No More Learning

! ! THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
23
to intervene in Cappadocia. Fortunately the remembrance of the former energy of the Romans defended their interests in the east better than their present government did, and the energy and dexterity of the governor supplied what the senate lacked in both respects. Mithradates kept back and con tented himself with inducing Tigranes the great-king of Armenia, who held a more free position with reference to the Romans than he did, to send troops to Cappadocia. Sulla quickly collected his forces and the contingents of the Asiatic allies, crossed the Taurus, and drove the
Gordius along with his Armenian auxiliaries out of Cappadocia. This proved effectual. Mithradates yielded on all points; Gordius had to assume the blame of the Cappadocian troubles, and the pseudo-Ariarathes disappeared; the election of king, which the Pontic faction had vainly attempted to direct towards Gordius, fell on the respected Cappadocian Ariobarzanes.
When Sulla in following out his expedition arrived in
the region of the Euphrates, in whose waters the Roman contact
governor
standards were then first mirrored, the Romans came for
the first time into contact with the Parthians, who in con
sequence of the variance between them and Tigranes had Parthians occasion to make approaches to the Romans. On both
sides there seemed a feeling that it was of some moment, in
this first contact between the two great powers of the east
and the west, that neither should renounce its claims to the sovereignty of the world ; but Sulla, bolder than the Parthian envoy, assumed and maintained in the conference the place of honour between the king of Cappadocia and the Par thian ambassador. Sulla’s fame was more increased by this greatly celebrated conference on the Euphrates than by his
victories in the east; on its account the Parthian envoy after wards forfeited his life to his master's resentment. But for the moment this contact had no further result. Nicomedes in
reliance on the favour of the Romans omitted to evacuate
between
Romans and the
92.
New aggressions of Mithra dates.
Paphlagonia, but the decrees adopted by the senate against Mithradates were carried further into effect, the reinstatement of the Scythian chieftains was at least promised by him ; the earlier rtatus yuo in the east seemed to be restored (662).
So it was alleged; but in fact there was little trace of any real return of‘the former order of things. Scarce had Sulla left Asia, when Tigranes king of Great Armenia fell upon Ariobarzanes the new king of Cappadocia, expelled him, and reinstated in his stead the Pontic pretender Ariarathes. In Bithynia, where after the death of the old
:4
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
91. king Nicomedes II. (about 663) his son Nicomedes III. Philopator had been recognized by the people and by the Roman senate as legitimate king, his younger brother Socrates came forward as pretender to the crown and possessed himself of the sovereignty. It was clear that the real author of the Cappadocian as of the Bithynian troubles was no other than Mithradates, although he refrained from taking any open part. Every one knew that Tigranes only acted at his beck; but Socrates also had marched into Bithynia with Pontic troops, and the legitimate king’s life was threatened by the assassins of Mithradates. In the Crimea even and the neighbouring countries the Pontic king had no thought of receding, but on the contrary carried his arms farther and farther.
Aqnillius sent to Asia.
The Roman government, appealed to for aid by the kings Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes in person, despatched to Asia Minor in support of Lucius Cassius who was
there the consular Manius Aquillius—an ofiicer tried in the Cimbrian and Sicilian wars—not, however, as general at the head of an army, but as an ambassador, and directed the Asiatic client states and Mithradates in particular to lend armed assistance in case of need. The result was as it had been two years before. The Roman oflicer accomplished the commission entrusted to him with the aid of the small Roman corps which the governor of
governor
CHAP. vrrr THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
25
the province of Asia had at his disposal, and of the levy of the Phrygians and Galatians; king Nicomedes and king Ariobarzanes again ascended their tottering thrones; Mithradates under various pretexts evaded the summons to furnish contingents, but gave to the Romans no open resistance; on the contrary the Bithynian pretender Socrates was even put to death by his orders (664).
It was a singular complication. Mithradates was fully
90.
The state
convinced that he could do nothing against the Romans in of things inter
open conflict, and was therefore firmly resolved not to allow mediate
matters to come to an open rupture and war with them. between war and
Had he not been so resolved, there was no more favourable peace.
opportunity for beginning the struggle than the present: just at the time when Aquillius marched into Bithynia and Cappadocia, the Italian insurrection was at the height of
its power and might encourage even the weak to declare against Rome; yet Mithradates allowed the year 664 to '0. pass without profiting by the opportunity. Nevertheless he pursued with equal tenacity and activity his plan of ex tending his territory in Asia Minor. This strange combina
tion of a policy of peace at any price with a policy of conquest was certainly in itself untenable, and was simply
a fresh proof that Mithradates did not belong to the class
of genuine statesmen; he knew neither how to prepare for conflict like king Philip nor how to submit like king Attalus, but in the true style of a sultan was perpetually fluctuating between a greedy desire of conquest and the sense of his own weakness. But even in this point of view
his proceedings can only be understood, when we recollect that Mithradates had become acquainted by twenty years’ experience with the Roman policy of that day. He knew very well that the Roman government were far from desirous of war; that they in fact, looking to the serious danger which threatened their rule from any general of reputation, and with the fresh remembrance o’ the Cimbrian
Aquillius about war.
Nieo~ modes.
:6 THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK iv
war and Marius, dreaded war still more if possible than he did himself. He acted accordingly. He was not afraid to demean himself in a way which would have given to any energetic government not fettered by selfish considerations manifold ground and occasion for declaring war; but he carefully avoided any open rupture which would have placed the senate under the necessity of declaring As soon as men appeared to be in earnest he drew back, before Sulla as well as before Aquillius; he hoped, doubtless, that he would not always be confronted by energetic generals, that he too would, as well as Jugurtha, fall in with his Scaurus or Albinus. It must be owned that this hope was not without reason although the very example of Jugurtha had on the other hand shown how foolish was to confound the bribery of Roman commander and the corruption of Roman army with the conquest of the
Roman people.
Thus matters stood between peace and war, and looked
quite as they would drag on for long in the same in decisive position. But was not the intention of Aquillius to allow this and, as he could not compel his government to declare war against Mithradates, he made use of
Nicomedes for that purpose. The latter, who was under the power of the Roman general and was, moreover, his debtor for the accumulated war expenses and for sums promised to the general in person, could not avoid comply ing with the suggestion that he should begin war with Mithradates. The declaration of war by Bithynia took place; but, even when the vessels of Nicomedes closed the Bosporus against those of Pontus, and his troops marched into the frontier districts of Pontus and laid waste the region of Amastris, Mithradates remained still unshaken in his policy of peace instead of driving the Bithynians over the frontier, he lodged complaint with the Roman envoys and asked them either to mediate or to allow him the
; a
a
5
if ;
it
a
it
it.
CHAP- vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
27
privilege of self-defence. But he was informed by Aquillius, that he must under all circumstances refrain from war against Nicomedes. That indeed was plain. They had employed exactly the same policy against Carthage; they allowed the victim to be set upon by the Roman hounds and forbade its defending itself against them. Mithradates reckoned himself lost, just as the Carthaginians had done; but, while the Phoenicians yielded from despair, the king of Sinope did the very opposite and assembled his troops and ships. “Does not even he who must succumb,” he is reported to have said, “defend himself against the robber? ” His son Ariobar zanes received orders to advance into Cappadocia 5 a
was sent once more to the Roman envoys to inform them of the step to which necessity had driven the king, and to demand their ultimatum. It was to the effect which was to be anticipated. Although neither the Roman senate nor king Mithradates nor king Nicomedes had desired the rupture, Aquillius desired it and war ensued
(end of 665). at Mithradates prosecuted the political and military pre
parations for the passage of arms thus forced upon him "OBS Mithm
with all his characteristic energy. First of all he drew datu closer his alliance with Tigranes king of Armenia, and obtained from him the promise of an auxiliary army which
was to march into western Asia and to take possession of
the soil there for king Mithradates and of the moveable property for king Tigranes. The Parthian king, offended by the haughty carriage of Sulla, though not exactly coming forward as an antagonist to the Romans, did not act as their ally. To the Greeks the king endeavoured to present himself in the character of Philip and Perseus, as the defender of the Greek nation against the alien rule of the Romans. Pontic envoys were sent to the king of Egypt and to the last remnant of free Greece, the league of the
message
28 THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK rv
Cretan cities, and adjured those for whom Rome had already forged her chains to rise now at the last moment and save Hellenic nationality; the attempt was in the case of Crete at least not wholly in vain, and numerous Cretans took service in the Pontic army. Hopes were entertained that the lesser and least of the protected states—Numidia, Syria, the Hellenic republics—would successively rebel, and that the provinces would revolt, particularly the west of Asia Minor, the victim of unbounded oppression. Efforts were made to excite a Thracian rising, and even to arouse Macedonia to revolt. Piracy, which even previously was flourishing, was now everywhere let loose as a most welcome ally, and with alarming rapidity squadrons of corsairs, calling themselves Pontic privateers, filled the Mediterranean far and wide. With eagerness and delight accounts were received of the commotions among the Roman burgesses, and of the Italian insurrection subdued yet far from extinguished. No direct relations, however, were formed with the discontented and the insurgents in Italy; except that a foreign corps armed and organized in the Roman fashion was created in Asia, the flower of which consisted of Roman and Italian refugees. Forces like those of Mithradates had not been seen in Asia since the Persian wars. The statements that, leaving out of account the Armenian auxiliary army, he took the field with 250,000 infantry and 40,000 cavalry, and that Pontic decked and 100 open vessels put to sea, seem no‘. too exaggerated in the case of a warlike sovereign who had at his disposal the numberless inhabitants of the steppes.
His generals, particularly the brothers Neoptolemus and Archelaus, were experienced and cautious Greek captains; among the soldiers of the king there was no want of brave men who despised death; and the armour glittering with gold and silver and the rich dresses of the Scythians and
Medes mingled gaily
with the bronze and steel of the
300
CHAP. vtu THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
19
Greek troopers. No unity of military organization, it is true, bound together these party-coloured masses; the army of Mithradates was just one of those unwieldy Asiatic war-machines, which had so often already—on the last occasion exactly a century before at Magnesia—succumbed to a superior military organization ; but still the east was in arms against the Romans, while in the western half of the empire also matters looked far from peaceful.
However much it was in itself a political necessity for
Rome to declare war against Mithradates, yet the particular moment was as unhappily chosen as possible; and for this
reason it is very probable that Manius Aquillius brought Roman about the rupture between Rome and Mithradates at this
time primarily from regard to his own interests. For the moment they had no other troops at their disposal in Asia than the small Roman division under Lucius Cassius and the militia of western Asia, and, owing to the military and financial distress in which they were placed at home in consequence of the insurrectionary war, a Roman army could not in the most favourable case land in Asia before the summer of 666. Hitherto the Roman magistrates there had a diflicult position; but they hoped to protect the Roman province and to be able to hold their ground as they stood—the Bithynian army under king Nicomedes in its position taken up in the previous year in the Paphla gonian territory between Amastris and Sinope, and the divisions under Lucius Cassius, Manius Aquillius, and
precise
Oppius, farther back in the Bithynian, Galatian, and Cappadocian territories, while the Bithyno-Roman fleet continued to blockade the Bosporus.
Quintus
In the beginning of the spring of 666 Mithradates assumed the offensive. On a tributary of the Halys, the Amnias (near the modern Tesch Kiipri), the Pontic van Asia guard of cavalry and light-armed troops encountered the Minor.
Bithynian army, and notwithstanding its very superior
Weak counter prepara tions of the
88.
Mith- [88. radates occupies
Antl movement:
numbers so broke it at the first onset that the beaten army dispersed and the camp and military chest fell into the hands of the victors. It was mainly to Neoptolemus and Archelaus that the king was indebted for this brilliant success. The far more wretched Asiatic militia, stationed farther back, thereupon gave themselves up as vanquished, even before they encountered the enemy; when the
generals of Mithradates approached them, they dispersed. A Roman division was defeated in Cappadocia ; Cassius sought to keep the field in Phrygia with the militia, but he discharged it again without venturing on a battle, and threw himself with his few trustworthy troops into the townships on the upper Maeander, particularly into Apamea. Oppius in like manner evacuated Pamphylia and shut himself up in the Phrygian Laodicea ; Aquillius was overtaken while retreating at the Sangarius in the Bithynian territory, and so totally defeated that he lost his camp and had to seek refuge at Pergamus in the Roman province 5 the latter also was soon overrun, and Pergamus itself fell into the hands of the king, as likewise the Bosporus and the ships that were there. After each victory Mithradates had dismissed all the prisoners belonging to the militia of Asia Minor, and had neglected no step to raise to a higher pitch the national sympathies that were from the first turned towards him. Now the whole country as far as the Maeander was with the exception of a few fortresses in his power; and news at the same time arrived, that a new revolution had broken out at Rome, that the consul Sulla destined to act against Mithradates had instead of embarking for Asia marched on Rome, that the most celebrated Roman generals were fighting battles with each other in order . to settle to whom the chief command in the Asiatic war should belong. Rome seemed zealously employed in the work of self-destruction: it is no wonder that, though even now minorities everywhere adhered to Rome, the great
30
THE EAST AND KING MITIIRADATES BOOK rv
can. vin THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
31
body of the natives of Asia Minor joined the Pontic king. Hellenes and Asiatics united in the rejoicing which welcomed the deliverer ; it became usual to compliment the king, in whom as in the divine conqueror of the Indians Asia and Hellas once more found a common meeting-point, under the name of the new Dionysus. The cities and islands sent messengers to meet him, wherever he went, and to invite “the delivering god ” to visit them; and in festal attire the citizens flocked forth in front of their gates to receive him. Several places delivered the Roman officers sojourning among them in chains to the king; Laodicea thus surrendered Quintus Oppius, the commandant of the town, and Mytilene in Lesbos the consular Manius Aquillius. 1 The whole fury of the barbarian, who gets the man before whom he has trembled into his power, discharged itself on the unhappy author of the war. The aged man was led throughout Asia Minor, sometimes on foot chained to a powerful mounted Bastarnian, sometimes bound on an ass and proclaiming his own name; and, when at length the pitiful spectacle
arrived at the royal quarters in Pergamus, by the king’s orders molten gold was poured down his throat —in order to satiate his avarice, which had really occasioned the war—till he expired in torture.
But the king was not content with this savage mockery, which alone suffices to erase its author’s name from the roll of true nobility. From Ephesus king Mithradates issued
again
orders to all the governors and cities dependent on him to general
put to death on one and the same day all Italians residing within their bounds, whether free or slaves, without distinc tion of sex or age, and on no account, under severe penalties, to aid any of the proscribed to escape; to cast forth the
1 Retribution came upon the authors of the arrest and surrender of Aquillius twenty-five years afterwards, when after Mithradates’ death his son Pharnaces handed them over to the Romans.
Orders issued from Ephesus for a
massau-e.
3:
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK Iv
corpses of the slain as a prey to the birds; to confiscate their property and to hand over one half of it to the murderers, and the other half to the king. The horrible orders were-excepting in a few districts, such as the island of Cos—punctually executed, and eighty, or according to other accounts one hundred and fifty, thousand-—if not innocent, at least defenceless—men, women, and children were slaughtered in cold blood in one day in Asia Minor ; a fearful execution, in which the good opportunity of getting rid of debts and the Asiatic servile willingness to perform any executioner’s oflice at the bidding of the sultan had at least as much part as the comparatively noble feeling of revenge. In a political point of view this measure was not only without any rational object—for its financial purpose might have been attained without this bloody edict, and the natives of Asia Minor were not to be driven into warlike zeal even by the consciousness of the most blood-stained guilt—but even opposed to the king’s designs, for on the one hand it compelled the Roman senate, so far as it was still capable of energy at all, to an energetic prosecution of the war, and on the other hand it struck at not the Romans merely, but the king’s natural allies as well, the non-Roman Italians. This Ephesian massacre was altogether a mere meaningless act of brutally blind revenge, which obtains a false semblance of grandeur simply through the colossal proportions in which the character of sultanic rule was here displayed.
The king’s views altogether grew high ; he had begun the war from despair, but the unexpectedly easy victory and
Organiza
tion of the
conquered
provinces. the non-arrival of the dreaded Sulla occasioned a transi
tion to the most highflown hopes. He set up his home in the west of Asia Minor; Pergamus the seat of the Roman governor became his new capital, the old kingdom of Sinope was handed over to the king’s son Mithradates to be administered as a viceroyship ; Cappadocia, Phrygia,
CHAP- V! " THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
33
Bithynia were organized as Pontic satrapies. The grandees of the empire and the king’s favourites were loaded with rich gifts and fiefs, and not only were the arrears of taxes remitted, but exemption from taxation for five years was promised, to all the communities—a measure which was as much a mistake as the massacre of the Romans, if the king expected thereby to secure the fidelity of the inhabitants of Asia Minor.
The king’s treasury was, no doubt, copiously replenished otherwise by the immense sums which accrued from the property of the Italians and other confiscations ; for instance in Cos alone 800 talents (,6 r 9 5,000) which the Jews had deposited there were carried off by Mithradates. The northern portion of Asia Minor and most of the islands belonging to it were in the king's power; except some petty Paphlagonian dynasts, there was hardly a district which still adhered to Rome ; the whole Aegean Sea was commanded by his fleets. The south-west alone, the city leagues of Caria and Lycia and the city of Rhodes, resisted him. In Caria, no doubt, Stratonicea was reduced by force of arms; but Magnesia on the Sipylus successfully withstood a severe siege, in which Mithradates’ ablest oflicer Archelaus was defeated and wounded. Rhodes, the asylum of the Romans who had escaped from Asia with the governor Lucius Cassius among them, was assailed on the part of Mithradates by sea and land with immense superiority of force. But his sailors, courageously as they did their duty under the eyes of the king, were awkward novices, and so Rhodian squadrons vanquished those of Pontus four times as strong and returned home with captured vessels. By land also the siege made no progress; after a part of the works had been destroyed, Mithradates abandoned enterprise, and the important island as well as the main land opposite remained in the hands of the Romans.
But not only was the Asiatic VOL IV
the
province occupied by 103
34
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK iv
Pontle Mithradates almost without defending itself, chiefly in con invasion of sequence of the Sulpician revolution breaking out at a
most unfavourable time; Mithradates even directed an 92 attack against Europe. Already since 662 the neighbours
of Macedonia on her northern and eastern frontier had been
renewing their incursions with remarkable vehemence and
90. 89. perseverance ; in the years 664, 665 the Thracians overran
Europe.
Predatory inroads of the Thra
Macedonia and all Epirus and plundered the temple of Dodona. Still more singular was the circumstance, that with these movements was combined a renewed attempt to place a pretender on the Macedonian throne in the person of one Euphenes. Mithradates, who from the Crimea maintained connections with the Thracians, was hardly a stranger to all these events. The praetor Gaius Sentius defended himself, it is true, against these intruders with the aid of the Thracian Dentheletae ; but it was not long before mightier opponents came against him. Mithradates, carried away by his successes, had formed the bold resolution that he would, like Antiochus, bring the war for the sovereignty of Asia to a decision in Greece, and had by land and sea directed thither the flower of his troops. His son Ariarathes penetrated from Thrace into the weakly-defended Macedonia, subduing the country as he advanced and parcelling it into Pontic satrapies. Abdera and Philippi became the principal bases for the operations of the Pontic arms in Europe. The Pontic fleet, com
Thrace and Macedonia occupied
by the Pontic armies. Pontic
fleet in the manded by Mithradates’ best general Archelaus, appeared Aegean.
in the Aegean Sea, where scarce a Roman sail was to be found. Delos, the emporium of the Roman commerce in those waters, was occupied and nearly 20,000 men, mostly Italians, were massacred there; Euboea suffered a similar fate ; all the islands to the east of the Malean promontory were soon in the hands of the enemy ; they might proceed to attack the mainland itself. The assault, no doubt, which the Pontic fleet made from Euboea on the important
CHAP- vul THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
35
Demetrias, was repelled by Bruttius Sura, the brave lieu tenant of the governor of Macedonia, with his handful of troops and a few vessels hurriedly collected, and he even occupied the island of Sciathus; but he could not prevent the enemy from establishing himself in Greece proper.
There Mithradates carried on his operations not only The Pontic by arms, but at the same time by national propagandism.
His chief instrument for Athens was one Aristion, by birth Greece
an Attic slave, by profession formerly a teacher of the Epicurean philosophy, now a minion of Mithradates ; an
excellent master of persuasion, who by the brilliant career which he pursued at court knew how to dazzle the mob, and with due gravity to assure them that help was already on the way to Mithradates from Carthage, which had been for about sixty years lying in ruins. These addresses of the new Pericles were so far effectual that, while the few persons possessed of judgment escaped from Athens, the mob and one or two literati whose heads were turned formally renounced the Roman rule. So the ex-philosopher became a despot who, supported by his hands of Pontic mercenaries, commenced an infamous and bloody rule ; and the Piraeeus was converted into a Pontic harbour. As soon as the troops of Mithradates gained a footing on the Greek continent, most of the small free states—the Achaeans, Laconians, Boeotians—as far as Thessaly joined them. Sura, after having drawn some reinforcements from Macedonia, ad vanced into Boeotia to bring help to the besieged Thespiae
and engaged in conflicts with Archelaus and Aristion during
three days at Chaeronea ; but they led to no decision and
Sura was obliged to retire when the Pontic reinforcements
from the Peloponnesus approached (end of 666, beg. of 667). 88. 87.
So commanding was the position of Mithradates, parti cularly by sea, that an embassy of Italian insurgents could invite him to make an attempt to land in Italy; but their
Position of the Romans.
cause was already by that time lost, and the king rejected the suggestion.
The position of the Roman government began to be critical. Asia Minor and Hellas were wholly, Macedonia to a considerable extent, in the enemy’s hands ; by sea the Pontic flag ruled without a rival. Then there was the Italian insurrection, which, though baffled on the whole, still held the undisputed command of wide districts of Italy; the barely hushed revolution, which threatened every moment to break out afresh and more formidably ; and, lastly, the alarming commercial and monetary crisis (iii. 5 30) occasioned by the internal troubles of Italy and the enormous losses of the Asiatic capitalists, and the want of trustworthy troops. The government would have required three armies, to keep down the revolution in Rome, to crush completely the insurrection in Italy, and to wage war in Asia; it had but one, that of Sulla ; for the northern army was, under the untrustworthy Gnaeus Strabo, simply an additional embarrassment. Sulla had to choose which of these three tasks he would undertake; he decided, as we have seen, for the Asiatic war. It was
no trifling matter—we should perhaps say, it was a great act of patriotism—that in this conflict between the general interest of his country and the special interest of his party the former retained the ascendency ; and that Sulla, in spite of the dangers which his removal from Italy involved
for his constitution and his party, landed in the spring of 87. 667 on the coast of Epirus.
35
THE EAST AND KING MITIIRADATES BOOK IV
Sulla’: landing.
But he came not, as Roman commanders-in-chief had been wont to make their appearance in the East. That his army of five legions or of at most 30,000 men,1 was little stronger than an ordinary consular army, was the
1 We must recollect that after the outbreak of the Social War the legion had at least not more than half the number of men which it had previously, as it was no longer accompanied by Italian contingents.
CHAP. VIII THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
37
least element of difference. Formerly in the eastern wars a Roman fleet had never been wanting, and had in fact without exception commanded the sea ; Sulla, sent to reconquer two continents and the islands of the Aegean sea, arrived without a single vessel of war. Formerly the
had brought with him a full chest and drawn the greatest portion of his supplies by sea from home; Sulla came with empty hands-—for the sums raised with difliculty for the campaign of 666 were expended in Italy—and found himself exclusively left dependent on requisitions. Formerly the general had found his only opponent in the enemy’s camp, and since the close of the struggle between the orders political factions had without exception been united in opposing the public foe ; but Romans of note
fought under the standards of Mithradates, large districts
of Italy desired to enter into alliance with him, and it was
at least doubtful whether the democratic party would follow
the glorious example that Sulla had set before and keep
truce with him so long as he was fighting against the
Asiatic king. But the vigorous general, who had to contend with all these embarrassments, was not accus
tomed to trouble himself about more remote dangers
before finishing the task immediately in hand. When
his proposals of peace addressed to the king, which sub stantially amounted to restoration of the state of matters
before the war, met with no acceptance, he advanced just
as he had landed, from the harbours of Epirus to Boeotia, G\reece defeated the generals of the enemy Archelaus and Aristion occupied. there at Mount Tilphossium, and after that victory possessed
himself almost without resistance of the whole Grecian mainland with the exception of the fortresses of Athens and the Piraeeus, into which Aristion and Archelaus had thrown themselves, and which he failed to carry by coup 4': main. A Roman division under Lucius Hortensius occupied Thessaly and made incursions into Macedonia another
general
a ;
it,
a
Protracted siege of Athens and the Piraeeus.
under Munatius stationed itself before Chalcis, to keep! off the enemy’s corps under Neoptolemus in Euboea; Sulla‘ himself formed a camp at Eleusis and Megara, from which‘ he commanded Greece and the Peloponnesus, and prose-' cuted the siege of the city and harbour of Athens. The Hellenic cities, governed as they always were by their immediate fears, submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and were glad when they were allowed to ransom them selves from more severe punishment by supplying provisions and men and paying fines.
The sieges in Attica advanced less rapidly. Sulla found himself compelled to prepare all sorts of heavy besieging implements for which the trees of the Academy and the Lyceum had to supply the timber. Archelaus conducted the defence with equal vigour and judgment; he armed the crews of his vessels, and thus reinforced repelled the attacks of the Romans with superior strength and made frequent and not seldom successful sorties. The Pontic army of Dromichaetes advancing to the relief of the city was defeated under the walls of Athens by the Romans after a severe struggle, in which Sulla’s brave legate Lucius Licinius Murena particularly distinguished himself; but the siege did not on that account advance more rapidly. From Macedonia, where the Cappadocians had meanwhile defini tively established themselves, plentiful and regular supplies arrived by sea, which Sulla was not in a condition to cut off from the harbour-fortress ; in Athens no doubt provisions were beginning to fail, but from the proximity of the two fortresses Archelaus was enabled to make various attempts to throw quantities of grain into Athens, which were not
38
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK 1v!
87-86. wholly unsuccessful. So the winter of 667-8 passed away tediously without result. As soon as the season allowed, Sulla threw himself with vehemence on the Piraeeus; he in fact succeeded by missiles and mines in making a breach in part of the strong walls of Pericles, and immediately the
can. vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
39
Romans advanced to the assault ; but it was repulsed, and on its being renewed crescent-shaped entrenchments were found constructed behind the fallen walls, from which the invaders‘ found themselves assailed on three sides with missiles and compelled to retire. Sulla then raised the siege, and contented himself with a blockade. In the mean while the provisions in Athens were wholly exhausted ; the garrison attempted to procure a capitulation, but Sulla sent back their fluent envoys with the hint that he stood before them not as a student but as a general, and would accept only unconditional surrender. When Aristion, well knowing what fate was in store for him, delayed compliance, the ladders were applied and the city, hardly any longer defended, was taken by storm (1 March 668). Aristion threw himself into the Acropolis, where he soon afterwards surrendered. The Roman general left the soldiery to murder and plunder in the captured city and the more considerable ringleaders of the revolt to be executed; but the city itself obtained back from him its liberty and its possessions—even the important Delos,—and was thus once more saved by its illustrious dead.
The Epicurean schoolmaster had thus been vanquished;
but the position of Sulla remained in the highest degree
diflicult, and even desperate. He had now been more
than a year in the field without having advanced a step
worth mentioning; a single port mocked all his exertions,
while Asia was utterly left to itself, and the conquest of Macedonia by Mithradates’ lieutenants had recently been completed by the capture of Amphipolis. Without a fleet Want of n —it was becoming daily more apparent—it was not only fleet. impossible to secure his communications and supplies in
of the ships of the enemy and the numerous but impossible to recover even the Piraeeus, to say nothing of Asia and the islands; and yet it was difficult to see how ships of war were to be got. As early as the
presence pirates,
Athens [86. falls.
Critical position of Sulla.
40
THE EAST AND KING MITl“IRADATES BOOK rv
87-86. winter of 667-8 Sulla had despatched one of his ablest and most dexterous oflicers, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, into the eastern waters, to raise ships there if possible. Lucullus put to sea with six open boats, which he had borrowed from the Rhodians and other small communities ; he him self merely by an accident escaped from a piratic squadron, which captured most of his boats ; deceiving the enemy by changing his vessels he arrived by way of Crete and Cyrene at Alexandria ; but the Egyptian court rejected his request for the support of ships of war with equal courtesy and de cision. Hardly anything illustrates so clearly as does this fact the sad decay of the Roman state, which had once
been able gratefully to decline the offer of the kings of Egypt to assist the Romans with all their naval force, and now itself seemed to the Alexandrian statesmen bankrupt. To all this fell to be added the financial embarrassment ; Sulla had already been obliged to empty the treasuries of the Olympian Zeus, of the Delphic Apollo, and of the Epidaurian Asklepios, for which the gods were compensated by the moiety, confiscated by way of penalty, of the Theban territory. But far worse than all this military and financial
was the reaction of the political revolution in Rome ; the rapid, sweeping, violent accomplishment of which had far surpassed the worst apprehensions. The revolution conducted the government in the capital ; Sulla had been deposed, his Asiatic command had been entrusted to the democratic consul Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who might be daily looked for in Greece. The soldiers had no doubt adhered to Sulla, who made every effort to keep them in good humour; but what could be expected, when money and supplies were wanting, when the general was deposed and proscribed, when his successor was on the way, and, in addition to all this, the war against the tough antagonist who commanded the sea was protracted without
of a close?
perplexity
prospect
CHAI’. vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
4!
King Mithradates undertook to deliver his antagonist Pontic
from his perilous position. He it was, to all appearance, armies enter
who disapproved the defensive system of his generals and Greece. sent orders to them to vanquish the enemy with the utmost
As early as 667 his son Ariarathes had started from 87. Macedonia to combat Sulla in Greece proper; only the sudden death, which overtook the prince on the march at the Tisaean promontory in Thessaly, had at that time led
to the abandonment of the expedition.
His successor Taxiles now appeared (668), driving before him the Roman 86. corps stationed in Thessaly, with an army of, it is said,
100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry at Thermopylae. Dromichaetes joined him. Archelaus also—compelled, Evacuation
speed.
not so much by Sulla’s arms as by his master’s of the
apparently,
orders—evacuated the Piraeeus first partially and then entirely, and joined the Pontic main army in Boeotia. Sulla, after the Piraeeus with all its greatly-admired fortifica
Piraeeus
tions had been by his orders destroyed, followed the Pontic army, in the hope of being able to fight a pitched battle before the arrival of Flaccus. In vain Archelaus advised that they should avoid such a battle, but should
the sea and the coast occupied and the enemy in suspense. Now just as formerly under Darius and Antiochus, the masses of the Orientals, like animals terrified in the midst of a fire, flung themselves hastily and blindly into battle; and did so on this occasion more foolishly than ever, since the Asiatics might perhaps have needed to wait but a few months in order to be the spectators of a battle between Sulla and Flaccus.
keep
In the plain of the Cephissus not far from Chaeronea, Battle of in March 668, the armies met. Even including the Chaeronea
86. division driven back from Thessaly, which had succeeded
in accomplishing its junction with the Roman main army, and including the Greek contingents, the Roman army found itself opposed to a foe three times as strong and
Slight
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES 1300! ! N
particularly to a cavalry fur superior and from the nature 0! the field of battle very dangerous, against which Sulla found it necessary to protect his flanks by digging trenches, while in front he caused a chain of palisades to be introduced between his first and second lines for protection against the enemy’s war-chariots. When the war-chariots rolled on to open the battle, the first line of the Romans withdrew behind this row of stakes: the chariots, rebounding from it and scared by the Roman slingers and archers, threw them selves on their own line and carried confusion both into the Macedonian phalanx and into the corps of the Italian
42
Archelaus brought up in haste his cavalry from both flanks and sent it to engage the enemy, with a view to gain time for rearranging his infantry ; it charged with great fury and broke through the Roman ranks; but the Roman infantry rapidly formed in close masses and courageously withstood the horsemen assailing them on every side. Meanwhile Sulla himself on the right wing led his cavalry against the exposed flank of the enemy ; the Asiatic infantry gave way before it was even properly engaged, and its giving way carried confusion also into the masses of the cavalry. A general attack of the Roman infantry, which through the wavering demeanour of the hostile Cavalry gained time to breathe, decided the victory. The closing of the gates of the camp, which Archelaus ordered to check the flight, only increased the slaughter, and when the gates at length were opened, the Romans entered at the same time with the Asiatics. It is said that Archelaus brought
not a twelfth part of his force in safety to Chalcis; Sulla followed him to the Euripus; be was not in a position to cross that narrow arm of the sea.
refugees.
‘
It was a great victory, but the results were trifling, effect of the partly because of the want of a fleet, partly because the Roman conqueror, instead of pursuing the vanquished, was under the necessity in the first instance of protecting himself
CHAP. Vlll THE EAST AN» KING MITHRADATES
43
against his own countrymen. The sea was still exclusively
‘covered by Pontic squadrons, which now showed themselves
even to the westward of the Malean promontory; even
after the battle of Chaeronea Archelaus landed troops on Zacynthus and made an attempt to establish himself on that
island. Moreover Lucius Flaccus had in the meanwhile Sulla ml
landed with two legions in Epirus, not without Flaccul. having sustained severe loss on the way from storms and
from the war-vessels of the enemy cruising in the Adriatic ;
his troops were already in Thessaly; thither Sulla had in
the first instance to turn. The two Roman armies encamped over against each other at Melitaea on the northern slope of Mount Othrys; a collision seemed inevitable. But Flaccus, after he had opportunity of convincing himself that Sulla’s soldiers were by no means inclined to betray their victorious leader to the totally unknown democratic commander-in—chief, but that on the contrary his own advanced guard began to desert to Sulla’s
camp, evaded a conflict to which he was in no respect
equal, and set out towards the north, with the view of
actually
Macedonia and Thrace to Asia and there paving the way for further results by subduing Mithradates.
That Sulla should have allowed his weaker opponent to depart without hindrance, and instead of following him should have returned to Athens, where he seems to
have passed the winter of 668-9, is in a military point 86-85 of view surprising. We may suppose perhaps that in
this also he was guided by political motives, and that he was sufliciently moderate and patriotic in his views willingly to forgo a victory over his countrymen, at least so long as they had still the Asiatics to deal with, and to find the most tolerable solution of the un happy dilemma in allowing the armies of the revolution in Asia and of the oligarchy in Europe to fight against the common foe.
getting through
Battle of Orcho menu.
44
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
Second]! ! In the spring of 669 there was again fresh work in
Pontic Europe. Mithradates, who continued his preparations inde army sent
to Greece. fatigably in Asia Minor, had sent an army not much less than that which had been extirpated at Chaeronea, under Dorylaus to Euboea ; thence it had, after a junction with the remains of the army of Archelaus, passed over the Euripus to Boeotia. The Pontic king, who judged of what his army could do by the standard of victories over the Bithynian and Cappadocian militia, did not understand the unfavourable turn which things had taken in Europe; the circles of the courtiers were already whispering as to the treason of Archelaus ; peremptory orders were issued to fight a second battle at once with the new army, and not to fail on this occasion to annihilate the Romans. The master’s will was carried out, if not in conquering, at least in fighting. The Romans and Asiatics met once more in
the plain of the Cephissus, near Orchomenus. The numerous and excellent cavalry of the latter flung itself impetuously on the Roman infantry, which began to waver and give way : the danger was so urgent, that Sulla seized a standard and advancing with his adjutants and orderlies against the enemy called out with a loud voice to the soldiers that, if they should be asked at home where they had abandoned their general, they might reply—at Orcho menus. This had its effect; the legions rallied and vanquished the enemy’s horse, after which the infantry were overthrown with little difliculty. On the following day the camp of the Asiatics was surrounded and stormed ; far the greatest portion of them fell or perished in the Copaic marshes; a few only, Archelaus among the rest, reached Euboea. The Boeotian communities had severely to pay for their renewed revolt from Rome, some of them even to annihilation. Nothing opposed the advance into Mace- donia and Thrace; Philippi was occupied, Abdera was voluntarily evacuated by the Pontic garrison, the European
‘
cHAr. vni THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
45
continent in general was cleared of the enemy. At the
end of the third year of the war (669) Sulla was able to 85.
take up winter-quarters in Thessaly, with a view to begin the Asiatic campaign in the spring of 670,1 for which 84 purpose he gave orders to build ships in the Thessalian ports.
Meanwhile the circumstances of Asia Minor also had Reaction undergone a material change. If king Mithradates had as: once come forward as the liberator of the Hellenes, if he against had introduced his rule with the recognition of civic inde pendence and with remission of taxes, they had after this
brief ecstasy been but too rapidly and too bitterly undeceived. He had very soon emerged in his true character, and had begun to exercise a despotism far surpassing the tyranny of the Roman governors-—a despotism which drove even the patient inhabitants of Asia Minor to open revolt. The sultan again resorted to the most violent expedients. His decrees granted inde pendence to the townships which turned to him, citizenship to the metoea', full remission of debts to the debtors, lands to those that had none, freedom to the slaves; nearly
1 5,000 such manumitted slaves fought in the army of Archelaus. The most fearful scenes were the result of this high-handed subversion of all existing order. The most considerable mercantile cities, Smyrna, Colophon, Ephesus, Tralles, Sardes, closed their gates against the king’s
1 The chronology of these events is, like all their details, enveloped in
an obscurity which investigation is able to dispel, at most, only partially.
That the battle of Chaeronea took place. if not on the same day as the storming of Athens (Pausan. i. no). at any rate soon afterwards, perhaps
in March 668, is tolerably certain. That the succeeding Thessalian and 86
the second Boeotian campaign took up not merely the remainder of 668 55 but also the whole of 669, is in itself probable and is rendered still more 85
so by the fact that Sulla's enterprises in Asia are not suflicient to fill more
than a single campaign. Licinianus also appears to indicate that Sulla returned to Athens for the winter of 668-669 and there took in hand the 86-8‘,
work of investigation and punishment; after which he relates the battle
of Orchomenus. The crossing of Sulla to Asia has accordingly been
placed not in 669, but in 670. 85. 84.
Lucullus and the fleet on the Asiatic coast.
governors or put them to death, and declared for Rome. 1 On the other hand the king’s lieutenant Diodorus, a philosopher of note like Aristion, of another school, but equally available for the worst subservience, under the instructions of his master caused the whole town-council of Adramyttium to be put to death. The Chians, who were suspected of an inclination to Rome, were fined in the first instance in 2000 talents (£480,000) and, when the pay ment was found not correct, they were at marr: put on board ship and deported in chains under the charge of their own slaves to the coast of Colchis, while their island was occupied with Pontic colonists. The king gave orders that the chiefs of the Celts in Asia Minor should all be put to death along with their wives and children in one day, and that Galatia should be converted into a Pontic satrapy. Most of these bloody edicts were carried into effect either
at Mithradates’ own headquarters or in Galatia, but the few who escaped placed themselves at the head of their powerful tribes and expelled Eumachus, the governor of the king, out of their bounds. It may readily be conceived that such a king would be pursued by the daggers of assassins ; sixteen hundred men were condemned to death
by the royal courts of inquisition as having been implicated in such conspiracies.
While the king was thus by his suicidal fury provoking his temporary subjects to rise in arms against him, he was at the same time hard pressed by the Romans in Asia, both by sea and by land. Lucullus, after the failure of his attempt to lead forth the Egyptian fleet against Mithra dates, had with better success repeated his efforts to procure
1 The resolution of the citizens of Ephesus to this effect has recentlv been found (Waddington, Additions to Lebas, Inrcr. iii. 136 a). They had, according to their own declaration, fallen into the power of Mithra dates " the king of Cappadocia," being frightened by the magnitude of his forces and the suddenness of his attack; but. when opportunity offered, they declared war against him “for the rule (-ij'yepoyla. ) of the Romans and the common weal. "
46
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
cans. vru THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
47
vessels of war in the Syrian maritime towns, and reinforced his nascent fleet in the ports of Cyprus, Pamphylia, and Rhodes till he found himself strong enough to proceed to the attack. He dexterously avoided measuring himself against superior forces and yet obtained no inconsiderable advantages. The Cnidian island and peninsula were occupied by him, Samos was assailed, Colophon and Chios were wrested fr. m the enemy.
Meanwhile Flaccus had proceeded with his army through Flaccus
l
Macedonia and Thrace to Byzantium, and thence, passing
the straits, had reached Chalcedon (end of 668). There 85,
a military insurrection broke out against the general, ostensibly because he embezzled the spoil from the soldiers. The soul of it was one of the chief oflicers of
the army, a man whose name had become a proverb in
Rome for a true mob-orator, Gaius Flavius Fimbria, who, Fimbria. after having differed with his commander-in-chief, trans
ferred the demagogic practices which he had begun in the
Forum to the camp. Flaccus was deposed by the army
and soon afterwards put to death at Nicomedia, not far from Chalcedon; Fimbria was installed by decree of the soldiers in his stead. As a matter of course he allowed
his troops every indulgence; in the friendly Cyzicus, for instance, the citizens were ordered to surrender all their property to the soldiers on pain of death, and by way of warning example two of the most respectable citizens were
at once executed. Nevertheless in a military point of view
the change of commander-in-chief was a gain; Fimbria
was not, like Flaccus, an incapable general, but energetic
and talented. At Miletopolis (on the Rhyndacus to the
west of Brussa) he defeated the younger Mithradates, who
as governor of the satrapy of Pontus had marched against Poll! him, completely in a nocturnal assault, and by this victory opened his way to Pergamus, the capital formerly of the Roman province and now of the Pontic king, whence he
Fimbria‘! 30521“
Perilous position
dislodged the king and compelled him to take flight to the port of Pitane not far off, with the view of there embarking. Just at that moment Lucullus appeared in those waters with his fleet ; Fimbria adjured him to render assistance so that he might be enabled to capture the king. But the Optimate was stronger in Lucullus than the patriot; he sailed onward and the king escaped to Mitylene. The situation of Mithradates was even thus sufliciently embar rassed. At the end of 669 Europe was lost, Asia Minor was partly in rebellion against him, partly occupied by a Roman army; and he was himself threatened by the latter in his immediate vicinity. The Roman fleet under Lucullus had maintained its position on the Trojan coast by two successful naval engagements at the promontory of Iectum and at the island of Tenedos ; it was joined there by the ships which had in the meanwhile been built by Sulla’s orders in Thessaly, and by its position commanding the Hellespont it secured to the general of the Roman sena torial army a safe and easy passage next spring to Asia.
Mithradates attempted to negotiate. Under other circumstances no doubt the author of the edict for the Ephesian massacre could never have cherished the hope of being admitted at all to terms of peace with Rome; but amidst the internal convulsions of the Roman republic, when the ruling government had declared the general sent against Mithradates an outlaw and subjected his partisans at home to the most fearful persecutions, when one Roman general opposed the other and yet both stood opposed to the same foe, he hoped that he should be able to obtain not merely a peace, but a favourable peace. He had the choice of applying to Sulla or to Fimbria; he caused negotiations to be instituted with both, yet it seems from the first to have been his design to come to terms with Sulla, who, at least from the king’s point of view, seemed decidedly superior to his rival. His general Archelaus, a
of [85. Mithra
dates.
48
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK Iv
Negotia tions for
can. vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES 49
instructed by his master, asked Sulla to cede Asia to the king and to expect in return the king’s aid against the democratic party in Rome. But Sulla, cool and clear as ever, while urgently desiring a speedy settlement of Asiatic affairs on account of the position of things in Italy, estimated the advantages of the Cappadocian alliance for the war impending over him in Italy as
and was altogether too much of a Roman to consent to so disgraceful and so injurious a con cession.
very slight,
In the peace conferences, which took place in the winter Prelimi
of 669-70, at Delium on the coast of Boeotia opposite to nariel d '
Euboea, Sulla distinctly refused to cede even a foot’s
sis-a4. breadth of land, but, with good reason faithful to the old Roman custom of not increasing after victory the demands
made before battle, did not go beyond the conditions previously laid down. He required the restoration of all the conquests made by the king and not wrested from him again—Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Bithynia, Asia Minor and the islands—the surrender of prisoners and deserters, the delivering up of the eighty war-vessels of Archelaus to reinforce the still insignificant Roman fleet; lastly, pay and provisions for the army and the very moderate sum of 3000 talents (£720,000) as indemnity for the expenses of the war. The Chians carried off to the Black Sea were to be sent home, the families of the Mace donians who were friendly to Rome and had become refugees were to be restored, and a number of war-vessels were to be delivered to the cities in alliance with Rome. Respecting Tigranes, who in strictness should likewise have been included in the peace, there was silence on both sides, since neither of the contracting parties cared for the endless further steps which would be occasioned by making him a party. The king thus retained the state of possession which he had before the war, nor was he subjected to any
voL. Iv
104
diflicultiel.
humiliation affecting his honour. 1 Archelaus, clearly per ceiving that much comparatively beyond expectation was obtained and that more was not obtainable, concluded the preliminaries and an armistice on these conditions, and withdrew the troops from the places which the Asiatics still possessed in Europe.
But Mithradates rejected the peace and demanded at least that the Romans should not insist on the surrender of the war-vessels and should concede to him Paphlagonia ; while he at the same time asserted that Fimbria was ready to grant him far more favourable conditions. Sulla, offended by this placing of his offers on an equal footing with those of an unofficial adventurer, and having already gone to the utmost measure of concession, broke off the negotiations. He had employed the interval to reorganize Macedonia and to chastise the Dardani, Sinti, and Maedi, in doing which he at once procured booty for his army and drew nearer Asia; for he was resolved at any rate to go thither, in order
50
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
Sulla
proceeds to to come to a reckoning with Fimbria. He now at once
Asia.
put his legions stationed in Thrace as well as his fleet in motion towards the Hellespont. Then at length Archelaus succeeded in wringing from his obstinate master a reluctant consent to the treaty; for which he was
subsequently regarded with an evil eye at court as the author of the injurious peace, and even accused of treason, so that some time afterwards he found himself compelled to leave the country and to take refuge with the Romans, who readily received him and loaded him with honours. The Roman soldiers also murmured; their disappointment doubtless at
not receiving the expected spoil of Asia probably contributed
1 The statement that Mithradates in the peace stipulated for impunity to the towns which had embraced his side (Memnon, 35) seems, looking to the character of the victor and of the vanquished, far from credible, and it is not given by Appian or by Licinianus. They neglected to draw up the treaty of peace in writing, and this neglect afterwards left room fer various mist epresentations.
can vur THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
51
to that murmuring more than their indignation—in itself very justifiable—that the barbarian prince, who had murdered eighty thousand of their countrymen and had brought unspeakable misery on Italy and Asia, should be allowed to return home unpunished with the greatest part of the treasures which he had collected by the pillage of Asia. Sulla himself may have been painfully sensible that the political complications thwarted in a most vexatious way a task which was in a military point of view so simple, and compelled him after such victories to content himself with such a peace. But the self-denial and the sagacity with which he had conducted this whole war were only dis played afresh in the conclusion of this peace ; for war with a prince, to whom almost the whole coast of the Black Sea belonged, and whose obstinacy was clearly displayed by the very last negotiations, would still under the most
favourable circumstances require years, and the situation of Italy was such that it seemed almost too late even for Sulla to oppose the party in power there with the few legions which he possessed. 1 Before this could be done, however,
1 Armenian tradition also is acquainted with the first Mithradatic war. Ardasches king of Armenia-Moses of Chorene tells ns—was not content with the second rank which rightfully belonged to him in the Persian (Parthian) empire, but compelled the Parthian king Arschagan to cede to him the supreme power, whereupon he had a palace built for himself in Persia and had coins struck there with his own image. He appointed Arschagan Viceroy of Persia and his son Dicran (Tigranes) Viceroy of Armenia, and gave his daughter Ardaschama in marriage to the great prince of the Iberians Mihrdates (Mithradates) who was descended from Mihrdates satrap of Darius and governor appointed by Alexander over the conquered lberians, and ruled in the northern mountains as well as over the Black Sea. Ardasches then took Croesus the king of the Lydians prisoner, subdued the mainland between the two great seas (Asia Minor), and crossed the sea with innumerable vessels to subjugate the west. As there was anarchy at that time in Rome, be nowhere encountered serious resistance, but his soldiers killed each other and Ardasches fell by the hands of his own troops. After Ardasches' death his successor Dicran marched against the army of the Greeks (ie. the Romans) who now in turn invaded the Armenian land ; he set a limit to their advance, handed over to his brother-in-law Mihrdats the administration of Madschag (Muaca in Cappadocia) and of the interior along with a considerable force, and returned to Armenia. Many years afterwards there were still
Dardanus.
Sulla against Fimbria.
it was ‘absolutely necessary to overthrow the bold officer who was at the head of the democratic army in Asia, in order that he might not at some future time come from Asia to the help of the Italian revolution, just as Sulla now hoped to return from Asia and crush it. At Cypsela on the Hebrus Sulla obtained accounts of the ratification of the peace by Mithradates ; but the march to Asia went on. The king, it was said, desired personally to confer with the Roman general and to cement the peace with him ; it may be presumed that this was simply a convenient pretext for transferring the army to Asia and there putting an end to Fimbria.
So Sulla, attended by his legions and by Archelaus, crossed the Hellespont ; after he had met with Mithradates on its Asiatic shore at Dardanus and had orally concluded the treaty, he made his army continue its march till he came upon the camp of Fimbria at Thyatira not far from Pergamus, and pitched his own close beside The Sullan soldiers, far superior to the Fimbrians in number, discipline, leadership, and ability, looked with contempt on the dispirited and demoralized troops and their uncalled commander-in-chief. Desertions from the ranks of the Fimbrians became daily more numerous. When Fimbria ordered an attack, the soldiers refused to fight against their
pointed out in the Armenian towns statues of Greek god: by well-known masters, trophies of this campaign.
We have no difliculty in recognizing here various facts of the first Mithradatic war, but the whole narrative evidently confused, furnished with heterogeneous additions, and in particular transferred by patriotic falsification to Armenia. In just the same way the victory over Crassus afterwards attributed to the Armenians. These Oriental accounts are to be received with all the greater caution, that they are by no means mere popular legends on the contrary the accounts of Josephus, Eusebius, and other authorities current among the Christians of the fifth century have been amalgamated with the Armenian traditions, and the historical romances of the Greeks and beyond doubt the patri ntic fancies also of Moses himself have been laid to a considerable extent under contribution. Bad as cur Occidental tradition in itself, to call in the aid of Oriental tradition this and similar cases-4. ! has been attempted for instance by the un critical Saint-Martin--can only lead to still further confusion.
52
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOCK w
in
is
is
;
is
it.
CRAP. VIII THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
53
fellow-citizens, or even to take the oath which he required
that they would stand faithfully by each other in battle.
An attempt to assassinate Sulla miscarried; at the confer
ence which Fimbria requested Sulla did not make his appearance, but contented himself with suggesting to him
through one of his officers a means of personal escape.
Fimbria was of an insolent temperament, but he was no Fimbria’! poltroon ; instead of accepting the vessel which Sulla death. offered to him and fleeing to the barbarians, he went to
and fell on his own sword in the temple of Asklepios. Those who were most compromised in his army resorted to Mithradates or to the pirates, with whom they found ready reception; the main body placed itself under the orders of Sulla.
Sulla determined to leave these two legions, whom he did not trust for the impending war, behind in Asia, where the fearful crisis left for long its lingering traces in the several cities and districts. The command of this corps and the governorship of Roman Asia he committed to his best oflicer, Lucius Licinius Murena. The revolutionary measures of Mithradates, such as the liberation of the slaves and the annulling of debts, were of course cancelled; a restoration, which in many places could not be carried into effect without force of arms. The towns of the territory on the eastern frontier underwent a comprehensive reorganization, and reckoned from the year 670 as the date of their being constituted. justice moreover was exercised, as the victors understood the term. The most noted adherents of Mithradates and the authors of the massacre of the Italians were punished with death. The persons liable to taxes were obliged immediately to pay down in cash according to valuation the whole arrears of tenths and customs for the last five years; besides which they had to pay a war-indemnity of 20,000 talents (£4,800,000), for the collection of ‘which Lucius Lucullus was left behind.
Pergarnus
Regulation of Asiatic affairs.
84.
54
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATFS BOOK 1v
These were measures fearful in their rigour and dreadful in their effects ; but when we recall the Ephesian decree and its execution, we feel inclined to regard them as a com
mild retaliation. That the exactions in other respects were not unusually oppressive, is shown by the value of the spoil afterwards carried in triumph, which amounted in precious metal to only about £1,000,000. The few communities on the other hand that had remained faithful -—particularly the island of Rhodes, the region of Lycia, Magnesia on the Maeander—were richly rewarded : Rhodes received back at least a portion of the possessions withdrawn from it after the war against Perseus 515). In like manner compensation was made as far as possible by free
charters and special favours to the Chians for the hardships which they had borne, and to the Ilienses for the insanely cruel maltreatmentinflicted on them by Fimbria on account of the negotiations into which they had entered with Sulla. Sulla had already brought the kings of Bithynia and Cappa docia to meet the Pontic king at Dardanus, and had made them all promise to live in peace and good neighbourhood; on which occasion, however, the haughty Mithradates had refused to admit Ariobarzanes who was not descended of royal blood—the slave, as he called him—to his presence. Gaius Scribonius Curio was commissioned to superintend the restoration of the legal order of things in the two
kingdoms evacuated by Mithradates.
The goal was thus attained. After four years of war the
Pontic king was again client of the Romans, and single and settled government was re-established in Greece, Mace donia, and Asia Minor; the requirements of interest and honour were satisfied, not adequately, yet so far as circum stances would allow; Sulla had not only brilliantly distin guished himself as soldier and general, but had the skill,
in his path crossed by thousand obstacles, to preserve the diflicult mean between bold perseverance and prudent
paratively
a
a if a
a
(ii.
CHAP- vnl THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
55
concession. Almost like Hannibal he had fought and
in order that with the forces, which the first victory gave him, he might prepare forthwith for a second and severer struggle. After he had in some degree com pensated his soldiers for the fatigues which they had undergone by luxurious winter-quarters in the rich west of Asia Minor, he in the spring of 671 transferred them in
1600 vessels from Ephesus to the Piraeeus and thence by the land route to Patrae, where the vessels again lay ready to convey the troops to Brundisium. His arrival was pre ceded by a report addressed to the senate respecting his campaigns in Greece and Asia, the writer of which appeared to know nothing of his deposition; it was the mute herald of the impending restoration.
conquered,
Sulla [88.
linear In my.
7_
'I‘rm state of suspense and uncertainty existing in Italy when Sulla took his departure for Greece in the beginning of 667 has been already described : the half-suppressed insurrection, the principal army under the more than half-usurped com mand of a general whose politics were very doubtful, the confusion and the manifold activity of intrigue in the capital. The victory of the oligarchy by force of arms had, in spite or because of its moderation, engendered manifold discontent. The capitalists, painfully affected by the blows of the most severe financial crisis which Rome had yet wit nessed, were indignant at the government on account of the
law which it had issued as to interest, and on account of the Italian and Asiatic wars which it had not prevented. The insurgents, so far as they had laid down their arms, bewailed not only the disappointment of their proud hopes of obtain ing equal rights with the ruling burgesses, but also the forfeiture of their venerable treaties, and their new position as subjects utterly destitute of rights. The communities between the Alps and the Po were likewise discontented with the partial concessions made to them, and the new burgesses and freedmen were exasperated by the cancelling of the Sulpician laws. The populace of the city suffered amid the general distress, and found it intolerable that the
government of the sabre was no longer disposed to acquiesce
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CHAPTER II
CINNA ANDSULIA
cnar. ix CINNA AND SULLA
57
in the constitutional rule of the bludgeon. The adherents, resident in the capital, of those outlawed after the Sulpician revolution—adherents who remained very numerous in consequence of the remarkable moderation of Sulla laboured zealously to procure permission for the outlaws to return home ; and in particular some ladies of wealth and distinction spared for this purpose neither trouble nor money. None of these grounds of ill-humour were such as to furnish any immediate prospect of a fresh violent collision between the parties ; they were in great part of an aimless and tem porary nature; but they all fed the general discontent, and had already been more or less con'cerned in producing the murder of Rufus, the repeated attempts to assassinate Sulla,
the issue of the consular and tribunician elections for 667 87 partly in favour of the opposition.
The name of the man whom the discontented had sum- Chain. moned to the head of the state, Lucius Cornelius Cinna,
had been hitherto scarcely heard of, except so far as he had
borne himself well as an officer in the Social war. We
have less information regarding the personality and the original designs of Cinna than regarding those of any other party leader in the Roman revolution. The reason to all appearance, simply that this man, altogether vulgar and guided by the lowest selfishness, had from the first no ulterior political plans whatever. It was asserted at his very first appearance that he had sold himself for round sum of money to the new burgesses and the coterie of Marius, and the charge looks very credible; but even were false, remains nevertheless significant that suspicion of the sort, such as was never expressed against Saturninus and Sulpicius, attached to Cinna. In fact the movement, at the head of which he put himself, has altogether the appearance of worthlessness both as to motives and as to aims. pro
ceeded not so much from party as from number of mal contents without proper political aims or notable support,
a
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it It
is,
a
it
a
Carbo. Sertorius.
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who had mainly undertaken to effect the recall of the exiles by legal or illegal means. Cinna seems to have been admitted into the conspiracy only by an afterthought and merely because the intrigue, which in consequence of the restriction of the tribunician powers needed a consul to bring forward its proposals, saw in him among the consular
87. candidates for 667 its fittest instrument and so pushed him forward as consul. Among the leaders appearing in the second rank of the movement were some abler heads ; such was the tribune of the people Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, who had made himself a name by his impetuous popular elo quence, and above all Quintus Sertorius, one of the most talented of Roman oflicers and a man in every respect excellent, who since his candidature for the tribunate of the people had been a personal enemy to Sulla and had been led by this quarrel into the ranks of the disaffected to which he did not at all by nature belong. The proconsul Strabo, although at variance with the government, was yet far from going along with this faction.
Outbreak of the Cinnan revolution.
So long as Sulla was in Italy, the Confederates for good reasons remained quiet.