The second plan for the thought of eternal return which we have adduced here does not think
primarily
about the "impact" of the doc- trine on mankind or on the transformation of human "existence" with- in being as a whole.
Heidegger - Nietzsche - v1-2
" Zarathustra calls himself and knows himself to be the god-less one.
As the god-less one he experiences the uttermost
• Heidegger's phrase echoes that of Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part II, "On the Virtuous": "You love your virtue, as a mother loves her child. Yet who ever heard of a mother wanting to be paid for her love? "
The Third Communication of the Doctrine 67
need, and thereby the innermost necessity, to create what is most needed. For that reason the one who is god-less in the way we have indicated confronts a question which we might formulate succinctly as follows: What would remain for human beings to create-how could they be human at all, that is to say, how could they become who they are-if gods were always available and merely at hand? If there were gods as simply as there are stones and trees and water? Is it not the case that the god must first of all be created? Do we not require supreme force to be able to create something out beyond ourselves? And prior to that, must not man himself, the last man, the contemptible man, be re-created to that end? Does not man require a burden so that he will not take his god too lightly?
The thought of thoughts derives from these considerations its defini- tion as the greatest burden. Thus is Zarathustra the god-less overcome! To be sure. But has Nietzsche thereby come "farther," or has he slipped back onto the path of Christianity, which laid its very founda- tions by claiming the sole existent God all for itself? No, neither farther ahead nor farther back. For Zarathustra begins by going under. Zara- thustra's commencement is his downgoing. Another essence for Zara- thustra Nietzsche never for a moment entertained. Only the lame, only those who have wearied of their Christianity, look to Nietzsche's statements for quick and easy confirmation of their own specious athe- ism. But the eternal recurrence of the same is the thought that is hardest to bear. Its thinker must be a hero in knowing and willing, one who dare not and cannot explain away the world and the creation of a world with some gratuitous formula. "Everything in the hero's sphere turns to tragedy. " Only in passage through tragedy does the question concerning the god arise, the god in whose sphere-and this too only
as a "perhaps"--everything turns to world.
The nineteen-year-old Nietzsche, as we have already heard, asks at
the end of his autobiographical portrait, "And where is the ring that ultimately encircles him [the human being]? Is it the world? Is it God? " What is now the reply to this early question? The reply is yet another question: "Circulus vitiosus deus? " Yet the ring has now been defined as the eternal return of the same; the circulus is simultaneously vitiosus, the terrifying; this terrifying ring surrounds beings, determines
68 THE ETERI"AL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
them as a whole, defines them as the world. The ring and its eternity can be grasped solely in terms of the Moment. Accordingly, the god who is sought in the experience of the ring of fright will remain a. matter of inquiry solely from within the Moment. Then, the god is only a question? Indeed, "only" a question; that is, he is the one who is asked for, the one who is called. It remains to be considered whether the god possesses more divinity in the question concerning him or in the situation where we are sure of him and are able, as it were, to brush him aside or fetch him forward, as our needs dictate. The god is "only" a question. How do matters stand with this "only"? It is not merely the god who is a question-eternal recurrence too, the circulus vitiosus itself, is also "only" a question.
All three communications of the thought of thoughts are questions that vary in configuration and in stage of development. Even if we are far from penetrating their context and content, even if we are but barely aware of these things, the fact that the communications share the interrogative form is compelling. To be sure, we can clarify the state of affairs at first only with the help of determinations that are more negative than positive. The communication is no "doctrine" and no "disquisition" in the sense of a theoretical scholarly or scientific presentation. It is not some bit of "lore" asseverated by a learned per- son. Nor is it a philosophical treatise of the sort we have inherited from Leibniz or Kant; just as little is it a philosophical and conceptual struc- ture modeled on those erected by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. If therefore Nietzsche's communication does not seem to conform either to the framework of a scientific doctrine or to familiar philosophical discussions as they had been conducted up to Nietzsche's time, or even to the form exhibited by a purely poetic configuration, only one possi- bility appears to remain: it can only be a "personal act of faith," per- haps no more than an "illusory figment of the imagination. " Or does the remaining possibility consist in our having to ask what this thought, in itself and on its own, is in terms of its configuration? In the face of Nietzsche's labors in thought there can no longer be any doubt about whether we are permitted to force the thought summarily into our customary and common rubrics, or whether, on the contrary, such
The Third Communication ofthe Doctrine 69
thinking must induce us to jettison our common notions, induce us to meditate.
With this meditation we have encroached on the question of the configuration of the thought of eternal recurrence of the same. The encroachment is intentional. It means to suggest that Nietzsche's own mode of communication must remain definitive whenever we deline- ate the thought's configuration. Such a caution is all the more neces- sary since in relation to the question of configuration a cursory glance at Nietzsche's suppressed notes might easily lead us astray. We shall now try to gain insight into what Nietzsche thought about the eternal recurrence of the same but did not himself make public. Our examina- tion can catch a glimpse of what is essential only if it does not remain mere reportage, only if it is interpretation. On the one hand, the inter- pretation must be instigated by a prior glimpse of the essential ques- tions posed by the thought of eternal recurrence of the same; on the other hand, the interpretation must allow itself to be guided by meticu- lous deference toward what Nietzsche himself said.
10. The Thought of Return in the Suppressed Notes
From the moment Nietzsche's "thought of thoughts" came to him in August, 1881, everything he meditated on and committed to writing concerning that thought but shared with no one was destined to be labeled as his "literary remains. " If the thought of eternal recurrence of the same is Nietzsche's principal thought, then it will have been present to him during the entire subsequent period of his creative life, from 1881 to January, 1889. That this is the case is shown by the later publication of the literary remains which originated during the years mentioned. They are to be found in volumes XII through XVI of the Grossoktav edition. But if the thought of eternal recurrence of the same, the thought of thoughts, necessarily determines all of Nietz- sche's thinking from the very beginning, then his reflections on this thought and the sketches containing those reflections will vary accord- ing to the particular domain, direction, and stage of development in which Nietzsche's philosophical labors happened to be advancing. That means that these so-called "literary remains" are not always the same. Nietzsche's "posthumously published notes" do not comprise an
arbitrary bunch of confused and scattered observations that by chance never made it to the printer's. The sketches differ not only in terms of content but also in their form-or lack of form. They arose out of constantly changing moods, sometimes were caught fleetingly among a melee of intentions and points of view; sometimes they were elaborated fully, sometimes ventured only by way of tentative and faltering experi- ment; and sometimes, quick as lightning, they arrived in one fell swoop. If the thought of eternal recurrence of the same is the thought
Thought ofReturn in the Suppressed Notes 71
of thoughts, then it will be least explicitly portrayed or even named wherever in its essentiality it is to have the greatest impact. If for a certain stretch of time nothing or nothing explicit appears to be said about this thought in Nietzsche's notes, that by no means indicates that it has in the meantime become unimportant or even has been abandoned. We must ponder all these things if we wish to understand Nietzsche's "posthumously published notes" and think them through philosophically, instead of merely piecing together a "theory" out of some remarks we have managed to pick up here and there.
What we are here demanding-and what we will be able to achieve only in a provisional sort of way-is all the more imperative since in the publication of the literary remains heretofore the "material" as a whole has inevitably been arranged in a particular order. Furthermore, the individual fragments on the doctrine of return, which stem from different years and from disparate manuscripts and contexts, have been thoughtlessly strung together in a numerated series. However, anyone who is even slightly aware of the difficulties entailed in finding an appropriate form of publication for Nietzsche's literary remains-espe- cially those from the later years, that is, from 1881 onward-will not inveigh against Nietzsche's initial and subsequent editors because of the procedure they elected to follow. Whatever flaws the prior editions reveal, it remains the decisive achievement of the first editors that they made Nietzsche's private handwritten papers accessible by transcribing them into a readable text. Only they could have done it-above all,
Peter Cast, who after many years of collaborating with Nietzsche in the preparation of those manuscripts that were sent on to the printer was perfectly familiar with Nietzsche's handwriting and all the transforma- tions it underwent. Otherwise a great deal in the scarcely legible manuscripts, and often the most important things, would have r~ mained sealed to us today.
We shall now attempt a provisional characterization of the stock of sketches that deal explicitly with the doctrine of return, considering them in their chronological sequence. Nietzsche's own threefold com- munication of the thought of eternal return in The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil will mark off the peri- ods for us. It seems plausible that Nietzsche's notes from the period
72 THE ETERl\AL RECURREl\CE OF THE SAME
when the thought first struck him (August, 1881 and immediately af- terward) will assume special significance. V olume XII of the Grossok- tav edition contains unpublished materials from the years 1881-82 and from the period 1882-86 (the Zarathustra period). The remarks con- cerning the doctrine of return from the years 1881-82 are explicitly designated as such in volume XII, pages 51-69; the remarks from the Zarathustra period are for the most part in volume XII, pages 369-71. * The editors avoided an overhasty interpretation by refraining from ordering this stock of observations under other rubrics (metaphysics, epistemology, ethics) and by presenting them in a separate section. Yet the first notes we know of on the doctrine of eternal return, Nietzsche's earliest and most important sketches subsequent to his experience near that boulder at Surlei, are not to be found in the text proper of volume XII. They are appended to that volume in the editors' "Concluding Report" (see the second, revised edition, third printing, pages 425-28). Some of these passages appear scattered throughout the first edition of volume XII, for example, on pages 5, 3, 4, 128, and 6; some of them do not appear at all. The fact that now in the second, revised edition the most important texts are presented in the ''Concluding Report" betrays the total bewilderment of the editors. We shall have to begin with those passages that limp along behind in the appendix of the present edition-passages that are all too easily overlooked.
In addition, we must free ourselves straightaway of a prejudicial view. The editors say (XII, 425): "Right from the start two different intentions run parallel to each other; the one aims at a theoretical presentation of the doctrine, the other at a poetical treatment of it. " Now, to be sure, we too have spoken of a "poetic" presentation of the doctrine of eternal return in Zarathustra. Yet we avoided distinguish- ing it from a "theoretical" presentation, not because the passages cited from The Gay Science and Beyond Good and Evil are not theoretical presentations, but because here the word and concept theoretical do
• For the notes from 1881-82 see now CM V/2; for the notes from the Zarathustra period (1882-86) see CM Vll/1-3. The Kritische Studienausgabe contains these notes in volumes 9 and J0. -11, respectively. On the "philological question" generally, see Maz- zino Montinari's Foreword to volume 14 of the Kritische Studienausgabe, pp. 7-17; and section II of the Analysis at the end of this volume.
Thought ofReturn in the Suppressed Notes 73
not say anything, especially not when one follows the lead of the edi- tors and of those who portray Nietzsche's "doctrine" by equating theoretical with "treatment in prose. " The distinction "theoretical-po- etical" results from muddled thinking. Even if we were to let it obtain in general, such a distinction would in any case be out of place here. In Nietzsche's thinking of his fundamental thought the "poetical" is every bit as much "theoretical," and the "theoretical" is inherently "poetical. " All philosophical thinking-and precisely the most rigorous and prosaic-is in itself poetic. It nonetheless never springs from the art of poetry. A work of poetry, a work like Holderlin's hymns, can for its part be thoughtful in the highest degree. It is nonetheless never philosophy. Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra is poetic in the high- est degree, and yet it is not a work of art, but "philosophy. " Because all actual, that is, all great philosophy is inherently thoughtful-poetic, the distinction between "theoretical" and "poetical" cannot be applied to philosophical texts.
11. The Four Notes Dated August 1881
We turn now to four notes on the doctrine of eternal return from August, 1881. These notes are at the same time sketches for a work, and that fact alone betrays the scope that Nietzsche assigned to the thought of eternal return of the same. In terms of time, the notes were drafted a year prior to Nietzsche's first communication of the thought in The Gay Science; they offer a preview of Nietzsche's whole way of treating the doctrine of return in later years. The notes also serve to corroborate Nietzsche's own words concerning Thus Spoke Zarathus- tra in Ecce Homo, according to which the thought of return is "the fundamental conception of the work. " The first sketch reads as follows (XII, 425)*:
The Return ofthe Same. Plan.
I. Incorporation of the fundamental errors.
2. Incorporation of the passions.
3. Incorporation of knowledge and of the knowledge that can renounce.
(Passion of insight. )
4. The Innocent. The individual as experiment. The amelioration of life,
degradation, ennervation-transition.
5. The new burden: the eternal retum of the same. Infinite importance of
our knowing, erring, our habits, ways of life, for everything to come. What will we do with the remnants of our lives-we who have spent the greater part of them in the most essential uncertainty? We shall teach the
• See CM, II [141]. The first four points of this first sketch appear in GOA in italics, while CM has them in Roman type. I have followed CM throughout in this respect. Entry II [141] includes a long commentary on the fourth point, projecting a "philos- ophy of indifference" and identifying the "innocent" as one who is capable of "child's play. "
The Four Notes Dated August 1881 75 teaching-that is the most potent means of incorporating it in ourselves.
Our kind of beatitude, as teacher of the greatest teaching.
Early August, 1881, in Sils-Maria, 6,000 feet above sea level and much higher above all human things!
The very fact that Nietzsche expressly records the time and occasion of the note speaks for the extraordinary nature of its content and its intent. The doctrine is grasped in terms of the teaching of it and in terms of the teacher.
The title of the "plan" points directly to the sense of the whole. And yet eternal return is mentioned only when we arrive at number five; furthermore, nothing at all is said there about its content, not even by way of vague outline. Instead, the plan's key word is "incorporation. "* The doctrine is called "the greatest teaching" and "the new burden. " Then comes the sudden question: "What will we do with the remnants of our lives? '' Here, then, it is a matter of decision-and of incision-in our lives, a matter of cutting away what has prevailed hitherto, what has by now run its course, from what still "remains. " Obviously, the cut is made by the thought of return, which transforms everything. However, what comes before this incision and what follows
it are not divided into two separate quantities. What has gone before is not rejected. Four other points precede number five, and the fourth concludes with a reference to "transition. " However novel it may be, the doctrine of eternal return does not drop out of the blue, but is yoked to a "transition. " Where we initially expect an explication of the doctrine's essential import, and above all an account of its various aspects and an explanation of it, all we get here, one might say, is something about the doctrine's impact on mankind, and prior to that on the teacher himself and alone. All we get is something about the
• The term Einverleibung, which also may be rendered as "ingestion," reflects Nietz- sche's preoccupation in the summer of 1881 with the natural sciences and especially the science of physiology. He had been studying Wilhelm Roux, The Struggle ofParts in the Organism: A Contribution to the Perfection ofthe Doctrine ofMechanistic Teleolo- gy (Leipzig, 1881), so that these earliest notes on eternal recurrence appear in the often bizarre context of /'homme machine. The term also appears twice in II [134] and once in II [182], notes which W. Miiller-Lauter has traced to Roux. See Miiller-Lauter, "Wilhelm Roux's Influence on Friedrich Nietzsche," Nietzsche-Studien, VII (1978),
189-223.
76 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
"incorporation" of new knowledge and the teaching of such knowledge as a new kind of beatitude. We know from Thus Spoke Zarathustra how essential the question of the "incorporation" of the thought is; we know that Zarathustra first becomes a convalescent after he has incorporated the weightiest elements of the thought. If we pursue the meaning of this word we arrive at the notion of "eating," of devouring and digesting. Whatever is incorporated makes the body-and our embodiment-steadfast and secure. It is also something we have finished with and which determines us in the future. It is the juice that feeds our energies. To incorporate the thought here means to think the thought in such a way that right from the start it becomes our fundamental stance toward beings as a whole, pervading every single thought as such and from the outset. Only when the thought has become the basic posture of our thinking as a whole has it been appropriated-and taken into the body-as its essence demands.
The definitive meditation on the project entitled "the return of the same" advances directly to "incorporation. " The peculiar nature of this first plan remains important. We have no "schema" into which we might pigeonhole this "project" and so make it familiar to us; we must be on the lookout for the project itself, for whatever pertains to it, for its own schema. If this were the plan for a projected book, then the book would have been something altogether its own, not only with regard to its content but also in the way it would have "appeared" as a book and then "had an impact" or "made no impact. " Whatever is taught there, whatever is thought in the thought, recedes before the way it is taught and thought. The plan sketched here is nothing other than the germ of the plan for the coming work, Thus Spoke Zarathus- tra, hence not a sketch toward a "theoretical," prosaic elaboration of the thought of return. Even this much enables us to see how vacuous the distinction discussed earlier is.
The second plan that is relevant here is as "prosaic" as it is "poeti- cal. " It bears no title and does not pertain to the project that is presented first in the Grossoktav edition. Among Nietzsche's notes it does not stand together with the first plan, but is presented as fragment number 129 in volume XII. " It reads:
• Heidegger presents the second note in two phases, first the opening paragraph, then the four points of the plan itself, listed below. See CM, II [144].
The Four Notes Dated August 1881 77
It would be a dreadful thing if we were still to believe in sin: but no matter what we do, if we repeat it countless times it is innocent. If the thought of the eternal return of all things does not overwhelm you, that is no one's fault; and it is not to its credit if it does do so. -W e judge our predecessors more gently than they themselves judged: we regret the errors they incorpo- rated, not their wickedness.
The passage enlightens us as to why in point four of the first project "the innocent" is mentioned. With the death of the moral God, the sinners and the guilty parties vanish from being as a whole, and the necessity of being-as it is-assumes its prerogative.
The second plan proceeds now to reverse the sequence of the princi- pal thoughts, inasmuch as ii begins with the thought of return. It runs (XII, 426):
I. The mightiest insight.
2. Opinions and errors transform mankind and grant it its drives, or: the
incorporated errors.
3. Necessity and innocence. 4. The play oflife.
This plan also provides directives in some other respects: "necessity" does not refer to any arbitrary kind of necessity but to that of being as a whole. "The play of life" reminds us immediately of a fragment of Heraclitus, the thinker to whom Nietzsche believed he was most close- ly akin, that is to say, fragment 52: Aion pais esti paidzon, pesseuon; paidos he basileie. "The aeon is a child at play, playing at draughts; dominion is the child's" (that is to say, dominion over being as a whole).
The suggestion is that innocence pervades being as a whole. The whole is aion, a word that can scarcely be translated in an adequate way. It means the whole of the world, but also time, and, related by time to our "life," it means the course oflife itself. We are accustomed to defining the meaning of aion thus: "Aeon" suggests the "time" of the "cosmos," that is, of nature, which operates in the time which physics measures. One distinguishes time in this sense from the time we "live through. " Yet what is named in aion resists such a distinction. At the same time, we are thinking of kosmos too cursorily when we represent it cosmologically.
78 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
Nietzsche's use of the word life is ambiguous. It designates being as a whole and also the way in which we are "caught up in the melee" of the whole. The talk of "play" is correspondingly equivocal. "
The intimations in the direction of Heraclitus are not fortuitous, especially since Nietzsche in his notes of this period often touches on another thought which one customarily-and Nietzsche too follows custom here--designates as Heraclitus' principal thought: panta rhei ["everything flows"]. But this is a statement which for all we know does not even stem from Heraclitus. Far from characterizing his thought, it distorts his thought beyond recognition.
The second plan for the thought of eternal return which we have adduced here does not think primarily about the "impact" of the doc- trine on mankind or on the transformation of human "existence" with- in being as a whole. Rather, it thinks about being as a whole itself. Here it is more a question of catching a glimpse of the "metaphysical" character of the doctrine of return, whereas in the prior plan the doc- trine's "existentiell"t sense preponderated-if we may employ these designations that are still common today. Or does the distinction between "metaphysical" and "existentiell," if it is a clear and viable distinction at all, have as little to do with Nietzsche's philosophy as that other one which tried to distinguish between its theoretical-prosaic and its poetical character? We will be able to decide this question only later.
The plan projected next seems to assume yet another shape. t Of it the editors assert that it is "the sketch for the poetical idea" of the doctrine of return:
Midday and Eternity
Pointers Toward a New Life
Zarathustra, born on Lake Urmi, left his home during his thirtieth year, went to the province of Aria, and in the ten years of his mountain solitude composed the Zend-Avesta.
• Heidegger here adds a parenthetical reference to Nietzsche's poem "To Goethe," the first of the "Songs of the Outlaw Prince," published as an appendix to the second edition of The Gay Science in 1887. He also draws attention to Nil, 380f. , where that poem is presented and discussed. See Volume IV, Nihilism, pp. 235-37.
t On existentiell, as opposed to existenzial, see Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 55 n.
t See CM, II [195-96].
The Four Notes Dated August 1881 79 Once again the sun of insight stands at midday: and coiled in its light lies
the serpent of eternity-it is your time, ye brothers of noon!
The key word in this plan is midday. "Midday and Eternity": both are concepts and names for time-provided we are aware of the fact that we think eternity too solely in terms of time. Now that the thought of eternal return is thought, it is "midday and eternity" at one and the same time; we could also say that it is the Moment. Nietzsche's project chooses the highest determinations of time as the title of a work that is to treat of being as a whole and of the new life within such being. The way being as a whole is thought is also indicated by the imagery: the serpent, the most discerning animal, "the serpent of eternity," lies coiled in the midday sunlight of insight. A magnificent image-and it is not meant to be "poetical"! It is poetized, but only because it is
thought, and thought most deeply. And it is thought thus, because the project in which being as a whole is to be grasped and elevated to knowledge here ventures farthest-not into the vacuous, tenebrous space of idle "speculation," but into the domain at the midpoint of humanity's path. Concerning the time of midday, when the sun stands at its zenith and things cast no shadow, the following is said at the conclusion of Part One of Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
And that is the great midday when man stands at the midpoint of his path between beast and overman, when he celebrates his way to evening as his supreme hope: for it is the way to a new morning.
There and then the one who goes under will bless himself for being one who goes over in transition; and the sun of his insight will stand for him at midday.
"All gods are dead: now we will that the overman live"-at some great midday, let this be our ultimate will! -
Thus spoke Zarathustra.
When Zarathustra here says, "All gods are dead," what he means is that contemporary man, the Last Man, is no longer strong enough for any one of the gods, especially since these can never simply be inherit- ed from tradition. A tradition takes shape as a power of Dasein only where it is sustained by the creative will, and only as long as it is so sustained.
Midday is a luminous midpoint in the history of humanity, a mo-
80 THE ETI! ~RNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
ment of transition in the cheering light of eternity, when the sky is deep and fore-noon and after-noon, past and future, confront one an- other and thus come to decision. Indeed, the subtitle of the plan "Mid~ day and Eternity" reads "Pointers toward a New Life. " We might expect directives on how to achieve practical wisdom in our lives; but if we do so we will surely be deceived. For the "new life" meant here is a new way of standing in the midst of beings as a whole; it is a new kind of truth and thereby a metamorphosis of beings.
That we must understand the "new life" in this fashion is shown by a fourth projected plan which also stems from August, 1881. * It bears the title, "On the 'Projection of a New Way to Live,'" and is divided into four books. Here we will list only the characteristic titles of the four books:
I. On the Dehumanization of Nature. II. On the Incorporation of Experiences.
III. On the Ultimate Happiness of the Lonely One. IV. Annulus aeternitatis.
Books I and IV embrace II and III, which are to treat of humanity. Book I is to execute the dehumanization of nature. This implies that all the anthropomorphisms projected into being as a whole, such as guilt, purpose, intention, and providence, are to be expunged from nature, in order that man himself may be restored to nature (as homo natura). Such being as a whole is defined in Book IV as the "ring of eternity. "
What is striking about these four projected plans, all of them drawn up in a little less than a month, and what we can now grasp only in an approximate way, is the wealth of prospects offered by a few essential regions of inquiry, to which Nietzsche appeals again and again. This wealth of prospects constantly compels Nietzsche to introduce new sides of the question into the scope of his project. All this allows us to speculate that with the first unfolding of the thought of eternal return ofthe same-as with all great thoughts-everything essential was there already at daybreak, so to speak, although not yet in a developed form.
• See CM, II [197], dated Sils-Maria, August 26, 1881. Heidegger presents only the titles of the four books, omitting what one might call Nietzsche's "stage directions" or stylistic intentions for each book.
The Four Notes Dated August 1881 81
Wherever Nietzsche attempts an elaboration, he operates at first with the already available means, derived from the prior interpretation of beings. If there is something like catastrophe in the creative work of great thinkers, then it consists not in being stymied and in failing to go farther, but precisely in advancing farther-that is to say, in their let- ting themselves be determined by the initial impact of their thought, an impact that always deflects them. Such going "farther" is always fatal, for it prevents one from abiding by the source of one's own commencement. The history of Western philosophy will have to be assimilated in times to come with the help of this way of looking at things. The result could be some very remarkable and very instructive insights.
Yet if everything is there for Nietzsche in the summer of 1881, so far as his thought of thoughts is concerned, will the subsequent years bring anything new? That is a question that curiosity-seekers might pose. The principal quality of the curious is reflected in the fact that what- ever they are curious about ultimately and even from the outset means absolutely nothing to them. All curiosity thrives on this essential indif- ference. But the curious among us will be disappointed. Nietzsche ultimately produces nothing "new. " He gets bogged down-or so it seems-and wearies of his greatest thought. Or is the reverse the case? Did Nietzsche remain so faithful to his thought that he had to suffer shipwreck as a result of it-quite apart from what medical science is able to determine concerning his insanity?
We ask a different sort of question-not whether anything new eventuates, but whether and in what way the very first, the "old" mat- ters are developed and assimilated. And perhaps the most important thing in all this is not what we subsequently find as explicit observa- tions and sketches of the doctrine of return but the new clarity that radiates in Nietzsche's questioning as a whole and brings his thinking to new plateaus. Although some commentators have tried recently to convince us that Nietzsche's doctrine of return was later dislodged and swept aside by his doctrine of will to power, we would reply by demon- strating that the doctrine of will to power springs from nowhere else than eternal return, carrying the mark of its origin always with it, as the stream its source.
12. Summary Presentation of the Thought: Being as a Whole as Life and Force;
the World as Chaos
The four plans succeed in casting light on the three communications published by Nietzsche himself. Not only that. In them we catch sight of certain landmarks that will help us find our way through the entire stock of notes we are about to refer to.
The first group (XII, 51-69) derives from the period immediately subsequent to August, 1881, up to the publication of The Gay Science a year later. The editors have divided the lot into two sections, the first (51-63) entitled "Presentation and Grounding of the Doctrine," the second (63-69) entitled "Impact of the Doctrine on Humanity. " This division of the notes is based on criteria that do not stem from Nietz- sche himself. "' By means of this procedure of supplying titles, a procedure that ostensibly shuns every form of manipulation, the doctrine of return is stamped in advance as a "theory," which in addition is said to have "practical effects. " Such a division of the stock of notes does not allow what is essential in the doctrine of return to assert itself, even in the form of a question. What is essential is the fact that it is neither a "theory" nor a piece of practical wisdom for our lives. The apparently harmless and well-nigh obvious division of the materials has contributed principally to the miscomprehension of the doctrine of return. The misinterpretation of the thought of return as a
• However, to be fair, one should note that the editors were doubtless following the "plan" taken up as aphorism number 1057 in The Will to Power. The four-point plan from winter 1883-84 (CM, Mp XVII 16 [4]) employs such turns of phrase as "presenta- tion of the doctrine," "its theoretical presuppositions," and "presumable consequences. "
Summary Presentation ofthe Thought 83
"theory" with practical consequences seemed all the more plausible inasmuch as Nietzsche's notes, which are said to provide a "presentation and grounding," speak the language of the natural sciences. Indeed, Nietzsche reverts to the scientific writings of his era in physics, chemistry, and biology; and in letters written during these years he speaks of plans to study mathematics and the natural sciences at one of the major universities. All this demonstrates quite clearly that Nietzsche himself also pursued a "scientific side" to the doctrine of return. At all events, the appearances speak for that fact. The question, of course, is whether appearances, even when they are conjured by Nietzsche himself, dare serve as a standard of measure for interpreting the thought of thoughts in his philosophy. Such a question becomes unavoidable the moment we have grasped Nietzsche's philosophy and our confrontation with it-this is to say, with all of Western
philosophy-as a matter for this century and the century to come.
So far as the division of fragments is concerned, we shall in our provisional characterization deliberately follow the lead of the available edition, even though that division is dubious. Perhaps in this way we
will most readily perceive that in these fragments it is not a question of "natural science" that is being treated. The context of the particular fragments is by no means immediately evident. Above all, we must be aware of the fact that the sequence of notes numbered 90 through 132, as we encounter them in the available edition, is nowhere to be found as such in Nietzsche; these fragments, which the edition strings to- gether, are to be found in the manuscript bearing the catalogue num- ber M III 1, but in altogether disparate places. For example, number 92 appears on page 40 of the manuscript, number 95 on page 124, number 96 on page 41; number 105 appears on page 130, number 106 on pages 130 and 128, number 109 on page 37; number 116 appears on page 33, while number 122 is on page 140. Thus even in the sequential ordering of the fragments the editors-surely without in-
tending to do so-have misled us.
We shall try to avoid being misled. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's manu-
script offers no secure guidelines. Such a guideline can be found only in an understanding of the collective content of the whole. We shall try to set in relief the principal thought contained in the fragments that
84 THE ETERl\AL RECURREI'\CE OF THE SA:VH:
are pieced together here. What is most important in this regard is that we make clear what Nietzsche generally has in view and the way it stands in view. We could perform such a task with thoroughness only if we analyzed meticulously every single fragment. This lecture course is not the place for such a task. However, in order to be able to follow Nietzsche's lead, to move in the direction he is headed, in order to have present to our minds that principal, intrinsic node of questions on the basis of which Nietzsche speaks in these individual fragments, we elect to go the way of a summary presentation. This way too is exposed to the charge of arbitrariness. For we are the ones who are outlining it, and the question remains: From what sort of preview does our pro- jected outline originate, how comprehensive is the inquiry from which that outline arises? The essential import of our summary presentation may be articulated in ten points; we shall also have to make clear the way in which they cohere.
l. What stands in view? W e reply: The world in its collective char- acter. What all pertains to that? The whole of inanimate and animate existence, whereby "animate" encompasses not only plants and ani- mals but human beings as well. Inanimate and animate things are not juxtaposed as two separate regions. Nor arc they laminated one on top of the other. Rather, they are represented as interwoven in one vast nexus of Becoming. Is the unity of that nexus "living" or "lifeless"? Nietzsche writes (XII, number ll2): "Our whole world is the ashes of countless living creatures: and even if the animate seems so miniscule in comparison to the whole, it is nonetheless the case that everything has already been transposed into life-and so it goes. " Apparently opposed to this is a thought expressed in The Gay Science (number 109): "Let us guard against saying that death is the opposite of life; the living creature is simply a kind of dead creature, and a very rare kind. " In these passages lies the suggestion that in terms of quantity the living creature is something slight, in terms of its occurrence something rare, when we cast a glance toward the whole. Yet this rare and slight some- thing remains forever the firebrand that yields an enormous quantity of ashes. Accordingly, one would have to say that what is dead constitutes a kind of living existence, and not at all the reverse. At the same time, however, the reverse also holds, inasmuch as what is dead comes from
Summary Presentation ofthe Thought 85
the animate and in its preponderance continues to condition the ani- mate. Thus the animate is only a kind of metamorphosis and creative force of life, and death is an intermediate state. To be sure, such an interpretation does not capture perfectly Nietzsche's thought during this period. Furthermore, a contradiction obtains between these two thoughts, which we can formulate as follows: What is dead is the ashes of countless living creatures; and life is merely a kind of death. In the first case, the living determines the provenance of the dead; in the second, the dead determines the manner of life of the living. The dead takes preeminence in the second, whereas in the first it becomes subor- dinate to the living. "'
Perhaps two different views of the dead are in play here. If that is the case, then the very possibility of contradiction becomes superfluous. If the dead is taken with a view to its knowability, and if knowing is conceived as a firm grasp on what is permanent, identifiable, and un- equivocal, then the dead assumes preeminence as an object of knowl- edge, whereas the animate, being equivocal and ambiguous, is only a kind-and a subordinate kind-of the dead. If, on the contrary, the dead itself is thought in terms of its provenance, then it is but the ashes of what is alive. The fact that the living remains subordinate to the dead in quantitative terms and in terms of preponderance does not refute the fact that it is the origin of the dead, especially since it is proper to the essence of what is higher that it remain rare, less com- mon. From all this we discern one decisive point: by setting the lifeless in relief against the living, along the guidelines of any single aspect, we do not do justice to the state of affairs-the world is more enigmatic than our calculating intellect would like to admit. (On the preemi- nence of the dead, cf. XII, number 495 and ff. , especially number 497). t
• A reminder that "the dead," das Tote, is not to be read as a plural, in the sense of Gogol's Dead Souls. The nominalized neuter singular adjective refers to the whole of inanimate nature, to the "billiard ball universe" of classical mechanics. Hence the con- nection with knowledge (Erkenntnis), to which Heidegger draws attention in what fol- lows.
t GOA, XII, numbers 495 ff. stress the anorganic basis of human life. The fragment to which Heidegger draws special attention, number 497, begins: "Fundamentally false evaluation in the world of sensation with regard to what is dead. Because that is what we
86 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
2. What is the pervasive character of the world? The answer is: "force. " What is force? Nobody would presume to say straightforward- ly and with an air of finality what "force" is. Just this one point can and must be made here at the start: Nietzsche does not-and cannot- conceive of "force" in the way that physics does. Physics, whether mechanistic or dynamic in style, thinks the concept of force always and everywhere as a quantitative specification within an equation; physics as such, in the way it takes up nature into its representational frame- work, can never think force as force. Given its frame of reference, physics always deals with sheer relations of force with a view to the magnitude of their spatia-temporal appearance. The moment physics conducts nature into the domain of the "experiment," it co-posits in advance the calculative, technical relation (in the broader sense) be- tween sheer magnitudes of force and effects of force, and with calcula- tion it co-posits rationality. A physics that is to be technically useful and yet would also like to be irrational is nonsense. What Nietzsche designates and means by the term "force" is not what physics means by it. If one wished to call Nietzsche's interpretation of beings "dynamic," inasmuch as the Greek word for force is dynamis, one would of course also have to say what that Greek word means; in any case, it does not mean the "dynamic" as opposed to the "static," a distinction that stems from a mode of thought which at bottom remains mechanistic. It is not fortuitous that "dynamics" and "statics" are names of two physical- technical domains of thought. *
are! We belong to it! " Inasmuch as the world of sensation is one of pain, superficiality, and falsehood, the "dead" world promises a veritable feast to the intellect. The note concludes:
Let us see through this comedy [of sensation], so that we can enjoy it. Let us not conceive of the return to what lacks sensation as a regression! We shall become altogether true; we will perfect ourselves! Death is to be reinterpreted! Thus we recon- cile ourselves to the real, that is, the dead world.
In CM see M Ill I [70].
• This paragraph reflects Heidegger's early interest in physics and mathematics-an
interest that perdured up to the time of the Nietzsche lectures. For example, in his 1935-36 lecture course Heidegger devoted considerable time to the notion of force in Newtonian physics. See Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding (Tiibingen: M. Niemeyer, 1962), esp. pp. 66--69; English translation in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writ- ings, pp. 262-66. In his inaugural lecture of 1915 at the University of Freiburg, "The
Summary Presentation of the Thought 87
Whoever transposes the representational modes of "dynamics" and "statics" to being as a whole only introduces measureless confusion into thought. Because Nietzsche was everywhere sure of the funda- mental aims of his intellectual life-however much his utterances and formulations inevitably remained impacted in contemporary entangle- ments--our thinking requires a kind of rigor that far surpasses the precision of the mathematical and natural sciences, not only in degree but in essence, whenever it tries to follow Nietzsche's thought. What Nietzsche calls "force" becomes clear to him in later years as "will to power. "
3. Is force limited or boundless? It is limited. Why? Nietzsche ascer- tains the reason in the very essence of force; it is the essence of force to be finite. Presupposing that force is "infinitely waxing" (XII, number 93), on what should it "feed"? Because force is always expended, with- out thereby dwindling to nothing, it must be nourished by some sort of surplus. What might the source of such a surplus be? "We insist that the world as force dare not be thought of as being unbounded-we forbid ourselves the notion of an infinite force as incompatible with the very concept 'force'" (XII, number 94). Does Nietzsche then simply decree his conception of the essential finitude of force as such? He also calls this proposition a "belief' (ibid. ; cf. WM, 1065). On what is "belief' in the essential finitude of force founded? Nietzsche says that infinitude is "incompatible with the very concept 'force'. " This means that "force" is in essence something determinate, something firmly defined in itself; hence it is necessarily and inherently limited. "Any- thing ill-defined about force, anything undulating, is altogether un-
thinkable for us" (XII, number 104). This implies that the asserted essential finitude of force is not some sort of blind "belief' in the sense of a groundless supposition. It is rather a taking-for-true on the basis of the truth of knowledge concerning the correct concept of force, that is
Concept of Time in Historiography," Heidegger treated questions of "dynamics" in modern physics. Sec Martin Heidegger, Friihe Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klos- termann, 1972), pp. 360-63. Finally, for corroboration of Heidegger's identification of Rationalitat with calculation (Rec/men) in post-Galilean physics, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, I, 4-5, which equates ratiocinatio with accounting and defines "Reason" as "nothing but reckoning. "
88 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
to say, on the basis of its thinkability. Yet Nietzsche neither says nor asks what kind of thinking it is that thinks the essential concept; nor docs he say or ask whether and in what way thought and thinkability may serve as the court of jurisdiction for the essence of beings. But perhaps he does not need to ask such a thing, seeing that all philos- ophy prior to him never asked such things, either. Of course, this is more an excuse than a justification.
• Heidegger's phrase echoes that of Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part II, "On the Virtuous": "You love your virtue, as a mother loves her child. Yet who ever heard of a mother wanting to be paid for her love? "
The Third Communication of the Doctrine 67
need, and thereby the innermost necessity, to create what is most needed. For that reason the one who is god-less in the way we have indicated confronts a question which we might formulate succinctly as follows: What would remain for human beings to create-how could they be human at all, that is to say, how could they become who they are-if gods were always available and merely at hand? If there were gods as simply as there are stones and trees and water? Is it not the case that the god must first of all be created? Do we not require supreme force to be able to create something out beyond ourselves? And prior to that, must not man himself, the last man, the contemptible man, be re-created to that end? Does not man require a burden so that he will not take his god too lightly?
The thought of thoughts derives from these considerations its defini- tion as the greatest burden. Thus is Zarathustra the god-less overcome! To be sure. But has Nietzsche thereby come "farther," or has he slipped back onto the path of Christianity, which laid its very founda- tions by claiming the sole existent God all for itself? No, neither farther ahead nor farther back. For Zarathustra begins by going under. Zara- thustra's commencement is his downgoing. Another essence for Zara- thustra Nietzsche never for a moment entertained. Only the lame, only those who have wearied of their Christianity, look to Nietzsche's statements for quick and easy confirmation of their own specious athe- ism. But the eternal recurrence of the same is the thought that is hardest to bear. Its thinker must be a hero in knowing and willing, one who dare not and cannot explain away the world and the creation of a world with some gratuitous formula. "Everything in the hero's sphere turns to tragedy. " Only in passage through tragedy does the question concerning the god arise, the god in whose sphere-and this too only
as a "perhaps"--everything turns to world.
The nineteen-year-old Nietzsche, as we have already heard, asks at
the end of his autobiographical portrait, "And where is the ring that ultimately encircles him [the human being]? Is it the world? Is it God? " What is now the reply to this early question? The reply is yet another question: "Circulus vitiosus deus? " Yet the ring has now been defined as the eternal return of the same; the circulus is simultaneously vitiosus, the terrifying; this terrifying ring surrounds beings, determines
68 THE ETERI"AL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
them as a whole, defines them as the world. The ring and its eternity can be grasped solely in terms of the Moment. Accordingly, the god who is sought in the experience of the ring of fright will remain a. matter of inquiry solely from within the Moment. Then, the god is only a question? Indeed, "only" a question; that is, he is the one who is asked for, the one who is called. It remains to be considered whether the god possesses more divinity in the question concerning him or in the situation where we are sure of him and are able, as it were, to brush him aside or fetch him forward, as our needs dictate. The god is "only" a question. How do matters stand with this "only"? It is not merely the god who is a question-eternal recurrence too, the circulus vitiosus itself, is also "only" a question.
All three communications of the thought of thoughts are questions that vary in configuration and in stage of development. Even if we are far from penetrating their context and content, even if we are but barely aware of these things, the fact that the communications share the interrogative form is compelling. To be sure, we can clarify the state of affairs at first only with the help of determinations that are more negative than positive. The communication is no "doctrine" and no "disquisition" in the sense of a theoretical scholarly or scientific presentation. It is not some bit of "lore" asseverated by a learned per- son. Nor is it a philosophical treatise of the sort we have inherited from Leibniz or Kant; just as little is it a philosophical and conceptual struc- ture modeled on those erected by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. If therefore Nietzsche's communication does not seem to conform either to the framework of a scientific doctrine or to familiar philosophical discussions as they had been conducted up to Nietzsche's time, or even to the form exhibited by a purely poetic configuration, only one possi- bility appears to remain: it can only be a "personal act of faith," per- haps no more than an "illusory figment of the imagination. " Or does the remaining possibility consist in our having to ask what this thought, in itself and on its own, is in terms of its configuration? In the face of Nietzsche's labors in thought there can no longer be any doubt about whether we are permitted to force the thought summarily into our customary and common rubrics, or whether, on the contrary, such
The Third Communication ofthe Doctrine 69
thinking must induce us to jettison our common notions, induce us to meditate.
With this meditation we have encroached on the question of the configuration of the thought of eternal recurrence of the same. The encroachment is intentional. It means to suggest that Nietzsche's own mode of communication must remain definitive whenever we deline- ate the thought's configuration. Such a caution is all the more neces- sary since in relation to the question of configuration a cursory glance at Nietzsche's suppressed notes might easily lead us astray. We shall now try to gain insight into what Nietzsche thought about the eternal recurrence of the same but did not himself make public. Our examina- tion can catch a glimpse of what is essential only if it does not remain mere reportage, only if it is interpretation. On the one hand, the inter- pretation must be instigated by a prior glimpse of the essential ques- tions posed by the thought of eternal recurrence of the same; on the other hand, the interpretation must allow itself to be guided by meticu- lous deference toward what Nietzsche himself said.
10. The Thought of Return in the Suppressed Notes
From the moment Nietzsche's "thought of thoughts" came to him in August, 1881, everything he meditated on and committed to writing concerning that thought but shared with no one was destined to be labeled as his "literary remains. " If the thought of eternal recurrence of the same is Nietzsche's principal thought, then it will have been present to him during the entire subsequent period of his creative life, from 1881 to January, 1889. That this is the case is shown by the later publication of the literary remains which originated during the years mentioned. They are to be found in volumes XII through XVI of the Grossoktav edition. But if the thought of eternal recurrence of the same, the thought of thoughts, necessarily determines all of Nietz- sche's thinking from the very beginning, then his reflections on this thought and the sketches containing those reflections will vary accord- ing to the particular domain, direction, and stage of development in which Nietzsche's philosophical labors happened to be advancing. That means that these so-called "literary remains" are not always the same. Nietzsche's "posthumously published notes" do not comprise an
arbitrary bunch of confused and scattered observations that by chance never made it to the printer's. The sketches differ not only in terms of content but also in their form-or lack of form. They arose out of constantly changing moods, sometimes were caught fleetingly among a melee of intentions and points of view; sometimes they were elaborated fully, sometimes ventured only by way of tentative and faltering experi- ment; and sometimes, quick as lightning, they arrived in one fell swoop. If the thought of eternal recurrence of the same is the thought
Thought ofReturn in the Suppressed Notes 71
of thoughts, then it will be least explicitly portrayed or even named wherever in its essentiality it is to have the greatest impact. If for a certain stretch of time nothing or nothing explicit appears to be said about this thought in Nietzsche's notes, that by no means indicates that it has in the meantime become unimportant or even has been abandoned. We must ponder all these things if we wish to understand Nietzsche's "posthumously published notes" and think them through philosophically, instead of merely piecing together a "theory" out of some remarks we have managed to pick up here and there.
What we are here demanding-and what we will be able to achieve only in a provisional sort of way-is all the more imperative since in the publication of the literary remains heretofore the "material" as a whole has inevitably been arranged in a particular order. Furthermore, the individual fragments on the doctrine of return, which stem from different years and from disparate manuscripts and contexts, have been thoughtlessly strung together in a numerated series. However, anyone who is even slightly aware of the difficulties entailed in finding an appropriate form of publication for Nietzsche's literary remains-espe- cially those from the later years, that is, from 1881 onward-will not inveigh against Nietzsche's initial and subsequent editors because of the procedure they elected to follow. Whatever flaws the prior editions reveal, it remains the decisive achievement of the first editors that they made Nietzsche's private handwritten papers accessible by transcribing them into a readable text. Only they could have done it-above all,
Peter Cast, who after many years of collaborating with Nietzsche in the preparation of those manuscripts that were sent on to the printer was perfectly familiar with Nietzsche's handwriting and all the transforma- tions it underwent. Otherwise a great deal in the scarcely legible manuscripts, and often the most important things, would have r~ mained sealed to us today.
We shall now attempt a provisional characterization of the stock of sketches that deal explicitly with the doctrine of return, considering them in their chronological sequence. Nietzsche's own threefold com- munication of the thought of eternal return in The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil will mark off the peri- ods for us. It seems plausible that Nietzsche's notes from the period
72 THE ETERl\AL RECURREl\CE OF THE SAME
when the thought first struck him (August, 1881 and immediately af- terward) will assume special significance. V olume XII of the Grossok- tav edition contains unpublished materials from the years 1881-82 and from the period 1882-86 (the Zarathustra period). The remarks con- cerning the doctrine of return from the years 1881-82 are explicitly designated as such in volume XII, pages 51-69; the remarks from the Zarathustra period are for the most part in volume XII, pages 369-71. * The editors avoided an overhasty interpretation by refraining from ordering this stock of observations under other rubrics (metaphysics, epistemology, ethics) and by presenting them in a separate section. Yet the first notes we know of on the doctrine of eternal return, Nietzsche's earliest and most important sketches subsequent to his experience near that boulder at Surlei, are not to be found in the text proper of volume XII. They are appended to that volume in the editors' "Concluding Report" (see the second, revised edition, third printing, pages 425-28). Some of these passages appear scattered throughout the first edition of volume XII, for example, on pages 5, 3, 4, 128, and 6; some of them do not appear at all. The fact that now in the second, revised edition the most important texts are presented in the ''Concluding Report" betrays the total bewilderment of the editors. We shall have to begin with those passages that limp along behind in the appendix of the present edition-passages that are all too easily overlooked.
In addition, we must free ourselves straightaway of a prejudicial view. The editors say (XII, 425): "Right from the start two different intentions run parallel to each other; the one aims at a theoretical presentation of the doctrine, the other at a poetical treatment of it. " Now, to be sure, we too have spoken of a "poetic" presentation of the doctrine of eternal return in Zarathustra. Yet we avoided distinguish- ing it from a "theoretical" presentation, not because the passages cited from The Gay Science and Beyond Good and Evil are not theoretical presentations, but because here the word and concept theoretical do
• For the notes from 1881-82 see now CM V/2; for the notes from the Zarathustra period (1882-86) see CM Vll/1-3. The Kritische Studienausgabe contains these notes in volumes 9 and J0. -11, respectively. On the "philological question" generally, see Maz- zino Montinari's Foreword to volume 14 of the Kritische Studienausgabe, pp. 7-17; and section II of the Analysis at the end of this volume.
Thought ofReturn in the Suppressed Notes 73
not say anything, especially not when one follows the lead of the edi- tors and of those who portray Nietzsche's "doctrine" by equating theoretical with "treatment in prose. " The distinction "theoretical-po- etical" results from muddled thinking. Even if we were to let it obtain in general, such a distinction would in any case be out of place here. In Nietzsche's thinking of his fundamental thought the "poetical" is every bit as much "theoretical," and the "theoretical" is inherently "poetical. " All philosophical thinking-and precisely the most rigorous and prosaic-is in itself poetic. It nonetheless never springs from the art of poetry. A work of poetry, a work like Holderlin's hymns, can for its part be thoughtful in the highest degree. It is nonetheless never philosophy. Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra is poetic in the high- est degree, and yet it is not a work of art, but "philosophy. " Because all actual, that is, all great philosophy is inherently thoughtful-poetic, the distinction between "theoretical" and "poetical" cannot be applied to philosophical texts.
11. The Four Notes Dated August 1881
We turn now to four notes on the doctrine of eternal return from August, 1881. These notes are at the same time sketches for a work, and that fact alone betrays the scope that Nietzsche assigned to the thought of eternal return of the same. In terms of time, the notes were drafted a year prior to Nietzsche's first communication of the thought in The Gay Science; they offer a preview of Nietzsche's whole way of treating the doctrine of return in later years. The notes also serve to corroborate Nietzsche's own words concerning Thus Spoke Zarathus- tra in Ecce Homo, according to which the thought of return is "the fundamental conception of the work. " The first sketch reads as follows (XII, 425)*:
The Return ofthe Same. Plan.
I. Incorporation of the fundamental errors.
2. Incorporation of the passions.
3. Incorporation of knowledge and of the knowledge that can renounce.
(Passion of insight. )
4. The Innocent. The individual as experiment. The amelioration of life,
degradation, ennervation-transition.
5. The new burden: the eternal retum of the same. Infinite importance of
our knowing, erring, our habits, ways of life, for everything to come. What will we do with the remnants of our lives-we who have spent the greater part of them in the most essential uncertainty? We shall teach the
• See CM, II [141]. The first four points of this first sketch appear in GOA in italics, while CM has them in Roman type. I have followed CM throughout in this respect. Entry II [141] includes a long commentary on the fourth point, projecting a "philos- ophy of indifference" and identifying the "innocent" as one who is capable of "child's play. "
The Four Notes Dated August 1881 75 teaching-that is the most potent means of incorporating it in ourselves.
Our kind of beatitude, as teacher of the greatest teaching.
Early August, 1881, in Sils-Maria, 6,000 feet above sea level and much higher above all human things!
The very fact that Nietzsche expressly records the time and occasion of the note speaks for the extraordinary nature of its content and its intent. The doctrine is grasped in terms of the teaching of it and in terms of the teacher.
The title of the "plan" points directly to the sense of the whole. And yet eternal return is mentioned only when we arrive at number five; furthermore, nothing at all is said there about its content, not even by way of vague outline. Instead, the plan's key word is "incorporation. "* The doctrine is called "the greatest teaching" and "the new burden. " Then comes the sudden question: "What will we do with the remnants of our lives? '' Here, then, it is a matter of decision-and of incision-in our lives, a matter of cutting away what has prevailed hitherto, what has by now run its course, from what still "remains. " Obviously, the cut is made by the thought of return, which transforms everything. However, what comes before this incision and what follows
it are not divided into two separate quantities. What has gone before is not rejected. Four other points precede number five, and the fourth concludes with a reference to "transition. " However novel it may be, the doctrine of eternal return does not drop out of the blue, but is yoked to a "transition. " Where we initially expect an explication of the doctrine's essential import, and above all an account of its various aspects and an explanation of it, all we get here, one might say, is something about the doctrine's impact on mankind, and prior to that on the teacher himself and alone. All we get is something about the
• The term Einverleibung, which also may be rendered as "ingestion," reflects Nietz- sche's preoccupation in the summer of 1881 with the natural sciences and especially the science of physiology. He had been studying Wilhelm Roux, The Struggle ofParts in the Organism: A Contribution to the Perfection ofthe Doctrine ofMechanistic Teleolo- gy (Leipzig, 1881), so that these earliest notes on eternal recurrence appear in the often bizarre context of /'homme machine. The term also appears twice in II [134] and once in II [182], notes which W. Miiller-Lauter has traced to Roux. See Miiller-Lauter, "Wilhelm Roux's Influence on Friedrich Nietzsche," Nietzsche-Studien, VII (1978),
189-223.
76 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
"incorporation" of new knowledge and the teaching of such knowledge as a new kind of beatitude. We know from Thus Spoke Zarathustra how essential the question of the "incorporation" of the thought is; we know that Zarathustra first becomes a convalescent after he has incorporated the weightiest elements of the thought. If we pursue the meaning of this word we arrive at the notion of "eating," of devouring and digesting. Whatever is incorporated makes the body-and our embodiment-steadfast and secure. It is also something we have finished with and which determines us in the future. It is the juice that feeds our energies. To incorporate the thought here means to think the thought in such a way that right from the start it becomes our fundamental stance toward beings as a whole, pervading every single thought as such and from the outset. Only when the thought has become the basic posture of our thinking as a whole has it been appropriated-and taken into the body-as its essence demands.
The definitive meditation on the project entitled "the return of the same" advances directly to "incorporation. " The peculiar nature of this first plan remains important. We have no "schema" into which we might pigeonhole this "project" and so make it familiar to us; we must be on the lookout for the project itself, for whatever pertains to it, for its own schema. If this were the plan for a projected book, then the book would have been something altogether its own, not only with regard to its content but also in the way it would have "appeared" as a book and then "had an impact" or "made no impact. " Whatever is taught there, whatever is thought in the thought, recedes before the way it is taught and thought. The plan sketched here is nothing other than the germ of the plan for the coming work, Thus Spoke Zarathus- tra, hence not a sketch toward a "theoretical," prosaic elaboration of the thought of return. Even this much enables us to see how vacuous the distinction discussed earlier is.
The second plan that is relevant here is as "prosaic" as it is "poeti- cal. " It bears no title and does not pertain to the project that is presented first in the Grossoktav edition. Among Nietzsche's notes it does not stand together with the first plan, but is presented as fragment number 129 in volume XII. " It reads:
• Heidegger presents the second note in two phases, first the opening paragraph, then the four points of the plan itself, listed below. See CM, II [144].
The Four Notes Dated August 1881 77
It would be a dreadful thing if we were still to believe in sin: but no matter what we do, if we repeat it countless times it is innocent. If the thought of the eternal return of all things does not overwhelm you, that is no one's fault; and it is not to its credit if it does do so. -W e judge our predecessors more gently than they themselves judged: we regret the errors they incorpo- rated, not their wickedness.
The passage enlightens us as to why in point four of the first project "the innocent" is mentioned. With the death of the moral God, the sinners and the guilty parties vanish from being as a whole, and the necessity of being-as it is-assumes its prerogative.
The second plan proceeds now to reverse the sequence of the princi- pal thoughts, inasmuch as ii begins with the thought of return. It runs (XII, 426):
I. The mightiest insight.
2. Opinions and errors transform mankind and grant it its drives, or: the
incorporated errors.
3. Necessity and innocence. 4. The play oflife.
This plan also provides directives in some other respects: "necessity" does not refer to any arbitrary kind of necessity but to that of being as a whole. "The play of life" reminds us immediately of a fragment of Heraclitus, the thinker to whom Nietzsche believed he was most close- ly akin, that is to say, fragment 52: Aion pais esti paidzon, pesseuon; paidos he basileie. "The aeon is a child at play, playing at draughts; dominion is the child's" (that is to say, dominion over being as a whole).
The suggestion is that innocence pervades being as a whole. The whole is aion, a word that can scarcely be translated in an adequate way. It means the whole of the world, but also time, and, related by time to our "life," it means the course oflife itself. We are accustomed to defining the meaning of aion thus: "Aeon" suggests the "time" of the "cosmos," that is, of nature, which operates in the time which physics measures. One distinguishes time in this sense from the time we "live through. " Yet what is named in aion resists such a distinction. At the same time, we are thinking of kosmos too cursorily when we represent it cosmologically.
78 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
Nietzsche's use of the word life is ambiguous. It designates being as a whole and also the way in which we are "caught up in the melee" of the whole. The talk of "play" is correspondingly equivocal. "
The intimations in the direction of Heraclitus are not fortuitous, especially since Nietzsche in his notes of this period often touches on another thought which one customarily-and Nietzsche too follows custom here--designates as Heraclitus' principal thought: panta rhei ["everything flows"]. But this is a statement which for all we know does not even stem from Heraclitus. Far from characterizing his thought, it distorts his thought beyond recognition.
The second plan for the thought of eternal return which we have adduced here does not think primarily about the "impact" of the doc- trine on mankind or on the transformation of human "existence" with- in being as a whole. Rather, it thinks about being as a whole itself. Here it is more a question of catching a glimpse of the "metaphysical" character of the doctrine of return, whereas in the prior plan the doc- trine's "existentiell"t sense preponderated-if we may employ these designations that are still common today. Or does the distinction between "metaphysical" and "existentiell," if it is a clear and viable distinction at all, have as little to do with Nietzsche's philosophy as that other one which tried to distinguish between its theoretical-prosaic and its poetical character? We will be able to decide this question only later.
The plan projected next seems to assume yet another shape. t Of it the editors assert that it is "the sketch for the poetical idea" of the doctrine of return:
Midday and Eternity
Pointers Toward a New Life
Zarathustra, born on Lake Urmi, left his home during his thirtieth year, went to the province of Aria, and in the ten years of his mountain solitude composed the Zend-Avesta.
• Heidegger here adds a parenthetical reference to Nietzsche's poem "To Goethe," the first of the "Songs of the Outlaw Prince," published as an appendix to the second edition of The Gay Science in 1887. He also draws attention to Nil, 380f. , where that poem is presented and discussed. See Volume IV, Nihilism, pp. 235-37.
t On existentiell, as opposed to existenzial, see Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 55 n.
t See CM, II [195-96].
The Four Notes Dated August 1881 79 Once again the sun of insight stands at midday: and coiled in its light lies
the serpent of eternity-it is your time, ye brothers of noon!
The key word in this plan is midday. "Midday and Eternity": both are concepts and names for time-provided we are aware of the fact that we think eternity too solely in terms of time. Now that the thought of eternal return is thought, it is "midday and eternity" at one and the same time; we could also say that it is the Moment. Nietzsche's project chooses the highest determinations of time as the title of a work that is to treat of being as a whole and of the new life within such being. The way being as a whole is thought is also indicated by the imagery: the serpent, the most discerning animal, "the serpent of eternity," lies coiled in the midday sunlight of insight. A magnificent image-and it is not meant to be "poetical"! It is poetized, but only because it is
thought, and thought most deeply. And it is thought thus, because the project in which being as a whole is to be grasped and elevated to knowledge here ventures farthest-not into the vacuous, tenebrous space of idle "speculation," but into the domain at the midpoint of humanity's path. Concerning the time of midday, when the sun stands at its zenith and things cast no shadow, the following is said at the conclusion of Part One of Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
And that is the great midday when man stands at the midpoint of his path between beast and overman, when he celebrates his way to evening as his supreme hope: for it is the way to a new morning.
There and then the one who goes under will bless himself for being one who goes over in transition; and the sun of his insight will stand for him at midday.
"All gods are dead: now we will that the overman live"-at some great midday, let this be our ultimate will! -
Thus spoke Zarathustra.
When Zarathustra here says, "All gods are dead," what he means is that contemporary man, the Last Man, is no longer strong enough for any one of the gods, especially since these can never simply be inherit- ed from tradition. A tradition takes shape as a power of Dasein only where it is sustained by the creative will, and only as long as it is so sustained.
Midday is a luminous midpoint in the history of humanity, a mo-
80 THE ETI! ~RNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
ment of transition in the cheering light of eternity, when the sky is deep and fore-noon and after-noon, past and future, confront one an- other and thus come to decision. Indeed, the subtitle of the plan "Mid~ day and Eternity" reads "Pointers toward a New Life. " We might expect directives on how to achieve practical wisdom in our lives; but if we do so we will surely be deceived. For the "new life" meant here is a new way of standing in the midst of beings as a whole; it is a new kind of truth and thereby a metamorphosis of beings.
That we must understand the "new life" in this fashion is shown by a fourth projected plan which also stems from August, 1881. * It bears the title, "On the 'Projection of a New Way to Live,'" and is divided into four books. Here we will list only the characteristic titles of the four books:
I. On the Dehumanization of Nature. II. On the Incorporation of Experiences.
III. On the Ultimate Happiness of the Lonely One. IV. Annulus aeternitatis.
Books I and IV embrace II and III, which are to treat of humanity. Book I is to execute the dehumanization of nature. This implies that all the anthropomorphisms projected into being as a whole, such as guilt, purpose, intention, and providence, are to be expunged from nature, in order that man himself may be restored to nature (as homo natura). Such being as a whole is defined in Book IV as the "ring of eternity. "
What is striking about these four projected plans, all of them drawn up in a little less than a month, and what we can now grasp only in an approximate way, is the wealth of prospects offered by a few essential regions of inquiry, to which Nietzsche appeals again and again. This wealth of prospects constantly compels Nietzsche to introduce new sides of the question into the scope of his project. All this allows us to speculate that with the first unfolding of the thought of eternal return ofthe same-as with all great thoughts-everything essential was there already at daybreak, so to speak, although not yet in a developed form.
• See CM, II [197], dated Sils-Maria, August 26, 1881. Heidegger presents only the titles of the four books, omitting what one might call Nietzsche's "stage directions" or stylistic intentions for each book.
The Four Notes Dated August 1881 81
Wherever Nietzsche attempts an elaboration, he operates at first with the already available means, derived from the prior interpretation of beings. If there is something like catastrophe in the creative work of great thinkers, then it consists not in being stymied and in failing to go farther, but precisely in advancing farther-that is to say, in their let- ting themselves be determined by the initial impact of their thought, an impact that always deflects them. Such going "farther" is always fatal, for it prevents one from abiding by the source of one's own commencement. The history of Western philosophy will have to be assimilated in times to come with the help of this way of looking at things. The result could be some very remarkable and very instructive insights.
Yet if everything is there for Nietzsche in the summer of 1881, so far as his thought of thoughts is concerned, will the subsequent years bring anything new? That is a question that curiosity-seekers might pose. The principal quality of the curious is reflected in the fact that what- ever they are curious about ultimately and even from the outset means absolutely nothing to them. All curiosity thrives on this essential indif- ference. But the curious among us will be disappointed. Nietzsche ultimately produces nothing "new. " He gets bogged down-or so it seems-and wearies of his greatest thought. Or is the reverse the case? Did Nietzsche remain so faithful to his thought that he had to suffer shipwreck as a result of it-quite apart from what medical science is able to determine concerning his insanity?
We ask a different sort of question-not whether anything new eventuates, but whether and in what way the very first, the "old" mat- ters are developed and assimilated. And perhaps the most important thing in all this is not what we subsequently find as explicit observa- tions and sketches of the doctrine of return but the new clarity that radiates in Nietzsche's questioning as a whole and brings his thinking to new plateaus. Although some commentators have tried recently to convince us that Nietzsche's doctrine of return was later dislodged and swept aside by his doctrine of will to power, we would reply by demon- strating that the doctrine of will to power springs from nowhere else than eternal return, carrying the mark of its origin always with it, as the stream its source.
12. Summary Presentation of the Thought: Being as a Whole as Life and Force;
the World as Chaos
The four plans succeed in casting light on the three communications published by Nietzsche himself. Not only that. In them we catch sight of certain landmarks that will help us find our way through the entire stock of notes we are about to refer to.
The first group (XII, 51-69) derives from the period immediately subsequent to August, 1881, up to the publication of The Gay Science a year later. The editors have divided the lot into two sections, the first (51-63) entitled "Presentation and Grounding of the Doctrine," the second (63-69) entitled "Impact of the Doctrine on Humanity. " This division of the notes is based on criteria that do not stem from Nietz- sche himself. "' By means of this procedure of supplying titles, a procedure that ostensibly shuns every form of manipulation, the doctrine of return is stamped in advance as a "theory," which in addition is said to have "practical effects. " Such a division of the stock of notes does not allow what is essential in the doctrine of return to assert itself, even in the form of a question. What is essential is the fact that it is neither a "theory" nor a piece of practical wisdom for our lives. The apparently harmless and well-nigh obvious division of the materials has contributed principally to the miscomprehension of the doctrine of return. The misinterpretation of the thought of return as a
• However, to be fair, one should note that the editors were doubtless following the "plan" taken up as aphorism number 1057 in The Will to Power. The four-point plan from winter 1883-84 (CM, Mp XVII 16 [4]) employs such turns of phrase as "presenta- tion of the doctrine," "its theoretical presuppositions," and "presumable consequences. "
Summary Presentation ofthe Thought 83
"theory" with practical consequences seemed all the more plausible inasmuch as Nietzsche's notes, which are said to provide a "presentation and grounding," speak the language of the natural sciences. Indeed, Nietzsche reverts to the scientific writings of his era in physics, chemistry, and biology; and in letters written during these years he speaks of plans to study mathematics and the natural sciences at one of the major universities. All this demonstrates quite clearly that Nietzsche himself also pursued a "scientific side" to the doctrine of return. At all events, the appearances speak for that fact. The question, of course, is whether appearances, even when they are conjured by Nietzsche himself, dare serve as a standard of measure for interpreting the thought of thoughts in his philosophy. Such a question becomes unavoidable the moment we have grasped Nietzsche's philosophy and our confrontation with it-this is to say, with all of Western
philosophy-as a matter for this century and the century to come.
So far as the division of fragments is concerned, we shall in our provisional characterization deliberately follow the lead of the available edition, even though that division is dubious. Perhaps in this way we
will most readily perceive that in these fragments it is not a question of "natural science" that is being treated. The context of the particular fragments is by no means immediately evident. Above all, we must be aware of the fact that the sequence of notes numbered 90 through 132, as we encounter them in the available edition, is nowhere to be found as such in Nietzsche; these fragments, which the edition strings to- gether, are to be found in the manuscript bearing the catalogue num- ber M III 1, but in altogether disparate places. For example, number 92 appears on page 40 of the manuscript, number 95 on page 124, number 96 on page 41; number 105 appears on page 130, number 106 on pages 130 and 128, number 109 on page 37; number 116 appears on page 33, while number 122 is on page 140. Thus even in the sequential ordering of the fragments the editors-surely without in-
tending to do so-have misled us.
We shall try to avoid being misled. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's manu-
script offers no secure guidelines. Such a guideline can be found only in an understanding of the collective content of the whole. We shall try to set in relief the principal thought contained in the fragments that
84 THE ETERl\AL RECURREI'\CE OF THE SA:VH:
are pieced together here. What is most important in this regard is that we make clear what Nietzsche generally has in view and the way it stands in view. We could perform such a task with thoroughness only if we analyzed meticulously every single fragment. This lecture course is not the place for such a task. However, in order to be able to follow Nietzsche's lead, to move in the direction he is headed, in order to have present to our minds that principal, intrinsic node of questions on the basis of which Nietzsche speaks in these individual fragments, we elect to go the way of a summary presentation. This way too is exposed to the charge of arbitrariness. For we are the ones who are outlining it, and the question remains: From what sort of preview does our pro- jected outline originate, how comprehensive is the inquiry from which that outline arises? The essential import of our summary presentation may be articulated in ten points; we shall also have to make clear the way in which they cohere.
l. What stands in view? W e reply: The world in its collective char- acter. What all pertains to that? The whole of inanimate and animate existence, whereby "animate" encompasses not only plants and ani- mals but human beings as well. Inanimate and animate things are not juxtaposed as two separate regions. Nor arc they laminated one on top of the other. Rather, they are represented as interwoven in one vast nexus of Becoming. Is the unity of that nexus "living" or "lifeless"? Nietzsche writes (XII, number ll2): "Our whole world is the ashes of countless living creatures: and even if the animate seems so miniscule in comparison to the whole, it is nonetheless the case that everything has already been transposed into life-and so it goes. " Apparently opposed to this is a thought expressed in The Gay Science (number 109): "Let us guard against saying that death is the opposite of life; the living creature is simply a kind of dead creature, and a very rare kind. " In these passages lies the suggestion that in terms of quantity the living creature is something slight, in terms of its occurrence something rare, when we cast a glance toward the whole. Yet this rare and slight some- thing remains forever the firebrand that yields an enormous quantity of ashes. Accordingly, one would have to say that what is dead constitutes a kind of living existence, and not at all the reverse. At the same time, however, the reverse also holds, inasmuch as what is dead comes from
Summary Presentation ofthe Thought 85
the animate and in its preponderance continues to condition the ani- mate. Thus the animate is only a kind of metamorphosis and creative force of life, and death is an intermediate state. To be sure, such an interpretation does not capture perfectly Nietzsche's thought during this period. Furthermore, a contradiction obtains between these two thoughts, which we can formulate as follows: What is dead is the ashes of countless living creatures; and life is merely a kind of death. In the first case, the living determines the provenance of the dead; in the second, the dead determines the manner of life of the living. The dead takes preeminence in the second, whereas in the first it becomes subor- dinate to the living. "'
Perhaps two different views of the dead are in play here. If that is the case, then the very possibility of contradiction becomes superfluous. If the dead is taken with a view to its knowability, and if knowing is conceived as a firm grasp on what is permanent, identifiable, and un- equivocal, then the dead assumes preeminence as an object of knowl- edge, whereas the animate, being equivocal and ambiguous, is only a kind-and a subordinate kind-of the dead. If, on the contrary, the dead itself is thought in terms of its provenance, then it is but the ashes of what is alive. The fact that the living remains subordinate to the dead in quantitative terms and in terms of preponderance does not refute the fact that it is the origin of the dead, especially since it is proper to the essence of what is higher that it remain rare, less com- mon. From all this we discern one decisive point: by setting the lifeless in relief against the living, along the guidelines of any single aspect, we do not do justice to the state of affairs-the world is more enigmatic than our calculating intellect would like to admit. (On the preemi- nence of the dead, cf. XII, number 495 and ff. , especially number 497). t
• A reminder that "the dead," das Tote, is not to be read as a plural, in the sense of Gogol's Dead Souls. The nominalized neuter singular adjective refers to the whole of inanimate nature, to the "billiard ball universe" of classical mechanics. Hence the con- nection with knowledge (Erkenntnis), to which Heidegger draws attention in what fol- lows.
t GOA, XII, numbers 495 ff. stress the anorganic basis of human life. The fragment to which Heidegger draws special attention, number 497, begins: "Fundamentally false evaluation in the world of sensation with regard to what is dead. Because that is what we
86 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
2. What is the pervasive character of the world? The answer is: "force. " What is force? Nobody would presume to say straightforward- ly and with an air of finality what "force" is. Just this one point can and must be made here at the start: Nietzsche does not-and cannot- conceive of "force" in the way that physics does. Physics, whether mechanistic or dynamic in style, thinks the concept of force always and everywhere as a quantitative specification within an equation; physics as such, in the way it takes up nature into its representational frame- work, can never think force as force. Given its frame of reference, physics always deals with sheer relations of force with a view to the magnitude of their spatia-temporal appearance. The moment physics conducts nature into the domain of the "experiment," it co-posits in advance the calculative, technical relation (in the broader sense) be- tween sheer magnitudes of force and effects of force, and with calcula- tion it co-posits rationality. A physics that is to be technically useful and yet would also like to be irrational is nonsense. What Nietzsche designates and means by the term "force" is not what physics means by it. If one wished to call Nietzsche's interpretation of beings "dynamic," inasmuch as the Greek word for force is dynamis, one would of course also have to say what that Greek word means; in any case, it does not mean the "dynamic" as opposed to the "static," a distinction that stems from a mode of thought which at bottom remains mechanistic. It is not fortuitous that "dynamics" and "statics" are names of two physical- technical domains of thought. *
are! We belong to it! " Inasmuch as the world of sensation is one of pain, superficiality, and falsehood, the "dead" world promises a veritable feast to the intellect. The note concludes:
Let us see through this comedy [of sensation], so that we can enjoy it. Let us not conceive of the return to what lacks sensation as a regression! We shall become altogether true; we will perfect ourselves! Death is to be reinterpreted! Thus we recon- cile ourselves to the real, that is, the dead world.
In CM see M Ill I [70].
• This paragraph reflects Heidegger's early interest in physics and mathematics-an
interest that perdured up to the time of the Nietzsche lectures. For example, in his 1935-36 lecture course Heidegger devoted considerable time to the notion of force in Newtonian physics. See Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding (Tiibingen: M. Niemeyer, 1962), esp. pp. 66--69; English translation in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writ- ings, pp. 262-66. In his inaugural lecture of 1915 at the University of Freiburg, "The
Summary Presentation of the Thought 87
Whoever transposes the representational modes of "dynamics" and "statics" to being as a whole only introduces measureless confusion into thought. Because Nietzsche was everywhere sure of the funda- mental aims of his intellectual life-however much his utterances and formulations inevitably remained impacted in contemporary entangle- ments--our thinking requires a kind of rigor that far surpasses the precision of the mathematical and natural sciences, not only in degree but in essence, whenever it tries to follow Nietzsche's thought. What Nietzsche calls "force" becomes clear to him in later years as "will to power. "
3. Is force limited or boundless? It is limited. Why? Nietzsche ascer- tains the reason in the very essence of force; it is the essence of force to be finite. Presupposing that force is "infinitely waxing" (XII, number 93), on what should it "feed"? Because force is always expended, with- out thereby dwindling to nothing, it must be nourished by some sort of surplus. What might the source of such a surplus be? "We insist that the world as force dare not be thought of as being unbounded-we forbid ourselves the notion of an infinite force as incompatible with the very concept 'force'" (XII, number 94). Does Nietzsche then simply decree his conception of the essential finitude of force as such? He also calls this proposition a "belief' (ibid. ; cf. WM, 1065). On what is "belief' in the essential finitude of force founded? Nietzsche says that infinitude is "incompatible with the very concept 'force'. " This means that "force" is in essence something determinate, something firmly defined in itself; hence it is necessarily and inherently limited. "Any- thing ill-defined about force, anything undulating, is altogether un-
thinkable for us" (XII, number 104). This implies that the asserted essential finitude of force is not some sort of blind "belief' in the sense of a groundless supposition. It is rather a taking-for-true on the basis of the truth of knowledge concerning the correct concept of force, that is
Concept of Time in Historiography," Heidegger treated questions of "dynamics" in modern physics. Sec Martin Heidegger, Friihe Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klos- termann, 1972), pp. 360-63. Finally, for corroboration of Heidegger's identification of Rationalitat with calculation (Rec/men) in post-Galilean physics, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, I, 4-5, which equates ratiocinatio with accounting and defines "Reason" as "nothing but reckoning. "
88 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
to say, on the basis of its thinkability. Yet Nietzsche neither says nor asks what kind of thinking it is that thinks the essential concept; nor docs he say or ask whether and in what way thought and thinkability may serve as the court of jurisdiction for the essence of beings. But perhaps he does not need to ask such a thing, seeing that all philos- ophy prior to him never asked such things, either. Of course, this is more an excuse than a justification.
