it is the negation of all fixed forms, of the permanence of nature; it stresses the fugitive character of everything, which evokes, by its absence the face of the lord, the only
permanent
thing that keeps all together.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
for them it was and is the real and legitimate outcome and fulfilling of the Jewish religion.
17 nevertheless, of course, Christianity is in a different way 'universalized Judaism' as islam is.
Christianity universalized Judaism by abolishing the mosaic law. in a polemic with Judaism, it used the 'Jewish' argument, that the father of Judaism himself, Abraham, living before moses, did not know that law. islam did the other way around. it universalized Judaism by denationaliz- ing and so universalizing the law. the problem here is hegel's interpreta- tion of Judaism. hegel does not like Judaism enough to be able to say that Christianity is 'universalized Judaism'. in some texts, in his Aesthetics for example, hegel even seems to like islam more than Judaism.
not only because of his Christian teleology, but also because of a lack of sources, hegel did not go in debate with the self-conception of islam in relation to Judaism and Christianity. islam considers itself to be the synthesis of Judaism and Christianity. it succeeded to overcome the one- sidedness of both religions. Judaism is a legal religion within the world, while Christianity is a spiritual, mystical religion that leaves the world, as becomes clear in the phenomenon of monasticism. therefore, muslims welcome the reformation, because protestantism abolished monasticism and brought Christianity again in the world. but because the result of this reformation was secularism,18 it becomes clear that Christianity cannot find the right equilibrium between spirituality and law. therefore, islam is the right synthesis of both Judaist innerworldliness and Christian outer- worldliness. especially with regard to the relation between protestantism and secularism and the absence of monasticism, hegel could have had a nice discussion with muslims. because of this discussion, hegel should
17 lustiger, Jean-marie, Le choix de Dieu, Entretiens avec Jean-Louis Missika et Dominique Wolton, paris: edition de fallois 1987 p. 49, 357. see also lustiger, Jean-marie, 'Christliches europa--was bedeutet das? ' in: gu? nther gillessen (ed. ) Zur Problematik von Nation und Konfession, regensburg: pustet 1993, pp. 138-153, p. 142.
18 that was muhammad iqbal's criticism of the reformation, see Annemarie schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, leiden: e. J. brill 1963, p. 268.
? 220 gerrit steunebrink
have written a specific chapter on islam in his philosophy of religion. for this discussion is about which religion is the last and accomplished one. moreover, islam has the advantage of being the last world religion.
hegel's description of the function of the dogma of trinity, as an inte- gration of the plurality of innerworldy presence of god within god self, has still some plausibility for Christians as is shown in the work of the well-known catholic theologian Karl rahner. in his article 'unity and trin- ity of god' that he contributed to a volume with the title The God of Chris- tianity and Islam, rahner says: "the monotheistic religions, and they are not identical with monotheistic metaphysics say: the last most original unity that sustains everything and that is infinite and almighty, does not abode in a solitude, far away and unreachable by men, but can, without splitting up its unicity, as a unity penetrate in the pluralism of the world and it can be given, concretize itself. "19 the hegelian overtones in this formulation are unmistakable.
hegel's attempt to establish a relation between different understand- ings of god as trinitarian or as monistic monotheism at the one side and differences in the self-understanding of man at the other side is perfectly legitimate, but it is difficult to draw conclusions about actual human behaviour with regard to fanaticism. one should not forget that the nega- tive estimation of religious feelings, as expressed in the discussion about enthusiasm, fanaticism and so on, originated in times of the european religious wars. moreover, they were Christian wars.
most important, the description of islam as a religion of the sublime, is not just inadequate. however, we have to postpone this evaluation to that in the chapter about islamic philosophy. there we can explain that hegel, amongst all kind of misinterpretations, hit a mark. this becomes already a little bit clear in the chapters about islam in his philosophy of history. moreover, we have to interpret that chapter first of all. in this chapter, we find an answer to the question why islam entered on the scene after the final and absolute religion of Christianity.
6. islam in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History
in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History hegel speaks about islam not
only in a special chapter about muhammadism, but in a chapter about
19 Karl rahner, 'einzigkeit und dreifaltigkeit gottes' in: Andreas bsteh (ed. ) Der Gott des Christentums und des Islams, mo? dling: Verlag sankt gabriel 1978, pp. 119-137, p. 122 (translation g. s. ).
? a religion after christianity? 221
the Crusades too. both chapters belong to part iV, the part about the 'Christian germanic world', that is the world of western Christianity as it emerges after the fall of the western roman empire. the chapter about muhammadism is, of course, at the beginning of that part, for islam origi- nated in the seventh century. the chapter next to it is about the empire of Charlemagne. the chapter on the Crusades belongs to the section of the middle Ages and the chapter next to it deals with the transition of feudalism to monarchism, within which the development of the nationali- ties is discussed.
in the chapter about islam, hegel first describes the situation of the young, Christianized germanic peoples after the great wandering of peo- ples, following the collapse of the western roman empire. they tried to realize their freedom, but instead of thinking along general rules, laws and principles, they got lost, according to hegel, because of their underdevel- oped nature, in a lot of particularities, dependencies and accidentalities. therefore, the opposite tendency towards generality and integration in a totality had to appear and this happened in the 'revolution of the east'. 20 in fact, this revolution is islam as a religion of the sublime that liberated itself from the particularity of Judaism, stressed unity at the cost of plural- ity and particularity.
it made the adoration of the one to the goal of all subjectivity and it even made subjectivity in its turn merge into the one. At the surface, it seems that hegel refers with this remark to mystical trends in islam, for which it would not be untrue. however, a striking comparison with indian religion shows hegel's true intention. Characteristical for indian religion is according to hegel the monastic immersion in the absolute. however, the islamic way to immerse into the absolute is opposite to this. it is innerworldly activistic. 21 subjectivity in islam is alive, an activity, it enters into the world to negate it and by doing so it mediates the adoration of the one. moreover, indeed, although islam knows mysticism, it does not know monastic life. the essence of this activity is conversion, to bring the whole world to the adoration of the one and only.
then hegel gives a short, and partly because of its shortness, not incor- rect description of some islamic principles, the description he did not give in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. he stresses, like Kant, the
20 g. w. f. hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, transl. J. sibree, london: henry g. bohn 1857, pp. 369-370.
21 hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 369.
? 222 gerrit steunebrink
prohibition on images and says correctly that mohammed is a prophet, and, unlike Jesus, still a human being, not elevated above human weaknesses. hegel gives as 'the' characteristic quality of islam: "that in actual exis- tence nothing can become fixed, but that everything is to expand itself
in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the one remains the only bond by which the whole is capable of uniting. "22 thus is the world of the sublime. nothing is fixed. only the one is important and therefore in the expansion of islam all barriers, all limits, cast distinctions and so on disappear. only man as a believer is important. hegel certainly judges islam in the right way. hegel thinks, like herder who always made a relation between a religion and its nat- ural environment, that this conception of the limitless, unstableness of all things is influenced by the natural 'habitat' of islam, the desert: "here spirit exists in its simplest form, and the sense of the formless has its special abode; for in the desert nothing can be brought into a firm consis- tent shape. "23 for Kant, 'formless' nature, like a wild ocean, is the vehicle for the experience of the sublime and hegel, following herder therefore takes the 'formlessness' of the desert as the source of the islamite experi- ence of the sublime. 24 hegel mentions mohammed's flight from mecca to medina and stresses especially the vast conquests that started already during his lifetime, but were realized under his successors. hegel takes over the accepted prejudice of the western world that the muslims spread their faith by violence, killing everybody that did not want to convert. only later they became more lenient to the conquered. instead of becom- ing muslim, they had to pay a poll tax.
in this context, hegel talks about enthusiasm and fanaticism as essen- tially related to the 'abstract' worship of the one. 'it is the essence of fanaticism to bear only a desolating destructive relation to the concrete, but that of mohametanism was, at the same time, capable of the greatest elevation- an elevation free from all petty interest, and united with all the virtues that appertain to magnanimity and valour. '25 while hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of religion compares the islamic religion of the abstract one with the natural religion of the enlightenment, he now compares islamic fanaticism to the terror of the french revolution.
22 idem, p. 371.
23 idem.
24 J. g. herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, frankfurt am main:
deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1989, p. 300.
25 hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 372.
? a religion after christianity? 223
immediately after the just quoted mixed estimation of islamic fanaticism he adds: 'La religion et la terreur was the principle in this case, as with robespierre, la liberte? et la terreur. '26 Again, like in the lectures on the philosophy of religion hegel tries to make a psychological typology with the help of the concept of fanaticism. it has the psychological affect that, while europeans are involved in a multitude of relations, being a bundle of them, in islam the individual is one passion and that alone. reckless- ness in it positive and negative aspects. it produces, as specifically islam poetry shows, a warmth and fervour, a glow that is the perfect freedom of fancy of every fetter--an absorption in the life of its object and the sentiment it inspires, so that selfishness and egotism are utterly banished. lawrence of Arabia ante dato! in addition, hegel concludes about islam: "never has enthusiasm, as such, performed greater deeds. "27 this is spe- cifically said of muslim enthusiasm, because it is abstract and therefore all-comprehensive, restrained by nothing, without limits and indifferent to all sides.
however, what is or was the place of islam in history? hegel describes the rapid speed of the high development of the arts and the sciences in the Arab empire and the good quality of their government. their decline is caused by the fact that the islamic universality of the sublime does not produce determined forms. "but the great empire of the Caliphs did not last long: for on the basis presented by universality nothing is firm. it fell at the same time as the empire of the franks. After them the ottomans came. At the end was this: fanaticism having cooled down, no moral prin- ciple remained in men's souls. "28
because a new moral principle is not regained, the turn is to the euro- peans, according to hegel. they profited from the islamic developments. hegel describes how european valour idealized itself to a noble chivalry in the struggle with the saracens. how science, especially philosophy came from the Arabs to europe. how the beautiful islamic poetry inspired ger- man literature, especially in goethe's 'west-o? stlicher divan'. however, is that all? what is the philosophical significance of the fact that the values of chivalry, science, philosophy and art came from the islamic world to europe. to discover this significance a glance on a remark about islam in the chapter about the Crusades is revealing.
26 idem, p. 372. 27 idem, p. 373. 28 idem, p. 374.
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there hegel says that the Crusades had the same effect as the struggle of the Karolingians with the saracens. the acquaintance with islamic enthusiasm promoted the virtues of chivalry and this spirit was diffused over the whole of europe by the Crusades. it civilized europe: "the ferocity and savage valour that characterized the predatory life of the barbarians (the europeans! ! g. s. ) (. . . ), was elevated by religion and then kindled to a noble enthusiasm through contemplating the boundless magnanimity of oriental prowess. for Christianity also contains that element of boundless abstraction and freedom; the oriental chivalric spirit found therefore in occidental hearts a response, which paved the way for their attaining a nobler virtue than they had previously known. "29
therefore, hegel is putting here again, like in the Lectures on the Phi- losophy of Religion, islam and Christianity on the same level. they are both characterized by universality and in that sense by freedom from particularity, called abstraction by hegel. And islam inspires Christians to the realization of their specific, concrete universality. the result was the emergence of new ecclesiastical orders or knighthood. hegel aims at the phenomenon of templar orders that were engaged in works of char- ity. hegel mentions this orders of nobler virtue together with the trans- fer of Arab sciences to europe and calls them, in the next chapter about the disappearance of feudalism in europe: "moral phenomena tending in the direction of a general principle. "30 therefore, the encounter with islam stimulated the direction to generality. in practical-ethical life this tendency to general principles manifest itself in the transition of feudal- istic particularity in monarchical sovereignty, based on a political body, in which all individual interest are governed by law, while in feudalism it still was possible for 'vassals' to maintain their personal interest against the prince. hegel refers clearly to the development of theories of sover- eignty of hobbes and the development of the state of estates. therefore, generality first had to transcend all particularities in which the Christian german peoples were immersed, as hegel said in the beginning of his chapter about islam.
however, this general principle cannot deny particularity. the denial of particularity was the weak spot of the universalism of the islamic empires that could not find a definite political mode of existence. Christianity unites generality with particularity, as the dogma of the trinity shows.
29 idem, p. 412. 30 idem, p. 415.
? a religion after christianity? 225
therefore, hegel relates the general principal of the law to the particu- larity of nations, in which this political constitution is born. so now, the philosophical significance of abstract universalism of islam is to bring the western, Christian german world to the development of the necessary moment of generality in law that at the same time is only concrete in the particularity of the nationalities. in this way, the abstract universality of the islamic world is at service of the development of the concrete universality of Christianity in the form of the modern particular european states.
nevertheless, what is left for the islamic world? does it not exist any- more? : "but the east itself, when by degrees enthusiasm has vanished, sank into the grossest vice, the most hideous passions became dominant, and as sensual enjoyment was sanctioned in the first form which maho- metan doctrine assumed, and was exhibited as a reward of the faithful in paradise, it took the place of fanaticism. "31 According to hegel, religiously legitimized voluptuousness at the end replaces enthusiasm or fanaticism. by that, islam lost its vigour. "At present, driven back into its Asiatic and African quarters, and tolerated only in one corner of europe through the jealousy of Christian powers, islam has long vanished from the stage of history at large, and has retreated into oriental ease and repose. "32
7. evaluation: teleology and a positive Appreciation of islam
of course, hegel's teleological reading of the function of islam in the development of europe is impossible. it actually does not give a solution for the problems that islam causes to the view that Christianity is the absolute, fulfilling religion.
besides this, the positive tone in hegel's description of islam is strik- ing. he admires islamic 'enthusiasm' and 'fanaticism' and praises muslims for their magnanimity. he even dares to say that islam civilized europe! his admiration for islam is caused by influence of romantic thinkers like herder, by the translation work done by the romantics in germany and by goethe's appropriation of islamic poetry in his west-eastern diwan hegel refers to. 33 we will come back on it when we talk about hegel's interpretation of islamic art.
31 idem, p. 374.
32 idem.
33 Johann wolfgang goethe, West-o? stlicher Divan, frankfurt am main: insel Verlag
1974.
? 226 gerrit steunebrink
hegel's formulation that in islam no finite reality can be fixed, but that everything is destined to expand itself in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the one remains the only bond by which the whole is can be united, is not a bad interpretation of the islamic worldview. it is confirmed by the famous orientalist louis massignon in his analysis of the 'arabesque', the well-known meandering ornamental pattern in islamic art. he interprets this meandering as an expression of the islamic worldview.
it is the negation of all fixed forms, of the permanence of nature; it stresses the fugitive character of everything, which evokes, by its absence the face of the lord, the only permanent thing that keeps all together. 34
rightly, hegel stressed the activist character of islam against the monas- tic tradition of hindus. indeed, although there are mystical fraternities and some mystics were unmarried, the phenomenon of monasticism with the pledge of chastity is unknown even unwanted in official islam. in this sense, islam far more resembles Judaism.
there are some common prejudices in his work too. so the idea that islam converted people by violence. it is a too long story to explain it totally, but first of all, we have to say that the muslims were welcomed as liberators by many Christians that suffered from the violence of their Christian emperor. the spread of islamic rule of law did not imply the conversion by violence of Christians and Jews. they had the right to live according to their own laws, if they recognized islamic rule of law as the general rule of law.
hegel's idea of islamic paradise as a kind of reward for oversexed believers does not understand that the symbolism of women in paradise ('houris') means the restoration of the right sexual relations and behaviour as they were established in paradise. 35 this position is to a certain extent familiar with saint thomas Aquinas' opinion, that in paradise, because of man's purity, sexual pleasures could be more intense than after the fall, in life as we know it. 36
what about his verdict of islam in his time? to a certain extent, it was true. the ottoman empire had lost its vigour and power. therefore, it was called the 'sick man of europe'. nevertheless, what hegel did not know, was that already in his time the first moves toward a reformation in the
34 louis massignon, En Islam Jardins et mosque? es, paris: 1981, pp. 17-18.
35 louis massignon, 'mystique et continence en islam', in: louis massignon, Parole don- ne? e, paris: E? ditions du seuil 1983, pp. 273-280, 275.
36 thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ia 98, 2 ad 3.
? a religion after christianity? 227
empire were started. end eighteenth century, beginning nineteenth cen- tury, the empire started to implement the western educational system. After hegel's death in 1832, with the famous reform decree of 1839, it began to implement even a western law system. the philosopher Auguste Comte congratulated the sultan for his endeavour.
like hegel, the famous muslim reformist Al-Afghani (1838-1897) thought that it was necessary first to realize a religious reformation in order to make a social revolution possible. he is said to have been inspired by the reformation in europe. it is very seductive to look for hegel's influence here, for hegel thought that the protestant reformation of the Christian world was a precondition of the french revolution. but it was the prot- estant french historian and politician guizot (1787-1874) that influenced Al Afghani in this respect. 37
however, hegel certainly influenced the famous indian-pakistani reform thinker, poet and nobel prize winner sir muhammad iqbal (1877-1938). he too was engaged in discussions about the example of luther and the reformation, but scorned reformation for its secularist results. in england, he got his philosophical education first of all in english neo-hegelianism, by mactaggart, and went to germany. 38 in germany, he learned to love the same poet that hegel loved, goethe, because of his adequate, dynamic understanding of islam. iqbal was positively interested in the interaction, in romantic times, between islamic and german literature. he praised hegel for his interpretation of the famous mystic rumi. he quotes hegel and compares his 'spiritual' worldview with islamic worldviews and used hegel's idea of god as an absolute ego to stress the personal character of god and the activist ego character of human beings. 39 essentially he is known for his activist interpretation of islam and his criticism of 'the ease and repose' of the islamic world and therefore of fatalism and pantheism. we met the word 'fatalism' in hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and we will meet the word 'pantheism' in the next chapters. however, it is already clear here that those words were fashionable for a long time. moreover, they are criticized by iqbal, not because they were just untrue,
37 nikki r. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism. Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani', by nikkie r. Keddie, berkely, los Angels, london: university of California press 1983, pp. 42, 82, 171.
38 Annemarie schimmel, Gabriel's Wing. A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muham- mad Iqbal, leiden: e. J. brill 1963, p. 37.
39 sir muhammad iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, lahore: Kashmiri bazar 1962, p. 71.
? 228 gerrit steunebrink
but because they represented too a kind of self (mis)understanding of islam that should be criticized. like all reform thinkers of the nineteenth century, muslims and non-muslims alike, iqbal defends activism. in addi- tion, this defence resembles very much hegel's stress on islamic activism and dynamic presence in the world. in how far he was influenced directly of indirectly by hegel's description of islam in the Philosophy of History as activism, so perfectly fitting in iqbals worldview is difficult to trace. A source tells us that he wrote an examination paper in germany on the topic of world history. 40 later iqbal left hegel and looked for support for his activism to vitalism and nietzsche.
8. islam in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy
hegel told us that the development of the sciences and of philosophy in the islamic world was finally meant to stimulate their development in the Christian-germanic world. however, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, hegel does not analyze that movement. therefore, we do not find an extensive presentation of the influential philosophies of, for exam- ple, Avicenna and Averroes. why? first of all we have to say, that hegel does not possess knowledge about islamic philosophy out of the original sources. he is relying heavily on tennemann and buhle. nevertheless, this explanation does not satisfy. for tenneman (1761-1819) gives a far more extensive description of islamic philosophy as hegel does. At the end he mentions an interesting description by Averroes and by the Jewish philosopher maimonides of the theological school of the 'speakers', the 'mutakallimun' (Arabic) or the medabberim (hebraic) or the 'loquentes' (latin). that islamic school had its origin in early Christian theological discussions with philosophy and defends the unsustainability of nature and the non-fixed, fugitive character of things and their laws with respect to gods omnipotence. 41
hegel does the other way around. he mentions that school immedi- ately in the introduction, after some positive remarks about the rapid development of Arabic sciences. After concluding with praising Arabic philosophy for free, brilliant and deep imagination, without specifying to
40 schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, p. 37.
41 wilhelm gotlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, leipzig: barth 1789-1819, bd. 8, p. 441.
? a religion after christianity? 229
what he refers to, he continues in part A with an elaborate exposition of the medabberim.
in b of the section about Arabic philosophy he describes what is tra- ditionally called islamic philosophy under the title 'commentators of Aristotle'. 42 but here, contrary to tennemann, he gives only short list of the well know names from Al Kindi and Al farabi to Avicenna and Averroes, including the famous critic of islamic philosophy and theology al ghazali, whom he calls a witty sceptic. he mentions their dates and works, tells an anecdote and that is it. he concludes with saying that their function was to make the west acquainted with Aristotle. that is all, for that was all they had to do! the section ends with a paragraph (C) about the Jewish philosophers of the middle Ages. indeed Jewish philosophy of the middle Ages functioned in the context of the revival of philosophy in the Arabic world. Just like the Christians of the middle east, they knew Arabic and wrote in Arabic language. As a thinker, hegel only mentions maimonides.
hegel's general judgment about Arabic philosophy is that it did not contribute something specifically to the development of the principle of philosophy. therefore, he tells nothing about the real contribution they made to the development of western medieval philosophy. to a certain extent hegel is excused, for this contribution was not the focus of the sources like tenneman he used. you can find far more islamic philosophy in tennemann than hegel gives. nevertheless, tennemann judges that it is Aristotelism corrupted by neo-platonism and that there is nothing original in Arabic philosophy. hegel just adopts this judgment. At last, mediaeval philosophy as such, whether islamic or Christian, has no spe- cific relevance for the development of philosophy according to hegel. for him it is philosophy in service of theology and it had as its only principle the principle of revelation.
probably because he wants to find something special and different in the islamic worldview, he pays ample attention to the passage from maimonides about the muslim theologians, the mutakallimun or medab- berim, that defend the omnipotence of god against all (semi)autonomy of finite things. but by going back to maimonides' story about them, hegel present this school that criticized philosophy and even, by the mouth of al-ghazali, dealt a blow to islamic philosophy, as the characteristic islamic
42 g. w. f. hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, i, ii, iii, frankfurt: suhrkamp 1971, ii, pp. 515, 517, 522.
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philosophy. that of course, is impossible. still, amazingly perhaps, hegel has a point by paying attention to that school. we come back on this issue in the evaluation at the end of this section.
like tennemann, hegel's quotes extensively maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, in which he mentions a discussion in early islamic theology, caused by the influence of greek philosophy, about the unity of god. maimonides refers to the position of the rationalists, the school of the mutazila (the mutazila? in hegel's quotation), this school denied the pos- sibility of all plurality, that means of a plurality of attributes of god, at the same time it severely criticizes all anthropomorphism and tried to interpret the anthropomorphisms of the Koran allegorically. he mentions their opponents the Asharites (in hegel's text 'Assaria'). they defended a literal interpretation of the Koran. All their problems were already pres- ent in Christian times, among the greeks and the syrians, who tried to defend their Christian truth against the philosophers. when islam arose, they took over that style of thinking from the greek and syriac-Aramaic thinkers. what hegel fascinates in the philosophy of the medabberim, is exactly the denial of the substantial character of the finite world. here he finds the theological-philosophical position of islam that justified him to interpret the islam as a religion of the sublime, that is a religion in which the Absolute as 'the one' is absolutely dominating , either giving a shadow of autonomy to the finite world, nor to mans' reason and actions.
it belonged to the repertoire of early islamic theologians, so hegel quotes maimonides again, to deny the possibility of certain knowledge of things, because one could always think the opposite. they interpreted the world as a collection of atoms without any relation, so that all conjunc- tions are something accidental. it does not belong to the nature of things to have this or that accidentent. the accidents itself are just coming up and passing away, all dependent of the creative force of god. it is just a matter of habit that fire moves upward, that the earth is moving around a centre. god could have arranged it otherwise. hegel is naming the clas- sical topics of that theological discussion. 43 because in this position only god himself is a 'substantial being' hegel's association with pantheism is understandable: "this pantheism, if you want spinozism, is the position, the general point of view of oriental poets, historians and philosophers. "44
43 for an up to date exposition of these discussions see: william montgomery watt and michel marmura, Der Islam I, II, III, stuttgart-berlin: Kohlhammer 1985, bd. ii in: 'die religionen der menschheit' bd. 25, pp. 368 ff.
44 hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, ii, p. 519.
? a religion after christianity? 231
hegel characterizes the islamic worldview in general with this word. for him, this 'spinozistic' worldview represents the idea of the sublime. god as the only, the persistent one is, in its abstract negativity, the basic con- cept of the oriental world of representations.
for the qualification of the islamic world as pantheism hegel relies on f. A. g. tholuck who published in 1821 one of the first books on islamic mysticism in europe called Sufism or the Pantheistic Theosophy of the Per- sians (sufismus sive theosophia persarum pantheistica). 45 Another book he wrote, quoted by hegel, was Anthology of Oriental Mysticism (blu? ten- sammlung aus der morgenla? ndischen mystik). we put aside now the topic of pantheism. it is an essential issue in the next and last part of this essay. first, we have to ask: is hegel's lecture of the history of Arabic philosophy adequate? in addition, if the answer is 'no', as the reader may presume, how is it the possible that hegel still hits an essential mark in his concep- tion of the islamic worldview?
9. evaluation: philosophy and religion of the sublime
what is true and what is false in this representation of islamic philosophy? As we already said, hegel underestimates the classical islamic philoso- phy of the middle Ages, by saying that they were only commentators of Aristotle. Avicenna, for example, contributed to western thinking by the unaristotelian distinctions between essence and existence and his ideas of contingency. of course, hegel's presentation of a theological school as 'the islamic philosophy' is wrong.
but at the other hand, this theological position became influential through the work of al-ghazali, a very important thinker in the world of islam, sometimes called a 'church father' or 'the thomas Aquinas of islam'. 46 hegel just mentions the name of al-ghazali among the commentators of Aristotle, as if he was just another philosopher. this was normal for a long time. As the first part of his The incoherence of the Philosophers (some- times translated as the Refutation of the Philosophers or The destruction of the Philosophers), al-ghazali wrote a book on 'The goals of philosophy', in
45 for tholuck and the reception of islamic mysticism in the west, especially of rumi, see franklin d. lewis, Rumi, Past and Present, East and West, oxford: one world 2000, pp. 506 ff.
46 see for criticism of this epitheta too: montgomery watt and marmura, Der Islam, ii, pp. 408 ff.
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which he summarized the philosophical positions he wanted to attack. it was translated in latin separately in the twelfth century, without the prologue in which al-ghazali exposed his goals, and for a long time this was the only book that was known. therefore he was regarded, for exam- ple by thomas of Aquinas, as a philosopher and an Aristotelian. 47 in the fourteenth century, the second part seemed to be translated and edited together with Averroes' critical commentary called The Incoherence of the Incoherence (sometimes translated as the Refutation of the Refutation or The Destruction of the Destruction). nevertheless, for a long time al ghaza- lis criticism of the philosophers was only known by the criticism of this criticism by Averroes. 48
tenneman too interprets him as a philosopher and as a sceptic very near to greek scepticism. however, he tells us too that al-ghazali was a sceptic not just because he wanted to be a sceptic, but because of theo- logical motives. he wanted to defend the possibility of miracles. never- theless, tennemans complains about the fact that he did not have at his disposal the original sources. he knows al-ghazali only from the refuta- tion of his thoughts by Averroes in his 'incoherence'. 49 but tenneman was right about the theological motives of al-ghazali. According to the modern point of view, al ghazali was not just another islamic Aristoteliz- ing philosopher, but a mystical theologian who criticized philosophy and theology using philosophy to combat philosophy with its own arms. 50 the inspiration for this criticism was the position described by maimonides as the position of the Asharites against the mutazila. so he mobilized the criticism of the mutakallimun against philosophy and especially against rational theology. his target was the philosophy of Avicenna. he is indeed famous for a criticism of causality that resembles very much that of david hume. therefore, he was called in old times, as hegel does a sceptic. how- ever, the aim and the source of his criticism of causality was not scep- ticism, but to prove the absolute omnipotence of god as first cause in
47 louis gardet, L'islam, religion et communaute? , paris: descle? e de brouwer 1967.
48 Charles burnett, 'Arabic into latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy into western europe', in: peter Adamson and richard taylor (eds. ) The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2005, pp. 370-405, p. 396. beatrice h. Zedler, 'introduction' in: Averroes' Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin version of Calo Calonymos, edited by beatrice Zedler, milwaukee: the marquette university press 1961, pp. 1-65.
49 tenneman, Geschichte der Philosophie, bd. 8, p. 404. 50 montgomery watt and marmura, der islam, ii, pp. 408 ff.
? a religion after christianity? 233
all causal relations in our finite world.
Christianity universalized Judaism by abolishing the mosaic law. in a polemic with Judaism, it used the 'Jewish' argument, that the father of Judaism himself, Abraham, living before moses, did not know that law. islam did the other way around. it universalized Judaism by denationaliz- ing and so universalizing the law. the problem here is hegel's interpreta- tion of Judaism. hegel does not like Judaism enough to be able to say that Christianity is 'universalized Judaism'. in some texts, in his Aesthetics for example, hegel even seems to like islam more than Judaism.
not only because of his Christian teleology, but also because of a lack of sources, hegel did not go in debate with the self-conception of islam in relation to Judaism and Christianity. islam considers itself to be the synthesis of Judaism and Christianity. it succeeded to overcome the one- sidedness of both religions. Judaism is a legal religion within the world, while Christianity is a spiritual, mystical religion that leaves the world, as becomes clear in the phenomenon of monasticism. therefore, muslims welcome the reformation, because protestantism abolished monasticism and brought Christianity again in the world. but because the result of this reformation was secularism,18 it becomes clear that Christianity cannot find the right equilibrium between spirituality and law. therefore, islam is the right synthesis of both Judaist innerworldliness and Christian outer- worldliness. especially with regard to the relation between protestantism and secularism and the absence of monasticism, hegel could have had a nice discussion with muslims. because of this discussion, hegel should
17 lustiger, Jean-marie, Le choix de Dieu, Entretiens avec Jean-Louis Missika et Dominique Wolton, paris: edition de fallois 1987 p. 49, 357. see also lustiger, Jean-marie, 'Christliches europa--was bedeutet das? ' in: gu? nther gillessen (ed. ) Zur Problematik von Nation und Konfession, regensburg: pustet 1993, pp. 138-153, p. 142.
18 that was muhammad iqbal's criticism of the reformation, see Annemarie schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, leiden: e. J. brill 1963, p. 268.
? 220 gerrit steunebrink
have written a specific chapter on islam in his philosophy of religion. for this discussion is about which religion is the last and accomplished one. moreover, islam has the advantage of being the last world religion.
hegel's description of the function of the dogma of trinity, as an inte- gration of the plurality of innerworldy presence of god within god self, has still some plausibility for Christians as is shown in the work of the well-known catholic theologian Karl rahner. in his article 'unity and trin- ity of god' that he contributed to a volume with the title The God of Chris- tianity and Islam, rahner says: "the monotheistic religions, and they are not identical with monotheistic metaphysics say: the last most original unity that sustains everything and that is infinite and almighty, does not abode in a solitude, far away and unreachable by men, but can, without splitting up its unicity, as a unity penetrate in the pluralism of the world and it can be given, concretize itself. "19 the hegelian overtones in this formulation are unmistakable.
hegel's attempt to establish a relation between different understand- ings of god as trinitarian or as monistic monotheism at the one side and differences in the self-understanding of man at the other side is perfectly legitimate, but it is difficult to draw conclusions about actual human behaviour with regard to fanaticism. one should not forget that the nega- tive estimation of religious feelings, as expressed in the discussion about enthusiasm, fanaticism and so on, originated in times of the european religious wars. moreover, they were Christian wars.
most important, the description of islam as a religion of the sublime, is not just inadequate. however, we have to postpone this evaluation to that in the chapter about islamic philosophy. there we can explain that hegel, amongst all kind of misinterpretations, hit a mark. this becomes already a little bit clear in the chapters about islam in his philosophy of history. moreover, we have to interpret that chapter first of all. in this chapter, we find an answer to the question why islam entered on the scene after the final and absolute religion of Christianity.
6. islam in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History
in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History hegel speaks about islam not
only in a special chapter about muhammadism, but in a chapter about
19 Karl rahner, 'einzigkeit und dreifaltigkeit gottes' in: Andreas bsteh (ed. ) Der Gott des Christentums und des Islams, mo? dling: Verlag sankt gabriel 1978, pp. 119-137, p. 122 (translation g. s. ).
? a religion after christianity? 221
the Crusades too. both chapters belong to part iV, the part about the 'Christian germanic world', that is the world of western Christianity as it emerges after the fall of the western roman empire. the chapter about muhammadism is, of course, at the beginning of that part, for islam origi- nated in the seventh century. the chapter next to it is about the empire of Charlemagne. the chapter on the Crusades belongs to the section of the middle Ages and the chapter next to it deals with the transition of feudalism to monarchism, within which the development of the nationali- ties is discussed.
in the chapter about islam, hegel first describes the situation of the young, Christianized germanic peoples after the great wandering of peo- ples, following the collapse of the western roman empire. they tried to realize their freedom, but instead of thinking along general rules, laws and principles, they got lost, according to hegel, because of their underdevel- oped nature, in a lot of particularities, dependencies and accidentalities. therefore, the opposite tendency towards generality and integration in a totality had to appear and this happened in the 'revolution of the east'. 20 in fact, this revolution is islam as a religion of the sublime that liberated itself from the particularity of Judaism, stressed unity at the cost of plural- ity and particularity.
it made the adoration of the one to the goal of all subjectivity and it even made subjectivity in its turn merge into the one. At the surface, it seems that hegel refers with this remark to mystical trends in islam, for which it would not be untrue. however, a striking comparison with indian religion shows hegel's true intention. Characteristical for indian religion is according to hegel the monastic immersion in the absolute. however, the islamic way to immerse into the absolute is opposite to this. it is innerworldly activistic. 21 subjectivity in islam is alive, an activity, it enters into the world to negate it and by doing so it mediates the adoration of the one. moreover, indeed, although islam knows mysticism, it does not know monastic life. the essence of this activity is conversion, to bring the whole world to the adoration of the one and only.
then hegel gives a short, and partly because of its shortness, not incor- rect description of some islamic principles, the description he did not give in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. he stresses, like Kant, the
20 g. w. f. hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, transl. J. sibree, london: henry g. bohn 1857, pp. 369-370.
21 hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 369.
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prohibition on images and says correctly that mohammed is a prophet, and, unlike Jesus, still a human being, not elevated above human weaknesses. hegel gives as 'the' characteristic quality of islam: "that in actual exis- tence nothing can become fixed, but that everything is to expand itself
in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the one remains the only bond by which the whole is capable of uniting. "22 thus is the world of the sublime. nothing is fixed. only the one is important and therefore in the expansion of islam all barriers, all limits, cast distinctions and so on disappear. only man as a believer is important. hegel certainly judges islam in the right way. hegel thinks, like herder who always made a relation between a religion and its nat- ural environment, that this conception of the limitless, unstableness of all things is influenced by the natural 'habitat' of islam, the desert: "here spirit exists in its simplest form, and the sense of the formless has its special abode; for in the desert nothing can be brought into a firm consis- tent shape. "23 for Kant, 'formless' nature, like a wild ocean, is the vehicle for the experience of the sublime and hegel, following herder therefore takes the 'formlessness' of the desert as the source of the islamite experi- ence of the sublime. 24 hegel mentions mohammed's flight from mecca to medina and stresses especially the vast conquests that started already during his lifetime, but were realized under his successors. hegel takes over the accepted prejudice of the western world that the muslims spread their faith by violence, killing everybody that did not want to convert. only later they became more lenient to the conquered. instead of becom- ing muslim, they had to pay a poll tax.
in this context, hegel talks about enthusiasm and fanaticism as essen- tially related to the 'abstract' worship of the one. 'it is the essence of fanaticism to bear only a desolating destructive relation to the concrete, but that of mohametanism was, at the same time, capable of the greatest elevation- an elevation free from all petty interest, and united with all the virtues that appertain to magnanimity and valour. '25 while hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of religion compares the islamic religion of the abstract one with the natural religion of the enlightenment, he now compares islamic fanaticism to the terror of the french revolution.
22 idem, p. 371.
23 idem.
24 J. g. herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, frankfurt am main:
deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1989, p. 300.
25 hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 372.
? a religion after christianity? 223
immediately after the just quoted mixed estimation of islamic fanaticism he adds: 'La religion et la terreur was the principle in this case, as with robespierre, la liberte? et la terreur. '26 Again, like in the lectures on the philosophy of religion hegel tries to make a psychological typology with the help of the concept of fanaticism. it has the psychological affect that, while europeans are involved in a multitude of relations, being a bundle of them, in islam the individual is one passion and that alone. reckless- ness in it positive and negative aspects. it produces, as specifically islam poetry shows, a warmth and fervour, a glow that is the perfect freedom of fancy of every fetter--an absorption in the life of its object and the sentiment it inspires, so that selfishness and egotism are utterly banished. lawrence of Arabia ante dato! in addition, hegel concludes about islam: "never has enthusiasm, as such, performed greater deeds. "27 this is spe- cifically said of muslim enthusiasm, because it is abstract and therefore all-comprehensive, restrained by nothing, without limits and indifferent to all sides.
however, what is or was the place of islam in history? hegel describes the rapid speed of the high development of the arts and the sciences in the Arab empire and the good quality of their government. their decline is caused by the fact that the islamic universality of the sublime does not produce determined forms. "but the great empire of the Caliphs did not last long: for on the basis presented by universality nothing is firm. it fell at the same time as the empire of the franks. After them the ottomans came. At the end was this: fanaticism having cooled down, no moral prin- ciple remained in men's souls. "28
because a new moral principle is not regained, the turn is to the euro- peans, according to hegel. they profited from the islamic developments. hegel describes how european valour idealized itself to a noble chivalry in the struggle with the saracens. how science, especially philosophy came from the Arabs to europe. how the beautiful islamic poetry inspired ger- man literature, especially in goethe's 'west-o? stlicher divan'. however, is that all? what is the philosophical significance of the fact that the values of chivalry, science, philosophy and art came from the islamic world to europe. to discover this significance a glance on a remark about islam in the chapter about the Crusades is revealing.
26 idem, p. 372. 27 idem, p. 373. 28 idem, p. 374.
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there hegel says that the Crusades had the same effect as the struggle of the Karolingians with the saracens. the acquaintance with islamic enthusiasm promoted the virtues of chivalry and this spirit was diffused over the whole of europe by the Crusades. it civilized europe: "the ferocity and savage valour that characterized the predatory life of the barbarians (the europeans! ! g. s. ) (. . . ), was elevated by religion and then kindled to a noble enthusiasm through contemplating the boundless magnanimity of oriental prowess. for Christianity also contains that element of boundless abstraction and freedom; the oriental chivalric spirit found therefore in occidental hearts a response, which paved the way for their attaining a nobler virtue than they had previously known. "29
therefore, hegel is putting here again, like in the Lectures on the Phi- losophy of Religion, islam and Christianity on the same level. they are both characterized by universality and in that sense by freedom from particularity, called abstraction by hegel. And islam inspires Christians to the realization of their specific, concrete universality. the result was the emergence of new ecclesiastical orders or knighthood. hegel aims at the phenomenon of templar orders that were engaged in works of char- ity. hegel mentions this orders of nobler virtue together with the trans- fer of Arab sciences to europe and calls them, in the next chapter about the disappearance of feudalism in europe: "moral phenomena tending in the direction of a general principle. "30 therefore, the encounter with islam stimulated the direction to generality. in practical-ethical life this tendency to general principles manifest itself in the transition of feudal- istic particularity in monarchical sovereignty, based on a political body, in which all individual interest are governed by law, while in feudalism it still was possible for 'vassals' to maintain their personal interest against the prince. hegel refers clearly to the development of theories of sover- eignty of hobbes and the development of the state of estates. therefore, generality first had to transcend all particularities in which the Christian german peoples were immersed, as hegel said in the beginning of his chapter about islam.
however, this general principle cannot deny particularity. the denial of particularity was the weak spot of the universalism of the islamic empires that could not find a definite political mode of existence. Christianity unites generality with particularity, as the dogma of the trinity shows.
29 idem, p. 412. 30 idem, p. 415.
? a religion after christianity? 225
therefore, hegel relates the general principal of the law to the particu- larity of nations, in which this political constitution is born. so now, the philosophical significance of abstract universalism of islam is to bring the western, Christian german world to the development of the necessary moment of generality in law that at the same time is only concrete in the particularity of the nationalities. in this way, the abstract universality of the islamic world is at service of the development of the concrete universality of Christianity in the form of the modern particular european states.
nevertheless, what is left for the islamic world? does it not exist any- more? : "but the east itself, when by degrees enthusiasm has vanished, sank into the grossest vice, the most hideous passions became dominant, and as sensual enjoyment was sanctioned in the first form which maho- metan doctrine assumed, and was exhibited as a reward of the faithful in paradise, it took the place of fanaticism. "31 According to hegel, religiously legitimized voluptuousness at the end replaces enthusiasm or fanaticism. by that, islam lost its vigour. "At present, driven back into its Asiatic and African quarters, and tolerated only in one corner of europe through the jealousy of Christian powers, islam has long vanished from the stage of history at large, and has retreated into oriental ease and repose. "32
7. evaluation: teleology and a positive Appreciation of islam
of course, hegel's teleological reading of the function of islam in the development of europe is impossible. it actually does not give a solution for the problems that islam causes to the view that Christianity is the absolute, fulfilling religion.
besides this, the positive tone in hegel's description of islam is strik- ing. he admires islamic 'enthusiasm' and 'fanaticism' and praises muslims for their magnanimity. he even dares to say that islam civilized europe! his admiration for islam is caused by influence of romantic thinkers like herder, by the translation work done by the romantics in germany and by goethe's appropriation of islamic poetry in his west-eastern diwan hegel refers to. 33 we will come back on it when we talk about hegel's interpretation of islamic art.
31 idem, p. 374.
32 idem.
33 Johann wolfgang goethe, West-o? stlicher Divan, frankfurt am main: insel Verlag
1974.
? 226 gerrit steunebrink
hegel's formulation that in islam no finite reality can be fixed, but that everything is destined to expand itself in activity and life in the boundless amplitude of the world, so that the worship of the one remains the only bond by which the whole is can be united, is not a bad interpretation of the islamic worldview. it is confirmed by the famous orientalist louis massignon in his analysis of the 'arabesque', the well-known meandering ornamental pattern in islamic art. he interprets this meandering as an expression of the islamic worldview.
it is the negation of all fixed forms, of the permanence of nature; it stresses the fugitive character of everything, which evokes, by its absence the face of the lord, the only permanent thing that keeps all together. 34
rightly, hegel stressed the activist character of islam against the monas- tic tradition of hindus. indeed, although there are mystical fraternities and some mystics were unmarried, the phenomenon of monasticism with the pledge of chastity is unknown even unwanted in official islam. in this sense, islam far more resembles Judaism.
there are some common prejudices in his work too. so the idea that islam converted people by violence. it is a too long story to explain it totally, but first of all, we have to say that the muslims were welcomed as liberators by many Christians that suffered from the violence of their Christian emperor. the spread of islamic rule of law did not imply the conversion by violence of Christians and Jews. they had the right to live according to their own laws, if they recognized islamic rule of law as the general rule of law.
hegel's idea of islamic paradise as a kind of reward for oversexed believers does not understand that the symbolism of women in paradise ('houris') means the restoration of the right sexual relations and behaviour as they were established in paradise. 35 this position is to a certain extent familiar with saint thomas Aquinas' opinion, that in paradise, because of man's purity, sexual pleasures could be more intense than after the fall, in life as we know it. 36
what about his verdict of islam in his time? to a certain extent, it was true. the ottoman empire had lost its vigour and power. therefore, it was called the 'sick man of europe'. nevertheless, what hegel did not know, was that already in his time the first moves toward a reformation in the
34 louis massignon, En Islam Jardins et mosque? es, paris: 1981, pp. 17-18.
35 louis massignon, 'mystique et continence en islam', in: louis massignon, Parole don- ne? e, paris: E? ditions du seuil 1983, pp. 273-280, 275.
36 thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ia 98, 2 ad 3.
? a religion after christianity? 227
empire were started. end eighteenth century, beginning nineteenth cen- tury, the empire started to implement the western educational system. After hegel's death in 1832, with the famous reform decree of 1839, it began to implement even a western law system. the philosopher Auguste Comte congratulated the sultan for his endeavour.
like hegel, the famous muslim reformist Al-Afghani (1838-1897) thought that it was necessary first to realize a religious reformation in order to make a social revolution possible. he is said to have been inspired by the reformation in europe. it is very seductive to look for hegel's influence here, for hegel thought that the protestant reformation of the Christian world was a precondition of the french revolution. but it was the prot- estant french historian and politician guizot (1787-1874) that influenced Al Afghani in this respect. 37
however, hegel certainly influenced the famous indian-pakistani reform thinker, poet and nobel prize winner sir muhammad iqbal (1877-1938). he too was engaged in discussions about the example of luther and the reformation, but scorned reformation for its secularist results. in england, he got his philosophical education first of all in english neo-hegelianism, by mactaggart, and went to germany. 38 in germany, he learned to love the same poet that hegel loved, goethe, because of his adequate, dynamic understanding of islam. iqbal was positively interested in the interaction, in romantic times, between islamic and german literature. he praised hegel for his interpretation of the famous mystic rumi. he quotes hegel and compares his 'spiritual' worldview with islamic worldviews and used hegel's idea of god as an absolute ego to stress the personal character of god and the activist ego character of human beings. 39 essentially he is known for his activist interpretation of islam and his criticism of 'the ease and repose' of the islamic world and therefore of fatalism and pantheism. we met the word 'fatalism' in hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and we will meet the word 'pantheism' in the next chapters. however, it is already clear here that those words were fashionable for a long time. moreover, they are criticized by iqbal, not because they were just untrue,
37 nikki r. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism. Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani', by nikkie r. Keddie, berkely, los Angels, london: university of California press 1983, pp. 42, 82, 171.
38 Annemarie schimmel, Gabriel's Wing. A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muham- mad Iqbal, leiden: e. J. brill 1963, p. 37.
39 sir muhammad iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, lahore: Kashmiri bazar 1962, p. 71.
? 228 gerrit steunebrink
but because they represented too a kind of self (mis)understanding of islam that should be criticized. like all reform thinkers of the nineteenth century, muslims and non-muslims alike, iqbal defends activism. in addi- tion, this defence resembles very much hegel's stress on islamic activism and dynamic presence in the world. in how far he was influenced directly of indirectly by hegel's description of islam in the Philosophy of History as activism, so perfectly fitting in iqbals worldview is difficult to trace. A source tells us that he wrote an examination paper in germany on the topic of world history. 40 later iqbal left hegel and looked for support for his activism to vitalism and nietzsche.
8. islam in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy
hegel told us that the development of the sciences and of philosophy in the islamic world was finally meant to stimulate their development in the Christian-germanic world. however, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, hegel does not analyze that movement. therefore, we do not find an extensive presentation of the influential philosophies of, for exam- ple, Avicenna and Averroes. why? first of all we have to say, that hegel does not possess knowledge about islamic philosophy out of the original sources. he is relying heavily on tennemann and buhle. nevertheless, this explanation does not satisfy. for tenneman (1761-1819) gives a far more extensive description of islamic philosophy as hegel does. At the end he mentions an interesting description by Averroes and by the Jewish philosopher maimonides of the theological school of the 'speakers', the 'mutakallimun' (Arabic) or the medabberim (hebraic) or the 'loquentes' (latin). that islamic school had its origin in early Christian theological discussions with philosophy and defends the unsustainability of nature and the non-fixed, fugitive character of things and their laws with respect to gods omnipotence. 41
hegel does the other way around. he mentions that school immedi- ately in the introduction, after some positive remarks about the rapid development of Arabic sciences. After concluding with praising Arabic philosophy for free, brilliant and deep imagination, without specifying to
40 schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, p. 37.
41 wilhelm gotlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, leipzig: barth 1789-1819, bd. 8, p. 441.
? a religion after christianity? 229
what he refers to, he continues in part A with an elaborate exposition of the medabberim.
in b of the section about Arabic philosophy he describes what is tra- ditionally called islamic philosophy under the title 'commentators of Aristotle'. 42 but here, contrary to tennemann, he gives only short list of the well know names from Al Kindi and Al farabi to Avicenna and Averroes, including the famous critic of islamic philosophy and theology al ghazali, whom he calls a witty sceptic. he mentions their dates and works, tells an anecdote and that is it. he concludes with saying that their function was to make the west acquainted with Aristotle. that is all, for that was all they had to do! the section ends with a paragraph (C) about the Jewish philosophers of the middle Ages. indeed Jewish philosophy of the middle Ages functioned in the context of the revival of philosophy in the Arabic world. Just like the Christians of the middle east, they knew Arabic and wrote in Arabic language. As a thinker, hegel only mentions maimonides.
hegel's general judgment about Arabic philosophy is that it did not contribute something specifically to the development of the principle of philosophy. therefore, he tells nothing about the real contribution they made to the development of western medieval philosophy. to a certain extent hegel is excused, for this contribution was not the focus of the sources like tenneman he used. you can find far more islamic philosophy in tennemann than hegel gives. nevertheless, tennemann judges that it is Aristotelism corrupted by neo-platonism and that there is nothing original in Arabic philosophy. hegel just adopts this judgment. At last, mediaeval philosophy as such, whether islamic or Christian, has no spe- cific relevance for the development of philosophy according to hegel. for him it is philosophy in service of theology and it had as its only principle the principle of revelation.
probably because he wants to find something special and different in the islamic worldview, he pays ample attention to the passage from maimonides about the muslim theologians, the mutakallimun or medab- berim, that defend the omnipotence of god against all (semi)autonomy of finite things. but by going back to maimonides' story about them, hegel present this school that criticized philosophy and even, by the mouth of al-ghazali, dealt a blow to islamic philosophy, as the characteristic islamic
42 g. w. f. hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, i, ii, iii, frankfurt: suhrkamp 1971, ii, pp. 515, 517, 522.
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philosophy. that of course, is impossible. still, amazingly perhaps, hegel has a point by paying attention to that school. we come back on this issue in the evaluation at the end of this section.
like tennemann, hegel's quotes extensively maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, in which he mentions a discussion in early islamic theology, caused by the influence of greek philosophy, about the unity of god. maimonides refers to the position of the rationalists, the school of the mutazila (the mutazila? in hegel's quotation), this school denied the pos- sibility of all plurality, that means of a plurality of attributes of god, at the same time it severely criticizes all anthropomorphism and tried to interpret the anthropomorphisms of the Koran allegorically. he mentions their opponents the Asharites (in hegel's text 'Assaria'). they defended a literal interpretation of the Koran. All their problems were already pres- ent in Christian times, among the greeks and the syrians, who tried to defend their Christian truth against the philosophers. when islam arose, they took over that style of thinking from the greek and syriac-Aramaic thinkers. what hegel fascinates in the philosophy of the medabberim, is exactly the denial of the substantial character of the finite world. here he finds the theological-philosophical position of islam that justified him to interpret the islam as a religion of the sublime, that is a religion in which the Absolute as 'the one' is absolutely dominating , either giving a shadow of autonomy to the finite world, nor to mans' reason and actions.
it belonged to the repertoire of early islamic theologians, so hegel quotes maimonides again, to deny the possibility of certain knowledge of things, because one could always think the opposite. they interpreted the world as a collection of atoms without any relation, so that all conjunc- tions are something accidental. it does not belong to the nature of things to have this or that accidentent. the accidents itself are just coming up and passing away, all dependent of the creative force of god. it is just a matter of habit that fire moves upward, that the earth is moving around a centre. god could have arranged it otherwise. hegel is naming the clas- sical topics of that theological discussion. 43 because in this position only god himself is a 'substantial being' hegel's association with pantheism is understandable: "this pantheism, if you want spinozism, is the position, the general point of view of oriental poets, historians and philosophers. "44
43 for an up to date exposition of these discussions see: william montgomery watt and michel marmura, Der Islam I, II, III, stuttgart-berlin: Kohlhammer 1985, bd. ii in: 'die religionen der menschheit' bd. 25, pp. 368 ff.
44 hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, ii, p. 519.
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hegel characterizes the islamic worldview in general with this word. for him, this 'spinozistic' worldview represents the idea of the sublime. god as the only, the persistent one is, in its abstract negativity, the basic con- cept of the oriental world of representations.
for the qualification of the islamic world as pantheism hegel relies on f. A. g. tholuck who published in 1821 one of the first books on islamic mysticism in europe called Sufism or the Pantheistic Theosophy of the Per- sians (sufismus sive theosophia persarum pantheistica). 45 Another book he wrote, quoted by hegel, was Anthology of Oriental Mysticism (blu? ten- sammlung aus der morgenla? ndischen mystik). we put aside now the topic of pantheism. it is an essential issue in the next and last part of this essay. first, we have to ask: is hegel's lecture of the history of Arabic philosophy adequate? in addition, if the answer is 'no', as the reader may presume, how is it the possible that hegel still hits an essential mark in his concep- tion of the islamic worldview?
9. evaluation: philosophy and religion of the sublime
what is true and what is false in this representation of islamic philosophy? As we already said, hegel underestimates the classical islamic philoso- phy of the middle Ages, by saying that they were only commentators of Aristotle. Avicenna, for example, contributed to western thinking by the unaristotelian distinctions between essence and existence and his ideas of contingency. of course, hegel's presentation of a theological school as 'the islamic philosophy' is wrong.
but at the other hand, this theological position became influential through the work of al-ghazali, a very important thinker in the world of islam, sometimes called a 'church father' or 'the thomas Aquinas of islam'. 46 hegel just mentions the name of al-ghazali among the commentators of Aristotle, as if he was just another philosopher. this was normal for a long time. As the first part of his The incoherence of the Philosophers (some- times translated as the Refutation of the Philosophers or The destruction of the Philosophers), al-ghazali wrote a book on 'The goals of philosophy', in
45 for tholuck and the reception of islamic mysticism in the west, especially of rumi, see franklin d. lewis, Rumi, Past and Present, East and West, oxford: one world 2000, pp. 506 ff.
46 see for criticism of this epitheta too: montgomery watt and marmura, Der Islam, ii, pp. 408 ff.
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which he summarized the philosophical positions he wanted to attack. it was translated in latin separately in the twelfth century, without the prologue in which al-ghazali exposed his goals, and for a long time this was the only book that was known. therefore he was regarded, for exam- ple by thomas of Aquinas, as a philosopher and an Aristotelian. 47 in the fourteenth century, the second part seemed to be translated and edited together with Averroes' critical commentary called The Incoherence of the Incoherence (sometimes translated as the Refutation of the Refutation or The Destruction of the Destruction). nevertheless, for a long time al ghaza- lis criticism of the philosophers was only known by the criticism of this criticism by Averroes. 48
tenneman too interprets him as a philosopher and as a sceptic very near to greek scepticism. however, he tells us too that al-ghazali was a sceptic not just because he wanted to be a sceptic, but because of theo- logical motives. he wanted to defend the possibility of miracles. never- theless, tennemans complains about the fact that he did not have at his disposal the original sources. he knows al-ghazali only from the refuta- tion of his thoughts by Averroes in his 'incoherence'. 49 but tenneman was right about the theological motives of al-ghazali. According to the modern point of view, al ghazali was not just another islamic Aristoteliz- ing philosopher, but a mystical theologian who criticized philosophy and theology using philosophy to combat philosophy with its own arms. 50 the inspiration for this criticism was the position described by maimonides as the position of the Asharites against the mutazila. so he mobilized the criticism of the mutakallimun against philosophy and especially against rational theology. his target was the philosophy of Avicenna. he is indeed famous for a criticism of causality that resembles very much that of david hume. therefore, he was called in old times, as hegel does a sceptic. how- ever, the aim and the source of his criticism of causality was not scep- ticism, but to prove the absolute omnipotence of god as first cause in
47 louis gardet, L'islam, religion et communaute? , paris: descle? e de brouwer 1967.
48 Charles burnett, 'Arabic into latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy into western europe', in: peter Adamson and richard taylor (eds. ) The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2005, pp. 370-405, p. 396. beatrice h. Zedler, 'introduction' in: Averroes' Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin version of Calo Calonymos, edited by beatrice Zedler, milwaukee: the marquette university press 1961, pp. 1-65.
49 tenneman, Geschichte der Philosophie, bd. 8, p. 404. 50 montgomery watt and marmura, der islam, ii, pp. 408 ff.
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all causal relations in our finite world.
