No More Learning

His grandfather had been governor of Multan under
Firuz Tughluq, and his father and several of his uncles had served
under the Sayyids. Buhlul annexed the Punjab to Delhi; his son
Sikandar Lodi during a reign of thirty years added considerably to
the kingdom he had inherited from his father. But the Delhi kingdom
was actually a congeries of semi-independent governorships mostly
held by Afghans (Lodis, Farmulis or Lohanis). Babur himself says
that when he first entered Hindustan this country was governed by
five Muslim and two pagan rulers, namely the Lodis in the Delhi
empire which extended from Bhera to Bihar; Sultan Muhammad
Muzaffar in Gujarat; the Bahmanis in the Deccan; Mahmud Khalji
in Malwa; Nusrat Shah in Bengal; the Raja of Vijayanagar, and
Rana Sanga in Chitor. In order to make himself master of Hindustan,
Babur would have to dispose of the Lodis and of Rana Sanga. The
leading dramatis personae in this Indian episode are Ibrahim Lodi--
the son of Sikandar Lodi, the son of Buhlul Lodi—who came to the
throne in 1517; and ‘Alam Khan or ‘Ala-ud-Din—another son of
Buhlul Lodi. Outside the ruling house were Daulat Khan, governor
of Lahore, the son of Tatar Khan, who held Sirhind and all the


## p. 10 (#42) ##############################################

10
BABUR
countries of the Punjab to the north of the Sutlej; Dilawar Khan,
Ghazi Khan and Hajji Khan, his sons; Hasan Khan Mewati, Biban-an
Afghan chief, king of Oudh—and Rana Sangram Singh, or Rana Sanga
of Chitor, who was the acknowledged head of the Hindu chiefs.
THE FOUR INVASIONS
There has been some disagreement among the Muslim historians
regarding the various invasions of Hindustan by Babur. Babur him.
self, writing in 1526 after the battle of Panipat, says that from the
time of his conquest of Kabul in 1505 his desire for Hindustan had
been constant, but that until 1519 it had not, for a variety of reasons,
been possible to make a move on that country, and so its territories
had remained unsubdued. At the beginning of this year, however,
Babur made a sudden descent on Bajaur which he captured after a
short siege. At the same time with a view to winning over the people
he concluded an alliance with the Yusufzais by marrying the daughter
of one of their chiefs; and when shortly after the fort of Bhera on the
Jhelum submitted without offering resistance Babur gave orders that
no violence should be done to the inhabitants or to their flocks and
crops. Babur himself evidently regarded his occupation of Bajaur
and Bhera as his first Indian expedition. “From then till now we
laboriously held tight to Hindustan, five times leading an army into
it. The fifth time. . . made Hindustan our conquest and possession. ”]
Abu-'l-Fazl also reckons that Babur made five expeditions, but he
regards the abortive expeditions of January, 1505, and of September,
1507, as the first and second, and the successful invasion in January,
1519, as the third. Abu-'l-Fazl confesses he could get no information
about his fourth expedition; the fifth is, of course, that which led
to the battle of Panipat. Unfortunately there is a gap in the Memoirs
between 2 January, 1520, and 16 November, 1525, so that we cannot
know precisely which expeditions Babur regarded as the second, third
and fourth
In January, 1505, Babur took Kohat and Tarbila in Multan, and
returned in May of that year without having crossed the Indus. In
September, 1507, he turned back owing to disagreement among his
chiefs after reaching Mandrawar.
In order to understand the circumstances which facilitated the
ultimate conquest of India by Babur, we must take up the narrative
where it broke off in chapter ix of vol. III of this series.
Ibrahim Shah Lodi, in 1523, was confronted with rebellion and
risings in all the outlying parts of his kingdom. His relations had
one and all turned against him, but his most serious rivals were his
uncle, ‘Alam Khan (also known as 'Ala-ud-din) who had been living
1 Memoirs, translated by Mrs Beveridge, p. 479.


## p. 11 (#43) ##############################################

'ALAM KHAN AND DAULAT KHAN
11
under the protection of Sultan Muzaffar of Gujarat (see vol. III,
p. 321), and Daulat Khan Lodi, the governor of Lahore. During
the revolts against Shah Ibrahim, Daulat Khan, who had formed the
confederacy, sent his son Ghazi Khan to Delhi in order to ascertain
the position of affairs at headquarters, and on his return to Lahore
Ghazi Khan warned his father that Ibrahim intended to deprive
him of his governorship. Daulat Khan was determined to resist, but
doubting his power to do so unaided he sent messengers to Kabul,
offering to acknowledge Babur as his sovereign in return for assistance.
Babur readily agreed, although 'Alam Khan, the uncle of Shah
Ibrahim, who had recently fled to Kabul, was at the time begging
Babur to place him on the throne of Delhi.
The Lodi army sent against Daulat Khan under the leadership
of Bihar Khan encountered Babur's army near Lahore and was
utterly defeated, and Babur found himself master of that city, a
victory which he quickly followed up by the capture of Dipalpur,
where he was joined by Daulat Khan and his two sons Ghazi and
Dilawar. Instead of handing over Lahore to Daulat Khan, Babur
only presented him with Jullundur and Sultanpur as assignments.
Daulat Khan was naturally disgusted and went into hiding with his
son Ghazi, intending to take the first opportunity which might offer
of regaining what he had lost. Dilawar Khan, who had acted
treacherously towards his father, was now given Sultanpur and the
title of Khan Khanan.
'Alam, who still aspired to the throne of Delhi, now offered Babur
the formal cession of Lahore if he would help him to achieve this
end. This offer on the part of a leading Lodi prince naturally appealed
to Babur, as it would give him a legitimate right to what he had only
taken by force. He therefore instructed his generals whom he had
left in Lahore to assist 'Alam Khan in his attack on Delhi. That
Babur himself could not take part in this expedition was due to the
fact that the Uzbegs were laying siege to Balkh, and as the safety
of this city was almost as vital to himself as to Shah Isma'il, to whom
it now belonged, he felt it incumbent upon him to go to the aid of
his Persian ally. 'Alam Khan now felt that the sooner he acted the
better, as it would not only be to his own advantage if he could
defeat his nephew Ibrahim without the personal aid of Babur, but
also because there was the risk that if things did not go well with
Babur, the Indian contingent might at any moment be recalled.
Daulat Khan, as soon as Babur left India, emerged from his hiding-
place, and with a view to the possible recovery of Lahore offered
to help 'Alam Khan to conquer Delhi. Babur's officers, however,
could not agree to this arrangement, in that Daulat Khan was no
longer on friendly terms with Babur. After much discussion it was
finally agreed that Daulat and his son Ghazi were to remain in
charge of the Punjab, while his other sons Dilawar and Hajji were
>


## p. 12 (#44) ##############################################

12
BABUR
to accompany ‘Alam Khan in his attack on Delhi. The attack came
to nothing-chiefly owing to treachery on both sides—and Ibrahim
still remained lord of Delhi. But Babur, who had disposed of his
troubles in the north, was not far off.
Leaving Mirza Kamran, then a mere child, in nominal charge
of Kabul and Qandahar, Babur set out over the Indus river to
Sialkot. On his march he was joined first by Humayun with the
troops from Badakhshan, and later on the same day by Khvaja
Kilan with the Ghazni troops. It was at Sialkot that Babur heard
of Alam Khan's failure to take Delhi. Daulat Khan and Ghazi, on
learning of Babur's approach, fled to the fortress of Milwat (Malot)
north of Lahore. Babur blockaded Milwat on every side and Daulat
Khan, seeing no hope of escape, capitulated. Daulat Khan died on
the way to Bhera, where he was to have been imprisoned. “Alam
Khan again fled to Babur, bringing with him a certain number of
his scattered troops, who had suffered severely at the hands of
Ibrahin. He arrived on foot and nearly destitute.
Lahore and its dependent provinces being practically subdued,
Babur was now able to devote his whole attention to the capture of
Delhi. Realising the political importance of having an Afghan prince
in his camp, he paid every attention to ‘Alam Khan suitable to his
rank; and, although the latter had everything to lose by Babur's
success, he was entrusted with a command both at Panipat and at
Khanua. The opposing parties were now both advancing to an
encounter. Ibrahim marched his main forces due north from Delhi
along the right bank of the Jumna, while a secondary force under
Hamid Khan moved up from Hissar Firuza in the south-west. This
force, coming into contact with Babur's right wing was totally routed
by Humayun, who was then eighteen years of age. This was Humayun's
first experience of battle. Babur marched to Ambala, and following
the river Jumna arrived at Panipat, which he occupied. Here Babur,
whose forces probably numbered some 25,000, took up a defensive
position, drawing up his army in a long line. On his extreme right
.
were the town and suburbs of Panipat. His centre was protected by
rows of movable carts (araba), seven hundred in number, connected
by twisted bull-hides; between every pair of guns there were six or
seven movable breastworks (tura) for the protection of the matchlock
men. In the centre (ghul) was Babur himself. His left was protected
by ditches and branches of trees. His principal officers were Humayun
and Khvaja Kilan on the right, Muhammad Sultan Mirza and Mahdi
Khvaja on the left, Chin Timur Sultan on the right centre (ung-ghul),
and Mir Ali Khalifa--the Prime Minister on the left centre (sul-
ghul). On the extreme right and left of the whole line were strong
1 Ghazi Khan seems to have been a man of culture and taste, for Babur speaks
of his library where he found precious books, which he divided between Huma-
yun and Kamran.


## p. 13 (#45) ##############################################

a
THE BATTLE OF PANIPAT
13
flanking parties (tulghama), ready at a moment's notice to wheel round
and take the enemy in the flank or rear. On 12 April Babur was ready
to receive Ibrahim's attack, but for eight days nothing happened,
except for the attempt of small parties of the emperor's troops to
vex the enemy by riding up to their camp and shooting arrows
among them. On 20 April Babur, growing impatient, sent out a
force of four or five thousand men to make a night attack, which
though badly conducted had the desired effect of making Ibrahim
move. On 21 April at day break the Afghans were seen to approach.
Ibrahim had with him 100,000 men and nearly 1000 elephants. It
seemed that the main attack was to be made on the emperor's right.
At first they moved forward at a quick pace in the manner of shock
troops, and the first slackening of their speed when they came near
Babur's defences caused confusion with the lines which were follow-
ing close on their heels. Babur at once took advantage of this check
to use his flanking parties, which wheeled round and attacked the
enemy in the rear. In the meanwhile the emperor's left wing under
Mahdi Khvaja had been faring badly at the hands of the Afghans,
but strong support being sent from the centre, the Mughuls were
able to repel them. At this juncture Babur ordered his gunners to
open fire, and then the main attacking force of the Afghans found
themselves exposed to arrows on either flank and to shot or bullets
in front. The battle lasted till noon and was throughout most hotly
contested, but the superior strategy and experience of the Timurid
prince enabled him to bring confusion among the vastly superior
numbers of the Afghans, who finally took to flight leaving, it is said,
over 15,000 dead on the field, including Sultan Ibrahim himself and
Vikramajit the old Raja of Gwalior, who had fought nobly on the
side of the man who had but lately deprived him of his principality.
Babur's first care now was to secure the public treasures of Delhi
and Agra, and to prevent plundering by his victorious army. He
himself entered Delhi and Humayun was sent forward to Agra, which
still held out: and though he was not able at once to enter the forts,
he prevented any treasure being carried off. An incident now
occurred which has its place among the romantic anecdotes of Indian
history. The wives and children of the Raja of Gwalior, who had
been left in the fort of Agra, were seized, while attempting to escape,
by Humayun's men. Humayun, hearing of this, treated them with
the utmost courtesy and protected them from their captors. In order
to show their gratitude to the young prince they presented him with
jewels and precious stones; among these was a diamond of enormous
value, which has been identified with the famous Koh-i-Nur now in
the Tower of London. Humayun handed over this diamond by way
of homage to his father, who returned it to him as a gift. On the
Friday following Babur's arrival in Delhi (27 April, 15261) his name
1 Hodivala, Historical Studies in Mughul Numismatics, pp. 261-2.


## p. 14 (#46) ##############################################

14
BABUR
1
.
was read in the Grand Mosque as "Emperor of Hindustan" and his
highest ambition was at last attained. In his Memoirs Babur com-
pares his own success to the similar achievements of Sultan Mahmud
of Ghazni and of Sultan Shihab-ud-Din Ghuri, and points out that
though he owed everything to divine favour, his own performance
was infinitely superior to theirs for they had had at their disposal
enormous resources in men and money.
The Indian summer having now set in, Babur's most devoted chiefs
and followers were beginning to murmur, including the loyal Khvaja
Kilan, who, advocating that Babur should follow the example of
Tamerlane and abandon Hindustan, was allowed to withdraw and
become governor of Ghazni; to others was offered the choice of
staying or returning.
No chapter in the Memoirs is more interesting than that containing
Babur's description of India and its fauna and flora, which follows
his description of the battle of Panipat. It is fitting in this place to
quote his general impressions of this country :
Hindustan is a country of few charms. Its people have no good looks; of
social intercourse, paying and receiving visits there is none; of genius and
capacity none; of manners none; in handicraft and work there is no form or
symmetry, method or quality; there are no good horses, no good dogs, no grapes,
musk-melons or first-rate fruits, no ice or cold water, no good bread or cooked
food in the bazars, no hot-baths, no colleges, no candles, torches or candlesticks.
In place of candle and torch they have a great dirty gang they call lamp-men
(diwati), who in the left hand hold a smallish wooden tripod to one corner of
which a thing like the top of a candlestick is fixed, having a wick in it about
as thick as the thumb. In the right hand they hold a gourd, through a narrow
slit made in which oil is let trickle in a thin thread when the wick needs it.
Great people keep a hundred or two of these lamp-men. This is the Hindustan
substitute for lamps and candlesticks! If their rulers and begs have work at
night needing candles, these dirty lamp-men bring these lamps, go close up
and there stand.
Except their large rivers and their standing-waters which flow in ravines or
hollows (there are no waters). There are no running-waters in their gardens
or residence (‘imaratlar). These residences have no charm, air (hawa),
regularity or symmetry.
Peasants and people of low standing go about naked. They tie on a thing
called languta, a decency-clout which hangs two spans below the navel. From
the tie of this pendant decency-clout, another clout is passed between the
thighs and made fast behind. Women also tie on a cloth (lang), one-half of
which goes round the waist, the other is thrown over the head.
Pleasant things of Hindustan are that it is a large country and has masses
of gold and silver. Its air in the Rains is very fine. Sometimes it rains 10, 15 or
20 times a day; torrents pour down all at once and rivers flow where no water
had been While it rains and through the Rains, the air is remarkably fine,
not to be surpassed for healthiness and charm. . The fault is that the air
becomes very soft and damp. A bow of those (Transoxanian) countries after
going through the Rains in Hindustan, may not be drawn even; it is ruined;
not only the bow, everything is affected, armour, book, cloth, and utensils all;
a house even does not last long. Not only in the Rains but also in the cold
and the hot seasons, the airs are excellent; at these times, however, the north-
west wind constantly gets up laden with dust and earth. It gets up in great
strength every year in the heats, under the Bull and Twins, when the Rains


## p. 15 (#47) ##############################################

BABUR SETTLES IN HINDUSTAN
15
are near; so strong and carrying so much dust and earth that there is no seeing
one another. People call this wind Darkener of the Sky (H. andhi). The
weather is hot under the Bull and Twins, but not intolerably so, not so hot as
in Balkh and Qandahar and not for half so long.
Another good thing in Hindustan is that it has unnumbered and endless
workmen of every kind. There is a fixed caste (jamʻi) for every sort of work
and for every thing, which has done that work or that thing from father to
son till now. Muila Sharaf, writing in the Zafar-nama about the building of
Timur Beg's Stone Mosque, lays stress on the fact that on it 200 stone-cutters
worked, from Azarbaijan, Fars, Hindustan and other countries. But 680 men
worked daily on my buildings in Agra and of Agra stone-cutters only; while
1491 stone-cutters worked daily on my buildings in Agra, Sikri, Biana
(Bayana), Dholpur, Gwaliar and Kol. In the same way there are numberless
artisans and workmen of every sort in Hindustan. (Memoirs, pp. 518-29. )
The difficulties with which Babur was now confronted cannot be
better described than in his own words :
On our first coming to Agra, there was remarkable dislike and hostility
between its people and mine, the peasantry and soldiers running away in fear
of our men. Delhi and Agra excepted, not a fortified town but strengthened
its defences and neither was in obedience nor submitted. Qasim Sambhali
was in Sambhal; Nizam Khan was in Biana; in Mewat was Hasan Khan
Mewati himself-impious mannikin! -who was the sole leader of the trouble
and mischief. Muhammad Zaitun was in Dholpur; Tatar Khan Sarang-khani
was in Gwaliar; Husain Khan Nuhani was in Rapri; Qutb Khan was in Itawa
(Etawa); 'Alam Khan (Kalpi) was in Kalpi. Qanauj and the other side of
Gang (Ganges) was all held by Afghans in independent hostility, such as
Nasir Khan Nuhani, Ma'ruf Farmuli and a crowd of other amirs. These had
been in rebellion for three or four years before Ibrahim's death and when I
defeated him, were holding Qanauj and the whole country beyond it.
At
the present time they were lying two or three marches on our side of Qanauj
and had made Bihar Khan the son of Darya Khan Nuhani their padshah, under
the style Sultan Muhammad. Marghub the slave was in Mahawin (Mahaban);
he remained there, thus close, for some time but came no nearer.
It was the hot-season when we came to Agra. All the inhabitants had run
away in terror. Neither grain for ourselves nor corn for our horses was to
be had. The villages, out of hostility and hatred to us, had taken to thieving
and highway-robbery; there was no moving on the roads. There had been no
chance since the treasure was distributed to send men in strength into the
parganas and elsewhere. Moreover the year was a very hot one; violent pesti-
lential winds struck people down in heaps together; masses began to die off.
On these accounts the greater part of the begs and best braves became
unwilling to stay in Hindustan, indeed set their faces for leaving it. It is no
reproach to old and experienced begs if they speak of such matters; even if
they do so, this man (Babur) has enough sense and reason to get at what is
honest or what is mutinous in their representations, to distinguish between
loss and gain. But as this man had seen his task whole, for himself, when he
resolved on it, what taste was there in their reiterating that things should be
done differently? What recommends the expression of distasteful opinions by
men of little standing ? Here is a curious thing: This last time of our riding
out from Kabul, a few men of little standing had just been made begs; what I
looked for from them was that if I went through fire and water and came out
again, they would have gone in with me unhesitatingly, and with me have come
out, that wherever I went, there at my side would they be-not that they would
speak against my fixed purpose, not that they would turn back from any task
or great affair on which, all counselling, all consenting, we had resolved, so long
as that counsel was not abandoned. Badly as these new begs behaved, Secretary


## p. 16 (#48) ##############################################

16
BABUR
Ahmadi and Treasurer Wali behaved still worse. Khwaja Kilan had done well
in the march out from Kabul, in Ibrahim's defeat and until Agra was occupied:
he had spoken bold words and shewn ambitious views. But a few days after
the capture of Agra, all his views changed—the one zealous for departure at
any price was Khwaja Kilan.
When I knew of this unsteadiness amongst (my) people, I summoned all the
begs and took counsel. Said I, “There is no supremacy and grip on the world
without means and resources; without lands and retainers sovereignty and com-
mand are impossible. By the labours of several years, by encountering hardship,
by long travel, by flinging myself and the army into battle, and by deadly
slaughter, we, through God's grace, beat these masses of enemies in order that
we might take their broad lands. And now what force compels us, what
necessity has arisen that we should, without cause, abandon countries taken at
such risk of life? Was it for us to remain in Kabul, the sport of harsh poverty?
Henceforth, let no well-wisher of mine speak of such things ! But let not those
turn back from going who, weak in strong persistence, have set their faces to
depart ! ” By these words, which recalled just and reasonable views to their
minds, I made them, willy-nilly, quit their fears. (Memoirs, pp. 523-5. )
Meanwhile, some of the Afghan chiefs set up Ibrahim's brother,
Mahmud, but most of them, seeing that Babur, who had made Agra
his headquarters, had come to stay and did not, like Tamerlane,
intend to withdraw, laid down their arms. While Babur was in Kabul,
Rana Sanga of Chitor (the modern Udaipur), who was at this time
recognised as head of all the Rajputs, had exchanged friendly
embassies with him, and had even offered to help him against
Ibrahim. His life had been one of constant wars, in the course of
which he had defeated Sultan Mahmud Khalji, and captured the
provinces of Bhilsa, Sarangpur, Chanderi and Ranthambhor. He is
said to have been so often wounded in battle that in addition to
having eighty scars he had but one eye and one arm and was a cripple.
He is said to have had at his disposal when necessary seven rajas and
one hundred and four chiefs. But Babur as emperor of Delhi and
Babur as a leader of raids from Kabul were two different people,
and Rana Sanga now declared war against him, and for the first
time Babur found himself engaged in a jihad or Holy War against
the idolator. Humayun meanwhile was sent on a punitive expedition
against the various amirs in the east, who under Nasir Khan Nuhani
and Ma'ruf Farmuli had taken Kanauj. During this expedition
Humayun took Jaunpur and Ghazipur. Gwalior was also taken bv
a stratagem, of which Babur gives a vivid account. It may be
mentioned that after the capture of Gwalior, Babur had a narrow
escape from death by poisoning, for which Sultan Ibrahim's mother
was responsible. Rana Sanga now marched on Bayana, where Mahdi
Khvaja was governor, but the troops who came out to oppose the
Rana, being unable to withstand him, turned back. The Rana, who
had now been joined by a number of powerful chiefs including
Silahdi (Silah-ud-Din) of Raisen (30,000 horse) and Hasan Khan,
the renegade raja of Mewat (12,000 horse), advanced with 100. 000
horse to a hill near Khanua, a village in the Bharatpur state thirty-
>


## p. 17 (#49) ##############################################

THE BATTLE OF KHANUA
:17
seven miles west of Agra. - Babur was at this moment in a highly
precarious position, being practically surrounded in his camp on all
sides by an enemy in possession of the open country. As he himself
confesses, he was at this crisis overwhelmed by religious compunctior.
He had on many occasions intended to give up wine drinking, and
now he issued a farman on the subject, and having disposed of all his
gold and silver wine vessels he poured his wine into a well. He
further vowed that he would remit the tamgha or stamp duty to all
Muslims. As before the battle of Panipat, he found it necessary to
speak stirring words of encouragement to his troops, who were even
more dejected than their master. On 16 March, 1527, was fought the
.
battle of Khanua. Babur again adopted the araba formation. He
himself was in the centre; Chin Timur and Khusrav Kukiltash were
on the right; Humayun (who had returned from his successful cam-
paign in the east), Dilawar Khan Khanan and other Indian nobles
were also on the right wing; Sayyid Mahdi Khvaja was on the left;
and on the right and left were flanking parties; the artillery line was
commanded by Nizam-ud-din 'Ali Khalifa. The Rana's left wing
opened the battle by attacking Babur's right, but was driven back
by Chin Timur. Mustafa Rumi, the Turkish gunner, brought for-
ward the carts and guns from the centre of Humayun's division, and
broke the enemy's ranks. Then followed an attack by the Rana's
right wing, which was repulsed, and finally Babur led his centre
forward. After ten hours' fighting Babur's forces were victorious,
and the Rana took to flight. Hasan Khan Mewati was among the
slain. Sultan Mahmud Lodi who was present at the battle escaped.
After his victory over Rana Sanga, Babur proceeded to reduce Mewat,
and on 7 April, 1527, he entered its capital Alwar in triumph. By
the end of 1527 Babur's authority was established everywhere except
in Oudh.
- Meanwhile Medini Rai, a Rajput chief, had established himself
in Chanderi on the borders of Bundelkhand and Malwa. Here he was
besieged by Pabur.
The garrison on the second day gave up all hope
of resistance, and having put their women to death they rushed out
naked to perish, but not to be captured (29 January, 1528). Humayun
with a large contingent, taking advantage of Babur's promise made
before the battle of Khanua that all who pleased might go on leave
to Kabul, was now despatched to Badakhshan, while Babur himself
set cut to punish Biban, who had repulsed the Mughul army in
Oudh and captured Lucknow. Crossing the Ganges Babur speedily
defeated Biban and drove him into Bengal. Sultan Mahmud Lodi,
the brother of Ibrahim, had meanwhile occupied Bihar, and he now
with a force of 100,000 men advanced on Benares, where he was put
to flight. On 6 May, 1529, Babur won his third great battle in India,
at the junction of the Ganges and its tributary the Gogra, whence
it has come to be known as the battle of the Gogra. In this engage-
2


## p. 18 (#50) ##############################################

18
BABUR
ment he was opposed by the Afghan chiefs who had taken up the
cause of Sultan Mahmud Lodi. Babur gives a very detailed account
of the campaign leading up to this battle, which reads like a diary
kept from day to day. The progress of the battle itself, in which
much use was made both of boats and of artillery, is, however, by
no means easy to follow. As a result of this victory Babur was joined
by nearly all the Afghan chiefs and amirs; and was able to conclude
a treaty of peace with Nusrat Shah, king of Bengal, by which he
himself became sovereign of Bihar.
Humayun having spent a year in Badakhshan, where in obedience
to his father's commands he had refrained from attempting the recap-
ture of Samarqand, set out for Kabul and thence for Agra. He was
next sent to his jagir Sambhal. At the end of six months he was
suddenly attacked by fever. This caused Babur so much anxiety that
he caused Humayun to be brought to Agra. The most learned
doctors were at a loss for a remedy. A famous saint, Mir Abu Baqa,
being called in to advise, said that when physicians were at a loss,
the patient should give in alms the most valuable thing he had and
should seek remedy from God. Babur thereupon said: "I am the
.
most valuable thing that Humayun possesses. . . . I shall make myself
a sacrifice for him. May God the Creator accept it. ”i Babur was
shortly after taken ill, and Humayun recovered : as he lay dying,
Babur appointed Humayun his successor. Mir Khalifa, having
formed a bad opinion of Humayun, desired to place Mahdi Khvaja,
Babur's brother-in-law, on the throne, but he changed his mind, it
would seem, on account of the arrogant behaviour of the Khvaja.
Babur died in Agra on 26 December, 1530. ”
The Indian career of the Turki prince Babur did not actually
begin till his capture of Lahore in 1524, and he died in 1530. It
therefore took him only six years to lay the foundations of a vast
empire the rulers of which, real or nominal, continued down to the
middle of the nineteenth century. It is interesting to recall that his
famous ancestor Timur had, in 1397, invaded northern India, and
entered Delhi in 1398 as a conqueror. But Tamerlane's ambitions
were too great for him to treat his Indian campaign as more than
a raid. That Babur should have confined his conquering activities
to northern India, after consolidating his power between the Oxus
and Kashmir, was, no doubt, partly due to the fact that he had been
helped by the powerful founder of the Safavid kingdom, Shah Isma'il,
with whom, much against his better Sunni feelings, he had made an
alliance which had lasted twenty months (A. H. 917-18-A. D. 1511-12).
There could, therefore, be no question of attacking Persia, even had
he been strong enough to do so. It was as lord of Kabul that he cast
longing glances across the Hindu Kush.
The question naturally presents itself: how did Babur keep such
1 Akbar-nama, p. 276.
? Hodivala, p. 262.


## p. 19 (#51) ##############################################

BABUR'S CHARACTER
19
a detailed record of his own doings from the age of eleven (A. H. 899) ?
Not only his own doings, but those of his relations are recorded in
full detail. And whence did he derive all this information, bio-
graphical and geographical? Mirza Haidar Dughlat had the same
gift: he tells us he wrote the Tarikh-i-Rashidi because the memory
of the Mughuls and their Khans—i. e. the eastern branch of the
Chaghatai-stood in danger of being altogether lost through want of
a chronicler. The earlier Mongols, Chingiz and his descendants, had
been fortunate in their chroniclers in their own day. It was the
descendants of Tamerlane, however, Babur, Mirza Haidar, Gulbadan
Begam, who first among princes undertook to write autobiographies,
while Humayun, Jahangir (for part of his reign) and Shah Jahan
were content to have their memoirs written by personal attendants.
There are very few examples in history of a great conqueror who was
also an eminent poet, though many soldiers, like Julius Caesar and
Xenophon, have been men of letters. Babur was a sufficiently good
poet (in Turki) to have become famous on that account alone, had
he achieved no fame as a soldier or ruler.
In writing an epitome of the emperor Babur's career, having in
view only the part he played in the history of his times, the romantic
side of this remarkable man's personal character has perforce been
relegated to the background: but in conclusion a few words may be
said regarding his private life.
Babur was one of those men who are so active in mind and body
that they are never idle and always find time for everything. Excepting
during the three years when he was hiding in Tashkent under the
protection of the Sultan of Kashghar he knew no rest, and he himself
says towards the end of his life that he had never kept the Fast of
Ramazan twice in any one place. He was pre-eminently human,
and has drawn a picture of himself in his memoirs in which no attempt
is made to hide either his virtues or his vices. He was a rigid Sunni
Muslim, and both orthodox and superstitious in his beliefs. When in
order to please the Shiah Shah Isma'il he adopted the Qizilbash
head-dress for himself and his soldiers, he showed a form of mora!
courage reminding one of his grandson Akbar, who while still pro-
fessing Islam displayed the utmost leniency towards Hindus and
Christians : and if Babur's motive was purely political, it required
no little self-reliance to face the sarcasm and derision which this
head-dress provoked among the zealous Sunnis of Transoxiana: not
to mention the hatred in which the name of Shah Isma'il was held
by reason of his cruelty towards the Sunnis of Khurasan.
As a soldier Babur was, like most of his race, fearless in battle, and
as a general he was a great tactician with a keen eye to detect any
mistake on the part of his opponents. He was also one of the first
military commanders in Asia to appreciate the value of artillery.
As a diplomatist he seems to have shown much more cunning and


## p. 20 (#52) ##############################################

20
BABUR
skill in dealing with the Afghans than with his own people and
the manner in which he played off the rebellious amirs of Sultan
Ibrahim against each other was worthy of a Machiaveili.
While inheriting a savagery common to all the Mongols and
Turks, and a total disregard for human life, he was capable of great
generosity in forgiving those who had behaved ill towards him. Like
all his family he was strongly addicted to intemperance, though his
drinking bouts were always followed by very sincere repentance.
He had a love for the beauties of nature probably rare in his day,
something apart from a delight in the artificial beauties of poetry,
which was common to all his co-religionists whether Turks or Persians.
His careful descriptions of the animals and plants of India reves)
great powers of observation. These portions of his memoirs read like
the notes of a peace-loving naturalist rather than those of a restless
warrior.
The Memoirs of Babur must be reckoned among the most enthral-
ling and romantic works in the literature of all time. They were
written in that form of Turkish known as Turki, which was Bahur's
mother-tongue. As we possess them they are not complete; all the
copies known to us contain gaps from 1508 to 1519, from 1520 to
1525 and from 1529 to 1530. A more complete copy was apparently
known to his cousin Mirza Haidar, the author of the Tarikh-i-Rashidi.
but the translation into Persian made in 1589 by Khan Khanan
'Abdur-Rahim, the son of Bairam Khan, contains the same gaps as
the Haidarabad Codex, from which Mrs Annette Beveridge made
her admirable English translation.
Babur was a real poet, and apart from the incidental verses intro-
duced in his memoirs we have from his pen a small collection of
Turki lyrics, which bear comparison with the best poetry of his day!
He also wrote a religious pcem called the Mubayyin, and about two
years before his death he wrote a versified rendering of the Risala-i-
Walidiyya, a pious tract written by the famous Khwaja Ahrar in
honour of his parents:
See Divan-i-Babur Padishah, edited with facsimile by E. Denison Ross.
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1910. This edition was based on a
unique MS. in the library of the Nawab of Rampur:


## p. 21 (#53) ##############################################

CHAPTER II
HUMAYUN
ALTHOUGH Babur had recognised his eldest son Humayun as
successor to the large territory he had acquired, the new ruler's
position was extremely insecure. As he lay dying Babur had warned
Humayun of the possibility of claims by the three other brothers and
had charged him always to forgive their faults.
By force of arms the Mughuls had imposed themselves on northern
India, but they had been so occupied in fighting that they had hardly
begun to rule, and India was still only an outlying portion of the
realm, Kabul being the proper capital and centre. Their generals
were still soldiers and not administrators, and, as Babur had said on
his first conquest of Kabul, the scheme of government was still saifi
(by the sword) not qalami (by the pen). To strengthen his position
Babur had invited members of the families of Timur and Chingiz
freely to join him. Not a few with royal blood in their veins were
possible claimants to the throne recently vacated. In the occupied
area were many turbulent elements excited by the century of chaos
which had followed Timur's invasion, and among these, especially
towards the east, were many Afghans belonging to the last dynasty
which had ruled. Babur had met and defeated the Rajputs, but had
not subdued them, and they, more than the other sections of Indians
in the north, had a strong national instinct. South-east of Rajputana
lay Gujarat, where Bahadur Shah was reviving and extending the
kingdom of his predecessors. "
Humayun, taking his insecure seat on the throne four days after
his father's death, assigned the westerly Punjab, Kabul and Qandahar
to be governed by his brother Kamran, and made smaller provisions
for the two younger brothers. He then proceeded early in 1531 to
besiege the strong fortress of Kalinjar in Bundelkhand, which might
be used as a base for attacks on the lower Duab. During these
operations he received news that Mahmud Lodi, brother of the late
king Ibrahim Lodi, who had received support in Bengal, had invaded
the east of his territory and taken Jaunpur. Humayun marched
rapidly towards Jaunpur and defeated the Afghans. They were
scattered for a time, but Sher Khan, who was reported to have failed
to support Mahmud Lodi at the critical time and was the ables!
1 There was even a plot in favour of Mahdi Khvaja, brother-in-law of Babu:.
(Humayun-nama, pp. 25 and 298. )
2 See vol. II, chap XIII.
3 The site of the battle was probably in the Daunrua estate, on the banks of
the Sai river, 15 miles east of Jaunpur.
4 For Sher Khan's earlier history see chap. III.


## p. 22 (#54) ##############################################

22
HUMAYUN
leader among them, began a fresh concentration. In order to break
this up Humayun despatched an army to invest the stronghold of
Chunar on the Ganges south of Benares, and followed it himself.
Before any results could be obtained other embarrassments led him
to arrange a peace by which Sher Khan was left to continue his plans
for an Afghan supremacy in the east. Kamran, since his father's
death, had cherished hopes of gaining the whole of Babur's territory
in spite of the ample provision he had received. Leaving his brother
'Askari in charge of Qandahar he advanced with an army to Lahore
which he secured by a cunning stratagem, as the governor refused
to be false to his trust. At the same time he continued to assure
Humayun of his loyalty and actually received a further grant
of territory round Hissar Firuza which had been Humayun's own
governorship and for some generations to come was regarded as the
holding of the Mughul heir apparent.
While his hold over his own territory was thus weakened through
the claims of a treacherous brother and the open attempts of the
Afghans, Humayun was forced to take notice of affairs outside.
Suspecting the loyalty of Muhammad Zaman Mirza, who was not
only his brother-in-law but was also descended like himself from Timur,
and had been appointed by Babur governor of Bihar, he removed
him from office in 1533 and placed him in confinement at Bayana.
Muhammad Zaman escaped and offered his services to Bahadur
Shah, king of Gujarat, while a cousin named Muhammad Sultan and
his son who had been plotting with him were seized and sentenced
to be blinded. The peaceful relations which existed between Gujarat
and Agra were broken by the refusal of Bahadur Shah to turn away
the fugitives and by the terms of the letter sent in his name to
Humayun. His continued extension of authority towards central
India and Rajputana also aroused jealousy and some alarm. Humayun
received an application for help from the Rana of Chitor who was
in danger of being crushed by his ambitious neighbour, and although
Humayun's religious principles would not allow him to aid an
unbeliever against an enemy of his own faith, he marched to Gwalior
late in 1534 and called on Bahadur Shah to stop his enterprise against
the Rana and again demanded the fugitives. Despairing of help
from Agra the Rana came to terms with Bahadur Shah and Humayun
hoped to be able to attend to his eastern possessions where Afghan
intrigue was most dangerous.
Peace between Chitor and Gujarat was, however, short, and
Bahadur Shah not only renewed his attack but also sent a strong
force to resist the Mughul power. This army was commanded by
Tatar Khan Lodi, whose father ‘Ala-ud-din was one of the Afghan
kings of Delhi, and had himself, after two unsuccessful attempts on
the throne, been banished by Babur to Badakhshan, and escaping
i See vol. III, p. 329.


## p. 23 (#55) ##############################################

INVASION OF GUJARAT
23
thence was one of the refugees in Gujarat. While 'Ala-ud-din took
one force towards Kalinjar and another threatened the Punjab, Tatar
Khan moved directly on Agra. He was successful in taking Bayana
and his advance troops even raided the suburbs of Agra.
Humayun now displayed better qualities of determination than
hitherto. He directed his brothers Hindal and 'Askari who were at
Agra to attack the invaders and himself moved through eastern
Malwa to Sarangpur, receiving the capitulation of the strong fortress
of Raisen on the way. Tatar Khan's army, in spite of its initial success,
did not await the Mughul forces under 'Askari. Most of his troops
abandoned him with their booty and having only a few thousand
horse remaining with him he was overwhelmed and slain by 'Askari
at Mandrel. 'Ala-ud-din's force, threatened by Humayun himself,
withdrew to Gujarat, and the army which had marched towards the
Punjab also returned.
When Humayun reached Sarangpur Chitor had not fallen, and a
council was held in the Gujarat camp to decide whether the siege
should be pressed or the Mughul enemy met. It was correctly guessed
that Humayun would not fight a Muslim king while he was engaged
against an unbeliever like the Rana, and efforts were redoubled to
take the fortress. The Gujarat artillery prevailed at last, and while
the women of the city perished voluntarily in flames the remnant
of the garrison hurled themselves to death against the weapons of
the besiegers. As the end of the siege was approaching Humayun
had moved on into Gujarat territory till he reached Mandasor only
60 miles from Chitor, and once again Bahadur Shah had to make
choice of his plan of campaign. This time he rejected the advice of
his most acute councillor who wished him to attack Humayun at
once with troops elated by their recent success. He decided to remain
on the defensive and rely on his superior artillery to repel the
Mughuls. An entrenched camp in such a position was merely a trap.
When the besieged made a sally they were easily defeated in the
open field by the Mughuls even with odds in their favour, and rarely
succeeded in drawing them close enough to bring them under
artillery fire. As the siege continued supplies ran short and could
not be replaced. The garrison was dying of starvation and Bahadur
Shah decided to escape. With a few attendants he left the camp in
the night (March, 1535) and made his way to Mandu with Mallu
Qadir Khan, the governor of that place, while some of the surviving
troops either followed him or were led by Muhammad Zaman Mirza
to cause revolt in the Punjab.
The tumult of departure added to the explosion of cannon made
the Mughuls believe that they were about to be attacked and their
forces were drawn up in readiness. As daylight appeared the truth
was known and they broke into the camp and divided the spoil.
A body of horse was sent in pursuit of the fugitives and Humayun


## p. 24 (#56) ##############################################

2+
HUMAYUN
followed it to Mandu. This vast fortress with a battlemented wall
23 miles in length stands on an isolated plateau 2079 feet above the
sea. Its size and the length of its defences have frequently enabled
surprise attacks to penetrate its walls, though later it held out for
six months when besieged by Akbar. Bahadur Shah opened negotia-
tions for peace in which the cession of Malwa to Humayun was
proposed, but while the terms were still being discussed a small
body of Mughuls forced their way over an unguarded part of the
walls and opened the nearest gate. Mallu Khan at once warned
Bahadur Shah, who tried to escape and meeting a Mughul force cut
his way through and reached the citadel. Despairing of his ability
to hold this he ordered his horses to be raised and lowered over the
wall and fled to Champaner” while the Mughul army sacked Mandu.
For the time being the whole of Malwa lay at the mercy of Humayun,
who followed up his success by a hasty pursuit of Bahadur Shah.
As the Mughul troops reached Champaner, Bahadur Shah, after
setting fire to the town, fled north to Cambay where he halted only
to destroy the fleet he had prepared to combat the Portuguese, and
escaped thence to Diu, evading Humayun by only a few hours and
cutstripping the force which pursued him. Humayun at Cambay
was the first of his house to see the ocean. During his halt there his
small escort had a narrow escape from being overwhelmed by the
local chieftains who were tributary to Bahadur Shah, and who planned
a night attack. Though they were able to plunder the camp during
the night Humayun had been warned of the design by an old woman
of the neighbourhood whose son had been enslaved by the Mughuls
and who hoped by this service to gain his release. As light appeared
the marauders were attacked and driven off with great slaughter.
When Bahadur Shah had fled from Humayun before Chitor, his
chief artillery officer, a Turk called Rumi Khan, had deserted to the
Mughul side and had remained with Humayun. He was now
approached by an emissary from Bahadur Shah, who by a skilful
mixture of abuse and persuasion induced him to dissuade Humayun
from an attack on Diu. Humayun was convinced that the air of the
seashore did not suit him and he returned to Champaner which was
being stoutly defended by Ikhtiyar Khan, a Gujarat general.
Though this magnificent city had been laid in ashes after an
existence of only 50 years the citadel was still intact, well equipped
for a siege, and situated in difficult jungle through the concealed
paths of which the people of the country could take fresh supplies.
The Mughul army was not well supplied for siege operations and
four months passed without any progress being made. Success was
finally due to the intelligence of the emperor fortified by his personal
bravery. While reconnoitring the position he saw some villagers come
I For a-description see G. Yazdani, Mandu, 1929.
2 In 22° 29' N. , 73° 32' E.


## p. 25 (#57) ##############################################

FAILURE TO HOLD GUJARAT
25
out of the woods and as their explanations were not satisfactory he
had them beaten. They then guided the Mughuls to the foot of the
walls. Though these could not be breached Humayun at once devised
a means of scaling them by driving spikes into the mortar between
the stones, and on a moonlight night, while a furious attack was made
on other parts of the fortress 300 men climbed the wall, Humayun
himself being the fortieth. This unexpected attack inside the citadel,
with the news that the emperor himself was in command, terrified
the defenders, who allowed Humayun's party to capture a gate.
Ikhtiyar Khan although safe in the upper fort had not sufficient
munitions there to prolong his resistance and was forced to surrender
on 9 August, 1535. Since its foundation Champaner had been a
repository for the treasure of the Gujarat kings and Humayun's army
was enriched by great booty. One of Bahadur Shah's officers whom
Humayun plied with drink, instead of putting to the torture as his
counsellors advised, revealed great treasures hidden in a reservoir
and well. The capture of the two celebrated forts at Mandu and
Champaner so delighted Humayun that he commemorated his vic-
lories by striking coin at these places.
While Humayun had thus beaten down open resistance, had taken
strongholds and had assumed the outward appearance of sovereignty,
he took no steps to consolidate his rule and wasted months in revelry
and enjoyment of his booty. An army sent by Shah Husain of Sind
to help in his campaign against Gujarat was diverted by a bribe
offered by the governor of Patan in the north of the kingdom who stili
held out for Bahadur Shah, and it finally returned as Shah Husain
feared that his troops might be corrupted by the luxury of the imperial
army. Bahadur Shah in his retreat at Diu was approached by the
chiefs in the north of his lost kingdom, who offered to remit their land
revenue to him as the Mughuls were taking no steps to collect it.
He commissioned 'Imad-ul-Mulk to march to Ahmadabad with full
powers over collection and remission. As the new governor progressed,
taking steps to restore administration, he was joined by considerable
forces and was able to recruit more by using the funds he had col-
lected. Humayun, though he easily fell into habits of sloth and
luxury during success, could always rouse himself when danger was
apparent. He marshalled forces and sending his brother 'Askari in
advance went to meet 'Imad-ul-Mulk. Although the latter was able
to surprise 'Askari at a disadvantage and plunder his camp, the
Mughul army reformed and won the battle which ensued. Humayun
then advanced to and occupied Ahmadabad and at last took steps
to organise the newly acquired province. He placed 'Askari in charge
as viceroy with Hindu Beg, an experienced general, to aid him and
appointed officials to other posts. His advisers pressed him in view
of the disturbances and rebellion which were taking part in the east
of his realm to restore Gujarat to Bahadur Shah. So far was he from


## p. 26 (#58) ##############################################

26
HUMAYUN
taking this sound advice that he planned to attack Diu where Bahadur
Shah was sheltering.
Malwa had been left in such haste, with no arrangements for the
proper government of the province, that it had been invaded by
former officials and the Mughul troops had been driven to Ujjain.
Humayun decided to return to Mandu which had greatly attracted
him, and his arrival there was sufficient for the time to quell opposi-
tion. His departure from Gujarat was, however, the signal for
disaster in that tract; Bahadur Shah still had a fleet, and his people
held one or two ports on the coast. With help from the Portuguese
and a body of African slaves he was able to re-establish a stronger
footing and took town after town. There was no master mind to
direct the sending of reinforcements and 'Askari showed more dis-
position to call in troops to ensure his own safety than to help his
subordinates. Moreover, detachments of Gujarat forces left scattered
in the north and east when Bahadur Shah abandoned Chitor were
now coming together. Ghazanfar, who was a foster brother of
'Askari, deserted after being confined for a rude jest at the viceroy
and offered to disclose to Bahadur Shah full details of the Mughul
position at Ahmadabad, which he described as so precarious thai
*Askari would fly if attacked. The local chiefs in Gujarat, who had
found no reason to prefer the new rulers, also urged their former
king to return, promising him their assistance.
While Bahadur Shah was rallying his former subjects, collecting
troops and approaching Ahmadabad, his opponent 'Askari began to
lose heart. No help was to be expected from Humayun, and a section
of 'Askari's advisers urged him to declare himself independent of his
brother in the hope that such a measure would be popular in the
locality and an encouragement to the troops. Bahadur Shah had
arrived within a few miles of Ahmadabad and the Mughul army
moved out to meet him. Although 'Askari was not prepared to set
himself up against Humayun he was convinced that retreat was
necessary, and his counsellors planned to take what treasure was
left in Champaner and to make for Agra where they still hoped to
persuade 'Askari to assume the royal title.