The individual is an extremely vulnerable piece of vanity: this vanity, when it is
conscious
of its high degree of susceptibility to pain, demands that every one should be made equal; that the individual should only stand inter pares.
Nietzsche - Works - v15 - Will to Power - b
acts like an organic cell.
It predatory and violent.
It would fain regenerate itself--pregnancy.
It would fain give birth to its God and see all mankind at
upon
Terrible
215
? _
Every living organism gropes around as far as its power permits, and overcomes all that weaker than itself: by this means finds pleasure" in its own existence. The increasing" humanity of this tendency consists in the fact that we are beginning to feel ever more subtly how difficult
its feet.
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216 THE WILL TO POWER.
it is really to absorb others: while we could show our power by injuring him, his will estranges him from us, and thus makes him less susceptible of
being overcome.
770.
The degree of resistance which has to be con tinually overcome in order to remain at the top, is the measure offreedom, whether for individuals or for societies: freedom being understood as positive
ower, as will to povver. The highest form of individual freedom, ofsovereignty, would, according to this, in all probability be found not five feet away from its opposite--that is to say, where the danger of slavery hangs over life, like a hundred swords of Damocles. Let any one go through the whole of history from this point of view: the ages when the individual reaches perfect maturity, i. e. the free ages, when the classical type, sovereign man, is attained to--these were certainly not humane timesl
There should be no choice: either one must be uppermost 0r nethermost -- like a worm, despised, annihilated, trodden upon. One must have tyrants against one in order to become a tyrant, ie. in order to be free. It is no small advantage to have a hundred swords of Damocles
suspended over one: it is only thus that one learns to dance, it is only thus that one attains to any freedom in one's movements.
771
Man more than any other animal was originally altruistic--hence his slow growth (child) and lofty
? ? ? ? 4
development. Hence, too, his extraordinary and latest kind of egoism. ---Beasts of prey are much more individualistic.
772.
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
217
A criticism of selfishness. The
involuntary of La Rochefoucauld, who believed that he was saying something bold, liberal, and
ingenuousness
paradoxical (in his days, of course, truth in psychological matters was something that astonished people) when he said: "Les grandes dmes ne sont pas celles qui ont mains de passions et plus de uertus que les dmes communes, mais seule ment celles qui ont de plus grands desseins. " Certainly, John Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort the noble and philosophical La Rochefoucauld of the eighteenth century) recognises in him merely an astute and keen-sighted observer of all that which the result of habitual selfishness in the
human breast, and he adds: "A noble spirit unable to see the necessity of constant observa tion of baseness and contemptibility, unless were to show against what corrupting influences lofty spirit and noble character were able to triumph. "
The Morphology of llze Feelings of Self.
First stanafooint. --To what extent are sympathy
? or communal feelings, the lower or
states, at a time when personal self-esteem and
initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals, are not yet possible?
preparatory
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Second standpoint--To what extent is the zenith of collective self-esteem, the pride in the distinc tion of the clan, the feeling of inequality and a certain abhorrence of mediation, of equal rights and of reconciliation, the school for individual self
esteem ? It may be this in so far a it compels the
individual to represent the pride of the community ' --he is obliged to speak and act with tremendous
self-respect, because he stands for the community And the same holds good when the individual re gards himself as the instrument or speaking-tube of a godhead.
Third standpoint--To what extent do these forms of impersonality invest the individual with enormous importance ? In so far as higher powers are using him as an intermediary: religious shy ness towards one's self is the condition of prophets and poets.
Fourth standpoint--To what extent does re sponsibility for a whole educate the individual in foresight, and give him a severe and terrible hand, a calculating and cold heart, majesty of bearing and of action--things which he would not allow
himself if he stood only for his own rights?
In short, collective self-esteem is the great pre
paratory school for personal sovereignty. The noble caste is that which creates the heritage of this faculty.
774
The disguised forms of will to power :-- .
(I) The desire for freedom, for independence for equilibrium, for peace, for co~ordination. Also
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
that of the anchorite, the "Free-Spirit. " In its lowest form, the will to live at all costs--the instinct of self-preservation.
(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying the will to power of whole community; submis siveness, the making of one's self indispensable and useful to him who has the power; lOve, secret path to the heart of the powerful, in order to be come his master.
(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imagin ary comfort of belonging to higher order than those who actually hold the reins of power; the acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows of judging even the more powerful;
tion; the discovery of new codes of morality (of which the jews are classical example).
775
Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power. -- Praise and gratitude for harvests, for good weather, victories, marriages, and peace--all festivals need
subject on which feeling can be outpoured. The desire to make all good things that happen to one appear as though they h'ad been done to one: people will have a donor. The same holds good of the work of art: people are not satisfied with
alone, they must praise the artist. --What, then, praise It a sort of compensation for benefits
received, sort of giving back, manifestation of _ our power--for the man who praises assents to, blesses, values, judges: he arrogates to himself the right to give his consent to thing, to be able to
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confer honours. An increased feeling of happiness or of liveliness is also an increased feeling of power, and it is as a result of this feeling that a man
praises as the outcome of this feeling that he invents donor, " subject Gratitude thus revenge of lofty kind: most severely exercised and demanded where equality and pride' both require to be upheld--that to say, where
practised to its fullest extent.
77-6.
Concerning the Machiavelli's-m of Power.
The will to power appears :--
(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form of will to "freedom ": the mere fact of breaking loose from something seems to be an end in itself (in religio-moral sense: " One only answerable to one's own conscience " evangelical freedom," etc. etc. ).
In the case of stronger species, ascending to power, in the form of the will to overpower. If this fails, then shrinks to the " will to justice "-- that to say, to the will to the same measure of rights as the ruling caste possesses.
In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent, and most courageous, in the form of "love of humanity," of "love of the people," of the " gospel," of "truth," of " God," of " pity," of " self sacrifice," etc. etc. ; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of capture, of imposing service on some one, of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part of great mass of power to which one attempts to give
revenge
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direction: the hero, the prophet, the Caesar, the Saviour, the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes also belongs to this category; will overpower something, possess utterly, and looks like self
abnegation. At bottom only the love of one's instrument, of one's " horse "--the conviction that things belong to one because one in position to use them. ) "
77
Love. ---Behold this love and pity of women-- what could be more egoistic? . And when they do sacrifice themselves and their honour or reputa tion, to whom do they sacrifice themselves? To the man? Is not rather to an unbridled desire? These desires are quite as selfish, even though they may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude.
. . . To what extent can such hyperfoetation of one valuation sanctity everything else
778.
"Senses," "Passions. "--When the fear of the senses and of the passions and of the desires be comes so great as to Warn us against them, already symptom of weakness: extreme measures always characterise abnormal conditions. That which lacking here, or more precisely that which
decaying, the power to resist an impulse when one feels instinctively that one must yield,----that
to say, that one must react,--then an excellent thing to avoid opportunities (temptations).
" Freedom," "justice," " Love
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The stimulation of the senses is only a tempta tion in so far as those creatures are concerned whose systems are easily swayed and influenced: on the Iother hand, in the case of remarkable con stitutional obtuseness and hardness, strong stimuli are necessary in order to set the functions in motion. Dissipation can only be objected to in the case of one who has no right to it; and almost all passions have fallen into disrepute thanks to
those who were not strong enough to convert them
totheir own advantage.
One should understand that passions are open
to the same objections as illnesses: yet we should not be justified in doing without illnesses, and still less without passions. We require the abnormal; we give life a tremendous shock by means of these great illnesses. .
In detailthe following should be distinguished :-- (I) The dominating passion, which may even bring the supremest form of health with it: in this case the co-ordination of the internal system and
its functions to perform one task is best attained,-- but this is almost a definition of health.
( 2) The antagonism of the passions--the double, treble, and multiple soul in one breast:' this is very unhealthy; it is a sign of inner ruin and of disintegration, betraying and promoting an internal dualism and anarchy--unless, of course,
one passion becomes master. Return to health.
* This refers to Goethe's Faust. In Part I. ,Act Scene Il. , we find Faust exclaiming in despair "Two souls, alas within my bosom throne See Theodore Martin's Faust, trans lated into English verse. --TR.
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? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
(3) The juxtaposition of passions without their being either opposed or united with one another. Very often transitory, and then, as soon as order is established, this condition may be a healthy one. A most interesting class of men belong to this order, the chameleons; they are not necessarily at loggerheads with themselves, they are both happy and secure, but they cannot develop--their moods lie side by side, even though they may seem to lie far apart. They change, but they become nothing.
779
The quantitative estimate of aims and its in fluence upon the valuing standpoint: the great and the imall criminal. The greatness or small ness of the aims will determine whether the doer feels respect for himself with it all, or whether he feels pusillanimous and miserable.
The degree of intellectuality manifested in the means employed'may likewise influence our valua
How differently the philosophical innovator, experimenter, and man of violence stands out against robbers, barbarians, adventurers l--There is a semblance of disinterestedness in the former.
Finally, noble manners, bearing, courage, self rconfidence,---how they alter the _ value of that
which is attained by means of them!
*
Concerning the optics of valuation :--
The influence of the greatness or smallness of the aims.
tion.
.
223
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THE WILL TO POWER.
The influence of the intellectuality of the means. The influence of the behaviour in action.
The influence of success or failure.
The influence of opposing forces and their value. The influence of that which is permitted and
that which is forbidden.
780.
The tricks by means of which actions, measures, and passions are legitimised, which from an in
dividual standpoint are no longer good form or even in good taste:--
Art, which allows us to enter such strange worlds, makes them tasteful to us.
Historians prove its justification and' reason; travels, exoticism, psychology, penal codes, the lunatic asylum, the criminal, sociology.
Impersonality (so that as media Of a collective whole we allow ourselves these passions and actions --the Bar, juries, the bourgeois, the soldier, the minister, the prince, society, " critics ") makes us feel that we are Sacrificing something.
A
781.
Preoccupations concerning one's self and one's eternal salvation are not expressive either of a rich or of a self-confident nature, for the latter lets all questions of eternal bliss go to the devil, --it is not interested in such matters of happiness ; it is all power, deeds, desires; it imposes itself upon things; it even violates things. The Chris
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
tian is a romantic hypochondriac who does not stand firmly on his legs.
Whenever hedonistic views come to the front, one can always presuppose the existence of pain and a certain ill-constitutedness.
782.
" The growing autonomy of the individual "--- Parisian philosophers like M. Fouille? e talk of such things: they would do well to study the race
moutonnie? re for a moment; for they belong to it. For Heaven's sake open your eyes, ye sociologists who deal with the future! The individual grew strong under quite opposite conditions: ye describe the extremest weakening and impoverishment of
man ; ye actually want this weakness and impover ishment, and ye apply the whole lying machinery of the old ideal in order to achieve your end. Ye are so constituted that ye actually regard your gregarious wants as an ideal! Here we are in
the presence of an absolute lack of psychological honesty.
783.
The two traits which characterise the modern European are apparently antagonistic--indivia'ual ism and the demand for equal rights: this I am at
last beginning to understand.
The individual is an extremely vulnerable piece of vanity: this vanity, when it is conscious of its high degree of susceptibility to pain, demands that every one should be made equal; that the individual should only stand inter pares. But in this way a social
VOL. n. P
225
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race is depicted in which, as a matter of fact, gifts and powers are on the whole equally distributed. The pride which would have loneliness and but few appreciators is quite beyond comprehension: really " great " successes are only attained through the masses--indeed, we scarcely understand yet
that a mob success is in reality only a small suc cess; because pulchrum est paucorum hominum.
No morality will countenance order of rank among men, and the jurists know nothing of a communal conscience. The principle of indi vidualism rejects really great men, and demands the most delicate vision for, and the speediest dis covery of, a talent among people who are almost equal; and inasmuch as every one has some modicum of talent in such late and civilised cul
tures (and can, therefore, expect to receive his share of honour), there is a more general buttering~up of modest merits to-day than there has ever been.
~This gives the age the appearance of unlimited justice. Its want of justice is to be found not in its unbounded hatred of tyrants and demagogues, even in the arts; but in its detestation 0f noble natures who scorn the praise of the many. The
demand for equal rights (that is to say, the privi lege of sitting in judgment on everything and everybody) is anti~aristocratic.
This age knows just as little concerning the absorption of the individual, of his mergence into a great type of men who do not want to be personalities. It was this that formerly constituted the distinction and the zeal of many lofty natures
(the greatest poets among them); or of the desire
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
227
to be a polis, as in Greece; or of Jesuitism, or of the Prussian Staff Corps, and bureaucracy; or of apprenticeship and a continuation of the tradition of great masters: to all of which things, non-social conditions and the absence of petty vanity are necessary.
784.
Individualism is a modest and still unconscious form of will to power; with it a single human unit seems to think it sufficient to free himself from the preponderating power of society (or of the State or
_
He does not set himself up in opposi tion as a personality, but merely as a unit; he
Church).
? the rights of all other individuals as against the whole. That is to say, he instinc tively places himself on a level with every other unit: what he combats he does not combat as a person, but as a representative of units against a mass.
Socialism is merely an agitatory measure of individualism : it recognises the fact that in order to attain to something, men must organise them selves into a general movement-- into a "power. " But what the Socialist requires is not society as the object of the individual, but society as a means
of making many individuals possible: this is the instinct of Socialists, though they frequently de ceive themselves on this point (apart from this, however, in order to make their kind prevail, they are compelled to deceive others to an enormous
represents
Altruistic moral preaching thus enters into the service of individual egoism,--one 0f
extent).
? ? ? 228 THE WILL TO POWER.
the most common frauds of the nineteenth century.
Anarchy is also merely an agitatory measure of Socialism; with it the Socialist inspires fear, with fear he begins to fascinate and'to terrorise: but What he does above all is to draw all courageous
and reckless people to his side, even in the most intellectual spheres.
In spite of all this, individualism is the most modest stage of the will to power.
*
When one has reached a certain degree of inde
pendence, one always longs for more: separation in proportion to the degree of force ; the individual is no longer content to regard himself as equal
to everybody, he actually see/es for his peer--he makes himself stand out from others. Individual
ism is followed by a development in groups and organs ; correlative tendencies join up together and become powerfully active: now there arise between these centres of power, friction, war, a reconnoitring of the forces on either side, reciprocity, under standings, and the regulation of mutual services. Finally, there appears an order of rank. .
Recapitulation--
I. The individuals emancipate themselves.
2. They make war, and ultimately agree con
cerning equal rights(justice is made an end in itself). 3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in degrees of power begin to make themselves felt,
and to a greater extent than before (the reason being that on the Whole peace is established, and innumerable small centres of power begin to create
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
differences which formerly were scarcely notice
Now the individuals begin to form groups, these strive after privileges and preponderance, and war starts afresh in a milder form.
People demand freedom only when they have no power. Once power is obtained, a preponder ance thereof is the next thing to be coveted; if this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is still too weak' for it), then "justice," i. e. "equality of power " become the objects of desire.
785.
The rectification of the concept " egoism. "--When one has discovered what an error the "individual"
and that every single creature represents the whole process of evolution (not alone " inherited," but in " himself"), the individual then acquires an inordinately great importance. The voice of in stinct quite right here. When this instinct tends to decline, i. e. when the individual begins
to seek his worth in his services to Others, one may be sure that exhaustion and degeneration have set in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when funda mental and free from all hypocrisy, the instinct of creating second value for one's self in the ser vice ofiother cgoists. As rule, however,
only apparent--a circuitous path to the preserva tion of one's own feelings Of vitality and worth.
786.
The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation.
Proposition one. ----There are no such things as
able).
229
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THE WILL TO POWER.
moral actions: they are purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demonstrate their exist ence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for instance, both acknowledged)--but they are not
even possible. Owing to psychological misunder standing, a man invented an opposite to the instinc tive impulses of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was thereby discovered : a primum mobile was postulated which does not exist at all. Ac cording to the valuation which gave rise to the antithesis "moral" and "immoral," one should say: There is nothing else on earth but immoral intentions and actions.
Proposition two. ----The whole differentiation, "moral" and "immoral," arises from the assump tion that both moral and immoral actions are the result of a spontaneous will--in short, that such a will exists; or in other words, that moral judg ments can only hold good with regard to intuitions
and actions that are free. But this whole order of actions and intentions is purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral standard could be applied does not exist at all: there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral action.
96
The psychological error out of which the anti thesis " moral " and "immoral" arose is: " selfless," "unselfish," "self-denying"--all unreal and fan tastic.
A false dogmatism also clustered around the concept "ego"; it was regarded as atomic, and falsely opposed to a non-ego ; it was also liberated
? ? ? ? (5)
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
23I
from Becoming, and declared to belong to the sphere of Being. The false materialisation of the ego: this (owing to the belief in individual im mortality) was made an article of faith under the pressure of religio-moral discipline. According to this artificial liberation of the ego and its trans ference to the realm of the absolute, people thought that they had arrived at an antithesis in values which seemed quite irrefutable--the
single ego and the vast non-ego. seemed obvious that the value of the individual ego could only exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego, more particularly in the sense of being subject to
and existing only for its sake. Here, of course, the gregarious instinct determined the direction of thought: nothing is_ more opposed to this instinct than the sovereignty of the individual. Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then its value must lie in self-negation.
Thus:" (I) the false emancipation of the "in dividual as an atom;
(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the desire to remain an atom, and regards as hostile. As result: the overcoming of the individual
by changing his aim.
(4) At this point there appeared to be actions
that were self-effacing: around these actions whole sphere of antitheses was fancied.
? was asked, in what sort of actions does man most strongly assert himself? Around these
was believed that there could be such
covetousness, lust for power, cruelty, etc. etc. ) hate, contempt, and anathemas were
(sexuality, heaped:
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THE WILL TO POWER.
things as selfless impulses. Everything selfish was condemned, everything unselfish was in demand.
(6) And the result was: what had been done? A ban had been placedon the strongest, the most natural, yea, the only genuine impulses; hencefor ward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy,
there must be no trace in it of any of those genuine impulses--monstrous fraud in psychology. Every kind of "self-satisfaction" had to be remodelled and made possible by means of misunderstanding and adjusting one's self sub specie bani. Conversely: that species which found its advantage in depriving mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives of the gregarious instincts, eg. the priests and the philosophers, were sufficiently crafty and psycho logically astute to show how selfishness ruled every where. The Christian conclusion from this was: " Everything is sin, even our virtues. Man is utterly undesirable. Selfless actions are impos sible. " Original sin. In short, once man had
opposed his instincts to a purely imaginary world of the good, he concluded by despising himself as incapable of performing " good " actions.
N. B. ---In this way Christianity represents a' step forward in the sharpening of psychological insight : La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It perceived the essential equality of human actions,and the equality of their values as a whole (all immoral).
>1:
Now the first serious object was to rear men in whom self-seeking impulses were extinguished:
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
priests, saints. And people doubted that perfec tion was possible, they did not doubt What per fection was.
The psychology of the saint and of the priest and of the "good" man, must naturally have seemed purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of all action had been declared bad: therefore, in order to make action still possible, deeds had to be
which, though not possible, had to be declared possible and sanctified. They now honoured and idealised things with as much falsity as they had previously slandered them.
Inveighing against the instincts Of life came to be regarded as holy and estimable. The priestly ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute Obedience, absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self sacrifice, renunciation of the beautiful, of reason, and of sensuality, and dark frown for all the strong qualities that existed.
An advance made: the slandered instincts attempt to re-establish their rights (e. g. Luther's Reformation, the coarsest form of moral falsehood under, the cover of "Evangelical freedom they are rechristened With holy names.
The calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that they are necessary in order that the virtuous instincts may be possible. Il faut vivre, afin de vivre pour autrui: egoism as means to an end. '
* Spencer's conclusion the Data of Ethz'cs. ---TR.
prescribed
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But people go still further: they try to grant both the egoistic and altruistic impulses the right to exist--equal rights for both--from the utili tarian standpoint.
People go further: they see greater utility in placing the egoistic rights before the altruistic-- greater utility in the sense of more happiness for the majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc. Thus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate,
but under the cloak of an extremely altruistic standpoint--the collective utility of humanity.
An attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic mode of action with the natural order of things. Altruism is sought in the very roots of life. Altruism and egoism are both based upon the
essence of life and nature.
The disappearance of the opposition between them is dreamt of as a future possibility. Con
tinued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the two into one.
At last it is seen that altruistic actions are merely a species of the egoistic--and that the degree to which one loves and spends one's self is a
proof of the extent of one's individual power and personality. In short, that the more evil man can be made, the better he and that one cannot be the one without the other. . . At this point the
curtain rises which concealed the monstrous fraud of the psychology that has prevailed hitherto.
Results--There are only immoral intentions and actions the so-called moral actions must be shown
234
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*
is, .
? socns'rv AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
235
'to be immoral. All emotions are traced to a single will, the will to power, and are called essentially equal. The concept of life: in the apparent antithesis good and evil, degrees of power in the instincts alone are expressed. A temporary order of rank is established according to which certain instincts are either controlled or enlisted 'in our service. Morality is justified: economically, etc.
*
Against proposition two--Determinism: the attempt to rescue the moral world by transferring it to the unknown.
Determinism is only a manner of allowing our selves to conjure our valuations away, once they have lost their place in a world interpreted mechanistically. Determinism must therefore be attacked and undermined at all costs: just as our right to distinguish between an absolute and phenomenal world should be disputed.
787
It is absolutely necessary to emancipate our selves from motives: otherwise we should not be allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves or to neglect ourselves! Only the innocence of Be coming gives us the highest courage and the highest freedom.
788.
A clean conscience must be restored to the evil mam--has this been my involuntary endeavour all
? ? ? ? 236
THE WILL To POWER.
the time? for I take as the evil man him who is strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the con victs in prison should be referred to here).
789.
Our new "freedom. " What a feeling of relief there is in the thought that we emancipated spirits do not feel ourselves harnessed to any system of teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts reward and punishment have no roots in the essence of existence! Likewise that good and evil actions are not good or evil in themselves, but only from the point of view of the self-pre servative tendencies of certain species of humanity !
Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure and pain are not of cosmic, far less then of meta physical, importance! (That form of pessimism associated with the name of Hartmann, which pledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of existence into the balance, with its arbitrary con finement in the prison and within the bounds of pre-Copernican thought, would be something not only retrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be merely a bad joke on the part of a " Berliner. " ')
790.
If one is clear as to the "wherefore" of one's life, then the "how " of it can take care of itself.
* " Berliner "---The citizens of Berlin are renowned in Germany for their poor jokes--TR.
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
237
It already even sign of disbelief in the where fore and in the purpose and sense of life--in fact,
sign of lack of will--when the value of
and pain step into the foreground, and hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes pre valent; and self-abnegation, resignation, virtue, "objectivity," may, at the very least, be signs that the most important factor beginning to make its absence felt.
791
Hitherto there has been no German culture. It no refutation of this assertion to say that there have been great anchorites in Germany (Goethe,
for instance); for these had their own culture. But was precisely around them, as though around mighty, defiant, and isolated rocks, that the remain ing spirit of Germany, as their antithesis, lay--that
pleasure
?
upon
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215
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Every living organism gropes around as far as its power permits, and overcomes all that weaker than itself: by this means finds pleasure" in its own existence. The increasing" humanity of this tendency consists in the fact that we are beginning to feel ever more subtly how difficult
its feet.
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216 THE WILL TO POWER.
it is really to absorb others: while we could show our power by injuring him, his will estranges him from us, and thus makes him less susceptible of
being overcome.
770.
The degree of resistance which has to be con tinually overcome in order to remain at the top, is the measure offreedom, whether for individuals or for societies: freedom being understood as positive
ower, as will to povver. The highest form of individual freedom, ofsovereignty, would, according to this, in all probability be found not five feet away from its opposite--that is to say, where the danger of slavery hangs over life, like a hundred swords of Damocles. Let any one go through the whole of history from this point of view: the ages when the individual reaches perfect maturity, i. e. the free ages, when the classical type, sovereign man, is attained to--these were certainly not humane timesl
There should be no choice: either one must be uppermost 0r nethermost -- like a worm, despised, annihilated, trodden upon. One must have tyrants against one in order to become a tyrant, ie. in order to be free. It is no small advantage to have a hundred swords of Damocles
suspended over one: it is only thus that one learns to dance, it is only thus that one attains to any freedom in one's movements.
771
Man more than any other animal was originally altruistic--hence his slow growth (child) and lofty
? ? ? ? 4
development. Hence, too, his extraordinary and latest kind of egoism. ---Beasts of prey are much more individualistic.
772.
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
217
A criticism of selfishness. The
involuntary of La Rochefoucauld, who believed that he was saying something bold, liberal, and
ingenuousness
paradoxical (in his days, of course, truth in psychological matters was something that astonished people) when he said: "Les grandes dmes ne sont pas celles qui ont mains de passions et plus de uertus que les dmes communes, mais seule ment celles qui ont de plus grands desseins. " Certainly, John Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort the noble and philosophical La Rochefoucauld of the eighteenth century) recognises in him merely an astute and keen-sighted observer of all that which the result of habitual selfishness in the
human breast, and he adds: "A noble spirit unable to see the necessity of constant observa tion of baseness and contemptibility, unless were to show against what corrupting influences lofty spirit and noble character were able to triumph. "
The Morphology of llze Feelings of Self.
First stanafooint. --To what extent are sympathy
? or communal feelings, the lower or
states, at a time when personal self-esteem and
initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals, are not yet possible?
preparatory
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Second standpoint--To what extent is the zenith of collective self-esteem, the pride in the distinc tion of the clan, the feeling of inequality and a certain abhorrence of mediation, of equal rights and of reconciliation, the school for individual self
esteem ? It may be this in so far a it compels the
individual to represent the pride of the community ' --he is obliged to speak and act with tremendous
self-respect, because he stands for the community And the same holds good when the individual re gards himself as the instrument or speaking-tube of a godhead.
Third standpoint--To what extent do these forms of impersonality invest the individual with enormous importance ? In so far as higher powers are using him as an intermediary: religious shy ness towards one's self is the condition of prophets and poets.
Fourth standpoint--To what extent does re sponsibility for a whole educate the individual in foresight, and give him a severe and terrible hand, a calculating and cold heart, majesty of bearing and of action--things which he would not allow
himself if he stood only for his own rights?
In short, collective self-esteem is the great pre
paratory school for personal sovereignty. The noble caste is that which creates the heritage of this faculty.
774
The disguised forms of will to power :-- .
(I) The desire for freedom, for independence for equilibrium, for peace, for co~ordination. Also
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
that of the anchorite, the "Free-Spirit. " In its lowest form, the will to live at all costs--the instinct of self-preservation.
(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying the will to power of whole community; submis siveness, the making of one's self indispensable and useful to him who has the power; lOve, secret path to the heart of the powerful, in order to be come his master.
(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imagin ary comfort of belonging to higher order than those who actually hold the reins of power; the acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows of judging even the more powerful;
tion; the discovery of new codes of morality (of which the jews are classical example).
775
Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power. -- Praise and gratitude for harvests, for good weather, victories, marriages, and peace--all festivals need
subject on which feeling can be outpoured. The desire to make all good things that happen to one appear as though they h'ad been done to one: people will have a donor. The same holds good of the work of art: people are not satisfied with
alone, they must praise the artist. --What, then, praise It a sort of compensation for benefits
received, sort of giving back, manifestation of _ our power--for the man who praises assents to, blesses, values, judges: he arrogates to himself the right to give his consent to thing, to be able to
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? 4220 THE WILL TO POWER.
confer honours. An increased feeling of happiness or of liveliness is also an increased feeling of power, and it is as a result of this feeling that a man
praises as the outcome of this feeling that he invents donor, " subject Gratitude thus revenge of lofty kind: most severely exercised and demanded where equality and pride' both require to be upheld--that to say, where
practised to its fullest extent.
77-6.
Concerning the Machiavelli's-m of Power.
The will to power appears :--
(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form of will to "freedom ": the mere fact of breaking loose from something seems to be an end in itself (in religio-moral sense: " One only answerable to one's own conscience " evangelical freedom," etc. etc. ).
In the case of stronger species, ascending to power, in the form of the will to overpower. If this fails, then shrinks to the " will to justice "-- that to say, to the will to the same measure of rights as the ruling caste possesses.
In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent, and most courageous, in the form of "love of humanity," of "love of the people," of the " gospel," of "truth," of " God," of " pity," of " self sacrifice," etc. etc. ; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of capture, of imposing service on some one, of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part of great mass of power to which one attempts to give
revenge
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direction: the hero, the prophet, the Caesar, the Saviour, the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes also belongs to this category; will overpower something, possess utterly, and looks like self
abnegation. At bottom only the love of one's instrument, of one's " horse "--the conviction that things belong to one because one in position to use them. ) "
77
Love. ---Behold this love and pity of women-- what could be more egoistic? . And when they do sacrifice themselves and their honour or reputa tion, to whom do they sacrifice themselves? To the man? Is not rather to an unbridled desire? These desires are quite as selfish, even though they may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude.
. . . To what extent can such hyperfoetation of one valuation sanctity everything else
778.
"Senses," "Passions. "--When the fear of the senses and of the passions and of the desires be comes so great as to Warn us against them, already symptom of weakness: extreme measures always characterise abnormal conditions. That which lacking here, or more precisely that which
decaying, the power to resist an impulse when one feels instinctively that one must yield,----that
to say, that one must react,--then an excellent thing to avoid opportunities (temptations).
" Freedom," "justice," " Love
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The stimulation of the senses is only a tempta tion in so far as those creatures are concerned whose systems are easily swayed and influenced: on the Iother hand, in the case of remarkable con stitutional obtuseness and hardness, strong stimuli are necessary in order to set the functions in motion. Dissipation can only be objected to in the case of one who has no right to it; and almost all passions have fallen into disrepute thanks to
those who were not strong enough to convert them
totheir own advantage.
One should understand that passions are open
to the same objections as illnesses: yet we should not be justified in doing without illnesses, and still less without passions. We require the abnormal; we give life a tremendous shock by means of these great illnesses. .
In detailthe following should be distinguished :-- (I) The dominating passion, which may even bring the supremest form of health with it: in this case the co-ordination of the internal system and
its functions to perform one task is best attained,-- but this is almost a definition of health.
( 2) The antagonism of the passions--the double, treble, and multiple soul in one breast:' this is very unhealthy; it is a sign of inner ruin and of disintegration, betraying and promoting an internal dualism and anarchy--unless, of course,
one passion becomes master. Return to health.
* This refers to Goethe's Faust. In Part I. ,Act Scene Il. , we find Faust exclaiming in despair "Two souls, alas within my bosom throne See Theodore Martin's Faust, trans lated into English verse. --TR.
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? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
(3) The juxtaposition of passions without their being either opposed or united with one another. Very often transitory, and then, as soon as order is established, this condition may be a healthy one. A most interesting class of men belong to this order, the chameleons; they are not necessarily at loggerheads with themselves, they are both happy and secure, but they cannot develop--their moods lie side by side, even though they may seem to lie far apart. They change, but they become nothing.
779
The quantitative estimate of aims and its in fluence upon the valuing standpoint: the great and the imall criminal. The greatness or small ness of the aims will determine whether the doer feels respect for himself with it all, or whether he feels pusillanimous and miserable.
The degree of intellectuality manifested in the means employed'may likewise influence our valua
How differently the philosophical innovator, experimenter, and man of violence stands out against robbers, barbarians, adventurers l--There is a semblance of disinterestedness in the former.
Finally, noble manners, bearing, courage, self rconfidence,---how they alter the _ value of that
which is attained by means of them!
*
Concerning the optics of valuation :--
The influence of the greatness or smallness of the aims.
tion.
.
223
? ? ? ? 224
THE WILL TO POWER.
The influence of the intellectuality of the means. The influence of the behaviour in action.
The influence of success or failure.
The influence of opposing forces and their value. The influence of that which is permitted and
that which is forbidden.
780.
The tricks by means of which actions, measures, and passions are legitimised, which from an in
dividual standpoint are no longer good form or even in good taste:--
Art, which allows us to enter such strange worlds, makes them tasteful to us.
Historians prove its justification and' reason; travels, exoticism, psychology, penal codes, the lunatic asylum, the criminal, sociology.
Impersonality (so that as media Of a collective whole we allow ourselves these passions and actions --the Bar, juries, the bourgeois, the soldier, the minister, the prince, society, " critics ") makes us feel that we are Sacrificing something.
A
781.
Preoccupations concerning one's self and one's eternal salvation are not expressive either of a rich or of a self-confident nature, for the latter lets all questions of eternal bliss go to the devil, --it is not interested in such matters of happiness ; it is all power, deeds, desires; it imposes itself upon things; it even violates things. The Chris
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
tian is a romantic hypochondriac who does not stand firmly on his legs.
Whenever hedonistic views come to the front, one can always presuppose the existence of pain and a certain ill-constitutedness.
782.
" The growing autonomy of the individual "--- Parisian philosophers like M. Fouille? e talk of such things: they would do well to study the race
moutonnie? re for a moment; for they belong to it. For Heaven's sake open your eyes, ye sociologists who deal with the future! The individual grew strong under quite opposite conditions: ye describe the extremest weakening and impoverishment of
man ; ye actually want this weakness and impover ishment, and ye apply the whole lying machinery of the old ideal in order to achieve your end. Ye are so constituted that ye actually regard your gregarious wants as an ideal! Here we are in
the presence of an absolute lack of psychological honesty.
783.
The two traits which characterise the modern European are apparently antagonistic--indivia'ual ism and the demand for equal rights: this I am at
last beginning to understand.
The individual is an extremely vulnerable piece of vanity: this vanity, when it is conscious of its high degree of susceptibility to pain, demands that every one should be made equal; that the individual should only stand inter pares. But in this way a social
VOL. n. P
225
? ? ? ? 226 THE WILL TO POWER.
race is depicted in which, as a matter of fact, gifts and powers are on the whole equally distributed. The pride which would have loneliness and but few appreciators is quite beyond comprehension: really " great " successes are only attained through the masses--indeed, we scarcely understand yet
that a mob success is in reality only a small suc cess; because pulchrum est paucorum hominum.
No morality will countenance order of rank among men, and the jurists know nothing of a communal conscience. The principle of indi vidualism rejects really great men, and demands the most delicate vision for, and the speediest dis covery of, a talent among people who are almost equal; and inasmuch as every one has some modicum of talent in such late and civilised cul
tures (and can, therefore, expect to receive his share of honour), there is a more general buttering~up of modest merits to-day than there has ever been.
~This gives the age the appearance of unlimited justice. Its want of justice is to be found not in its unbounded hatred of tyrants and demagogues, even in the arts; but in its detestation 0f noble natures who scorn the praise of the many. The
demand for equal rights (that is to say, the privi lege of sitting in judgment on everything and everybody) is anti~aristocratic.
This age knows just as little concerning the absorption of the individual, of his mergence into a great type of men who do not want to be personalities. It was this that formerly constituted the distinction and the zeal of many lofty natures
(the greatest poets among them); or of the desire
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
227
to be a polis, as in Greece; or of Jesuitism, or of the Prussian Staff Corps, and bureaucracy; or of apprenticeship and a continuation of the tradition of great masters: to all of which things, non-social conditions and the absence of petty vanity are necessary.
784.
Individualism is a modest and still unconscious form of will to power; with it a single human unit seems to think it sufficient to free himself from the preponderating power of society (or of the State or
_
He does not set himself up in opposi tion as a personality, but merely as a unit; he
Church).
? the rights of all other individuals as against the whole. That is to say, he instinc tively places himself on a level with every other unit: what he combats he does not combat as a person, but as a representative of units against a mass.
Socialism is merely an agitatory measure of individualism : it recognises the fact that in order to attain to something, men must organise them selves into a general movement-- into a "power. " But what the Socialist requires is not society as the object of the individual, but society as a means
of making many individuals possible: this is the instinct of Socialists, though they frequently de ceive themselves on this point (apart from this, however, in order to make their kind prevail, they are compelled to deceive others to an enormous
represents
Altruistic moral preaching thus enters into the service of individual egoism,--one 0f
extent).
? ? ? 228 THE WILL TO POWER.
the most common frauds of the nineteenth century.
Anarchy is also merely an agitatory measure of Socialism; with it the Socialist inspires fear, with fear he begins to fascinate and'to terrorise: but What he does above all is to draw all courageous
and reckless people to his side, even in the most intellectual spheres.
In spite of all this, individualism is the most modest stage of the will to power.
*
When one has reached a certain degree of inde
pendence, one always longs for more: separation in proportion to the degree of force ; the individual is no longer content to regard himself as equal
to everybody, he actually see/es for his peer--he makes himself stand out from others. Individual
ism is followed by a development in groups and organs ; correlative tendencies join up together and become powerfully active: now there arise between these centres of power, friction, war, a reconnoitring of the forces on either side, reciprocity, under standings, and the regulation of mutual services. Finally, there appears an order of rank. .
Recapitulation--
I. The individuals emancipate themselves.
2. They make war, and ultimately agree con
cerning equal rights(justice is made an end in itself). 3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in degrees of power begin to make themselves felt,
and to a greater extent than before (the reason being that on the Whole peace is established, and innumerable small centres of power begin to create
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
differences which formerly were scarcely notice
Now the individuals begin to form groups, these strive after privileges and preponderance, and war starts afresh in a milder form.
People demand freedom only when they have no power. Once power is obtained, a preponder ance thereof is the next thing to be coveted; if this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is still too weak' for it), then "justice," i. e. "equality of power " become the objects of desire.
785.
The rectification of the concept " egoism. "--When one has discovered what an error the "individual"
and that every single creature represents the whole process of evolution (not alone " inherited," but in " himself"), the individual then acquires an inordinately great importance. The voice of in stinct quite right here. When this instinct tends to decline, i. e. when the individual begins
to seek his worth in his services to Others, one may be sure that exhaustion and degeneration have set in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when funda mental and free from all hypocrisy, the instinct of creating second value for one's self in the ser vice ofiother cgoists. As rule, however,
only apparent--a circuitous path to the preserva tion of one's own feelings Of vitality and worth.
786.
The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation.
Proposition one. ----There are no such things as
able).
229
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? 230
THE WILL TO POWER.
moral actions: they are purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demonstrate their exist ence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for instance, both acknowledged)--but they are not
even possible. Owing to psychological misunder standing, a man invented an opposite to the instinc tive impulses of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was thereby discovered : a primum mobile was postulated which does not exist at all. Ac cording to the valuation which gave rise to the antithesis "moral" and "immoral," one should say: There is nothing else on earth but immoral intentions and actions.
Proposition two. ----The whole differentiation, "moral" and "immoral," arises from the assump tion that both moral and immoral actions are the result of a spontaneous will--in short, that such a will exists; or in other words, that moral judg ments can only hold good with regard to intuitions
and actions that are free. But this whole order of actions and intentions is purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral standard could be applied does not exist at all: there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral action.
96
The psychological error out of which the anti thesis " moral " and "immoral" arose is: " selfless," "unselfish," "self-denying"--all unreal and fan tastic.
A false dogmatism also clustered around the concept "ego"; it was regarded as atomic, and falsely opposed to a non-ego ; it was also liberated
? ? ? ? (5)
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
23I
from Becoming, and declared to belong to the sphere of Being. The false materialisation of the ego: this (owing to the belief in individual im mortality) was made an article of faith under the pressure of religio-moral discipline. According to this artificial liberation of the ego and its trans ference to the realm of the absolute, people thought that they had arrived at an antithesis in values which seemed quite irrefutable--the
single ego and the vast non-ego. seemed obvious that the value of the individual ego could only exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego, more particularly in the sense of being subject to
and existing only for its sake. Here, of course, the gregarious instinct determined the direction of thought: nothing is_ more opposed to this instinct than the sovereignty of the individual. Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then its value must lie in self-negation.
Thus:" (I) the false emancipation of the "in dividual as an atom;
(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the desire to remain an atom, and regards as hostile. As result: the overcoming of the individual
by changing his aim.
(4) At this point there appeared to be actions
that were self-effacing: around these actions whole sphere of antitheses was fancied.
? was asked, in what sort of actions does man most strongly assert himself? Around these
was believed that there could be such
covetousness, lust for power, cruelty, etc. etc. ) hate, contempt, and anathemas were
(sexuality, heaped:
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THE WILL TO POWER.
things as selfless impulses. Everything selfish was condemned, everything unselfish was in demand.
(6) And the result was: what had been done? A ban had been placedon the strongest, the most natural, yea, the only genuine impulses; hencefor ward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy,
there must be no trace in it of any of those genuine impulses--monstrous fraud in psychology. Every kind of "self-satisfaction" had to be remodelled and made possible by means of misunderstanding and adjusting one's self sub specie bani. Conversely: that species which found its advantage in depriving mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives of the gregarious instincts, eg. the priests and the philosophers, were sufficiently crafty and psycho logically astute to show how selfishness ruled every where. The Christian conclusion from this was: " Everything is sin, even our virtues. Man is utterly undesirable. Selfless actions are impos sible. " Original sin. In short, once man had
opposed his instincts to a purely imaginary world of the good, he concluded by despising himself as incapable of performing " good " actions.
N. B. ---In this way Christianity represents a' step forward in the sharpening of psychological insight : La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It perceived the essential equality of human actions,and the equality of their values as a whole (all immoral).
>1:
Now the first serious object was to rear men in whom self-seeking impulses were extinguished:
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
priests, saints. And people doubted that perfec tion was possible, they did not doubt What per fection was.
The psychology of the saint and of the priest and of the "good" man, must naturally have seemed purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of all action had been declared bad: therefore, in order to make action still possible, deeds had to be
which, though not possible, had to be declared possible and sanctified. They now honoured and idealised things with as much falsity as they had previously slandered them.
Inveighing against the instincts Of life came to be regarded as holy and estimable. The priestly ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute Obedience, absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self sacrifice, renunciation of the beautiful, of reason, and of sensuality, and dark frown for all the strong qualities that existed.
An advance made: the slandered instincts attempt to re-establish their rights (e. g. Luther's Reformation, the coarsest form of moral falsehood under, the cover of "Evangelical freedom they are rechristened With holy names.
The calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that they are necessary in order that the virtuous instincts may be possible. Il faut vivre, afin de vivre pour autrui: egoism as means to an end. '
* Spencer's conclusion the Data of Ethz'cs. ---TR.
prescribed
233
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But people go still further: they try to grant both the egoistic and altruistic impulses the right to exist--equal rights for both--from the utili tarian standpoint.
People go further: they see greater utility in placing the egoistic rights before the altruistic-- greater utility in the sense of more happiness for the majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc. Thus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate,
but under the cloak of an extremely altruistic standpoint--the collective utility of humanity.
An attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic mode of action with the natural order of things. Altruism is sought in the very roots of life. Altruism and egoism are both based upon the
essence of life and nature.
The disappearance of the opposition between them is dreamt of as a future possibility. Con
tinued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the two into one.
At last it is seen that altruistic actions are merely a species of the egoistic--and that the degree to which one loves and spends one's self is a
proof of the extent of one's individual power and personality. In short, that the more evil man can be made, the better he and that one cannot be the one without the other. . . At this point the
curtain rises which concealed the monstrous fraud of the psychology that has prevailed hitherto.
Results--There are only immoral intentions and actions the so-called moral actions must be shown
234
? ? ? ;
*
is, .
? socns'rv AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
235
'to be immoral. All emotions are traced to a single will, the will to power, and are called essentially equal. The concept of life: in the apparent antithesis good and evil, degrees of power in the instincts alone are expressed. A temporary order of rank is established according to which certain instincts are either controlled or enlisted 'in our service. Morality is justified: economically, etc.
*
Against proposition two--Determinism: the attempt to rescue the moral world by transferring it to the unknown.
Determinism is only a manner of allowing our selves to conjure our valuations away, once they have lost their place in a world interpreted mechanistically. Determinism must therefore be attacked and undermined at all costs: just as our right to distinguish between an absolute and phenomenal world should be disputed.
787
It is absolutely necessary to emancipate our selves from motives: otherwise we should not be allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves or to neglect ourselves! Only the innocence of Be coming gives us the highest courage and the highest freedom.
788.
A clean conscience must be restored to the evil mam--has this been my involuntary endeavour all
? ? ? ? 236
THE WILL To POWER.
the time? for I take as the evil man him who is strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the con victs in prison should be referred to here).
789.
Our new "freedom. " What a feeling of relief there is in the thought that we emancipated spirits do not feel ourselves harnessed to any system of teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts reward and punishment have no roots in the essence of existence! Likewise that good and evil actions are not good or evil in themselves, but only from the point of view of the self-pre servative tendencies of certain species of humanity !
Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure and pain are not of cosmic, far less then of meta physical, importance! (That form of pessimism associated with the name of Hartmann, which pledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of existence into the balance, with its arbitrary con finement in the prison and within the bounds of pre-Copernican thought, would be something not only retrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be merely a bad joke on the part of a " Berliner. " ')
790.
If one is clear as to the "wherefore" of one's life, then the "how " of it can take care of itself.
* " Berliner "---The citizens of Berlin are renowned in Germany for their poor jokes--TR.
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
237
It already even sign of disbelief in the where fore and in the purpose and sense of life--in fact,
sign of lack of will--when the value of
and pain step into the foreground, and hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes pre valent; and self-abnegation, resignation, virtue, "objectivity," may, at the very least, be signs that the most important factor beginning to make its absence felt.
791
Hitherto there has been no German culture. It no refutation of this assertion to say that there have been great anchorites in Germany (Goethe,
for instance); for these had their own culture. But was precisely around them, as though around mighty, defiant, and isolated rocks, that the remain ing spirit of Germany, as their antithesis, lay--that
pleasure
?
