No More Learning

After the downfall of the Attic maritime power these regions were, on the whole, left to themselves. The Greek land-powers never got so far as to intervene seriously there, although Philip the father of Alexander and Lysimachus sometimes attempted it ; and the Romans, on whom with the conquest of Macedonia and Asia Minor devolved the political obligation of becoming the strong protectors of Greek civilization at the point where it needed such protection, utterly neglected the summons of interest as well as of honour. The fall of Sinope, the decline of Rhodes, completed the isolation of the Hellenes on the
northern shore of the Black Sea. A vivid picture of their position with reference to the roving barbarians is given to us by an inscription of Olbia (near Oczakow not far from the mouth of the Dnieper), which apparently may be placed not long before the time of Mithradates. The citizens had not only to send annual tribute to the court-camp of the barbarian king, but also to make him a gift when he encamped before the town or even simply passed by, and in a similar way to buy ofl" minor chieftains and in fact sometimes the whole horde with presents; and it fared ill with them if the gift appeared too small. The treasury of the town was bankrupt and they had to pledge the temple jewels. Meanwhile the savage tribes were thronging with out in front of the gates; the territory was laid waste, the field-labourers were dragged away an mama, and, what was worst of all, the weaker of their barbarian neighbours, the Scythians, sought, in order to shelter themselves from the pressure of the more savage Celts, to obtain possession of the walled town, so that numerous citizens were leaving it and the inhabitants alreadycontemplated its entire surrender.
Such was the state in which Mithradates found matters, when his Macedonian phalanx crossing the ridge of the Caucasus descended into the valleys of the Kuban and Terek and his fleet at the same time appeared in the
CHAP. VIII THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
17
Crimean waters. No wonder that here too, as had already been the case in Dioscurias, the Hellenes everywhere received the king of Pontus with open arms and regarded the half-Hellene and his Cappadocians armed in Greek fashion as their deliverers. What Rome had here neglected, became apparent. The demands on the rulers of Panti- capaeum for tribute had just then been raised to an exor bitant height; the town of Chersonesus found itself hard pressed by Scilurus king of the Scythians dwelling in the peninsula and his fifty sons; the former were glad to sur render their hereditary lordship, and the latter their long preserved freedom, in order to save their last possession, their Hellenism. It was not in vain. Mithradates’ brave generals, Diophantus and Neoptolemus, and his disciplined troops easily got the better of the peoples of the steppes. Neoptolemus defeated them at the straits of Panticapaeum partly by water, partly in winter on the ice; Chersonesus
was delivered, the strongholds of the Taurians were broken, and the possession of the peninsula was secured by judi ciously constructed fortresses. Diophantus marched against the Reuxinales or, as they were afterwards called, the Roxolani (between the Dnieper and Don) who came forward to the aid of the Taurians 5 50,000 of them fled before his 6000 phalangites, and the Pontic arms penetrated as far as the Dnieper. 1 Thus Mithradates acquired here a second
1 The recently discovered decree of the town of Chersonesus in honour of this Diophantus (Dittenberger, Syll. n. 252) thoroughly confirms the traditional account. It shows us the city in the immediate vicinity-the port of Balaclava must at that time have been in the power of the Tauri and Siinferopol in that of the Scythians—hard pressed partly by the Tauri on the south coat of the Crimea, partly and especially by the Scythians who held in their power the whole interior of the peninsula and the main land adjoining; it shows us further how the general of king Mithradates relieves on all sides the Greek city, defeats the Tauri, and erccts in their territory a stronghold (probably Eupatorion), restores the connection between the western and the eastern Hellenes of the peninsula, over powers in the west the dynasty of Scilurus, and in the east Saumacus prince of the Scythians, pursues the Scythians even to the mainland, and at length conquers them with the Reuxinales—such is the name given to the
VOL. IV 102
18 THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK Iv
kingdom combined with that of Pontus and, like the latter, mainly based on a number of Greek commercial towns. It was called the kingdom of the Bosporus; it embraced the modern Crimea with the opposite Asiatic promontory, and annually furnished to the royal chests and magazines 20o talents (£48,000) and 270,000 bushels of grain. The tribes of the steppe themselves from the north slope of the Caucasus to the mouth of the Danube entered, at least in great part, into relations of dependence on, or treaty with, the Pontic king and, if they furnished him with no other aid, afforded at any rate an inexhaustible field for recruiting his armies.
While thus the most important successes were gained towards the north, the king at the same time extended his dominions towards the east and the west. The Lesser Armenia was annexed by him and converted from a de pendent principality into an integral part of the Pontic kingdom ; but still more important was the close connection which he formed with the king of the Greater Armenia. He not only gave his daughter Cleopatra in marriage to Tigranes, but it was mainly through his support that Tigranes shook ofi" the yoke of the Arsacids and took their place in Asia. An agreement seems to have been made between the two to the effect that Tigranes should take in hand to occupy Syria and the interior of Asia, and Mithradates Asia Minor and the coasts of the Black Sea, under promise of mutual support ; and it was beyond doubt the more active and capable Mithradates who brought about this agreement
with a view to cover his rear and to secure a powerful
later Roxolani here, where they first appear--in the great pitched battle. which is mentioned also in the traditional account. There does not seem to have been any formal subordination of the Greek city under the king ; Mithradates appears only as protecting ally, who fights the battles against the Scythians that passed as invincible (Tot): dvwroo'rd'rovs (Iona/Was $1,149), on behalf of the Greek city, which probably stood to him nearly in the relation of Massilia and Athens to Rome. The Scythians on the other hand in the Crimea become subjects (i‘ndnoot) of Mithradates.
ally.
CRAP. V"! THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
19
Lastly, in Asia Minor the king turned his eyes towards Paphla the interior of Paphlagonia—the coast had for long belonged 3133;“ to the Pontic empire—and towards Cappadocia. 1 The docin former was claimed on the part of Pontus as having acquimd' been bequeathed by the testament of the last of the Pylaemenids to king Mithradates Euergetes: against this,
however, legitimate or illegitimate pretenders and the land
itself protested. As to Cappadocia, the Pontic rulers had
not forgotten that this country and Cappadocia on the sea had
been formerly united, and continually cherished ideas of re
union. Paphlagonia was occupied by Mithradates in concert
with Nicomedes king of Bithynia, with whom he shared
the land. When the senate raised objections to this course, Mithradates yielded to its remonstrance, while Nicomedes
equipped one of his sons with the name of Pylaemenes and under this title retained the country to himself. The policy
of the allies adopted still worse expedients in Cappadocia, King Ariarathes VI. was killed by Gordius, it was said by the orders, at any rate in the interest, of Ariarathes’ brother
in-law Mithradates Eupator: his young son Ariarathes knew no means of meeting the encroachments of the king of Bithynia except the ambiguous help of his uncle, in return for which the latter then suggested to him that he should allow the murderer of his father, who had taken flight, to return to Cappadocia. This led to a rupture and to war; but when the two armies confronted each other ready for battle, the
1 The chronology of the following eventscanonlybedetermined approxi
mately. Mithradates Eupator seems to have practically entered on the government somewhere about 640 ; Sulla‘s intervention took place in 662
(Liv. E). 70) with which accords the calculation assigning to the Mith
radatic wars 2. period of thirty years (662-691) (l’lin. 1:’. 1V. vii. 26, 97). 92-68, In the interval fell the quarrels as to the Paphlagonian and Cappadocian succession, with which the bribery attempted by Mithradates in Rome
(Diod. 631) apparently in the first tribunate of Saturninus in 651 (iii. 466) 103, was probably connected. Marius, who left Rome in 665 and did not 99. remain long in the east, found Mithradates already in Cappadocia and
Mnegotiated with him regarding his aggressions (Cic. ad Brut. i. 5 ; Plut. . War. 31); Ariarathes VI. had consequently been by that time put to
114, 92,
30 THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK |v
uncle requested a previous conference with the nephew and thereupon cut down the unarmed youth with his own hand. Gordius, the murderer of the father, then undertook the government by the directions of Mithradates ; and although the indignant population rose against him and called the younger son of the last king to the throne, the latter was unable to offer any permanent resistance to the superior forces of Mithradates. The speedy death of the youth placed by the people on the throne gave to the Pontic king the greater liberty of action, because with that youth the Cappadocian royal house became extinct. A pseudo
Ariarathes was proclaimed as nominal regent, just as had been done in Paphlagonia; under whose name Gordius administered the kingdom as lieutenant of Mithradates.
Mightier than any native monarch for many a day had been, Mithradates bore rule alike over the northern and the southern shores of the Black Sea and far into the interior of Asia Minor. The resources of the king for war by land and by sea seemed immeasurable. His recruiting field stretched from the mouth of the Danube to the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea; Thracians, Scythians, Sauromatae, Bastarnae, Colchians, Iberians (in the modern Georgia) crowded under his banners ; above all he recruited his war-hosts from the brave Bastarnae. For his fleet the
satrapy of Colchis supplied him with the most excellent timber, which was floated down from the Caucasus, besides flax, hemp, pitch, and wax; pilots and oflicers were hired in Phoenicia and Syria. The king, it was said, had marched into Cappadocia with 600 scythe-chariots, 10,000 horse,
80,000 foot; and he had by no means mustered for this war all his resources. In the absence of any Roman or other naval power worth mentioning, the Pontic fleet, with Sinope and the ports of the Crimea as its rallying points, had exclusive command of the Black Sea.
CHAP- VIII THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES 21
That the Roman senate asserted its general policy—of The keeping down the states more or less dependent on it--also if: in dealing with that of Pontus, is shown by its attitude on radates occasion of the succession to the throne after the sudden
death of Mithradates V. From the boy in minority who followed him there was taken away Great Phrygia, which
had been :‘onferred on his father for his taking part in
the war against Aristonicus or rather for his good money
(iii. 358), and this region was added to the territory im
mediately subject to Rome. 1 But, after this boy had at
attained majority, the same senate showed utter passiveness towards his aggressions on all sides and towards the formation of this imposing power, the development of which occupies perhaps a period of twenty years. It was passive, while one of its dependent states became
into a great military power, having at command more than a hundred thousand armed men ; while the ruler of that state entered into the closest connection with the new great-king of the east, who was placed partly by his aid at the head of the states in the interior of Asia; while he annexed the neighbouring Asiatic kingdoms and principalities under pretexts which sounded almost like a mockery of the ill-informed and far-distant protecting power; while, in fine, he even established himself in Europe and ruled as king over the Tauric peninsula, and as lord-protector almost to the Macedono-Thracian frontier. These circumstances indeed formed the subject of discussion in the senate; but when the illustrious corporation consoled itself in the affair of the Paphlagonian succession with the fact that Nicomedes appealed to his pseudo-Pylaemenes, it was evidently not so
1 A decree of the senate of the year 638 recently found in the village 116. Aresti to the south of Synnada (Viereck, Sermo Gran-ur qua rmalu: Romanur urur rit, p. 51) confirms all the regulations made by the king up
to his death and thus shows that Great Phrygia after the death of the father was not merely taken from the son, as Appian also states. but was thereby brought directly under Roman allegiance.
length
developed
Interven
Sulla sent to Cappa docia
22 THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK iv
much deceived as grateful for any pretext which spared it from serious interference. Meanwhile the complaints became daily more numerous and more urgent. The
of the Tauric Scythians, whom Mithradates had driven from the Crimea, turned for help to Rome; those of the senators who at all reflected on the traditional maxims of Roman policy could not but recollect that formerly, under circumstances so wholly different, the crossing of king Antiochus to Europe and the occupation of the Thracian Chersonese by his troops had become the signal for the Asiatic war 453), and could not but see that the occupation of the Tauric Chersonese by the Pontic king ought still less to be tolerated now. The scale was at
princes
tion of the last turned by the practical reunion of the kingdom of senate.
Cappadocia, respecting which, moreover, Nicomedes of Bithynia—who on his part had hoped to gain possession of
another pseudo-Ariarathes, and now saw that the Pontic pretender excluded his own—would hardly fail to urge the Roman government to intervention. The senate resolved that Mithradates should reinstate the
Scythian princes—so far were they driven out of the track of right policy their negligent style of government, that instead of supporting the Hellenes against the barbarians they had now on the contrary to support the Scythians against those who were half their countrymen. Paphlagonia was declared independent, and the pseudo-Pylaemenes of Nicomedes was directed to evacuate the country. In like manner the pseudo-Ariarathes of Mithradates was to retire from Cappadocia, and, as the representatives of the country refused the freedom proffered to king was once more to be appointed by free popular election.
The decrees sounded energetic enough only was an error, that instead of sending an army they dircrted the governor of Cilicia, Lucius Sulla, with the handful of troops whom he commanded there against the pirates and robbers,
Cappadocia
;
it
it, a
by
by
(ii.
CHAP. V! ! ! THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
23
to intervene in Cappadocia. Fortunately the remembrance of the former energy of the Romans defended their interests in the east better than their present government did, and the energy and dexterity of the governor supplied what the senate lacked in both respects. Mithradates kept back and con tented himself with inducing Tigranes the great-king of Armenia, who held a more free position with reference to the Romans than he did, to send troops to Cappadocia. Sulla quickly collected his forces and the contingents of the Asiatic allies, crossed the Taurus, and drove the
Gordius along with his Armenian auxiliaries out of Cappadocia. This proved effectual. Mithradates yielded on all points; Gordius had to assume the blame of the Cappadocian troubles, and the pseudo-Ariarathes disappeared; the election of king, which the Pontic faction had vainly attempted to direct towards Gordius, fell on the respected Cappadocian Ariobarzanes.
When Sulla in following out his expedition arrived in
the region of the Euphrates, in whose waters the Roman contact
governor
standards were then first mirrored, the Romans came for
the first time into contact with the Parthians, who in con
sequence of the variance between them and Tigranes had Parthians occasion to make approaches to the Romans. On both
sides there seemed a feeling that it was of some moment, in
this first contact between the two great powers of the east
and the west, that neither should renounce its claims to the sovereignty of the world ; but Sulla, bolder than the Parthian envoy, assumed and maintained in the conference the place of honour between the king of Cappadocia and the Par thian ambassador. Sulla’s fame was more increased by this greatly celebrated conference on the Euphrates than by his
victories in the east; on its account the Parthian envoy after wards forfeited his life to his master's resentment. But for the moment this contact had no further result. Nicomedes in
reliance on the favour of the Romans omitted to evacuate
between
Romans and the
92.
New aggressions of Mithra dates.
Paphlagonia, but the decrees adopted by the senate against Mithradates were carried further into effect, the reinstatement of the Scythian chieftains was at least promised by him ; the earlier rtatus yuo in the east seemed to be restored (662).
So it was alleged; but in fact there was little trace of any real return of‘the former order of things. Scarce had Sulla left Asia, when Tigranes king of Great Armenia fell upon Ariobarzanes the new king of Cappadocia, expelled him, and reinstated in his stead the Pontic pretender Ariarathes. In Bithynia, where after the death of the old
:4
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
91. king Nicomedes II. (about 663) his son Nicomedes III. Philopator had been recognized by the people and by the Roman senate as legitimate king, his younger brother Socrates came forward as pretender to the crown and possessed himself of the sovereignty. It was clear that the real author of the Cappadocian as of the Bithynian troubles was no other than Mithradates, although he refrained from taking any open part. Every one knew that Tigranes only acted at his beck; but Socrates also had marched into Bithynia with Pontic troops, and the legitimate king’s life was threatened by the assassins of Mithradates. In the Crimea even and the neighbouring countries the Pontic king had no thought of receding, but on the contrary carried his arms farther and farther.
Aqnillius sent to Asia.
The Roman government, appealed to for aid by the kings Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes in person, despatched to Asia Minor in support of Lucius Cassius who was
there the consular Manius Aquillius—an ofiicer tried in the Cimbrian and Sicilian wars—not, however, as general at the head of an army, but as an ambassador, and directed the Asiatic client states and Mithradates in particular to lend armed assistance in case of need. The result was as it had been two years before. The Roman oflicer accomplished the commission entrusted to him with the aid of the small Roman corps which the governor of
governor
CHAP. vrrr THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
25
the province of Asia had at his disposal, and of the levy of the Phrygians and Galatians; king Nicomedes and king Ariobarzanes again ascended their tottering thrones; Mithradates under various pretexts evaded the summons to furnish contingents, but gave to the Romans no open resistance; on the contrary the Bithynian pretender Socrates was even put to death by his orders (664).
It was a singular complication. Mithradates was fully
90.
The state
convinced that he could do nothing against the Romans in of things inter
open conflict, and was therefore firmly resolved not to allow mediate
matters to come to an open rupture and war with them. between war and
Had he not been so resolved, there was no more favourable peace.
opportunity for beginning the struggle than the present: just at the time when Aquillius marched into Bithynia and Cappadocia, the Italian insurrection was at the height of
its power and might encourage even the weak to declare against Rome; yet Mithradates allowed the year 664 to '0. pass without profiting by the opportunity. Nevertheless he pursued with equal tenacity and activity his plan of ex tending his territory in Asia Minor. This strange combina
tion of a policy of peace at any price with a policy of conquest was certainly in itself untenable, and was simply
a fresh proof that Mithradates did not belong to the class
of genuine statesmen; he knew neither how to prepare for conflict like king Philip nor how to submit like king Attalus, but in the true style of a sultan was perpetually fluctuating between a greedy desire of conquest and the sense of his own weakness. But even in this point of view
his proceedings can only be understood, when we recollect that Mithradates had become acquainted by twenty years’ experience with the Roman policy of that day. He knew very well that the Roman government were far from desirous of war; that they in fact, looking to the serious danger which threatened their rule from any general of reputation, and with the fresh remembrance o’ the Cimbrian
Aquillius about war.
Nieo~ modes.
:6 THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK iv
war and Marius, dreaded war still more if possible than he did himself. He acted accordingly. He was not afraid to demean himself in a way which would have given to any energetic government not fettered by selfish considerations manifold ground and occasion for declaring war; but he carefully avoided any open rupture which would have placed the senate under the necessity of declaring As soon as men appeared to be in earnest he drew back, before Sulla as well as before Aquillius; he hoped, doubtless, that he would not always be confronted by energetic generals, that he too would, as well as Jugurtha, fall in with his Scaurus or Albinus. It must be owned that this hope was not without reason although the very example of Jugurtha had on the other hand shown how foolish was to confound the bribery of Roman commander and the corruption of Roman army with the conquest of the
Roman people.
Thus matters stood between peace and war, and looked
quite as they would drag on for long in the same in decisive position. But was not the intention of Aquillius to allow this and, as he could not compel his government to declare war against Mithradates, he made use of
Nicomedes for that purpose. The latter, who was under the power of the Roman general and was, moreover, his debtor for the accumulated war expenses and for sums promised to the general in person, could not avoid comply ing with the suggestion that he should begin war with Mithradates. The declaration of war by Bithynia took place; but, even when the vessels of Nicomedes closed the Bosporus against those of Pontus, and his troops marched into the frontier districts of Pontus and laid waste the region of Amastris, Mithradates remained still unshaken in his policy of peace instead of driving the Bithynians over the frontier, he lodged complaint with the Roman envoys and asked them either to mediate or to allow him the
; a
a
5
if ;
it
a
it
it.
CHAP- vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
27
privilege of self-defence. But he was informed by Aquillius, that he must under all circumstances refrain from war against Nicomedes. That indeed was plain. They had employed exactly the same policy against Carthage; they allowed the victim to be set upon by the Roman hounds and forbade its defending itself against them. Mithradates reckoned himself lost, just as the Carthaginians had done; but, while the Phoenicians yielded from despair, the king of Sinope did the very opposite and assembled his troops and ships. “Does not even he who must succumb,” he is reported to have said, “defend himself against the robber? ” His son Ariobar zanes received orders to advance into Cappadocia 5 a
was sent once more to the Roman envoys to inform them of the step to which necessity had driven the king, and to demand their ultimatum. It was to the effect which was to be anticipated. Although neither the Roman senate nor king Mithradates nor king Nicomedes had desired the rupture, Aquillius desired it and war ensued
(end of 665). at Mithradates prosecuted the political and military pre
parations for the passage of arms thus forced upon him "OBS Mithm
with all his characteristic energy. First of all he drew datu closer his alliance with Tigranes king of Armenia, and obtained from him the promise of an auxiliary army which
was to march into western Asia and to take possession of
the soil there for king Mithradates and of the moveable property for king Tigranes. The Parthian king, offended by the haughty carriage of Sulla, though not exactly coming forward as an antagonist to the Romans, did not act as their ally. To the Greeks the king endeavoured to present himself in the character of Philip and Perseus, as the defender of the Greek nation against the alien rule of the Romans. Pontic envoys were sent to the king of Egypt and to the last remnant of free Greece, the league of the
message
28 THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK rv
Cretan cities, and adjured those for whom Rome had already forged her chains to rise now at the last moment and save Hellenic nationality; the attempt was in the case of Crete at least not wholly in vain, and numerous Cretans took service in the Pontic army. Hopes were entertained that the lesser and least of the protected states—Numidia, Syria, the Hellenic republics—would successively rebel, and that the provinces would revolt, particularly the west of Asia Minor, the victim of unbounded oppression. Efforts were made to excite a Thracian rising, and even to arouse Macedonia to revolt. Piracy, which even previously was flourishing, was now everywhere let loose as a most welcome ally, and with alarming rapidity squadrons of corsairs, calling themselves Pontic privateers, filled the Mediterranean far and wide. With eagerness and delight accounts were received of the commotions among the Roman burgesses, and of the Italian insurrection subdued yet far from extinguished. No direct relations, however, were formed with the discontented and the insurgents in Italy; except that a foreign corps armed and organized in the Roman fashion was created in Asia, the flower of which consisted of Roman and Italian refugees. Forces like those of Mithradates had not been seen in Asia since the Persian wars. The statements that, leaving out of account the Armenian auxiliary army, he took the field with 250,000 infantry and 40,000 cavalry, and that Pontic decked and 100 open vessels put to sea, seem no‘. too exaggerated in the case of a warlike sovereign who had at his disposal the numberless inhabitants of the steppes.
His generals, particularly the brothers Neoptolemus and Archelaus, were experienced and cautious Greek captains; among the soldiers of the king there was no want of brave men who despised death; and the armour glittering with gold and silver and the rich dresses of the Scythians and
Medes mingled gaily
with the bronze and steel of the
300
CHAP. vtu THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
19
Greek troopers. No unity of military organization, it is true, bound together these party-coloured masses; the army of Mithradates was just one of those unwieldy Asiatic war-machines, which had so often already—on the last occasion exactly a century before at Magnesia—succumbed to a superior military organization ; but still the east was in arms against the Romans, while in the western half of the empire also matters looked far from peaceful.
However much it was in itself a political necessity for
Rome to declare war against Mithradates, yet the particular moment was as unhappily chosen as possible; and for this
reason it is very probable that Manius Aquillius brought Roman about the rupture between Rome and Mithradates at this
time primarily from regard to his own interests. For the moment they had no other troops at their disposal in Asia than the small Roman division under Lucius Cassius and the militia of western Asia, and, owing to the military and financial distress in which they were placed at home in consequence of the insurrectionary war, a Roman army could not in the most favourable case land in Asia before the summer of 666. Hitherto the Roman magistrates there had a diflicult position; but they hoped to protect the Roman province and to be able to hold their ground as they stood—the Bithynian army under king Nicomedes in its position taken up in the previous year in the Paphla gonian territory between Amastris and Sinope, and the divisions under Lucius Cassius, Manius Aquillius, and
precise
Oppius, farther back in the Bithynian, Galatian, and Cappadocian territories, while the Bithyno-Roman fleet continued to blockade the Bosporus.
Quintus
In the beginning of the spring of 666 Mithradates assumed the offensive. On a tributary of the Halys, the Amnias (near the modern Tesch Kiipri), the Pontic van Asia guard of cavalry and light-armed troops encountered the Minor.
Bithynian army, and notwithstanding its very superior
Weak counter prepara tions of the
88.
Mith- [88. radates occupies
Antl movement:
numbers so broke it at the first onset that the beaten army dispersed and the camp and military chest fell into the hands of the victors. It was mainly to Neoptolemus and Archelaus that the king was indebted for this brilliant success. The far more wretched Asiatic militia, stationed farther back, thereupon gave themselves up as vanquished, even before they encountered the enemy; when the
generals of Mithradates approached them, they dispersed. A Roman division was defeated in Cappadocia ; Cassius sought to keep the field in Phrygia with the militia, but he discharged it again without venturing on a battle, and threw himself with his few trustworthy troops into the townships on the upper Maeander, particularly into Apamea. Oppius in like manner evacuated Pamphylia and shut himself up in the Phrygian Laodicea ; Aquillius was overtaken while retreating at the Sangarius in the Bithynian territory, and so totally defeated that he lost his camp and had to seek refuge at Pergamus in the Roman province 5 the latter also was soon overrun, and Pergamus itself fell into the hands of the king, as likewise the Bosporus and the ships that were there. After each victory Mithradates had dismissed all the prisoners belonging to the militia of Asia Minor, and had neglected no step to raise to a higher pitch the national sympathies that were from the first turned towards him. Now the whole country as far as the Maeander was with the exception of a few fortresses in his power; and news at the same time arrived, that a new revolution had broken out at Rome, that the consul Sulla destined to act against Mithradates had instead of embarking for Asia marched on Rome, that the most celebrated Roman generals were fighting battles with each other in order . to settle to whom the chief command in the Asiatic war should belong. Rome seemed zealously employed in the work of self-destruction: it is no wonder that, though even now minorities everywhere adhered to Rome, the great
30
THE EAST AND KING MITIIRADATES BOOK rv
can. vin THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
31
body of the natives of Asia Minor joined the Pontic king. Hellenes and Asiatics united in the rejoicing which welcomed the deliverer ; it became usual to compliment the king, in whom as in the divine conqueror of the Indians Asia and Hellas once more found a common meeting-point, under the name of the new Dionysus. The cities and islands sent messengers to meet him, wherever he went, and to invite “the delivering god ” to visit them; and in festal attire the citizens flocked forth in front of their gates to receive him. Several places delivered the Roman officers sojourning among them in chains to the king; Laodicea thus surrendered Quintus Oppius, the commandant of the town, and Mytilene in Lesbos the consular Manius Aquillius. 1 The whole fury of the barbarian, who gets the man before whom he has trembled into his power, discharged itself on the unhappy author of the war. The aged man was led throughout Asia Minor, sometimes on foot chained to a powerful mounted Bastarnian, sometimes bound on an ass and proclaiming his own name; and, when at length the pitiful spectacle
arrived at the royal quarters in Pergamus, by the king’s orders molten gold was poured down his throat —in order to satiate his avarice, which had really occasioned the war—till he expired in torture.
But the king was not content with this savage mockery, which alone suffices to erase its author’s name from the roll of true nobility. From Ephesus king Mithradates issued
again
orders to all the governors and cities dependent on him to general
put to death on one and the same day all Italians residing within their bounds, whether free or slaves, without distinc tion of sex or age, and on no account, under severe penalties, to aid any of the proscribed to escape; to cast forth the
1 Retribution came upon the authors of the arrest and surrender of Aquillius twenty-five years afterwards, when after Mithradates’ death his son Pharnaces handed them over to the Romans.
Orders issued from Ephesus for a
massau-e.
3:
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK Iv
corpses of the slain as a prey to the birds; to confiscate their property and to hand over one half of it to the murderers, and the other half to the king. The horrible orders were-excepting in a few districts, such as the island of Cos—punctually executed, and eighty, or according to other accounts one hundred and fifty, thousand-—if not innocent, at least defenceless—men, women, and children were slaughtered in cold blood in one day in Asia Minor ; a fearful execution, in which the good opportunity of getting rid of debts and the Asiatic servile willingness to perform any executioner’s oflice at the bidding of the sultan had at least as much part as the comparatively noble feeling of revenge. In a political point of view this measure was not only without any rational object—for its financial purpose might have been attained without this bloody edict, and the natives of Asia Minor were not to be driven into warlike zeal even by the consciousness of the most blood-stained guilt—but even opposed to the king’s designs, for on the one hand it compelled the Roman senate, so far as it was still capable of energy at all, to an energetic prosecution of the war, and on the other hand it struck at not the Romans merely, but the king’s natural allies as well, the non-Roman Italians. This Ephesian massacre was altogether a mere meaningless act of brutally blind revenge, which obtains a false semblance of grandeur simply through the colossal proportions in which the character of sultanic rule was here displayed.
The king’s views altogether grew high ; he had begun the war from despair, but the unexpectedly easy victory and
Organiza
tion of the
conquered
provinces. the non-arrival of the dreaded Sulla occasioned a transi
tion to the most highflown hopes. He set up his home in the west of Asia Minor; Pergamus the seat of the Roman governor became his new capital, the old kingdom of Sinope was handed over to the king’s son Mithradates to be administered as a viceroyship ; Cappadocia, Phrygia,
CHAP- V! " THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
33
Bithynia were organized as Pontic satrapies. The grandees of the empire and the king’s favourites were loaded with rich gifts and fiefs, and not only were the arrears of taxes remitted, but exemption from taxation for five years was promised, to all the communities—a measure which was as much a mistake as the massacre of the Romans, if the king expected thereby to secure the fidelity of the inhabitants of Asia Minor.
The king’s treasury was, no doubt, copiously replenished otherwise by the immense sums which accrued from the property of the Italians and other confiscations ; for instance in Cos alone 800 talents (,6 r 9 5,000) which the Jews had deposited there were carried off by Mithradates. The northern portion of Asia Minor and most of the islands belonging to it were in the king's power; except some petty Paphlagonian dynasts, there was hardly a district which still adhered to Rome ; the whole Aegean Sea was commanded by his fleets. The south-west alone, the city leagues of Caria and Lycia and the city of Rhodes, resisted him.
In Caria, no doubt, Stratonicea was reduced by force of arms; but Magnesia on the Sipylus successfully withstood a severe siege, in which Mithradates’ ablest oflicer Archelaus was defeated and wounded. Rhodes, the asylum of the Romans who had escaped from Asia with the governor Lucius Cassius among them, was assailed on the part of Mithradates by sea and land with immense superiority of force. But his sailors, courageously as they did their duty under the eyes of the king, were awkward novices, and so Rhodian squadrons vanquished those of Pontus four times as strong and returned home with captured vessels. By land also the siege made no progress; after a part of the works had been destroyed, Mithradates abandoned enterprise, and the important island as well as the main land opposite remained in the hands of the Romans.
But not only was the Asiatic VOL IV
the
province occupied by 103
34
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK iv
Pontle Mithradates almost without defending itself, chiefly in con invasion of sequence of the Sulpician revolution breaking out at a
most unfavourable time; Mithradates even directed an 92 attack against Europe. Already since 662 the neighbours
of Macedonia on her northern and eastern frontier had been
renewing their incursions with remarkable vehemence and
90. 89. perseverance ; in the years 664, 665 the Thracians overran
Europe.
Predatory inroads of the Thra
Macedonia and all Epirus and plundered the temple of Dodona. Still more singular was the circumstance, that with these movements was combined a renewed attempt to place a pretender on the Macedonian throne in the person of one Euphenes. Mithradates, who from the Crimea maintained connections with the Thracians, was hardly a stranger to all these events. The praetor Gaius Sentius defended himself, it is true, against these intruders with the aid of the Thracian Dentheletae ; but it was not long before mightier opponents came against him. Mithradates, carried away by his successes, had formed the bold resolution that he would, like Antiochus, bring the war for the sovereignty of Asia to a decision in Greece, and had by land and sea directed thither the flower of his troops. His son Ariarathes penetrated from Thrace into the weakly-defended Macedonia, subduing the country as he advanced and parcelling it into Pontic satrapies. Abdera and Philippi became the principal bases for the operations of the Pontic arms in Europe. The Pontic fleet, com
Thrace and Macedonia occupied
by the Pontic armies. Pontic
fleet in the manded by Mithradates’ best general Archelaus, appeared Aegean.
in the Aegean Sea, where scarce a Roman sail was to be found. Delos, the emporium of the Roman commerce in those waters, was occupied and nearly 20,000 men, mostly Italians, were massacred there; Euboea suffered a similar fate ; all the islands to the east of the Malean promontory were soon in the hands of the enemy ; they might proceed to attack the mainland itself. The assault, no doubt, which the Pontic fleet made from Euboea on the important
CHAP- vul THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
35
Demetrias, was repelled by Bruttius Sura, the brave lieu tenant of the governor of Macedonia, with his handful of troops and a few vessels hurriedly collected, and he even occupied the island of Sciathus; but he could not prevent the enemy from establishing himself in Greece proper.
There Mithradates carried on his operations not only The Pontic by arms, but at the same time by national propagandism.
His chief instrument for Athens was one Aristion, by birth Greece
an Attic slave, by profession formerly a teacher of the Epicurean philosophy, now a minion of Mithradates ; an
excellent master of persuasion, who by the brilliant career which he pursued at court knew how to dazzle the mob, and with due gravity to assure them that help was already on the way to Mithradates from Carthage, which had been for about sixty years lying in ruins. These addresses of the new Pericles were so far effectual that, while the few persons possessed of judgment escaped from Athens, the mob and one or two literati whose heads were turned formally renounced the Roman rule. So the ex-philosopher became a despot who, supported by his hands of Pontic mercenaries, commenced an infamous and bloody rule ; and the Piraeeus was converted into a Pontic harbour. As soon as the troops of Mithradates gained a footing on the Greek continent, most of the small free states—the Achaeans, Laconians, Boeotians—as far as Thessaly joined them. Sura, after having drawn some reinforcements from Macedonia, ad vanced into Boeotia to bring help to the besieged Thespiae
and engaged in conflicts with Archelaus and Aristion during
three days at Chaeronea ; but they led to no decision and
Sura was obliged to retire when the Pontic reinforcements
from the Peloponnesus approached (end of 666, beg. of 667). 88. 87.
So commanding was the position of Mithradates, parti cularly by sea, that an embassy of Italian insurgents could invite him to make an attempt to land in Italy; but their
Position of the Romans.
cause was already by that time lost, and the king rejected the suggestion.
The position of the Roman government began to be critical. Asia Minor and Hellas were wholly, Macedonia to a considerable extent, in the enemy’s hands ; by sea the Pontic flag ruled without a rival. Then there was the Italian insurrection, which, though baffled on the whole, still held the undisputed command of wide districts of Italy; the barely hushed revolution, which threatened every moment to break out afresh and more formidably ; and, lastly, the alarming commercial and monetary crisis (iii. 5 30) occasioned by the internal troubles of Italy and the enormous losses of the Asiatic capitalists, and the want of trustworthy troops. The government would have required three armies, to keep down the revolution in Rome, to crush completely the insurrection in Italy, and to wage war in Asia; it had but one, that of Sulla ; for the northern army was, under the untrustworthy Gnaeus Strabo, simply an additional embarrassment. Sulla had to choose which of these three tasks he would undertake; he decided, as we have seen, for the Asiatic war. It was
no trifling matter—we should perhaps say, it was a great act of patriotism—that in this conflict between the general interest of his country and the special interest of his party the former retained the ascendency ; and that Sulla, in spite of the dangers which his removal from Italy involved
for his constitution and his party, landed in the spring of 87. 667 on the coast of Epirus.
35
THE EAST AND KING MITIIRADATES BOOK IV
Sulla’: landing.
But he came not, as Roman commanders-in-chief had been wont to make their appearance in the East. That his army of five legions or of at most 30,000 men,1 was little stronger than an ordinary consular army, was the
1 We must recollect that after the outbreak of the Social War the legion had at least not more than half the number of men which it had previously, as it was no longer accompanied by Italian contingents.
CHAP. VIII THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
37
least element of difference. Formerly in the eastern wars a Roman fleet had never been wanting, and had in fact without exception commanded the sea ; Sulla, sent to reconquer two continents and the islands of the Aegean sea, arrived without a single vessel of war. Formerly the
had brought with him a full chest and drawn the greatest portion of his supplies by sea from home; Sulla came with empty hands-—for the sums raised with difliculty for the campaign of 666 were expended in Italy—and found himself exclusively left dependent on requisitions. Formerly the general had found his only opponent in the enemy’s camp, and since the close of the struggle between the orders political factions had without exception been united in opposing the public foe ; but Romans of note
fought under the standards of Mithradates, large districts
of Italy desired to enter into alliance with him, and it was
at least doubtful whether the democratic party would follow
the glorious example that Sulla had set before and keep
truce with him so long as he was fighting against the
Asiatic king. But the vigorous general, who had to contend with all these embarrassments, was not accus
tomed to trouble himself about more remote dangers
before finishing the task immediately in hand. When
his proposals of peace addressed to the king, which sub stantially amounted to restoration of the state of matters
before the war, met with no acceptance, he advanced just
as he had landed, from the harbours of Epirus to Boeotia, G\reece defeated the generals of the enemy Archelaus and Aristion occupied. there at Mount Tilphossium, and after that victory possessed
himself almost without resistance of the whole Grecian mainland with the exception of the fortresses of Athens and the Piraeeus, into which Aristion and Archelaus had thrown themselves, and which he failed to carry by coup 4': main. A Roman division under Lucius Hortensius occupied Thessaly and made incursions into Macedonia another
general
a ;
it,
a
Protracted siege of Athens and the Piraeeus.
under Munatius stationed itself before Chalcis, to keep! off the enemy’s corps under Neoptolemus in Euboea; Sulla‘ himself formed a camp at Eleusis and Megara, from which‘ he commanded Greece and the Peloponnesus, and prose-' cuted the siege of the city and harbour of Athens. The Hellenic cities, governed as they always were by their immediate fears, submitted unconditionally to the Romans, and were glad when they were allowed to ransom them selves from more severe punishment by supplying provisions and men and paying fines.
The sieges in Attica advanced less rapidly. Sulla found himself compelled to prepare all sorts of heavy besieging implements for which the trees of the Academy and the Lyceum had to supply the timber. Archelaus conducted the defence with equal vigour and judgment; he armed the crews of his vessels, and thus reinforced repelled the attacks of the Romans with superior strength and made frequent and not seldom successful sorties. The Pontic army of Dromichaetes advancing to the relief of the city was defeated under the walls of Athens by the Romans after a severe struggle, in which Sulla’s brave legate Lucius Licinius Murena particularly distinguished himself; but the siege did not on that account advance more rapidly. From Macedonia, where the Cappadocians had meanwhile defini tively established themselves, plentiful and regular supplies arrived by sea, which Sulla was not in a condition to cut off from the harbour-fortress ; in Athens no doubt provisions were beginning to fail, but from the proximity of the two fortresses Archelaus was enabled to make various attempts to throw quantities of grain into Athens, which were not
38
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK 1v!
87-86. wholly unsuccessful. So the winter of 667-8 passed away tediously without result. As soon as the season allowed, Sulla threw himself with vehemence on the Piraeeus; he in fact succeeded by missiles and mines in making a breach in part of the strong walls of Pericles, and immediately the
can. vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
39
Romans advanced to the assault ; but it was repulsed, and on its being renewed crescent-shaped entrenchments were found constructed behind the fallen walls, from which the invaders‘ found themselves assailed on three sides with missiles and compelled to retire. Sulla then raised the siege, and contented himself with a blockade. In the mean while the provisions in Athens were wholly exhausted ; the garrison attempted to procure a capitulation, but Sulla sent back their fluent envoys with the hint that he stood before them not as a student but as a general, and would accept only unconditional surrender. When Aristion, well knowing what fate was in store for him, delayed compliance, the ladders were applied and the city, hardly any longer defended, was taken by storm (1 March 668). Aristion threw himself into the Acropolis, where he soon afterwards surrendered. The Roman general left the soldiery to murder and plunder in the captured city and the more considerable ringleaders of the revolt to be executed; but the city itself obtained back from him its liberty and its possessions—even the important Delos,—and was thus once more saved by its illustrious dead.
The Epicurean schoolmaster had thus been vanquished;
but the position of Sulla remained in the highest degree
diflicult, and even desperate. He had now been more
than a year in the field without having advanced a step
worth mentioning; a single port mocked all his exertions,
while Asia was utterly left to itself, and the conquest of Macedonia by Mithradates’ lieutenants had recently been completed by the capture of Amphipolis. Without a fleet Want of n —it was becoming daily more apparent—it was not only fleet. impossible to secure his communications and supplies in
of the ships of the enemy and the numerous but impossible to recover even the Piraeeus, to say nothing of Asia and the islands; and yet it was difficult to see how ships of war were to be got. As early as the
presence pirates,
Athens [86. falls.
Critical position of Sulla.
40
THE EAST AND KING MITl“IRADATES BOOK rv
87-86. winter of 667-8 Sulla had despatched one of his ablest and most dexterous oflicers, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, into the eastern waters, to raise ships there if possible. Lucullus put to sea with six open boats, which he had borrowed from the Rhodians and other small communities ; he him self merely by an accident escaped from a piratic squadron, which captured most of his boats ; deceiving the enemy by changing his vessels he arrived by way of Crete and Cyrene at Alexandria ; but the Egyptian court rejected his request for the support of ships of war with equal courtesy and de cision. Hardly anything illustrates so clearly as does this fact the sad decay of the Roman state, which had once
been able gratefully to decline the offer of the kings of Egypt to assist the Romans with all their naval force, and now itself seemed to the Alexandrian statesmen bankrupt. To all this fell to be added the financial embarrassment ; Sulla had already been obliged to empty the treasuries of the Olympian Zeus, of the Delphic Apollo, and of the Epidaurian Asklepios, for which the gods were compensated by the moiety, confiscated by way of penalty, of the Theban territory. But far worse than all this military and financial
was the reaction of the political revolution in Rome ; the rapid, sweeping, violent accomplishment of which had far surpassed the worst apprehensions. The revolution conducted the government in the capital ; Sulla had been deposed, his Asiatic command had been entrusted to the democratic consul Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who might be daily looked for in Greece. The soldiers had no doubt adhered to Sulla, who made every effort to keep them in good humour; but what could be expected, when money and supplies were wanting, when the general was deposed and proscribed, when his successor was on the way, and, in addition to all this, the war against the tough antagonist who commanded the sea was protracted without
of a close?
perplexity
prospect
CHAI’. vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
4!
King Mithradates undertook to deliver his antagonist Pontic
from his perilous position. He it was, to all appearance, armies enter
who disapproved the defensive system of his generals and Greece. sent orders to them to vanquish the enemy with the utmost
As early as 667 his son Ariarathes had started from 87. Macedonia to combat Sulla in Greece proper; only the sudden death, which overtook the prince on the march at the Tisaean promontory in Thessaly, had at that time led
to the abandonment of the expedition. His successor Taxiles now appeared (668), driving before him the Roman 86. corps stationed in Thessaly, with an army of, it is said,
100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry at Thermopylae. Dromichaetes joined him. Archelaus also—compelled, Evacuation
speed.
not so much by Sulla’s arms as by his master’s of the
apparently,
orders—evacuated the Piraeeus first partially and then entirely, and joined the Pontic main army in Boeotia. Sulla, after the Piraeeus with all its greatly-admired fortifica
Piraeeus
tions had been by his orders destroyed, followed the Pontic army, in the hope of being able to fight a pitched battle before the arrival of Flaccus. In vain Archelaus advised that they should avoid such a battle, but should
the sea and the coast occupied and the enemy in suspense. Now just as formerly under Darius and Antiochus, the masses of the Orientals, like animals terrified in the midst of a fire, flung themselves hastily and blindly into battle; and did so on this occasion more foolishly than ever, since the Asiatics might perhaps have needed to wait but a few months in order to be the spectators of a battle between Sulla and Flaccus.
keep
In the plain of the Cephissus not far from Chaeronea, Battle of in March 668, the armies met. Even including the Chaeronea
86. division driven back from Thessaly, which had succeeded
in accomplishing its junction with the Roman main army, and including the Greek contingents, the Roman army found itself opposed to a foe three times as strong and
Slight
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES 1300! ! N
particularly to a cavalry fur superior and from the nature 0! the field of battle very dangerous, against which Sulla found it necessary to protect his flanks by digging trenches, while in front he caused a chain of palisades to be introduced between his first and second lines for protection against the enemy’s war-chariots. When the war-chariots rolled on to open the battle, the first line of the Romans withdrew behind this row of stakes: the chariots, rebounding from it and scared by the Roman slingers and archers, threw them selves on their own line and carried confusion both into the Macedonian phalanx and into the corps of the Italian
42
Archelaus brought up in haste his cavalry from both flanks and sent it to engage the enemy, with a view to gain time for rearranging his infantry ; it charged with great fury and broke through the Roman ranks; but the Roman infantry rapidly formed in close masses and courageously withstood the horsemen assailing them on every side. Meanwhile Sulla himself on the right wing led his cavalry against the exposed flank of the enemy ; the Asiatic infantry gave way before it was even properly engaged, and its giving way carried confusion also into the masses of the cavalry. A general attack of the Roman infantry, which through the wavering demeanour of the hostile Cavalry gained time to breathe, decided the victory. The closing of the gates of the camp, which Archelaus ordered to check the flight, only increased the slaughter, and when the gates at length were opened, the Romans entered at the same time with the Asiatics. It is said that Archelaus brought
not a twelfth part of his force in safety to Chalcis; Sulla followed him to the Euripus; be was not in a position to cross that narrow arm of the sea.
refugees.
‘
It was a great victory, but the results were trifling, effect of the partly because of the want of a fleet, partly because the Roman conqueror, instead of pursuing the vanquished, was under the necessity in the first instance of protecting himself
CHAP. Vlll THE EAST AN» KING MITHRADATES
43
against his own countrymen. The sea was still exclusively
‘covered by Pontic squadrons, which now showed themselves
even to the westward of the Malean promontory; even
after the battle of Chaeronea Archelaus landed troops on Zacynthus and made an attempt to establish himself on that
island. Moreover Lucius Flaccus had in the meanwhile Sulla ml
landed with two legions in Epirus, not without Flaccul. having sustained severe loss on the way from storms and
from the war-vessels of the enemy cruising in the Adriatic ;
his troops were already in Thessaly; thither Sulla had in
the first instance to turn. The two Roman armies encamped over against each other at Melitaea on the northern slope of Mount Othrys; a collision seemed inevitable. But Flaccus, after he had opportunity of convincing himself that Sulla’s soldiers were by no means inclined to betray their victorious leader to the totally unknown democratic commander-in—chief, but that on the contrary his own advanced guard began to desert to Sulla’s
camp, evaded a conflict to which he was in no respect
equal, and set out towards the north, with the view of
actually
Macedonia and Thrace to Asia and there paving the way for further results by subduing Mithradates.
That Sulla should have allowed his weaker opponent to depart without hindrance, and instead of following him should have returned to Athens, where he seems to
have passed the winter of 668-9, is in a military point 86-85 of view surprising. We may suppose perhaps that in
this also he was guided by political motives, and that he was sufliciently moderate and patriotic in his views willingly to forgo a victory over his countrymen, at least so long as they had still the Asiatics to deal with, and to find the most tolerable solution of the un happy dilemma in allowing the armies of the revolution in Asia and of the oligarchy in Europe to fight against the common foe.
getting through
Battle of Orcho menu.
44
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
Second]! ! In the spring of 669 there was again fresh work in
Pontic Europe. Mithradates, who continued his preparations inde army sent
to Greece. fatigably in Asia Minor, had sent an army not much less than that which had been extirpated at Chaeronea, under Dorylaus to Euboea ; thence it had, after a junction with the remains of the army of Archelaus, passed over the Euripus to Boeotia. The Pontic king, who judged of what his army could do by the standard of victories over the Bithynian and Cappadocian militia, did not understand the unfavourable turn which things had taken in Europe; the circles of the courtiers were already whispering as to the treason of Archelaus ; peremptory orders were issued to fight a second battle at once with the new army, and not to fail on this occasion to annihilate the Romans. The master’s will was carried out, if not in conquering, at least in fighting. The Romans and Asiatics met once more in
the plain of the Cephissus, near Orchomenus. The numerous and excellent cavalry of the latter flung itself impetuously on the Roman infantry, which began to waver and give way : the danger was so urgent, that Sulla seized a standard and advancing with his adjutants and orderlies against the enemy called out with a loud voice to the soldiers that, if they should be asked at home where they had abandoned their general, they might reply—at Orcho menus. This had its effect; the legions rallied and vanquished the enemy’s horse, after which the infantry were overthrown with little difliculty. On the following day the camp of the Asiatics was surrounded and stormed ; far the greatest portion of them fell or perished in the Copaic marshes; a few only, Archelaus among the rest, reached Euboea. The Boeotian communities had severely to pay for their renewed revolt from Rome, some of them even to annihilation. Nothing opposed the advance into Mace- donia and Thrace; Philippi was occupied, Abdera was voluntarily evacuated by the Pontic garrison, the European
‘
cHAr. vni THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
45
continent in general was cleared of the enemy. At the
end of the third year of the war (669) Sulla was able to 85.
take up winter-quarters in Thessaly, with a view to begin the Asiatic campaign in the spring of 670,1 for which 84 purpose he gave orders to build ships in the Thessalian ports.
Meanwhile the circumstances of Asia Minor also had Reaction undergone a material change. If king Mithradates had as: once come forward as the liberator of the Hellenes, if he against had introduced his rule with the recognition of civic inde pendence and with remission of taxes, they had after this
brief ecstasy been but too rapidly and too bitterly undeceived. He had very soon emerged in his true character, and had begun to exercise a despotism far surpassing the tyranny of the Roman governors-—a despotism which drove even the patient inhabitants of Asia Minor to open revolt. The sultan again resorted to the most violent expedients. His decrees granted inde pendence to the townships which turned to him, citizenship to the metoea', full remission of debts to the debtors, lands to those that had none, freedom to the slaves; nearly
1 5,000 such manumitted slaves fought in the army of Archelaus. The most fearful scenes were the result of this high-handed subversion of all existing order. The most considerable mercantile cities, Smyrna, Colophon, Ephesus, Tralles, Sardes, closed their gates against the king’s
1 The chronology of these events is, like all their details, enveloped in
an obscurity which investigation is able to dispel, at most, only partially.
That the battle of Chaeronea took place. if not on the same day as the storming of Athens (Pausan. i. no). at any rate soon afterwards, perhaps
in March 668, is tolerably certain. That the succeeding Thessalian and 86
the second Boeotian campaign took up not merely the remainder of 668 55 but also the whole of 669, is in itself probable and is rendered still more 85
so by the fact that Sulla's enterprises in Asia are not suflicient to fill more
than a single campaign. Licinianus also appears to indicate that Sulla returned to Athens for the winter of 668-669 and there took in hand the 86-8‘,
work of investigation and punishment; after which he relates the battle
of Orchomenus. The crossing of Sulla to Asia has accordingly been
placed not in 669, but in 670. 85. 84.
Lucullus and the fleet on the Asiatic coast.
governors or put them to death, and declared for Rome. 1 On the other hand the king’s lieutenant Diodorus, a philosopher of note like Aristion, of another school, but equally available for the worst subservience, under the instructions of his master caused the whole town-council of Adramyttium to be put to death. The Chians, who were suspected of an inclination to Rome, were fined in the first instance in 2000 talents (£480,000) and, when the pay ment was found not correct, they were at marr: put on board ship and deported in chains under the charge of their own slaves to the coast of Colchis, while their island was occupied with Pontic colonists. The king gave orders that the chiefs of the Celts in Asia Minor should all be put to death along with their wives and children in one day, and that Galatia should be converted into a Pontic satrapy. Most of these bloody edicts were carried into effect either
at Mithradates’ own headquarters or in Galatia, but the few who escaped placed themselves at the head of their powerful tribes and expelled Eumachus, the governor of the king, out of their bounds. It may readily be conceived that such a king would be pursued by the daggers of assassins ; sixteen hundred men were condemned to death
by the royal courts of inquisition as having been implicated in such conspiracies.
While the king was thus by his suicidal fury provoking his temporary subjects to rise in arms against him, he was at the same time hard pressed by the Romans in Asia, both by sea and by land. Lucullus, after the failure of his attempt to lead forth the Egyptian fleet against Mithra dates, had with better success repeated his efforts to procure
1 The resolution of the citizens of Ephesus to this effect has recentlv been found (Waddington, Additions to Lebas, Inrcr. iii. 136 a). They had, according to their own declaration, fallen into the power of Mithra dates " the king of Cappadocia," being frightened by the magnitude of his forces and the suddenness of his attack; but. when opportunity offered, they declared war against him “for the rule (-ij'yepoyla. ) of the Romans and the common weal. "
46
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK IV
cans. vru THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES
47
vessels of war in the Syrian maritime towns, and reinforced his nascent fleet in the ports of Cyprus, Pamphylia, and Rhodes till he found himself strong enough to proceed to the attack. He dexterously avoided measuring himself against superior forces and yet obtained no inconsiderable advantages. The Cnidian island and peninsula were occupied by him, Samos was assailed, Colophon and Chios were wrested fr. m the enemy.
Meanwhile Flaccus had proceeded with his army through Flaccus
l
Macedonia and Thrace to Byzantium, and thence, passing
the straits, had reached Chalcedon (end of 668). There 85,
a military insurrection broke out against the general, ostensibly because he embezzled the spoil from the soldiers. The soul of it was one of the chief oflicers of
the army, a man whose name had become a proverb in
Rome for a true mob-orator, Gaius Flavius Fimbria, who, Fimbria. after having differed with his commander-in-chief, trans
ferred the demagogic practices which he had begun in the
Forum to the camp. Flaccus was deposed by the army
and soon afterwards put to death at Nicomedia, not far from Chalcedon; Fimbria was installed by decree of the soldiers in his stead. As a matter of course he allowed
his troops every indulgence; in the friendly Cyzicus, for instance, the citizens were ordered to surrender all their property to the soldiers on pain of death, and by way of warning example two of the most respectable citizens were
at once executed. Nevertheless in a military point of view
the change of commander-in-chief was a gain; Fimbria
was not, like Flaccus, an incapable general, but energetic
and talented. At Miletopolis (on the Rhyndacus to the
west of Brussa) he defeated the younger Mithradates, who
as governor of the satrapy of Pontus had marched against Poll! him, completely in a nocturnal assault, and by this victory opened his way to Pergamus, the capital formerly of the Roman province and now of the Pontic king, whence he
Fimbria‘! 30521“
Perilous position
dislodged the king and compelled him to take flight to the port of Pitane not far off, with the view of there embarking. Just at that moment Lucullus appeared in those waters with his fleet ; Fimbria adjured him to render assistance so that he might be enabled to capture the king. But the Optimate was stronger in Lucullus than the patriot; he sailed onward and the king escaped to Mitylene. The situation of Mithradates was even thus sufliciently embar rassed. At the end of 669 Europe was lost, Asia Minor was partly in rebellion against him, partly occupied by a Roman army; and he was himself threatened by the latter in his immediate vicinity. The Roman fleet under Lucullus had maintained its position on the Trojan coast by two successful naval engagements at the promontory of Iectum and at the island of Tenedos ; it was joined there by the ships which had in the meanwhile been built by Sulla’s orders in Thessaly, and by its position commanding the Hellespont it secured to the general of the Roman sena torial army a safe and easy passage next spring to Asia.
Mithradates attempted to negotiate. Under other circumstances no doubt the author of the edict for the Ephesian massacre could never have cherished the hope of being admitted at all to terms of peace with Rome; but amidst the internal convulsions of the Roman republic, when the ruling government had declared the general sent against Mithradates an outlaw and subjected his partisans at home to the most fearful persecutions, when one Roman general opposed the other and yet both stood opposed to the same foe, he hoped that he should be able to obtain not merely a peace, but a favourable peace. He had the choice of applying to Sulla or to Fimbria; he caused negotiations to be instituted with both, yet it seems from the first to have been his design to come to terms with Sulla, who, at least from the king’s point of view, seemed decidedly superior to his rival. His general Archelaus, a
of [85. Mithra
dates.
48
THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES BOOK Iv
Negotia tions for
can. vm THE EAST AND KING MITHRADATES 49
instructed by his master, asked Sulla to cede Asia to the king and to expect in return the king’s aid against the democratic party in Rome. But Sulla, cool and clear as ever, while urgently desiring a speedy settlement of Asiatic affairs on account of the position of things in Italy, estimated the advantages of the Cappadocian alliance for the war impending over him in Italy as
and was altogether too much of a Roman to consent to so disgraceful and so injurious a con cession.
very slight,
In the peace conferences, which took place in the winter Prelimi
of 669-70, at Delium on the coast of Boeotia opposite to nariel d '
Euboea, Sulla distinctly refused to cede even a foot’s
sis-a4. breadth of land, but, with good reason faithful to the old Roman custom of not increasing after victory the demands
made before battle, did not go beyond the conditions previously laid down. He required the restoration of all the conquests made by the king and not wrested from him again—Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Bithynia, Asia Minor and the islands—the surrender of prisoners and deserters, the delivering up of the eighty war-vessels of Archelaus to reinforce the still insignificant Roman fleet; lastly, pay and provisions for the army and the very moderate sum of 3000 talents (£720,000) as indemnity for the expenses of the war. The Chians carried off to the Black Sea were to be sent home, the families of the Mace donians who were friendly to Rome and had become refugees were to be restored, and a number of war-vessels were to be delivered to the cities in alliance with Rome. Respecting Tigranes, who in strictness should likewise have been included in the peace, there was silence on both sides, since neither of the contracting parties cared for the endless further steps which would be occasioned by making him a party. The king thus retained the state of possession which he had before the war, nor was he subjected to any
voL.