But
Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be
fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to
denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it,
swiftness of movement (De Coel.
Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be
fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to
denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it,
swiftness of movement (De Coel.
Summa Theologica
But since the composite agent, which is a
body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the
term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic
intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms,
must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production
of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can
have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had
when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone
matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces
each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to
denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom,
according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is
"all form and fitness and concord of parts. "
Reply to Objection 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the
types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3):
"By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God;
that from invisible things visible things might be made. " But if by
immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come
material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Reply to Objection 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred,
not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held,
but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which
they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine
intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things,
that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by
movement, not by emanation.
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ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of
creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its
formation?
(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with
formless matter?
(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time
its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): "The earth was void and
empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version
[*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until
it received its form.
Objection 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of
God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of
nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in
the Divine working.
Objection 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is
part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without
substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause
matter to exist without form.
On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent.
But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him
(Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect. " Therefore the work of His
creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal
creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is
opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore,
formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that
at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in
the corporeal creation.
I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for
instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter
was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order
of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem. ), Ambrose (In
Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen. ), hold that formlessness of
matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem
mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for
Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from
the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we
thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was
prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to
formation, the argument is clear. For it formless matter preceded in
duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since
the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say,
then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being
existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.
Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which
afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this
would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who
maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as
fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed
that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding
form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing
to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make
an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of
an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely
accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must
assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor
under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the
formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of
primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not
precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and
nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to
act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand
by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that
beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation.
Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded
its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that
Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees,
as will be shown later ([568]Q[69], A[1]; [569]Q[74], A[2]).
As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty
was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to
be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that
transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that
"darkness was upon the fact of the deep. " And the earth lacked beauty
in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil
was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or
"invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view;
secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants,
for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading
[*Septuagint], "shapeless"---that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of
two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the
heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the
deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of
the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty. "
Reply to Objection 1: The word earth is taken differently in this
passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the
words "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is
signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea
of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the
similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in
speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they
should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it
has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and
to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect,
then, the earth is said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and
shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in
itself, it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is
completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus,
quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers
understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said [570](A[1])
how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.
Reply to Objection 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in
potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality
must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God
produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a
perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of
act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality.
Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form,
than for accident to be without subject.
In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,
according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the
informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part,
but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the
disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.
In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient
natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;
except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and
without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy
Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being
that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction
is expressed, as will be shown later [571](A[3]; [572]Q[68], A[1]).
This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth. " The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements
according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That
air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the
corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and
water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus
xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words,
"Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered
that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be
composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But
Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says
that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does
not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold
to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God" Scripture
usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters,"
not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said
to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third
distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the
waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of
darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words:
"Darkness was upon the face of the deep. " The remaining distinctions
will appear from what follows [573](Q[71]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?
Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal
things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two
things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says
that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he
says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the
matter of all corporeal things is the same.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10):
"Things that are one in genus are one in matter. " But all corporeal
things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all
bodies is the same.
Objection 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities,
and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the
same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
Objection 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in
potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter
considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually
interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener.
i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each
other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have
differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are
of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements
have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption
prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the
fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not
to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom
he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you
are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My
will is more powerful than the link that binds you together. " But this
theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural
movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a
natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that
they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which
is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the
movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards,
another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without
contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their
nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it
follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies
are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural
corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all
bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity
were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish
bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be
true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and
so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be
merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms---that
is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial,
since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the
ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was
some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form
exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath
generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of
corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it
is in itself, is in potentiality to form.
Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all
those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is
in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to
all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more
perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves.
For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection
and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality
to a perfect form, and "vice versa. " Matter, therefore, whilst existing
under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to
the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the
latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form
in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this
condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that
bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should
possess the same matter.
Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii. ] imagines,
that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven---beings in
potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its
form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it
is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be
act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside,
then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with
motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form---that
is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form---it
follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing
is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not,
being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly
bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone
which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to
inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form
perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no
potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle
[*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly
bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so
far as they agree in the character of potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato,
who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter
is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of
corporeal creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense,
corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on
account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph.
x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of
all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of
corporeity.
Reply to Objection 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same in
all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are
distinguished, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: As potentiality is directed towards act,
potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight
is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of
the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because
the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental
form.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at
the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything
at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable,
and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement
would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not
the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously
with formless matter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower
bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order. " If, therefore,
the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily
exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to
be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for
one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the
empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
Objection 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the
place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the
contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally
apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world"; from which
it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this
world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.
Objection 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly
transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven.
There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the
aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher
heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the
air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night.
Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless
matter.
On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the visible
firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.
I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of
Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect,
namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede
say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [*Hom.
ii. in Hexaem. ] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the lowest
darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond
this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest. " But they
differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and
Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament,
which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made,
not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given
by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His
first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of
the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not
very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made
on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by
other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained
according to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. i; vii. ], by supposing that
formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but
by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature,
but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the
things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect
state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason
can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come
a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in
the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be
made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the
world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised
to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning,
there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something
corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and
change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after
the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called
the empyrean, i. e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness.
It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says
that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that
the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean.
But
Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be
fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to
denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it,
swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said
to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean
heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the
present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures
is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is
finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must
have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.
Reply to Objection 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that
the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end,
does not influence inferior bodies of another order---those, namely,
that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more
probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself
motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra,
[574]Q[112], A[3]], influence those of lower degree who act as
messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches
(Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of
the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved,
produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of
movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of
conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to
dignity.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not
as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may
correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem. )
says: "The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his
habitual dwelling in light and joy. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem. ): "It is
certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body,
and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it
encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the
light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. "But
since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that
it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see
the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the
empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does,
but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory
which differs from mere natural brightness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously
with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find
two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary
corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. "Therefore time was not
created with formless matter.
Objection 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the
beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God
divided the light from the darkness. "Therefore in the beginning time
was not.
Objection 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement;
and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day.
Therefore in the beginning time was not.
Objection 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be
reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.
Objection 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created
things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned
among the things first created.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual
and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time. "
I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were
these four---the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless
corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is
not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only
two things as first created---the angelic nature and corporeal
matter---making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two,
namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation,
by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede
formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore,
cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that
of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter
preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence
of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no
such measure.
Reply to Objection 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion
that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was
in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was
in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into
day and night.
Reply to Objection 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin
immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the
measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of
whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the
firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if
the first movement was another than this, time would have been its
measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it
must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement
of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in
the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived,
since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession
in movement. "
Reply to Objection 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned
those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore,
among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common
measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable
subject.
Reply to Objection 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean
heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has
reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality.
But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as
actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now. "
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the
work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly
the work of the third day.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of
spiritual things?
(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?
(3) Whether light is a quality?
(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the word "light" is used in its proper sense in speaking of
spiritual things?
Objection 1: It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense in
spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that "in
spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not
called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is
to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically. "
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the
intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper
sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense
in spiritual matters.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made
manifest is light. " But to be made manifest belongs more properly to
spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that "Splendor" is among
those things which are said of God metaphorically.
I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways---that is to say,
either in its original application or in its more extended meaning.
This is clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the
act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most
trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge
obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, "Seeing how it tastes,"
or "smells," or "burns. "Further, sight is applied to knowledge
obtained through the intellect, as in those words: "Blessed are the
clean of heart, for they shall see God" (Mat. 5:8). And thus it is with
the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes
manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that
which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is
taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood
metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De
Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to
manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual
things.
The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has
been said.
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Whether light is a body?
Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among
bodies. "Therefore light is a body.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is
a species of fire. " But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.
Objection 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection,
belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and
its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they
are bodies. Therefore light is a body.
On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same place
simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore
light is not a body.
I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons.
First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different
from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any
two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same
place; since contiguity requires distinction of place.
The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its
diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement
of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place
to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the
end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be
argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though
this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances
so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as
the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end
to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that
whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movement, that of
light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle
as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is
not the local movement of a body.
The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a
body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence
of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter
would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a
body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from
what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the
intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of
so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And
should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves
around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is
obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is
not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done,
since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before.
Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but
to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in
act---in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.
Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in
its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in
earthly matter is "burning coal. " Nor must too much attention be paid
to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he
merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various
writers.
Reply to Objection 3: All these properties are assigned to light
metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For
because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of
movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to
local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For
even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place,
to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether light is a quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every
quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality
be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light
does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn.
Therefore light is not a quality.
Objection 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold
is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case
with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light
therefore is not a sensible quality.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the
light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly
bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them
actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a
substantial or spiritual form.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a
species of quality.
I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not
a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an
intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot
be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the
air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not
do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly, because
light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are
warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions.
Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form, but this
also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms
are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the
intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26:
whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is
impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the
accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very
nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and
everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial
form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is
withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.
We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the
substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on
the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself
luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays
of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse
natures of bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial
form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the
mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when
matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the
form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted
into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so
as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than fully
impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not
permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in
time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the
transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a
substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial
form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its
active cause.
Reply to Objection 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary,
forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of
change, which is itself removed from contrariety.
Reply to Objection 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire,
as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does
light act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards
producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually
visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?
Objection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not
fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above
[575](A[3]), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such
should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of
light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.
Objection 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day,
and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made
on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have
been on the first day.
Objection 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular
movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute
of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second
day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought
not to be assigned to the first day.
Objection 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken
of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the
darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the
demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown ([576]Q[63],
A[5]). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to
the first day.
On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have
been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light.
Therefore light must have been made on the first day.
I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light.
Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not have
fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and
therefore when we read, "In the beginning God created heaven and
earth," a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the
word "heaven," and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the
word "earth. " And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of higher
dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual
nature is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of
spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the
enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.
Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was
purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i in
Hexaem. ] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of
time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or
angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.
Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes. ] gives as a reason for the omission that
Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone
appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of
idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had
spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all
corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship,
since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars,
which was forbidden them (Dt. 4).
But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the
corporeal creature. One is where we read that "the earth was void and
empty," and another where it is said that "darkness was upon the face
of the deep. " Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the
formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the
production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of
the first body, as was stated [577](A[3]), and thus by means of light
it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The second
reason is because light is a common quality.
body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the
term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic
intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms,
must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production
of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can
have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had
when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone
matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces
each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to
denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom,
according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is
"all form and fitness and concord of parts. "
Reply to Objection 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the
types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3):
"By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God;
that from invisible things visible things might be made. " But if by
immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come
material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Reply to Objection 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred,
not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held,
but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which
they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine
intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things,
that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by
movement, not by emanation.
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ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of
creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its
formation?
(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with
formless matter?
(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time
its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): "The earth was void and
empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version
[*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until
it received its form.
Objection 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of
God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of
nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in
the Divine working.
Objection 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is
part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without
substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause
matter to exist without form.
On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent.
But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him
(Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect. " Therefore the work of His
creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal
creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is
opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore,
formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that
at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in
the corporeal creation.
I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for
instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter
was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order
of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem. ), Ambrose (In
Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen. ), hold that formlessness of
matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem
mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for
Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from
the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we
thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was
prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to
formation, the argument is clear. For it formless matter preceded in
duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since
the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say,
then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being
existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.
Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which
afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this
would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who
maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as
fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed
that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding
form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing
to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make
an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of
an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely
accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must
assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor
under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the
formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of
primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not
precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and
nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to
act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand
by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that
beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation.
Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded
its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that
Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees,
as will be shown later ([568]Q[69], A[1]; [569]Q[74], A[2]).
As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty
was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to
be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that
transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that
"darkness was upon the fact of the deep. " And the earth lacked beauty
in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil
was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or
"invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view;
secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants,
for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading
[*Septuagint], "shapeless"---that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of
two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the
heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the
deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of
the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty. "
Reply to Objection 1: The word earth is taken differently in this
passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the
words "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is
signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea
of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the
similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in
speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they
should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it
has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and
to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect,
then, the earth is said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and
shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in
itself, it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is
completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus,
quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers
understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said [570](A[1])
how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.
Reply to Objection 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in
potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality
must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God
produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a
perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of
act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality.
Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form,
than for accident to be without subject.
In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,
according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the
informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part,
but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the
disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.
In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient
natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;
except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and
without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy
Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being
that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction
is expressed, as will be shown later [571](A[3]; [572]Q[68], A[1]).
This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth. " The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements
according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That
air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the
corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and
water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus
xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words,
"Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered
that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be
composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But
Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says
that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does
not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold
to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God" Scripture
usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters,"
not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said
to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third
distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the
waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of
darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words:
"Darkness was upon the face of the deep. " The remaining distinctions
will appear from what follows [573](Q[71]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?
Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal
things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two
things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says
that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he
says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the
matter of all corporeal things is the same.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10):
"Things that are one in genus are one in matter. " But all corporeal
things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all
bodies is the same.
Objection 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities,
and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the
same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
Objection 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in
potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter
considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually
interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener.
i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each
other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have
differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are
of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements
have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption
prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the
fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not
to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom
he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you
are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My
will is more powerful than the link that binds you together. " But this
theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural
movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a
natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that
they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which
is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the
movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards,
another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without
contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their
nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it
follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies
are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural
corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all
bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity
were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish
bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be
true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and
so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be
merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms---that
is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial,
since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the
ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was
some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form
exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath
generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of
corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it
is in itself, is in potentiality to form.
Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all
those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is
in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to
all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more
perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves.
For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection
and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality
to a perfect form, and "vice versa. " Matter, therefore, whilst existing
under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to
the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the
latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form
in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this
condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that
bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should
possess the same matter.
Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii. ] imagines,
that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven---beings in
potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its
form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it
is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be
act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside,
then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with
motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form---that
is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form---it
follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing
is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not,
being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly
bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone
which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to
inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form
perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no
potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle
[*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly
bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so
far as they agree in the character of potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato,
who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter
is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of
corporeal creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense,
corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on
account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph.
x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of
all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of
corporeity.
Reply to Objection 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same in
all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are
distinguished, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: As potentiality is directed towards act,
potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight
is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of
the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because
the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental
form.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at
the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything
at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable,
and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement
would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not
the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously
with formless matter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower
bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order. " If, therefore,
the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily
exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to
be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for
one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the
empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
Objection 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the
place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the
contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally
apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world"; from which
it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this
world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.
Objection 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly
transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven.
There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the
aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher
heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the
air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night.
Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless
matter.
On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the visible
firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.
I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of
Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect,
namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede
say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [*Hom.
ii. in Hexaem. ] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the lowest
darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond
this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest. " But they
differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and
Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament,
which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made,
not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given
by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His
first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of
the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not
very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made
on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by
other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained
according to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. i; vii. ], by supposing that
formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but
by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature,
but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the
things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect
state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason
can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come
a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in
the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be
made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the
world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised
to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning,
there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something
corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and
change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after
the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called
the empyrean, i. e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness.
It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says
that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that
the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean.
But
Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be
fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to
denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it,
swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said
to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean
heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the
present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures
is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is
finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must
have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.
Reply to Objection 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that
the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end,
does not influence inferior bodies of another order---those, namely,
that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more
probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself
motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra,
[574]Q[112], A[3]], influence those of lower degree who act as
messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches
(Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of
the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved,
produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of
movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of
conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to
dignity.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not
as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may
correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem. )
says: "The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his
habitual dwelling in light and joy. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem. ): "It is
certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body,
and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it
encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the
light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. "But
since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that
it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see
the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the
empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does,
but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory
which differs from mere natural brightness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously
with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find
two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary
corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. "Therefore time was not
created with formless matter.
Objection 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the
beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God
divided the light from the darkness. "Therefore in the beginning time
was not.
Objection 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement;
and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day.
Therefore in the beginning time was not.
Objection 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be
reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.
Objection 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created
things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned
among the things first created.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual
and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time. "
I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were
these four---the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless
corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is
not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only
two things as first created---the angelic nature and corporeal
matter---making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two,
namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation,
by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede
formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore,
cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that
of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter
preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence
of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no
such measure.
Reply to Objection 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion
that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was
in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was
in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into
day and night.
Reply to Objection 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin
immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the
measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of
whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the
firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if
the first movement was another than this, time would have been its
measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it
must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement
of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in
the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived,
since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession
in movement. "
Reply to Objection 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned
those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore,
among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common
measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable
subject.
Reply to Objection 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean
heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has
reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality.
But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as
actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now. "
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the
work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly
the work of the third day.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of
spiritual things?
(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?
(3) Whether light is a quality?
(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the word "light" is used in its proper sense in speaking of
spiritual things?
Objection 1: It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense in
spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that "in
spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not
called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is
to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically. "
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the
intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper
sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense
in spiritual matters.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made
manifest is light. " But to be made manifest belongs more properly to
spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that "Splendor" is among
those things which are said of God metaphorically.
I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways---that is to say,
either in its original application or in its more extended meaning.
This is clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the
act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most
trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge
obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, "Seeing how it tastes,"
or "smells," or "burns. "Further, sight is applied to knowledge
obtained through the intellect, as in those words: "Blessed are the
clean of heart, for they shall see God" (Mat. 5:8). And thus it is with
the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes
manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that
which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is
taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood
metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De
Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to
manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual
things.
The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has
been said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether light is a body?
Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among
bodies. "Therefore light is a body.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is
a species of fire. " But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.
Objection 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection,
belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and
its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they
are bodies. Therefore light is a body.
On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same place
simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore
light is not a body.
I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons.
First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different
from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any
two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same
place; since contiguity requires distinction of place.
The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its
diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement
of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place
to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the
end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be
argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though
this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances
so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as
the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end
to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that
whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movement, that of
light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle
as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is
not the local movement of a body.
The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a
body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence
of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter
would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a
body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from
what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the
intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of
so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And
should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves
around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is
obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is
not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done,
since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before.
Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but
to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in
act---in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.
Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in
its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in
earthly matter is "burning coal. " Nor must too much attention be paid
to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he
merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various
writers.
Reply to Objection 3: All these properties are assigned to light
metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For
because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of
movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to
local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For
even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place,
to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether light is a quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every
quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality
be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light
does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn.
Therefore light is not a quality.
Objection 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold
is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case
with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light
therefore is not a sensible quality.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the
light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly
bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them
actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a
substantial or spiritual form.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a
species of quality.
I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not
a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an
intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot
be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the
air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not
do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly, because
light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are
warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions.
Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form, but this
also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms
are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the
intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26:
whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is
impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the
accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very
nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and
everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial
form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is
withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.
We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the
substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on
the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself
luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays
of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse
natures of bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial
form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the
mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when
matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the
form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted
into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so
as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than fully
impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not
permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in
time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the
transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a
substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial
form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its
active cause.
Reply to Objection 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary,
forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of
change, which is itself removed from contrariety.
Reply to Objection 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire,
as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does
light act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards
producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually
visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?
Objection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not
fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above
[575](A[3]), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such
should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of
light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.
Objection 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day,
and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made
on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have
been on the first day.
Objection 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular
movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute
of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second
day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought
not to be assigned to the first day.
Objection 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken
of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the
darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the
demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown ([576]Q[63],
A[5]). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to
the first day.
On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have
been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light.
Therefore light must have been made on the first day.
I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light.
Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not have
fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and
therefore when we read, "In the beginning God created heaven and
earth," a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the
word "heaven," and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the
word "earth. " And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of higher
dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual
nature is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of
spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the
enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.
Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was
purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i in
Hexaem. ] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of
time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or
angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.
Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes. ] gives as a reason for the omission that
Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone
appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of
idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had
spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all
corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship,
since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars,
which was forbidden them (Dt. 4).
But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the
corporeal creature. One is where we read that "the earth was void and
empty," and another where it is said that "darkness was upon the face
of the deep. " Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the
formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the
production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of
the first body, as was stated [577](A[3]), and thus by means of light
it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The second
reason is because light is a common quality.
