life, a climate of diffuse intimidation in which questions of political and existential security enjoy high priority over those of social justice—quod erat operandum.
With the exaggeration of the securitarian imperative to the level of being the omnipotent theme of contemporary media democracies, the Zeitgeist
218
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
readjusted itself after September 11, 2001, to a new ecosystem of threats and
defense mechanisms—while, this time, as frivolously as it might sound, the
threat tendencies of Islamist terror in general point "in the right direction"
when seen from the perspective of radicalized capitalism. To feel threatened
by the Middle Eastern sources now means to see reasons why one could
perhaps be ready to make peace with the drifting away of Western politi-
cal culture into postdemocratic conditions. The "war on terror" possesses
the ideal quality of not being able to be won—and thus never having to be
ended. These prospects suggest that the postdemocratic trends will enjoy a
long life. They create the preconditions with which democratically elected
leaders can get away with presenting themselves as commanders in chief. If
political thinking limits itself to advising the commander in chief, concepts
such as democracy and independent judiciary cultures are only chips in a
27
tration illustrates these relations with an abundance of unmistakable exam- ples. Within a few years the world became witness to how a democracy that is proud of its culture of dissent experienced a sudden extinction of political diversity of opinion because it was exposed to the knowingly and willingly induced fiction of a struggle for survival, which needed to be waged by the entire nation. The political field of the nation was influenced by homog- enizing forces. Reminiscent of real wars, in this drole de guerre there was a paralyzing of inner opposition through the patriotic imperative. This devel- opment to a large extent results from the work of the neoconservatives in the United States, who do not hesitate to proudly conjure up the specter of "World War IV,"28 to suffocate, wherever possible, every sign of a new opposition in light of growing social inequalities.
An investigation of the redistribution of threat potentials on the geo- political maps of the present raises the question of how the much-discussed Islamic danger is to be understood. By which media does it affect the psy- chopolitical system of the West and the Islamic countries? Does it really have the potential to "replace communism as the world dogma," as one can hear it in radical Islamic circles between Khartoum and Karachi for the last decade, and not only from behind closed doors? 29 The new specter, which is haunting Europe, the United States, and other parts of the world—from where does it take its power to threaten the leaders of the established pow- ers? Can political Islam—whether appearing with a terroristic component or without—unfold itself to become an alternative world bank of rage? Will it
strategic game.
The psychopolitical fate of the United States during the Bush adminis-
219
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
become a globally attractive collection point of antisystemic or postcapital- ist energies? Can Islamism be used for the continuation of the weary West- ern grand narratives concerning the uprising of the debased and humili- ated against their masters, old and new? Does it suffice to meditate on the concept of jihad as long as it turns into a pseudonym for class struggle? Or do the fronts, which emerge from the eruptions of the Islamic world, not possess a sense of obstinacy that can only be reconciled with Western forms of the narrative of continuing revolution, universalizing emancipation, and progressive realization of human rights at the price of misunderstandings and distortions.
What qualifies political Islam as a potential successor to communism are three advantages, which can be analogously identified with historical com- munism. The first is the fact that an inspiring mission dynamic is inherent to Islamism, a dynamic that predisposes it to become a quickly swelling col- lective of new converts, that is, a "movement" in the narrow sense of the term. It is not only the case that it quasi-universally addresses "all" without discriminating on the basis of nations and social classes. It attracts especially the disadvantaged, undecided, and outraged (insofar as they are not female, and sometimes even those). It does so by presenting itself as the advocate of the spiritually and materially neglected poor and by gaining sympathies as the heart in a heartless world. The low preconditions of admission play an impor- tant part here. As soon as a person has been admitted to the ranks of believ- ers, he is immediately usable for the purpose of the fighting community— in some cases to be immediately used as a martyr. By plunging into a vibrant community, newcomers are often given for the first time the feeling of hav- ing found a home and of not playing an equal and detached spectator but a particular role in the dramas of the world.
The second attraction of political Islam emanates from the fact that it— in a way only preceded by communism—is capable of offering its followers a clear, aggressive, and grandiosely theatrical "worldview" that rests on a clear differentiation of friend and enemy, an unmistakable mission to win, and an exhilaratingly Utopian final vision: the reconstitution of the global emirate, which is supposed to provide a shelter for the Islamic millennium, stretched out from Andalusia to the far East. With it the figure of the class enemy is replaced with that of the enemy of the faith, and class struggle is replaced by holy war—while keeping the dualistic schema of a war of prin- ciples, it demands a necessarily long war rich in casualties. As usual, in its last battle the party of the good is destined to win.
220
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
It can easily be seen that when it is used for political purposes, so-called fundamentalism is less of a matter of faith than an appeal to act or, more specifically, a matter of providing roles through which great numbers of potential actors are put into a position in which they can move from the- ory to praxis—or rather from frustration to praxis. In general it is true what demographic research has brought to light: "religion provides . . . additional oil for a fire whose original fuel does not come from it. "30 As a matrix of radical activations, Islam is on a par with historical communism; perhaps it is even superior because it can present itself with regard to its culture of origin not as a movement of radical rupture but as one of a revo- lutionary reestablishment.
The third and politically most important reason for the inevitably grow- ing dramatics of political Islam (even if at this hour, after a series of defeats, it seems to have lost quite a bit of its initial attraction) results from the demographic dynamic of its field of recruitment. Just like the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, it is essentially a youth movement or, more specifically, a movement of young men. Its verve to a large degree results from the excess of vitality of an unstoppable giant wave of unem- ployed and, socially speaking, hopeless male adolescents between the ages of fifteen and thirty—in their majority second, third, and fourth sons, who can enact their futile rage only by participating in the next best aggression programs. By creating in their base countries counter-worlds to the existing one, Islamic organizations create a grid of alternative positions in which angry, ambitious young men can feel important—including the impulse to attack both close and faraway enemies today rather than tomorrow.
These numerically enormous groups constitute the natural allegiance of agitators from the elder generation, whose sermons derive their content almost automatically from the willingness among the members of their congregation to be outraged—whereas the Islamic tradition only provides the semantic forms to add captions to real anger and violence tensions. As in a laboratory experiment, it was possible to observe these conditions dur- ing a scheme to create "spontaneous riots" because of the Danish carica- tures of Mohammed in February 2006. While politically correct Europeans agonized over how to apologize to allegedly or actually offended Muslims, anonymous activists in Iraq continued to turn the wheel of provocation or, even better, the wheel of combative self-stimulation a bit further by way of destroying the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of the most important Shiite sacred buildings in the north of Baghdad. They destroyed it with a
221
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
bomb attack, which led to dozens of Sunni houses of worship being dev- astated during counterattacks. These events speak a clear language. They reveal more about the hunger for a triggering event among the groups who are ready to attack than about an allegedly inevitable clash of civilizations. The agitators would feel sorry if they had to realize that the external cata- lysts were in fact sorry.
From this perspective it is legitimate to claim that Islam, in its Islamist variation, could transform itself to become a religious readymade excel-
31
Its suitability comes from characteristics of
lent for mobilizing purposes.
Muslim dogmatic theology that from the start were publicly committed to the war against "infidels. " The unprepared reader of the Koran has to be amazed about how it is possible that a sacred book is not afraid to repudiate itself when almost on every page it threatens the enemies of the prophet and of the faith with suffering in the eternal flames. The explanations of schol- ars hardly help to get over this estrangement, even if they try to trace the polemical passages of the Koran back to their historical context: the prophet engages in these passages in a form of early-socialist criticism against the wealthy of his time, the arrogant and ruthless merchants from Mecca who did not want to hear anything anymore about the egalitarian and gener- ous values of the old Arab tribal culture. Mohammed's teachings, scholars argue, ties in with these values as it commits his followers to caring for the weak. The initially plausible reference to the monotheistic privilege of zeal- ousness both for God and against the infidels fails to provide a sufficient explanation. It is just as evident to claim that no human being would want to concern himself with the opaque passages in the Koran if it were not for the fact that millions of aggressive gangs of searchers for God choose their words so to fit their coming deeds (while the comparably heated passages of the psalms of rage in the Old Testament have left the small audience of churches and synagogues cold for a long time).
The new mobilization movements—whether legitimate or not from the standpoint of Koran theology—could, assuming that birth rates remain high, influence a reservoir of several million young men in the Arabic hemi- sphere by the middle of the twenty-first century, men who probably only find an existentially attractive horizon of meaning in departing to politically and religiously concealed projects of self-destruction. In thousands of Koran schools, which recently sprang up like mushrooms everywhere that has boiling excesses of adolescent men, the anxious cohorts are indoctrinated with the concepts of holy war. Only a small portion of them will be able to
222
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
manifest themselves in external terrorism. The more significant portion will probably be invested in life-consuming civil wars on Arab soil—wars for which the Iran-Iraq massacre between 1980 and 1988 has provided a hint. In the case of the new wars, however, the quantitative proportions will, it can be predicted, skyrocket to a monstrous level. Giant battles of exterminations between Shiite and Sunni war parties are not unthinkable—the destruc- tion of the mosques and sacred sites of the other side provide the preamble for that. That Israel is anticipating further trials by fire cannot be missed. Without a far-sighted politics of sealing itself off, the Jewish enclave cannot survive the next decades. The truth is: even people who know the situation today do not have the slightest idea of how the approaching Muslim "youth bulge," the most extensive wave of genocidal excesses of adolescent men in
32
the history of mankind, could be contained by peaceful means.
These references to the actual mass-basis of radical Islamic movements mark at the same time the limit at which their commensurability with historical communism ends. The coming adherents of the Islamic goal of expansion do not at all resemble a class of workers and employees who unite to seize governmental power in order to put an end to their misery. Rather, they embody an agitated subproletariat or, even worse, a desper- ate movement of economically superfluous and socially useless people for whom there are too few acceptable positions available in their own sys-
tem, even if they should get to power through coups d'etat or elections. Because of demographic circumstances, concepts of the enemy in such movements cannot be sociologically defined, as was still possible within a Marxist conception of a "class of exploiters. " One can only define them by way of religion, political orientation, and culture—internally they are directed against the, in the eyes of the activists, despicable elites who make too many political concessions to the West. Externally they turn against the West as such, insofar as the latter is portrayed as the manifestation of humiliating, corrosive, and obscene cultural imports. Naturally, Islamist leaders will sooner or later attempt to gain power over the reserve coun- tries of the East in order to occupy positions of command over the redistri- bution of massive fortunes coming out of the oil business. Thus they could for some time appease their patronage by letting them participate in the oil manna. Since increasing energy prices during the coming decades will support a provocative laziness in bringing about reforms of the existing oil theocracies, riots in these countries are very likely. The case of Iran has shown what can happen next.
223
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
However much it might be the case that Islamist theocracy insists on the formally and materially totalitarian demand to regulate all aspects of living in a virtually Islamized global society according to the law of the Koran, it is less capable of confronting the economical, political, technical, and artistic facts of the contemporary age. While communism presented an authentic expression of Western modernization tendencies and, in some respects, though not in terms of economy, was the avant-garde of these tendencies, political Islamism bears the obvious mark of an antimodern disposition and dissynchronicity with the modern world. Part of this is its problematic relationship to the global culture of knowledge, as well as its thoroughly parasitic relationship to the weapons technology of the West. This situation is, for the time being, not changed by the extreme demographic dynamic of the Islamic world, whose population increased between 1900 and 2000 from 150 million to 1. 2 billion—eight times its original size. Although the "popu-
33
lation weapon" is, as Gunnar Heinsohn has shown, of modern origin, turns against its owners in the case of a lack of opportunities to expand and emigrate. If one of the leaders of Hamas, the Palestinian physician Abdel Aziz Rantisi, most recently announced that the forthcoming century would be that of Islam, he commits a fallacy common today of confusing culture and biomass. He would be right only in the unlikely case that the Islamic world as a whole is soon successful in escaping from its self-incurred back- wardness. Even the most sympathetic interpreters currently have only illu- sory ideas about how this is supposed to happen.
In considering the hijacking of the airplanes that were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York on the morning of Septem- ber 11, 2001, within the context of our observations, it becomes clear that it was not a demonstration of Islamic strength but a symbol of a sardonic lack of means, the compensation for which could only have been the sacrifice of human lives masked as being sacred. No Marx of political Islam will ever be able to argue that although modern technology emerged out of the lap of Western civilization, it will only reach its complete determination in the hands of Islamic operators. The lesson of September 11 is that the enemies of the West expect success exclusively from the vengeful reversal of Western tools against their creators. The Islamophile Friedrich Nietzsche would have to modify his judgments today. The accusations that he leveled in his curse against Christianity have, behind his back, arrived at a different address.
Radical Islamism provides the first example of a purely vengeful ideology
34
that only knows how to punish not how to create something new.
224
it
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
The weakness of Islam as a political religion, be it in its modest or radi- cal variations, rests on its backward-looking orientation. So far its leaders have not been capable of formulating nontechnical, romantic, angry con- cepts for the world of tomorrow. Without a doubt it is possible to set the rising protest masses of the Near and Middle East on their feet by using a rhetoric that is angry and terrific during the forthcoming half century. As a moblilizer of thymotic reserves on a large scale, Islamism has in fact not at all reached its climax. The dream of the activists for a neo-medieval Great Islamic Empire will continue to inspire numerous dreamers, even if the political conditions for its realization are missing in every respect. On the other hand, it is possible that conventional central powers could emerge out of the likely regional formations of empires of Islamic countries. That they would be able to create cultural artifacts, which would awaken a libido of imitation in other places, is unlikely. What remains decisive for the course of events is the fact that the heads of Islamism are, in their current condition, completely incapable of contributing to the writing of the next chapters of cultural evolution, not to mention dictating them, even if their countries of origin carry the "victory banner of procreation"35 as proudly as possible in front of them.
So far Islamism has little to show that would enable it to creatively continue the technological, economic, and scientific conditions of exis- tence for humankind during the twenty-first century. It would already be a titanic achievement if it were able to realize in due time the modern- ization of its own inventory. What is certain is that Islam has awakened from its dogmatic slumber. After centuries of stagnation, it returns to the world stage—in order to discover with embarrassment that it is incapable of adding to the major achievements in the area of culture that the cos- mopolitan, moderate, and inventive Islam was responsible for up until the thirteenth century. It could take another hundred years until its mas- terminds will be talked about not because of their threats but because of their achievements.
It will not be an empty time of waiting for the West. Because in the Islamic world there are several demographically explosive countries with plans to implement aggressive empire politics—particularly Iran and Paki- stan, to a lesser degree Egypt and Morocco—we will be confronted in future decades with a number of incoherent but spontaneously allied offensives, reminiscent of the semimodern departure movements of angry losers from Italy and Germany during the most unpleasant of times.
225
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
Under these circumstances, the expectations of Islamism as a potential successor of communism and its role as a global opposition movement should be set low. In reality they are absolutely illusory. It is not at all pos- sible to see how it would be capable of organizing a new universal collective of dissidence potentials in the countries of globalized capitalism. However, a number of regional major banks of rage will accumulate huge thymotic potentials over longer periods of time. But these will, most likely, waste their capital by spilling blood instead of investing it in promising culture and business companies. For the first half of the twenty-first century, the Islamist youth movements in dozens of countries in the Near and Middle East will be the radiating trouble spots on the crisis maps of strategic ana- lysts. However, whatever the Islamic advances will add to a politics of rage during the next decades—and the next twenty or thirty years could become one of the most fatal periods of all times if worst-case scenarios should materialize—their projects will hardly go beyond the level of a politically black romanticism based on immanent reasons. Thus the mobilization of those who choose a detour through God-given battles aims for a dark goal: the self-destruction of the superfluous.
Anyone holding onto the demand that world history has to proceed as the world's court of judgment is looking forward to disappointing times. In any case, one would have to look out for other judges. Because there is not much good one can hope for from criminal courts, the future will at most hold arbitration courts. Under these circumstances, only global capitalism qualifies for the role. It alone could grow to become its own enemy during the next round of the game, an enemy that excites itself to the point where it has to take itself as seriously as a contender who is deciding who is to be and who is not to be.
226
CONCLUSION BEYOND RESENTMENT
AFTER EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID DURING THE COURSE of this investigation, it would be absurd to claim that rage's best days are behind it. On the contrary, rage (together with its thymotic siblings, pride, the need for recognition, and resentment) is a basic force in the ecosystem of affects, whether interpersonal, political, or cultural. This thesis remains valid, even if rage cannot concentrate itself in the future in the form of uni- versal collectives of a communist type, but rather only in regional collec- tions. If regression from a certain achieved state of political psychology is not possible, the thymotic energies I have discussed here should be officially accredited as an adequate image of the real, inasmuch as they have fallen victim to an organized misinterpretation.
What has truly reached an end is the psychohistorical constellation of religiously and politically inflated retributive thinking that was characteris- tic ofthe Christian, socialist, and Communist courtrooms. Nietzsche found the right concept to characterize its essence when—with an eye to Paul and his invention of "Christianity"—he diagnosed that resentment could become a mark of genius. As long as the liaison of spirit and resentment
227
CONCLUSION
was stable, the desire for justice in the world—beyond earthly life or within actual history—could find shelter in fictitious beliefs: the theology of the wrath of God and the thymotic global economy of communism. In both systems, nothing less was at stake than the correction of accounts of suffering and injustice in a world that is morally out of balance. Both sought to turn resentment into a positive emotion in order to keep awake the sense of the unacceptability of an unjust world. It is because of their efforts that the highly unlikely phenomenon of "criticism" came into existence in Western civilization—insofar as we understand "criticism" to mean the spirit that has been fueled by ingenious resentment of sub- mission to mere facts, in particular facts of injustice. "Criticism" in this sense is not an absolute privilege of the West, however much it unfolded paradigmatically in the West; it is present in every culture that was suc- cessful in withdrawing from domination by servile, holistic, monologi- cal, and masochistic motives. Anyone insisting that democratic politics and forms of life could be universal should consider the cultures of coun- seling, the practices of discussion, and the traditions of criticisin of "the
1
The following insight needs to be asserted like an axiom: under condi- tions of globalization no politics of balancing suffering on the large scale is possible that is built on holding past injustices against someone, no matter if it is codified by redemptive, social-messianic, or democratic-messianic ide- ologies. This insight sets narrow limits to the moral productivity of move- ments of accusation even if they—as in the case of socialism, feminism, and postcolonialism—advocate a cause that is, in itself, respectable. It is much more important to delegitimize the inherited fatal alliance of intelligence and resentment to create a space for future paradigms of detoxified worldly wisdom. The criteria are not all that new—John Locke, the mastermind of the liberal English bourgeoisie, expressed them in a simple language in 1690:
2
the basic rights to life, freedom, and property. With regard to the historical
success of this triad, the evidence is clear: only in those areas of the world where these norms are respected do we have true forms of Enlightenment. Two centuries after Locke, Friedrich Nietzsche—although in a form that is, while fully justified from the standpoint of therapy, without doubt too pathetic—complemented these premises of successful civilizations with a hygienic program that puts the liberation from the spirit of resentment on the agenda. Nietzsche was concerned about the replacement of the toxic figure of "vengeful humility" with a form of intelligence that assures itself
others" as regional sources of democracy.
228
CONCLUSION
anew about its thymotic motives. It is obvious that without an open culture of ambition, this cannot be done. Such a culture would have to be post- monotheistic in the sense that it breaks open retributive metaphysics and its political reflexes with an appropriate level of thoroughness. The goal is a meritocracy, which balances, in an intercultural and transcultural way, an antiauthoritarian relaxed morality, on the one hand, and a distinctive normative consciousness and respect for inalienable personal rights, on the other. The adventure of morality takes place through the parallel pro- gram of elitist and egalitarian forces. Only within these parameters can a change of accent away from acquisition drives and toward giving virtues be conceived.
The investment costs for this education program are high. What is at stake in it is the creation of a code of conduct for multicivilizational com- plexes. Such a schema needs to be strong enough to cope with the fact that the condensed or globalized world remains, for the time being at least, structured in a multi-megalomaniac and inter-paranoid way. It is not possible to integrate a universe out of energetic, thymotic, irritable actors through ideal syntheses from the top. It is only possible to keep it at a bal- ance through power relationships. Great politics proceeds only by balanc- ing acts.
To stay in balance means not evading any necessary fights and not provoking unnecessary ones. It also means not giving up on the course of the world with its entropic processes, primarily the destruction of the envi- ronment and the demoralization of human relationships. Part of this means learning to see oneself always through the eyes of others. What in former times was to be achieved by an overstrained religious humility will have to be accomplished by a culture of rationally built second-order observations. This alone could stop the malignant naivete by connecting the desire to be respected with the ability to see oneself in relative terms. Time is required to solve these tasks—but not the historical time of the epic and tragedy. Essen- tial time needs to be determined as the time of civilizational learning. Those who only want to make "history" remain below this definition.
The term "transition" should not mislead us into ignoring the fact that one always exercises under conditions of emergency in order to prevent emergency from happening wherever possible. Mistakes are not permitted and yet are likely. If the exercises go well, it might be the case that a set of interculturally binding disciplines emerge that could, for the first time, rightly be referred to with an expression that, until now, has been used pre- maturely: world culture.
229
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
I. Cf. Ralf Miggelbrink, Der zornige Gott. Die Bedeutung einer anstofiigen biblischen
Tradition (The wrathful god: The significance of a scandalous biblical tradition)
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 13.
2. I thus disagree with the legend, which is popular among theologians, that myth
always implies the transfiguration of the existing world. According to this leg- end myth only comes to being with prophetic speech because of myth's distance from the world and its critical dimension. In reality myth is already as prophetic as prophecy is still mythic.
3. Cf. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz. Den Krieg denken (Clausewitz: Thinking war) (Frankfurt: Propylaen, 1980), as well as Robert Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002).
4. Concerning the unconscious nexus of humanism and bellicosity, see Bazon Brock and Gerlinde Koschick, eds. , Krieg und Kunst (War and art) (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002).
5. Cf. Iliad 9. 328 f.
231
INTRODUCTION
6. See Peter Sloterdijk, "Bilder der Gewalt—Gewalt der Bilder: Von der antiken Mythologie zur postmodernen Bilderindustrie," in Iconic Turn: Die neueMachtder Bilder (The new power of images), ed. Christa Maar and Hubert Burda (Cologne: Dumont, 2004), 333-34, for a reference to the continuous existence of irruptive ancient rage in the "natural theology of explosion" of modern mass culture.
7. The later stoic phenomenology of rage states that rage does not allow for any past. One can hide all other vices, but "anger parades itself; it shows on the face [seprofert et infaciem exit); the greater it is, the more obviously it seethes o u t . . . . The other affections make themselves seen [apparent). Anger sticks right out [eminet]" (Seneca, "On Anger," in Moral and Political Essays, ed. John M. Coo- per and J. F. Procope [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 18). Dur- ing the twentieth century, academic psychology sometimes speaks of "explosive reactions"; cf. Ernst Kretschmer, Medizinische Psychologie (Medical psychology) (Leipzig: Thieme 1930), 183-84.
8. Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (The Man Without Qualities) (Ham- burg: Rowohlt 1952), 1239-43.
9. The expression is borrowed from Heinrich Mann, who reports in his Napoleon essay from 1925 about the fatal Corsican, "He enters the world like a bullet enters the battle. This is how the revolution sent him. " Later I will show that the con- cept of revolution rests not least in a modernization of ancient menis. Its psycho- logical kernel is the transformation of the subject into an active gathering place of worid rage.
10. Bruno Snell, "Die Auffassung des Menschen bei Homer," in Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europaischen Denkens bei den Griechen (The discovery of spirit: Studies of the emergence of European thinking in ancient Greece) (Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1946), 15-37.
11. Cf. , for reasons of curiosity, Jiirgen Manthey, Die Unsterblichkeit Achills. Vom Ursprung des Erzahlens (The immortality of Achilles: On the origin of narrating) (Munich: Hanser, 1997), 31-32.
12. Concerning the ancient conception of genius, see the work of the Roman rheto- rician Censorinus, De die natali, as well as Peter Sloterdijk, Spharen I, Blasen (Spheres I: Bubbles) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), chap. 6, "Divider of Soul Space," 421-85.
13. Seneca De ira 1. 6: "Non est ergo natura hominis poenae appetens; ideo ne ira qui- dem secundum naturam hominis, quia poenae appetens est [therefore punish- ment does not go with being a good man. Nor, for that reason, does anger, since punishment does go with anger]. " One can establish a distant analogy between the philosophical domestication of anger in the Greeks and the civilization of the
232
INTRODUCTION
rage of God in the theology of "the priestly writings" of post-Babylonian Juda- ism. The change of emphasis toward individualized repentance withdraws the conditions of the prophetic speeches of threat from the divine penalization and destructive rage. See Miggelbrink, Derzornige Gott, 48-49.
14. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 146-50.
15. The classic catalogue of cardinal sins still provides an image that balances between erotic and thymotic vices. This is based on the assumption that one rightly can assign avaritia (avarice), luxuria (voluptuousness), and gula (intemperance) to the erotic pole, while superbia (arrogance, pride), ira (rage), and invidia (jeal- ousy, enviousness) belong to the thymotic pole. Only acedia (melancholia) does not fit into this categorization because it expresses a sadness without subject and object.
16. The classic expression of this idea is the slogan that was common among bour- geois of the eighteenth century: "Felix mentis": happy because of one's owns achievements. This expression decorates the facade of one of the most beauti- ful classicist buildings in Amsterdam for a good reason. This temple of enlight- enment, located at the street Kaisergracht, the canal of the king, was built in 1787 and after 1945 was temporarily the headquarters of the Dutch Communist Party. Today it is the location of one of the most lively cultural centers of the Netherlands.
17. Cf. Robert Shaeffer, The Resentment Against Achievement: Understanding the Assault Upon Ability (Buffalo, N. Y. : Prometheus Books, 1988).
18. Cf. Heiner Miihlmann, Die Natur derKulturen. Entwurfeiner kulturdynamischen Theorie (The Nature of civilizations: An attempt of a culture-dynamic theory) (Vienna: Springer, 1996).
19. We also owe one of the best summaries of the ancient and more recent discourses about thymos to a student of Strauss, Francis Fukuyama. See the rich passages of the unread best-seller The End ofHistory and the Last Man (1992; New York: Pen- guin, 2006). Also see the final section of the introduction, "The Postcommunist Situation," this volume.
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7. 7.
21. Seneca, who cites this passage from Aristotle's treatise On the Soul (De anima) in
his work De ira (1. 9), objects to the Greek thinker with the argument that affects
are just as bad as helpers as they are as leaders.
22. Cf. Fukuyama, The End of History, 165-66.
23. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in EnglisTi^tmns. Bruce Fink
(New York: Norton, 2006); Alexander Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of 233
INTRODUCTION
Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H.
Nichols (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1980).
24. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other
Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2005), 145.
25. Ibid. , 144.
26. Concerning the invention of the "symbolic" as the domain of the (holy) father
in a situation of an actual weakening of the paternal function, see Michel Tort, Fin du dogme paternal (The End of the paternal dogma) (Paris: Aubier, 2005), 123-24.
27. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (New York: Penguin, 1994).
28. Cf. the deduction of modern entrepreneurial psychology from the innovation that arises from the pressure of paying off one's debts in Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger's essential work, Eigentum, Zins und Geld: Ungeloste Riitsel der Wirschaftswissenscha. fi (Property, interest, and money: unsolved riddles of eco- nomics) (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1996).
cc
29. See Walter Burkert, Vergeltung" zwischen Ethologie und Ethik. Reflexe und
Reflexionen in Texten und Mythologien desAltertums ("Retaliation" between eth- nology and ethics: reflexes and reflections in texts and mythologies of antiquity) (Munich: Siemens Stiftung 1992), 21-22.
30. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Old and New Tablets," in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2006), 159.
31. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), 42.
32. Boris Groys, Das kommunistische Postskriptum (The communist postscript) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006).
33. See the discursive justification of this metaphor in Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, Eigentumsokonomik (Property economics) (Marburg: Metropolis, 2006).
34. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, 157.
35. Boris Groys, Anne von der Heyden, and Peter Weibel, eds. , Zurueck aus der
Zukunft. Osteuropaeische Kulturen im Zeitalter des Postkommunismus (Back from the future: Eastern European cultures during the age of postcommunism) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005).
36. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 61-95.
234
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
37- Ibid. , 73.
38. Fukuyama, The End of History, 284.
39. Cf. Gunnar Heinsohn, Sohne und Weltmacht. Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der
Nationen (Sons and Global power: terror within the rise and fall of nations) (Zurich: Orell Fiissli, 2003), and his Finis Germaniae, Kursbuch 162 (Hamburg: Zeit, 2005), 18-29.
40. The proposition concerning the end of history exists in at least four different ver- sions: two are from Kojeve: the end of history in Stalinism and the end of history in the American way of life and in Japanese snobbism; one is in Dostoevsky: the end of history in the "Crystal Palace"; and one in Heidegger: the end of history in boredom. Concerning the last two versions, see Peter Sloterdijk, "Heideggers Politik: Das Ende der Geschichte vertagen" (Heidegger's politics: coping with the end of history), closing statement at the conference Heidegger. Le danger et la promesse, Strasbourg, December 5, 2004; as well as Peter Sloterdijk, Im Weltin- nenraum des Kapitals. Fur eine philosophische Theorie der Globalisierung (In the world interior of capital: for a philosophical theory of globalization) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 258-348. There you also find the technical definition of "world history" as the successful phase of unilateralism and the constituting phase of the world system (1492-1944).
41. Cf. Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2004); Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, eds. , Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2005).
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
1. Thomas Mann, Joseph and his Brothers, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Every-
man's Library, 2005), 538.
2. Robert A. F. Thurman, Anger: The Seven Deadly Sins (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
3. Cf. Juliane Vogel, Die Furie und das Gesetz. Zur Dramaturgie der "grossen Szene' in
der Tragoedie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Fury and law: On the dramaturgy of the "great
scene" in the tragedy of the nineteenth century) (Freiburg: Rombach, 2002).
4. Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History," in Selected Writings, vol. 4, trans.
Harry Zorn, (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2003), 392; Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2001).
5. Concerning the source of the formula "x as such—x pure and simple," see Karl
Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique ofPolitical Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993), 105. ^
235
6. 7.
8.
1. 2.
214
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
animation of philosophical congresses will provide the hollow pumpkin with new haunting power.
After the collapse of communism the business of world-directed revenge and, generally speaking, the business of a universal balance of suffering had to slip out of the hands of human agencies. Consequently there were good reasons the Catholic Church could present itself as authentic after the fall of communism, even as the soul of an authentic and spiritual communism. To see and seize this opportunity was Karol Wojtyla's theatrical message. The Catholic message, of course, includes the return to the classical mor- ally conservative attitude according to which the man of the present would need to free himself from rage and revolt in order to rediscover what he had lost as a consequence of the events of 1789: patience and humility. What is most of the time overlooked concerning these recommendations is that highly praised virtues stand on shaky grounds if they are not supported by the threatening force of a convincingly delivered theology of the Day of Judgment.
These remarks suggest that Hegel's figure of a cunningness of reason still has a certain pragmatic appeal, however ascetic the expectations of a hid- den reason in history might be today. If one had to step back to sum up the achievements of communism, one would most importantly mention its external effects, which many times surpassed its internal effects in terms of productivity. These external effects were, to be sure, so paradoxical that they were hardly ever addressed. It is not necessary here to once again call to mind the much-appreciated efforts of the Soviet Union in the war on the armies of the National Socialist invader. The most important external effect of communism unfolded only after 1945, when an unprecedented chance opened up to expand the European welfare-state system against the back- ground of the saber-rattling regime of Stalin and its Middle and West Euro- pean outposts.
It is ironic that the communist world bank of rage achieved its most important success in the form of an unintended side effect. By accumulat- ing a truly intimidating political and ideological threat potential, it helped its former main adversaries, the Western, moderate socialists and social democrats, to reach the high point of their historical ability. It made it easy for the parliamentarily integrated socialist parties in Europe to extort an unprecedented amount of concessions from the liberal and conservative managers of capital in redistributing wealth and extending social networks. Within this constellation, it seemed plausible to the social partners of the
215
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
Western world to transform large parts of their national industries, in par- ticular in France and Great Britain, to government control.
If it is correct to say that sovereignty refers to the capacity to convincingly threaten someone, then it is also true that the Western workers' parties and unions achieved their highest effects of sovereignty because of an indirect threat of class struggle, which they were able to include in the negotiations of the bargaining parties without having to clench the fist themselves. It suf- ficed for them to consider the realities ofthe Second World to make it clear to the employers that social peace has its price. It can be asserted without exag- geration that the social achievements of postwar Europe, in particular the often-cited Rhenish form of capitalism with its extensively extended welfare state and the excessive culture of therapy, were presents from Stalinism— grapes of wrath that, it needs to be said, could only ripen and taste sweet after being exported to a freer climate.
The expenditures for social peace in the West needed to be recalculated from scratch when the threat potential of the left irresistibly continued to decline—not least because the Soviet Union was increasingly difficult to take seriously as a threat to the West. The ultimate phase of the Brezhnev era was the latest that the preconditions for some kind of successful missionary and expansionist activity from Moscow existed. Maoism outside of China never meant more than a straw fire of peasant romanticism in the Third World (think of Che Guevara's confused excursions to Africa and Bolivia) and the waywardness of wealth in Western universities. It was already evi- dent that the East—because of its dogmatic ignorance of the question of property—could not possibly win the confrontation between competing systems. Furthermore, the Russian army provided the proof during its futile ten-year campaign against the Afghan franc-tireurs, who were supported by the United States (1979-1989), how little it was able to live up to its former reputation.
Under these circumstances, the organs of the workers of the West lost their privilege of profiting from the fear of communism from the perspec- tive of capital without any effort. The liberal-conservative camp was able to understand: during the wage-negotiation talks it sat next to a debilitated, if not degenerated, counterpart. On the one hand, the latter was out of shape because of its relative level of saturation; on the other hand, it succumbed to a creeping paralysis that resulted from the ideological deflation of the left.
Since the early 1980s, this sense of exhaustion has determined the psy- chopolitical atmosphere of the West—its results multiply with the climate-
216
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
changing fallout of September 11. It appears that a neo-authoritarian turn of capitalism with a liberal-bellicist background is more and more likely. The year 1979 needs to be seen from today's perspective as the key time of the twentieth century. The entry into the postcommunist situation begins then in a threefold sense: the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union after the invasion of its armies into Afghanistan, the accession to power of Margaret Thatcher, and the consolidation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini.
What is called neoliberalism was in fact nothing but a recalculation of the costs of inner peace in the countries of European capitalist and social- democratic "mixed economy" or of American-style "regulatory capital- ism. "26 This necessarily led to the result that Western entrepreneurialism had paid too high a price to attain social peace under passing political and ideological pressure from the East. The time for cost-reducing measures had come, measures that aimed to switch priorities from the primacy of full employment to that of corporate dynamics. In fact, a downright reversal of the Zeitgeist was brought about: it moved ever quicker away from the revolting and control-centered ethics of comfort during the decades after the war (which survived only in France) in order to give preference to a neo-entrepreneurial risk ethic.
The "market revolution" in Great Britain, which was designed by Joseph Keith and, starting in 1979, realized by Margaret Thatcher (a revolution that would soon spread to the Continent and large parts of the Western world, especially Reagan's and Clinton's America), makes clear how precisely the above diagnosis captures the situation and how radical were the conse^ quences that are to be drawn from it. This shows itself most strikingly in the permanent trend of neoliberalism—the long march to mass unemployment that has set the tone from a social-political perspective. The new circum- stances brought with it what could have hardly been imagined until then: unemployment rates of 10 percent and more are accepted more or less with- out a fight by the populations of European nations—even the increasingly visible decrease of welfare benefits has so far not provokes a flaring-up of the fire of class struggle. The relationships of sovereignty have been reversed overnight: organizations of employees have little power to threaten, because the privilege to threaten has, rather one-sidedly, passed onto the business side. The latter can now plausibly claim that everything will become much worse if the other side refuses to understand and abide by the new rules of the game.
217
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
THE THIRD COLLECTION: CAN POLITICAL ISLAM SET UP A NEW WORLD BANK OF DISSIDENCE?
IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP THIS SCENARIO IN MIND IN ORDER TO understand the conditions under which Islamic terrorism could celebrate its rise to become a power with the capacity to exert threats. Initially, the Islamists did not seem to be more than parasites of the postcommunist constellation. No one would have thought at the time of Islamism's first appearance that one was witnessing something like a third Catholicism or an Eastern alternative to communism. Nevertheless, day by day the Islamist activists successfully imposed themselves as the new enemy of the West, ini- tially the United States, and then helpless Europe. In this role they have been interpreted ambivalently from the beginning. For tragic-minded polit- ical scientists, who are convinced of the need to always have an enemy, the anger of Islamism seemed like a present from heaven. Although Islamism was initially not especially dangerous in a material sense (as long as its agents did not gain access to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the control of migration remained sufficiently strict), it keeps the psycho- political tone of irritated collectives in the West at the desired level. For the adherents of the liberal idyll, on the other hand, Islamist terror remains an unwelcome guest—a crazy graffiti sprayer who disfigures the facades of enemy-free societies with obscene messages.
However one may evaluate the ambivalent reception of the new terror by its Western addressees, it would never have advanced beyond the level of an irritating marginal phenomenon if it had not become an interesting asset in the recalculation of the costs for social peace in Western societ- ies. While the communist threat led to a significant increase in the social costs of peace, the threat of Islamist terror brings with it, at the bottom line, effects that help lower the costs. By exerting imaginary stressful pressure on the attacked collective, it contributes to a feeling of belonging to a real com- munity, a belonging based on solidarity, a survival unit wrestling for its own future in spite of recently severely deepened social differences. Addition- ally, the new terror creates, because of its undifferentiated hostility against Western forms of life, a climate of diffuse intimidation in which questions of political and existential security enjoy high priority over those of social justice—quod erat operandum.
With the exaggeration of the securitarian imperative to the level of being the omnipotent theme of contemporary media democracies, the Zeitgeist
218
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
readjusted itself after September 11, 2001, to a new ecosystem of threats and
defense mechanisms—while, this time, as frivolously as it might sound, the
threat tendencies of Islamist terror in general point "in the right direction"
when seen from the perspective of radicalized capitalism. To feel threatened
by the Middle Eastern sources now means to see reasons why one could
perhaps be ready to make peace with the drifting away of Western politi-
cal culture into postdemocratic conditions. The "war on terror" possesses
the ideal quality of not being able to be won—and thus never having to be
ended. These prospects suggest that the postdemocratic trends will enjoy a
long life. They create the preconditions with which democratically elected
leaders can get away with presenting themselves as commanders in chief. If
political thinking limits itself to advising the commander in chief, concepts
such as democracy and independent judiciary cultures are only chips in a
27
tration illustrates these relations with an abundance of unmistakable exam- ples. Within a few years the world became witness to how a democracy that is proud of its culture of dissent experienced a sudden extinction of political diversity of opinion because it was exposed to the knowingly and willingly induced fiction of a struggle for survival, which needed to be waged by the entire nation. The political field of the nation was influenced by homog- enizing forces. Reminiscent of real wars, in this drole de guerre there was a paralyzing of inner opposition through the patriotic imperative. This devel- opment to a large extent results from the work of the neoconservatives in the United States, who do not hesitate to proudly conjure up the specter of "World War IV,"28 to suffocate, wherever possible, every sign of a new opposition in light of growing social inequalities.
An investigation of the redistribution of threat potentials on the geo- political maps of the present raises the question of how the much-discussed Islamic danger is to be understood. By which media does it affect the psy- chopolitical system of the West and the Islamic countries? Does it really have the potential to "replace communism as the world dogma," as one can hear it in radical Islamic circles between Khartoum and Karachi for the last decade, and not only from behind closed doors? 29 The new specter, which is haunting Europe, the United States, and other parts of the world—from where does it take its power to threaten the leaders of the established pow- ers? Can political Islam—whether appearing with a terroristic component or without—unfold itself to become an alternative world bank of rage? Will it
strategic game.
The psychopolitical fate of the United States during the Bush adminis-
219
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
become a globally attractive collection point of antisystemic or postcapital- ist energies? Can Islamism be used for the continuation of the weary West- ern grand narratives concerning the uprising of the debased and humili- ated against their masters, old and new? Does it suffice to meditate on the concept of jihad as long as it turns into a pseudonym for class struggle? Or do the fronts, which emerge from the eruptions of the Islamic world, not possess a sense of obstinacy that can only be reconciled with Western forms of the narrative of continuing revolution, universalizing emancipation, and progressive realization of human rights at the price of misunderstandings and distortions.
What qualifies political Islam as a potential successor to communism are three advantages, which can be analogously identified with historical com- munism. The first is the fact that an inspiring mission dynamic is inherent to Islamism, a dynamic that predisposes it to become a quickly swelling col- lective of new converts, that is, a "movement" in the narrow sense of the term. It is not only the case that it quasi-universally addresses "all" without discriminating on the basis of nations and social classes. It attracts especially the disadvantaged, undecided, and outraged (insofar as they are not female, and sometimes even those). It does so by presenting itself as the advocate of the spiritually and materially neglected poor and by gaining sympathies as the heart in a heartless world. The low preconditions of admission play an impor- tant part here. As soon as a person has been admitted to the ranks of believ- ers, he is immediately usable for the purpose of the fighting community— in some cases to be immediately used as a martyr. By plunging into a vibrant community, newcomers are often given for the first time the feeling of hav- ing found a home and of not playing an equal and detached spectator but a particular role in the dramas of the world.
The second attraction of political Islam emanates from the fact that it— in a way only preceded by communism—is capable of offering its followers a clear, aggressive, and grandiosely theatrical "worldview" that rests on a clear differentiation of friend and enemy, an unmistakable mission to win, and an exhilaratingly Utopian final vision: the reconstitution of the global emirate, which is supposed to provide a shelter for the Islamic millennium, stretched out from Andalusia to the far East. With it the figure of the class enemy is replaced with that of the enemy of the faith, and class struggle is replaced by holy war—while keeping the dualistic schema of a war of prin- ciples, it demands a necessarily long war rich in casualties. As usual, in its last battle the party of the good is destined to win.
220
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
It can easily be seen that when it is used for political purposes, so-called fundamentalism is less of a matter of faith than an appeal to act or, more specifically, a matter of providing roles through which great numbers of potential actors are put into a position in which they can move from the- ory to praxis—or rather from frustration to praxis. In general it is true what demographic research has brought to light: "religion provides . . . additional oil for a fire whose original fuel does not come from it. "30 As a matrix of radical activations, Islam is on a par with historical communism; perhaps it is even superior because it can present itself with regard to its culture of origin not as a movement of radical rupture but as one of a revo- lutionary reestablishment.
The third and politically most important reason for the inevitably grow- ing dramatics of political Islam (even if at this hour, after a series of defeats, it seems to have lost quite a bit of its initial attraction) results from the demographic dynamic of its field of recruitment. Just like the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, it is essentially a youth movement or, more specifically, a movement of young men. Its verve to a large degree results from the excess of vitality of an unstoppable giant wave of unem- ployed and, socially speaking, hopeless male adolescents between the ages of fifteen and thirty—in their majority second, third, and fourth sons, who can enact their futile rage only by participating in the next best aggression programs. By creating in their base countries counter-worlds to the existing one, Islamic organizations create a grid of alternative positions in which angry, ambitious young men can feel important—including the impulse to attack both close and faraway enemies today rather than tomorrow.
These numerically enormous groups constitute the natural allegiance of agitators from the elder generation, whose sermons derive their content almost automatically from the willingness among the members of their congregation to be outraged—whereas the Islamic tradition only provides the semantic forms to add captions to real anger and violence tensions. As in a laboratory experiment, it was possible to observe these conditions dur- ing a scheme to create "spontaneous riots" because of the Danish carica- tures of Mohammed in February 2006. While politically correct Europeans agonized over how to apologize to allegedly or actually offended Muslims, anonymous activists in Iraq continued to turn the wheel of provocation or, even better, the wheel of combative self-stimulation a bit further by way of destroying the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of the most important Shiite sacred buildings in the north of Baghdad. They destroyed it with a
221
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
bomb attack, which led to dozens of Sunni houses of worship being dev- astated during counterattacks. These events speak a clear language. They reveal more about the hunger for a triggering event among the groups who are ready to attack than about an allegedly inevitable clash of civilizations. The agitators would feel sorry if they had to realize that the external cata- lysts were in fact sorry.
From this perspective it is legitimate to claim that Islam, in its Islamist variation, could transform itself to become a religious readymade excel-
31
Its suitability comes from characteristics of
lent for mobilizing purposes.
Muslim dogmatic theology that from the start were publicly committed to the war against "infidels. " The unprepared reader of the Koran has to be amazed about how it is possible that a sacred book is not afraid to repudiate itself when almost on every page it threatens the enemies of the prophet and of the faith with suffering in the eternal flames. The explanations of schol- ars hardly help to get over this estrangement, even if they try to trace the polemical passages of the Koran back to their historical context: the prophet engages in these passages in a form of early-socialist criticism against the wealthy of his time, the arrogant and ruthless merchants from Mecca who did not want to hear anything anymore about the egalitarian and gener- ous values of the old Arab tribal culture. Mohammed's teachings, scholars argue, ties in with these values as it commits his followers to caring for the weak. The initially plausible reference to the monotheistic privilege of zeal- ousness both for God and against the infidels fails to provide a sufficient explanation. It is just as evident to claim that no human being would want to concern himself with the opaque passages in the Koran if it were not for the fact that millions of aggressive gangs of searchers for God choose their words so to fit their coming deeds (while the comparably heated passages of the psalms of rage in the Old Testament have left the small audience of churches and synagogues cold for a long time).
The new mobilization movements—whether legitimate or not from the standpoint of Koran theology—could, assuming that birth rates remain high, influence a reservoir of several million young men in the Arabic hemi- sphere by the middle of the twenty-first century, men who probably only find an existentially attractive horizon of meaning in departing to politically and religiously concealed projects of self-destruction. In thousands of Koran schools, which recently sprang up like mushrooms everywhere that has boiling excesses of adolescent men, the anxious cohorts are indoctrinated with the concepts of holy war. Only a small portion of them will be able to
222
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
manifest themselves in external terrorism. The more significant portion will probably be invested in life-consuming civil wars on Arab soil—wars for which the Iran-Iraq massacre between 1980 and 1988 has provided a hint. In the case of the new wars, however, the quantitative proportions will, it can be predicted, skyrocket to a monstrous level. Giant battles of exterminations between Shiite and Sunni war parties are not unthinkable—the destruc- tion of the mosques and sacred sites of the other side provide the preamble for that. That Israel is anticipating further trials by fire cannot be missed. Without a far-sighted politics of sealing itself off, the Jewish enclave cannot survive the next decades. The truth is: even people who know the situation today do not have the slightest idea of how the approaching Muslim "youth bulge," the most extensive wave of genocidal excesses of adolescent men in
32
the history of mankind, could be contained by peaceful means.
These references to the actual mass-basis of radical Islamic movements mark at the same time the limit at which their commensurability with historical communism ends. The coming adherents of the Islamic goal of expansion do not at all resemble a class of workers and employees who unite to seize governmental power in order to put an end to their misery. Rather, they embody an agitated subproletariat or, even worse, a desper- ate movement of economically superfluous and socially useless people for whom there are too few acceptable positions available in their own sys-
tem, even if they should get to power through coups d'etat or elections. Because of demographic circumstances, concepts of the enemy in such movements cannot be sociologically defined, as was still possible within a Marxist conception of a "class of exploiters. " One can only define them by way of religion, political orientation, and culture—internally they are directed against the, in the eyes of the activists, despicable elites who make too many political concessions to the West. Externally they turn against the West as such, insofar as the latter is portrayed as the manifestation of humiliating, corrosive, and obscene cultural imports. Naturally, Islamist leaders will sooner or later attempt to gain power over the reserve coun- tries of the East in order to occupy positions of command over the redistri- bution of massive fortunes coming out of the oil business. Thus they could for some time appease their patronage by letting them participate in the oil manna. Since increasing energy prices during the coming decades will support a provocative laziness in bringing about reforms of the existing oil theocracies, riots in these countries are very likely. The case of Iran has shown what can happen next.
223
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
However much it might be the case that Islamist theocracy insists on the formally and materially totalitarian demand to regulate all aspects of living in a virtually Islamized global society according to the law of the Koran, it is less capable of confronting the economical, political, technical, and artistic facts of the contemporary age. While communism presented an authentic expression of Western modernization tendencies and, in some respects, though not in terms of economy, was the avant-garde of these tendencies, political Islamism bears the obvious mark of an antimodern disposition and dissynchronicity with the modern world. Part of this is its problematic relationship to the global culture of knowledge, as well as its thoroughly parasitic relationship to the weapons technology of the West. This situation is, for the time being, not changed by the extreme demographic dynamic of the Islamic world, whose population increased between 1900 and 2000 from 150 million to 1. 2 billion—eight times its original size. Although the "popu-
33
lation weapon" is, as Gunnar Heinsohn has shown, of modern origin, turns against its owners in the case of a lack of opportunities to expand and emigrate. If one of the leaders of Hamas, the Palestinian physician Abdel Aziz Rantisi, most recently announced that the forthcoming century would be that of Islam, he commits a fallacy common today of confusing culture and biomass. He would be right only in the unlikely case that the Islamic world as a whole is soon successful in escaping from its self-incurred back- wardness. Even the most sympathetic interpreters currently have only illu- sory ideas about how this is supposed to happen.
In considering the hijacking of the airplanes that were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York on the morning of Septem- ber 11, 2001, within the context of our observations, it becomes clear that it was not a demonstration of Islamic strength but a symbol of a sardonic lack of means, the compensation for which could only have been the sacrifice of human lives masked as being sacred. No Marx of political Islam will ever be able to argue that although modern technology emerged out of the lap of Western civilization, it will only reach its complete determination in the hands of Islamic operators. The lesson of September 11 is that the enemies of the West expect success exclusively from the vengeful reversal of Western tools against their creators. The Islamophile Friedrich Nietzsche would have to modify his judgments today. The accusations that he leveled in his curse against Christianity have, behind his back, arrived at a different address.
Radical Islamism provides the first example of a purely vengeful ideology
34
that only knows how to punish not how to create something new.
224
it
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
The weakness of Islam as a political religion, be it in its modest or radi- cal variations, rests on its backward-looking orientation. So far its leaders have not been capable of formulating nontechnical, romantic, angry con- cepts for the world of tomorrow. Without a doubt it is possible to set the rising protest masses of the Near and Middle East on their feet by using a rhetoric that is angry and terrific during the forthcoming half century. As a moblilizer of thymotic reserves on a large scale, Islamism has in fact not at all reached its climax. The dream of the activists for a neo-medieval Great Islamic Empire will continue to inspire numerous dreamers, even if the political conditions for its realization are missing in every respect. On the other hand, it is possible that conventional central powers could emerge out of the likely regional formations of empires of Islamic countries. That they would be able to create cultural artifacts, which would awaken a libido of imitation in other places, is unlikely. What remains decisive for the course of events is the fact that the heads of Islamism are, in their current condition, completely incapable of contributing to the writing of the next chapters of cultural evolution, not to mention dictating them, even if their countries of origin carry the "victory banner of procreation"35 as proudly as possible in front of them.
So far Islamism has little to show that would enable it to creatively continue the technological, economic, and scientific conditions of exis- tence for humankind during the twenty-first century. It would already be a titanic achievement if it were able to realize in due time the modern- ization of its own inventory. What is certain is that Islam has awakened from its dogmatic slumber. After centuries of stagnation, it returns to the world stage—in order to discover with embarrassment that it is incapable of adding to the major achievements in the area of culture that the cos- mopolitan, moderate, and inventive Islam was responsible for up until the thirteenth century. It could take another hundred years until its mas- terminds will be talked about not because of their threats but because of their achievements.
It will not be an empty time of waiting for the West. Because in the Islamic world there are several demographically explosive countries with plans to implement aggressive empire politics—particularly Iran and Paki- stan, to a lesser degree Egypt and Morocco—we will be confronted in future decades with a number of incoherent but spontaneously allied offensives, reminiscent of the semimodern departure movements of angry losers from Italy and Germany during the most unpleasant of times.
225
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
Under these circumstances, the expectations of Islamism as a potential successor of communism and its role as a global opposition movement should be set low. In reality they are absolutely illusory. It is not at all pos- sible to see how it would be capable of organizing a new universal collective of dissidence potentials in the countries of globalized capitalism. However, a number of regional major banks of rage will accumulate huge thymotic potentials over longer periods of time. But these will, most likely, waste their capital by spilling blood instead of investing it in promising culture and business companies. For the first half of the twenty-first century, the Islamist youth movements in dozens of countries in the Near and Middle East will be the radiating trouble spots on the crisis maps of strategic ana- lysts. However, whatever the Islamic advances will add to a politics of rage during the next decades—and the next twenty or thirty years could become one of the most fatal periods of all times if worst-case scenarios should materialize—their projects will hardly go beyond the level of a politically black romanticism based on immanent reasons. Thus the mobilization of those who choose a detour through God-given battles aims for a dark goal: the self-destruction of the superfluous.
Anyone holding onto the demand that world history has to proceed as the world's court of judgment is looking forward to disappointing times. In any case, one would have to look out for other judges. Because there is not much good one can hope for from criminal courts, the future will at most hold arbitration courts. Under these circumstances, only global capitalism qualifies for the role. It alone could grow to become its own enemy during the next round of the game, an enemy that excites itself to the point where it has to take itself as seriously as a contender who is deciding who is to be and who is not to be.
226
CONCLUSION BEYOND RESENTMENT
AFTER EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID DURING THE COURSE of this investigation, it would be absurd to claim that rage's best days are behind it. On the contrary, rage (together with its thymotic siblings, pride, the need for recognition, and resentment) is a basic force in the ecosystem of affects, whether interpersonal, political, or cultural. This thesis remains valid, even if rage cannot concentrate itself in the future in the form of uni- versal collectives of a communist type, but rather only in regional collec- tions. If regression from a certain achieved state of political psychology is not possible, the thymotic energies I have discussed here should be officially accredited as an adequate image of the real, inasmuch as they have fallen victim to an organized misinterpretation.
What has truly reached an end is the psychohistorical constellation of religiously and politically inflated retributive thinking that was characteris- tic ofthe Christian, socialist, and Communist courtrooms. Nietzsche found the right concept to characterize its essence when—with an eye to Paul and his invention of "Christianity"—he diagnosed that resentment could become a mark of genius. As long as the liaison of spirit and resentment
227
CONCLUSION
was stable, the desire for justice in the world—beyond earthly life or within actual history—could find shelter in fictitious beliefs: the theology of the wrath of God and the thymotic global economy of communism. In both systems, nothing less was at stake than the correction of accounts of suffering and injustice in a world that is morally out of balance. Both sought to turn resentment into a positive emotion in order to keep awake the sense of the unacceptability of an unjust world. It is because of their efforts that the highly unlikely phenomenon of "criticism" came into existence in Western civilization—insofar as we understand "criticism" to mean the spirit that has been fueled by ingenious resentment of sub- mission to mere facts, in particular facts of injustice. "Criticism" in this sense is not an absolute privilege of the West, however much it unfolded paradigmatically in the West; it is present in every culture that was suc- cessful in withdrawing from domination by servile, holistic, monologi- cal, and masochistic motives. Anyone insisting that democratic politics and forms of life could be universal should consider the cultures of coun- seling, the practices of discussion, and the traditions of criticisin of "the
1
The following insight needs to be asserted like an axiom: under condi- tions of globalization no politics of balancing suffering on the large scale is possible that is built on holding past injustices against someone, no matter if it is codified by redemptive, social-messianic, or democratic-messianic ide- ologies. This insight sets narrow limits to the moral productivity of move- ments of accusation even if they—as in the case of socialism, feminism, and postcolonialism—advocate a cause that is, in itself, respectable. It is much more important to delegitimize the inherited fatal alliance of intelligence and resentment to create a space for future paradigms of detoxified worldly wisdom. The criteria are not all that new—John Locke, the mastermind of the liberal English bourgeoisie, expressed them in a simple language in 1690:
2
the basic rights to life, freedom, and property. With regard to the historical
success of this triad, the evidence is clear: only in those areas of the world where these norms are respected do we have true forms of Enlightenment. Two centuries after Locke, Friedrich Nietzsche—although in a form that is, while fully justified from the standpoint of therapy, without doubt too pathetic—complemented these premises of successful civilizations with a hygienic program that puts the liberation from the spirit of resentment on the agenda. Nietzsche was concerned about the replacement of the toxic figure of "vengeful humility" with a form of intelligence that assures itself
others" as regional sources of democracy.
228
CONCLUSION
anew about its thymotic motives. It is obvious that without an open culture of ambition, this cannot be done. Such a culture would have to be post- monotheistic in the sense that it breaks open retributive metaphysics and its political reflexes with an appropriate level of thoroughness. The goal is a meritocracy, which balances, in an intercultural and transcultural way, an antiauthoritarian relaxed morality, on the one hand, and a distinctive normative consciousness and respect for inalienable personal rights, on the other. The adventure of morality takes place through the parallel pro- gram of elitist and egalitarian forces. Only within these parameters can a change of accent away from acquisition drives and toward giving virtues be conceived.
The investment costs for this education program are high. What is at stake in it is the creation of a code of conduct for multicivilizational com- plexes. Such a schema needs to be strong enough to cope with the fact that the condensed or globalized world remains, for the time being at least, structured in a multi-megalomaniac and inter-paranoid way. It is not possible to integrate a universe out of energetic, thymotic, irritable actors through ideal syntheses from the top. It is only possible to keep it at a bal- ance through power relationships. Great politics proceeds only by balanc- ing acts.
To stay in balance means not evading any necessary fights and not provoking unnecessary ones. It also means not giving up on the course of the world with its entropic processes, primarily the destruction of the envi- ronment and the demoralization of human relationships. Part of this means learning to see oneself always through the eyes of others. What in former times was to be achieved by an overstrained religious humility will have to be accomplished by a culture of rationally built second-order observations. This alone could stop the malignant naivete by connecting the desire to be respected with the ability to see oneself in relative terms. Time is required to solve these tasks—but not the historical time of the epic and tragedy. Essen- tial time needs to be determined as the time of civilizational learning. Those who only want to make "history" remain below this definition.
The term "transition" should not mislead us into ignoring the fact that one always exercises under conditions of emergency in order to prevent emergency from happening wherever possible. Mistakes are not permitted and yet are likely. If the exercises go well, it might be the case that a set of interculturally binding disciplines emerge that could, for the first time, rightly be referred to with an expression that, until now, has been used pre- maturely: world culture.
229
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
I. Cf. Ralf Miggelbrink, Der zornige Gott. Die Bedeutung einer anstofiigen biblischen
Tradition (The wrathful god: The significance of a scandalous biblical tradition)
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 13.
2. I thus disagree with the legend, which is popular among theologians, that myth
always implies the transfiguration of the existing world. According to this leg- end myth only comes to being with prophetic speech because of myth's distance from the world and its critical dimension. In reality myth is already as prophetic as prophecy is still mythic.
3. Cf. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz. Den Krieg denken (Clausewitz: Thinking war) (Frankfurt: Propylaen, 1980), as well as Robert Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002).
4. Concerning the unconscious nexus of humanism and bellicosity, see Bazon Brock and Gerlinde Koschick, eds. , Krieg und Kunst (War and art) (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002).
5. Cf. Iliad 9. 328 f.
231
INTRODUCTION
6. See Peter Sloterdijk, "Bilder der Gewalt—Gewalt der Bilder: Von der antiken Mythologie zur postmodernen Bilderindustrie," in Iconic Turn: Die neueMachtder Bilder (The new power of images), ed. Christa Maar and Hubert Burda (Cologne: Dumont, 2004), 333-34, for a reference to the continuous existence of irruptive ancient rage in the "natural theology of explosion" of modern mass culture.
7. The later stoic phenomenology of rage states that rage does not allow for any past. One can hide all other vices, but "anger parades itself; it shows on the face [seprofert et infaciem exit); the greater it is, the more obviously it seethes o u t . . . . The other affections make themselves seen [apparent). Anger sticks right out [eminet]" (Seneca, "On Anger," in Moral and Political Essays, ed. John M. Coo- per and J. F. Procope [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 18). Dur- ing the twentieth century, academic psychology sometimes speaks of "explosive reactions"; cf. Ernst Kretschmer, Medizinische Psychologie (Medical psychology) (Leipzig: Thieme 1930), 183-84.
8. Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (The Man Without Qualities) (Ham- burg: Rowohlt 1952), 1239-43.
9. The expression is borrowed from Heinrich Mann, who reports in his Napoleon essay from 1925 about the fatal Corsican, "He enters the world like a bullet enters the battle. This is how the revolution sent him. " Later I will show that the con- cept of revolution rests not least in a modernization of ancient menis. Its psycho- logical kernel is the transformation of the subject into an active gathering place of worid rage.
10. Bruno Snell, "Die Auffassung des Menschen bei Homer," in Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europaischen Denkens bei den Griechen (The discovery of spirit: Studies of the emergence of European thinking in ancient Greece) (Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1946), 15-37.
11. Cf. , for reasons of curiosity, Jiirgen Manthey, Die Unsterblichkeit Achills. Vom Ursprung des Erzahlens (The immortality of Achilles: On the origin of narrating) (Munich: Hanser, 1997), 31-32.
12. Concerning the ancient conception of genius, see the work of the Roman rheto- rician Censorinus, De die natali, as well as Peter Sloterdijk, Spharen I, Blasen (Spheres I: Bubbles) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), chap. 6, "Divider of Soul Space," 421-85.
13. Seneca De ira 1. 6: "Non est ergo natura hominis poenae appetens; ideo ne ira qui- dem secundum naturam hominis, quia poenae appetens est [therefore punish- ment does not go with being a good man. Nor, for that reason, does anger, since punishment does go with anger]. " One can establish a distant analogy between the philosophical domestication of anger in the Greeks and the civilization of the
232
INTRODUCTION
rage of God in the theology of "the priestly writings" of post-Babylonian Juda- ism. The change of emphasis toward individualized repentance withdraws the conditions of the prophetic speeches of threat from the divine penalization and destructive rage. See Miggelbrink, Derzornige Gott, 48-49.
14. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 146-50.
15. The classic catalogue of cardinal sins still provides an image that balances between erotic and thymotic vices. This is based on the assumption that one rightly can assign avaritia (avarice), luxuria (voluptuousness), and gula (intemperance) to the erotic pole, while superbia (arrogance, pride), ira (rage), and invidia (jeal- ousy, enviousness) belong to the thymotic pole. Only acedia (melancholia) does not fit into this categorization because it expresses a sadness without subject and object.
16. The classic expression of this idea is the slogan that was common among bour- geois of the eighteenth century: "Felix mentis": happy because of one's owns achievements. This expression decorates the facade of one of the most beauti- ful classicist buildings in Amsterdam for a good reason. This temple of enlight- enment, located at the street Kaisergracht, the canal of the king, was built in 1787 and after 1945 was temporarily the headquarters of the Dutch Communist Party. Today it is the location of one of the most lively cultural centers of the Netherlands.
17. Cf. Robert Shaeffer, The Resentment Against Achievement: Understanding the Assault Upon Ability (Buffalo, N. Y. : Prometheus Books, 1988).
18. Cf. Heiner Miihlmann, Die Natur derKulturen. Entwurfeiner kulturdynamischen Theorie (The Nature of civilizations: An attempt of a culture-dynamic theory) (Vienna: Springer, 1996).
19. We also owe one of the best summaries of the ancient and more recent discourses about thymos to a student of Strauss, Francis Fukuyama. See the rich passages of the unread best-seller The End ofHistory and the Last Man (1992; New York: Pen- guin, 2006). Also see the final section of the introduction, "The Postcommunist Situation," this volume.
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7. 7.
21. Seneca, who cites this passage from Aristotle's treatise On the Soul (De anima) in
his work De ira (1. 9), objects to the Greek thinker with the argument that affects
are just as bad as helpers as they are as leaders.
22. Cf. Fukuyama, The End of History, 165-66.
23. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in EnglisTi^tmns. Bruce Fink
(New York: Norton, 2006); Alexander Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of 233
INTRODUCTION
Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H.
Nichols (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1980).
24. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other
Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2005), 145.
25. Ibid. , 144.
26. Concerning the invention of the "symbolic" as the domain of the (holy) father
in a situation of an actual weakening of the paternal function, see Michel Tort, Fin du dogme paternal (The End of the paternal dogma) (Paris: Aubier, 2005), 123-24.
27. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (New York: Penguin, 1994).
28. Cf. the deduction of modern entrepreneurial psychology from the innovation that arises from the pressure of paying off one's debts in Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger's essential work, Eigentum, Zins und Geld: Ungeloste Riitsel der Wirschaftswissenscha. fi (Property, interest, and money: unsolved riddles of eco- nomics) (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1996).
cc
29. See Walter Burkert, Vergeltung" zwischen Ethologie und Ethik. Reflexe und
Reflexionen in Texten und Mythologien desAltertums ("Retaliation" between eth- nology and ethics: reflexes and reflections in texts and mythologies of antiquity) (Munich: Siemens Stiftung 1992), 21-22.
30. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Old and New Tablets," in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2006), 159.
31. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), 42.
32. Boris Groys, Das kommunistische Postskriptum (The communist postscript) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006).
33. See the discursive justification of this metaphor in Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, Eigentumsokonomik (Property economics) (Marburg: Metropolis, 2006).
34. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, 157.
35. Boris Groys, Anne von der Heyden, and Peter Weibel, eds. , Zurueck aus der
Zukunft. Osteuropaeische Kulturen im Zeitalter des Postkommunismus (Back from the future: Eastern European cultures during the age of postcommunism) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005).
36. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 61-95.
234
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
37- Ibid. , 73.
38. Fukuyama, The End of History, 284.
39. Cf. Gunnar Heinsohn, Sohne und Weltmacht. Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der
Nationen (Sons and Global power: terror within the rise and fall of nations) (Zurich: Orell Fiissli, 2003), and his Finis Germaniae, Kursbuch 162 (Hamburg: Zeit, 2005), 18-29.
40. The proposition concerning the end of history exists in at least four different ver- sions: two are from Kojeve: the end of history in Stalinism and the end of history in the American way of life and in Japanese snobbism; one is in Dostoevsky: the end of history in the "Crystal Palace"; and one in Heidegger: the end of history in boredom. Concerning the last two versions, see Peter Sloterdijk, "Heideggers Politik: Das Ende der Geschichte vertagen" (Heidegger's politics: coping with the end of history), closing statement at the conference Heidegger. Le danger et la promesse, Strasbourg, December 5, 2004; as well as Peter Sloterdijk, Im Weltin- nenraum des Kapitals. Fur eine philosophische Theorie der Globalisierung (In the world interior of capital: for a philosophical theory of globalization) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 258-348. There you also find the technical definition of "world history" as the successful phase of unilateralism and the constituting phase of the world system (1492-1944).
41. Cf. Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2004); Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, eds. , Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2005).
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
1. Thomas Mann, Joseph and his Brothers, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Every-
man's Library, 2005), 538.
2. Robert A. F. Thurman, Anger: The Seven Deadly Sins (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
3. Cf. Juliane Vogel, Die Furie und das Gesetz. Zur Dramaturgie der "grossen Szene' in
der Tragoedie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Fury and law: On the dramaturgy of the "great
scene" in the tragedy of the nineteenth century) (Freiburg: Rombach, 2002).
4. Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History," in Selected Writings, vol. 4, trans.
Harry Zorn, (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2003), 392; Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2001).
5. Concerning the source of the formula "x as such—x pure and simple," see Karl
Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique ofPolitical Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993), 105. ^
235
6. 7.
8.
1. 2.
