Now by leaving after
entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of
scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited
to leave.
entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of
scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited
to leave.
Summa Theologica
xv in Ezech.
, and Moral.
xxii): "No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a
beginning of a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish
great things. " Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to
the perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments
which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that one
ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the counsels,
unless one be already practiced in the observance of the precepts.
Objection 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a
place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop
Siagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], "order should be observed in ascending
to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the summit by
overpassing the steps. " [*The rest of the quotation is from Regist. v,
Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc. ]. "For we are well aware that walls when
built receive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid
of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight before
they are seasoned they bring down the whole building" (Dist. xlviii,
can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that one should not
enter religion unless one be practiced in the observance of the
precepts.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned
is towards his mother," says: "First we are conceived in the womb of
Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are
nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same
elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being
regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her
hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in
good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we
progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's milk
for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine,
by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the
beginning with God. " Afterwards it goes on to say: "For those who are
just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the hands of the Church as
it were and fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing
arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Afterwards they
are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and being weaned so to speak,
begin to fast and keep other difficult observances. Many, like the
heretics and schismatics, have perverted this order by being weaned
before the time. Hence they have come to naught. " Now this order is
apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or induce others to
enter religion, before they are practiced in the easier observance of
the commandments. Therefore they would seem to be heretics or
schismatics.
Objection 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to
that which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels,
because they are more universal, for "the implication of the one by the
other is not convertible" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the
counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold. Seeing
then that the right order requires one to pass from that which comes
first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not to pass
to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being first of
all practiced in the observance of the commandments.
On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the
observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the observance
of the counsels. For it is stated (Lk. 5:28) that "leaving all things
he . . . followed Him. " Therefore it is not necessary for a person to
be practiced in the observance of the commandments before passing to
the perfection of the counsels.
I answer that, As shown above ([3834]Q[188], A[1]), the religious state
is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of
charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to
perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are those
things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the
attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an
obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the loss
of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods man
turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it is
evident that the observances of the religious state, while removing the
obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin: for
instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, and the like
withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all other manner of
sins.
Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the
observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to attain
to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not practiced, in
order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: "The young
man lies when he says: 'All these have I kept from my youth. ' For if he
had fulfilled this commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself,' why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou hast
and give to the poor? " But this means that he lied as to the perfect
observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract. viii super
Matth. ) that "it is written in the Gospel according to the Hebrews that
when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,' the rich man
began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How sayest
thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, seeing that it is
written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself? Behold
many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are clothed in filth, and
die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all manner of good things,
and nothing whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord
reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For it is
impossible to fulfil the commandment which says, Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially to have such great
wealth. " This also refers to the perfect fulfilment of this precept. on
the other hand, it is true that he kept the commandments imperfectly
and in a general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the observance
of the precepts of charity, as stated above ([3835]Q[184], A[3]).
Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the counsels is
useful both to the innocent and to sinners, our Lord called not only
the innocent youth but also the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His
call, and the youth obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the
religious life more easily than those who presume on their innocency.
It is to the former that our Lord says (Mat. 21:31): "The publicans and
the harlots shall go into the kingdom of God before you. "
Reply to Objection 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in
three ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and
thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since
every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of his
life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with
various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state need
not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be a
cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a layman.
Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this way it is
clear that one man begins straightway not only from a higher state, but
even from a higher degree of holiness, than the highest degree to which
another man attains throughout his whole life. Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 1): "All are agreed that the boy Benedict began at a high
degree of grace and perfection in his daily life. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3836]Q[184], A[6]) the holy
orders prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for
the attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid
on the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the
burden of religion seasons the walls, i. e. men, by drawing out the damp
of vice.
Reply to Objection 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that
it is chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has
to pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is
clear from what follows that the statement that certain "heretics" and
"schismatics have perverted this order" refers to the order of
doctrine. For it continues thus: "But he says that he has kept these
things, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath
[*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking 'retributio,'
which Douay renders 'reward,' as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was
humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was
humbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is the
Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of angels,
namely the Word that is in the beginning with God. " The example which
is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being commanded to fast
until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on them
as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires them inwardly to take
upon themselves difficult things of their own choice. Hence after
Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the Church observes a
fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. 1:15), "is
not confined to any particular age; He ceases not when men die, He is
not excluded from the maternal womb. " Gregory also in a homily for
Pentecost (xxx in Ev. ) says: "He fills the boy harpist and makes him a
psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and makes him a wise judge [*Dan.
1:8-17]," and afterwards he adds: "No time is needed to learn
whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind by the merest touch. " Again
it is written (Eccles. 8:8), "It is not in man's power to stop the
Spirit," and the Apostle admonishes us (1 Thess. 5:19): "Extinguish not
the Spirit," and (Acts 7:51) it is said against certain persons: "You
always resist the Holy Ghost. "
Reply to Objection 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the
ends, so to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the
precepts of charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that
these precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but
that the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of
the precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the
precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is
altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in
the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity
precedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of
time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed
to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of
charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels
as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts
without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common
observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of
nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of time,
for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the species. But
the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels is directed to
the observance of the precepts together with the counsels; as an
imperfect to a perfect species, even as the irrational to the rational
animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, since
"nature," as Boethius says (De Consol. iii, 10), "begins with perfect
things. " And yet it is not necessary for the precepts first of all to
be observed without the counsels, and afterwards with the counsels,
just as it is not necessary for one to be an ass before being a man, or
married before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary for a
person first of all to keep the commandments in the world before
entering religion; especially as the worldly life does not dispose one
to religious perfection, but is more an obstacle thereto.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the
religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed,
according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according to
the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret. , cap. Non solum. , de Regular.
et Transeunt, ad Relig. ] who moreover forbade anyone to be bound to the
religious life by profession before completing the year of probation.
Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone while yet in the
world to be bound by vow to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews "should
be persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free
will" (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil what
one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter
religion.
Objection 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of
falling; wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33,34): "If a man open a pit .
. . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay
the price of the beasts. " Now through being bound by vow to enter
religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various
sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion.
On the contrary, It is written, (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye, and pay to the
Lord your God"; and a gloss of Augustine says that "some vows concern
the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the like. "
Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. But Holy
Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore it is
better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As stated above ([3837]Q[88], A[6]), when we were
treating of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is
more praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to
vow is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the
virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and
just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will obstinate
in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through proceeding
from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore it is in
itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn
vow which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious
order. This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded
by a year's probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple
vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds him
to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a year's
probation.
Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood
as referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the
obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end,
because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation
unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be avoided;
indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et Paulin. ), "happy
is the necessity that compels us to better things. "
Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of
the will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself,
instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from it.
But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not
derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate from
the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after being
baptized.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation
of entering religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter
religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is
said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a
priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to
become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or
abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his
benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health
he refused to become a monk. " And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge
and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be
admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to
retain them in peace. " Now this would not be if he were bound to enter
religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep one's
vow of entering religion.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power.
Now it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends
on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem
that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself
to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one.
Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the
fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land;
and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man
obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the
vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not
necessarily to be fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth him"; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to
the Lord your God," says: "To vow depends on the will: but after the
vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3838]Q[88], A[1]), when we were
treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning
God. Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface [*Innoc. I, Epist.
ii, Victricio Epo. Rotomag. , cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii,
qu. 1]: "If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely
irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given to
God be deserving of punishment! " Therefore a man is under an obligation
to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something pertaining to
God.
Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to
God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine service,
as stated above ([3839]Q[186], A[1]). Hence it follows that he who
binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter
religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if
he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as soon as
he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas if he
intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a certain
fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time comes or
the condition is fulfilled.
Reply to Objection 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple
vow. Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to
dwell in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of
conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter religion.
Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas) the Bishop of
Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing to enter
religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled that if "he
wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the government of his
see and pay his vows to the Most High. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3840]Q[88], A[3], ad 2), when
we were treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a
certain religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to
be received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to
enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to
go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one
particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the
obligation to which he has engaged himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is
greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a
temporal vow; and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti
Redemptione, cap. Scripturae), "he who exchanges a temporary service
for the perpetual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking
his vow. "
Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into
religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving alms
a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan. 4:24,
"Redeem thou thy sins with alms," much more does it suffice to satisfy
for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service
by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfaction,
even that of public penance, according to the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. i,
cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory
declares (Hom. xx in Ezech. ). Hence we read in the Lives of the Fathers
(vi, 1) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as by
being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby absolved from all
debt of punishment, nevertheless the entrance into religion is more
profitable than a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, as regards the
advancement in good, which is preferable to absolution from punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion in
perpetuity?
Objection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion, is
bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to
enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet. 2:21,
"It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than
after they have known it to turn back," and Lk. 9:62, "No man putting
his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of
God. " But he who bound himself by the vow to enter religion, is under
the obligation to enter, as stated above [3841](A[3]). Therefore he is
also bound to remain for always.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise
to scandal, and is a bad example to others.
Now by leaving after
entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of
scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited
to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to
fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain
evermore.
Objection 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a
perpetual vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated
above (A[3], ad 3;[3842] Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But this would not be so
if a person after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the
intention of leaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter
religion is bound also to remain in perpetuity.
On the contrary, The vow of religious profession, for the reason that
it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be preceded
by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before the simple
vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. Therefore it seems
that he who vows to enter religion is not for that reason bound to
remain there in perpetuity.
I answer that, The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will: because
"to vow is an act of the will" according to Augustine [*Gloss of Peter
Lombard on Ps. 75:12]. Consequently the obligation of a vow extends as
far as the will and intention of the person who takes the vow.
Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to enter
religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to remain in
perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind himself to enter
religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining the freedom to
remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound to remain. If,
however, in vowing he thought merely of entering religion, without
thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in perpetuity, it
would seem that he is bound to enter religion according to the form
prescribed by common law, which is that those who enter should be given
a year's probation. Wherefore he is not bound to remain for ever.
Reply to Objection 1: It is better to enter religion with the purpose
of making a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one
disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn or
to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to do:
else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the
kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false.
Reply to Objection 2: A man who has entered religion gives neither
scandal nor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a
reasonable motive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive
scandal on their part, and not active scandal on the part of the person
leaving, since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient
on account of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and
the like.
Reply to Objection 3: He who enters with the purpose of leaving
forthwith, does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his
intention in vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as
to wish to try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he
is not bound to remain for evermore.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether children should be received in religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in
religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad
Relig. , cap. Nullus): "No one should be tonsured unless he be of legal
age and willing. " But children, seemingly, are not of legal age; nor
have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason.
Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in religion.
Objection 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of
repentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf. [3843] Q[81], A[1]] from
"religare" [to bind] or from "re-eligere" [to choose again], as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But
repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they
should not enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath.
But children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath
(Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum. ). Therefore it
would seem that neither should they be bound by vow.
Objection 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an
obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe
age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their parents
or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, can.
Puella) that "if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred
veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they choose, can
at once declare the deed null and void. " It is therefore unlawful for
children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or bound to
religion.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 19:14): "Suffer the little
children, and forbid them not to come to Me. " Expounding these words
Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth. ) that "the disciples of Jesus before
they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf. Mat.
19:16-30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ: but our
Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children. We must
therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in wisdom
we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were great, and
forbid the children to come to Jesus. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1), the religious vow is
twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to
God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such a
vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may
encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as
in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De
Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig. , cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies
to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to
be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age
of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called
"the age of puberty," although in some it comes earlier and in others
it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of nature.
Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an obstacle, if the
person who makes a vow to God is not his own master; for instance, if a
slave, though having the use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even
is ordained, without the knowledge of his master: for his master can
annul this, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And
since boys and girls under the age of puberty are naturally in their
father's power as regards the disposal of their manner of life, their
father may either cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do
so, as it is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).
Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a
simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in
virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching the
age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet
this obligation may be removed by his father's authority, under whose
control he still remains, because the ordinance of the law whereby one
man is subject to another considers what happens in the majority of
cases. If, however, the
child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the
authority of his parents; though if he has not the full use of reason,
he would not be bound in the sight of God.
The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious.
Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of the
solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what happens
in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of puberty,
however much the person who makes profession may have the use of
reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to make him
a religious (Extra, De Regular. , etc. cap. Significatum est. ).
Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of
puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received into
religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the Baptist
(Lk. 1:80) that "the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was
in the deserts. " Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, 3), "the Roman
nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Benedict to be nurtured
for Almighty God"; and this is most fitting, according to Lam. 3:27,
"It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth. " It is
for this reason that by common custom children are made to apply
themselves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass their
lives.
Reply to Objection 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and
taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is
able to make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is
possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be
educated in a religious house.
Reply to Objection 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the
attachment of perfection, as stated above ([3844]Q[186], A[1], ad 4);
and accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it.
But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as
occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above
([3845]Q[186], A[1], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as
the canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however,
they bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in
God's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in
the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.
Reply to Objection 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is
not rebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents' consent:
but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that
she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she
binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her
parents' authority.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference
to one's parents?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from entering
religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not lawful to
omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which is optional.
Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation of the precept
concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12); wherefore the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): "If any widow have children or
grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to make
a return of duty to her parents. " But the entrance to religion is
optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit deference
to one's parents for the sake of entering religion.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father
is greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is
natural, while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from
Gn. 9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in
order to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals
(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside
the deference due to his father in order to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to
those to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot
enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that "those who
are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a monastery,
when they seek admittance, unless first of all they withdraw from
public business" (Dist. liii, can. Legem. ). Therefore seemingly much
less may children enter religion in despite of their duty to their
parents.
On the contrary, It is related (Mat. 4:22) that James and John "left
their nets and father, and followed our Lord. " By this, says Hilary
(Can. iii in Matth. ), "we learn that we who intend to follow Christ are
not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the ties of home. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3846]Q[101], A[2], ad 2) when we were
treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle,
wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their
children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter
religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children,
namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1 Tim.
5:8) that "if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel. "
Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted by
their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a condition of
necessity. Consequently we must say that when their parents are in such
need that they cannot fittingly be supported otherwise than by the help
of their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion in
despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the parents'
necessity be not such as to stand in great need of their children's
assistance, the latter may, in despite of the duty they owe their
parents, enter religion even against their parents' command, because
after the age of puberty every freeman enjoys freedom in things
concerning the ordering of his state of life, especially in such as
belong to the service of God, and "we should more obey the Father of
spirits that we may live [*'Shall we not much more obey the Father of
Spirits, and live? ']," as says the Apostle (Heb. 12:9), than obey our
parents. Hence as we read (Mat. 8:22; Lk. 9:62) our Lord rebuked the
disciple who was unwilling to follow him forthwith on account of his
father's burial: for there were others who could see to this, as
Chrysostom remarks [*Hom. xxvii in Matth. ].
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends
not only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of
deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the
commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by
revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those who
live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits their
condition.
Reply to Objection 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin,
it follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he
would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person, for
"a slave belongs wholly to his master" [*Aristotle, Polit. i, 2]. On
the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is not
hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring himself to
the service of God; which is most conducive to man's good.
Reply to Objection 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot
lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore if
a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or to pay
a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation in order
to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and has not
wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely by
surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law [*Cod.
IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays an obligation not on the
person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person of a
freeman "is above all pecuniary consideration" [*Dig. L, xvii, de div.
reg. Jur. ant. 106,176]. Hence, after surrendering his property, he may
lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in
order to earn the means of paying the debt.
On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except as
may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.
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Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter
religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that "he who undertakes the
cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: 'My son, if thou
be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a
stranger'" (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, "because to be surety
for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety of
one's own behavior. " Now he who is under an obligation to a man for a
debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he can.
Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to which
obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for him to
lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all.
But if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the
people would be left without a pastor's care, which would be unfitting.
Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders
are directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his
contemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and
archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and
hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish priest
or archdeacon to pass over to religion.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce
sunt leges. ): "If a man, while governing the people in his church under
the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by the Holy Ghost to
desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical
rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we authorize him to go
freely. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 3;[3847] Q[88], A[12], ad 1),
the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other obligation.
Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be bound by
perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service [*Cf. [3848]
Q[184], A[5]], while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as bishops
are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure of souls.
Wherefore bishops "cannot lay aside their bishopric for any pretext
whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff" (Extra, De
Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig. , cap. Licet. ): whereas archdeacons and
parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of the bishop the cure
entrusted to them, without the Pope's special permission, who alone can
dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it is evident that archdeacons
and parish priests may lawfully enter religion.
Reply to Objection 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound
themselves to the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their
archdeaconry or parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain
their archdeaconry or parish for ever.
Reply to Objection 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil. ): "Although they,"
namely religious, "are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about
whom you argue, saying; 'If all shut themselves up and live in
solitude, who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will
be able to urge sinners to virtue? ' If this holds true, if all are
fools with thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable,
for if all be virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish.
Virtue is rare, and is not desired by many. " It is therefore evident
that this is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest
the river run dry. [*St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection,
which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article. ]
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Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another?
Objection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to
another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. 10:25): "Not
forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed"; and a gloss observes:
"Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who presuming
on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of the imperfect,
that they may appear to be righteous.
xxii): "No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a
beginning of a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish
great things. " Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to
the perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments
which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that one
ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the counsels,
unless one be already practiced in the observance of the precepts.
Objection 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a
place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop
Siagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], "order should be observed in ascending
to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the summit by
overpassing the steps. " [*The rest of the quotation is from Regist. v,
Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc. ]. "For we are well aware that walls when
built receive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid
of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight before
they are seasoned they bring down the whole building" (Dist. xlviii,
can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that one should not
enter religion unless one be practiced in the observance of the
precepts.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned
is towards his mother," says: "First we are conceived in the womb of
Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are
nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same
elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being
regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her
hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in
good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we
progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's milk
for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine,
by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the
beginning with God. " Afterwards it goes on to say: "For those who are
just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the hands of the Church as
it were and fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing
arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Afterwards they
are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and being weaned so to speak,
begin to fast and keep other difficult observances. Many, like the
heretics and schismatics, have perverted this order by being weaned
before the time. Hence they have come to naught. " Now this order is
apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or induce others to
enter religion, before they are practiced in the easier observance of
the commandments. Therefore they would seem to be heretics or
schismatics.
Objection 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to
that which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels,
because they are more universal, for "the implication of the one by the
other is not convertible" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the
counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold. Seeing
then that the right order requires one to pass from that which comes
first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not to pass
to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being first of
all practiced in the observance of the commandments.
On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the
observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the observance
of the counsels. For it is stated (Lk. 5:28) that "leaving all things
he . . . followed Him. " Therefore it is not necessary for a person to
be practiced in the observance of the commandments before passing to
the perfection of the counsels.
I answer that, As shown above ([3834]Q[188], A[1]), the religious state
is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of
charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to
perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are those
things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the
attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an
obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the loss
of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods man
turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it is
evident that the observances of the religious state, while removing the
obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin: for
instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, and the like
withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all other manner of
sins.
Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the
observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to attain
to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not practiced, in
order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: "The young
man lies when he says: 'All these have I kept from my youth. ' For if he
had fulfilled this commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself,' why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou hast
and give to the poor? " But this means that he lied as to the perfect
observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract. viii super
Matth. ) that "it is written in the Gospel according to the Hebrews that
when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,' the rich man
began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How sayest
thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, seeing that it is
written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself? Behold
many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are clothed in filth, and
die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all manner of good things,
and nothing whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord
reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For it is
impossible to fulfil the commandment which says, Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially to have such great
wealth. " This also refers to the perfect fulfilment of this precept. on
the other hand, it is true that he kept the commandments imperfectly
and in a general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the observance
of the precepts of charity, as stated above ([3835]Q[184], A[3]).
Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the counsels is
useful both to the innocent and to sinners, our Lord called not only
the innocent youth but also the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His
call, and the youth obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the
religious life more easily than those who presume on their innocency.
It is to the former that our Lord says (Mat. 21:31): "The publicans and
the harlots shall go into the kingdom of God before you. "
Reply to Objection 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in
three ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and
thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since
every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of his
life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with
various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state need
not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be a
cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a layman.
Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this way it is
clear that one man begins straightway not only from a higher state, but
even from a higher degree of holiness, than the highest degree to which
another man attains throughout his whole life. Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 1): "All are agreed that the boy Benedict began at a high
degree of grace and perfection in his daily life. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3836]Q[184], A[6]) the holy
orders prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for
the attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid
on the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the
burden of religion seasons the walls, i. e. men, by drawing out the damp
of vice.
Reply to Objection 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that
it is chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has
to pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is
clear from what follows that the statement that certain "heretics" and
"schismatics have perverted this order" refers to the order of
doctrine. For it continues thus: "But he says that he has kept these
things, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath
[*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking 'retributio,'
which Douay renders 'reward,' as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was
humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was
humbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is the
Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of angels,
namely the Word that is in the beginning with God. " The example which
is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being commanded to fast
until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on them
as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires them inwardly to take
upon themselves difficult things of their own choice. Hence after
Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the Church observes a
fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. 1:15), "is
not confined to any particular age; He ceases not when men die, He is
not excluded from the maternal womb. " Gregory also in a homily for
Pentecost (xxx in Ev. ) says: "He fills the boy harpist and makes him a
psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and makes him a wise judge [*Dan.
1:8-17]," and afterwards he adds: "No time is needed to learn
whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind by the merest touch. " Again
it is written (Eccles. 8:8), "It is not in man's power to stop the
Spirit," and the Apostle admonishes us (1 Thess. 5:19): "Extinguish not
the Spirit," and (Acts 7:51) it is said against certain persons: "You
always resist the Holy Ghost. "
Reply to Objection 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the
ends, so to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the
precepts of charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that
these precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but
that the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of
the precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the
precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is
altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in
the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity
precedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of
time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed
to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of
charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels
as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts
without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common
observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of
nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of time,
for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the species. But
the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels is directed to
the observance of the precepts together with the counsels; as an
imperfect to a perfect species, even as the irrational to the rational
animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, since
"nature," as Boethius says (De Consol. iii, 10), "begins with perfect
things. " And yet it is not necessary for the precepts first of all to
be observed without the counsels, and afterwards with the counsels,
just as it is not necessary for one to be an ass before being a man, or
married before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary for a
person first of all to keep the commandments in the world before
entering religion; especially as the worldly life does not dispose one
to religious perfection, but is more an obstacle thereto.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the
religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed,
according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according to
the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret. , cap. Non solum. , de Regular.
et Transeunt, ad Relig. ] who moreover forbade anyone to be bound to the
religious life by profession before completing the year of probation.
Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone while yet in the
world to be bound by vow to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews "should
be persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free
will" (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil what
one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter
religion.
Objection 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of
falling; wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33,34): "If a man open a pit .
. . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay
the price of the beasts. " Now through being bound by vow to enter
religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various
sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion.
On the contrary, It is written, (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye, and pay to the
Lord your God"; and a gloss of Augustine says that "some vows concern
the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the like. "
Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. But Holy
Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore it is
better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As stated above ([3837]Q[88], A[6]), when we were
treating of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is
more praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to
vow is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the
virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and
just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will obstinate
in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through proceeding
from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore it is in
itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn
vow which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious
order. This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded
by a year's probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple
vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds him
to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a year's
probation.
Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood
as referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the
obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end,
because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation
unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be avoided;
indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et Paulin. ), "happy
is the necessity that compels us to better things. "
Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of
the will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself,
instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from it.
But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not
derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate from
the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after being
baptized.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation
of entering religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter
religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is
said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a
priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to
become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or
abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his
benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health
he refused to become a monk. " And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge
and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be
admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to
retain them in peace. " Now this would not be if he were bound to enter
religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep one's
vow of entering religion.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power.
Now it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends
on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem
that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself
to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one.
Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the
fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land;
and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man
obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the
vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not
necessarily to be fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth him"; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to
the Lord your God," says: "To vow depends on the will: but after the
vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3838]Q[88], A[1]), when we were
treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning
God. Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface [*Innoc. I, Epist.
ii, Victricio Epo. Rotomag. , cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii,
qu. 1]: "If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely
irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given to
God be deserving of punishment! " Therefore a man is under an obligation
to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something pertaining to
God.
Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to
God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine service,
as stated above ([3839]Q[186], A[1]). Hence it follows that he who
binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter
religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if
he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as soon as
he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas if he
intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a certain
fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time comes or
the condition is fulfilled.
Reply to Objection 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple
vow. Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to
dwell in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of
conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter religion.
Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas) the Bishop of
Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing to enter
religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled that if "he
wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the government of his
see and pay his vows to the Most High. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3840]Q[88], A[3], ad 2), when
we were treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a
certain religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to
be received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to
enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to
go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one
particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the
obligation to which he has engaged himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is
greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a
temporal vow; and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti
Redemptione, cap. Scripturae), "he who exchanges a temporary service
for the perpetual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking
his vow. "
Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into
religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving alms
a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan. 4:24,
"Redeem thou thy sins with alms," much more does it suffice to satisfy
for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service
by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfaction,
even that of public penance, according to the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. i,
cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory
declares (Hom. xx in Ezech. ). Hence we read in the Lives of the Fathers
(vi, 1) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as by
being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby absolved from all
debt of punishment, nevertheless the entrance into religion is more
profitable than a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, as regards the
advancement in good, which is preferable to absolution from punishment.
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Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion in
perpetuity?
Objection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion, is
bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to
enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet. 2:21,
"It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than
after they have known it to turn back," and Lk. 9:62, "No man putting
his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of
God. " But he who bound himself by the vow to enter religion, is under
the obligation to enter, as stated above [3841](A[3]). Therefore he is
also bound to remain for always.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise
to scandal, and is a bad example to others.
Now by leaving after
entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of
scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited
to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to
fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain
evermore.
Objection 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a
perpetual vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated
above (A[3], ad 3;[3842] Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But this would not be so
if a person after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the
intention of leaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter
religion is bound also to remain in perpetuity.
On the contrary, The vow of religious profession, for the reason that
it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be preceded
by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before the simple
vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. Therefore it seems
that he who vows to enter religion is not for that reason bound to
remain there in perpetuity.
I answer that, The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will: because
"to vow is an act of the will" according to Augustine [*Gloss of Peter
Lombard on Ps. 75:12]. Consequently the obligation of a vow extends as
far as the will and intention of the person who takes the vow.
Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to enter
religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to remain in
perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind himself to enter
religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining the freedom to
remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound to remain. If,
however, in vowing he thought merely of entering religion, without
thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in perpetuity, it
would seem that he is bound to enter religion according to the form
prescribed by common law, which is that those who enter should be given
a year's probation. Wherefore he is not bound to remain for ever.
Reply to Objection 1: It is better to enter religion with the purpose
of making a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one
disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn or
to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to do:
else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the
kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false.
Reply to Objection 2: A man who has entered religion gives neither
scandal nor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a
reasonable motive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive
scandal on their part, and not active scandal on the part of the person
leaving, since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient
on account of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and
the like.
Reply to Objection 3: He who enters with the purpose of leaving
forthwith, does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his
intention in vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as
to wish to try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he
is not bound to remain for evermore.
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Whether children should be received in religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in
religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad
Relig. , cap. Nullus): "No one should be tonsured unless he be of legal
age and willing. " But children, seemingly, are not of legal age; nor
have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason.
Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in religion.
Objection 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of
repentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf. [3843] Q[81], A[1]] from
"religare" [to bind] or from "re-eligere" [to choose again], as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But
repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they
should not enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath.
But children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath
(Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum. ). Therefore it
would seem that neither should they be bound by vow.
Objection 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an
obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe
age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their parents
or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, can.
Puella) that "if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred
veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they choose, can
at once declare the deed null and void. " It is therefore unlawful for
children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or bound to
religion.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 19:14): "Suffer the little
children, and forbid them not to come to Me. " Expounding these words
Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth. ) that "the disciples of Jesus before
they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf. Mat.
19:16-30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ: but our
Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children. We must
therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in wisdom
we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were great, and
forbid the children to come to Jesus. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1), the religious vow is
twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to
God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such a
vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may
encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as
in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De
Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig. , cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies
to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to
be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age
of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called
"the age of puberty," although in some it comes earlier and in others
it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of nature.
Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an obstacle, if the
person who makes a vow to God is not his own master; for instance, if a
slave, though having the use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even
is ordained, without the knowledge of his master: for his master can
annul this, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And
since boys and girls under the age of puberty are naturally in their
father's power as regards the disposal of their manner of life, their
father may either cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do
so, as it is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).
Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a
simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in
virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching the
age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet
this obligation may be removed by his father's authority, under whose
control he still remains, because the ordinance of the law whereby one
man is subject to another considers what happens in the majority of
cases. If, however, the
child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the
authority of his parents; though if he has not the full use of reason,
he would not be bound in the sight of God.
The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious.
Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of the
solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what happens
in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of puberty,
however much the person who makes profession may have the use of
reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to make him
a religious (Extra, De Regular. , etc. cap. Significatum est. ).
Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of
puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received into
religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the Baptist
(Lk. 1:80) that "the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was
in the deserts. " Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, 3), "the Roman
nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Benedict to be nurtured
for Almighty God"; and this is most fitting, according to Lam. 3:27,
"It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth. " It is
for this reason that by common custom children are made to apply
themselves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass their
lives.
Reply to Objection 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and
taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is
able to make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is
possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be
educated in a religious house.
Reply to Objection 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the
attachment of perfection, as stated above ([3844]Q[186], A[1], ad 4);
and accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it.
But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as
occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above
([3845]Q[186], A[1], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as
the canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however,
they bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in
God's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in
the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.
Reply to Objection 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is
not rebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents' consent:
but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that
she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she
binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her
parents' authority.
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Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference
to one's parents?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from entering
religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not lawful to
omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which is optional.
Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation of the precept
concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12); wherefore the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): "If any widow have children or
grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to make
a return of duty to her parents. " But the entrance to religion is
optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit deference
to one's parents for the sake of entering religion.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father
is greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is
natural, while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from
Gn. 9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in
order to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals
(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside
the deference due to his father in order to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to
those to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot
enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that "those who
are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a monastery,
when they seek admittance, unless first of all they withdraw from
public business" (Dist. liii, can. Legem. ). Therefore seemingly much
less may children enter religion in despite of their duty to their
parents.
On the contrary, It is related (Mat. 4:22) that James and John "left
their nets and father, and followed our Lord. " By this, says Hilary
(Can. iii in Matth. ), "we learn that we who intend to follow Christ are
not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the ties of home. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3846]Q[101], A[2], ad 2) when we were
treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle,
wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their
children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter
religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children,
namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1 Tim.
5:8) that "if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel. "
Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted by
their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a condition of
necessity. Consequently we must say that when their parents are in such
need that they cannot fittingly be supported otherwise than by the help
of their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion in
despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the parents'
necessity be not such as to stand in great need of their children's
assistance, the latter may, in despite of the duty they owe their
parents, enter religion even against their parents' command, because
after the age of puberty every freeman enjoys freedom in things
concerning the ordering of his state of life, especially in such as
belong to the service of God, and "we should more obey the Father of
spirits that we may live [*'Shall we not much more obey the Father of
Spirits, and live? ']," as says the Apostle (Heb. 12:9), than obey our
parents. Hence as we read (Mat. 8:22; Lk. 9:62) our Lord rebuked the
disciple who was unwilling to follow him forthwith on account of his
father's burial: for there were others who could see to this, as
Chrysostom remarks [*Hom. xxvii in Matth. ].
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends
not only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of
deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the
commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by
revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those who
live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits their
condition.
Reply to Objection 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin,
it follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he
would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person, for
"a slave belongs wholly to his master" [*Aristotle, Polit. i, 2]. On
the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is not
hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring himself to
the service of God; which is most conducive to man's good.
Reply to Objection 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot
lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore if
a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or to pay
a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation in order
to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and has not
wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely by
surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law [*Cod.
IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays an obligation not on the
person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person of a
freeman "is above all pecuniary consideration" [*Dig. L, xvii, de div.
reg. Jur. ant. 106,176]. Hence, after surrendering his property, he may
lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in
order to earn the means of paying the debt.
On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except as
may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.
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Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter
religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that "he who undertakes the
cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: 'My son, if thou
be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a
stranger'" (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, "because to be surety
for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety of
one's own behavior. " Now he who is under an obligation to a man for a
debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he can.
Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to which
obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for him to
lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all.
But if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the
people would be left without a pastor's care, which would be unfitting.
Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders
are directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his
contemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and
archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and
hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish priest
or archdeacon to pass over to religion.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce
sunt leges. ): "If a man, while governing the people in his church under
the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by the Holy Ghost to
desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical
rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we authorize him to go
freely. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 3;[3847] Q[88], A[12], ad 1),
the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other obligation.
Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be bound by
perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service [*Cf. [3848]
Q[184], A[5]], while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as bishops
are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure of souls.
Wherefore bishops "cannot lay aside their bishopric for any pretext
whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff" (Extra, De
Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig. , cap. Licet. ): whereas archdeacons and
parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of the bishop the cure
entrusted to them, without the Pope's special permission, who alone can
dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it is evident that archdeacons
and parish priests may lawfully enter religion.
Reply to Objection 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound
themselves to the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their
archdeaconry or parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain
their archdeaconry or parish for ever.
Reply to Objection 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil. ): "Although they,"
namely religious, "are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about
whom you argue, saying; 'If all shut themselves up and live in
solitude, who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will
be able to urge sinners to virtue? ' If this holds true, if all are
fools with thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable,
for if all be virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish.
Virtue is rare, and is not desired by many. " It is therefore evident
that this is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest
the river run dry. [*St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection,
which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article. ]
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Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another?
Objection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to
another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. 10:25): "Not
forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed"; and a gloss observes:
"Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who presuming
on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of the imperfect,
that they may appear to be righteous.
