and British pressure, and his
stubborn
defense of the Constitution of 1917.
Revolution and War_nodrm
Sandos, "PanC'ho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's MexicanDiplomacy Re- considered," Joumal ofLatin American Studies 13, no.
2 (1981).
68 Some of the instability along the border arose from the "Plan of San Diego," an obscure group of Mexican radicals who hoped to spark a revolt in the southwestern United States by building networks among the Mexican-American communities in southern Texas and spon- soring a numberr of cross-border raids. See Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, "The Plan of San Diego and the Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination," His- panic-American Historical Review 58, no. 3 (1978); James A. Sandos, "The Plan of San Diego: War and. Diplomacy on the Texas Border, 1915-1916," Arizona and the West 14, no. 1 (1972); and Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley-1915,'' South- western Historical Quarterly 57, no. 3 (1954).
69 General Hugh L. Scott told Wilson that "there will be no way to stave off war, and we should at once seize all the border towns . . . and shove the Mexicans into the desert. " Simi- larly, Colonel House wrote Wilson, "I have been praying that we could get out of the Mexi- can difficulty without war, but it looks now as if it were inevitable. " Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 203, 214.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
can leader could have accepted these terms, however, and Carranza would not even discuss them until the Punitive Expedition was gone. 7?
His stubbornen ss was rewarded in January 1917 when Wilson decided to withdraw the expedition unilaterally. Although war had been averted, the Punitive Expedition left an enduring residue of suspicion and resentment. Carranza still faced continued opposition from Villa, Zapata, and several other rebel groups, and he was understandably resentful of U. S. and British support for Manuel Pelaez, an independent landlord and rebel leader whose troops controlled the main oil fields, as well as the growing number of economic and commercial restrictions imposed on Mexico. 71 U. S. -Mexi- can relations were strained further by article 27 of the new Mexican Consti- . tution, which appeared to threaten the position of foreign investors in Mexico, particularly in the oil and mining industries. 72 Yet despite these ten-
sions (as well as opposition from U. S. business interests), Wilson decided to extend full diplomatic recognition to Carranza in August 1917, primarily to keep U. S. -Mexican relations quiet as war with Germany approached.
Carranza's stubborn defense of Mexican independence enhanced his popularity temporarily, but persistent economic problems and protracted internal opposition continued to plague his presidency. After World War I, his efforts to assert control over Mexico's raw materials led to new tensions with the United States, when a coalition of U. S. corporations, Republican congressmen, and administration officials (notably Secretary of State Lans- ing, Ambassador Henry Fletcher, and State Department official Boaz Long) launched a campaign of intimidation that brought the United States close to war with Mexico in the fall of 1919. In addition to the goal of protecting U. S. investments in Mexico, this effort reflected the U. S. desire to prevent the spread of economic nationalism in Latin America. Lansing at one point threatened direct intervention in an attempt to persuade Carranza to mod- erate his policies, but even he hoped to avoid the use of force. Moreover, al- though advocates of intervention mounted an extensive public relations effort to portray the Carranza regime as hostile and "Bolshevistic," public support for intervention remained weak. Wilson remained unconvinced
that such a course was necessary, and Lansing's various maneuvers merely
70 Among other things, the United States demanded that Mexico provide "full and ade- quate protection to the lives and property of citizens of the United States," and it reserved "the right to re-enter Mexico and to afford such protection by its military forces in the event of the Mexican government failing to do so. " See Haley, Revolution and intervention, 235-36.
71 The United States imposed export controls on Mexico that limited U. S. -Mexican trade and made it difficult for Carranza to obtain arms, and also restricted Mexican access to loans from U. S. banks. See Katz, Secret War, 515-16.
n Article27declaredthatallsubsoildepositswerethepropertyoftheMexicannationand that concessions could only be granted by the national government. Foreigners were forbid- den to acquire property in Mexico unless they registered as Mexican for purposes of owner- ship and gave up the right to seek aid from foreign governments.
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
accelerated his own departure from office. Carranza and the oil companies eventually compromised on the most important points of contention, and the crisis was over by early 1920. 73
Carranza's fatal mistake came later in the year, when he tried to prevent a popular general, Alvaro Obregon, from entering the presidential contest. The Mexican Army defected to Obregon's side, and Carranza was killed while attempting to flee to Vera Cruz. Obregon was elected president in September 1920, and although he also faced several internal challenges dur- ing his presidency, he became the first Mexican president to serve a full term since Diaz. Obregon also achieved a guarded rapprochement with the United States and helped set the stage for the final consolidation of the rev- olution under President Lazaro Cardenas.
Is the Mexican Revolu tion an Exception ?
Does the Mexican Revolution support the theory proposed in this book?
. The answer is a qualified yes. As expected, the collapse of central authority in Mexico encouraged foreign powers to intervene either to improve their own positions or to prevent other states from doing so. This tendency was most pronounced in the case of Great Britain, whose economic interests in Mexico were second only to those of the United States. Britain recognized the Huerta government in 1913 despite strong U. S. opposition, a step that a number of British officials saw as a way to protect British interests in Mex- ico and to undermine the U. S. position throughout Latin America. 74 The British retreated when events in Europe made it more important to maintam good relations with the United States, but British officials continued to in- terfere in Mexico throughout the revolutionary period. 75 British activities in Mexico were driven both by the need to protect their oil supplies and the
desire to prevent either a Mexican-German rapprochement or a unilateral
73 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, chaps. 6 and 7, esp. 158; and Mark T. Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution: U. S. -Mexican Relations under Wilson and Carranza (Tuc- son: University of Arizona Press, 1977), chap. 6.
74 The clearest exponent of this view was Sir Lionel Carden, who became British minister to Mexico in Oc? ober 1913- Carden recommended that Britain formally declare its opposition to U. S. policy and predicted that "by adopting such a line . . . we should leave ourselves free to afford effective protection to the great interests we have at stake which are being con- stantly imperiled by the . . . interested action of the United States; and we should regain the influence we used to have in Latin America and with it a considerable part of the trade which we have lost and are still losing. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 176. See also Arthur S. Link, Wil- son: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 365-77; and Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pt. 2.
75 The British also discovered that the quality of the oil from their holdings in Mexico was too low to meet their naval requirements, forcing them to rely on U. S. companies and dis- couraging further confrontations with the United States.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
U. S. invasion that would jeopardize the British position in Mexico com- pletely. 76
U. S. policy toward the Mexican Revolution was driven by a similar desire to protect its own position and prevent other countries from improving theirs. Wilson's repeated attempts to guide the revolution stemmed in part from his belief that "European imperialism" was responsible for the insta- bility that afflicted "backward" countries such as Mexico, and he consis- tently opposed measures that might enhance European influence. n Wilson opposed Huerta in part? because he believed that foreign (i. e. , British) sup- port was keeping Huerta in power, and he denounced interference by "for- eign capitalists" in a major speech in October 1913. 78 U. S. officials favored the creation of a coalition government because it would maximize U. S. leverage, and the decision to extend de facto recognition to Carranza in Oc-
tober 1915 was largely a response to the fear of German influence? 9 The pos- sibility of a German-Mexican rapprochement also influenced the decision to intervene in 1916, and Carranza's occasional efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the United States remained a major concern for U. S. pol- icy makers until the end of World War I.
These fears were not entirely misplaced, as Germany also tried to exploit the turmoil in Mexico to further its own interests. The Germans' policy in Mexico initiallly aimed at protecting their investments and preserving good relations with the United States; to this end, they tried unsuccessfully to me- diate between Huerta and the United States and proposed joint intervention to restore order in 1913. After Huerta's ouster and the outbreak of World War I, however, Germany began to see the revolution primarily as a means of hindering U. S. support for Britain and France. 80 Germany deflected Car- ranza's initial inquiries about an alliance (to avoid provoking the United States), but when the onset of unrestricted submarine warfare made conflict with the United States virtually inevitable, Germany tried to entice Car-
76 "In the years 1917-18 the British were attempting to fight a three-front war in Mexico against Germany, the United States, and the Mexican nationalists. " Katz, Secret War, 464.
n See Katz, Secret War, 191-93, 222-23, 493-96.
78 The U. S. ambassador in London also warned a group of British businessmen that the United States "will warmly welcome your investments in all parts of ? he Americas on the condition that these investments do not give you control of the country in question. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 180; and see also Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, B-;-9 Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 108-no; and Link, New Freedom, 320.
79 As Lansing put it, "Germany does not wish to have one faction dominant in Mexico, therefore, we must recognize one. . . . Our possible relations with Germany must be our first con- sideration, and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. " See Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59; and Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, 3o-31?
80 German state secretary Gottlieb von Jagow remarked i n May, "It would be very desirable that America be drawn into a war and be distracted from Europe, where it tends to be pro- English. " Quoted in Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus," 126.
? ? Revolution and War
ranza into attacking the United States by offering to help Mexico regain Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. 81 Like Britain and the United States, in short, German policy illustrates how intervention in a revolution can be mo- tivated by the desire to improve a state's position vis-a-vis other powers.
The Mexican case also illustrates revolutionary states' tendency to spiral with foreign powers, as was most apparent in Mexico's relations with the United States. Although leaders in both countries sought to avoid a serious conflict, a combination of legitimate differences and unfortunate misunder- standings nearly drove the two states to war in 1916 and continued to afflict U. S. -Mexican relations for many years thereafter. Tensions between the two were due partly to incompatible objectives (Wilson wanted to foster a liberal capitalist order in Mexico that would protect foreign property rights, while Carranza and his followers sought to defend Mexican autonomy and con- solidate their hold on power) and partly to more immediate conflicts of in- terest (such as the safety of U. S. citizens, the security of the border region, and Mexican efforts to tax U. S. properties). These concrete disputes were ex- acerbated by each side's propensity to exaggerate the other's hostility and to ignore how threatening its own conduct might appear. Because U. S. offi- cials disavowed any aggressive aims and genuinely believed that their ac- tions were in Mexico's best interest, they took Carranza's refusals to accept U. S. guidance as a sign of deep-seated hostility. 82 U. S. officials were upset when Carranza rejected an offer of U. S. support in 1913 and condemned the intervention at Vera Cruz in 1914, and his unwillingness to compromise led Wilson to conclude that "nothing can be done with or through the First Chief. "83 By 1917, Wilson was referring to Carranza as a "pedantic ass" and complaining that "all that [he] has said and done shows his intense resent-
? ? 81 This gambit backfired when Carranza declined the offer and British intelligence inter- cepted and released a secret German message describing their efforts. See Katz, Secret War, chaps. 9-10; and Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Macmillan, 1? 6).
82 In 1913, Wilson declared, "We are actuated by no other motives than the betterment of the conditions ofour unfortunate neighbor, and by the sincere desire to advance the cause of human liberty. " Quoted in Link, New Freedom, 394, and see also 386-87. Two years later, Wil- son admitted, "What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet th1t we want to serve her. She believes that we want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which some of our fellow citizens have tried to exploit her. . . . [But] I will try to serve all America, . . . by trying to serve Mexico herself. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 224. The U. S. belief that its actions were benevolent is also revealed in House's comment to Wilson: "Heaven knows, you have done all a man could to help the peo- ple there, and the fact that they are not able to follow your kindly lead, is no fault of yours. " Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 66.
83 Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 180. The image of Mexican intransigence was reinforced by Carranza's decision to close the port of Progeso (cutting off the U. S. sup- ply of sisal), his opposition to the Punitive Expedition, his refusal to discuss internal matters in the Joint Commission, his occasional attempts to use Germany as a counterweight to U. S.
and British pressure, and his stubborn defense of the Constitution of 1917.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ment of this Administration. "84 For their part, the Mexican revolutionaries saw U. S. interference as a direct threat to the goal of establishing Mexican sovereignty and independence, and they failed to appreciate either Wilson's altruistic motives or his reluctance to use force.
These suspicions were compounded by another familiar feature of revo- lutionary situations: namely, the difficulty of obtaining reliable information or forecasting the future course of the revolution itself. Wilson tried to alle- viate this prolblem by dispatching a series of special agents to gather infor- mation, but most of them proved to be woefully unreliable. 85 In 1913, for example, Wilson's hostility to Huerta was reinforced when special agent John Lind reported, erroneously, that British oil interests were controlling British policy and that foreign support was keeping Huerta in power, and the subsequent decision to seize Vera Cruz was based on Lind's similarly misguided assertion that the Mexicans would not oppose a U. S. landing. 86 Other U. S. attempts to predict the course of the revolution were equally un- reliable; Secretary of State Bryan stated in September 1913, "We have nearly reached the end of our trouble," and he offered an equally optimistic (and inaccurate) forecast after Huerta's departure the following year. 87 U. S. lead- ers misread the course of the civil war as well, at first expecting Villa to win quickly and discounting Carranza's chances until the latter's triumph was nearly complete. 88 Once again, this error was partially based on inaccurate
84 Quoted in Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolu tion, 64. Frustration at Mexican unwillingness to accept U. S. help was a recurring theme among U. S. officials. House remarked, "If the Mex- icans understood that our motives were unselfish, she should not object to our helping adjust her unruly household," and the chief U. S. representative on the Joint Commission wrote Wil- son that the Mexicans "certainly are discouraging people to try to help. " Quoted in Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:153; and Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaignsfor Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 53-54.
85 According to one author, "Wilson's judgment in selecting diplomatic agents was, for the most part, notoriously poor. " Frederick Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1986), 35?
86 Lind predicted that U. S. intervention could "be accomplished without the military loss of an American," but the landing left 19 U. S. soldiers dead and 71 wounded, while the Mexicans suffered 126 killed and 195 wounded. Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 130; also see Link, New Freedom, 400. Larry Hill argues that Lind's analysis "had little basis in fact," and Alan Knight describes Lind's reporting as "garbled, ill-informed, and naive, displaying a crude racism and a paranoid suspicion of Britain. " See Larry D. Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Special Agents in Mexico (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 99-102; Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:139, 15o-53; and Calvert, Mexican Revolution, 2JJ-34?
87 In December 1914, Bryan wrote Wilson, "The situation seems to be clearing up in Mex- ico. Villa and Zapata are working in harmony and interim president Gutierrez seems to be about to assume authority over most of the country. " Wilson's assessment was more mea- sured, but even he believed "we have certainly cleared the stage and made a beginning. " Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 232, 260, and New Freedom, 363.
88 Villa's efforts to cultivate U. S. support convinced Wilson that he "certainly seems capa- ble of good things. " In August 1914, House described Villas as "the only man of force now in
? [2951
? ? Revolution and War
testimony from U. S. agents in Mexico, who painted a rosy portrait of Villa and an unflattering one of the first chief. 89 U. S. ignorance is also evident in Wilson's repeated attempts to arrange a compromise peace, which rested on the naive hope that Carranza would be willing to share power (or to with- draw entireliy) even though his armies held the upper hand. Uncertainty also exacerbated tensions during the Punitive Expedition, especially after the skirmishes at Parral and Carrizal. In the latter case, however, the rapid acquisition of more accurate information reduced pressure for U. S. retalia- tion and helped both sides back away from the brink. 90
Similar problems contributed to a spiral between Great Britain and Mex- ico in 1917-18. Britain was worried about Carranza's efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the Allies, especially after intercepting German diplo- matic communications that conveyed an exaggerated impression of Ger- man influence. These reports helped convince Great Britain to attempt to overthrow the Carranza government; by contrast, because the United States had better sources of information by this point (and was not relying on in- tercepted German messages}, it held a far more sanguine view of German influence and merely wanted to keep Mexico calm. 91
Again we arrive at the final issue: Why did the Mexican Revolution not lead to war? There are at least four interrelated reasons.
First, the revolution in Mexico was only modestly threatening, owing to the enormous asymmetry of power between the United States and Mexico. Even if the revolution created greater uncertainty about the precise balance of power, leaders on both sides knew that Mexico was not a major military threat to the United States. Because Mexico was so much weaker, the Mexi-
sight in Mexico," noting further that Carranza was "not equal to the situation. " Quoted in Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 23? 41. According to Edward Haley, "lacking reliable informa- tion about the military capacities of the Constitutionalists, (Wilson] discounted (their) victo- ries (over Villa). Rather than reports of Constitutionalist progress, the President received countless despatches describing widespread starvation and suffering in Mexico. " Revolution and Intervention, 158-00.
89 In November 1914, a State Department official reported, "General Villa is the only indi- vidual who can put the country on a peaceful footing," and predicted that "one good fight will settle the question and Carranza will find himself with scant forces and will have to flee the country. " Another special agent, Duval West, confirmed this assessment after visiting Villa, Zapata, andl Carranza in the spring of 1915, and his negative report on Carranza con- vinced Wilson that the first chief was not the man to bring order to Mexico. See Link, Strug- glefor Neutrality, 25B-59, 459"-61, 46? 71; and Haley, Revolution and Interoention, 15? 1.
90 When news of the clash at Carrizal reached Washington, Wilson's first belief was that "thebreaksemestohavecomeinMexico;andallmypatienceseemstohavegonefornoth- ing. " He prepared a message to Congress requesting authorization to occupy northern Mex- ico, but public opinion was strongly opposed to war, and a report that U. S. troops had started the fighting convinced Wilson to make another attempt to avoid escalation. See Haley, Revo- lution and Interoention, 21o-23; Katz, Secret War, 31o-11.
? ? 91 See Katz, Secret War, 485--95.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
cans knew all-out war would be foolhardy and U. S. leaders knew they could afford to act with forebearance. Thus, Wilson justified his policy of "watchful waiting" in 1913 by saying, "We can afford to exercise the self-re- straint of a really great nation, which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it," and. he offered a similar appraisal the following year. 92
Second, the "ideology" of the Mexican revolutionary movements did not menace other states in the same way as French republicanism, Soviet Marx- ism, or Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamentalism. Instead, U. S. leaders were sympathetic to the basic ideals of the revolution (despite their reserva- tions about specific issues), and Wilson's various interventions were in- tended to guide the revolution but not to reverse it. 93 And in contrast to the other revolutions we have examined, in Mexico the revolutionaries did not develop a universalist ideology and did not see themselves as a model for other societies. 94 The danger of contagion was further reduced because the central goals of the revolution-the establishment of a liberal constitutional order and far-reaching agrarian reform-were simply not relevant north of the border. Apart from the minor threat posed by banditry and border raid- ing, therefore, there was no danger that the revolution would spread and thus little incentive for preventive war.
Apartial exception to this argument was the U. S. concern that Mexican ef- forts to assert control over foreign investments might establish a dangerous precedent for other developing countries. Especially after World War I, some U. S. officials seem to have believed that the Mexican government was fomenting unrest in the United States and was in cahoots with the Bolshe- viks and the International Workers of the World movement. Yet this danger was never great enough to justify intervention, because Carranza's revolu- tionary nationalism was not directed against private property per se and did not pose a serious threat to U. S. business interests. Indeed, some U. S. businessmen recognized that intervention might harm rather than protect U. S. assets in Mexico. 95
Third, U. S. leaders were aware that an invasion would not be easy or cheap; indeed, Wilson's diplomatic efforts were clearly inspired by his de-
92 InMarch1914,Wilsontoldareporterthat"acountryofthesizeandpoweroftheUnited States can afford to wait just as long as it pleases. Nobody doubts its power, and nobody doubts that Mr. Huerta is eventually to retire. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu tion and Intervention, 100, 130.
93 On the broad ndeological compatibility of the United States and Mexico, see Alan Knight, U. S. -Mexican Relations, 1910-1940 (San Diego: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987), 5-10.
94 On this point see Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:297; and also Eric Woif, Peasant Wars ofthe Twentieth Century {New York: Harper, 1969), 25-26. The ideological background to the revo- lution is summarized in James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968).
95 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 158-59, 174-75. [2971
? ? Revolution and War
sire to avoid having to do more. Wilson had agreed to occupy Vera Cruz in 1914 because he believed (incorrectly) that the Mexicans would not resist, but the experience had been chastening. U. S. military leaders estimated tha? an all-out intervention in Mexico would require roughly five hundred thou- sand men, and given the deep divisions that persisted throughout the coun- try, merely sending an expedition to Mexico City would not have restored! order. Instead, a prolonged and costly occupation would have been neces- sary, on a much larger scale than the earlier U. S. occupations of Cuba or Nicaragua. Thus, the awareness that there was no offensive advantage vis-
a-vis Mexnco reinforced Wilson's already strong desire to avoid war.
The most important barrier to a North American war, however, was the outbreak of World War I. Wilson and his advisors recognized that large- scale involvement in Mexico would limit their ability to influence events in Europe, which they regarded as far more important. As Wilson told his pri- vate secretary in 1916: "It begins to look as if war with Germany is in- evitable. If it should come . . . I do not wish America's energies and forces divided for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany. "96 This consideration also explains why Germany was eager to promote a U. S. - Mexican conflict; as Lansing put it in 1915, "Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene. "97 This concern increased as the U. S. entry into the world! war approached and helped persuade Wilson to withdraw the Punitive Ex-
pedition. House told the new U. S. ambassador, Henry Fletcher, "to do everything possible to avoid a break with Carranza," and Fletcher later re- called that "during the war my job was to keep Mexico quiet, and it was done. "98
Thus, the absence of war was due to the relatively low level of threat cre- ated by the revolution, as well as to the fact that events elsewhere posed an even greater danger. 99 Like the United States during the wars of the French Revolutio! l,l the Mexican revolutionaries were fortunate that a war in Eu- rope encouraged its potential opponents to act with restraint. U. S. -Mexican
% See Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden Gty, N. Y. : Garden City Pub- lishing, 1927), 159?
97 Quoted in Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59? Lansing later told a friend that concern for Germany "was a decided factor in our Mexican policy, I might say, a controlling factor. " According to Boaz Long, "but for the European war, the Mexican situation would have been one of the foremost foreign issues of our time. " Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 68-69.
98 Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 93; and see Katz, Secret War, 313.
99 Similar conditions facilitated Cardenas's consolidation of the revolution in the 1930s, es- pecially his nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938. The United States would have opposed this step more strongly had the rise of Nazi Germany and the growing tensions in Europe not encouraged efforts to solidify ties with anti-Fascist leaders such as Cardenas.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
relations deteriorated again after the armistice (and unlike in 1916, the United States now possessed a sizeable army), but Wilson's attention was still focused primarily on European affairs and he remained firmly set against intervention for the remainder of his term.
Overall, this case is best seen as a near miss. Although war did not occur, the risk of war was very high on more than one occasion, and for many of the reasons identified by the theory. The Mexican instance also confirms that intervening nn a revolution is a difficult and unpredictable business; despite its more or less benevolent intentions and the absence of intense ideological conflict, U. S. efforts to guide the course of events in Mexico were unsuc- cessful at best and counterproductive at worst.
THE TURKISH REVOLUTION
Beginning in 1919, the Nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal transformed the core of the former Ottoman Empire from the center of multinational. Muslim dynasty into a secular Turkish state. Bernard Lewis describes this development as "one of the major revolutions of modern times," and it eventually enabled the Turks to escape the punitive condi- tions imposed at the end of World War I and to reemerge as an accepted member of the European system. 100
Like the American and Mexican cases, the revolution in Turkey did not re- sult in significant interstate violence. Although some familiar sources of conflict were present, their effects were relatively weak and short-lived. The revolution was accompanied by a major war with Greece, but this conflict was a cause of the revolution rather than an effect. The revolution also led to a protracted confrontation with Great Britain, and nearly to open warfare at one point, but a direct clash was avoided and Turkey soon established itself as a status quo power within the European order.
The comparatively mild repercussions of the Turkish Revolution were due in part to the origins and character of the revolutionary movement and its limited international objectives. This was not a mass revolution-from-below, guided or exploited by a revolutionary vanguard party; rather, it was an elite revolution-from-above conducted by dissident members of the old regime. 101 In constructing their new state, the leaders of the revolution explicitly re- jected a pan-Turanian or pan-Islamic agenda in favor of a program based on modernization and the promotion of Turkish nationalism within Anatolia proper. Thus, unlike most revolutionary states, Turkey did not pose a signif-
100 See his EmergenceofModern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 1.
101 See Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolutionfrom Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1978).
[2991
? ?
68 Some of the instability along the border arose from the "Plan of San Diego," an obscure group of Mexican radicals who hoped to spark a revolt in the southwestern United States by building networks among the Mexican-American communities in southern Texas and spon- soring a numberr of cross-border raids. See Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, "The Plan of San Diego and the Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination," His- panic-American Historical Review 58, no. 3 (1978); James A. Sandos, "The Plan of San Diego: War and. Diplomacy on the Texas Border, 1915-1916," Arizona and the West 14, no. 1 (1972); and Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley-1915,'' South- western Historical Quarterly 57, no. 3 (1954).
69 General Hugh L. Scott told Wilson that "there will be no way to stave off war, and we should at once seize all the border towns . . . and shove the Mexicans into the desert. " Simi- larly, Colonel House wrote Wilson, "I have been praying that we could get out of the Mexi- can difficulty without war, but it looks now as if it were inevitable. " Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 203, 214.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
can leader could have accepted these terms, however, and Carranza would not even discuss them until the Punitive Expedition was gone. 7?
His stubbornen ss was rewarded in January 1917 when Wilson decided to withdraw the expedition unilaterally. Although war had been averted, the Punitive Expedition left an enduring residue of suspicion and resentment. Carranza still faced continued opposition from Villa, Zapata, and several other rebel groups, and he was understandably resentful of U. S. and British support for Manuel Pelaez, an independent landlord and rebel leader whose troops controlled the main oil fields, as well as the growing number of economic and commercial restrictions imposed on Mexico. 71 U. S. -Mexi- can relations were strained further by article 27 of the new Mexican Consti- . tution, which appeared to threaten the position of foreign investors in Mexico, particularly in the oil and mining industries. 72 Yet despite these ten-
sions (as well as opposition from U. S. business interests), Wilson decided to extend full diplomatic recognition to Carranza in August 1917, primarily to keep U. S. -Mexican relations quiet as war with Germany approached.
Carranza's stubborn defense of Mexican independence enhanced his popularity temporarily, but persistent economic problems and protracted internal opposition continued to plague his presidency. After World War I, his efforts to assert control over Mexico's raw materials led to new tensions with the United States, when a coalition of U. S. corporations, Republican congressmen, and administration officials (notably Secretary of State Lans- ing, Ambassador Henry Fletcher, and State Department official Boaz Long) launched a campaign of intimidation that brought the United States close to war with Mexico in the fall of 1919. In addition to the goal of protecting U. S. investments in Mexico, this effort reflected the U. S. desire to prevent the spread of economic nationalism in Latin America. Lansing at one point threatened direct intervention in an attempt to persuade Carranza to mod- erate his policies, but even he hoped to avoid the use of force. Moreover, al- though advocates of intervention mounted an extensive public relations effort to portray the Carranza regime as hostile and "Bolshevistic," public support for intervention remained weak. Wilson remained unconvinced
that such a course was necessary, and Lansing's various maneuvers merely
70 Among other things, the United States demanded that Mexico provide "full and ade- quate protection to the lives and property of citizens of the United States," and it reserved "the right to re-enter Mexico and to afford such protection by its military forces in the event of the Mexican government failing to do so. " See Haley, Revolution and intervention, 235-36.
71 The United States imposed export controls on Mexico that limited U. S. -Mexican trade and made it difficult for Carranza to obtain arms, and also restricted Mexican access to loans from U. S. banks. See Katz, Secret War, 515-16.
n Article27declaredthatallsubsoildepositswerethepropertyoftheMexicannationand that concessions could only be granted by the national government. Foreigners were forbid- den to acquire property in Mexico unless they registered as Mexican for purposes of owner- ship and gave up the right to seek aid from foreign governments.
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accelerated his own departure from office. Carranza and the oil companies eventually compromised on the most important points of contention, and the crisis was over by early 1920. 73
Carranza's fatal mistake came later in the year, when he tried to prevent a popular general, Alvaro Obregon, from entering the presidential contest. The Mexican Army defected to Obregon's side, and Carranza was killed while attempting to flee to Vera Cruz. Obregon was elected president in September 1920, and although he also faced several internal challenges dur- ing his presidency, he became the first Mexican president to serve a full term since Diaz. Obregon also achieved a guarded rapprochement with the United States and helped set the stage for the final consolidation of the rev- olution under President Lazaro Cardenas.
Is the Mexican Revolu tion an Exception ?
Does the Mexican Revolution support the theory proposed in this book?
. The answer is a qualified yes. As expected, the collapse of central authority in Mexico encouraged foreign powers to intervene either to improve their own positions or to prevent other states from doing so. This tendency was most pronounced in the case of Great Britain, whose economic interests in Mexico were second only to those of the United States. Britain recognized the Huerta government in 1913 despite strong U. S. opposition, a step that a number of British officials saw as a way to protect British interests in Mex- ico and to undermine the U. S. position throughout Latin America. 74 The British retreated when events in Europe made it more important to maintam good relations with the United States, but British officials continued to in- terfere in Mexico throughout the revolutionary period. 75 British activities in Mexico were driven both by the need to protect their oil supplies and the
desire to prevent either a Mexican-German rapprochement or a unilateral
73 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, chaps. 6 and 7, esp. 158; and Mark T. Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution: U. S. -Mexican Relations under Wilson and Carranza (Tuc- son: University of Arizona Press, 1977), chap. 6.
74 The clearest exponent of this view was Sir Lionel Carden, who became British minister to Mexico in Oc? ober 1913- Carden recommended that Britain formally declare its opposition to U. S. policy and predicted that "by adopting such a line . . . we should leave ourselves free to afford effective protection to the great interests we have at stake which are being con- stantly imperiled by the . . . interested action of the United States; and we should regain the influence we used to have in Latin America and with it a considerable part of the trade which we have lost and are still losing. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 176. See also Arthur S. Link, Wil- son: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 365-77; and Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pt. 2.
75 The British also discovered that the quality of the oil from their holdings in Mexico was too low to meet their naval requirements, forcing them to rely on U. S. companies and dis- couraging further confrontations with the United States.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
U. S. invasion that would jeopardize the British position in Mexico com- pletely. 76
U. S. policy toward the Mexican Revolution was driven by a similar desire to protect its own position and prevent other countries from improving theirs. Wilson's repeated attempts to guide the revolution stemmed in part from his belief that "European imperialism" was responsible for the insta- bility that afflicted "backward" countries such as Mexico, and he consis- tently opposed measures that might enhance European influence. n Wilson opposed Huerta in part? because he believed that foreign (i. e. , British) sup- port was keeping Huerta in power, and he denounced interference by "for- eign capitalists" in a major speech in October 1913. 78 U. S. officials favored the creation of a coalition government because it would maximize U. S. leverage, and the decision to extend de facto recognition to Carranza in Oc-
tober 1915 was largely a response to the fear of German influence? 9 The pos- sibility of a German-Mexican rapprochement also influenced the decision to intervene in 1916, and Carranza's occasional efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the United States remained a major concern for U. S. pol- icy makers until the end of World War I.
These fears were not entirely misplaced, as Germany also tried to exploit the turmoil in Mexico to further its own interests. The Germans' policy in Mexico initiallly aimed at protecting their investments and preserving good relations with the United States; to this end, they tried unsuccessfully to me- diate between Huerta and the United States and proposed joint intervention to restore order in 1913. After Huerta's ouster and the outbreak of World War I, however, Germany began to see the revolution primarily as a means of hindering U. S. support for Britain and France. 80 Germany deflected Car- ranza's initial inquiries about an alliance (to avoid provoking the United States), but when the onset of unrestricted submarine warfare made conflict with the United States virtually inevitable, Germany tried to entice Car-
76 "In the years 1917-18 the British were attempting to fight a three-front war in Mexico against Germany, the United States, and the Mexican nationalists. " Katz, Secret War, 464.
n See Katz, Secret War, 191-93, 222-23, 493-96.
78 The U. S. ambassador in London also warned a group of British businessmen that the United States "will warmly welcome your investments in all parts of ? he Americas on the condition that these investments do not give you control of the country in question. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 180; and see also Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, B-;-9 Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 108-no; and Link, New Freedom, 320.
79 As Lansing put it, "Germany does not wish to have one faction dominant in Mexico, therefore, we must recognize one. . . . Our possible relations with Germany must be our first con- sideration, and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. " See Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59; and Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, 3o-31?
80 German state secretary Gottlieb von Jagow remarked i n May, "It would be very desirable that America be drawn into a war and be distracted from Europe, where it tends to be pro- English. " Quoted in Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus," 126.
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ranza into attacking the United States by offering to help Mexico regain Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. 81 Like Britain and the United States, in short, German policy illustrates how intervention in a revolution can be mo- tivated by the desire to improve a state's position vis-a-vis other powers.
The Mexican case also illustrates revolutionary states' tendency to spiral with foreign powers, as was most apparent in Mexico's relations with the United States. Although leaders in both countries sought to avoid a serious conflict, a combination of legitimate differences and unfortunate misunder- standings nearly drove the two states to war in 1916 and continued to afflict U. S. -Mexican relations for many years thereafter. Tensions between the two were due partly to incompatible objectives (Wilson wanted to foster a liberal capitalist order in Mexico that would protect foreign property rights, while Carranza and his followers sought to defend Mexican autonomy and con- solidate their hold on power) and partly to more immediate conflicts of in- terest (such as the safety of U. S. citizens, the security of the border region, and Mexican efforts to tax U. S. properties). These concrete disputes were ex- acerbated by each side's propensity to exaggerate the other's hostility and to ignore how threatening its own conduct might appear. Because U. S. offi- cials disavowed any aggressive aims and genuinely believed that their ac- tions were in Mexico's best interest, they took Carranza's refusals to accept U. S. guidance as a sign of deep-seated hostility. 82 U. S. officials were upset when Carranza rejected an offer of U. S. support in 1913 and condemned the intervention at Vera Cruz in 1914, and his unwillingness to compromise led Wilson to conclude that "nothing can be done with or through the First Chief. "83 By 1917, Wilson was referring to Carranza as a "pedantic ass" and complaining that "all that [he] has said and done shows his intense resent-
? ? 81 This gambit backfired when Carranza declined the offer and British intelligence inter- cepted and released a secret German message describing their efforts. See Katz, Secret War, chaps. 9-10; and Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Macmillan, 1? 6).
82 In 1913, Wilson declared, "We are actuated by no other motives than the betterment of the conditions ofour unfortunate neighbor, and by the sincere desire to advance the cause of human liberty. " Quoted in Link, New Freedom, 394, and see also 386-87. Two years later, Wil- son admitted, "What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet th1t we want to serve her. She believes that we want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which some of our fellow citizens have tried to exploit her. . . . [But] I will try to serve all America, . . . by trying to serve Mexico herself. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 224. The U. S. belief that its actions were benevolent is also revealed in House's comment to Wilson: "Heaven knows, you have done all a man could to help the peo- ple there, and the fact that they are not able to follow your kindly lead, is no fault of yours. " Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 66.
83 Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 180. The image of Mexican intransigence was reinforced by Carranza's decision to close the port of Progeso (cutting off the U. S. sup- ply of sisal), his opposition to the Punitive Expedition, his refusal to discuss internal matters in the Joint Commission, his occasional attempts to use Germany as a counterweight to U. S.
and British pressure, and his stubborn defense of the Constitution of 1917.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ment of this Administration. "84 For their part, the Mexican revolutionaries saw U. S. interference as a direct threat to the goal of establishing Mexican sovereignty and independence, and they failed to appreciate either Wilson's altruistic motives or his reluctance to use force.
These suspicions were compounded by another familiar feature of revo- lutionary situations: namely, the difficulty of obtaining reliable information or forecasting the future course of the revolution itself. Wilson tried to alle- viate this prolblem by dispatching a series of special agents to gather infor- mation, but most of them proved to be woefully unreliable. 85 In 1913, for example, Wilson's hostility to Huerta was reinforced when special agent John Lind reported, erroneously, that British oil interests were controlling British policy and that foreign support was keeping Huerta in power, and the subsequent decision to seize Vera Cruz was based on Lind's similarly misguided assertion that the Mexicans would not oppose a U. S. landing. 86 Other U. S. attempts to predict the course of the revolution were equally un- reliable; Secretary of State Bryan stated in September 1913, "We have nearly reached the end of our trouble," and he offered an equally optimistic (and inaccurate) forecast after Huerta's departure the following year. 87 U. S. lead- ers misread the course of the civil war as well, at first expecting Villa to win quickly and discounting Carranza's chances until the latter's triumph was nearly complete. 88 Once again, this error was partially based on inaccurate
84 Quoted in Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolu tion, 64. Frustration at Mexican unwillingness to accept U. S. help was a recurring theme among U. S. officials. House remarked, "If the Mex- icans understood that our motives were unselfish, she should not object to our helping adjust her unruly household," and the chief U. S. representative on the Joint Commission wrote Wil- son that the Mexicans "certainly are discouraging people to try to help. " Quoted in Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:153; and Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaignsfor Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 53-54.
85 According to one author, "Wilson's judgment in selecting diplomatic agents was, for the most part, notoriously poor. " Frederick Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1986), 35?
86 Lind predicted that U. S. intervention could "be accomplished without the military loss of an American," but the landing left 19 U. S. soldiers dead and 71 wounded, while the Mexicans suffered 126 killed and 195 wounded. Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 130; also see Link, New Freedom, 400. Larry Hill argues that Lind's analysis "had little basis in fact," and Alan Knight describes Lind's reporting as "garbled, ill-informed, and naive, displaying a crude racism and a paranoid suspicion of Britain. " See Larry D. Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Special Agents in Mexico (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 99-102; Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:139, 15o-53; and Calvert, Mexican Revolution, 2JJ-34?
87 In December 1914, Bryan wrote Wilson, "The situation seems to be clearing up in Mex- ico. Villa and Zapata are working in harmony and interim president Gutierrez seems to be about to assume authority over most of the country. " Wilson's assessment was more mea- sured, but even he believed "we have certainly cleared the stage and made a beginning. " Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 232, 260, and New Freedom, 363.
88 Villa's efforts to cultivate U. S. support convinced Wilson that he "certainly seems capa- ble of good things. " In August 1914, House described Villas as "the only man of force now in
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testimony from U. S. agents in Mexico, who painted a rosy portrait of Villa and an unflattering one of the first chief. 89 U. S. ignorance is also evident in Wilson's repeated attempts to arrange a compromise peace, which rested on the naive hope that Carranza would be willing to share power (or to with- draw entireliy) even though his armies held the upper hand. Uncertainty also exacerbated tensions during the Punitive Expedition, especially after the skirmishes at Parral and Carrizal. In the latter case, however, the rapid acquisition of more accurate information reduced pressure for U. S. retalia- tion and helped both sides back away from the brink. 90
Similar problems contributed to a spiral between Great Britain and Mex- ico in 1917-18. Britain was worried about Carranza's efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the Allies, especially after intercepting German diplo- matic communications that conveyed an exaggerated impression of Ger- man influence. These reports helped convince Great Britain to attempt to overthrow the Carranza government; by contrast, because the United States had better sources of information by this point (and was not relying on in- tercepted German messages}, it held a far more sanguine view of German influence and merely wanted to keep Mexico calm. 91
Again we arrive at the final issue: Why did the Mexican Revolution not lead to war? There are at least four interrelated reasons.
First, the revolution in Mexico was only modestly threatening, owing to the enormous asymmetry of power between the United States and Mexico. Even if the revolution created greater uncertainty about the precise balance of power, leaders on both sides knew that Mexico was not a major military threat to the United States. Because Mexico was so much weaker, the Mexi-
sight in Mexico," noting further that Carranza was "not equal to the situation. " Quoted in Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 23? 41. According to Edward Haley, "lacking reliable informa- tion about the military capacities of the Constitutionalists, (Wilson] discounted (their) victo- ries (over Villa). Rather than reports of Constitutionalist progress, the President received countless despatches describing widespread starvation and suffering in Mexico. " Revolution and Intervention, 158-00.
89 In November 1914, a State Department official reported, "General Villa is the only indi- vidual who can put the country on a peaceful footing," and predicted that "one good fight will settle the question and Carranza will find himself with scant forces and will have to flee the country. " Another special agent, Duval West, confirmed this assessment after visiting Villa, Zapata, andl Carranza in the spring of 1915, and his negative report on Carranza con- vinced Wilson that the first chief was not the man to bring order to Mexico. See Link, Strug- glefor Neutrality, 25B-59, 459"-61, 46? 71; and Haley, Revolution and Interoention, 15? 1.
90 When news of the clash at Carrizal reached Washington, Wilson's first belief was that "thebreaksemestohavecomeinMexico;andallmypatienceseemstohavegonefornoth- ing. " He prepared a message to Congress requesting authorization to occupy northern Mex- ico, but public opinion was strongly opposed to war, and a report that U. S. troops had started the fighting convinced Wilson to make another attempt to avoid escalation. See Haley, Revo- lution and Interoention, 21o-23; Katz, Secret War, 31o-11.
? ? 91 See Katz, Secret War, 485--95.
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cans knew all-out war would be foolhardy and U. S. leaders knew they could afford to act with forebearance. Thus, Wilson justified his policy of "watchful waiting" in 1913 by saying, "We can afford to exercise the self-re- straint of a really great nation, which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it," and. he offered a similar appraisal the following year. 92
Second, the "ideology" of the Mexican revolutionary movements did not menace other states in the same way as French republicanism, Soviet Marx- ism, or Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamentalism. Instead, U. S. leaders were sympathetic to the basic ideals of the revolution (despite their reserva- tions about specific issues), and Wilson's various interventions were in- tended to guide the revolution but not to reverse it. 93 And in contrast to the other revolutions we have examined, in Mexico the revolutionaries did not develop a universalist ideology and did not see themselves as a model for other societies. 94 The danger of contagion was further reduced because the central goals of the revolution-the establishment of a liberal constitutional order and far-reaching agrarian reform-were simply not relevant north of the border. Apart from the minor threat posed by banditry and border raid- ing, therefore, there was no danger that the revolution would spread and thus little incentive for preventive war.
Apartial exception to this argument was the U. S. concern that Mexican ef- forts to assert control over foreign investments might establish a dangerous precedent for other developing countries. Especially after World War I, some U. S. officials seem to have believed that the Mexican government was fomenting unrest in the United States and was in cahoots with the Bolshe- viks and the International Workers of the World movement. Yet this danger was never great enough to justify intervention, because Carranza's revolu- tionary nationalism was not directed against private property per se and did not pose a serious threat to U. S. business interests. Indeed, some U. S. businessmen recognized that intervention might harm rather than protect U. S. assets in Mexico. 95
Third, U. S. leaders were aware that an invasion would not be easy or cheap; indeed, Wilson's diplomatic efforts were clearly inspired by his de-
92 InMarch1914,Wilsontoldareporterthat"acountryofthesizeandpoweroftheUnited States can afford to wait just as long as it pleases. Nobody doubts its power, and nobody doubts that Mr. Huerta is eventually to retire. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu tion and Intervention, 100, 130.
93 On the broad ndeological compatibility of the United States and Mexico, see Alan Knight, U. S. -Mexican Relations, 1910-1940 (San Diego: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987), 5-10.
94 On this point see Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:297; and also Eric Woif, Peasant Wars ofthe Twentieth Century {New York: Harper, 1969), 25-26. The ideological background to the revo- lution is summarized in James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968).
95 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 158-59, 174-75. [2971
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sire to avoid having to do more. Wilson had agreed to occupy Vera Cruz in 1914 because he believed (incorrectly) that the Mexicans would not resist, but the experience had been chastening. U. S. military leaders estimated tha? an all-out intervention in Mexico would require roughly five hundred thou- sand men, and given the deep divisions that persisted throughout the coun- try, merely sending an expedition to Mexico City would not have restored! order. Instead, a prolonged and costly occupation would have been neces- sary, on a much larger scale than the earlier U. S. occupations of Cuba or Nicaragua. Thus, the awareness that there was no offensive advantage vis-
a-vis Mexnco reinforced Wilson's already strong desire to avoid war.
The most important barrier to a North American war, however, was the outbreak of World War I. Wilson and his advisors recognized that large- scale involvement in Mexico would limit their ability to influence events in Europe, which they regarded as far more important. As Wilson told his pri- vate secretary in 1916: "It begins to look as if war with Germany is in- evitable. If it should come . . . I do not wish America's energies and forces divided for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany. "96 This consideration also explains why Germany was eager to promote a U. S. - Mexican conflict; as Lansing put it in 1915, "Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene. "97 This concern increased as the U. S. entry into the world! war approached and helped persuade Wilson to withdraw the Punitive Ex-
pedition. House told the new U. S. ambassador, Henry Fletcher, "to do everything possible to avoid a break with Carranza," and Fletcher later re- called that "during the war my job was to keep Mexico quiet, and it was done. "98
Thus, the absence of war was due to the relatively low level of threat cre- ated by the revolution, as well as to the fact that events elsewhere posed an even greater danger. 99 Like the United States during the wars of the French Revolutio! l,l the Mexican revolutionaries were fortunate that a war in Eu- rope encouraged its potential opponents to act with restraint. U. S. -Mexican
% See Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden Gty, N. Y. : Garden City Pub- lishing, 1927), 159?
97 Quoted in Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59? Lansing later told a friend that concern for Germany "was a decided factor in our Mexican policy, I might say, a controlling factor. " According to Boaz Long, "but for the European war, the Mexican situation would have been one of the foremost foreign issues of our time. " Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 68-69.
98 Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 93; and see Katz, Secret War, 313.
99 Similar conditions facilitated Cardenas's consolidation of the revolution in the 1930s, es- pecially his nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938. The United States would have opposed this step more strongly had the rise of Nazi Germany and the growing tensions in Europe not encouraged efforts to solidify ties with anti-Fascist leaders such as Cardenas.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
relations deteriorated again after the armistice (and unlike in 1916, the United States now possessed a sizeable army), but Wilson's attention was still focused primarily on European affairs and he remained firmly set against intervention for the remainder of his term.
Overall, this case is best seen as a near miss. Although war did not occur, the risk of war was very high on more than one occasion, and for many of the reasons identified by the theory. The Mexican instance also confirms that intervening nn a revolution is a difficult and unpredictable business; despite its more or less benevolent intentions and the absence of intense ideological conflict, U. S. efforts to guide the course of events in Mexico were unsuc- cessful at best and counterproductive at worst.
THE TURKISH REVOLUTION
Beginning in 1919, the Nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal transformed the core of the former Ottoman Empire from the center of multinational. Muslim dynasty into a secular Turkish state. Bernard Lewis describes this development as "one of the major revolutions of modern times," and it eventually enabled the Turks to escape the punitive condi- tions imposed at the end of World War I and to reemerge as an accepted member of the European system. 100
Like the American and Mexican cases, the revolution in Turkey did not re- sult in significant interstate violence. Although some familiar sources of conflict were present, their effects were relatively weak and short-lived. The revolution was accompanied by a major war with Greece, but this conflict was a cause of the revolution rather than an effect. The revolution also led to a protracted confrontation with Great Britain, and nearly to open warfare at one point, but a direct clash was avoided and Turkey soon established itself as a status quo power within the European order.
The comparatively mild repercussions of the Turkish Revolution were due in part to the origins and character of the revolutionary movement and its limited international objectives. This was not a mass revolution-from-below, guided or exploited by a revolutionary vanguard party; rather, it was an elite revolution-from-above conducted by dissident members of the old regime. 101 In constructing their new state, the leaders of the revolution explicitly re- jected a pan-Turanian or pan-Islamic agenda in favor of a program based on modernization and the promotion of Turkish nationalism within Anatolia proper. Thus, unlike most revolutionary states, Turkey did not pose a signif-
100 See his EmergenceofModern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 1.
101 See Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolutionfrom Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1978).
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