However, what seriously concerned Tsong- khapa was the widespread misconceptions associated with Tantra which he believed to be
pervasive
at his time in Tibet.
Tsongkhapa-s-Qualms-About-Early-Tibetan-Interpretations-of-Madhyamaka-Philosophy
Q.
ita, Buton, and Tsongkhapa's own teacher Rendawa.
Tsongkhapa's critical views on the so-called Shentong Madhyamaka of the Jonang school appear to have been established even during the "earlier" period of his intellectual life.
In LS Tsongkhapa subjects Shentong abso- lutism to severe criticism.
29 The thrust of his critique seems to be to demonstrate the absence'of Indian Madhyamaka literary source for the Shentong view.
Tsongkhapa argues that there are only three possible Indian Madhyamaka sources30 for the Jonangpa's central claim that the ultimate truth must be understood as an absolute, but concludes that none of these sources actually support the Shentong standpoint.
Tsongkhapa concludes his criticlue by exhorting others to discard this view as one would spit out a particle of dust!
3l Finally, Tsongkhapa appears to be deeply concerned about what he sees as harmful legacies of Hva-shang in the tenets of some of the Tibetan Madhyamika thinkers.
The first two
? From a contemporary philosopher's perspective, one can say that first and foremost Tsongkhapa is deeply concerned by what he saw as a general lac? of philosophical and anal? tical rigour in Tibetan thinking. This, he beheved, was not only contradictory to the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism towards which most schools of Tibetan Buddhism claimed a strict adherence, but also went against the basic spirit of the Buddhist path. There was, in his view, a pervasive sense of philosophical
"naivety" and a dangerous trend towards a form of anti-rationalism in Tibet which were integrally connected. According to Tsongkhapa, this combination of philosophical naivety and anti-rationalism had profound religious and ethical consequences.
By "philosophical naivety," I am referring to all the variants of Tibetan interpretation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness, which appear to deny in one form or another the reality of the empirical world. In its most extreme form, Tsongkhapa believed, this denial is the view which is based on a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature and asserts that "things are neither existent nor non-existent. " "Naivists" also include those who conceived emptiness to be a mere nothingness. On this view, the empirical world becomes nothing but a mere illusion. Tn a broad sense, Madhyamikas do accept that our lived world of empirical experience is like an illusion. However( the difference is that according to Tsongkhapa, the objects of everyday world are illusion-like and not illusions as many Tibetan Madhyamikas appear to claim. 32
Such philosophical "naivety" is also closely related to epistemological scepticism, one of the two principal sources of anti-rationalism in Tibet (the other being the over-emphasis on the mystical perspectives of Tantra). Again, accordil! g to Tsongkhapa, this stems from a false understanding of the Madhyamaka view of epistemology in general, and in particular its position on the nature of prajna, insight, into the ultimate nature of reality. In actual fact, the sceptic rejects the very possibility of the valid means to knowledge (pramaIJa), especially with relation to emptiness. From the linguistic perspective this viewpoint "upholds the doctrine of in- effability, that nothing can be predicated of anything else, that any de- scription of emptiness is useless, all being equally distant from the ulti- mate. ,,33 All of this then naturally ties up with the position that the Madhyamaka has no views of its own. 34 For Tsongkhapa such standpoints reflect a certain naivety if not an intellectual laziness towards the prob- lematic of reconciling the empirical reality of all things and events and their essential emptiness or the lack of intrinsic existence and identity. According to Tsongkhapa, this problem of reconciliation is the crux of
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 9
concerns pertain to philosophical issues, while the third relates more to
meditative praxis.
10 THE TIBET JOURNAL
Madhyamaka philosophical endeavour. He argues that the confusions of the Tibetan thinkers stem from a deep misunderstanding pertaining to the very meaning of the name Prasangika-Madhyamaka (the proponent of the reductio ad absurdum argument) and its contrasts with the Svatantrika_ Madhyamaka school (the proponent of autonomous syllogism). Tsong_ khapa, in LTC, schematically lists four such positions and enters into a detailed critique of these standpoints. 35
According to Tsongkhapa the first position which is attributed to the Indian Jayananda (12th century CE) reflects an epistemological scepticism concerning the validation of the "tri-modal" character of a logical argu- ment. This is the standard post-Dharmakirti convention of Buddhist lOgic. The second is a universal scepticism that rejects the very possibility of "valid means to knowledge" (prarna1! a) and contends that, when engaged in philosophical argumentation, all that we have and indeed what we need is a verbal consent from the opponent. Tsongkhapa attributes this
position to what he calls "certain Tibetan translators who are students of Jayananda" (Dza ya anan ta'i slob rna bod kyi lo tsa ba dag). Baso Ch6kyi Gyaltshen (1402-1473) identifies Khu Lotsawa (12th century CE), a disciple of Jayananda, as one of them. 36 The third is the position that Tsongkhapa attributes to "those professing to be present-day Prasangikas" (da ita dbu rna thaI 'gyur bar 'dod pa). 37 This position maintains that a Prasangika does not have any thesis of his own both in the conventional and the ultimate sense. Tsongkhapa attributes the fourth position to "someone who claims to be a follower of Candrakirti" (Zla ba grags pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i bod kyi
rnkhas pa kha cig), possibly a reference to Majha Jhangchup Tsondrii (d. 1285) and other followers (possibly Zhang Thangsakpa) of Patshap Lotsawa, the translator of Candrakirti's works. 38 According to Tsongkhapa, the proponents of this position fail to appreciate the subtlety of the Prasangika's critique of the concept of autonomy of reason. The above viewpoints, as far as Tsongkhapa is concerned, are at best agnostic, and at worst nihilistic, points of view which are furthermost from the tenets of the Madhyamaka school, and especially the tradition of Buddhapalita and Candrakirti. For Tsongkhapa, the middle way of Madhyamaka philo- sophy cannot be characterised as nihilism, agnosticism, or even as mere
relativism.
In the parlance of Tibetan scholasticism, this I'agnosticl' interpretation
of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness is known as the "Madhya- maka's (alleged) thesislessness. " Based on a literal reading of certain passages from Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and Candrakirti/9 many of the earlier Tibetan Madhyamikas have consistently argued that the Prasangika literally does not have any positions of his own. According to this read- ing, it is suggested that the Prasangika is concerned only with the
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 11
refutation of other's views. Needless to say, the "no-thesis" view is a complex position containing several components. 40 As a literal reading of the Madhyamaka's catu! }koti argument appears to suggest, for the pro- ponents of this view, ontologically speaking reality literally cannot be said to be any of the following possibilities: "is", "is not", both "is and is not", and "neither is nor is not". Reality though absolute, is ineffable and indeterminate, for it is beyond language and thought. The phenomenal world is merely an illusion, the perception of which will disappear with- out any trace at the stage of final enlightenment. Epistemologically, the p roponents of this view maintain a thorough-going scepticism concerning the possibility of any valid means to knowledge, especially with regard to the absolute. The "real" is, in their view, only intuited in a state of n011- conceptuality. From the linguistic point of view, one could say that the proponents of the "no-thesis" view hold that language has no real bearing on reality, let alone any objective referentiality. Similarly, logic too cannot lead to any genuine inferential knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. Arguments are at best ad hominen or reductio ad absurdum, or what the Buddhists would call prasaftga. So, on their view, the true middle
course (madhyama) is this absence of commitment to any position of one's own. 4! Tsongkhapa vehemently rejects all of this.
Tsongkhapa's refutation of the various strands of the "no-thesis" view is too complex to be dea)t with here; also there exists substantial con- temporary literature on the general debates about whether or not the Madhyamikas have views of their own. 42 Suffice here to underline that the crux of Tsongkhapa's critique pertains to what he understands to be the Prasangika's unique reading of the principle of dependent origination. He argues that since dependent origination is the content (don) of "empti- ness", by denigrating the world of dependent origination, the proponents of the "no-thesis" view are rejecting what is perhaps the heart of the Prasangika's philosophy of emptiness. 43 Not only is it possible for empti- ness of intrinsic being and dependent origination to co-exist in a common locus, the very fact of dependence is, to Tsongkhapa's mind, the highest proof of the absence of intrinsic being. 44 To conceive otherwise, i. e. to hold that dependent origination entails intrinsic being, is to turn every- thing topsy-turvy. In Tsongkhapa's own words, this is like a god himself turning into a devil, a Tibetan equivalent of Nagarjuna's metaphor of medicine becoming the poison! 45
Furthermore, from Tsongkhapa's point of view, the denial of even the conventional existence of the world of dependent origination stems from ? metaphysical assumption that is shared also by all essentialist schools, I. e. existence (yod pn) is equivalent to existence-by-means-of-intrinsic-being (rang ngos nas yod pa). For example, in LTC, Tsongkhapa writes that
? 12 THE TIBET JOURNAL
If one asserts that so long as phenomena such as sprouts etc. exist (yod pal they do so by means of their intrinsic being (rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i yod pal, and that if they do not exist by means of their intrinsic being [then] they do not exist [at all], one is bound to fall into either of the two extremes [i. e. nihil- ism and absolutism]. This way of understanding [the mode of being of pheno- mena] is not different from the essentialists. 46
Tsongkhapa argues that, so far as the definition of nihilism is concern_ ed, there is no substantial difference between both the Prasangika and the essentialist; both agree that repudiation of causality lies at the heart of nihilism. The point of departure between the two parties is this: while the Prasangika does not reject causality, the realist assumes that by rejecting any notion of intrinsic being the Prasangika is rejecting causality as well. This is the principal reason why the Prasangika has been an object of such vehement criticism from the Buddhist essentialists. 47 So, according to Tsongkhapa, Prasangikas do have theses and views of their own, but no theses adhering to any notions of intrinsic being. The Prasangika rejects intrinsic being (svabhava), and emptiness of intrinsic being is their position. Similarly, Prasangikas accept the nominal existence of things and persons; and this is their standpoint. More importantly, as Buddhists, Prasangikas
must maintain that insight into "no-self" (anatman) is the sole path to liberation. Thus, Tsongkhapa concludes:
Therefore, the root cause of all problems is the reifying avidyii (ignorance) that apprehends intrinsic being. The insight into "no-self" or absence of intrinsic being alone is that which eliminates this [reifying consciousness] by means of direct opposition48 .
In effect, Tsongkhapa is rejecting the "no-thesis" view on the grounds that it is essentially nihilistic. In LTC Tsongkhapa cites extensively from Candrakirti to demonstrate a categorical difference between the Prasang-i ka and Carvaka's (Indian materialist's) similar assertions that the laws of karma do not exist intrinsically. 49 According to Tsongkhapa and Candra- kirti, the Carvaka's assertion constitutes nihilism, while the Prasangika's does not. This is because the first denies even the conventional reality of karma, while the latter does not. For Tsongkhapa, Candrakirti's insistence on appreciating this distinction implies his acceptance of the nominal existence of the laws of karma, a view which in Tsongkhapa's mind contradicts the claims of the "no-thesis" view. From a methodological perspective, Tsongkhapa sees the "no-thesis" view as reflecting a serious inability to appreciate the significance of the Prasangika's use of the unique prasajya form of negation. This is a form of negation that is abso- lute and does not commit the protagonist to any existential implication. Yet, to be effective in its application, even such a form of negation must
? pres
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 13
'uppose the acceptance of the law of excluded middle. Tsongkhapa
cites the passage from Vigrahavyavartanf in his support: If the absence of intrinsic being (svabhrJ. va) is reversed,
[its opposite] intrinsic being becomes established 50
? Without subscribing to the fundamental principles of logic, according to Tsongkhapa, one can only result in a state of indecision. Perhaps Tsong- khapa's criticism of this view is ultimately soteriological, at least in its intent. For if the proponents of the nno-thesis" view are right, then the insight into the middle way becomes essentially a state of mind that is a withdrawal of all cognitive activity rather than an active state of nknow- ing". This, for Tsongkhapa, is nothing but the ghost of Hva-shang's pernicious no-thought view, albeit in a new guise. 5l
All of this touch upon the problem of nihilism. For Tsongkhapa, the trouble with the "no-thesis" view is that, when pushed to its logical end, it slides into a form of ontological nihilism. The strategy Tsongkhapa adopts to ensure that the Madhyamaka philosophy does not remain open to the charge of nihilism involves two principal approaches. One is primarily a negative approach in that Tsongkhapa stipulates the para- meters of the Madhyamaka dialectics so that the de-constructive argu- ments of emptiness philosophy cannot and do not undermine the validity of ethics and religious activity. In other words, Tsongkhapa attempts to delineate reason's scope for negation so that the Madhyamaka reasoning does not negate the reality of the conventional world. 52 The second element of Tsongkhapa's strategy involves a constructive approach in that it entails developing a systematic and logically coherent account of con- ventional existence. 53 The primary motive here is to ensure that a clear distinction is maintained between the conventional reality of things and events on the one hand, and metaphysical speculations about their onto- logical status on the other. Tsongkhapa rejects the latter, and argues that existence equals conventional existence.
To summarise, in developing his philosophy of the middle way Tsong- khapa can be seen as nre-claiming" Nagarjuna in Tibet through a close reading of Candraklrti. This does not by any means entail that Tsongkha- pa's thought consists of mere re-presentation of CandrakIrti. As is clear from his works many of Tsongkhapa's substantive contributions are genuinely original by any intellectual standard. However, given Tsong- khapa's such close identification with Candrakirti's works it does seem to be the case that if Candrakirti's reading of Nagarjuna is flawed, serious doubts can also be raised about Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Madhya- maka philosophy. Perhaps Tsongkhapa's greatest contribution to Madhya- maka thought lies in the depth and the breadth of his exammation of the
? 14 THE TIBET JOURNAL
philosophical implications of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness in key areas of philosophy and soteriology. For example, Tsongkhapa lists what he sees as the "eight distinctive features of the Prasangik a_ Madhyamaka" all of which he takes to be direct consequences of the Prasangika's central thesis, namely the rejection of svabhtiva (intrinsic being). In identifying these features, Tsongkhapa writes
In interpreting the treatise of Arya [Naga? una] there exists a unique approach whereby the text is read in such a way so that all functionality (bya byed thams cad) can be maintained although not even an atom exists (rdul tsam yang) by means of self-defining characteristics. Because of this, this system [Prasali. gika] has many flawless tenets Crnam par dag pa'i grub mthaj that distinguish it from the other interpreters ('grel byed gzhan). "What are they? " [Answer:] For the time being, I shall state the principal ones: (i) The rejection of iilayavijftiirul (foundational consciousness) that is separate from the six categories of con-
cognising, apperceptive faculty of consciousness); and (iii) the rejection of autonomous syllogism as a means of generating insight into the nature of re<llity, thus three negative tenets. (iv) The need to accept the reality of ex- ternal objects as much as the reality of [the world of] consciousness; (v) that the Sriivakas and Pratyekabuddhas cognise the absence of intrinsic being of phenomena; (vi) maintaining that grasping at the self-existen? e of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction; (vii) the cessation [of empirical things] is a conditioned phenomenon; and (viii) because of this, there is a unique presentation of the nature of the three tenses of time. 54
This list should not be confused with another list of eight attributed to Tsongkhapa known as the "eight difficult points (dka' gnad brgyad) of the MUlaktlriktl" found in Gyaltshap Dharma Rinchen's (1364-1438) notes dBu ma rtsa ba'i dka'gnad chen po brgyad kyi brjed byang. 55 In the second list, (vii) and (viii) are omitted and in their place are: rejection of the notion of svabhtlva (rang mtshan khas mi len pa), and a unique way of understanding the Buddha's perception of the relative worid of multiplicity (sangs rgyas kyis ji snyed pa mkhyen tshul). 56 Subsequent Tibetan Madhyamikas have attacked Tsongkhapa for suggesting that Prasangika-Madhyamaka has unique tenets, especially such constructive theories as the acceptance of the cessation of empirical things as a conditioned phenomenon. For example, Gowo Rabjampa (1429-1496) has argued that the acceptance of such a conditioned phenomenon (zhig pa 'dus byas yin pa) is a Vaise$ika tenet thus the view of a tradition outside the fold of the Buddhist
schools. 57 Furthermore, he has rejected Tsongkhapa's claim that Prasallgika-Madhyamaka does not accept the existence of tllayavijfitina (foundational consciousness) and svasamvedana (reflexive awareness). 58 The later Nyingma thinker Ju Mipham Gelek Namgyal (1846-1911) too has
sciousness; (ii) a unique system of refuting the [concept of] svasamvedana (self
-
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 15
argued that the Prasangika need not reject conventional existence of both foundational consciousness and reflexive awareness. 59 In contrast, Tak- tshang agrees with Tsongkhapa that Prasangikas do reject reflexive aware- nesS but maintains that Candrakirti does not negate foundational con- sciousness. 60 Regardless of who is right in these debates, the fact remains that Tsongkhapa seriously attempted to draw out all philosophical and soteriological implications of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka's rejection of
intrinsic being (svabhtiva).
III
According to Tsongkhapa, the agnostic and nihilistic tendency can also permeate one's understanding of the nature of the path, and even affect the very conception of "enlightenment". In his Queries, Tsongkhapa points to some opposing trends prevalent in the Tibet of his time concerning the
understanding of the nature of enlightenment. He writes:
Generally speaking, there seem to be many diverse opinions concerning the way in which the "view" [of emptiness] (Ita ba) is perceived as arising. 61 One group of opinions maintains that all forms of conceptuality (mam rtog), be they positive or negative, are to be discarded. Yet others hold the directly opposing view that not only are all forms of conceptuality not to be discarded, but the greater the proliferation ofconcepts the more enhanced one's spiritual realisa- tion (nyams rtog) will become. [They maintain that) this is analogous to fact that the more fuel you bum the larger the size of the flame.
Again, another group of opinions contends that conceptualisation itself is the fundamental ignorance, ma rig pa (avidyti). This view is p rimarily based on
the quote "e_onceptua1I'sab"an 15 m.
deed the great I .
,62
gnorance. , But athers
? maintain the opposite view, that conceptualisation is in actual fact pristine dharmaktiya. These two views represent two opposing sides of the same spec- trum.
Again, some characterise Buddhahood or nirvti1J1l as the state of mind when the mmd abides in natural equilibrium free of distraction (yid 'di ma 'phros par tsm ne gnas pa'i tshe). [And they maintain that] the moment the mind wavers it is in the state of ordinary existence or sarrzsara. Yet others contend that even when conceptual thought-processes occur, no matter how long the processes last, if you observe with a single-pointed mind, dharmaktiya appears vividly. These two views are exact opposites.
Then again, some argue that an emptied vision of nothingness (mthong snang ban bun) arising through a combination of certain conditions, e. g. being situated in a dark room, adopting a specific bodily posture of meditation, and stopping all forms of thought, is the actual dharmaktiya. It is also the "empti- ness endowed with all aspects" (rNam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid), hence even ordinary people can experience direct recognition of dharmakaya. Yet others hold that such expenence does not constitute the totality of dharmaktiya vision but only a partial'glimpse of it. Some contend that this cannot be
? ? ? 16 THE TIBET JOURNAL
understood even as experiencing a partial glimpse of dharmakiiya; rather it represents an experience of mere vacuity or emptiness. Moreover, [they argue that] within emptiness this is not the negative intrinsic emptiness (chad /ta'i rang stong) of Candrakirti and Haribhadra, etc. , but it is the extrinsic emptiness (gzhan stong) as accepted by Asanga, the master of great Madhyamaka63 Some assert, however, that it is indeed the intrinsic emptiness. These two views are directly opposite. Some maintain that it is not even a genuine emptiness but only a form (gzugs brnyan tsam) or a reflection of emptiness. Therefore, [accord_ ing to them] it is not dharmakiiya, but a manifestation of it, as the perception of smoke can be indicative of the presence of fire. 64
Tsongkhapa's principal concerns here are actually the soteriological implications of these views. According to him not only do these positions lead to a kind of soteriological dead-end but more importantly, when combined with the anti-rationalist tendencies of certain Tibetan interpreta- tions of Vajrayana, their ramifications in the realm of ethics are deeply disturbing. He saw the moral decline, or moral laxity to be more precise, believed to be rampant at a particular point of history in Tibet as being a natural consequence of many of the philosophical views prevalent at the time. In his view, the various strands of the standpoints which he was arguing against are clearly, and dangerously, a residual legacy from the Chinese master Hva-shang Mahayana whose tenets were, according to Tsongkhapa, comprehensively demonstrated as unsound by the Indian
? master Kamalasila. In fact, Tsongkhapa often uses the term "Hva-shang's view" as a typological label when criticising a host of theories. For example, when criticising one of the positions in his Queries, Tsongkhapa states that IIAs far as I am concerned, I cannot see any difference between your style of meditation and that of Hva-shang's system! ,,65 Note the tone of finality in Tsongkhapa's criticism. Similarly, in LTC, Tsongkhapa criticises a form of meditative quietism on the grounds that by claiming that between Hva-shang and one's own position there is a difference in that their own standpoi? lt puts emphasis on meritorious deeds one is implicitly admitting that so far as philosophy and meditative system are concerned there is no substantial difference between the twO. 6 This, according to Tsongkhapa, is clearly at fault.
A related but distinct concern was what Tsongkhapa saw as a form of meditative quietism. This, he felt, results from an incorrect understanding of the nature of and the relationship between two principal elements in Buddhist meditative praxis, namely tranquil abiding (samatha) and special or penetrative insight (vipasyana). In its extreme form, meditative quietism is best illustrated by the system of Hva-shang Mahayana. The problem directly concerns the role of discursive thought in the soteriological process of the Buddhist path to enlightenment. This is the corollary of
TSONGKHAPA' S QUALMS 17
anti-rationalism in the realm of meditative practice. Drawing heavily from a pivotal s? ripture Smpdhinirmocanasutra, ? nd also the. three. Bhiivantikran:a of Kamaiaslia, Tsongkhapa argues extensively that discursive thought is as crucial in a spiritual aspirant's path to enlightenment as its counterpart, i. e. deep single-pointedness. 67 If mere quietude, no matter how sophisti- cated, constitutes the core of the process towards enlightenment, not "knowing" but "unknowing" becomes the key towards true awakening. Without discursive analysis no fresh insights can be gained nor can any
awareness of the ultimate nature of reality arise within the individual. Tsongkhapa sees no qualitative difference between such a form of quietude and the naturally occurring states of non-mentation (sems mi 'phro ba) like deep sleep, fainting, or stupor. 68
Tsongkhapa's solution for this problem was to re-emphasise the need for a healthy balance between the important Buddhist trio: study (thos pa), discursive thinking (bsam pa), and meditation (sgom pa). According to him the problem arises from the following situation. Many of those who are inclined towards a single-pointed life of meditative practice perceive study and discursive thinking to be an obstacle on the path to enlightenment; on the other hand, those with scholarly interests seem to be lacking in serious motivation to apply their intellectual understanding to meditative practice, instead they appear to be more keen to expand their scholarly reputation. 69 In other words, one group fails to appreciate fully the signi- ficance of learning while the other neglects the crucially important element, i. e. the meditative praxis.
Underlying the above issues is the crucial question of the exact nature of the relationship between the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (sunyatti) and the ultimate standpoint of Vajrayana Buddhism. Like many of his Tibetan predecessors Tsongkhapa shared the view that Tantra represents the pinnacle of spiritual awakening in Mahayana Buddhism. This is true also of great Tibetan masters like Marpa Lotsawa, Sakya Paw;iita, Buton, and of course many of the Kadam teachers including the Indian master Atisa himself.
However, what seriously concerned Tsong- khapa was the widespread misconceptions associated with Tantra which he believed to be pervasive at his time in Tibet. Among these was the widespread relegation-in some cases leading to eventual negation-of ethics on the grounds that the Tantra proposes a standpoint which is non- jUdgmental, and beyond all forms of dichotomy and polarities. Ethics was perceived to be relevant only to those of weak mind, whereas a true spiritual aspirant whose mind was receptive to the mysteries of Tantra could and should transcend the strictures of conventional morality. Such attitudes, according to Tsongkhapa, led to a climate of moral decline in ancient Tibet. From the above, we can surmise that Tsongkhapa saw an
? 18 THE TIBET JOURNAL
intimate link between epistemological scepticism, philosophical nihilism
and moral relativism. Not only does one naturally lead to the other, one could almost say that they are all different aspects of the same coin.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have attempted to "reconstruct" what I see as Tsongkha_ pa's key concerns about certain Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy. I have suggested that these qualms can be grouped under three main categories: i) Tsongkhapa's objections against what he sees as nihilistic interpretations of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka thought; ii) Tsongkhapa's objections against Shentong absolutism, and finally iii) Tsongkhapa's fears about residual influences of Hva-shang's quietist anti- rationalism in certain elements of Tibetan thought. Methodologically, I have argued that "listening" to the author's own voice is critical if we are to appreciate the dynamics behind the philosophical works of a historical thinker like Tsongkhapa. One very important consequence of identifying
an author's central concerns underlying his writings is that it gives a greater coherence and cogency to the author's overall project (if there is one). Certainly, in the case of Tsongkhapa, we know that one of the principal objectives underlying his Madhyamaka writings is to demon- strate that the Madhyamaka dialectics do not negate the reality of every- day world, especially ethics and religious activity. Related to this is also the aim of developing a reading of Madhyamaka philosophy in such a way that it can be consistently situated within an integrated system where the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness stands alongside Dharmakirti's epistemology and Asanga and Vasubandhu's ablzidharma psychology and
Vajrayana's meditative praxis. Throughout, I have endeavoured to engage "philosophically" with the issues which were of concern to Tsongkhapa so that they could be not only made comprehensible to us, but can also resonate with phiiosophical and soteriological questions which occupy people's mind to this day.
Notes
1. Jinpa (1997), chapter I, and Jinpa (1998).
2. Khedrup-Je (1385-1438) explicitly draws parallel between Tsongkhapa and
Nagarjuna in terms of their contribution to Buddhism. He writes: "'pftags pa'i yul du 'phags pa klu sgrub kyis rgyal ba'i bstan pa la bya ba chen po mdzad pa de bzhin du/ dus kyi mtha' rna 'di Ita bur gyur pa na/ rje bla rna 'di nyid kyis gangs ri'i khrod 'dir. . . " rNam thar dad pa'i Jugs ngogs, pp. 118-9. All Tibetan namesof people, places and schools are written Il1 phonetics to ensure easy pro- nounciation especially by non-Tibetologist readers. A list of these names with their corresponding Wylie transliterations is provided in the appendix.
bu;
? TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 19
3. The emergence of the Kadam school seems to have coincided with a quest- ioning of many of the tantra" which belong to the so-called earlier dis- semination of Buddhism in Tibet. Sumpa Yeshe Paljor (1704-1788) lists the following works: Lotsawa Rinchen Zangpo's (958-1055) Chos dang chos min mam 'byed, the letters of Lha Lama Yeshe 0, Zhiwa 0, Jhangchup 0, Tsami Lotsawa, and Chak Lotsawa, Ngog Loden Sherap's (1059-1109) gZe ma ra 'go, Sakya Par:l<;jita's (1 182-1251) sDom gsum rab dbye, (Collected Works of the Masters of lhe Sa Skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism), Vol. 5, pp. 297-320. Sumpa Yeshe Paljor also cites Drigong Pelzin and Go Khukpa Lhatse amongst those who quest- ion the authorship of some of the Nyingma tantras. dPag bsam Ijon bzang, pp. 391-406. For an English translation of Zhlwa O's letter and the identifica- tion of some of these objected tantras, see Karmay (1980).
5. Williams (1989; Spring), p. 2.
6. The dates of all Tibetan thinkers are based on Tseten Zhabdrung (1982).
7. On the complex history of the various editions of Kangyur and Tangyur, see
Harrison (1992), introduction. See also Dungkar Lobsang Thrinley's comments
in Deb ther dmar po, n. 489.
8. This debate has been an object of considerable interest in modern Tibetan
? ? 4 Taktshang Lotsawa (b. 1405) makes this observation in his Grub mtha' kun shes, p. 210. Ct. Williams (1989; Spring), p. 2.
Buddhist scholarship. . See Tucci (1958), Demieville (1967), Stein (1987), Houston (1980). Y. lmaeda (1975) Uournal asiatique, 1975, p . 140) has raised doubts about the factuality of the debate. However, I think that the weight of the historical evidence is too great to deny that this event took place. Earliest Tibetan sources which deal extensively with the debate are: sBa bzhed, and its revised version Zhabs btags 1M, Ne'u PaD<;lita's Chos 'byung, Sakya PaQ. <;lita's sDom gsum rab dbye, and ButOn Rinchen Drup's Chos 'byung, and Pawo Tsuglak Trengwa's (1504-1566) Chos 'byung mkhas pa'i dga' stan. For a contemporary discussion of the wider philosophical and religious implications of the debate, see Ruegg (1989), especially parts II, III, and IV.
9. Tibetan sources characterise the dispute as centred on the question of whether or not "enlightenment" is attained through a gradual and prolonged process of reflection and praxis or in the form of an instantaneous experience. A central point at issue here is the role of discursive analysis in one's path to enlightenment. "Simultaneists" reject this, while the "gradualists" insist on its indispensability. Hence, my choice of the terms here.
10. Ruegg (1989), p. 56.
11. bod mams da sian chad Ita ba Niigiirjuna 'i lugs zungsl spyod pa pha rol tu phyin pa
drug la gyis la chos spyod mam pa bcu nyams su longsl sgom pa shes rab rnam gsum la blo siJyongs la thabs dang shes rab zung du chud ring 'brei ba zhi gnas dang Ihag mthong la sgoms shigl. . . The text translated cited here is from mKhas pa'i
dga
sian, pp 3':JO-391. Cf. Ruegg (1989), p. 62. All translations of Tibetan texts are mine unless otherwise stated.
'
? 12. LTC, p. 250: 'di Ia dgongs nas lam stan pa'i bla ma'i mtshan nyid yongs su rdzogs pa la theg pa thams cad la mkhas pa mang du gsungs soil
20 THE TIBET JOURNAL
13. dGe s/lyor f:yi gnad la dri ba snyan bskul ba Ihag bsam rab dlear, TKSB, Val. ka. Interestingly, many of the expressions and arguments found in this letter have close resemblance to several critical sections of Khedrup-Je's ITa khrid
14. ]5.
16. 17.
18.
19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
Lhag bsam rab dkar gyi dris Ian dngos grub phreng ba and Lhag bsam rab dkar gyi Ita sgorn dris laY! in Collected Works, Vol. 2.
Dris Ian blo bzang bzhad pa'i sgra dbyangs Collected Works, Vol. nga.
Thi. i. ken, op. cit. , p. 159.
24. 25.
26.
27. 28.
to Tsongkhapa's rTen 'brcl bstod pa legs bshad snying po, a short ode on depend
mUll sel sgron me, Collected Works, VoLta
byi dol', Collected Works, VoLta. It seems as if Khedrup-Je is repeating many of Tsongkhapa's expressions. Note the pobmical nature of the title of Khedrup_ Je's work.
Byang chub lam rim chen mo. TKSB, Vol. pha.
ThLiken, Grub mtha' shel gyi me Iong, p. 158. Unfortunately, I have failed to locate Jhampa Lingpa's text.
Dri ba ihag /:Jsam rab dkal' gyi d? is Ian man ngag gi dg(mgs rgyan in The Complete Works of Gsa mdog Pat! chen Stikya mdLOg ldan, Val. 23, pp. 297-358. Phyag Perna Karpo'? short response can be found in the last chapter of his
l'gya chC1l po'i man ngag gi bshad sbyar rgyal ba'i gan mdzod, Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 349-370.
'jam dbyangs bla mas rjes bzung zhes bgyi bas, Queries, p. 41.
Thi. i. ken, pp. 158-9.
Sangye Gyatsho reads the letter as a critique of what he calls the so-called Maham udra that goes by the name of "new Drukpa [Kagyu)" ( 'brug gsar du grags pa'i phyag chen). dGa' ldan Chas 'byung, p. 69. Pawo Tsuglak Threngwa makes the interesting observation that Tsongkhapa wrote this letter as a result of deep disappointment he felt at the level of ignorance among the
meditators at a Kagyu retreat. He writes: "Phyis ri khrod shin tu dben pa
ba lhag bsam rab dkar Ia sogs pa mdzad/. " mKhas pa'i dga ' ston, p . 1 155. Druk Galwang Chaje, in his biography of Tsongkhapa (pp. 489-90), makes a point similar to m[(j1as pa'i dga' ston.
rJe red mda ' ba'i gsung Ian. TKSB, Vol. ka.
rjc l5un jam dpal dbyangs kyi lam gyi gnad riC red mda' ba la shog dril du phil/ ba. TKSB, Vol. pha.
I hope to undertake, as part of a futme project, a critical study of this letter together with some of the main responses from subsequent Tibetan thinkers. As yet, my own translation of the letter remains unpublished.
The traditional Geluk scholarship seems to accord this historically critical role
-
,
and also the last section of Thub bstan
? ? . .
. dri
? ent origination. Thurman (1984, p. 85) asserts that the text was written in 1398. His claim is probably based on Khedrup-Je's rNam thaI' dad pa'i jug ngogs although Thurman does not say so. It is difiicult to discern whether this date is accurate. Even if we were to accept this, it is far from clear whether Tsongkhapa really meant this ode to signal his departure from the main- stream of Tibetan Madhyamaka thought. On the surface, the text appears to be nothing more than a passionate expressIon of admiration of the Buddha for having taught the prinCIples of dependent originatlon
? ? 29. IS, ppA11-15
30. Ratnakara. . ,anti's Prajilaparamitopadesa, P5459 and two Brhattrkil, P5205 and
P5206, which Tsongkhapa attributes to a certain Danstasena, a student 01 Vasubandhu. On the use of the last two texts by Jonangpas and Tsongkha- pa'? crilical com ments, see Ruegg (1969), pp. 325-27. Sakya ChogJen takes issue with Tsongkhapa on the authorship of these two texts and defends the earlier Tibetan ascription of them to Vasubandhu. See Shing rta'i sral 'byed,
nature of phenomena, see Jinpa (1997), chapter 5.
33. Cabezon (1992), p. 7
34. On this so-called "no-thesis" interpretation of Madhyamaka, see later.
35. Sec LTC, pp. 121-145, and LN, pp. 171-73. Robert Thurman, in his fn , bases his
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 21
? ? 31. mchil ma'i thai ba bzhin du dar bar rigs 50// LS, pA15.
32. For a detailed examination of Tsongkhapa's u nderstanding of the illusion-like
? ? idcnlitication of these opponents on Bhaso Chokyi Gyaltsen (1402? 1473) and Lobsang Phuntsok. However, Thurman misreads LN's reference to the LTC (pp. l21-45) where Tsongkhapa states that he had alrEi. ldy dealt L'xlensively with the rdulaliOl,s of the four positions. Thurman takes this to be referring to Tsongkh"pa's rebuttal of four types of objections against the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (LTC, pp. 50-89). Sec Thurman (1984), pp. 326-28, footnotes 1 12, 113 & 1 14.
? From a contemporary philosopher's perspective, one can say that first and foremost Tsongkhapa is deeply concerned by what he saw as a general lac? of philosophical and anal? tical rigour in Tibetan thinking. This, he beheved, was not only contradictory to the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism towards which most schools of Tibetan Buddhism claimed a strict adherence, but also went against the basic spirit of the Buddhist path. There was, in his view, a pervasive sense of philosophical
"naivety" and a dangerous trend towards a form of anti-rationalism in Tibet which were integrally connected. According to Tsongkhapa, this combination of philosophical naivety and anti-rationalism had profound religious and ethical consequences.
By "philosophical naivety," I am referring to all the variants of Tibetan interpretation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness, which appear to deny in one form or another the reality of the empirical world. In its most extreme form, Tsongkhapa believed, this denial is the view which is based on a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature and asserts that "things are neither existent nor non-existent. " "Naivists" also include those who conceived emptiness to be a mere nothingness. On this view, the empirical world becomes nothing but a mere illusion. Tn a broad sense, Madhyamikas do accept that our lived world of empirical experience is like an illusion. However( the difference is that according to Tsongkhapa, the objects of everyday world are illusion-like and not illusions as many Tibetan Madhyamikas appear to claim. 32
Such philosophical "naivety" is also closely related to epistemological scepticism, one of the two principal sources of anti-rationalism in Tibet (the other being the over-emphasis on the mystical perspectives of Tantra). Again, accordil! g to Tsongkhapa, this stems from a false understanding of the Madhyamaka view of epistemology in general, and in particular its position on the nature of prajna, insight, into the ultimate nature of reality. In actual fact, the sceptic rejects the very possibility of the valid means to knowledge (pramaIJa), especially with relation to emptiness. From the linguistic perspective this viewpoint "upholds the doctrine of in- effability, that nothing can be predicated of anything else, that any de- scription of emptiness is useless, all being equally distant from the ulti- mate. ,,33 All of this then naturally ties up with the position that the Madhyamaka has no views of its own. 34 For Tsongkhapa such standpoints reflect a certain naivety if not an intellectual laziness towards the prob- lematic of reconciling the empirical reality of all things and events and their essential emptiness or the lack of intrinsic existence and identity. According to Tsongkhapa, this problem of reconciliation is the crux of
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 9
concerns pertain to philosophical issues, while the third relates more to
meditative praxis.
10 THE TIBET JOURNAL
Madhyamaka philosophical endeavour. He argues that the confusions of the Tibetan thinkers stem from a deep misunderstanding pertaining to the very meaning of the name Prasangika-Madhyamaka (the proponent of the reductio ad absurdum argument) and its contrasts with the Svatantrika_ Madhyamaka school (the proponent of autonomous syllogism). Tsong_ khapa, in LTC, schematically lists four such positions and enters into a detailed critique of these standpoints. 35
According to Tsongkhapa the first position which is attributed to the Indian Jayananda (12th century CE) reflects an epistemological scepticism concerning the validation of the "tri-modal" character of a logical argu- ment. This is the standard post-Dharmakirti convention of Buddhist lOgic. The second is a universal scepticism that rejects the very possibility of "valid means to knowledge" (prarna1! a) and contends that, when engaged in philosophical argumentation, all that we have and indeed what we need is a verbal consent from the opponent. Tsongkhapa attributes this
position to what he calls "certain Tibetan translators who are students of Jayananda" (Dza ya anan ta'i slob rna bod kyi lo tsa ba dag). Baso Ch6kyi Gyaltshen (1402-1473) identifies Khu Lotsawa (12th century CE), a disciple of Jayananda, as one of them. 36 The third is the position that Tsongkhapa attributes to "those professing to be present-day Prasangikas" (da ita dbu rna thaI 'gyur bar 'dod pa). 37 This position maintains that a Prasangika does not have any thesis of his own both in the conventional and the ultimate sense. Tsongkhapa attributes the fourth position to "someone who claims to be a follower of Candrakirti" (Zla ba grags pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i bod kyi
rnkhas pa kha cig), possibly a reference to Majha Jhangchup Tsondrii (d. 1285) and other followers (possibly Zhang Thangsakpa) of Patshap Lotsawa, the translator of Candrakirti's works. 38 According to Tsongkhapa, the proponents of this position fail to appreciate the subtlety of the Prasangika's critique of the concept of autonomy of reason. The above viewpoints, as far as Tsongkhapa is concerned, are at best agnostic, and at worst nihilistic, points of view which are furthermost from the tenets of the Madhyamaka school, and especially the tradition of Buddhapalita and Candrakirti. For Tsongkhapa, the middle way of Madhyamaka philo- sophy cannot be characterised as nihilism, agnosticism, or even as mere
relativism.
In the parlance of Tibetan scholasticism, this I'agnosticl' interpretation
of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness is known as the "Madhya- maka's (alleged) thesislessness. " Based on a literal reading of certain passages from Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and Candrakirti/9 many of the earlier Tibetan Madhyamikas have consistently argued that the Prasangika literally does not have any positions of his own. According to this read- ing, it is suggested that the Prasangika is concerned only with the
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 11
refutation of other's views. Needless to say, the "no-thesis" view is a complex position containing several components. 40 As a literal reading of the Madhyamaka's catu! }koti argument appears to suggest, for the pro- ponents of this view, ontologically speaking reality literally cannot be said to be any of the following possibilities: "is", "is not", both "is and is not", and "neither is nor is not". Reality though absolute, is ineffable and indeterminate, for it is beyond language and thought. The phenomenal world is merely an illusion, the perception of which will disappear with- out any trace at the stage of final enlightenment. Epistemologically, the p roponents of this view maintain a thorough-going scepticism concerning the possibility of any valid means to knowledge, especially with regard to the absolute. The "real" is, in their view, only intuited in a state of n011- conceptuality. From the linguistic point of view, one could say that the proponents of the "no-thesis" view hold that language has no real bearing on reality, let alone any objective referentiality. Similarly, logic too cannot lead to any genuine inferential knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. Arguments are at best ad hominen or reductio ad absurdum, or what the Buddhists would call prasaftga. So, on their view, the true middle
course (madhyama) is this absence of commitment to any position of one's own. 4! Tsongkhapa vehemently rejects all of this.
Tsongkhapa's refutation of the various strands of the "no-thesis" view is too complex to be dea)t with here; also there exists substantial con- temporary literature on the general debates about whether or not the Madhyamikas have views of their own. 42 Suffice here to underline that the crux of Tsongkhapa's critique pertains to what he understands to be the Prasangika's unique reading of the principle of dependent origination. He argues that since dependent origination is the content (don) of "empti- ness", by denigrating the world of dependent origination, the proponents of the "no-thesis" view are rejecting what is perhaps the heart of the Prasangika's philosophy of emptiness. 43 Not only is it possible for empti- ness of intrinsic being and dependent origination to co-exist in a common locus, the very fact of dependence is, to Tsongkhapa's mind, the highest proof of the absence of intrinsic being. 44 To conceive otherwise, i. e. to hold that dependent origination entails intrinsic being, is to turn every- thing topsy-turvy. In Tsongkhapa's own words, this is like a god himself turning into a devil, a Tibetan equivalent of Nagarjuna's metaphor of medicine becoming the poison! 45
Furthermore, from Tsongkhapa's point of view, the denial of even the conventional existence of the world of dependent origination stems from ? metaphysical assumption that is shared also by all essentialist schools, I. e. existence (yod pn) is equivalent to existence-by-means-of-intrinsic-being (rang ngos nas yod pa). For example, in LTC, Tsongkhapa writes that
? 12 THE TIBET JOURNAL
If one asserts that so long as phenomena such as sprouts etc. exist (yod pal they do so by means of their intrinsic being (rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i yod pal, and that if they do not exist by means of their intrinsic being [then] they do not exist [at all], one is bound to fall into either of the two extremes [i. e. nihil- ism and absolutism]. This way of understanding [the mode of being of pheno- mena] is not different from the essentialists. 46
Tsongkhapa argues that, so far as the definition of nihilism is concern_ ed, there is no substantial difference between both the Prasangika and the essentialist; both agree that repudiation of causality lies at the heart of nihilism. The point of departure between the two parties is this: while the Prasangika does not reject causality, the realist assumes that by rejecting any notion of intrinsic being the Prasangika is rejecting causality as well. This is the principal reason why the Prasangika has been an object of such vehement criticism from the Buddhist essentialists. 47 So, according to Tsongkhapa, Prasangikas do have theses and views of their own, but no theses adhering to any notions of intrinsic being. The Prasangika rejects intrinsic being (svabhava), and emptiness of intrinsic being is their position. Similarly, Prasangikas accept the nominal existence of things and persons; and this is their standpoint. More importantly, as Buddhists, Prasangikas
must maintain that insight into "no-self" (anatman) is the sole path to liberation. Thus, Tsongkhapa concludes:
Therefore, the root cause of all problems is the reifying avidyii (ignorance) that apprehends intrinsic being. The insight into "no-self" or absence of intrinsic being alone is that which eliminates this [reifying consciousness] by means of direct opposition48 .
In effect, Tsongkhapa is rejecting the "no-thesis" view on the grounds that it is essentially nihilistic. In LTC Tsongkhapa cites extensively from Candrakirti to demonstrate a categorical difference between the Prasang-i ka and Carvaka's (Indian materialist's) similar assertions that the laws of karma do not exist intrinsically. 49 According to Tsongkhapa and Candra- kirti, the Carvaka's assertion constitutes nihilism, while the Prasangika's does not. This is because the first denies even the conventional reality of karma, while the latter does not. For Tsongkhapa, Candrakirti's insistence on appreciating this distinction implies his acceptance of the nominal existence of the laws of karma, a view which in Tsongkhapa's mind contradicts the claims of the "no-thesis" view. From a methodological perspective, Tsongkhapa sees the "no-thesis" view as reflecting a serious inability to appreciate the significance of the Prasangika's use of the unique prasajya form of negation. This is a form of negation that is abso- lute and does not commit the protagonist to any existential implication. Yet, to be effective in its application, even such a form of negation must
? pres
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 13
'uppose the acceptance of the law of excluded middle. Tsongkhapa
cites the passage from Vigrahavyavartanf in his support: If the absence of intrinsic being (svabhrJ. va) is reversed,
[its opposite] intrinsic being becomes established 50
? Without subscribing to the fundamental principles of logic, according to Tsongkhapa, one can only result in a state of indecision. Perhaps Tsong- khapa's criticism of this view is ultimately soteriological, at least in its intent. For if the proponents of the nno-thesis" view are right, then the insight into the middle way becomes essentially a state of mind that is a withdrawal of all cognitive activity rather than an active state of nknow- ing". This, for Tsongkhapa, is nothing but the ghost of Hva-shang's pernicious no-thought view, albeit in a new guise. 5l
All of this touch upon the problem of nihilism. For Tsongkhapa, the trouble with the "no-thesis" view is that, when pushed to its logical end, it slides into a form of ontological nihilism. The strategy Tsongkhapa adopts to ensure that the Madhyamaka philosophy does not remain open to the charge of nihilism involves two principal approaches. One is primarily a negative approach in that Tsongkhapa stipulates the para- meters of the Madhyamaka dialectics so that the de-constructive argu- ments of emptiness philosophy cannot and do not undermine the validity of ethics and religious activity. In other words, Tsongkhapa attempts to delineate reason's scope for negation so that the Madhyamaka reasoning does not negate the reality of the conventional world. 52 The second element of Tsongkhapa's strategy involves a constructive approach in that it entails developing a systematic and logically coherent account of con- ventional existence. 53 The primary motive here is to ensure that a clear distinction is maintained between the conventional reality of things and events on the one hand, and metaphysical speculations about their onto- logical status on the other. Tsongkhapa rejects the latter, and argues that existence equals conventional existence.
To summarise, in developing his philosophy of the middle way Tsong- khapa can be seen as nre-claiming" Nagarjuna in Tibet through a close reading of Candraklrti. This does not by any means entail that Tsongkha- pa's thought consists of mere re-presentation of CandrakIrti. As is clear from his works many of Tsongkhapa's substantive contributions are genuinely original by any intellectual standard. However, given Tsong- khapa's such close identification with Candrakirti's works it does seem to be the case that if Candrakirti's reading of Nagarjuna is flawed, serious doubts can also be raised about Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Madhya- maka philosophy. Perhaps Tsongkhapa's greatest contribution to Madhya- maka thought lies in the depth and the breadth of his exammation of the
? 14 THE TIBET JOURNAL
philosophical implications of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness in key areas of philosophy and soteriology. For example, Tsongkhapa lists what he sees as the "eight distinctive features of the Prasangik a_ Madhyamaka" all of which he takes to be direct consequences of the Prasangika's central thesis, namely the rejection of svabhtiva (intrinsic being). In identifying these features, Tsongkhapa writes
In interpreting the treatise of Arya [Naga? una] there exists a unique approach whereby the text is read in such a way so that all functionality (bya byed thams cad) can be maintained although not even an atom exists (rdul tsam yang) by means of self-defining characteristics. Because of this, this system [Prasali. gika] has many flawless tenets Crnam par dag pa'i grub mthaj that distinguish it from the other interpreters ('grel byed gzhan). "What are they? " [Answer:] For the time being, I shall state the principal ones: (i) The rejection of iilayavijftiirul (foundational consciousness) that is separate from the six categories of con-
cognising, apperceptive faculty of consciousness); and (iii) the rejection of autonomous syllogism as a means of generating insight into the nature of re<llity, thus three negative tenets. (iv) The need to accept the reality of ex- ternal objects as much as the reality of [the world of] consciousness; (v) that the Sriivakas and Pratyekabuddhas cognise the absence of intrinsic being of phenomena; (vi) maintaining that grasping at the self-existen? e of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction; (vii) the cessation [of empirical things] is a conditioned phenomenon; and (viii) because of this, there is a unique presentation of the nature of the three tenses of time. 54
This list should not be confused with another list of eight attributed to Tsongkhapa known as the "eight difficult points (dka' gnad brgyad) of the MUlaktlriktl" found in Gyaltshap Dharma Rinchen's (1364-1438) notes dBu ma rtsa ba'i dka'gnad chen po brgyad kyi brjed byang. 55 In the second list, (vii) and (viii) are omitted and in their place are: rejection of the notion of svabhtlva (rang mtshan khas mi len pa), and a unique way of understanding the Buddha's perception of the relative worid of multiplicity (sangs rgyas kyis ji snyed pa mkhyen tshul). 56 Subsequent Tibetan Madhyamikas have attacked Tsongkhapa for suggesting that Prasangika-Madhyamaka has unique tenets, especially such constructive theories as the acceptance of the cessation of empirical things as a conditioned phenomenon. For example, Gowo Rabjampa (1429-1496) has argued that the acceptance of such a conditioned phenomenon (zhig pa 'dus byas yin pa) is a Vaise$ika tenet thus the view of a tradition outside the fold of the Buddhist
schools. 57 Furthermore, he has rejected Tsongkhapa's claim that Prasallgika-Madhyamaka does not accept the existence of tllayavijfitina (foundational consciousness) and svasamvedana (reflexive awareness). 58 The later Nyingma thinker Ju Mipham Gelek Namgyal (1846-1911) too has
sciousness; (ii) a unique system of refuting the [concept of] svasamvedana (self
-
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 15
argued that the Prasangika need not reject conventional existence of both foundational consciousness and reflexive awareness. 59 In contrast, Tak- tshang agrees with Tsongkhapa that Prasangikas do reject reflexive aware- nesS but maintains that Candrakirti does not negate foundational con- sciousness. 60 Regardless of who is right in these debates, the fact remains that Tsongkhapa seriously attempted to draw out all philosophical and soteriological implications of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka's rejection of
intrinsic being (svabhtiva).
III
According to Tsongkhapa, the agnostic and nihilistic tendency can also permeate one's understanding of the nature of the path, and even affect the very conception of "enlightenment". In his Queries, Tsongkhapa points to some opposing trends prevalent in the Tibet of his time concerning the
understanding of the nature of enlightenment. He writes:
Generally speaking, there seem to be many diverse opinions concerning the way in which the "view" [of emptiness] (Ita ba) is perceived as arising. 61 One group of opinions maintains that all forms of conceptuality (mam rtog), be they positive or negative, are to be discarded. Yet others hold the directly opposing view that not only are all forms of conceptuality not to be discarded, but the greater the proliferation ofconcepts the more enhanced one's spiritual realisa- tion (nyams rtog) will become. [They maintain that) this is analogous to fact that the more fuel you bum the larger the size of the flame.
Again, another group of opinions contends that conceptualisation itself is the fundamental ignorance, ma rig pa (avidyti). This view is p rimarily based on
the quote "e_onceptua1I'sab"an 15 m.
deed the great I .
,62
gnorance. , But athers
? maintain the opposite view, that conceptualisation is in actual fact pristine dharmaktiya. These two views represent two opposing sides of the same spec- trum.
Again, some characterise Buddhahood or nirvti1J1l as the state of mind when the mmd abides in natural equilibrium free of distraction (yid 'di ma 'phros par tsm ne gnas pa'i tshe). [And they maintain that] the moment the mind wavers it is in the state of ordinary existence or sarrzsara. Yet others contend that even when conceptual thought-processes occur, no matter how long the processes last, if you observe with a single-pointed mind, dharmaktiya appears vividly. These two views are exact opposites.
Then again, some argue that an emptied vision of nothingness (mthong snang ban bun) arising through a combination of certain conditions, e. g. being situated in a dark room, adopting a specific bodily posture of meditation, and stopping all forms of thought, is the actual dharmaktiya. It is also the "empti- ness endowed with all aspects" (rNam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid), hence even ordinary people can experience direct recognition of dharmakaya. Yet others hold that such expenence does not constitute the totality of dharmaktiya vision but only a partial'glimpse of it. Some contend that this cannot be
? ? ? 16 THE TIBET JOURNAL
understood even as experiencing a partial glimpse of dharmakiiya; rather it represents an experience of mere vacuity or emptiness. Moreover, [they argue that] within emptiness this is not the negative intrinsic emptiness (chad /ta'i rang stong) of Candrakirti and Haribhadra, etc. , but it is the extrinsic emptiness (gzhan stong) as accepted by Asanga, the master of great Madhyamaka63 Some assert, however, that it is indeed the intrinsic emptiness. These two views are directly opposite. Some maintain that it is not even a genuine emptiness but only a form (gzugs brnyan tsam) or a reflection of emptiness. Therefore, [accord_ ing to them] it is not dharmakiiya, but a manifestation of it, as the perception of smoke can be indicative of the presence of fire. 64
Tsongkhapa's principal concerns here are actually the soteriological implications of these views. According to him not only do these positions lead to a kind of soteriological dead-end but more importantly, when combined with the anti-rationalist tendencies of certain Tibetan interpreta- tions of Vajrayana, their ramifications in the realm of ethics are deeply disturbing. He saw the moral decline, or moral laxity to be more precise, believed to be rampant at a particular point of history in Tibet as being a natural consequence of many of the philosophical views prevalent at the time. In his view, the various strands of the standpoints which he was arguing against are clearly, and dangerously, a residual legacy from the Chinese master Hva-shang Mahayana whose tenets were, according to Tsongkhapa, comprehensively demonstrated as unsound by the Indian
? master Kamalasila. In fact, Tsongkhapa often uses the term "Hva-shang's view" as a typological label when criticising a host of theories. For example, when criticising one of the positions in his Queries, Tsongkhapa states that IIAs far as I am concerned, I cannot see any difference between your style of meditation and that of Hva-shang's system! ,,65 Note the tone of finality in Tsongkhapa's criticism. Similarly, in LTC, Tsongkhapa criticises a form of meditative quietism on the grounds that by claiming that between Hva-shang and one's own position there is a difference in that their own standpoi? lt puts emphasis on meritorious deeds one is implicitly admitting that so far as philosophy and meditative system are concerned there is no substantial difference between the twO. 6 This, according to Tsongkhapa, is clearly at fault.
A related but distinct concern was what Tsongkhapa saw as a form of meditative quietism. This, he felt, results from an incorrect understanding of the nature of and the relationship between two principal elements in Buddhist meditative praxis, namely tranquil abiding (samatha) and special or penetrative insight (vipasyana). In its extreme form, meditative quietism is best illustrated by the system of Hva-shang Mahayana. The problem directly concerns the role of discursive thought in the soteriological process of the Buddhist path to enlightenment. This is the corollary of
TSONGKHAPA' S QUALMS 17
anti-rationalism in the realm of meditative practice. Drawing heavily from a pivotal s? ripture Smpdhinirmocanasutra, ? nd also the. three. Bhiivantikran:a of Kamaiaslia, Tsongkhapa argues extensively that discursive thought is as crucial in a spiritual aspirant's path to enlightenment as its counterpart, i. e. deep single-pointedness. 67 If mere quietude, no matter how sophisti- cated, constitutes the core of the process towards enlightenment, not "knowing" but "unknowing" becomes the key towards true awakening. Without discursive analysis no fresh insights can be gained nor can any
awareness of the ultimate nature of reality arise within the individual. Tsongkhapa sees no qualitative difference between such a form of quietude and the naturally occurring states of non-mentation (sems mi 'phro ba) like deep sleep, fainting, or stupor. 68
Tsongkhapa's solution for this problem was to re-emphasise the need for a healthy balance between the important Buddhist trio: study (thos pa), discursive thinking (bsam pa), and meditation (sgom pa). According to him the problem arises from the following situation. Many of those who are inclined towards a single-pointed life of meditative practice perceive study and discursive thinking to be an obstacle on the path to enlightenment; on the other hand, those with scholarly interests seem to be lacking in serious motivation to apply their intellectual understanding to meditative practice, instead they appear to be more keen to expand their scholarly reputation. 69 In other words, one group fails to appreciate fully the signi- ficance of learning while the other neglects the crucially important element, i. e. the meditative praxis.
Underlying the above issues is the crucial question of the exact nature of the relationship between the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (sunyatti) and the ultimate standpoint of Vajrayana Buddhism. Like many of his Tibetan predecessors Tsongkhapa shared the view that Tantra represents the pinnacle of spiritual awakening in Mahayana Buddhism. This is true also of great Tibetan masters like Marpa Lotsawa, Sakya Paw;iita, Buton, and of course many of the Kadam teachers including the Indian master Atisa himself.
However, what seriously concerned Tsong- khapa was the widespread misconceptions associated with Tantra which he believed to be pervasive at his time in Tibet. Among these was the widespread relegation-in some cases leading to eventual negation-of ethics on the grounds that the Tantra proposes a standpoint which is non- jUdgmental, and beyond all forms of dichotomy and polarities. Ethics was perceived to be relevant only to those of weak mind, whereas a true spiritual aspirant whose mind was receptive to the mysteries of Tantra could and should transcend the strictures of conventional morality. Such attitudes, according to Tsongkhapa, led to a climate of moral decline in ancient Tibet. From the above, we can surmise that Tsongkhapa saw an
? 18 THE TIBET JOURNAL
intimate link between epistemological scepticism, philosophical nihilism
and moral relativism. Not only does one naturally lead to the other, one could almost say that they are all different aspects of the same coin.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have attempted to "reconstruct" what I see as Tsongkha_ pa's key concerns about certain Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy. I have suggested that these qualms can be grouped under three main categories: i) Tsongkhapa's objections against what he sees as nihilistic interpretations of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka thought; ii) Tsongkhapa's objections against Shentong absolutism, and finally iii) Tsongkhapa's fears about residual influences of Hva-shang's quietist anti- rationalism in certain elements of Tibetan thought. Methodologically, I have argued that "listening" to the author's own voice is critical if we are to appreciate the dynamics behind the philosophical works of a historical thinker like Tsongkhapa. One very important consequence of identifying
an author's central concerns underlying his writings is that it gives a greater coherence and cogency to the author's overall project (if there is one). Certainly, in the case of Tsongkhapa, we know that one of the principal objectives underlying his Madhyamaka writings is to demon- strate that the Madhyamaka dialectics do not negate the reality of every- day world, especially ethics and religious activity. Related to this is also the aim of developing a reading of Madhyamaka philosophy in such a way that it can be consistently situated within an integrated system where the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness stands alongside Dharmakirti's epistemology and Asanga and Vasubandhu's ablzidharma psychology and
Vajrayana's meditative praxis. Throughout, I have endeavoured to engage "philosophically" with the issues which were of concern to Tsongkhapa so that they could be not only made comprehensible to us, but can also resonate with phiiosophical and soteriological questions which occupy people's mind to this day.
Notes
1. Jinpa (1997), chapter I, and Jinpa (1998).
2. Khedrup-Je (1385-1438) explicitly draws parallel between Tsongkhapa and
Nagarjuna in terms of their contribution to Buddhism. He writes: "'pftags pa'i yul du 'phags pa klu sgrub kyis rgyal ba'i bstan pa la bya ba chen po mdzad pa de bzhin du/ dus kyi mtha' rna 'di Ita bur gyur pa na/ rje bla rna 'di nyid kyis gangs ri'i khrod 'dir. . . " rNam thar dad pa'i Jugs ngogs, pp. 118-9. All Tibetan namesof people, places and schools are written Il1 phonetics to ensure easy pro- nounciation especially by non-Tibetologist readers. A list of these names with their corresponding Wylie transliterations is provided in the appendix.
bu;
? TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 19
3. The emergence of the Kadam school seems to have coincided with a quest- ioning of many of the tantra" which belong to the so-called earlier dis- semination of Buddhism in Tibet. Sumpa Yeshe Paljor (1704-1788) lists the following works: Lotsawa Rinchen Zangpo's (958-1055) Chos dang chos min mam 'byed, the letters of Lha Lama Yeshe 0, Zhiwa 0, Jhangchup 0, Tsami Lotsawa, and Chak Lotsawa, Ngog Loden Sherap's (1059-1109) gZe ma ra 'go, Sakya Par:l<;jita's (1 182-1251) sDom gsum rab dbye, (Collected Works of the Masters of lhe Sa Skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism), Vol. 5, pp. 297-320. Sumpa Yeshe Paljor also cites Drigong Pelzin and Go Khukpa Lhatse amongst those who quest- ion the authorship of some of the Nyingma tantras. dPag bsam Ijon bzang, pp. 391-406. For an English translation of Zhlwa O's letter and the identifica- tion of some of these objected tantras, see Karmay (1980).
5. Williams (1989; Spring), p. 2.
6. The dates of all Tibetan thinkers are based on Tseten Zhabdrung (1982).
7. On the complex history of the various editions of Kangyur and Tangyur, see
Harrison (1992), introduction. See also Dungkar Lobsang Thrinley's comments
in Deb ther dmar po, n. 489.
8. This debate has been an object of considerable interest in modern Tibetan
? ? 4 Taktshang Lotsawa (b. 1405) makes this observation in his Grub mtha' kun shes, p. 210. Ct. Williams (1989; Spring), p. 2.
Buddhist scholarship. . See Tucci (1958), Demieville (1967), Stein (1987), Houston (1980). Y. lmaeda (1975) Uournal asiatique, 1975, p . 140) has raised doubts about the factuality of the debate. However, I think that the weight of the historical evidence is too great to deny that this event took place. Earliest Tibetan sources which deal extensively with the debate are: sBa bzhed, and its revised version Zhabs btags 1M, Ne'u PaD<;lita's Chos 'byung, Sakya PaQ. <;lita's sDom gsum rab dbye, and ButOn Rinchen Drup's Chos 'byung, and Pawo Tsuglak Trengwa's (1504-1566) Chos 'byung mkhas pa'i dga' stan. For a contemporary discussion of the wider philosophical and religious implications of the debate, see Ruegg (1989), especially parts II, III, and IV.
9. Tibetan sources characterise the dispute as centred on the question of whether or not "enlightenment" is attained through a gradual and prolonged process of reflection and praxis or in the form of an instantaneous experience. A central point at issue here is the role of discursive analysis in one's path to enlightenment. "Simultaneists" reject this, while the "gradualists" insist on its indispensability. Hence, my choice of the terms here.
10. Ruegg (1989), p. 56.
11. bod mams da sian chad Ita ba Niigiirjuna 'i lugs zungsl spyod pa pha rol tu phyin pa
drug la gyis la chos spyod mam pa bcu nyams su longsl sgom pa shes rab rnam gsum la blo siJyongs la thabs dang shes rab zung du chud ring 'brei ba zhi gnas dang Ihag mthong la sgoms shigl. . . The text translated cited here is from mKhas pa'i
dga
sian, pp 3':JO-391. Cf. Ruegg (1989), p. 62. All translations of Tibetan texts are mine unless otherwise stated.
'
? 12. LTC, p. 250: 'di Ia dgongs nas lam stan pa'i bla ma'i mtshan nyid yongs su rdzogs pa la theg pa thams cad la mkhas pa mang du gsungs soil
20 THE TIBET JOURNAL
13. dGe s/lyor f:yi gnad la dri ba snyan bskul ba Ihag bsam rab dlear, TKSB, Val. ka. Interestingly, many of the expressions and arguments found in this letter have close resemblance to several critical sections of Khedrup-Je's ITa khrid
14. ]5.
16. 17.
18.
19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
Lhag bsam rab dkar gyi dris Ian dngos grub phreng ba and Lhag bsam rab dkar gyi Ita sgorn dris laY! in Collected Works, Vol. 2.
Dris Ian blo bzang bzhad pa'i sgra dbyangs Collected Works, Vol. nga.
Thi. i. ken, op. cit. , p. 159.
24. 25.
26.
27. 28.
to Tsongkhapa's rTen 'brcl bstod pa legs bshad snying po, a short ode on depend
mUll sel sgron me, Collected Works, VoLta
byi dol', Collected Works, VoLta. It seems as if Khedrup-Je is repeating many of Tsongkhapa's expressions. Note the pobmical nature of the title of Khedrup_ Je's work.
Byang chub lam rim chen mo. TKSB, Vol. pha.
ThLiken, Grub mtha' shel gyi me Iong, p. 158. Unfortunately, I have failed to locate Jhampa Lingpa's text.
Dri ba ihag /:Jsam rab dkal' gyi d? is Ian man ngag gi dg(mgs rgyan in The Complete Works of Gsa mdog Pat! chen Stikya mdLOg ldan, Val. 23, pp. 297-358. Phyag Perna Karpo'? short response can be found in the last chapter of his
l'gya chC1l po'i man ngag gi bshad sbyar rgyal ba'i gan mdzod, Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 349-370.
'jam dbyangs bla mas rjes bzung zhes bgyi bas, Queries, p. 41.
Thi. i. ken, pp. 158-9.
Sangye Gyatsho reads the letter as a critique of what he calls the so-called Maham udra that goes by the name of "new Drukpa [Kagyu)" ( 'brug gsar du grags pa'i phyag chen). dGa' ldan Chas 'byung, p. 69. Pawo Tsuglak Threngwa makes the interesting observation that Tsongkhapa wrote this letter as a result of deep disappointment he felt at the level of ignorance among the
meditators at a Kagyu retreat. He writes: "Phyis ri khrod shin tu dben pa
ba lhag bsam rab dkar Ia sogs pa mdzad/. " mKhas pa'i dga ' ston, p . 1 155. Druk Galwang Chaje, in his biography of Tsongkhapa (pp. 489-90), makes a point similar to m[(j1as pa'i dga' ston.
rJe red mda ' ba'i gsung Ian. TKSB, Vol. ka.
rjc l5un jam dpal dbyangs kyi lam gyi gnad riC red mda' ba la shog dril du phil/ ba. TKSB, Vol. pha.
I hope to undertake, as part of a futme project, a critical study of this letter together with some of the main responses from subsequent Tibetan thinkers. As yet, my own translation of the letter remains unpublished.
The traditional Geluk scholarship seems to accord this historically critical role
-
,
and also the last section of Thub bstan
? ? . .
. dri
? ent origination. Thurman (1984, p. 85) asserts that the text was written in 1398. His claim is probably based on Khedrup-Je's rNam thaI' dad pa'i jug ngogs although Thurman does not say so. It is difiicult to discern whether this date is accurate. Even if we were to accept this, it is far from clear whether Tsongkhapa really meant this ode to signal his departure from the main- stream of Tibetan Madhyamaka thought. On the surface, the text appears to be nothing more than a passionate expressIon of admiration of the Buddha for having taught the prinCIples of dependent originatlon
? ? 29. IS, ppA11-15
30. Ratnakara. . ,anti's Prajilaparamitopadesa, P5459 and two Brhattrkil, P5205 and
P5206, which Tsongkhapa attributes to a certain Danstasena, a student 01 Vasubandhu. On the use of the last two texts by Jonangpas and Tsongkha- pa'? crilical com ments, see Ruegg (1969), pp. 325-27. Sakya ChogJen takes issue with Tsongkhapa on the authorship of these two texts and defends the earlier Tibetan ascription of them to Vasubandhu. See Shing rta'i sral 'byed,
nature of phenomena, see Jinpa (1997), chapter 5.
33. Cabezon (1992), p. 7
34. On this so-called "no-thesis" interpretation of Madhyamaka, see later.
35. Sec LTC, pp. 121-145, and LN, pp. 171-73. Robert Thurman, in his fn , bases his
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 21
? ? 31. mchil ma'i thai ba bzhin du dar bar rigs 50// LS, pA15.
32. For a detailed examination of Tsongkhapa's u nderstanding of the illusion-like
? ? idcnlitication of these opponents on Bhaso Chokyi Gyaltsen (1402? 1473) and Lobsang Phuntsok. However, Thurman misreads LN's reference to the LTC (pp. l21-45) where Tsongkhapa states that he had alrEi. ldy dealt L'xlensively with the rdulaliOl,s of the four positions. Thurman takes this to be referring to Tsongkh"pa's rebuttal of four types of objections against the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (LTC, pp. 50-89). Sec Thurman (1984), pp. 326-28, footnotes 1 12, 113 & 1 14.
