No More Learning

60 12d. They are solidity, humidity, heat and motion.
As for their natures, the earth element is solidity, the water element is humidity, the fire element is heat, and the wind element is
61
motion.
Motion is what causes the series of states which constitutes a 62
thing to reproduce itself in different places; in the same way that one
speaks of the motion of a flame (iv. 2c-d).
63 64
The Prakarana and the Sutra say: "What is the wind element?
It is lightness;" the Prakarana also says: "Lightness is a derived mpa. " Consequently, the dharma which has motion for its nature is the wind
65
element: its nature (lightness) is manifested by its act of motion.
What is the difference between the earth element, and earth, etc?
13a. In common usage, what is designated by the word "earth" is color and shape.
That is, when one sees earth, one sees its color and its shape. As is the case for the earth,
13b. The same for water and fire.
In common usage, that which one designates (by the word water or fire) is color and shape.
13c. Wind is either the wind element,
But the wind element is simply called "wind" in the world.
13d. Or else [color and shape].
66
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What is called "wind" in the world is also the wind element; in fact, one speaks of "black wind," or "circular wind. "
***
Why do all these dharmas, from visibles to avijnapti, receive the name rupa? Why do they together constitute the rupaskandha?
i. The Blessed One said: "Because it is incessantly broken, Oh
Bhiksus, one terms it rupa updddnaskandha. By what it is broken? It is 67
broken by contact with the hand. "
"To be broken" signifies "to be damaged," as stated in the 68
Arthavargtya stanza of the Ksudrakdgama (-Apphakavagga, i. 2): "If the pleasures are lacking in a person who ardently searches out these pleasures, such a person is broken, as a person pierced by an arrow is broken. " (Compare Mbh xiii. 193,48).
But how is rupa damaged?
By deteriorating, by being transformed.
ii. According to other masters, the quality that makes physical
matter rupa, namely rupana, is not cutting off, deterioration, but 69
rather impenetrability, impact or resistance, the obstacle th^t a rupa 70
opposes to its place being occupied by another rupa (see i. 43c-d). [iii. Objections. ]
1. If this is so, the rupa that constitutes an atom, a "monad," will not be rupa, for a monad, not susceptible to deterioration or resistance, is free from rupana.
Without doubt, a monad is devoid of rupana\ but a monad never
71
exists in an isolated state;
agglomerate, it is liable to deterioration and to resistance (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 390al).
2. Rupas of the past and the future are not rupa, for one cannot say that they are now in a state of resistance.
Without doubt, but they have been, and they shall be in this state. Whether past or future, they are of the same nature as the dhanna which is now in a state of resistance. In the same way indhana is not only (presently) kindled wood, but also (future) fuel.
in the state of agglomeration, being an
? 3. Avijnapti is not rupa, for it is devoid of resistance.
Without doubt, but one can justify the quality of rupa attributed to avijnapti:
a. Vijnapti, bodily or vocal action, from whence proceeds avijnapti, is rupa; thus avijnapti is rupa, as the shadow moves when the tree moves.
No. For avijtlapti is not subject to modifications; further, in order that the comparison be exact, the avijnapti should perish when the vijfiapti perishes, as is the case for the shadow and the tree.
b. Second explanation. Avijnapti is rupa, for the primary elements,
72
which constitute its point of support, are rupa
[Objection. ] According to this principle, the five sense conscious-
nesses would be rupa, for their point of support (the organ of sight, etc) is rupa.
This response is not valid. Avijnapti exists dependent upon the primary elements, as a shadow exists dependent on a tree, as the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the jewel. The visual consciousness is not dependent upon an organ which is solely the cause of its arising.
[Answer. ] That the shadow, or the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the tree, or on the jewel, is a hypothesis that does not conform to the principles of the Vaibhasikas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 63c22). The Vaibhasikas hold that each one of the atoms of color which constitute shade and brilliance, exists dependent upon a tetrad of primary elements. And even supposing that: 'The shadow is dependent upon the tree, since the shadow is dependent on the primary elements which are proper to it, and these are dependent upon the tree,"--the comparison to the shadow and avijnapti is
inadmissible. The Vaibhasikas admit that avijnapti does not perish when the primary elements which serve as its point of support perish (iv. 4c-d). Consequently your refutation ("This response is not valid. Avijnapti. . . ") is worthless.
But, we would say, one can refute the objection: "According to this principle, the five sense consciousnesses would be rupa"
In fact, the support of visual consciousness is twofold: 1. the organ
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of sight, which is in a state of "impact" (i. 29b), which is rUpa\ and 2. the mental organ (manas, i. 44c-d) which is not rupa.
Now the same does not hold for avijnapti whose point of support is exclusively rupa. Thus, from the fact that avijnapti is called rupa because its point of support is rupa, one cannot conclude that visual consciousness should be called rupa. Therefore, the second explanation is the right one.
*##
The organs and objects which have been defined as rupaskandha, I4a-b. These same organs and objects are regarded as ten
1 ayatanas, ten dhatus. *
Considered as ayatana, origin of the mind and of the mental states (i. 20), they are ten ayatanas: caksurayatana, rupayatana,. . . kdyaya- tana, sprastavyayatana.
Considered as dhdtu, a mine (i. 20), they are ten dhatus: caksur- dhdtu, rupadhdtu . . . kayadhatu, sprastavyadhdtu.
***
We have explained rupaskandha and how it is distributed into ayatanas and dhdtus. We must now explain the skandhas.
74 14c. Sensation is painful impression, etc.
Vedanaskandha is the threefold mode of feeling or experiencing sensation which is painful, pleasant, neither-painful-nor-pleasant. One should distinguish six classes of sensations: those which arise from the contact of the five material organs, the organ of sight, etc. , with their object; and those which arise from contact with the mental organ (ii. 7 and following).
75 14c-d Ideas consist of the grasping of characteristics.
The grasping of the diverse natures--perceiving that this is blue,
? yellow, long, short, male, female, friend, enemy, agreeable, disagree- able, etc. --is samjndskandha (see i. l6a). One can distinguish six types of samjfid, according to organ, as for sensation.
15a-b. Samkdraskandha are the samskaras different from the 76
The samskaras are everything that is conditioned (samskftajJa); but the name is reserved for those conditioned things which are not included in either the skandhas of rupa, vedana, or samjnd, explained above, or in the skandha of vijndna explained below (i. 16).
other four skandhas.
It is true that the Blessed One said in a Sutra, "The samskd- 77
raskandha is the six classes of volition;" but this definition excludes from samskaraskandha 1. ) all the viprayuktasamskdras (ii. 35), and 2. ) the samprayuktasamskaras (ii. 23b, 34), with the exception of volition itself. But the Sutra expresses itself thus by reason of the capital
78 definition the factor which creates future existence. Also the Blessed
importance of volition, which, being action by its nature,
One said, "The updddnaskandha called samskdra is so called because it
conditions conditioned things,"
determines the five skandhas of future existence.
79
that is to say, because it creates and 80
If we take the definition of the Sutra literally, we would then arrive at the conclusion that the mental dharmas, with the exception of volition, and all of the dharmas of the viprayukta class (ii. 35), do not form part of any skandha. They would thus not form part of the Truths of Suffering and Arising: one would not either know them, nor abandon them. Now the Blessed One said, "If there is a single dharma which is not known and penetrated, I declare that one cannot put an end to suffering" (vi. 33). And again "If there is a single dharma which is not abandoned . . . " (Samyukta TD 2, p. 55b7, b23). Thus the collection of mental states and viprayuktas is included within the samskaraskandha.
15b-d. These three skandhas\ with avijnapti and unconditioned things, are the dharmdyatana, the dharmadhdtu.
Vedanaskandha, samjndskandha, samskaraskandha, plus avijnapti
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(i. ll) and the three unconditioned things (i. 5b), are seven things which are called dharmdyatana or dharmadhdtu.
81 16a. Consciousness is the impression relative to each object.
Vijnanaskandha is the impression relative to each object, the "raw
82 83
of each object. Vijnanaskandha is six classes of con-
grasping"
sciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch, and mental consciousness.
Considered as dyatana (i. 20a), 16b. It is the mental organ.
Considered as dhdtu (i. 20a), 16c. It is seven dhdtus.
What are the seven?
16d. The six consciousnesses and the manas.
That is to say: the dhdtu of the eye or visual consciousness {caksurvijndnadhdtu), the dhdtu of the ear or auditory consciousness {srotravijnanadhatu), the dhdtu of the nose or olfactory consciousness {ghranavijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of tongue or taste consciousness (jihvdvijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of body or touch consciousness {kdyavijnanadhdtu), the dhdtu of mind or mental consciousness {manovijndnadhdtu), and the dhdtu of the mind (manodhdtu).
We have seen that there are five skandhas, twelve dyatanas, and eighteen dhdtus.
1. Rupaskandha is ten dyatanas, ten dhdtus, and avijnapti.
2. The dharmayatana, or dharmadhdtu is vedana, samjna and samskdrdskandha', avijnapti; and the unconditioned things.
3. Vijnanaskandha is the mana-dyatana\ it is seven dhdtus, namely the six classes of consciousness {vijndnakdya = vijndnadhdtu) and the mental organ.
Could a manas or manodhdtu be distinct from the six classes of consciousness, distina from the sense consciousness and from the mental consciousness?
84 There is no manas distina from the consciousness.
? 17a-b. Of these six consciousness, the one which continually
85 passes away, is the manas.
All consciousness which has just perished receives the name of manodhatu; in the same way, a man is both son and father, the same vegetable element is both fruit and seed.
[Objection. ] If the six consciousnesses which make up six dhatus constitute the manas, and if the manas is not a thing other than the six consciousnesses, then there would be either seventeen dhatus,--by excluding the manas which is co-functional with the six conscious- nesses,--or else twelve dhatus, by excluding the six consciousnesses which are co-functional with the manas,--supposing of course that you want to enumerate distinct things and not mere designations.
This is true; but
17c-d. One counts eighteen dhatus with a view to assigning a point of support to the sixth consciousness.
The first five consciousnesses have>>for their point of support the five material organs, organ of sight, etc. (see i. 44c-d); but the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, does not have such a point of support. Consequently, with a view to attributing a point of support to this consciousness, one calls manas or manodhatu, or again mana- ayatana and mana-indriya, that which serves it as its point of support, that is to say, any one of the six consciousnesses which depend on these six points of support, and six objects.
[Objection. ] If the consciousness or mind is called manas when, having perished, it is the point of support of another consciousness, the last mind of an Arhat will not be a manas, for it is not followed by a mind of which it would be the immediately antecedent cause and point of support (i. 44c-d).
This last mind has indeed the nature of manas, the nature of being a point of support. If it is not followed by a new mind, namely the consciousness-of-conception of a new existence (punarbhava), this is not related to its nature; rather, this results from the absence of other causes, actions and defilements, necessary to the production of a new thought.
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***
All conditioned dharmas are included within the totality of the skandhas (i. 7); all of the impure dharmas are included within the totality of the updddnaskandhas (i. 8); and all the dharmas are included within the totality of the dyatanas and the dhatus (i. 14). But, more briefly,
18a-b. All the dharmas are included in one skandha, one 86
dyatana, and one dhdtu.
In rupaskandha, mana-dyatana and dharmadhdtu.
87 18c. A dharma is included in its own nature.
Not in another nature. Why is this?
18d. For it is distinct from the nature of others.
A dharma is not included {samgraha) in that from which it is distinct. For example, the organ of sight is included within the rupaskandha, being rupa by its nature; within the caksurdyatana and within the caksurdhdtu, for it is the caksurayatana and caksurdhdtu\ within the Truth of Suffering and Arising, for it is suffering and arising; but it is not included within the other skandhas, ayatanas, etc. , for it is distinct by its nature from that which is not itself.
Without doubt the assemblies are won over by alms-giving and 88
other samgrahavastus: there is therefore samgraha of one thing by a thing different from it.
But the samgraha is occasional and as a consequence, not real, but conventional.
But, there are two organs of sight, of hearing, and of smell; consequently one should count twenty-one dhatus.
19a-c. The organs of sight, of hearing, and of smell, although twofold, form only, in pairs, one dhdtu, for their nature, their sphere of activity, and their consciousnesses are common.
The two organs of sight have a community of nature, for they
? are--both of them--the organ of sight; community of sphere, for they both have visible matter for their sphere; and community of con- sciousness, for they are both the point of support of the visual consciousness.
Consequently the two organs of sight form a single dhdtu.
The same holds for the organs of hearing and smell. 19d. It is for beauty's sake that they are twofold
Although they form only one dhdtu, these organs are produced in pairs, with a view to the beauty of the body. With but a single eye, a
89
What is the meaning of the terms skandha, dyatana, and dhdtu? 20a-b. Skandha signifies "heap," dyatana signifies "gate of
entry," "gate of arising," and dhdtu signifies "lineage. "
i. In the Sutra, skandha signifies "heap:" "Whatever rupa there is,
past, present, or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or
single ear, or a single nostril, one would be very ugly (ii. la; i. 43, 30).
***
excellent, far or near, if one puts together all this rilpa, that which is 90
past, etc. , one has that which is called rupaskandha"
[According to the Vaibhasikas,] (1) past rupa is rupa destroyed by
91
impermanence, future rupa is rupa which has not arisen, and present
rupa is rilpa which has arisen and which has not been destroyed; (2) rupa is internal when it forms part of the series called "me" (i. 39); all other rupa is external; or rather the terms internal and external are understood from the point of view of dyatana: the organ of sight is internal because it forms part of my series or of the series of another; (3) rilpa is gross when it offers resistance; or rather these two designations are relative and not absolute.
Should one say that, in this second hypothesis, the gross and the subtle are not proven, since the same rilpa is gross or subtle according to whether one compares it to a rupa more subtle or gross?
This objection is invalid, for terms of comparison do not vary:
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when a rupa is gross in relation to another rupa, it is not subtle in relation to this same other rupa: like father and son.
(5) past and future rupa are distant; present rupa is near.
The same for the other skandhas, with this difference: gross consciousness is that which has for its point of support the five organs; subtle consciousness is the mental consciousness; or rather conscious- ness is gross or subtle according to whether it belongs to a stage which
is inferior or superior.
According to the Bhadanta, (1) gross rupa is that which is
perceived by the five organs; all other rupa is subtle; (2) "inferior" signifies "unpleasant," "excellent" signifies "pleasant;" (3) distant rupa is that which is found in an invisible place; near rupa is that which is found in a visible place.
[The explanation of the Vaibhasikas is bad, for] past rupa, etc. , has already been designated by its name. The same for sensation; it is far or near according to whether its point of support is visible or invisible; it is gross or subtle according to whether it is corporeal or mental (ii. 7).
ii. ayatana signifies "gate of entry or of arising of the mind and of
the mental states" (cittacaitta, ii. 23). Etymologically, ayatana is that
place, the mountain, where there are many "families" of gems,--iron, copper, silver, gold,--is said "to have numerous dhdtus" in this same way in the human complex or series, there are eighteen types of "families" which are called the eighteen dhdtus.
96
(4) Inferior rupa is defiled rupa\ excellent rupa is non-defiled rupa; 92
93
which extends (tanvanti) the entry (aya) of the mind and of the 94
mental states.
iii. Dhdtu signifies gotra, race, lineage. In the same way that the
Gotra is thus a mine.
Of what are the other dhdtus the mine?
95
Of what is the organ of the eye the mine?
The dhdtus are the mine of their own species: the eye, being a "cause similar to its effect" (sabhdgahetu, ii. 52) of the later moments of the existence of the eye, is the mine, the dhdtu of the eye.
But then unconditioned things, which are eternal, cannot be considered as dhdtu?
Let us say that they are the mine of the mind and mental states.
? According to another opinion, dhdtu signifies species. The specific nature of the eighteen dhdtus is what is understood by the eighteen dhdtus.
97
iv. [Objections. ]1. Ifskandhasignifies"heap,"theskandhashave
only a nominal existence, not a real existence, for collections are not a
9 thing: for example a pile of wheat, or the pudgala. *
"No, [reply the Vaibhasikas,] for an atom is a skandha.
As an atom in this hypothesis cannot have the quality of being a heap, do not say that skandha signifies "heap. "
2. According to another opinion (Vibhdsd TD 27, p. 407c9), 10
skandha signifies "that which bears the burden, namely its effect. " ? 101
Or else skandha signifies "part, section," as one says in the world, "I
will lend you three skandhas, if you promise to return them to me. " 103
These two explanations are not in conformity with the Sutra. The Sutra, in fact, attributes the sense of heap to skandha and no other sense:"Whateverrupathereis,past,present,orfuture,. . . ifoneputs together all this rupa . . . "
3. [The Vaibhasikas say: The Sutra teaches that] all rupa,--past rupa, future rupa, etc. ,--is, individually, called skandha, the same way that it teaches that hair, etc. , is earth-element (below, note 120); thus each "real" (atomic) element of past rupa, future rupa, etc. , receives the name of skandha. Thus the skandhas have real existence and not merely nominal existence.
This interpretation is inadmissible, for the Sutra says ". . . if one puts together all this rupa,. . . one has that which is called
y rupaskandha!
4. [The Sautrantikas:] If this is the case, then the material dyatanas,--the organs and objects of the five sense consciousnesses,-- have only a nominal existence, for the quality of being a "gate of arising of the mind or mental states" does not belong to atoms taken one by one, which are solely real, but to collections of atoms which constitute an organ of sight, a visible object, etc.
[Answer:] No, since each of these atoms individually possesses the quality of being "a gate of the arising of the mind," of being the cause of consciousness (compare i. 44a-b. iii). If you do not accept this
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doctrine, you will refuse to the organ, in its totality, the quality of being a cause of consciousness, for it does not produce a consciousness by itself, without the cooperation of an object.
5. On the other hand, the Vibhasa (TD 27, p. 384al8) expresses 104
itself thus: "When the Abhidharmikas take into consideration the fact that the term skandha is only the denomination of a heap, they say that an atom is part of a dhdtu, an ayatana, and a skandha\ when they do not take this fact into consideration, they say that an atom is a
105
dhatu, an ayatana, a skandha" In fact, one metaphorically designates
the part by the whole; for example, "The robe is burned," for "One part of the robe is burned"
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Why did the Blessed One give skandhas, ayatanas and dhdtus as the triple designation of the dharmasl
20c-d. The teachings of the skandhas, etc. , because error, 106
1. Error is threefold: the first catagory of persons go astray by considering mental phenomena as together constituting a self; the second are similarly mistaken with respea to the material elements; and the third similarly err with respect to both the mental and the material elements.
2. The moral faculties (ii. 3c-d), the faculty of speculative conscious- ness (prajnendriya, ii. 24d), are of three catagories, sharp, mediocre, dull.
3. Joy is threefold: the first category of persons apply themselves to that which is said in brief; the second to that which is said normally; the third to that which is said at great length.
The teaching of the skandhas addresses itself to the first category of hearers, to those who are mistaken with respea to mental phenomena, who are of sharp faculties, and who are fond of a brief teaching; the teaching of the ayatanas addresses itself to the second
faculty, joy are threefold.
? category, and the teaching of the dhatus addresses itself to the third 107
category.
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Sensation and ideas each constitute a seperate skandha: all the other mental dharmas (ii. 24) are placed within the samskdraskandha (i. 15). Why is this?
21. The two mental states, sensation and ideas, are defined as
distinct skandfoas because they are the causes of the roots of
dispute, because they are the causes of transmigration, and also
by reason of the causes which justify the order of skandhas. 108
(i. 22b)
109
1. There are two roots of dispute: attachment to pleasure, and
attachment to opinions. Sensation and ideas are, respectfully, the principal causes of these two roots. In faa, if one becomes attached to pleasures, it is because one relishes the sensation; if one becomes attached to opinions, it is by reason of erroneous or false ideas (viparftasamjnd, v. 9)
2. Sensation and ideas are the causes of transmigration: those who are greedy for sensation and whose ideas are erroneous transmigrate.
3. The reasons which justify the order of the skandhas will be explained below (i. 22b-d).
***
Why do unconditioned things, which form part of the dharma- yatana and the dharmadhatu (i. l5d), not form part of the skandhas!
22a-b Unconditioned things are not named with respect to the
uo
1. Unconditioned things cannot be placed within any of the five skandhas, for they are not matter, nor sensation . . .
skandhas, because they do not correspond to the concept.
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2. One cannot make a sixth skandha of the unconditioned: it does not correspond to the concept of skandha, since skandha signifies "heap," "capable of being put together. " One cannot say of the unconditioned what the Sutra says of matter: "If one puts together all this unconditioned, that which is past . . . , one has that which one calls the a asamskrtaskandha" for the distinctions of past, etc. , do not exist with respect to unconditioned things.
3. Furthermore, the expression upddanaskandha (i. 8a) designates the totality of that which is the cause of defilements; the expression skandha designates the totality of that which is the cause of defilement (impure conditioned things) as well as the cause of purification (pure conditioned things: the Path). Thus unconditioned things, which are neither the cause of defilement, nor the cause of purification, cannot be placed either among the upddanaskandhas nor among the skandhas.
4. According to one opinion, the same way that the end of a jug is not a jug, in this same way unconditioned things, which are the end or cessation of the skandhas, are not skandhas (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 385bl8). And so according to this reasoning unconditioned things will be neither ayatanas nor dhdtus.
***
We have defined the skandhas. We should now explain the order in which the skandhas are enumerated.
22b-d. The order of the skandhas is justified by their grossness, their defilement, the characteristic of the jug, etc. , and also from
m
1. Matter, being subject to resistance (i. 29b), is the grossest of the skandhas. Among the non-material skandhas, sensation is the grossest, by reason of the grossness of its functioning: in fact, one localizes sensation in the hand, in the foot, etc. Ideas are grosser than the last two skandhas. The samskaraskandha is grosser that the skandha of consciousness. The skandhas are thus arranged in order of their diminishing grossness.
the point of view of their spheres of influence.
? 2. In the course of external transmigration, men and women are mutually infatuated by their bodies (rupas) because they are attached to the pleasures of sensation (vedand). This attachment proceeds from erroneous ideas {samjnviparydsa), which are due to the defilements which are samskdras. And it is the mind (citta) which is defiled by the defilements. The skandhas are thus arranged according to the process of their defilement.
3. Matter is the pot, sensation is the food, ideas are the seasoning, the samskdras are the cook, and the mind is the consumer. We have a third reason for the order of the skandhas.
4. Finally, in considering the skandhas on the one hand, and the dhdtus or spheres of existence (ii. 14) on the other, one sees that Kamadhatu is characterized by matter, namely by the five objects of sense enjoyment (kdmaguna: Dharmaskandha, 5. 15, Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 376all: compare Kathdvatthu, viii. 3). Rupadhatu, that is to say the Four Dhyanas, is characterized by sensation (organs of pleasure, satisfaction, and indifference, viii. 12). The first three stages of Arupya- dhatu are characterized by ideas: ideas of infinite space, etc. (viii. 4). The fourth stage of Arupyadhatu, or the summit of existence, is characterized by volition, the samskdra par excellence, which there
creates an existence of twenty-four thousand cosmic ages (iii. 81c). Finally, these diverse stages are the "abodes of consciousness'* (vijnd- nasathiti, iii. 6): it is in these places that the mind resides. The first four skandhas constitute the field; the fifth constitutes the seed.
There are thus five skandhas, no more, no less. One sees how the reasons which justify the order of the skandhas also justify the doctrine that makes sensation and ideas seperate skandhas: they are grosser than the other samskdras; they are the cause of the process of defilement; they are the food and the seasoning; and they reign over the two spheres of existence.
***
One should now explain the order in which the six ayatanas or dhdtus which are the six organs of consciousness, the organ of sight,
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etc. , are enumerated: an order the function of which is to arrange the objects {visaya) and the consciousnesses which correspond to these organs (rupadhdtu, caksurvijndnadhdtu . . . )
23a. The first five are the first because their object is present.
Five, beginning with the organ of sight, are called the first, because they bear only on present, simultaneous objects. Conversely, the object of the mental organ can be either (1) simultaneous to this organ; (2) earlier or past; (3) later or future; (4) tritemporal, that is to say simultaneous, earlier and later; or (5) beyond time.
23b. The first four are the first because their object is solely derived or secondary matter.
The organs of sight, of hearing, of smell and of taste do not attain to the primary elements (i. 12), but solely to matter which derives from the primary elements {bhautika, ii. 50a, 65).
The object of touch is not constant (i. 35a-b, lOd): sometimes primary elements, sometimes derived matter, sometimes both at the same time.
23c. These four are arranged according to the range and speed of their activity.
Their activity is at a distance, at a greater distance, very rapid
The organ of sight and the organ of hearing bear on a distant object (i. 43c-d). They are thus named first.
The organ of sight bears on objects at a greater distance than does the organ of hearing: for one can see a river of which one cannot make out the sound. The organ of sight is thus named before the organ of hearing.
Neither odor nor taste are perceived at a distance. But the activity of smell is more rapid than that of taste. The organ of smell perceives the odor of food before the organ of taste perceives its taste.
23d. Or rather the organs are arranged according to their position.
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