Reply to Objection 2: When the
existence
of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence.
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence.
Summa Theologica
Therefore God is
the object of this science.
I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between
a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty
and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit
is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that
faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight
in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects
of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the
aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they
refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is
in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the
principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is
about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must
be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its
principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this
science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted
the object of this science to be something other than God---that is,
either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole
Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we
treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.
Reply to Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even
as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a
cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of
the cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this
sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or
accidents but as in some way related to Him.
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Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?
Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For
Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought. "
But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things are
written that you may believe" (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a matter of argument.
Objection 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is
either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems
unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest
form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end,
because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit in those
things of which human reason brings its own experience. " Therefore
sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that
faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to
exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).
I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their
principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths
in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its
principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on
to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ
argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is
to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the
inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those
who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest
of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its
principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he
concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer
his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above
itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the
opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine
revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ,
and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from
another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there
is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning,
but only of answering his objections---if he has any---against faith.
Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a
truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought
against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can
be answered.
Reply to Objection 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot avail
to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine
argues from articles of faith to other truths.
Reply to Objection 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments
from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation:
thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the
revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of
this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human
reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine
revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of
human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of
faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are
put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy
nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the
natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:
"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the
authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to
know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus:
"As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring"
(Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these
authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the
authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and
the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be
used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation
made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and
not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors.
Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only those books of
Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such
honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing
them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their
works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and
written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning. "
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Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?
Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For
that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this
science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the
aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least
of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science
should make use of such similitudes.
Objection 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth
clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that
explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such
similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths
by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.
Objection 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they
approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to
represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the
higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in
Scriptures.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied
visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets. "
But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use
metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.
I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and
spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God
provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it
is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible
objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy
Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We
cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within
the covering of many sacred veils. " It is also befitting Holy Writ,
which is proposed to all without distinction of persons---"To the wise
and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rom. 1:14)---that spiritual truths be
expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order
that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp
intellectual things may be able to understand it.
Reply to Objection 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a
representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with
representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both
necessary and useful.
Reply to Objection 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished
by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow
the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the
metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through
those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive
instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught
metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more
openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise
of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the
impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to dogs"
(Mat. 7:6).
Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more
fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less
noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly,
because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For
then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of
divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been
expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who
could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is
more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what
He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn
from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that
God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because
thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.
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Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?
Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several
senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and
anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and
deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but
only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But
Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy.
Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the Old
Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and
allegory. " Now these four seem altogether different from the four
divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four
different senses mentioned above.
Objection 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,
which is not one of these four.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner
of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same
sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery. "
I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to
signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also
by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are
signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore
that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
things signified by words have themselves also a signification is
called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and
presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For
as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law,
and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of
future glory. " Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a
type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old
Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense;
so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which
signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral
sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there
is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the
author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one
act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense,
one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce
equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these
senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things,
but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types
of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the
senses are founded on one---the literal---from which alone can any
argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as
Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture
perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is
contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward
by the Scripture in its literal sense.
Reply to Objection 2: These three---history, etiology, analogy---are
grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine
expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called
etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason
why Moses allowed the putting away of wives---namely, on account of the
hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of
one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another.
Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses.
Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog. ) includes the anagogical
under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only---the
historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.
Reply to Objection 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the
literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively.
Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense.
When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God
has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely
operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie
the literal sense of Holy Writ.
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)
__________________________________________________________________
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational
creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way
to God.
In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever
concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the
procession of creatures from Him.
Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God
exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the
manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely,
His knowledge, will, power.
Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?
(2) Whether it is demonstrable?
(3) Whether God exists?
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Whether the existence of God is self-evident?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now
those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first
principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all. " Therefore the
existence of God is self-evident.
Objection 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which
are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.
Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once
recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as
the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen
that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which
nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and
mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore,
since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it
also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God
exists" is self-evident.
Objection 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For
whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist:
and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not
exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But
God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6)
Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of
the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is
not self-evident.
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on
the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident
because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as
"Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If,
therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the
proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the
first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things
that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and
part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of
the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be
self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of
the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as
Boethius says (Hebdom. , the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is
good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the
learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space. " Therefore I
say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for
the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own
existence as will be hereafter shown ([2]Q[3], A[4]). Now because we do
not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us;
but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us,
though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.
Reply to Objection 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused
way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude.
For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by
man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know
absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching
is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is
Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's
perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in
pleasures, and others in something else.
Reply to Objection 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God"
understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be
thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted
that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it
does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word
signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it
be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there
actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought;
and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not
exist.
Reply to Objection 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident
but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith
cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific
knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it
cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
Objection 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration.
But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what
it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore
we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
Objection 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this
could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between
the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it
seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is whether it exists.
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through
the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is
prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And
from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
which are known to us.
Reply to Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about
God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural
knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to
prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of
faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
known and demonstrated.
Reply to Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in
regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it
is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and
not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the
question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from
His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from
His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word
"God".
Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God exists?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But
the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist.
Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be
accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other
principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be
reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can
be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore
there is no need to suppose God's existence.
On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am. " (Ex.
3:14)
I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are
in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that
which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot,
to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not
possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For
what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it
is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in
the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and
moved, i. e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in
motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in
motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in
motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to
infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and,
consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only
inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff
moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is
necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and
this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no
case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found
to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to
itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible
to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in
order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the
intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause
is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among
efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate
cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity,
there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an
ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is
plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient
cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since
they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they
are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always
to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.
Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there
could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist
only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at
one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for
anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in
existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely
possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is
necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by
another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own
necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in
others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the
like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the
maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which
is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is
shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists
by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we
call God.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is
the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works,
unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out
of evil. " This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should
allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things
that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an
immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body
of the Article.
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OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather
how He is not.
Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by
us; (3) How He is named.
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore
(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him;
and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a
part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His
infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature,
and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
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Whether God is a body?
Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has
the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and
what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The
measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job
11:8,9). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Now
a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the
brightness of His glory and the figure," i. e. the image, "of His
substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
God? " (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
117:16). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something
which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
Lord sitting" (Is. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Is. 3:13).
Therefore God is a body.
Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local
term "wherefrom" or "whereto. " But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and
be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that
depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore
God is a body.
On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24):
"God is a spirit. "
I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved ([3]Q[2], A[3]), that God is the First Mover, and is
Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes
from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to
the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to
potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already
proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality
because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is
therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is
the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the
most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate;
and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But
an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies
would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other
thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by
which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore
it is impossible that God should be a body.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([4]Q[1], A[9]), Holy Writ
puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions
under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual
quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden
things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length,
the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or,
as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the
incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His
all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch
as all things lie under His protection.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as
regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.
Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it
is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Gn.
1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence
it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal,
that man is said to be according to the image of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting,
on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on
account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since
He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions
of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to
withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of
local motion.
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Whether God is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For
whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is
the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is
mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man
liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My
soul. " Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the
composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But
God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for
dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a
body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed
of matter and form.
I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First,
because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ([5]Q[2], A[3])
that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible
that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because
everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness
to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter
participates the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is
not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the
participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed
of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form;
hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is
an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must
be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He
is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form;
and not composed of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts
resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on
account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
as His anger.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are
individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject
since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;
and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
God.
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Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God---i. e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.
Objection 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every
agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not
identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity.
Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only
that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn.
14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the
relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very
Godhead.
I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the
essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc. , are not included in the
definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but
humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand,
in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization
is not due to individual matter---that is to say, to "this"
matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is
necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita.
the object of this science.
I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between
a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty
and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit
is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that
faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight
in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects
of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the
aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they
refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is
in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the
principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is
about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must
be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its
principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this
science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted
the object of this science to be something other than God---that is,
either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole
Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we
treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.
Reply to Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even
as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a
cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of
the cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this
sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or
accidents but as in some way related to Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?
Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For
Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought. "
But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things are
written that you may believe" (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a matter of argument.
Objection 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is
either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems
unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest
form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end,
because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit in those
things of which human reason brings its own experience. " Therefore
sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that
faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to
exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).
I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their
principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths
in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its
principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on
to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ
argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is
to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the
inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those
who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest
of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its
principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he
concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer
his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above
itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the
opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine
revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ,
and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from
another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there
is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning,
but only of answering his objections---if he has any---against faith.
Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a
truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought
against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can
be answered.
Reply to Objection 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot avail
to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine
argues from articles of faith to other truths.
Reply to Objection 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments
from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation:
thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the
revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of
this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human
reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine
revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of
human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of
faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are
put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy
nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the
natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:
"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the
authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to
know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus:
"As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring"
(Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these
authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the
authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and
the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be
used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation
made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and
not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors.
Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only those books of
Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such
honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing
them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their
works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and
written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?
Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For
that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this
science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the
aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least
of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science
should make use of such similitudes.
Objection 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth
clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that
explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such
similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths
by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.
Objection 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they
approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to
represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the
higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in
Scriptures.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied
visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets. "
But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use
metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.
I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and
spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God
provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it
is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible
objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy
Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We
cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within
the covering of many sacred veils. " It is also befitting Holy Writ,
which is proposed to all without distinction of persons---"To the wise
and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rom. 1:14)---that spiritual truths be
expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order
that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp
intellectual things may be able to understand it.
Reply to Objection 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a
representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with
representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both
necessary and useful.
Reply to Objection 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished
by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow
the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the
metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through
those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive
instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught
metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more
openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise
of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the
impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to dogs"
(Mat. 7:6).
Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more
fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less
noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly,
because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For
then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of
divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been
expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who
could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is
more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what
He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn
from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that
God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because
thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.
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Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?
Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several
senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and
anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and
deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but
only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But
Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy.
Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the Old
Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and
allegory. " Now these four seem altogether different from the four
divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four
different senses mentioned above.
Objection 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,
which is not one of these four.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner
of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same
sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery. "
I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to
signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also
by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are
signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore
that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
things signified by words have themselves also a signification is
called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and
presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For
as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law,
and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of
future glory. " Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a
type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old
Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense;
so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which
signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral
sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there
is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the
author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one
act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense,
one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce
equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these
senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things,
but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types
of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the
senses are founded on one---the literal---from which alone can any
argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as
Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture
perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is
contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward
by the Scripture in its literal sense.
Reply to Objection 2: These three---history, etiology, analogy---are
grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine
expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called
etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason
why Moses allowed the putting away of wives---namely, on account of the
hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of
one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another.
Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses.
Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog. ) includes the anagogical
under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only---the
historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.
Reply to Objection 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the
literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively.
Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense.
When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God
has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely
operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie
the literal sense of Holy Writ.
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TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational
creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way
to God.
In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever
concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the
procession of creatures from Him.
Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God
exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the
manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely,
His knowledge, will, power.
Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?
(2) Whether it is demonstrable?
(3) Whether God exists?
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Whether the existence of God is self-evident?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now
those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first
principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all. " Therefore the
existence of God is self-evident.
Objection 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which
are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.
Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once
recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as
the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen
that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which
nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and
mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore,
since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it
also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God
exists" is self-evident.
Objection 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For
whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist:
and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not
exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But
God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6)
Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of
the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is
not self-evident.
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on
the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident
because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as
"Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If,
therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the
proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the
first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things
that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and
part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of
the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be
self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of
the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as
Boethius says (Hebdom. , the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is
good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the
learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space. " Therefore I
say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for
the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own
existence as will be hereafter shown ([2]Q[3], A[4]). Now because we do
not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us;
but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us,
though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.
Reply to Objection 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused
way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude.
For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by
man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know
absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching
is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is
Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's
perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in
pleasures, and others in something else.
Reply to Objection 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God"
understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be
thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted
that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it
does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word
signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it
be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there
actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought;
and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not
exist.
Reply to Objection 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident
but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
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Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith
cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific
knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it
cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
Objection 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration.
But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what
it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore
we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
Objection 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this
could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between
the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it
seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is whether it exists.
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through
the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is
prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And
from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
which are known to us.
Reply to Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about
God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural
knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to
prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of
faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
known and demonstrated.
Reply to Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in
regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it
is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and
not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the
question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from
His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from
His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word
"God".
Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
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Whether God exists?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But
the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist.
Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be
accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other
principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be
reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can
be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore
there is no need to suppose God's existence.
On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am. " (Ex.
3:14)
I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are
in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that
which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot,
to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not
possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For
what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it
is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in
the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and
moved, i. e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in
motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in
motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in
motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to
infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and,
consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only
inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff
moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is
necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and
this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no
case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found
to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to
itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible
to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in
order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the
intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause
is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among
efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate
cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity,
there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an
ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is
plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient
cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since
they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they
are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always
to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.
Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there
could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist
only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at
one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for
anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in
existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely
possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is
necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by
another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary
things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been
already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own
necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in
others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the
like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the
maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which
is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the
same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is
shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists
by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we
call God.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is
the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works,
unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out
of evil. " This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should
allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things
that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an
immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body
of the Article.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)
When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather
how He is not.
Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by
us; (3) How He is named.
Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore
(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him;
and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a
part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His
infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is a body?
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature,
and subject?
(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
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Whether God is a body?
Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has
the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and
what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The
measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job
11:8,9). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Now
a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the
brightness of His glory and the figure," i. e. the image, "of His
substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
God? " (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
117:16). Therefore God is a body.
Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something
which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
Lord sitting" (Is. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Is. 3:13).
Therefore God is a body.
Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local
term "wherefrom" or "whereto. " But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and
be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that
depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore
God is a body.
On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24):
"God is a spirit. "
I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved ([3]Q[2], A[3]), that God is the First Mover, and is
Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes
from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to
the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to
potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already
proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality
because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is
therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is
the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the
most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate;
and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But
an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies
would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other
thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by
which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore
it is impossible that God should be a body.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([4]Q[1], A[9]), Holy Writ
puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions
under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual
quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden
things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length,
the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or,
as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the
incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His
all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch
as all things lie under His protection.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as
regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.
Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it
is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Gn.
1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence
it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal,
that man is said to be according to the image of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting,
on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on
account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since
He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions
of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to
withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of
local motion.
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Whether God is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For
whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is
the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is
mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man
liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My
soul. " Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the
composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But
God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for
dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a
body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed
of matter and form.
I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First,
because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ([5]Q[2], A[3])
that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible
that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because
everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness
to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter
participates the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is
not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the
participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed
of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form;
hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is
an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must
be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He
is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form;
and not composed of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts
resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on
account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
as His anger.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are
individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject
since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;
and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God---i. e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.
Objection 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every
agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not
identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity.
Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only
that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn.
14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the
relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very
Godhead.
I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the
essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc. , are not included in the
definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but
humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand,
in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization
is not due to individual matter---that is to say, to "this"
matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is
necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting "supposita.
