For
increase
of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing
causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more.
causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more.
Summa Theologica
13:56): "Lust hath perverted thy
heart. "
I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move
the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways.
First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers
are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity
that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes
remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all
energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary,
through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to
several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain
attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less
attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction,
when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of
any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or
will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is
good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of
reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension
of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in
those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the
apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative
power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict
of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we
observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn
their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result
being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the
sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it
also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is
not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in
the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the
lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
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Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a
passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the
weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest
thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is
weak and soon passes away.
Objection 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the
apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is
really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge;
and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really,
it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears
to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion
never influences the reason against its knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its
knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a
particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular
proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e. g. "Every
man," and "Not every man. " Now if two opinions contradict one another,
they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii. If
therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce
an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary
opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
Objection 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the
particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is
sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i,
text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e. g. that "no
fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for
example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication. "
Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
"words express the thoughts of the mind. " Now it often happens that
man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is
an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even
in particular.
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its
universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal
knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the
law of sin. " Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of
which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a
passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its
knowledge.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion
of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion;
wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin
a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the
object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to
an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to
the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there
were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov.
14:22): "They err that work evil. "
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that
they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the
words of Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . .
. and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of James
4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it
is a sin. " Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is
necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction.
Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge,
viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to
hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above
(Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in
general, e. g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know
in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done;
and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of
the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing
which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that
it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general
but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually:
and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter
to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails
to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through
mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not
attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is
ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider
actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance
supervening, e. g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity;
and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider
in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the passions
hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways.
First, by way of distraction, as explained above [1773](A[1]).
Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to
something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of
bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow
fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or
drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the
use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from
the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses
the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds
through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws
the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has
in general.
Reply to Objection 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does
not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge,
since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing
that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal
knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that something appears good in
particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion:
and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual
knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition,
and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative
proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true
habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and
actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is
directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.
Reply to Objection 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is
hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal,
so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal
proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his
conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that
the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two
particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e. g. No
fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e. g. Pleasure is to
be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from
arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the
passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.
Reply to Objection 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance
to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to
judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state
of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so,
yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii,
3.
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Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin committed through passion should
not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement
of the sensitive appetite, as stated above [1774](A[1]). Now vehemence
of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore
a sin committed through passion, should not be called a sin of
weakness.
Objection 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most
fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps.
77:39): "He remembered that they are flesh. " Therefore sins of weakness
should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those
which are due to a passion.
Objection 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things
which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, whether
he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according
to Gn. 4:7: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg. : 'The lust
thereof shall be under thee. '], and thou shalt have dominion over it. "
Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.
On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions
diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease.
Therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of
weakness.
I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which,
chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of
likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be
weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper
action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors
and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and
motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the
work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see
clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore
weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its
proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts
of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with
the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be
inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the
reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the
concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to
the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the
aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of
weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the
incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary
to his intention.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement
against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the
stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the
greater the weakness of the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which
is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body
may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as
stated above [1775](A[1]). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we
refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of
soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a
condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us
through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.
Reply to Objection 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its
consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that
our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of
the will is hindered in the way already explained [1776](A[1]).
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Whether self-love is the source of every sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every
sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause
of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore
man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. 19:18).
Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8): "Sin taking occasion
by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which
words a gloss says that "the law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that
concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a
distinct passion from love, as stated above ([1777]Q[3], A[2];[1778]
Q[23], A[4]). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set
on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love
arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility. "
Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.
Objection 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of
self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor.
Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love,
amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon. " Now every
sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of
every sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([1779]Q[75], A[1]), the proper and
direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to
a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from
inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone
desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves
himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him.
Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of
every sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a
fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate
self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv,
28) reckons to be the cause of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for
himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for
himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is
directed to the object of desire (e. g. a man is said to love wine or
money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil:
for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or
from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to
self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires
good things, or avoids evil things.
Reply to Objection 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix):
wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems
to be committed through self-love.
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Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of
life are fittingly described as causes of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh,
concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described
as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:10),
"covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all
evils. " Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it
should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.
Objection 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by
what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: "Beauty hath
deceived thee. " Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be
condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated
above ([1780]Q[30], A[2]). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not
only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore
"concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have
been mentioned.
Objection 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate
desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of
evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned
here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are
insufficiently described.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:16): "All that is in the world
is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg. : 'and'] pride of life. " Now a
thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is
written (1 Jn. 5:19): "The whole world is seated in wickedness. "
Therefore these three are causes of sin.
I answer that, As stated above [1781](A[4]), inordinate self-love is
the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of
good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident
that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is,
in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the
passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it
is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of
difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as
stated above (Q[23], A[1]). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated
above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things
which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the
preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or
as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and
the inordinate appetite of such things is called "concupiscence of the
flesh. " The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those
things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the
fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or
imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such are money,
apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called
"concupiscence of the eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the
sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote
curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the
concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as
to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.
The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of
life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall
state further on (Q[84], A[2]; [1782]SS, Q[162], A[1]).
It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can
be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible
part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to
the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible
passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness
according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of
good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of
"avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on
([1783]Q[84], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here
the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but
only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of
touch, but in respect of the eyes, i. e. of any apprehensive power.
Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all
the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so
its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner
apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. , serm. xxxiii).
Reply to Objection 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for
good, as stated above ([1784]Q[25], A[2];[1785] Q[39], A[2]); and so
those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the
causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.
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Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of
passion.
For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing
causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is
a cause of sin, as stated [1786](A[5]). Therefore the more intense the
passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin,
but increases it.
Objection 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to
merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases
merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a
greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also
increases rather than diminishes a sin.
Objection 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according
as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the
will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore
passion aggravates a sin.
On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of
the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the
less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).
I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will,
which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement
of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to
the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according
as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or
will, as stated above ([1787]AA[1],2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently,
in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the
lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything
intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must
needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is
voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our
control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason
and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse
of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this
respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its
voluntariness.
On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but
increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit,
as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it
is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which
anyone sins, the greater the sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that
to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the
part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his
turning to something else---accidentally, i. e. beside his intention.
Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental
cause, but of its direct cause.
Reply to Objection 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of
reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do
well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a
passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the
passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement,
as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.
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Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether.
For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin
altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes
an act to be involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth
against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would. "
Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 2: Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a
particular matter, as stated above [1788](A[2]; Q[76], A[3]). But
ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated
above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the
body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of
mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of
the soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of the passions as
"passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which
would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore
passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused
from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary.
Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act
wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does
not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be
observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either "in itself," as
when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," when the
will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the
case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is
considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk.
Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary
"directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it;
indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not.
Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is
sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in
the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a
passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin,
because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to
drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for
instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such
a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered
wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes,
however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason
altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to
other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since
the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as
stated above ([1789]Q[17], A[9]): wherefore such a passion does not
excuse from sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 1: The words, "So that you do not the things that
you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner
movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil,
in which sense we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: "The evil
which I will not, that I do. " Or again they may be referred to the will
as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act
counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: The particular ignorance which excuses
altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to
know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of
law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being
applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive
away, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a
comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about
drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease.
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Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be
mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin
committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for
pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin
of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But
passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the
sensuality, as stated above ([1790]Q[74], A[4]). Therefore a sin
committed through passion cannot be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained
above ([1791]AA[1],2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or
to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore
a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that "the passions of the
sins . . . work [Vulg. : 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit
unto death. " Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto
death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.
I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above ([1792]Q[72], A[5]),
consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion
pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to
direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last
end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating
reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden
movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to
a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the
deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the
passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated
above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal
sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are
committed through passion.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through
its cause, i. e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause
lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or
ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every
sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i. e. receives pardon [veniam].
Thirdly, by its genus, e. g. an idle word. This is the only kind of
venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards
the first kind.
Reply to Objection 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to
something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which
follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1):
hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason
altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its
free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however,
the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either
mortal or venial.
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OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz.
malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice,
i. e. purposely?
(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain
malice?
(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through
habit?
(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than
through passion?
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Whether anyone sins through certain malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through
certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain
malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work
evil. " Therefore no one sins through certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works
intending evil. " Now to sin through malice seems to denote the
intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia"
(malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not
denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore
no one sins through malice.
Objection 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a
cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely,
which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27): "[Who] as it were on
purpose have revolted from God [Vulg. : 'Him'], and would not understand
all His ways. " Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin
purposely or through certain malice.
I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for
the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to
corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is
thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the
principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both
rational (i. e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in
human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone
sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive
appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur
through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is
out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence
of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its
regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man,
even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life
which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some
temporal good, e. g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason
or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that
it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may
obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the
privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil,
which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in
order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through
certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge
that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through
ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action
is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: and
sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be
suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the
simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant,
when he sins through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own
sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or
obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would
choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering
loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a
pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to
choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's anger, to
being deprived of the pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be
taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good
habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through
malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also
denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of
evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he
sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean
some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when
anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this
imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the cause
of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not
indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous sin,
which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above
([1793]Q[75], A[4], ad 3).
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Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through habit,
sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain
malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man
commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word.
Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through
certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by
which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which
precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice.
Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through
certain malice.
Objection 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice,
he is glad after having done it, according to Prov. 2:14: "Who are glad
when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this,
because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those
actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who
sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: because "bad
men," i. e. those who have a vicious habit, "are full of remorse"
(Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed
through certain malice.
On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that is
done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to
which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard
to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed
through certain malice.
I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who
has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary to
use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that
habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something we use when we will,"
as stated above ([1794]Q[50], A[1]). And thus, even as it may happen
that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act,
because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, something of
which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some
works which are generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that
one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through the
uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses
the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice: because to
anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of
that habit, has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby
becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are
a second nature. Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a
vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result
being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain
possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is to
sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins
through habit, sins through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good,
consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not
simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof
is not a simple but a relative evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species
as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from
them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin
committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for
what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he
is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means
of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that
while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the
habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not
because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his
reaping some disadvantage from the sin.
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Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice,
sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an
unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i. e. through
choice, "unless it be done through habit. " Now to sin through certain
malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above
[1795](A[1]). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he
has the habit of sin.
Objection 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not
suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little. "
But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through
certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice,
not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a
habit.
Objection 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his
will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by
the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good.
Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something
supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through
passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as
stated ([1796]Q[77], A[3]). Therefore whenever anyone sins through
certain malice, he sins through habit.
On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same relation to the
choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something
evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of
a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.
Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may
choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.
I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil.
Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the
rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be
contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to
some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in
fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when
anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the
impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion.
Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then
alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to
evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his
having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect
of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to
him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends,
as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to
that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is
either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of
the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain
sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the
will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of
some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not
through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of
eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear
to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being
freed from the bridle, as it were.
It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice,
always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not
always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins
through certain malice, that he sins through habit.
Reply to Objection 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not
only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them
with pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of
reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into
sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this
something is not always a habit, as stated above.
heart. "
I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move
the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways.
First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers
are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity
that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes
remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all
energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary,
through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to
several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain
attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less
attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction,
when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of
any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or
will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is
good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of
reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension
of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in
those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the
apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative
power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict
of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we
observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn
their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result
being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the
sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it
also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is
not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in
the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the
lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
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Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a
passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the
weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest
thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is
weak and soon passes away.
Objection 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the
apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is
really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge;
and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really,
it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears
to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion
never influences the reason against its knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its
knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a
particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular
proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e. g. "Every
man," and "Not every man. " Now if two opinions contradict one another,
they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii. If
therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce
an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary
opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
Objection 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the
particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is
sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i,
text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e. g. that "no
fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for
example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication. "
Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
"words express the thoughts of the mind. " Now it often happens that
man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is
an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even
in particular.
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its
universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal
knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the
law of sin. " Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of
which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a
passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its
knowledge.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion
of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion;
wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin
a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the
object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to
an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to
the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there
were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov.
14:22): "They err that work evil. "
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that
they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the
words of Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . .
. and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of James
4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it
is a sin. " Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is
necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction.
Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge,
viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to
hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above
(Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in
general, e. g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know
in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done;
and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of
the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing
which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that
it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general
but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually:
and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter
to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails
to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through
mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not
attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is
ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider
actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance
supervening, e. g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity;
and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider
in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the passions
hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways.
First, by way of distraction, as explained above [1773](A[1]).
Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to
something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of
bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow
fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or
drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the
use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from
the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses
the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds
through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws
the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has
in general.
Reply to Objection 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does
not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge,
since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing
that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal
knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that something appears good in
particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion:
and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual
knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition,
and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative
proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true
habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and
actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is
directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.
Reply to Objection 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is
hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal,
so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal
proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his
conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that
the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two
particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e. g. No
fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e. g. Pleasure is to
be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from
arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the
passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.
Reply to Objection 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance
to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to
judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state
of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so,
yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii,
3.
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Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin committed through passion should
not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement
of the sensitive appetite, as stated above [1774](A[1]). Now vehemence
of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore
a sin committed through passion, should not be called a sin of
weakness.
Objection 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most
fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps.
77:39): "He remembered that they are flesh. " Therefore sins of weakness
should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those
which are due to a passion.
Objection 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things
which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, whether
he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according
to Gn. 4:7: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg. : 'The lust
thereof shall be under thee. '], and thou shalt have dominion over it. "
Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.
On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions
diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease.
Therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of
weakness.
I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which,
chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of
likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be
weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper
action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors
and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and
motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the
work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see
clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore
weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its
proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts
of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with
the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be
inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the
reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the
concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to
the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the
aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of
weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the
incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary
to his intention.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement
against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the
stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the
greater the weakness of the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which
is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body
may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as
stated above [1775](A[1]). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we
refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of
soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a
condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us
through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.
Reply to Objection 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its
consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that
our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of
the will is hindered in the way already explained [1776](A[1]).
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Whether self-love is the source of every sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every
sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause
of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore
man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. 19:18).
Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8): "Sin taking occasion
by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which
words a gloss says that "the law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that
concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a
distinct passion from love, as stated above ([1777]Q[3], A[2];[1778]
Q[23], A[4]). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set
on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love
arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility. "
Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.
Objection 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of
self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor.
Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love,
amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon. " Now every
sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of
every sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([1779]Q[75], A[1]), the proper and
direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to
a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from
inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone
desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves
himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him.
Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of
every sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a
fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate
self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv,
28) reckons to be the cause of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for
himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for
himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is
directed to the object of desire (e. g. a man is said to love wine or
money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil:
for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or
from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to
self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires
good things, or avoids evil things.
Reply to Objection 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix):
wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems
to be committed through self-love.
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Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of
life are fittingly described as causes of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh,
concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described
as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:10),
"covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all
evils. " Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it
should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.
Objection 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by
what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: "Beauty hath
deceived thee. " Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be
condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated
above ([1780]Q[30], A[2]). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not
only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore
"concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have
been mentioned.
Objection 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate
desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of
evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned
here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are
insufficiently described.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:16): "All that is in the world
is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg. : 'and'] pride of life. " Now a
thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is
written (1 Jn. 5:19): "The whole world is seated in wickedness. "
Therefore these three are causes of sin.
I answer that, As stated above [1781](A[4]), inordinate self-love is
the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of
good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident
that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is,
in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the
passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it
is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of
difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as
stated above (Q[23], A[1]). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated
above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things
which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the
preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or
as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and
the inordinate appetite of such things is called "concupiscence of the
flesh. " The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those
things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the
fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or
imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such are money,
apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called
"concupiscence of the eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the
sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote
curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the
concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as
to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.
The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of
life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall
state further on (Q[84], A[2]; [1782]SS, Q[162], A[1]).
It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can
be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible
part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to
the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible
passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness
according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of
good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of
"avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on
([1783]Q[84], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here
the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but
only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of
touch, but in respect of the eyes, i. e. of any apprehensive power.
Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all
the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so
its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner
apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. , serm. xxxiii).
Reply to Objection 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for
good, as stated above ([1784]Q[25], A[2];[1785] Q[39], A[2]); and so
those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the
causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.
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Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of
passion.
For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing
causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is
a cause of sin, as stated [1786](A[5]). Therefore the more intense the
passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin,
but increases it.
Objection 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to
merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases
merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a
greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also
increases rather than diminishes a sin.
Objection 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according
as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the
will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore
passion aggravates a sin.
On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of
the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the
less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).
I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will,
which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement
of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to
the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according
as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or
will, as stated above ([1787]AA[1],2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently,
in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the
lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything
intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must
needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is
voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our
control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason
and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse
of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this
respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its
voluntariness.
On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but
increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit,
as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it
is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which
anyone sins, the greater the sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that
to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the
part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his
turning to something else---accidentally, i. e. beside his intention.
Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental
cause, but of its direct cause.
Reply to Objection 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of
reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do
well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a
passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the
passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement,
as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.
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Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether.
For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin
altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes
an act to be involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth
against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would. "
Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 2: Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a
particular matter, as stated above [1788](A[2]; Q[76], A[3]). But
ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated
above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the
body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of
mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of
the soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of the passions as
"passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which
would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore
passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused
from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary.
Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act
wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does
not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be
observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either "in itself," as
when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," when the
will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the
case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is
considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk.
Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary
"directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it;
indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not.
Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is
sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in
the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a
passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin,
because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to
drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for
instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such
a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered
wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes,
however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason
altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to
other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since
the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as
stated above ([1789]Q[17], A[9]): wherefore such a passion does not
excuse from sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 1: The words, "So that you do not the things that
you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner
movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil,
in which sense we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: "The evil
which I will not, that I do. " Or again they may be referred to the will
as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act
counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: The particular ignorance which excuses
altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to
know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of
law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being
applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive
away, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a
comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about
drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease.
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Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be
mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin
committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for
pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin
of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But
passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the
sensuality, as stated above ([1790]Q[74], A[4]). Therefore a sin
committed through passion cannot be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained
above ([1791]AA[1],2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or
to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore
a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that "the passions of the
sins . . . work [Vulg. : 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit
unto death. " Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto
death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.
I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above ([1792]Q[72], A[5]),
consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion
pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to
direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last
end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating
reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden
movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to
a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the
deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the
passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated
above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal
sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are
committed through passion.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through
its cause, i. e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause
lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or
ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every
sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i. e. receives pardon [veniam].
Thirdly, by its genus, e. g. an idle word. This is the only kind of
venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards
the first kind.
Reply to Objection 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to
something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which
follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1):
hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason
altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its
free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however,
the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either
mortal or venial.
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OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz.
malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice,
i. e. purposely?
(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain
malice?
(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through
habit?
(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than
through passion?
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Whether anyone sins through certain malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through
certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain
malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work
evil. " Therefore no one sins through certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works
intending evil. " Now to sin through malice seems to denote the
intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia"
(malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not
denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore
no one sins through malice.
Objection 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a
cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely,
which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27): "[Who] as it were on
purpose have revolted from God [Vulg. : 'Him'], and would not understand
all His ways. " Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin
purposely or through certain malice.
I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for
the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to
corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is
thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the
principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both
rational (i. e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in
human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone
sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive
appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur
through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is
out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence
of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its
regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man,
even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life
which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some
temporal good, e. g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason
or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that
it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may
obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the
privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil,
which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in
order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through
certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge
that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through
ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action
is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: and
sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be
suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the
simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant,
when he sins through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own
sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or
obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would
choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering
loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a
pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to
choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's anger, to
being deprived of the pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be
taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good
habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through
malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also
denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of
evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he
sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean
some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when
anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this
imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the cause
of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not
indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous sin,
which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above
([1793]Q[75], A[4], ad 3).
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Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through habit,
sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain
malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man
commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word.
Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through
certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by
which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which
precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice.
Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through
certain malice.
Objection 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice,
he is glad after having done it, according to Prov. 2:14: "Who are glad
when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this,
because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those
actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who
sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: because "bad
men," i. e. those who have a vicious habit, "are full of remorse"
(Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed
through certain malice.
On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that is
done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to
which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard
to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed
through certain malice.
I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who
has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary to
use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that
habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something we use when we will,"
as stated above ([1794]Q[50], A[1]). And thus, even as it may happen
that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act,
because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, something of
which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some
works which are generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that
one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through the
uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses
the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice: because to
anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of
that habit, has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby
becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are
a second nature. Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a
vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result
being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain
possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is to
sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins
through habit, sins through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good,
consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not
simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof
is not a simple but a relative evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species
as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from
them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin
committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for
what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he
is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means
of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that
while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the
habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not
because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his
reaping some disadvantage from the sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice,
sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an
unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i. e. through
choice, "unless it be done through habit. " Now to sin through certain
malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above
[1795](A[1]). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he
has the habit of sin.
Objection 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not
suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little. "
But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through
certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice,
not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a
habit.
Objection 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his
will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by
the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good.
Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something
supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through
passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as
stated ([1796]Q[77], A[3]). Therefore whenever anyone sins through
certain malice, he sins through habit.
On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same relation to the
choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something
evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of
a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.
Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may
choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.
I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil.
Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the
rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be
contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to
some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in
fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when
anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the
impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion.
Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then
alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to
evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his
having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect
of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to
him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends,
as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to
that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is
either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of
the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain
sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the
will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of
some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not
through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of
eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear
to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being
freed from the bridle, as it were.
It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice,
always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not
always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins
through certain malice, that he sins through habit.
Reply to Objection 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not
only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them
with pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of
reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into
sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this
something is not always a habit, as stated above.
