No More Learning

This
double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven
upon man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to the
public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and
being; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being
in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded
with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that he
should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only
to them, _Necesse est ut eam_, _non ut vivam_. But it may be truly
affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other
discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is
communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as
the Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the same God that gave the
Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate
creatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of
God have wished themselves anathematised and razed out of the book of
life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion.

(8) This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine
most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant. For
first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the
contemplative or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For all
the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are private, and
respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man’s self (in which respects no
question the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike
to that comparison which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying
of philosophy and contemplation, who being asked what he was, answered,
“That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that
some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants
to utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet
their friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of them that
came to look on. ” But men must know, that in this theatre of man’s life
it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on. Neither could
the like question ever have been received in the Church, notwithstanding
their _Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus_, by which place
they would exalt their civil death and regular professions, but upon this
defence, that the monastical life is not simple contemplative, but
performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which
hath been truly esteemed as an office in the Church, or else of writing
or taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses
did when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch, the seventh
from Adam, who was the first contemplative and walked with God, yet did
also endow the Church with prophecy, which Saint Jude citeth. But for
contemplation which should be finished in itself, without casting beams
upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not.

(9) It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and
their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity in
virtue simply or attended, the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly
embrace and concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and
Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used in
some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits)
to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and
attended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed it in
serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they would have
deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there
was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and
season; and Herillus, which placed felicity in extinguishment of the
disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming
things according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation;
which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring
things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or
wavering of belief; all which are manifest to tend to private repose and
contentment, and not to point of society.

(10) It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth
that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest
we be liable to fortune and disturbance; as if it were not a thing much
more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to
obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune: as
Consalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting he had
rather die one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for long by
one foot of retreat. Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath
signed, who hath affirmed that “a good conscience is a continual feast;”
showing plainly that the conscience of good intentions, howsoever
succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature than all the provision
which can be made for security and repose.

(11) It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew general
about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or
profession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish
perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a
particular kind and course of life to that end; introducing such a health
of mind, as was that health of body of which Aristotle speaketh of
Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health;
whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of
body is best which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities,
so likewise that health of mind is most proper which can go through the
greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes’ opinion is to be
accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which
sustained, and could refrain their mind _in præcipitio_, and could give
unto the mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn.

(12) Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in some
of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that
did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities
and perturbations; whereas the resolution of men truly moral ought to be
such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, _e telâ
crassiore_, and not so fine as that everything should catch in it and
endanger it.

XXI. (1) To resume private or particular good, it falleth into the
division of good active and passive; for this difference of good (not
unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or
household terms of _promus_ and _condus_) is formed also in all things,
and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the one
to preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply
themselves, whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier; for in nature
the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent, and the earth,
which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the pleasures of living
creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food. In divine
doctrine, _beatius est dare quam accipere_. And in life, there is no
man’s spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he
hath fixed in his desire, more than sensuality, which priority of the
active good is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be
mortal and exposed to fortune. For if we might have a perpetuity and
certainty in our pleasures, the state of them would advance their price.
But when we see it is but _magni æstimamus mori tardius_, and _ne
glorieris de crastino_, _nescis partum diei_, it maketh us to desire to
have somewhat secured and exempted from time, which are only our deeds
and works; as it is said, _Opera eorum sequuntur eos_. The pre-eminence
likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural
in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the pleasures of the
sense, which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great
latitude. _Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris_; _cibus_, _somnus_, _ludus per
hunc circulum curritur_; _mori velle non tantum fortis_, _aut miser_,
_aut prudens_, _sed etiam fastidiosus potest_. But in enterprises,
pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men are
sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils,
reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it was
well said, _Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est_. Neither hath this
active good an identity with the good of society, though in some cases it
hath an incidence into it. For although it do many times bring forth
acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man’s own
power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it
findeth a contrary subject. For that gigantine state of mind which
possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla and
infinite other in smaller model, who would have all men happy or unhappy
as they were their friends or enemies, and would give form to the world,
according to their own humours (which is the true theomachy), pretendeth
and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth furthest from good of
society, which we have determined to be the greater.

(2) To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of conservative
and effective. For let us take a brief review of that which we have
said: we have spoken first of the good of society, the intention whereof
embraceth the form of human nature, whereof we are members and portions,
and not our own proper and individual form; we have spoken of active
good, and supposed it as a part of private and particular good. And
rightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire or
appetite proceeding from love to themselves: one of preserving and
continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their form;
and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things:
whereof the multiplying, or signature of it upon other things, is that
which we handled by the name of active good. So as there remaineth the
conserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it, which latter is the
highest degree of passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, to
preserve with advancement is the greater. So in man,

“Igneus est ollis vigor, et cælestis origo. ”

His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the
perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is
that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct of
an advancement, formal and essential, is carried to seek an advancement
local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and
down and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove
internal, so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the mean to
exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their
place. So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative or
perfective.

(3) To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth in
the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be
most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and lowest. And
this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of,
nor well inquired; for the good of fruition or contentment is placed
either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour
of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude; the
one having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good.
Whether of these is the greater good is a question controverted; but
whether man’s nature may not be capable of both is a question not
inquired.

(4) The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist,
Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the
sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to
ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates’ felicity was the felicity of
a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist’s felicity was the
felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch.
And both these opinions do not want their supports. For the opinion of
Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the epicures
themselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so,
certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations then
in compassing desires. The sophist’s opinion is much favoured by the
assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good
of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of
advancement, as motion though in a circle hath a show of progression.

(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former
superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there are some who take
more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet,
nevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? So as
this same, _Non uti ut non appetas_, _non appetere ut non metuas_, _sunt
animi pusilli et diffidentis_. And it seemeth to me that most of the
doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautious than the
nature of things requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in
offering to cure it. For when they would have a man’s whole life to be
but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think
that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing.
Better saith the poet:—

“Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat
Naturæ. ”

So have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform and harmonical, by
not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions; the reasons whereof I
suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a private,
free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like
instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many changes,
yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as
a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity
between a philosophical and civil life. And, therefore, men are to
imitate the wisdom of jewellers: who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or
an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone,
they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they
will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity as they
destroy not magnanimity.

(6) Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and
particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good of man
which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because
the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed
towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed
and composed in itself; though neither can a man understand virtue
without some relation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition.
This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic; but
not if it be well observed. For it concerneth the regiment and
government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in
architecture the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts
of building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting
the building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an
instrument or engine is not the same with the manner of setting it on
work and employing it; and yet, nevertheless, in expressing of the one
you incidently express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine of
conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity
thereunto.

(7) This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common duty of
every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective or
special duty of every man in his profession, vocation, and place. The
first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The
second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which
manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be
best. For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue,
challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, and place?
For although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and
there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, “That the vale best
discovereth the hill;” yet there is small doubt but that men can write
best and most really and materially in their own professions; and that
the writing of speculative men of active matter for the most part doth
seem to men of experience, as Phormio’s argument of the wars seemed to
Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which
accompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they magnify
them in excess. But generally it were to be wished (as that which would
make learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men would or could
become writers.

(8) In which kind I cannot but mention, _honoris causa_, your Majesty’s
excellent book touching the duty of a king; a work richly compounded of
divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts;
and being in some opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings
that I have read: not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the
coldness of negligence; not sick of dizziness, as those are who leese
themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in
matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do
who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well
disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for
action; and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted
those that write in their own professions to be subject—which is, that
they exalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly described, not
a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses or a
David, pastors of their people. Neither can I ever leese out of my
remembrance what I heard your Majesty in the same sacred spirit of
government deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, “That kings
ruled by their laws, as God did by the laws of nature; and ought as
rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative as God doth His power of
working miracles. ” And yet notwithstanding in your book of a free
monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude
of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and
duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your
Majesty, as a prime or eminent example of tractates concerning special
and respective duties; wherein I should have said as much, if it had been
written a thousand years since. Neither am I moved with certain courtly
decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence. No, it is
flattery to praise in absence—that is, when either the virtue is absent,
or the occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced,
either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration _pro
Marcello_, which is nothing but an excellent table of Cæsar’s virtue, and
made to his face; besides the example of many other excellent persons,
wiser a great deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a
full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.

(9) But to return; there belongeth further to the handling of this part,
touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite,
touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession,
which hath been likewise handled; but how? rather in a satire and
cynically, than seriously and wisely; for men have rather sought by wit
to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than
with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as
Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to
scorn and censure shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no
matter for his instruction: _Quærenti derisori scientiam ipsa se
abscondit_; _sed studioso fit obviam_. But the managing of this argument
with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be
one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be
planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk—that if he see you
first, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth—so is it with
deceits and evil arts, which, if they be first espied they leese their
life; but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden
to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought
to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the
columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the
serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and
lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest—that is, all forms and
natures of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay,
an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them,
without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted minds
presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and
believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and men’s exterior language. So
as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of
their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality. _Non recipit
stultus verba prudentiæ_, _nisi ea dixeris quæ_, _versantur in corde
ejus_.

(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain the
duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant.
So likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of
companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other
proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society,
but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.

(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it
also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the
weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular
and public. As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own
sons, which was so much extolled, yet what was said?

“Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores. ”

So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see
when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions
they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates,
and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being a
usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was
the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil
war: and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty.
Amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question
is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice. Which Jason of
Thessalia determined against the truth: _Aliqua sunt injuste facienda_,
_ut multa juste fieri possint_. But the reply is good: _Auctorem
præsentis justitiæ habes_, _sponsorem futuræ non habes_. Men must pursue
things which are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine
Providence. So then we pass on from this general part touching the
exemplar and description of good.

XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it
remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without
which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or
statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and
motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: _Necesse
est scilicet de virtute dicere_, _et quid sit_, _et ex quibus gignatur_.
_Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse_, _acquirendæ autem ejus
modos et vias ignorare_. _Non enum de virtute tantum_, _qua specie sit_,
_quærendum est_, _sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat_: _utrumque enum
volumeus_, _et rem ipsam nosse_, _et ejus compotes fieri_: _hoc autem ex
voto non succedet_, _nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo_. In such full
words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith
Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied
himself to philosophy, _Non ita disputandi causa_, _sed ita vivendi_.
And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any
consultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca
excellently saith, _De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat_, _de summa
nemo_), may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with
that aphorism of Hippocrates, _Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non
sentiunt_, _iis mens ægrotat_. They need medicine, not only to assuage
the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said that the cure of
men’s minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral
philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble
handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, “That the eyes of the handmaid look
perpetually towards the mistress,” and yet no doubt many things are left
to the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress’ will; so
ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of
divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due limits) many
sound and profitable directions.

(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but
find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry; the
rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and
action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men
(which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their
books. It is reasonable, therefore, that we propound it in the more
particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit
ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible,
and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have
written. We will, therefore, enumerate some heads or points thereof,
that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical we
ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the
one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of
application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of
the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the
constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents. So in the
culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command:
points of Nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one,
and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these
things, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application:—

“Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:”

and so likewise,

“Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo. ”

But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and
neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which
draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth
adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating
or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the
exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto
which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take
measure of the body.

(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound
and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and
tempers of men’s natures and dispositions, specially having regard to
those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and
causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture;
wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to
describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention.
For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are
proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle
handleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it
not deserve as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to
intend many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide
themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in
few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as
well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to
that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time;
others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of
pursuit:—

“Jam tum tenditqus fovetque. ”

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly
also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be
considered by Aristotle, “That there is a disposition in conversation
(supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s
self) to soothe and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and
cross;” and deserveth it not much better to be considered. “That there
is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more
serious nature (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to
take pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to
take distaste at the good of another? ” which is that properly which we
call good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity; and, therefore, I
cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the
several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in
morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry and
suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of
astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to
the predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action,
lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts,
lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of
these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures
of the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth. A man
shall meet with in every day’s conference the denominations of sensitive,
dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, _huomo di prima impressione_,
_huomo di ultima impressione_, and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this
kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry.
For the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no
precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both
history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these
observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but
no man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts might be made of
them for use of life.

(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed
upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and
sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and
not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune, as
sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy,
privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune,
rising _per saltum_, _per gradus_, and the like. And, therefore, we see
that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, _benignitas
hujis ut adolescentuli est_. Saint Paul concludeth that severity of
discipline was to be used to the Cretans, _increpa eos dure_, upon the
disposition of their country, _Cretensus semper mendaces_, _malæ bestiæ_,
_ventres_. Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire
contradictories: _Sed plerumque regiæ voluntates_, _ut vehementes sunt_,
_sic mobiles_, _sæpeque ipsæ sibi advers_. Tacitus observeth how rarely
raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition: _solus Vespasianus
mutatus in melius_. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and
sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men _qui magnam felicitatem
concoquere non possunt_. So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a
measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune;
_Divitiæ si affluant_, _nolite cor apponere_. These observations and the
like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in
his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses; but they
were never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do
essentially appertain; as the knowledge of this diversity of grounds and
moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of
complexions and constitutions doth to the physician, except we mean to
follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to
all patients.

(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the
affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to
know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases;
and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of
the divers characters of men’s natures, it followeth in order to know the
diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the
perturbations and distempars of the affections. For as the ancient
politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea,
and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm
and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would
be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in
working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the
nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as
winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I
find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers
volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which is the
principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are
considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved
by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the
quantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth them. For it is
not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this
inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light
can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to
the particular affections as light is to particular colours. Better
travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I
can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet it is like it
was after their manner, rather in subtlety of definitions (which in a
subject of this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample
descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular
writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: as of
anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance,
and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors
of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great life, how
affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and
how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose
themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify:
how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and
encounter one with another; and other the like particularities. Amongst
the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I
say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another;
even as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which
otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation
is erected that excellent use of _præmium_ and _pæna_, whereby civil
states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and hope,
for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of
states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so
it is in the government within.

(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and
have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite,
and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom,
exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company,
friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these
as they have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind
suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and
described, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate
of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we
will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it
were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and
habit to speak of.

(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of
those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custom;
using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it
will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not
learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle be true in
things wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now
stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature admitteth
a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily
on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and
that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of
enduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like: which latter
sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth,
than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion,
that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to
have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many
precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of
ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.

(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either
too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you
discourage, in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and
so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can
hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other
side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.

(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two several
times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst
disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may
work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the
more easy and pleasant.

(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which
is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by
nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a
wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness.

(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better, and
with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not
first in the intention, but _tanquam aliud agendo_, because of the
natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other
axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom, which
being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being governed
by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth forth
that which is lame and counterfeit.

(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and
operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great
caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers
in great indignation call poesy _vinum dæmonum_, because it increaseth
temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of
Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, “That young men are no
fit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the
boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and
experience”? And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and
discourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto
virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and
popular opinions against virtue in their parasites’ coats fit to be
scorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life,
because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled
years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true
also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy,
till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest
their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no
true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the
verse describes it, _Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur_; and
again, _Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit_, _hic diadema_: which the
poets do speak satirically and in indignation on virtue’s behalf; but
books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth
Machiavel to say, “That if Cæsar had been overthrown, he would have been
more odious than ever was Catiline;” as if there had been no difference,
but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most
excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there
not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities
themselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too precise,
arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, _In Marco Catone hæc
bona quæ videmus divina et egregia_, _ipsius scitote esse propria_; _quæ
nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura_, _sed a magistro_? Many
other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and
effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so,
likewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of
company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in
the doctrine of morality.

(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more
accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that
the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at
other times in a state more depraved. The purpose, therefore, of this
practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to
obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been
practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and observances or
exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because
they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil
hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of
that which is past, and an inception or account _de novo_ for the time to
come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all
good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to religion.

(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all
other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble
and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate;
which is, the electing and propounding unto a man’s self good and
virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his
compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set
before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute,
constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself
into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of nature;
whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a
carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as
if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude
stone still, till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when
nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all
the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man
practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like
but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what
virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend
unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself
thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express
himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine. His words
are these: _Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam_, _quæ supra
humanitatem est_, _heroicam sive divinam virtutem_; and a little after,
_Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est_, _swic neque Dei_: _sed hic
quidem status altius quiddam virtute est_, _ille aluid quiddam a vitio_.
And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus
attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, “That men
needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue
as good lords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been only an
imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen
and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind,
which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting
upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of
perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together.
And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a
false imitation of divine love, _Amor melior Sophista lœvo ad humanam
vitam_—that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist
or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules
and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that
facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so
certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work
him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality
can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay, further,
as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise
the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or
excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same
instant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though
they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only charity
admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power,
the angels transgressed and fell; _Ascendam_, _et ero similis altissimo_:
by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell;
_Eritis sicut Dii_, _scientes bonum et malum_: but by aspiring to a
similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever
transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are
called: _Diligite inimicos vestros_, _benefacite eis qui oderunt vos_,
_et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos_, _ut sitis filii
Patris vestri qui in cœlis est_, _qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos
et malos_, _et pluit super justos et injustos_. So in the first platform
of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, _Optimus
Maximus_: and the sacred Scriptures thus, _Miscericordia ejus super omnia
opera ejus_.

(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the
culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the
arts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to
collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by
others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But
as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel (Athenians)
that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink
wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of
sleep—

“Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:”

so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in
knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of wine”) is the more
vaporous, and the braver gate (“of ivory”) sendeth forth the falser
dreams.

(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy,
which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and
spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation
or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For
as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and
pleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral
knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without
perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile
for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind,
seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many
have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from
perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings; some again have
an elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of
honesty nor substance of sufficiency; and some again have honest and
reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business;
and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure,
we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to
stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it,
than in the strength and vigour of it.

XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all
others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom.
Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, “That the Romans were like sheep,
for that a man were better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for
in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the rest would
follow:” so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than
policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of
internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external
goodness; for that as to society sufficeth.
And therefore it cometh oft
to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in
the Holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, _Sed adhuc
poulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum_. Again,
states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of
frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so
governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following; but
the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These
respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.

(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary
actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government.
For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection; and they be
three wisdoms of divers natures which do often sever—wisdom of the
behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.

(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but
much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an
influence also into business and government. The poet saith, _Nec vultu
destrue verba tuo_: a man may destroy the force of his words with his
countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his
brother affability and easy access; _Nil interest habere ostium apertum_,
_vultum clausum_: it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and
to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So we see Atticus,
before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending,
did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his
countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of
such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage
appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well
expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: _Ne aut arrogans
videar_, _aut obnoxius_; _quorum alterum est àlienæ libertatis obliti_,
_alterum suæ_: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity,
without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if
behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass
into affectation, and then _Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam
transferre_—to act a man’s life? But although it proceed not to that
extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And
therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by
saying, _Amici fures temporis_: so certainly the intending of the
discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as
are accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it, and
seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do
seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything
becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by _puntos_ and
compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an
over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is
time and season. For as Solomon saith, _Qui respicit ad ventos_, _non
seminat_; _et qui respicit ad nubes_, _non metet_: a man must make his
opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as
a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it
ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to
be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any
deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for
exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly
handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto
collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the
professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note
or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there
is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three
wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of
behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an
inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government,
they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that
happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man’s life is
most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered
advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject.
For if books were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned
men with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without
learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.

(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should
be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less
infinite than science of government, which we see is laboured and in some
part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in
the saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that
it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general
wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at
certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use
their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them,
and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing
of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every
other occasion incident to man’s life. So as there is a wisdom of
counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal
insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon
particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general observation of
causes of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth
to his brother, _De petitione consulatus_ (being the only book of
business that I know written by the ancients), although it concerned a
particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of
many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a
perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may
see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed
by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as
the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters, we
see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts,
positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay
a while, offering to consideration some number of examples.

(6) _Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam_,
_ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi_. Here is commended the
provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it
was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’
papers unperused.

_Vir sapiens_, _si cum stulto contenderit_, _sive irascatur_, _sive
rideat_, _non inveniet requiem_. Here is described the great
disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than
himself; which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to
jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways
quit himself well of it.

_Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum_, _postea sentiet eum
contumacem_. Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in
his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness.

_Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo_? _coram regibus stabit_, _nec erit
inter ignobiles_. Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to
honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love
not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and
diligent.

_Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole_, _cum adolescente secundo
qui consurgit pro eo_. Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla
first, and after him by Tiberius. _Plures adorant solem orientem quam
occidentem vel meridianum_.

_Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te_, _locum tuum ne
demiseris_; _quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima_. Here caution
is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the
unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of
means to make them better.

_Erat civitas parva_, _et pauci in ea viri_: _venit contra eam rex
magnus_, _et vallavit eam_, _instruxitque munitones per gyrum_, _et
perfecta est obsidio_; _inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens_, _et
liberavit eam per sapientiam suam_; _et nullus deinceps recordatus est
huminis illius pauperis_. Here the corruption of states is set forth,
that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it.

_Millis responsio frangit iram_. Here is noted that silence or rough
answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.

_Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum_. Here is lively represented how
laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till the
last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a briar
or impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

_Melior est finis orationis quam principium_. Here is taxed the vanity
of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than
upon the conclusions and issues of speech.

_Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem_, _non bene facit_; _iste et pro
buccella panis deseret veritatem_. Here is noted, that a judge were
better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge
offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

_Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi_, _in quo
paratur fames_. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous
extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry
horseleech.

_Fons turbatus pede_, _et vena corrupta_, _est justus cadens coram
impio_. Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the
face of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many
particular injuries passed over by connivance.

_Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre_, _et dicit hoc non esse
peccatum_, _particeps est homicidii_. Here is noted that, whereas men in
wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they
might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate
their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.

_Noli esse amicus homini iracundo_, _nec ambulato cum homine furioso_.
Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do
principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse
us to many factions and quarrels.

_Qui conturbat domum suam_, _possidebit ventum_. Here is noted, that in
domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting
of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived of their
expectation, and it turneth to wind.

_Filius sapiens lætificat patrem_: _filius vero stultus mæstitia est
matri suæ_. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the
good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill
proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.

_Qui celat delictum_, _quærit amicitiam_; _sed qui altero sermone
repetit_, _separat fæderatos_. Here caution is given, that reconcilement
is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past,
than by apologies and excuses.

_In omni opere bono erit abundantia_; _ubi autem verba sunt plurima_,
_ibi frequenter egestas_. Here is noted, that words and discourse
aboundeth most where there is idleness and want.

_Primus in sua causa justus_: _sed venit altera pars_, _et inquiret in
eum_. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth
much; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed,
except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.

_Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia_, _et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora
ventris_. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which
seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which
hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.

_Qui erudit derisorem_, _ipse sibi injuriam facit_; _et qui arguit
impium_, _sibi maculam generat_. Here caution is given how we tender
reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem
it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.

_Da sapienti occasionem_, _et addetur ei sapientia_. Here is
distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal
and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is
quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.

_Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium_, _sic corda hominum
manifesta sunt prudentibus_. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to
a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are
represented; from which representation proceedeth that application,

“Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit. ”

(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of
Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a
desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as
deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with
brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the
sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is
allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and some
writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as
instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I
would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples.

(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to
be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out
any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it
and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But for fables, they
were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times
abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And
therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this
variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel
chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories
or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of
particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath much
greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example,
than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point
of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when the example
is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with
all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon
made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the
examples alleged for the discourse’s sake are cited succinctly, and
without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse
which they are brought in to make good.

(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of
times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel
handleth, so histories of lives is the most popular for discourse of
business, because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, there
is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is
discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of
Cicero _ad Atticum_, and others. For letters have a great and more
particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives.
Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil
knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.

(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much
from that whereof we have spoken as _sapere_ and _sibi sapere_, the one
moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For
there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a
man’s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many
are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like
ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the
garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: _Nam pol
sapiens_ (saith the comical poet) _fingit fortunam sibi_; and it grew to
an adage, _Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ_; and Livy attributed it to Cato
the first, _In hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat_, _ut quocunque
loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur_.

(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed,
hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in
Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the state
in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people as the
manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, “And in this
fortune had no part. ” And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in
anything he took in hand afterwards. For this is too high and too
arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, _Dicis_,
_Fluvius est neus et ego feci memet ipsum_; or of that which another
prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and
that which the poet expresseth,

“Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint! ”

For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and,
therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their
successes to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue. For so
Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus. So Cæsar said to the master of
the ship, _Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus_.

(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, _Faber quisque fortunæ suæ_:
_Sapiens dominabitur astris_: _Invia virtuti null est via_, and the like,
being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to
insolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward
declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no question
imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion as
they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus Cæsar (who was
rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died
he desired his friends about him to give him a _plaudite_, as if he were
conscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage.
This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is
practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And,
therefore, lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by
axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some
heads or passages of it.

(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to
teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every
man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the
difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is
as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral.
But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and
in substance. In honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an
opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please
herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the
hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey.
In substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that
nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the
globe of crystal or form; that is, that there be not anything in being
and action which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and
doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of
fortune otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man’s fortune can
be an end worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do
abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless
fortune as an organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration.

(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary
towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus
did require; who seeing in the frame of man’s heart such angles and
recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is,
to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their
natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps
and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their weaknesses
and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious, their
friends, factions, dependences; and again their opposites, enviers,
competitors, their moods and times, _Sola viri molles aditus et tempora
noras_; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this
not only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from time to time,
and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and
the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in
itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous:
for men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are
one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These
informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the
minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of
observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground
a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith,
_Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda_; _sed vir prudens
exhauriet illud_. And although the knowledge itself falleth not under
precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the
obtaining of it may.

(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the
ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and
distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to
words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to
set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said,
_Fronti nulla fides_, which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and
not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and
gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is _Animi janua_, “the gate
of the mind. ” None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of
Gallus, _Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat_. So again, noting the
differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in
the Senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech
of Germanicus, thus: _Magis in speciem adornatis verbis_, _quam ut
penitus sentire crederetur_; but of Drusus thus: _Paucioribus sed
intentior_, _et fida oratione_; and in another place, speaking of his
character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and popular,
he saith, “That in other things he was _velut eluctantium verborum_;” but
then again, _solutius loquebatur quando subveniret_. So that there is no
such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance
(_vultus jussus_), that can sever from a feigned tale some of these
fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and
formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily
and hardly.

(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted
without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: _Fraus
sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut majore emolumento fallat_; and the
Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is
better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small
favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as to
industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, _Alimenta socordiæ_. So
again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular
which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and
unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus
advanced many of the friends of Antonius, _Simul amicis ejus præfecturas
et tribunatus largitur_: wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he
did desolate him, and won from him his dependents.

(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of
flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially with
the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a
stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his
dissimulation when he said, “You are hurt because you do not reign;” of
which Tacitus saith, _Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere_:
_correptamque Græco versu admonuit_, _ideo lædi quia non regnaret_. And,
therefore, the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men
to confess their secrets:—

“Vino torus et ira. ”

And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so
settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes
upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open
themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation,
according to the proverb of Spain, _Di mentira_, _y sacar as verdad_:
“Tell a lie and find a truth. ”

(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports:
men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their
virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from
their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends,
with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions
conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more
masked: _Verior fama e domesticis emanat_.

(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their
natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by
their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly
and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope,
returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion
being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished
that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very
wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do.
And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to
suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian
proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:—

“Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
C’è ne manco che non credi. ”

“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men
do account upon. ”

(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their
natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being at the top
of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto
they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of
the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that
maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform
ourselves in men’s ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also
of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is
principally sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself
outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures,
_metus ejus rimatur_, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he broke the
other’s neck.

(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in
three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with
those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and
specially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of
persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least
which is perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind. The
second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in
most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech
inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to
a man’s knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and
inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man’s self to this watchful
and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and
action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a
philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, _Et hoc volo_,
_et etiam institutum servare_; so a politic man in everything should say
to himself, _Et hoc volo_, _ac etiam aliquid addiscere_. I have stayed
the longer upon this precept of obtaining good information because it is
a main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all
things, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of
themselves, and that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling; for
nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many
matters. So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but
only to this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which
may concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more
dexterity.

(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take
good information touching their own person, and well to understand
themselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a
glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine
glass is the Word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world,
or times wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves.

(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities and
virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with
the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and
examination to frame the considerations following.

(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with
the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit,
then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if
differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be
more close retired, and reserved; as we see in Tiberius, who was never
seen at a play, and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years;
whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men’s eyes, which Tacitus observeth,
_alia Tiberio morum via_.

(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions and
courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free; and,
if engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity; as we see was
done by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal
profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and
inclination; being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether
they were worse for a prince or for a priest.

(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to
have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein there
is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent; as Cæsar Julius
did, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the
excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and
saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom
the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a civil
and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial
greatness.

(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, to proceed
according to the composition of their own nature; as we may see in Cæsar,
all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not
solemn, or of reputation.

(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples,
in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their
natures and carriages are far differing. In which error it seemeth
Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith that he was wont often to say, _Sylla
potuit_, _ego non potero_? Wherein he was much abused, the natures and
proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the world;
the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn,
and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual.

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath many
other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.

(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man’s self, there
followeth the well opening and revealing a man’s self; wherein we see
nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less show. For
there is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man’s virtues,
fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering of a man’s
weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from the
other; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by
exposition, and the like. Wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus,
who was the greatest politique of his time, _Omnium quæ dixerat
feceratque arte quadam ostentator_, which requireth indeed some art, lest
it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to
the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than
in policy; for as it is said, _Audacter calumniare_, _semper aliquid
hæret_; so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, _Audacter
te vendita_, _semper aluquid hæret_. For it will stick with the more
ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile
at it and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth
countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and
government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at
times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military
persons); or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and
careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being
too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man’s self, as well as
gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others’
injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a
few solid natures, that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height
of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their
moderation.

(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not
perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not
disvalued and embased under the just price, which is done in three
manners—by offering and obtruding a man’s self, wherein men think he is
rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that
which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and
by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in commendation,
applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let
him hear what is truly said: _Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris_,
_si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat_.

(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the
valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners—by
caution, by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do
ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which
they are not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will
thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and
proclaim all their wants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves
to have a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from
a better cause or intended for some other purpose. For of the one it is
well said,

“Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni,”

and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the
virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a
coward, mildness; and so the rest. For the second, a man must frame some
probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble
his abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities
which are notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but
industries and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last but the
surest remedy—namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man
cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who
endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down
the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other,
which is to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to conceive that he
is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again,
to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those
things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets,
that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say,
“That that line cost them more labour than any of the rest;” and
presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which
they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in
this righting and helping of a man’s self in his own carriage, he must
take heed he show not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury,
by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some
sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage,
with a ready rescussing of a man’s self from scorns, is sometimes of
necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it
ever succeedeth with good felicity.

(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour to
frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing
hindereth men’s fortunes so much as this: _Idem manebat_, _neque idem
decebat_—men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to
Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he
had _versatile ingenium_. And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn
wits, which must be like themselves and cannot make departures, have more
dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat vicious
and enwrapped, and not easy to turn. In some it is a conceit that is
almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe
that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it
in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius Maximus
would have been temporising still, according to his old bias, when the
nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it
is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not
discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the
occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country
fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then
they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it
is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring
about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other
remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave
for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at
first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or
cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most
prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our
mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with
that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is well
expressed, _Fatis accede deisque_, that men do not only turn with the
occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit
or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions
that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not
occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please
the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake:
which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with
the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which
Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: _Et quemadmodum receptum est_, _ut
exercitum ducat imperator_, _sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ_;
_ut quæipsis videntur_, _ea gerantur_, _et non ipsi eventus persequi
cogantur_. For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of
sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly
and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own
plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very
imperfect without the other.

(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in
the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for although depth of
secrecy, and making way (_qualis est via navis in mari_, which the French
calleth _sourdes menées_, when men set things in work without opening
themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many
times _dissimulatio errores parit_, _qui dissimulatorem ipsum
illaqueant_. And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a
natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been
reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a
kind of profession, “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they
stood his friends or enemies. ” So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul,
made no scruple to profess “that he had rather be first in a village than
second at Rome. ” So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what
Cicero saith of him, _Alter_ (meaning of Cæsar) _non recusat_, _sed
quodammodo postulat_, _ut_ (_ut est_) _sic appelletur tyrannus_. So we
may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar, in his
very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in
his harangues to the people would swear, _Ita parentis honores consequi
liceat_ (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he
would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s that was erected
in the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said, “Is it possible? ”
or, “Did you ever hear the like? ” and yet thought he meant no hurt; he
did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous:
whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and
dissembling manner as Tacitus saith of him, _Occultior non melior_,
wherein Sallust concurreth, _Ore probo_, _animo inverecundo_, made it his
design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute
anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for
necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and
he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that
point when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could
make no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain
in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by
colour of the doubt of Cæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and
unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus
made this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in
regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to
Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, _Et cum artibus mariti
simulatione filii bene compostia_: for surely the continual habit of
dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly
politic.

(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom our
minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and
are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially and not
superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of
some men’s minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they
can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison,
preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and
effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular
fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in
many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some
measure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which
are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they must
needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato
the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to
no great purpose, _Hæc omnia magno studio agebat_. So in most things men
are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best,
when it should be the fittest.

(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards their fortune,
as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus. First the
amendment of their own minds. For the removal of the impediments of the
mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune
will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down
wealth and means; which I know most men would have placed first, because
of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions.
But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that
other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the
true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a valiant,
populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of
Solon, who, when Crœsus showed him his treasury of gold, said to him,
that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his
gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that
are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds,
wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like.