No More Learning

Members of the various councils in India would be
appointed by the secretary of state in council.
(j) The naval and military forces of the Company were transferred
to the crown, their separate local character being retained. It was
directed by clause 55 that except for the purpose of preventing or
repelling invasion, or under other sudden or urgent necessity, Indian
revenues should not be applicable for military operations outside
India without the consent of parliament.
The basic principles of the bill were fully discussed in parliament. 1
The object was to vest full charge of the government of India in the
crown “in order that the direct superintendence of the whole empire
might be placed under one executive authority". The new secretary
of state would be a member of the cabinet. His individual responsi-
bility was essential. His decision would be final on all matters. But
he should not be allowed to choose all his councillors, for the council
should possess considerable independence. It must exercise "moral
control” 3 As Sir Henry Maine subsequently observed, the ultimate
power of the secretary of state was regarded with apprehension by
certain spcakers in the House of Commons. On 23 June the directors
drew up a letter criticising the bill and stating that in their opinion
the council should have more than a consultative voice in all questions
regarding expenditure. In such cases the secretary of state should not
be able to exercise his overruling power. Precautionary provisions
were then engrafted on the bill and appeared as clauses 41 and 55. 4
The semi-independent status accorded to the Council of India by
the cabinet was approved by Mr Gladstone for the opposition. In
order“to clothe this new body with all the moral weight and influence
that was consistent with retaining intact the responsibility of the
secretary of state”, he recommended that its first members should be
named in the bill. Each nomination would thus receive the express
approval of parliament. This would give the council a start which
would secure for it a good character hereafter. It needed all possible
weight at this time of transition from one form of government to
)
3 Idem, CLI, 323.
1 Hansard, 1858, CXLIX, CL. 2 Idem, CL, 2066.
• Unpublished memorandum, dated 8 November, 1880.
5 Hansard, CLI, 470, 757-8.


## p. 211 (#247) ############################################

THE DEBATES OF 1858
211
another and there were precedents for such procedure. The proposal
was rejected by the cabinet, mainly on the ground that, if accepted, it
would deprive the court of directors of the power of electing any
members of the new body. The government wished to avoid needless
changes. It had found in the court of directors a council in being
which consisted partly of crown nominees and partly of persons elected
by the Company's court of proprietors. It would practically con-
tinue this council, increasing the number of nominees and reducing
the number of elected members so as nearly to equalise the two
varieties. 1
Both the cabinet and parliament desired to deal tenderly with the
Company which had fallen before “he inevitable consequences of
time, change and progress", 2 and to set up a substantial barrier
against inroads of unbalanced sentiment and attempts to debit the
revenues of India with unfair charges. India must not be brought
into the cockpit of party politics. The members of the Council of India
must be “neither the masters nor the puppets but the valuable
advisers of the new minister" 3
While, however, the council would be invested with an appreciable
degree of independence and would be so large as to represent the
various presidencies and public services in India, it would have no
powers of initiative, and would, in the main, confine its attention to
such questions of policy and matters of first-class interest as were laid
before it by its president, who in “secret" affairs could act by himself
entirely apart from his councillors. He was a member of the cabinet
which could not be forced to take into its confidence any given
number of persons whom it did not wish of its own accord to con-
sult. The president of the Board of Control had always possessed
the privilege of communicating with the governor-general through
the secret committee of the court of directors in regard to “secret”
business. 5
Secret orders, however, concerning the levying of war and other
matters might involve considerable expenditure from Indian revenues.
It was so newhat difficult to see how members of council could in such
cases discharge their statutory responsibilities.
While it was hoped that all these arrangements would conduce to
the better government of India, the cabinet was convinced that, in
Lord Derby's words, "the government of India must be, on the whole,
carried out in India itself”. 6 Interference should be on as small a
scale as possible; although, apart from the large amount of Indian
business which was necessarily transacted in England, since parlia-
ment was responsible to the nation for the administration of India, it
must discharge its responsibilities conscientiously.
1 Hansard, Cli, 759-60.
; Idem, CLI, 1454-5;
• Lec-Warner, Dalhousie, 1, 107-8.
Idem, cxLix, 820.
• Idem, CLI, 1457-8.
• Hansard, CLI, 1448.
14-2


## p. 212 (#248) ############################################

212
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
The Act“for the better government of India” (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106)
received the royal assent on 2 August, 1858; and a month later the
directors issued their last instructions to their servants in the East and
in memorable words commended their splendid trust to the care of
the sovereign of Great Britain.
Let Her Majesty appreciate the gift-let her take the vast country and the
teeming millions of India under Her direct control; but let Her not forget the great
corporation from which she has received them nor the lessons to be learnt from its
success.
Lord Stanley, afterwards Earl of Derby, who, as president of the
Board of Control, had piloted the bill of 1858 through the House of
Commons, was the first secretary of state for India. With the board's
two secretaries, he migrated to a new India Office which took the
place of the Company's East India House. The secretaries became
the first Parliamentary and Permanent Under-Sccretaries of State for
India. Resigning in 1859 with the Conservative cabinet, Stanley was
succeeded by Sir Charles Wood, who, as president of the Board of
Control, had been responsible for the Charter Act of 1853 and the
education dispatch of 1854, and now held office till 1866 with excellent
results. He was a single-minded man, of great knowledge, patience
and judgment, and was largely responsible for the success with which
Indian affairs were conducted during a very difficult period of transi-
tion and reconstruction. The arrangements for the councils of the
governor-general and those of the governors of Madras and Bombay,
the setting up of new High Courts of Judicature, the reorganisation
of finances, the codification of the law, railway extension, the amal-
gamation of the queen's and the Company's British regiments, the
determination of the number of British troops to be quartered in India,
the adjustment of numerous conflicting interests, all demanded careful
consideration in London. The council was a very strong one, including
ex-directors and men who had earned distinction in the Mutiny
period. Although there were necessarily differences of opinion and
outlook from time to time, although the transaction of business by
committees sometimes caused irritating delays, although time was
sometimes wasted over trifling financial questions which could better
have been decided in India, some years after quitting office Wood,
who had meantime become Lord Halifax, told the House of Lords
that any secretary of state who firmly and honestly discharged his
duties would never experience the slightest difficulty with his council. 4
On a subsequent occasion he
deprecated any measure which could diminish the independence and self-respect
of the council, for a strong council was needed to give the secretary of state the
support requisite for resisting party pressure, a pressure not always applied in a
manner beneficial to India. 5
i Foster, East India House, pp. 153-4.
2 Cf. Hansard, cxlviii, 1298.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 447.
• Hansard, cxcv, 1085. • Idem, cxcvi, 693.
6


## p. 213 (#249) ############################################

THE LEGISLATION OF 1869
213
In 1866, however, a more brilliant and impulsive, but less patient and
experienced, secretary of state presided at the council-board. Lord
Salisbury (then Lord Cranborne), while in office, avoided an open
breach with his council. But afterwards, when speaking in the House
of Lords as Marquis of Salisbury on 11 March, 1869, on“ the Governor-
general of India Bill”, he expressed his belief that the “tutelage” in
which the secretary of state for India was held by his council was
injurious to the good government of that country. In such matters
as railway guarantees and other commercial affairs the council's
"veto” was a protection, but, with that exception, responsibility
should lie with the secretary of state alone. Opportunity should be
taken of another bill then pending to clear up "the mystery” which
enabled the council, under cover of vetoing money questions, to inter-
fere in every other measure on the plea that it involved money con-
siderations and thus to become "an incubus on the minister". 1
On this occasion Lord Salisbury was followed by his successor in
office, the Duke of Argyll, who assured him that there was no mystery.
The true interpretation of the law was that the secretary of state was
“absolutely supreme" in financial, as in other matters, and could
overrule his council whenever he thought fit to do so. The duke was
aware of no case in which the council had set up its authority in
opposition to the will of the secretary of state. On 19 April, in bringing
forward the “Government of India Act Amendment Bill”, he ex-
plained to the House the history of clause 41 in the act of 1858 which
had given rise to Lord Salisbury's contention. Considerable discussion
followed, and extended over 29 April, when the bill was read a second
time, to 13 May, when Lord Salisbury moved and withdrew an
amendment. The subject revived in a debate in the House of Com-
mons on 17 August, 1880, when it was raised by Fawcett, the econo-
mist, afterwards postmaster-general. ? The view eventually taken was
that the true intentions of parliament in enacting clause 41 of the act
of 1858 were to impose constitutional restraint on the powers of the
secretary of state with respect to the expenditure of money, but by no
means to extend the effective assertion of this restraint to all cases,
especially where imperial questions were concerned. The secretary of
state was a member of the cabinet and in cabinet questions the views
of the cabinet must prevail. It was never intended that the council
should be able to resist the cabinet by stopping supplies. Vis-à-vis the
secretary of state, as representing the latter, the Council of India
possessed no veto. As Sir Henry Maine expressed it, “any such
power given to the council and exercised by it would produce before
long a combination of both the great English parties to sweep away
the council itself". 3
In the course of the debate in the House of Lords on 13 May, 1869,
· Hansard, cxciv, 1074.
· Idem, CCLV, 1453.
3 Unpublished memorandum.


## p. 214 (#250) ############################################

214
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
1
the Duke of Argyll stated that Lord Salisbury had been moved to
raise the question by the opposition which his council had offered to
a project put forward by certain commercial bodies to which the
secretary of state had agreed. The council had been supported by the
Government of India, but had eventually given way. In any case,
clause 41 of the act of 1858 survived Lord Salisbury's assault.
The Government of India Act Amendment Bill", which pro-
duced the Lords debate of 13 May, 1869, contained proposals for
altering the life-tenure of members of the Council of India to one of
ten years, which might, for reasons of public advantage, be extended
to fifteen years. The secretary of state justified his recommendation by
the rapid changes which were taking place in India, largely as a result
of extending railway communications, and by the need of not only
intimate but recent Indian experience on his council. His views
were accepted by the House. Lord Salisbury moved an amendment
to the bill proposing that in future all members of the council should
be appointed by the crown. None should be co-opted by the council
itself. The amend. nent was carried and embodied in the bill, together
with a provision transferring from the secretary of state in council
to the crown the right of filling vacancies on the councils of the
governor-general and governors in India. The general effect of the
legislation and debates of 1869 was to strengthen the position of the
secretary of state vis-à-vis his council. His position vis-à-vis the Govern-
ment of India was fortified by the completion in 1870 of a direct
telegraph line between India and England by submarine cable through
the Red Sea. He could thus less than ever be confronted with accom-
plished facts.
For years after 1869 the history of the Council of India was un-
eventful. When Lord Salisbury again presided over the India Office
(1874-7) his Afghan and North-West Frontier policy, especially the
occupation of Quetta and the separation of the trans-Indus districts
from the Panjab, was strongly opposed by members of his council who
followed Lord Lawrence's lead. 3 But a secretary of state who could
rely on cabinet support could now certainly get his way. Although,
according to Lord Salisbury's biographer, he was a believer “in the
virtue of a single inspiration and in the evil of hampering it by the
intrusion of competing ideas”, he was exercised by the problem of
combining an independence of initiative in the government of India
with his own responsibility for final decision, and considered that
it could be solved only by private correspondence between himself
and the viceroy. " He carried this doctrine to lengths to which Lord
Northbrook refused to follow him.
Lord Northbrook recognised the subordinate position of the viceroy but held
that parliament had confurred certain rights, not orily on the viceroy, but on his
1 Hansard, cxcvi, 700.
? Idem, cxcv, 1077-8. Cf. Martineau, op. cit. I, 356–7.
: Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, 11, 159. • Idem, pp. 65-6.
a
>


## p. 215 (#251) ############################################

POLICY OF THE INDIA OFFICE
215
council, which differentiated the latter in a very notable degree from subordinate
officials. 1
Lord Cromer has stated that Lord Salisbury was disposed to reject,
and, he thought, to underrate, the value of the views of Anglo-Indian
officials.
This does not appear to have been the practice of some of his
successors. Lord George Hamilton, who first as under-secretary and
afterwards as secretary of state introduced thirteen Indian budgets in
the House of Commons, writes that the Council of India was really a
cabinet with the important exception that its procedure and powers
were prescribed by an act of parliament. It had absolute control over
Indian expenditure. It preserved an unbroken record of the reasons
for expenditure of all kinds and performed the business of checking
far more effectively than the treasury, obtaining better results from
the expenditure sanctioned. 2 Lord Randolph Churchill found the
council "an invaluable instrument”. 3
As regards the general policy of the India Office in the latter years
of the nineteenth century, although relations between India and
England had become more intimate, involving a constantly increasing
degree of interference, and though the cases in which final orders
could be passed in India had become less frequent, yet the secretary
of state did not constantly interfere in the ordinary work of Indian
administration, but mainly confined his action to answering references
from the Indian government. Apart from great political or financia)
questions, the number or nature of these references depended on the
character of the governor-general for the time being. The secretary
of state initiated almost nothing. In domestic affairs the Indian
government was almost independent so long as it was content to
carry on without largely increasing the cost of existing establishments
or incurring new and heavy charges. The secretary of state had no
disposition to interfere needlessly in the details of administration in
India, but was sometimes subjected to pressure which could with
difficulty be resisted. On such occasions the council was extremely
useful. It further assisted in preserving continuity of administrative
principles in India where the official personnel was necessarily always
changing. "
The views of the majority of the Council of India on the subject of
divided control of the India army provoked the impatience of Lord
Ripon who, at the close of the first year of his viceroyalty, complained
of the increasing interference of the India Office which he ascribed to
the “subordinates", and the fact that Lord Hartington, then secretary,
was overworked with other than Indian business. But had the same
1 Mallet, Life of Northbrook, p. 91.
2 Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections (1874-1880), pp. 307-8.
• Winston Churchill, Life of Lord Randolph Churchill, 1, 475.
• Strachey, India, pp. 74 81 (1911 ed. ).


## p. 216 (#252) ############################################

216 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
viceroy received the warning drawn up by Sir Henry Maine, the most
prominent member of the then existent Council of India, relating to
the projected Ilbert bill, he might have been saved from a course of
action which he lived to regret bitterly. The council had in 1883
desired Lord Hartington, then secretary of state, to transmit Maine's
“secret” memorandum to the viceroy; but this was not done, and
they were subsequently consoled by Lord Kimberley, Hartington's
successor, with the just reminder that they should formally have
conveyed the warning themselves. 1
Meantime the constitution of the council was slightly altered. In
1876 the secretary of state was allowed to appoint not more than three
special experts (legal or financial) on the old tenure of good behaviour.
In 1889 he was allowed to abstain from filling vacancies until the
number of members should be reduced to ten. Reduction was asked
for in the interest of economy. In the previous year the council had
been joined by nne of its most distinguished members, Sir Alfred
Lyall, described by Lord George Hamilton as his “right-hand
adviser”, who held office for fifteen years and has left us some passing
impressions of its proceedings. Fresh from governing great provinces
he wrote:
The India Office is comfortable and convenient, but rather depressing: in the
first place, death visits the council rather frequently: secondly, we have all rather
the look of oid hulks laid up in dock,
and are men who have. said good-bye to active
service; thirdly, the distance and difference between London and India makes one
feel as if looking at things through a glass darl. ly, and not face to face, and in a year
or two I shall begin to distrust my own judgment. . . . In council we stand up and
orate, which breaks down desultory discussion, but is no good for thrashing out
questions.
Again, he says "one can prevent some mischief but do little good on
the council”. A year later, however, he liked his work, found that it
gave him enough to do and even more than he cared for. In 1894,
with all his colleagues, ne protested vainly and vigorously against the
exclusion of cotton goods from the general import duty of 5 per cent. ,
as a serious concession to British interests which would damage Indian
confidence in the British Government.
Neither parliament nor the secretary of state was inclined to inter-
fere with the administration of India as long as all went well and
Indian affairs hardly touched British politics. Between 1880 and 1905
so little did parliament seriously concern itself with Indian domestic
business that in 1889 and 1891 the secretary of state was able to dis-
regard resolutions of the House of Commons relating to the opium
trade, and in 1894, after consulting the Government of India, he
declined to take action on another resolution of the same House in
favour of simultaneous examinations in England and India for ad-
i Wolf, Life of Ripon, 11, 137-9,
Durand, Life of Lyall, p. 322.
3 Debates of 3 May, 1889, and 10 April, 1891, Hé usard, cccxxxv, CCCLII.


## p. 217 (#253) ############################################

MORLEY AND HIS COUNCIL
217
>
mission to the civil service. 1 The general feeling in this country was
that Indian affairs were safe in the hands of the Indian government;
and as late as 1904 Lord Curzon, after his first term of office, struck
no jarring note when he asked that his government might not be
bothered with “an excessive display of parliamentary affection” and
decíared that the ideal party in England for people in India was the
party which would act “both as the impartial umpire as well as the
superior authority in the disputes that sometimes arise between us,
and that will not unduly favour the home country at our expense
A year later, however, the viceroy resigned in consequence of a
difference with the Home Government and secretary of state, the bitter-
ness of which is recalled by some of his last words. 2 The quarrel came
as a climax to various disagreements, and at one time Lord Curzon,
with evident injustice, ascribed to the members of the Council of
India "a desire to thwart and hinder his work". 3 After his departure
a new era began. The partition of Bengal produced a violent agita-
tion; a revolutionary movement gradually emerged into view; a
scheme of wide constitutional reform was projected; and in 1907
John Morley, then secretary of state, desiring to add two Indian
gentlemen to his council, introduced and carried through parliament
a bill which empowered him to increase the strength of that body
from twelve to fourteen. No member would be appointed who had
been absent from India for more than five years; and no member
would hold office for more than seven years. Salaries of members
were reduced from £1200 to £1000.
General J. H. Morgan says that no more autocratic secretary for
India ever reigned at Whitehall,- none ever consulted his council less,
and none ever admonished a viceroy more. It must be remembered
that Morley was subjected to considerable pressure from the left wing
of his own party. But there is ample evidence to support General
Morgan's views, both in a letter from Lord Minto to Lord Stamford-
ham dated 5 July, 1910,' and in Morley' own Recollections. Yet it is
cvident that at one time Morley was anxious not to depress but to
elevate the position of the Council of India. Ir. August, 1907, he
invited Lord Cromer to join it and Cromer consented. Then the
secretary of state discovered that the act of 1858 forbade the appoint-
ment of anyone "capable of sitting and voting in parliament”. He
wrote to Minto on 23 August, 1907, that he would propose to the
cabinet that the law should be altered, for Cromer would “give to my
council a strength and authority in the public eye, of which, if we are
in for troublesome times, we shall stand in much need”. The project,
however, unfortunately ſell through; and Morley was left with coun-
cillors, none of whom individually carried weight in parliament.
a
1 Pp. 368-70, infra.
• Ronaldshay, Curzon, 1. 237.
6 Buchan, Momoir of Lord Minio, p. 311.
1 British Government in India, I1, 255.
• John Viscount Morley, an appreciation, p. 32.
Morley, Recollections, 11, 233.


## p. 218 (#254) ############################################

218 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
5
Regarding some of these as reactionary, he opened his doors wide to
irresponsible advisers;+ and finding no particular difficulty in getting
his own way, absorbed in the fascination of his task, gathered more
and more power into his own hands, much to the vexation of a long-
suffering viceroy. ?
The close of the Morley régime found the late Mr E. S. Montagu,
as parliamentary under-secretary, enquiring into the conduct of
business at the India Office. The Marquess of Crewe, its new head,
introduced proposals for reform which appear to have largely
emanated from Montagu, and were rejected by the Lords after an
illuminating debate.
On 31 July, 1913, in answer to a question put by Viscount Midleton,
Lord Crewe announced his intention of introducing proposals for
legislation which would facilitate and quicken India Office procedure
by making the transaction of council business by committees excep-
tional and no longer usual. 3 Members of council would now be
attached to particular departments.
They would be reduced to eight
or ten, the two Indian members being retained, and would become
whole-time servants, their salaries being raised once more to £1200.
They must possess recent experience, and, if qualified by official
service, would sit on the council in the concluding years of their active
service and not in the first years of their retirement. The secretary of
state emphasised the value of the council, which assisted him by
enabling matters to come up for decision in a more compact and
concentrated way than they did in other offices. He derived marked
advantage in case of a difference of opinion and a discussion on a
particular subject in council, from being obliged to present that sub-
ject in a more accurate, form than he probably would do if he had
only to argue the pros and cons of it with himself. Moreover, and
this was by no means the least important point, the council greatly
strengthened the position of the secretary of state in dealing with the
government of India, especially if he were a new-comer to office.
If the existence be conceived of a viceroy backed by a body of local experts of
long practical experience, then, I think, the secretary of state would need to be a
Bismarck to hold his own in any controversy against so powerful a combination as
that, and the only result, as I think, would be that India might be brought more
often than it is into the cockpit of parliamèntary politics.
The council's financial powers were such that in theory it might make
the government of India under our parli mentary system almost
impossible; theoretical possibilities, however, need not alarm practical
men who were anxious to agree if they could. A proof of this was that
in matters not financial "in which the secretary of state could overrule
his council”, such a step had been taken only “on the very rarest
occasions”. In 1914 Lord Crewe introduced a “Council of India”
a
>
>
1 Cf. Hansard, cxcv, 1083.
? See Buchan, op. cit. p. 312.
3 Hansard, xiv, 1574-86.


## p. 219 (#255) ############################################

LORD CREWE'S PROPOSALS
219
a
bill based on these views and including two novel proposals: (a) for
imposing statutory obligation to appoint two persons domiciled in
India to the council, selected from a list drawn up by the non-official
members of the imperial and provincial legislative councils in British
India; (6) for amplifying the list of “secret” matters with which,
under the act of 1858, the secretary of state could deal exclusively.
The bill was rejected by a large majority of the Lords. It was
strongly condemned by Lord Curzon as designed to withdraw from
the council's cognisance an enormous number of questions covering
the whole sphere of Indian government and to reduce that body,
which by its passive acquiescence in the removal of the capital from
Calcutta to Delhi had already shown itself flexible and pliant, to “an
impotent and costly sham”. i In proposing to compel the secretary
of state to choose two Indian politicians as his councillors, it was for-
gotten that the council was a body of experts, not one of politicians
or public speakers.
Lord Curzon's reference to the Delhi policy takes us back to certain
incidents of the year 1911 which formed an extraordinary episode in
the constitutional history of British India. ?
In 1876 Disraeli's government introduced a Royal Titles bill which
was in-ended to mark the new relation which, since 1858, the sovereign
had occupied towards her subjects in India. The bill passed through
pa ment by a very large majority; and in Mr Buckle's words:
The world understood that a new pledge had been given of the determination
of the British crown to cherish India; and her princes and peoples understood that
their sovereign had assumed towards them a nearer and more personal relation. "
At a great durbar held at Delhi on 1 January, 1877, Queen Victoria
was proclaimed “Queen-Empress of India”. On 1 January, 1903,
at a second Delhi durbar her successor was proclaimed “King-
Emperor”. On 12 December, 1911, there was a third Delhi durbar,
distinguished beyond its predecessors by the presence of the sovereigns
themselves and by the remarkable announcements which were made,
on the advice of his ministers, by the king-emperor. Up to that time
all changes of signal importance in the government of India had taken
place after full discussion in parliament and under parliamentary
sanction. Now, however, changes of great moment were proclaimed
of which parliament had no previous cognisance. At the durbar His
Majesty announced that the capital of India would henceforward be
Delhi and not Calcutta; the partition of Bengal, which had caused
such bitter controversy, would be revoked; Bengal would be one
province under a governor in council; a new province of Bihar and
Orissa would be created; Assam would once more be the charge of
a chief commissioner. These measures, which necessarily involved
heavy expenditure and far-reaching consequences, naturally pro-
1 Hansard, xvi. 484.
· Curzon, op. in. II, 119.
· Life of Disraeli, iv, 93, 167; V, 471.
3


## p. 220 (#256) ############################################

220
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
voked the criticism that the cabinet had “used the authority of the
sovereign to settle in their own way an issue of an acutely controversial
character”. 1 They originated with the governor-general in council,
found favour with the secretary of state and the Asquith cabinet, and
were therefore accepted by the Council of India, who can hardly have
obtained an opportunity to give even a passing thought to the large
issues and heavy expenditure involved. Approval was transmitted to
the governor-general; and parliament only became aware of all that
was contemplated after His Majesty had made the announcement.
Lord Crewe argued inter alig that in fact the action taken was ad-
ministrative and did not require parliamentary sanction. The original
partition of Bengal had been carried out without reference to parlia-
ment. But in fact these later changes were of far greater moment even
than that ill-starred measure.
In the third year of the last war, the Council of India and the India
Office came prominently before the nation. The management and
conduct of the campaign in Mesopotamia had been originally en-
trusted to the government and military authorities in India. The
commission of enquiry which was appointed, after the capture of
Kut-el-Amara by the Turks, and sat in London, commented un-
favourably on the India Office organisation and on the substitution of
private telegrams from the secretary of state to the viceroy for public
telegrams which would have passed through or been communicated
to the Council of India. The practice had so much developed of recent
years as to make the private telegrams “almost the regular channel of
official inter-communication”. 2 There were strong and obvious ob-
jections to this procedure. The private telegrams, moreover, did not
always remain in the office, for Lord Morley had taken his away.
Neither the Council of India nor the governor-general's council had
been kept in touch with the varying fortunes of the Mesopotamian
expedition, the control of which had been
narrowed down to two high officials, both heavily charged with many other anxious
and pressing duties, and both permanently stationed in localities which had little,
if any, private or personal touch with the forces campaigning in Mesopotamia. '
The conclusions of the commission were debated in both houses
of parliament and led to the resignation of the secretary of state,
MrAusten Chamberlain, who had succeeded late to a situation created
by others. His predecessor, Lord Crewe, contended in the House of
Lords that the policy of the expedition all through was a matter for
the cabinet and the cabinet alonc. 4 His own private telegrams of
importance relating to this matter had been made official and were
preserved at the India Office.
Lord Islington, under-secretary of state, admitted that private
telegrams had been excessively employed. 5 In future they would be
1 Lord Curzon, ap. Hansard, xi, 142. 2 Report of Mesopota,nia Commission, p. 102.
3 Idem, p. 103
• Hansard, xxv, 929.
5 Idem, 952.
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THE MESOPOTAMIA DEBATES
221
.
fewer and wherever possible would be made “official” after dispatch.
The India Office was not established or equipped for the conduct of
an extended campaign outside India. 1
Lord Curzon said that without the machinery of private letters and
telegrams the government of India, an “amazingly complex and dual
form of administration” which had two chiefs, could not go on. Still
these communications should not be employed to such an extent as to
leave the Council of India at home in ignorance of what was being
done. The secretary of state and the viceroy must not become "a kind
of concealed duumvirate”. They would gain by acting with, and not
without, their councils. In the Commons Montagu, who was then
out of office, had attacked the government of India as too wooden,
inelastic and antediluvian for modern purposes. The British democracy
had never enjoyed an opportunity of trying to rule India. Even if the
House of Commons were to give orders to the secretary of state, that
minister could be overruled by a majority of his council in vital
matters. He knew of one case in which
it was a very near thing, where the action of council might without remedy have
involved the government of India in a policy out of harmony with the declared
policy of the House of Commons and the cabinet.
The whole system of the India Office was designed to prevent control
by the House of Commons, for fear that there might be too advanced
a secretary of state. The statutory organisation of the office produced
an apotheosis of circumlocution. The whole system of governing India
must be explored in the light of the Mesopotamian Commission
Report. 2
Mr Chamberlain explained that both Lord Crewe and himself had
acted in relation to the Mesopotamian campaign as spokesmen of His
Majesty's government. Supreme control had been exercised by the
secretary of state on behalf of and by direction of the cabinet. The
India Office was notorganised to conduct militaryoperations and never
attempted to do so. It would therefore have been better if from the
first the control exercised on behalf of His Majesty's government had
been vested in the General Staff or Army Council. All the private
telegrams on which the commission had commented related to the
levying of war, and might, under the act of 1858, have been marked
"secret " instead of private, and then the commission's criticisms in
this connection would have gone by the board. Nothing but injury
could come to national, imperial and Indian interests by mixing up
a debate on a military breakdown, or alleged military mismanage-
ment, with the question of the whole future fabric of Indian govern-
ment. His Majesty's government were already considering a dispatch
from the Government of India on reforms in the political system of
that country:
1 Hansard, xxv, 956, 1027-8.
Idem, xcv, 2199-210.
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222
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
1
Immediately after the Mesopotamia debates Mr Austen Chamber-
lain resigned and was succeeded by Mr Montagu. The declaration of
20 August, 1917, shortly followed, and late in the same year, at the
invitation of the viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, the secretary of state
arrived in India. After preliminary conferences at Delhi, he toured
to Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, accompanied by the viceroy, the
home member of the governor-general's council and two members of
the Council of India, one British and one Indian. On the conclusion
of the tour, further consultations were held; and it was not until about
the end of April, 1918, that Mr Montagu returned to England. The
purpose of his visit had been to determine on the spot, and in con-
sultation with the viceroy, what steps should be taken in the direction
of establishing in India government responsible to the Indian peoples.
The joint report of Mr Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, published in
July, 1918, was framed after prolonged discussion with the council of
the governor-general and met with unanimous support from the
Council of India as “on the whole recommending the measures best
adapted to ensure safe and steady progress in the desired direction".
It formed the basis of the act of December, 1919, which materially
changed the constitution under which India had been governed since
the end of the Mutiny.
We have noticed the parting advice of the directors of the East India
Company and the main principles which underlay the legislation of
1858. It was parliament which deliberately organised the system de-
nounced by Mr Montagu in 1917. It was parliament which, desiring
to accord all possible independence to the Council of India, arranged
for that body to contain first an elected and then a co-opted element.
When the legislation of 1869 had invested the secretary of state with
power to appoint all his councillors and with certain other powers of
appointment, the council declined in importance, but for long main-
tained a strong position as an advisory and, in some measure, a con-
trolling body. Under the Morley régime a further decline set in, which
apparently accelerated rather rapidly.
While defending his proposals to the House of Lords in 1914,
Lord Crewe asked consideration for “the perpetual and in some
respects ever-increasing control of parliament, the ever-increasing
force of public opinion in India, and the power of the press in England
and India". With regard to the influence of parliamentary control on
the working of the India Office, Lord George Hamilton remarks:
The moment a crisis occurs, then the department affected which, for the time
being, is working at the very highest tension, is bombarded with questions, inter-
pellations, and demands for returns, which not infrequently absorb many hours of
attention from the very officials who are best qualified to deal with the emergent
subject.
But in pre-war days crises were infrequent, and Lord Crewe's plea
i Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections (1886–1906), p. 259.
>
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INDIA IN PARLIAMENT
223
for changes which cut at the root of the basic principle of the act of
1858 is hardly reconcilable with the testimony of the Montagu-
Chelmsford Report that parliamentary interest in India was neither
well-informed nor well-sustained.
Parliament, according to Mr Montagu and Lord Chelmsford,
should have devised a substitute for the prolonged inquests which
preceded periodical renewals of the Company's charter. Its omission
to do this was largely responsible "for our failure, in the face of a
growing nationalist feeling in India, to think out and work at a policy
of continuous advance”. I Was this omission then a grave mistake?
The parliamentary inquests of pre-Mutiny days did much good.
They belonged to times which were more leisurely than our own,
when the East India Company and its servants were well represented
in parliament, and some front-rank statesmen carefully studied Indian
affairs. Several speeches, for instance, delivered in the House of
Commons on the East India Company bill of 1853 are remarkable for
their intrinsic valuc as well as for the position of the speakers in public
esteem. It is instructive to compare the debates on that measure with
the debates on the Government of India bill of 1919. In 1853 the bill,
which had been prepared after long enquiries by committees of both
houses, was brought in on 9 June after three nights of discussion
distinguished by remarkable speeches by Wood, then president of
the Board of Control, by John Bright and by Sir James Hogg, chair-
man of the court of directors. The second reading lasted four nights. 3
Among the speakers were Macaulay, Cobden, Bright, Disraeli and
Lord John Russell. The bill was afterwards before a committee of the
whole house for eight nights, and was read a third time and passed
on 29 July. 4 The Government of India Bill of 1919, on the other hand,
was presented to the House of Commons on 29 May, was read a
second time on 5 June5 and was on that day sent to a joint committee
of both houses on which the lower house was represented by seven
members. The bill was recommitted on 3 December, 1919, considered
by the Commons on that day and the next, and was read a third time
on the 5th. The president of the Board of Education was the only
member of the cabinet beside the secretary of state who made any
contribution to the debates. The leaders of the Independent Liberal
and Labour parties made brief speeches. There was little inclination
to examine in detail the weighty recommendations of the joint com-
mittee. The debates were meagre.
Between 1858 and 1914 two processes were accelerating. In
England, domestic, Irish and foreign affairs were making more and
more insistent demands on the time and thoughts of members of
parliament; in India administration was becoming more elaborate
1 Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms.
? Hansard, CXXVII, 1093, 1095, 1195, 1230, 1277, 1299, 1352.
• Idem, cxxvIII, cxxix.
• Idem, cxxix, 1009-45.
5 Idem, CXVI, 2295-411.
6 Idem, cxxII, 429-538, 649–790.
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## p. 224 (#260) ############################################

224 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
and complex. There was no longer a court of directors with re-
presentatives and friends in the House of Commons. Secretaries of
state for India were increasingly left by preoccupied cabinets and
over-busy parliaments to shape their own policy. They gradually
emancipated themselves from their council and became more absolute
until, shortly after the close of our period, a secretary of state? ven-
tured on a remarkable departure in policy without cabinet sanction
and was compelled to resign office. It is certain that none of his pre-
decessors desired that periodical parliamentary inquests of the old
kind should be renewed. The idea was considered and abandoned by
Lord Morley, a who was fully aware that whereas those enquiries were
held in an atmosphere altogether remote from India, in widely
different times, and were therefore unproductive of any racial excite-
ment in that country, conditions so favourable to searching and fruit-
ful investigation had gone for ever. Perchance, too, he had read these
weighty words of Sir Henry Maine:
It would not be thought a very safe or happy constitutional rule for any civilized
European country that all its political, judicial, administrative and even social
institutions (for these last in India cannot be wholly separated from the others)
should be thrown into the crucible every twenty years. But if this experiment is
to be tried, why of all countries should it be tried on India ?
Maine argued that in view of the intense conservatism of the Indian
masses, of their singular liability to agitation and panic, they were
unlikely to be favourably impressed by the knowledge
that everything connected with the system under which they lived was to be brought
into question and that everybody was to be heard against it. Such enquiries were
formerly comparatively innocuous because in fact the people of India knew little
about them. But India had now been brought close to our shores by the electric
telegraph and the canal, and there are many agencies, unknown even in 1853,
which spread through the people more or less distorted representations of what is
doing in England. "
He went on to suggest that the remedy for parliamentary ignorance
of Indian affairs might be the constitution of a joint committee of both
houses, which would be brought into contact with Indian finance and
would create gradually a class of members familiar with Indian
questions.
Such a joint committee now sits. But if the parliaments of the period
of 1858-1918 failed, for obvious reasons, to study Indian affairs with
much care or thoroughness, they kept their eyes firmly fixed on some
essential principles of policy. They trusted their agents and treated
their servants with fairness and consideration. They dealt in a
generous and non-party spirit with such proposals for constitutional
reform as were put before them by responsible ministers. In financial
questions they desired to treat India with ample fairness. There is no
more striking instance of this than the attitude of parliament in regard
1 The late Mr E. S. Montagu. 2 Morley, Indian Speeches, pp. 22, 50.
: Minute by Sir H. Maine, 8 November, 1880.
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## p. 225 (#261) ############################################

THE CROWN AND INDIA
225
to the apportionment of the cost of employing Indian troops outside
India on occasions when the interests of the people of that country did
not appear to be directly affected. 1 Even in the financial year 1913-14
the contribution of India toward the upkeep of the imperial navy,
from which she was soon to benefit so feelingly, was only £164,000. 2
This considerate spirit met with a just and welcome reward when on
the outbreak of the great war a resolution was moved by a private
member on the viceroy's legislative council and carried unanimously,
stating that India would "desire in the present emergency that she
should be allowed not only to send her troops but to contribute the
cost of their maintenance and pay". 3
It is certain that no measure ever passed by parliament has better
fulfilled its purpose than the Royal Titles Act. Lytton Strachey
remarks of our English polity that it was in the main a common-sense
structure; but there was always a corner in it where common sense
could not enter, where, somehow or other, the ordinary measurements
were not applicable and the ordinary rules did not apply. “So our
ancestors had laid it down, giving scope, in their wisdom, to that
mystical element which, as it seems, can never quite be eradicated
from the affairs of men. " It is certain that like our own mind, and to
'
a far greater extent, the Indian mind craves for “an unexplored
inexplicable corner” in a polity. And if there is something which
awakens a feeling of the bonds which unite mankind in the thought
of the connection between the Indian people and ourselves, it is
certain that without a symbol of unity which will appeal to both alike,
that feeling would rapidly dwindle. The crown worn by Queen
Victoria and her successors has been far more than a mere symbol of
unity. It has been a strong power 4 and a reconciler in India.
1 Cf. Hansard, 1882, CCLXXIII, 255-307,
2 Idem, 1914, LX, 347.
3 Idem, LXVI, 956.
• Cf. Maconochie, Life of an Indian Civil Servant, p. 125; Lawrence, The India We Served,
239-41.
CHI VI


## p. 226 (#262) ############################################

CHAPTER XII
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
THE CENTRAL AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
IN INDIA, 1858-1918
The chief of the government in India, the man on the spot there,
HE
was first styled “viceroy and governor-general” in the famous pro-
clamation of 1858. The title of viceroy was not conferred on the
governor-general by any parliamentary statute although it is used in
the warrants of precedence and in the statutes of the knightly orders.
Where the governor-general is regarded as the representative of the
sovereign he is spoken of as viceroy; where he is referred to as the
statutory head of the Government of India he retains his original
title. 1
The superintendence, direction and control of the civil and military
administration were still vested in the governor-general in council,
who was now required by the Government of India Act of 1858
(21 & 22 Vic. c. 108) to pay due attention to such orders as he might
receive from the secretary of state. One of the most arduous tasks
before Lord Canning and his council was the preparation of pro-
posals for reshaping the central government and the governments of
Madras and Bombay. New machinery for legislation had also to be
considered.
THE NEW EXECUTIVE COUNCILS
The changes to be made in the executive councils, and more par-
ticularly in his own council, had for some time engaged Canning's
anxious thought. He corresponded first with Stanley and then with
Wood on the subject, and, although the letters exchanged were
private and confidential, their drift can be clearly gathered from
minutes preserved in the India Office and from Canning's corre-
spondence with Lord Granville. He was evidently dissatisfied with
the Bengal civil servants who had been his original councillors; and
it was only when James Wilson arrived from home as financial mem-
ber, and Bartle Frere joined the council from Bombay, that his ideas
gradually changed. He was still more dissatisfied with the system of
collective business which he found in operation. The council was
working as a board and deciding all questions by a majority vote, the
governor-general possessing an overruling power in matters of grave
importance. Canning wrote to Stanley that, as he was personally
1 Curzon, British Government in India, 11, 49; Strachey, India, p. 50.
? Fitzmaurice, Life of Granville, vol. 1, chaps. vii, xiv.


## p. 227 (#263) ############################################

PROPOSED ABOLITION OF COUNCILS
227
a
responsible for everything, he would manage better if he were relieved
from the necessity of discussing questions with a council. Let the
government of India be vested solely in the viceroy and let him be
able to appoint secretaries to assist him. He would consult the secre-
tary of the department concerned as to particular business, and should
there be a conflict of opinions, he would admit other secretaries to the
discussion. To such an arrangement there were two objections—first
the impossibility of leaving a glorified secretary to carry on the
supreme government in Calcutta when the governor-general left the
Bengal Presidency, and second the difficulty of providing for the
conduct of relations with the legislative council and for the manage-
ment of that council. He made suggestions for overcoming these
obstacles.
Stanley was inclined to agree in principle and laid the matter before
a committee of his council, which, on 23 May, 1859, decided by a
considerable majority that the executive councils at Calcutta, Bombay
and Madras, should all be remodelled on this basis. The "officers of
the departmental secretariats” would be the responsible advisers or
councillors of the governor-general and of local governors. But
methods for carrying this idea into effect had still to be considered.