When one
experiences
the pleasure of a smell, a taste, etc.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
404bll).
So too, having seen a disease, one searches out its origin, its disappearance, and its remedy. This illustration of the Truths is also given in the Sutra.
In which Sutra? In the Sutra which says, "Endowed with the
9
In the order in which, in the course of the period of examina- tion, he creates an idea of the Truths, in this same order, having reached the period of comprehension, he understands the Truths, because comprehension is projected by the preparatory exercises, the same way that a horse gallops without obstacle over familiar terrain.
***
What is the meaning of the word abhisamaya (comprehen- sion)? This word signifies abhisambodha, ''understanding, comprehension. " The root i signifies "to understand/'
four qualities, the doctor . . . "
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Why is comprehension only pure? Because it is a knowledge
{aya) turned towards {abhi) Nirvana and the true (sam, samyak). 10
Samyak means conforming to reality.
To the extent that they are a result, the five updddnaskandhas
(i. 8a-b) are the Truth of Suffering, that which one should see in
truth as being suffering. To the extent that they are a cause they
are the Truth of Origin or arising, because suffering arises from
11
them (i. 8c). Consequently suffering and arising differ in name,
but do not differ in fact, since they are the same updddnaskandhas considered as result or as cause. But Extinction and the Path differ in fact as well as in name.
*##
The Sutra gives the name of aryasatya, truth of the Aryans, to the Truths. What is the meaning of this expression?
They are truth for the Aryans, truths of the Aryans: this is why
11 they are called aryasatya.
Does this mean that they are false for the non-Aryans? Not being erroneous {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 397a26), they are true for everyone. [But the Aryans see them as they are, that is to say, under sixteen aspects (vii. 13): they see suffering, that is, the updddnaksandhas as suffering, impermanent, etc. Others do not. Therefore, the Truths are called "truths of the Aryans" and not truths of others, because the seeing of these latter is incorrect. In fact, they see what is suffering as being not suffering. ] As the stanza says,
"What the Aryans call happy (i. e. , Nirvana) others call painful;
13 what others call happy, the Aryans call painful. "
14
According to other masters, two are Aryan truths, and two
are truths of both Aryans and others.
? Since only a part of sensation (vedand) is painful by its nature (duhkhd vedana, i. 14). how can one say that all impure, conditi- oned things are suffering?
3. Impure dharmas, whether they are agreeable, disagreea-
ble, or otherwise, are, without exception, suffering, by
reason of the three types of suffering, each according to its
15 type.
There are three types of suffering: suffering which is suffering in and of itself {duhkhaduhkhata), suffering through the fact of being conditioned (samskdraduhkhatd), and suffering which is change or transformation (parindmaduhkbata).
By reason of these three, all impure conditioned things, without exception, are suffering: agreeable things are suffering because they are subject to transformation; disagreeable things are suffering in and of themselves; and neither-disagreeable-nor-a- greeable things are suffering because they are conditioned. What are the agreeable, disagreeable, and neither-disagreeable-nor-a- greeable dharmas?
The three sensations, in this order; and, by reason of the three sensations, all the samskdras which result in agreeable sensation, etc. , receive the name of agreeable, etc.
Agreeable sensation is suffering through transformation, as the Sutra says, "Agreeable sensation is agreeable when it arises, agreeable while it lasts, but suffering in its change. "
Disagreeable sensation is suffering by nature, as the Sutra says, "Suffering sensation is suffering when it arises, and suffering while it lasts. "
Neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable sensation is suffering
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because it is so decreed by its causes, as the Sutra says, "That which is impermanent is suffering. "
The same holds true for the samskdras which result in these
16
According to other masters, the expressions duhkhaduhkhatd, etc. , should be analysed: duhkham eva duhkhatd ("suffering is itself suffering''), viparindma eva duhkhatd ("transformation is itself suffering"), and samskara eva duhkhatd ("conditioned things are themselves suffering"). The meaning is the same.
***
Agreeable dharmas do not participate in suffering which is suffering in and of itself, nor do the disagreeable dharmas participate in suffering which is transformation: the second state of suffering belongs to the first ones, and the first to the second ones. But all conditioned things are suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being conditioned, and they are seen under this aspect only by the Aryans. Therefore it is said, "One does not feel a hair placed on the palm of the hand; but the same hair, in the eye, causes suffering and injury. So too the ignorant, resembling the hand, do not feel the hair which is suffering through the fact of being conditioned: but the Aryans, resembling
17
The Aryans make of existence in the most sublime heaven (Bhavagra) an idea more painful than do fools make of existence in the most dreadful hell (Avici).
***
sensations as for these sensations themselves.
***
the eye, are tortured by it. "
? But, one would say, the Path is conditioned; it should thus be suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being
18
The Path is not suffering, because the definition of suffering is to be hateful. Now the Path is not hateful to the Aryans because it produces the extinction of all of the sufferings of arising; when they consider Nirvana as peaceful, what they consider as peaceful is the extinction of what they consider as suffering [namely impure conditioned things, and not the extinction of the Path].
***
But, since the agreeable or happiness does exist, why is only suffering, and not the agreeable, a truth of the Aryans?
19
1. According to one explanation,
of happiness. In the same way that one calls a pile in which some peas are to be found "a pile of beans," so too no one with any intelligence would consider a wound as agreeable because one experiences a very small agreeable sensation when one washes this wound.
2. And further, "Because it is a cause of suffering, because it is
produced by many sufferings, because one desires it when one
20 suffers (see p. 903), the agreeable, they conclude, is suffering. "
21
3. But, even if accompanied by happiness,
totality has the same flavor of suffering through the fact of being conditioned: Aryans thus consider it as suffering. This is why suffering and not happiness is an Aryan Truth.
***
i. But how can Aryans regard sensations which are agreeable by nature as suffering?
conditioned.
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it is because of the slightness
existence in its
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They are hateful by reason of their impermanence in the same way that they consider the rupas, samjnds, etc. , as suffering, even though the rupas, samjnds, etc. , are not suffering in the same way as is disagreeable sensation.
ii. With regard to the proposed argument "The agreeable is suffering because it is a cause of suffering": (1) to be a cause of suffering is its aspect (akdra) or origin (vii. l3a); to see things as a cause of suffering is not to see them as suffering; (2) how could the Aryans born in Rupadhatu and in Arupyadhatu have an idea of suffering? For the skandhas of these spheres are not a cause of suffering; (3) why would the Sutra mention suffering through the fact of being conditioned? If Aryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is a cause of suffering, then suffering through the fact of being conditioned [that is, "What is impermanent is suffering"] would be useless.
iii. But if Aryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is impermanent, then what is the difference between the aspects of suffering and of impermanence? There would be confusion between "seeing things as suffering" and "seeing things as impermanent. "
One sees things as impermanent because their nature is to arise and perish; one sees them as suffering because they are hateful. When one has seen them as impermanent, they become hateful. The characteristic of impermanence implies the characteristic of suffering, but it is not subsumed in this characteristic.
22
iv. Certain masters deny any agreeable sensation, affirming
that all is suffering. They prove this thesis by Scripture and by reasoning.
Scripture: The Blessed One said, "Suffering is to be found in
any and all sensation"; "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as
suffering"; and "It is an error to regard what is suffering as
23 agreeable. "
Reasoning: 1. Because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure. The things that one pretends to be causes of
? pleasure,-food, drink, cold, warmth, etc. ,-when they are grasped or experienced to excess or out of season become causes of suffering. Now it is inadmissible that a cause of pleasure, because it has increased, or presents itself at a different moment,--even if it remains completely the same,--would produce suffering. Conse- quently these pretended causes of pleasure are, from their origins, the causes of suffering and not the causes of pleasure: for later suffering will grow and become felt. The same holds for the four positions (tryapatha), the position of lying down, sitting down, etc. (p. 907).
2. Because the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but sometime a remedy for suffering or a modification of suffering, (a) As long as a person is not tormented by sufferings which are caused by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, fatigue, or desire, he will not have any sensation which he will feel to be agreeable. Consequently the ignorant have the idea of pleasure, not with regard to true pleasure, but with regard to the relief of suffering,
(b) Fools also have the idea of pleasure with regard to the
modification of suffering: for example to pass a burden from one
24 shoulder to another.
Consequently agreeable things do not exist.
v. They exist, say the Abhidharmikas; and we would say, this is well proved.
1. We would ask him who denies the existence of pleasure,
25 What is suffering? If he answers, "That which is painful," we
would then ask, "How is it painful? " If he answers, "Because it does evil," we would say that "that which does good" is agreeable. If he answers, "Because it is not desired," we would say that "that
26 which is desired" is agreeable.
2. But, one would say, this same "desire" is no longer cherished by the Aryans when they obtain detachment. Thus the quality of "desirable" is not proved.
This objection is useless, for if Aryans, once they become
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detached, no longer cherish it, it is then from another point of view that it is undesirable to them.
The sensation which, in itself, is desirable, will never become, in itself, undesirable. Consequently, it is not from the point of view of its intrinsic nature, but from another point of view that Aryans do not cherish agreeable sensation. Rather, they hate it for its defects: it is the occasion for the loss of good dharmas, it is acquired only at great effort, it is directed toward suffering, and it is impermanent. If this sensation were undesirable in and of itself, who would ever be able to become attached to it? From the fact that, with a view to detaching themselves from it, Aryans consider it in its defects by placing themselves in a point of view distinct from that of its intrinsic nature, it then follows that agreeable sensation does exist in and of itself.
3. The meaning of the declaration of the Blessed One,
"Suffering is to be found in any and all sensation" has been fixed by
the Blessed One himself: "Oh Ananda, it is with regard to
impermanence, it is with regard to the transformation of the
samskdras that I said that 'Suffering is to be found in any and all
27
sensation. "'
not made with regard to the suffering which is suffering in and of itself.
If all sensation were, by its nature, suffering, then the Arya Ananda would not have asked, "The Blessed One taught that there are three types of sensation, agreeable, suffering, and neither-suf- fering-nor-agreeable. The Blessed One taught that any and all sensation is suffering. With what intention, from what point of view did the Blessed One teach that any and all sensation is suffering? " Ananda would have asked, "From what point of view did the Blessed One teach that there are three types of sensation? " And the Blessed One would have responded, "It was intentional, with a definite motive, that I taught that there are three types of sensation. "
Therefore if the Blessed One said, "I have declared, with a definite motive, that any and all sensation is suffering," this is because, by its nature, sensation is of three types.
Consequently it is proved that this declaration was
? 4. As for the declaration "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as suffering," agreeable sensation is, on the one hand, agreeable in and of itself, being pleasant; but on the other hand, it is in a certain sense suffering, since it changes and as such is impermanent. Persons not free from desire are bound to regard it as agreeable, because they savor its taste; Aryans are free from regarding it as agreeable, because they are free from desire with regard to it. This is why the Buddha enjoined one to regard agreeable sensation in a manner which would lead one to obtain deliverance.
How do we know that agreeable sensation is agreeable in and of itself? It is said, "The perfect, omniscient Buddha, knowing the impermanence and the transformation of the samskdras, declares that sensation is suffering. " (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 121a8).
5. The declaration "It is an error to regard what is suffering as agreeable" (v. 9a) is also made with a certain intention. The world attaches the idea of agreeable to agreeable sensation, to delectable objects, to existence. Now agreeable sensation is in a certain sense suffering: to consider it as absolutely agreeable is an error. Delectable objects contain much suffering, but little pleasure; to consider them as absolutely agreeable is an error. The same with regard to existence.
Consequently this text does not demonstrate the non-existence of agreeable sensation.
6. If all sensation is suffering in and of itself, how does one explain that the Buddha taught the existence of three types of sensation?
Perhaps the Buddha, in this teaching, is conforming to the views of the world.
This hypothesis is inadmissible: a. The Buddha said, "If I said that all sensation is suffering, then this is with a certain intention" (see above, p. 904).
b. The Buddha, on the subject of the three types of sensation (ii. 7 and foil. ), uses the expression, "conforming to reality. " In fact,
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after having said, "The organ of pleasure and the organ of satisfaction are agreeable sensation/' he then said "He who, conforming to reality and through correct discernment sees the
28
c. Furthermore, how would the world arrive at the conclusion
that sensation is of three types if it were exclusively suffering?
Would you say that one has the idea or impression of agreeable
sensation with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of
neutral sensation with regard to a medium sensation of suffering,
and the idea of a suffering sensation with regard to a strong
sensation of suffering? But pleasure also presents three degrees,
and it then follows that one would have the idea of great pleasure
with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of medium
pleasure with regard to a medium sensation of suffering, and the
idea of little pleasure with regard to strong sensation of suffe-
29
ring.
Furthermore, when one experiences pleasure arisen from some
excellent smell, taste or tangible thing, what is then the weak
suffering through a relationship to which the idea of pleasure is
30
[And if you maintain that the idea of pleasure is produced through a relationship with a weak sensation of suffering,] then this weak sensation of suffering has not arisen or when it has disappeared, one will all the more have the idea of pleasure, suffering having completely disappeared.
The same for smells, etc. , and the same for the pleasure of desire.
Furthermore, in your system, a weak sensation of suffering is transmitted by a clear and strong sensation [of pleasure]; a sensation of medium force is transmitted by an indistinct sensation [a sensation neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable]: and this would appear to be inconsistent. So too the Sutra teaches that the first three Dhyanas are accompanied by pleasure: there one will find, according to you, some weak suffering. The Sutra teaches that, in
five organs [or sensations], abandons the three bonds . . . "
produced?
? the Fourth Dhyana and above, sensation is neither-disagreeable- nor-agreeable: there one will find, according to you, medium suffering. Consequently your theory that agreeable sensation, etc. , correspond to weak suffering, etc. , is not admissible.
Finally, the Blessed One said, "Oh Mahanaman, if physical matter were exclusively suffering, not agreeable nor accompanied by pleasure,. . . there would be no reason why one would become
31 agreeable sensation exists at least a little.
attached to physical matter . . . "
We are thus assured that
Consequently the alleged scriptural arguments do not hold.
7. The first logical reason presented by our adversary, "because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure" is worthless. Our adversary does not take into account what is the cause of pleasure.
A given object is the cause of pleasure or suffering through the function of the state of the person who experiences it; it is not a cause of pleasure or suffering in an absolute manner. If a given object is a cause of pleasure when it is in a relationship with a body found in a certain state, then it will always be a cause of pleasure when it is again in a relationship with this body in the same state. A cause of pleasure is thus always a cause of pleasure.
A comparison: The same fire will give forth different results of cooking according to the state of the rice which one is cooking: the food will be edible or not. But when the rice is in a certain state, the fire will always produce the same result.
Furthermore, how can one dispute that, in the Dhyanas, the causes of pleasure are always causes of pleasure?
8. As for the argument that "the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but a remedy of suffering or a modification of suffering," we would say:
i. a.
When one experiences the pleasure of a smell, a taste, etc. , what is the suffering whose remedy is the object of the idea of pleasure? b. Before this suffering has arisen or when it is
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destroyed, in the absence of any remedy, one will all the more experience pleasure, c. The pleasure of the Dhyanas certainly cannot consist of a remedy of suffering, since suffering does not exist in the Dhyanas.
ii. When one moves a burden to another shoulder, this is truly a
pleasure that arises from a new bodily state and which continues to
arise as long as this bodily state does not disappear. If it were
otherwise, then the idea or impression of pleasure would become
32
stronger.
pleasure brought about by the changing of bodily position which has caused fatigue.
9. You ask, "If suffering does not begin from its beginning, how could there be, at its end, an impression of suffering? "
We would answer: By reason of a certain transformation of the body [consecutive to the absorption of food, etc. : suffering will not appear while the state favorable to pleasure lasts]; so too, in the case of alcohol, etc. , sweetness and tartness succeed one another.
It is thus proved that there is agreeable sensation, and that all impure conditioned things are suffering from the fact of the three types of suffering.
***
This thesis of the Abhidharma that the Truth of Suffering is the Truth of Origin, that is, that the updddnaskandhas, which are suffering, are at the same time the origin of suffering (see above p.
33
898), comes from the teaching of the Sutra. For, according to the
Sutra, it is only thirst or desire (trsna) which is the origin of 34
suffering.
The Sutra says that desire is the origin by reason of the capital importance of desire. But all the other impure dharmas are also a cause or origin of suffering.
The same explanation holds for the impression of
In fact, some other dharmas are named in other Sutras.
? The Blessed One said, "Action, desire and ignorance are the cause
of future samskdras";^ he also said, "Five types of seeds, that is,
the vijndna associated with upadana; the earth element, that is, the 6
four vijndnasthitis. "*
Thus the definition of the Sutra, "Desire is the origin of
suffering", is conceived from a particular point of view {dbhiprayi- 1
ka)? whereas the definition given in the Abhidharma is in strict conformity to the characteristics of the thing defined.
Furthermore, when the Buddha said, "It is desire which is the origin," he intended to define the cause of re-existence {abhi- nirvrtti). When, in the stanza, he enumerates action, desire, and ignorance, he defined the cause of different births (upapatti) which is action; the cause of re-existence, namely desire; and the cause of births and of re-existence, namely ignorance. We shall continue the explanation of the meaning of these terms. In fact, the Sutra says, "Action is the cause of births, and desire is the cause of re-existence"; and it teaches the successive order of causation: "The eye has action for its object; action has desire for its cause; desire has ignorance for its cause; and ignorance has incorrect
38 judgment for its cause. "
That consciousness and the other skandhas are the origin of suffering results again from the fact that the Sutra declares that they are respectively seed and field.
What is birth {upapatti)} What is re-existence {abhinirvrtti)} (iii. 40, vi. 39c).
Upapatti signifies a birth or an existence characterized by a certain sphere (Kamadhatu, etc. ), a certain realm of rebirth (god, human, etc. ), a certain mode of birth (birth from a womb, from an egg, etc. ), a certain gender, etc. Abhinirvrtti signifies re-existence without qualification.
The cause of birth is action, and the cause of re-existence is desire: so too a seed is the cause of a shoot characterized as a rice-shoot, a wheat-shoot, etc. ; whereas water is the cause of the simple germination of all the different species of shoots. How does
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one prove that desire is the cause of re-existence?
From the fact that a person free from desire is not reborn. When a person endowed with desire and a person free from desire die, we know that the first is reborn and that the second is not reborn. Therefore since there is no rebirth where there is no desire, we know that desire is the cause of re-existence.
39
Again from the fact that the series is bent by desire. We state
that the series of thoughts is unceasingly bent towards the object to which one has a desire. And the same holds for re-existence.
There is no defilement which adheres to the person (dtmab- hava, to existence) as much as desire, the same way that lentil
40
paste, once it is dried, adheres to a limb. There is no cause which
binds one to rebirth as much as the attachment to a self does. This reasoning proves that desire is the cause of re-existence.
***
The Blessed One proclaimed the Four Noble Truths, but he
4. The idea of a jug ends when the jug is broken; the idea of water ends when, in the mind, one analyzes the water. The jug and the water, and all that resembles them, exist
43 relatively. The rest exist absolutely.
If the idea of a thing disappears when this thing is broken into pieces, then this thing has relative existence (samvrtisat); for example, a jug: the idea of a jug disappears when it is reduced to pieces. If the idea of a thing disappears when this thing is dissipated, or broken to pieces, by the mind, then this thing should be regarded as having relative existence; for example, water. If we grasp and remember the dharmas, such as color, etc. , in the water,
41
absolute truth (paramdrthasatya). What are these Two Truths?
also declared
Two Truths, relative truth {samvftisatya) and 42
? then the idea of water will disappear.
These things,--jug, clothes, etc. , water, fire, etc. ,--are given their different names from the relative point of view or conform- ing to conventional usage. Thus if one says, from the relative point of view, "There is a jug, there is water," one is speaking truly, and one is not speaking falsely. Consequently this is relatively true.
That which differs is absolute truth. If, when a thing is broken to pieces or dissipated by the mind, the idea of this thing continues, then this thing has absolute existence (paramarthasat)\ for example, physical matter: one can reduce physical matter into atoms, one can remember smell and other dharmas in the mind, but the idea of the unique nature of physical matter persists. The same holds for sensations, etc. And as this absolutely exists, it is absolutely true.
44
The ancient masters say: Things are absolutely true in the
manner in which they are perceived, either by transworldly
knowledge or by the worldly knowledge acquired after trans-
45
worldly knowledge. They are relatively true in the manner in
which they are perceived by any other defiled or non-defiled worldly knowledge.
***
46
The Truths have been mentioned. We must now explain how
they are seen. Consequently, beginning from the beginning, we
47 would say:
5a-b. Firm in his cultivation, endowed with teaching and
reflection, he will be capable of giving himself up to
48 meditation.
Whoever desires to see the Truths should first of all keep the
49
Precepts. Then he reads the teaching upon which his Seeing of
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50
the Truths depends, or he hears their meaning. Having heard, he
correctly reflects. Having reflected, he gives himself up to the cultivation of meditation. With the wisdom (prajna, ii. 24, i. 2a) arisen from the teaching {srutamayt) for its support, there arises the wisdom arisen from reflection (cintdmayt)\ with this for its support, there arises the wisdom arisen from meditation (bhdvand- mayt).
***
What are the characteristics of these three wisdoms?
5c-d. The wisdoms arisen from the teaching, etc. , have
respectively for their sphere name, name and the thing, and
51 the thing.
52
According to the Vaibhasikas,
teaching has name for its object; wisdom arisen from reflection has the name and the thing for its object: in fact, sometimes it grasps the thing by means of the name, and sometimes it grasps the name
53
by means of the thing. Wisdom arisen from meditation has the
thing for its object; it goes to the things as an abstraction made from its name. One can compare this to three persons who are crossing a river: one who does not know how to swim does not abandon even for one moment his swimming apparatus; one who knows how to swim a little sometimes holds on to it and sometimes lets go of it; and one who knows how to swim crosses the river without any support whatsoever (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 420a28, p. 217c6).
54
But, we would say, in this interpretation, wisdom arisen from
reflection plays no role: in fact, when it has name for its object, it is wisdom arisen from the teaching, and when it has a thing for its object, it is the wisdom arisen from meditation. Thus the wisdom arisen from reflection does not exist. Rather, one should explain:
wisdom arisen from the
? the wisdom arisen from the teaching is a certitude which arises from a means of correct knowledge (pramdna) termed "the word of a qualified person** (dptavacana); the wisdom arisen from reflection is a certitude born of rational examination; and the wisdom arisen from meditation is a certitude arisen from absorption. In this way the specific characteristics of the three
55 wisdoms are proved in an irreprochable manner.
[In the expressions srutamayi prajnd, etc. , the suffix -maya,
according to PdninivA. 21 (tatprakrtavacane mayat) indicates
cause: Srutamayiprajnd is prajnd which has sruta, that is, the word
of a qualified person {dptavacana) for its cause (hetu). Or rather,
according to Pdnini iv. 3. 134 (tasya vikdrah), the suffix -maya
forms a word which indicates "transformation of . . . ": thus
Srutamayi prajnd is a transformation of the sruta. But this
"transformation'* should be understood metaphorically: this is how
a transformation would be spoken of; other characteristics are
considered, in fact, in taking this into consideration. ] As one says,
"The vital breaths are created by food, cows are created from
56 grass** (annamaydhprdndh, trnamaydvah).
How does one who thus applies himself to meditation succeed
57 in it?
When the ascetic is withdrawn with regard to his body and his mind by separating himself from promiscuity and bad thoughts, he succeeds.
For whom are these two separations easy?
59 For a contented person of few dsesires.
6a-b. Not for one discontented and with many desires.
6a. These are produced within one who is endowed with the
58 two separations.
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What should one understand by discontent and many desires?
6c-d. Discontent is desire for more than one now possesses; many desires is desire with regard to that which one does not possess.
60
The Abhidharmikas
clothes, etc. , which one possess is discontent. To desire what one does not possess is many desires.
But is not the desire to have more also produced with respect to what one does not possess? What then is the difference between the two?
61
Discontent is the dissatisfaction that one experiences from
the goods that one possesses, of poor or of small quantity. Many desires is the desire for goods, of excellent or in great quantity, that one does not possess.
7a. Their opposites are their oppositions.
The opposites of discontent and of many desires, namely contentment and few desires, are opposed to discontent and to many desires.
7b. They are of the three spheres or pure.
They belong to the Three Dhatus; they are also pure. But discontent and many desires only belong to Kamadhatu. What is the nature of content and few desires?
62
7c. Non-desire.
say: To desire more of the fine things,
They have for their nature [the root of good], non-desire.
? 63
Understand: "are non-desire. " The four lineages of the Aryans, the dryavamsas, are so called because the Aryans arise from them. They are also non-desire in their nature.
7c-d. Among them, three are contentment.
The first three--to be content with clothing, to be content with food, to be content with bed and with seat--are contentment by nature.
The fourth dryavamsa is to take delight in Extinction and in
64
the Path.
turns its back on attachment to pleasure and attachment to existence (v. 2).
What did the Blessed One teach by the four dryavamsas?
8a-b. By three is taught the regimen; by the last, activity.
The Blessed One, the Master of the Law (dharmasvdmi), established a certain regimen and a certain activity for his disciples
65 who, having renounced their old regimen and their old activities,
66
7c. The lineages of the Aryans.
It is not contentment. How is it non-desire? Because it
He established the regimen in the first three dryavamsas; and he established activity in the fourth: "If, with this regimen, you do these actions, before
long you will obtain deliverance. "
Why did the Blessed One establish such a regimen and such an activity?
are engaged in searching out deliverance.
8b. In order to create an obstacle to the arising of desire.
67
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The Sutra establishes that the arising of desire is fourfold:
"Oh monks, desire, arising, arises by reason of clothing, by reason of food, by reason of the bed and the seat; lasting, it lasts by reason . . . ; being attached, it is attached . . . Oh monks, desire, arising,
69
arises by reason of such existence or non-existence . . . " It is in
order to create an obstacle to it that the four dryavarhsas are taught.
9c-d. In order to momentarily or definitively arrest the desire of the object of the idea of self and of things pertaining to self.
This is another way of saying the same thing. The object of the idea of self is clothing. The object of the idea of self (ahamkdra- vastu) is the dtmabhdva, the sensorial and mental complex. Desire (icchd) is thirst (trsnd).
The first three dryavarhsas destroy for a time the desire for the things that one regards as pertaining to self. The fourth aryavarhsa definitively arrests the twofold desire.
***
We have explained the requisite qualities through which
70
meditation can succeed. Being in this way a suitable receptacle,
how would the ascetic enter into meditation?
9a-b. He enters therein, through visualization on the loathsome and through mindfulness of breathing (anapa- nasmrta).
Smrta is smrti (mindfulness). Who enters through visualiza- tion on the loathsome? Who enters through mindfulness of
? breathing? Respectfively,
9c. Those in whom desire and imagination are predominant
71 (adhirdgavitarkdndm).
An adhiraga and an adhivitarka are those in whom rdga (desire) and vitarka (imagining) are adhika (predominant). Those in whom desire appears lively and appears on many occasions, enter through the loathsome. Those who are imaginative enter through mindfulness of breathing.
Certain masters say: Mindfulness of breathing, having an unvaried object,--it bears on wind in which there are no difference of color or shape,--has for its result the cutting off of the imaginative process; whereas the loathsome, having a variety of colors and shapes for its object, provokes imagination.
Some other masters say: Mindfulness of breathing cuts off imagination because it is not turned towards externals, for it bears on breathing. The loathsome is turned outwards, like visual consciousenss; it is not visual consciousness, but it is a contempla- tion {upanidhydna, viii. l = nirupana) of an object of the visual consciousness.
###
Craving {rdga) is fourfold: (1) craving for colors, (2) craving for shapes, (3) craving for contact or for tangibles, and (4) craving for honors.
The visualization of the loathsome that has a cadaver turning
72 blue, rotting, etc.
So too, having seen a disease, one searches out its origin, its disappearance, and its remedy. This illustration of the Truths is also given in the Sutra.
In which Sutra? In the Sutra which says, "Endowed with the
9
In the order in which, in the course of the period of examina- tion, he creates an idea of the Truths, in this same order, having reached the period of comprehension, he understands the Truths, because comprehension is projected by the preparatory exercises, the same way that a horse gallops without obstacle over familiar terrain.
***
What is the meaning of the word abhisamaya (comprehen- sion)? This word signifies abhisambodha, ''understanding, comprehension. " The root i signifies "to understand/'
four qualities, the doctor . . . "
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Why is comprehension only pure? Because it is a knowledge
{aya) turned towards {abhi) Nirvana and the true (sam, samyak). 10
Samyak means conforming to reality.
To the extent that they are a result, the five updddnaskandhas
(i. 8a-b) are the Truth of Suffering, that which one should see in
truth as being suffering. To the extent that they are a cause they
are the Truth of Origin or arising, because suffering arises from
11
them (i. 8c). Consequently suffering and arising differ in name,
but do not differ in fact, since they are the same updddnaskandhas considered as result or as cause. But Extinction and the Path differ in fact as well as in name.
*##
The Sutra gives the name of aryasatya, truth of the Aryans, to the Truths. What is the meaning of this expression?
They are truth for the Aryans, truths of the Aryans: this is why
11 they are called aryasatya.
Does this mean that they are false for the non-Aryans? Not being erroneous {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 397a26), they are true for everyone. [But the Aryans see them as they are, that is to say, under sixteen aspects (vii. 13): they see suffering, that is, the updddnaksandhas as suffering, impermanent, etc. Others do not. Therefore, the Truths are called "truths of the Aryans" and not truths of others, because the seeing of these latter is incorrect. In fact, they see what is suffering as being not suffering. ] As the stanza says,
"What the Aryans call happy (i. e. , Nirvana) others call painful;
13 what others call happy, the Aryans call painful. "
14
According to other masters, two are Aryan truths, and two
are truths of both Aryans and others.
? Since only a part of sensation (vedand) is painful by its nature (duhkhd vedana, i. 14). how can one say that all impure, conditi- oned things are suffering?
3. Impure dharmas, whether they are agreeable, disagreea-
ble, or otherwise, are, without exception, suffering, by
reason of the three types of suffering, each according to its
15 type.
There are three types of suffering: suffering which is suffering in and of itself {duhkhaduhkhata), suffering through the fact of being conditioned (samskdraduhkhatd), and suffering which is change or transformation (parindmaduhkbata).
By reason of these three, all impure conditioned things, without exception, are suffering: agreeable things are suffering because they are subject to transformation; disagreeable things are suffering in and of themselves; and neither-disagreeable-nor-a- greeable things are suffering because they are conditioned. What are the agreeable, disagreeable, and neither-disagreeable-nor-a- greeable dharmas?
The three sensations, in this order; and, by reason of the three sensations, all the samskdras which result in agreeable sensation, etc. , receive the name of agreeable, etc.
Agreeable sensation is suffering through transformation, as the Sutra says, "Agreeable sensation is agreeable when it arises, agreeable while it lasts, but suffering in its change. "
Disagreeable sensation is suffering by nature, as the Sutra says, "Suffering sensation is suffering when it arises, and suffering while it lasts. "
Neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable sensation is suffering
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because it is so decreed by its causes, as the Sutra says, "That which is impermanent is suffering. "
The same holds true for the samskdras which result in these
16
According to other masters, the expressions duhkhaduhkhatd, etc. , should be analysed: duhkham eva duhkhatd ("suffering is itself suffering''), viparindma eva duhkhatd ("transformation is itself suffering"), and samskara eva duhkhatd ("conditioned things are themselves suffering"). The meaning is the same.
***
Agreeable dharmas do not participate in suffering which is suffering in and of itself, nor do the disagreeable dharmas participate in suffering which is transformation: the second state of suffering belongs to the first ones, and the first to the second ones. But all conditioned things are suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being conditioned, and they are seen under this aspect only by the Aryans. Therefore it is said, "One does not feel a hair placed on the palm of the hand; but the same hair, in the eye, causes suffering and injury. So too the ignorant, resembling the hand, do not feel the hair which is suffering through the fact of being conditioned: but the Aryans, resembling
17
The Aryans make of existence in the most sublime heaven (Bhavagra) an idea more painful than do fools make of existence in the most dreadful hell (Avici).
***
sensations as for these sensations themselves.
***
the eye, are tortured by it. "
? But, one would say, the Path is conditioned; it should thus be suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being
18
The Path is not suffering, because the definition of suffering is to be hateful. Now the Path is not hateful to the Aryans because it produces the extinction of all of the sufferings of arising; when they consider Nirvana as peaceful, what they consider as peaceful is the extinction of what they consider as suffering [namely impure conditioned things, and not the extinction of the Path].
***
But, since the agreeable or happiness does exist, why is only suffering, and not the agreeable, a truth of the Aryans?
19
1. According to one explanation,
of happiness. In the same way that one calls a pile in which some peas are to be found "a pile of beans," so too no one with any intelligence would consider a wound as agreeable because one experiences a very small agreeable sensation when one washes this wound.
2. And further, "Because it is a cause of suffering, because it is
produced by many sufferings, because one desires it when one
20 suffers (see p. 903), the agreeable, they conclude, is suffering. "
21
3. But, even if accompanied by happiness,
totality has the same flavor of suffering through the fact of being conditioned: Aryans thus consider it as suffering. This is why suffering and not happiness is an Aryan Truth.
***
i. But how can Aryans regard sensations which are agreeable by nature as suffering?
conditioned.
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it is because of the slightness
existence in its
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They are hateful by reason of their impermanence in the same way that they consider the rupas, samjnds, etc. , as suffering, even though the rupas, samjnds, etc. , are not suffering in the same way as is disagreeable sensation.
ii. With regard to the proposed argument "The agreeable is suffering because it is a cause of suffering": (1) to be a cause of suffering is its aspect (akdra) or origin (vii. l3a); to see things as a cause of suffering is not to see them as suffering; (2) how could the Aryans born in Rupadhatu and in Arupyadhatu have an idea of suffering? For the skandhas of these spheres are not a cause of suffering; (3) why would the Sutra mention suffering through the fact of being conditioned? If Aryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is a cause of suffering, then suffering through the fact of being conditioned [that is, "What is impermanent is suffering"] would be useless.
iii. But if Aryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is impermanent, then what is the difference between the aspects of suffering and of impermanence? There would be confusion between "seeing things as suffering" and "seeing things as impermanent. "
One sees things as impermanent because their nature is to arise and perish; one sees them as suffering because they are hateful. When one has seen them as impermanent, they become hateful. The characteristic of impermanence implies the characteristic of suffering, but it is not subsumed in this characteristic.
22
iv. Certain masters deny any agreeable sensation, affirming
that all is suffering. They prove this thesis by Scripture and by reasoning.
Scripture: The Blessed One said, "Suffering is to be found in
any and all sensation"; "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as
suffering"; and "It is an error to regard what is suffering as
23 agreeable. "
Reasoning: 1. Because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure. The things that one pretends to be causes of
? pleasure,-food, drink, cold, warmth, etc. ,-when they are grasped or experienced to excess or out of season become causes of suffering. Now it is inadmissible that a cause of pleasure, because it has increased, or presents itself at a different moment,--even if it remains completely the same,--would produce suffering. Conse- quently these pretended causes of pleasure are, from their origins, the causes of suffering and not the causes of pleasure: for later suffering will grow and become felt. The same holds for the four positions (tryapatha), the position of lying down, sitting down, etc. (p. 907).
2. Because the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but sometime a remedy for suffering or a modification of suffering, (a) As long as a person is not tormented by sufferings which are caused by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, fatigue, or desire, he will not have any sensation which he will feel to be agreeable. Consequently the ignorant have the idea of pleasure, not with regard to true pleasure, but with regard to the relief of suffering,
(b) Fools also have the idea of pleasure with regard to the
modification of suffering: for example to pass a burden from one
24 shoulder to another.
Consequently agreeable things do not exist.
v. They exist, say the Abhidharmikas; and we would say, this is well proved.
1. We would ask him who denies the existence of pleasure,
25 What is suffering? If he answers, "That which is painful," we
would then ask, "How is it painful? " If he answers, "Because it does evil," we would say that "that which does good" is agreeable. If he answers, "Because it is not desired," we would say that "that
26 which is desired" is agreeable.
2. But, one would say, this same "desire" is no longer cherished by the Aryans when they obtain detachment. Thus the quality of "desirable" is not proved.
This objection is useless, for if Aryans, once they become
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detached, no longer cherish it, it is then from another point of view that it is undesirable to them.
The sensation which, in itself, is desirable, will never become, in itself, undesirable. Consequently, it is not from the point of view of its intrinsic nature, but from another point of view that Aryans do not cherish agreeable sensation. Rather, they hate it for its defects: it is the occasion for the loss of good dharmas, it is acquired only at great effort, it is directed toward suffering, and it is impermanent. If this sensation were undesirable in and of itself, who would ever be able to become attached to it? From the fact that, with a view to detaching themselves from it, Aryans consider it in its defects by placing themselves in a point of view distinct from that of its intrinsic nature, it then follows that agreeable sensation does exist in and of itself.
3. The meaning of the declaration of the Blessed One,
"Suffering is to be found in any and all sensation" has been fixed by
the Blessed One himself: "Oh Ananda, it is with regard to
impermanence, it is with regard to the transformation of the
samskdras that I said that 'Suffering is to be found in any and all
27
sensation. "'
not made with regard to the suffering which is suffering in and of itself.
If all sensation were, by its nature, suffering, then the Arya Ananda would not have asked, "The Blessed One taught that there are three types of sensation, agreeable, suffering, and neither-suf- fering-nor-agreeable. The Blessed One taught that any and all sensation is suffering. With what intention, from what point of view did the Blessed One teach that any and all sensation is suffering? " Ananda would have asked, "From what point of view did the Blessed One teach that there are three types of sensation? " And the Blessed One would have responded, "It was intentional, with a definite motive, that I taught that there are three types of sensation. "
Therefore if the Blessed One said, "I have declared, with a definite motive, that any and all sensation is suffering," this is because, by its nature, sensation is of three types.
Consequently it is proved that this declaration was
? 4. As for the declaration "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as suffering," agreeable sensation is, on the one hand, agreeable in and of itself, being pleasant; but on the other hand, it is in a certain sense suffering, since it changes and as such is impermanent. Persons not free from desire are bound to regard it as agreeable, because they savor its taste; Aryans are free from regarding it as agreeable, because they are free from desire with regard to it. This is why the Buddha enjoined one to regard agreeable sensation in a manner which would lead one to obtain deliverance.
How do we know that agreeable sensation is agreeable in and of itself? It is said, "The perfect, omniscient Buddha, knowing the impermanence and the transformation of the samskdras, declares that sensation is suffering. " (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 121a8).
5. The declaration "It is an error to regard what is suffering as agreeable" (v. 9a) is also made with a certain intention. The world attaches the idea of agreeable to agreeable sensation, to delectable objects, to existence. Now agreeable sensation is in a certain sense suffering: to consider it as absolutely agreeable is an error. Delectable objects contain much suffering, but little pleasure; to consider them as absolutely agreeable is an error. The same with regard to existence.
Consequently this text does not demonstrate the non-existence of agreeable sensation.
6. If all sensation is suffering in and of itself, how does one explain that the Buddha taught the existence of three types of sensation?
Perhaps the Buddha, in this teaching, is conforming to the views of the world.
This hypothesis is inadmissible: a. The Buddha said, "If I said that all sensation is suffering, then this is with a certain intention" (see above, p. 904).
b. The Buddha, on the subject of the three types of sensation (ii. 7 and foil. ), uses the expression, "conforming to reality. " In fact,
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after having said, "The organ of pleasure and the organ of satisfaction are agreeable sensation/' he then said "He who, conforming to reality and through correct discernment sees the
28
c. Furthermore, how would the world arrive at the conclusion
that sensation is of three types if it were exclusively suffering?
Would you say that one has the idea or impression of agreeable
sensation with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of
neutral sensation with regard to a medium sensation of suffering,
and the idea of a suffering sensation with regard to a strong
sensation of suffering? But pleasure also presents three degrees,
and it then follows that one would have the idea of great pleasure
with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of medium
pleasure with regard to a medium sensation of suffering, and the
idea of little pleasure with regard to strong sensation of suffe-
29
ring.
Furthermore, when one experiences pleasure arisen from some
excellent smell, taste or tangible thing, what is then the weak
suffering through a relationship to which the idea of pleasure is
30
[And if you maintain that the idea of pleasure is produced through a relationship with a weak sensation of suffering,] then this weak sensation of suffering has not arisen or when it has disappeared, one will all the more have the idea of pleasure, suffering having completely disappeared.
The same for smells, etc. , and the same for the pleasure of desire.
Furthermore, in your system, a weak sensation of suffering is transmitted by a clear and strong sensation [of pleasure]; a sensation of medium force is transmitted by an indistinct sensation [a sensation neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable]: and this would appear to be inconsistent. So too the Sutra teaches that the first three Dhyanas are accompanied by pleasure: there one will find, according to you, some weak suffering. The Sutra teaches that, in
five organs [or sensations], abandons the three bonds . . . "
produced?
? the Fourth Dhyana and above, sensation is neither-disagreeable- nor-agreeable: there one will find, according to you, medium suffering. Consequently your theory that agreeable sensation, etc. , correspond to weak suffering, etc. , is not admissible.
Finally, the Blessed One said, "Oh Mahanaman, if physical matter were exclusively suffering, not agreeable nor accompanied by pleasure,. . . there would be no reason why one would become
31 agreeable sensation exists at least a little.
attached to physical matter . . . "
We are thus assured that
Consequently the alleged scriptural arguments do not hold.
7. The first logical reason presented by our adversary, "because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure" is worthless. Our adversary does not take into account what is the cause of pleasure.
A given object is the cause of pleasure or suffering through the function of the state of the person who experiences it; it is not a cause of pleasure or suffering in an absolute manner. If a given object is a cause of pleasure when it is in a relationship with a body found in a certain state, then it will always be a cause of pleasure when it is again in a relationship with this body in the same state. A cause of pleasure is thus always a cause of pleasure.
A comparison: The same fire will give forth different results of cooking according to the state of the rice which one is cooking: the food will be edible or not. But when the rice is in a certain state, the fire will always produce the same result.
Furthermore, how can one dispute that, in the Dhyanas, the causes of pleasure are always causes of pleasure?
8. As for the argument that "the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but a remedy of suffering or a modification of suffering," we would say:
i. a.
When one experiences the pleasure of a smell, a taste, etc. , what is the suffering whose remedy is the object of the idea of pleasure? b. Before this suffering has arisen or when it is
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destroyed, in the absence of any remedy, one will all the more experience pleasure, c. The pleasure of the Dhyanas certainly cannot consist of a remedy of suffering, since suffering does not exist in the Dhyanas.
ii. When one moves a burden to another shoulder, this is truly a
pleasure that arises from a new bodily state and which continues to
arise as long as this bodily state does not disappear. If it were
otherwise, then the idea or impression of pleasure would become
32
stronger.
pleasure brought about by the changing of bodily position which has caused fatigue.
9. You ask, "If suffering does not begin from its beginning, how could there be, at its end, an impression of suffering? "
We would answer: By reason of a certain transformation of the body [consecutive to the absorption of food, etc. : suffering will not appear while the state favorable to pleasure lasts]; so too, in the case of alcohol, etc. , sweetness and tartness succeed one another.
It is thus proved that there is agreeable sensation, and that all impure conditioned things are suffering from the fact of the three types of suffering.
***
This thesis of the Abhidharma that the Truth of Suffering is the Truth of Origin, that is, that the updddnaskandhas, which are suffering, are at the same time the origin of suffering (see above p.
33
898), comes from the teaching of the Sutra. For, according to the
Sutra, it is only thirst or desire (trsna) which is the origin of 34
suffering.
The Sutra says that desire is the origin by reason of the capital importance of desire. But all the other impure dharmas are also a cause or origin of suffering.
The same explanation holds for the impression of
In fact, some other dharmas are named in other Sutras.
? The Blessed One said, "Action, desire and ignorance are the cause
of future samskdras";^ he also said, "Five types of seeds, that is,
the vijndna associated with upadana; the earth element, that is, the 6
four vijndnasthitis. "*
Thus the definition of the Sutra, "Desire is the origin of
suffering", is conceived from a particular point of view {dbhiprayi- 1
ka)? whereas the definition given in the Abhidharma is in strict conformity to the characteristics of the thing defined.
Furthermore, when the Buddha said, "It is desire which is the origin," he intended to define the cause of re-existence {abhi- nirvrtti). When, in the stanza, he enumerates action, desire, and ignorance, he defined the cause of different births (upapatti) which is action; the cause of re-existence, namely desire; and the cause of births and of re-existence, namely ignorance. We shall continue the explanation of the meaning of these terms. In fact, the Sutra says, "Action is the cause of births, and desire is the cause of re-existence"; and it teaches the successive order of causation: "The eye has action for its object; action has desire for its cause; desire has ignorance for its cause; and ignorance has incorrect
38 judgment for its cause. "
That consciousness and the other skandhas are the origin of suffering results again from the fact that the Sutra declares that they are respectively seed and field.
What is birth {upapatti)} What is re-existence {abhinirvrtti)} (iii. 40, vi. 39c).
Upapatti signifies a birth or an existence characterized by a certain sphere (Kamadhatu, etc. ), a certain realm of rebirth (god, human, etc. ), a certain mode of birth (birth from a womb, from an egg, etc. ), a certain gender, etc. Abhinirvrtti signifies re-existence without qualification.
The cause of birth is action, and the cause of re-existence is desire: so too a seed is the cause of a shoot characterized as a rice-shoot, a wheat-shoot, etc. ; whereas water is the cause of the simple germination of all the different species of shoots. How does
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one prove that desire is the cause of re-existence?
From the fact that a person free from desire is not reborn. When a person endowed with desire and a person free from desire die, we know that the first is reborn and that the second is not reborn. Therefore since there is no rebirth where there is no desire, we know that desire is the cause of re-existence.
39
Again from the fact that the series is bent by desire. We state
that the series of thoughts is unceasingly bent towards the object to which one has a desire. And the same holds for re-existence.
There is no defilement which adheres to the person (dtmab- hava, to existence) as much as desire, the same way that lentil
40
paste, once it is dried, adheres to a limb. There is no cause which
binds one to rebirth as much as the attachment to a self does. This reasoning proves that desire is the cause of re-existence.
***
The Blessed One proclaimed the Four Noble Truths, but he
4. The idea of a jug ends when the jug is broken; the idea of water ends when, in the mind, one analyzes the water. The jug and the water, and all that resembles them, exist
43 relatively. The rest exist absolutely.
If the idea of a thing disappears when this thing is broken into pieces, then this thing has relative existence (samvrtisat); for example, a jug: the idea of a jug disappears when it is reduced to pieces. If the idea of a thing disappears when this thing is dissipated, or broken to pieces, by the mind, then this thing should be regarded as having relative existence; for example, water. If we grasp and remember the dharmas, such as color, etc. , in the water,
41
absolute truth (paramdrthasatya). What are these Two Truths?
also declared
Two Truths, relative truth {samvftisatya) and 42
? then the idea of water will disappear.
These things,--jug, clothes, etc. , water, fire, etc. ,--are given their different names from the relative point of view or conform- ing to conventional usage. Thus if one says, from the relative point of view, "There is a jug, there is water," one is speaking truly, and one is not speaking falsely. Consequently this is relatively true.
That which differs is absolute truth. If, when a thing is broken to pieces or dissipated by the mind, the idea of this thing continues, then this thing has absolute existence (paramarthasat)\ for example, physical matter: one can reduce physical matter into atoms, one can remember smell and other dharmas in the mind, but the idea of the unique nature of physical matter persists. The same holds for sensations, etc. And as this absolutely exists, it is absolutely true.
44
The ancient masters say: Things are absolutely true in the
manner in which they are perceived, either by transworldly
knowledge or by the worldly knowledge acquired after trans-
45
worldly knowledge. They are relatively true in the manner in
which they are perceived by any other defiled or non-defiled worldly knowledge.
***
46
The Truths have been mentioned. We must now explain how
they are seen. Consequently, beginning from the beginning, we
47 would say:
5a-b. Firm in his cultivation, endowed with teaching and
reflection, he will be capable of giving himself up to
48 meditation.
Whoever desires to see the Truths should first of all keep the
49
Precepts. Then he reads the teaching upon which his Seeing of
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50
the Truths depends, or he hears their meaning. Having heard, he
correctly reflects. Having reflected, he gives himself up to the cultivation of meditation. With the wisdom (prajna, ii. 24, i. 2a) arisen from the teaching {srutamayt) for its support, there arises the wisdom arisen from reflection (cintdmayt)\ with this for its support, there arises the wisdom arisen from meditation (bhdvand- mayt).
***
What are the characteristics of these three wisdoms?
5c-d. The wisdoms arisen from the teaching, etc. , have
respectively for their sphere name, name and the thing, and
51 the thing.
52
According to the Vaibhasikas,
teaching has name for its object; wisdom arisen from reflection has the name and the thing for its object: in fact, sometimes it grasps the thing by means of the name, and sometimes it grasps the name
53
by means of the thing. Wisdom arisen from meditation has the
thing for its object; it goes to the things as an abstraction made from its name. One can compare this to three persons who are crossing a river: one who does not know how to swim does not abandon even for one moment his swimming apparatus; one who knows how to swim a little sometimes holds on to it and sometimes lets go of it; and one who knows how to swim crosses the river without any support whatsoever (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 420a28, p. 217c6).
54
But, we would say, in this interpretation, wisdom arisen from
reflection plays no role: in fact, when it has name for its object, it is wisdom arisen from the teaching, and when it has a thing for its object, it is the wisdom arisen from meditation. Thus the wisdom arisen from reflection does not exist. Rather, one should explain:
wisdom arisen from the
? the wisdom arisen from the teaching is a certitude which arises from a means of correct knowledge (pramdna) termed "the word of a qualified person** (dptavacana); the wisdom arisen from reflection is a certitude born of rational examination; and the wisdom arisen from meditation is a certitude arisen from absorption. In this way the specific characteristics of the three
55 wisdoms are proved in an irreprochable manner.
[In the expressions srutamayi prajnd, etc. , the suffix -maya,
according to PdninivA. 21 (tatprakrtavacane mayat) indicates
cause: Srutamayiprajnd is prajnd which has sruta, that is, the word
of a qualified person {dptavacana) for its cause (hetu). Or rather,
according to Pdnini iv. 3. 134 (tasya vikdrah), the suffix -maya
forms a word which indicates "transformation of . . . ": thus
Srutamayi prajnd is a transformation of the sruta. But this
"transformation'* should be understood metaphorically: this is how
a transformation would be spoken of; other characteristics are
considered, in fact, in taking this into consideration. ] As one says,
"The vital breaths are created by food, cows are created from
56 grass** (annamaydhprdndh, trnamaydvah).
How does one who thus applies himself to meditation succeed
57 in it?
When the ascetic is withdrawn with regard to his body and his mind by separating himself from promiscuity and bad thoughts, he succeeds.
For whom are these two separations easy?
59 For a contented person of few dsesires.
6a-b. Not for one discontented and with many desires.
6a. These are produced within one who is endowed with the
58 two separations.
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Chapter Six
What should one understand by discontent and many desires?
6c-d. Discontent is desire for more than one now possesses; many desires is desire with regard to that which one does not possess.
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The Abhidharmikas
clothes, etc. , which one possess is discontent. To desire what one does not possess is many desires.
But is not the desire to have more also produced with respect to what one does not possess? What then is the difference between the two?
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Discontent is the dissatisfaction that one experiences from
the goods that one possesses, of poor or of small quantity. Many desires is the desire for goods, of excellent or in great quantity, that one does not possess.
7a. Their opposites are their oppositions.
The opposites of discontent and of many desires, namely contentment and few desires, are opposed to discontent and to many desires.
7b. They are of the three spheres or pure.
They belong to the Three Dhatus; they are also pure. But discontent and many desires only belong to Kamadhatu. What is the nature of content and few desires?
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7c. Non-desire.
say: To desire more of the fine things,
They have for their nature [the root of good], non-desire.
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Understand: "are non-desire. " The four lineages of the Aryans, the dryavamsas, are so called because the Aryans arise from them. They are also non-desire in their nature.
7c-d. Among them, three are contentment.
The first three--to be content with clothing, to be content with food, to be content with bed and with seat--are contentment by nature.
The fourth dryavamsa is to take delight in Extinction and in
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the Path.
turns its back on attachment to pleasure and attachment to existence (v. 2).
What did the Blessed One teach by the four dryavamsas?
8a-b. By three is taught the regimen; by the last, activity.
The Blessed One, the Master of the Law (dharmasvdmi), established a certain regimen and a certain activity for his disciples
65 who, having renounced their old regimen and their old activities,
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7c. The lineages of the Aryans.
It is not contentment. How is it non-desire? Because it
He established the regimen in the first three dryavamsas; and he established activity in the fourth: "If, with this regimen, you do these actions, before
long you will obtain deliverance. "
Why did the Blessed One establish such a regimen and such an activity?
are engaged in searching out deliverance.
8b. In order to create an obstacle to the arising of desire.
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The Path and the Saints 915
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The Sutra establishes that the arising of desire is fourfold:
"Oh monks, desire, arising, arises by reason of clothing, by reason of food, by reason of the bed and the seat; lasting, it lasts by reason . . . ; being attached, it is attached . . . Oh monks, desire, arising,
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arises by reason of such existence or non-existence . . . " It is in
order to create an obstacle to it that the four dryavarhsas are taught.
9c-d. In order to momentarily or definitively arrest the desire of the object of the idea of self and of things pertaining to self.
This is another way of saying the same thing. The object of the idea of self is clothing. The object of the idea of self (ahamkdra- vastu) is the dtmabhdva, the sensorial and mental complex. Desire (icchd) is thirst (trsnd).
The first three dryavarhsas destroy for a time the desire for the things that one regards as pertaining to self. The fourth aryavarhsa definitively arrests the twofold desire.
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We have explained the requisite qualities through which
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meditation can succeed. Being in this way a suitable receptacle,
how would the ascetic enter into meditation?
9a-b. He enters therein, through visualization on the loathsome and through mindfulness of breathing (anapa- nasmrta).
Smrta is smrti (mindfulness). Who enters through visualiza- tion on the loathsome? Who enters through mindfulness of
? breathing? Respectfively,
9c. Those in whom desire and imagination are predominant
71 (adhirdgavitarkdndm).
An adhiraga and an adhivitarka are those in whom rdga (desire) and vitarka (imagining) are adhika (predominant). Those in whom desire appears lively and appears on many occasions, enter through the loathsome. Those who are imaginative enter through mindfulness of breathing.
Certain masters say: Mindfulness of breathing, having an unvaried object,--it bears on wind in which there are no difference of color or shape,--has for its result the cutting off of the imaginative process; whereas the loathsome, having a variety of colors and shapes for its object, provokes imagination.
Some other masters say: Mindfulness of breathing cuts off imagination because it is not turned towards externals, for it bears on breathing. The loathsome is turned outwards, like visual consciousenss; it is not visual consciousness, but it is a contempla- tion {upanidhydna, viii. l = nirupana) of an object of the visual consciousness.
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Craving {rdga) is fourfold: (1) craving for colors, (2) craving for shapes, (3) craving for contact or for tangibles, and (4) craving for honors.
The visualization of the loathsome that has a cadaver turning
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