' Sacrificate sacrificium justitise,' quasi
quibusdam quserentibus, quie sunt
justitise opera subjungit: * Multi di-
cunt: quia ostendit nobis bona ?
quibusdam quserentibus, quie sunt
justitise opera subjungit: * Multi di-
cunt: quia ostendit nobis bona ?
Thomas Carlyle
de pa.
po.
pertotum ('Cod.
,' viii.
47).
Hoc autem certum est, quod ipse Dcus
per se a principio exercuit jurisdic-
tionem, ut no. S. De foro comp. licet.
(' Dec. ,' ii. 2, 10). Item per electionem
potorunt habere principes, sicut ha-
buerunt Saul et multos alios, viii. Q. 1,
licet. . . . Sic ergo audactor (Gratian,
'Decretum,' C. viii. 1, 15, 18) et in
pluribus aliis c. predicta, inquam(? )
Sic dominia, possessiones et jurisdic-
tiones licite sine peccato possunt esse
apud infideles. Hsec enim non tantum
pro fidelibus sed pro omni rationabili
creatura facta sunt, ut est predictum ;
' Ipse enim solem suum oriri facit
super bonos et malos '; ' Ipse otiam
volatilia pascit,' Mattei c. v. circa fi.
et. vi. Et propter hoc dicimus, non
licet Papse vel fidelibus auferro sua
sive dominia, sive jurisdictiones infi-
delibus, quia sine peccato possident.
Sed bene tamen credimus, quod Papa
qui est vicarius Jesu Christi, potes-
tatem habet non tam super Chris -
tianos, sed etiam super omnes in
fideles. "
* St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' 2. 2, 10, 10 : " Rospondeo
dicendum, quod circa hoc dupliciter
loqui possumus. Uno modo de dominio
vel prelatione infidelium super fideles
de novo instituenda; et hoc nullo
modo permitti debet, cederet enim
hoc in scandalum et in periculum fidei.
. . . Alio modo possumus loqui de
? ? dominio, vel prelatione jam pre-exis-
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. HL] NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE STATE. 35
It is therefore clear that in the judgment of all the writers
on political theory in the thirteenth century there is no doubt
whatever that the end and purpose of the State is a moral
one--that is, the maintenance of justice, or, in the terms
derived from Aristotle, the setting forward of the life accord-
ing to virtue, and that the authority of the State is limited
by its end--that is, by justice, and that it is derived from God
Himself.
ex gratia, non tollit jus humanum,
quod est ex naturali ratione; ideo
distinctio fidelium et infidelium secun-
dum ee considerata non tollit domi-
nium et prelationem supra fideles.
Potest tamen juste per sententiam vel
ordinationem ecclesiio auctoritatem Dei
habentis tale jus dominii vel prelationis
tolli; quia infideles merito suse in-
fidelitatis merentur potestatem amit-
tere super fideles, qui transferuntur
in filios Dei. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 36
CHAPTER IV.
THE NATURE OF LAW.
We have in the last chapter endeavoured to set out our
confident judgment that to the Middle Ages it was clear
that the nature and purpose of the State was a moral one,
that it came from God, and that its function was to maintain
and set forward justice. This may at first sight seem a con-
ception which, however important, is somewhat abstract, and
therefore, in order to appreciate its full significance, we must
go on to observe that both to the thinkers and to the practical
men of the Middle Ages justice had a definite and concrete
embodiment in the law.
We shall have occasion presently to consider the beginnings
of the theory of what is called sovereignty, but it is impossible
to understand the political ideas of the people of the Middle
Ages at all, if we do not begin by understanding that to them
there was only one supreme authority in the State, and that
was not the ruler, whether king or emperor, but only the law.
Behind the law of the State there was, indeed, a more august
law still, the law of nature or of God, to which the law of the
State was subordinate. But within the State, and subject
always to this higher authority, the law was supreme.
We may, indeed, say that it was the characteristic defect
of mediseval civilisation that it was, if anything, too legal;
but as the men of that time saw it, it was the majestic fabric
of the law which stood between them and anarchy, the anarchy
of mere disorder, or the anarchy of a capricious tyranny.
To them liberty, true liberty, was not something contrary to
law, but rather was to be found in law itself. We have in
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. IV. ]
37
THE NATURE OF LAW.
previous volumes endeavoured to set out something of all
this, and we have seen that in this matter there was no differ-
ence between the political writers of the ninth century and of
the eleventh and twelfth, between Feudalists and Civilians ; 1
but we may here recall a few of their most significant sayings.
Let the king, says Bracton, recognise in the law that
same authority which the law gives to him, for there is no
king where mere will rules and not the law. The Lord or the
Lady is only Lord of law (or right), they have no authority
to do wrong ; such is the doctrine of the Assizes of the king-
dom of Jerusalem. 2 The Bologna Civilians are only express-
ing the same judgment in more general terms when Azo says
of justice that it is the mind or will of God which is in all
things right and just, and when the author of the ' Prague
Fragment' says that the law flows from justice as a stream
from its source. 3
Before, however, we deal with the questions related to these
principles, we must in this chapter consider the systematic
treatment of the nature of law in its largest sense by St
Thomas Aquinas, so far, that is, as it is related to our
subject.
There are two very important sections of the ' Suinma
Theologica ' in which he considers this: in the first he con-
siders it in relation to reason, in the second he deals with it
in relation to justice. He begins his discussion by considering
1 Cf. vol. i. chaps. 18 and 19; vol.
ii. part i. chap. 2; vol. iii. part i.
chap. 2 ; vol. iii. part ii. chap. 6.
9 Bracton, ' De Legibus,' i. 8, 6:
" Attribuat igitur rex legi, quod lex
attribuit ei, videlicet, dominationem
et potestatem, non est enim rex ubi
dominatur voluntas, et non lex " (cf.
vol. iii. p. 38).
Assizes of Jerusalem, ' Assises de
la Cour des Bourgeois,' xxvi. : " Oar
la dame ne le aire n'en est seigneur
so non dou dreit . . . mais bien sachies
qu'il n'est mie seigneur de faire tort"
(cf. vol. iii. p. 33).
3 Azo, ' Summa Institutionum,' i. 1:
" Quasi dice ret, iustitia est Dei dis-
positio quse in omnibus rebus recte
consistit et juste disponit: ipse retri-
buit unicuique secundum opora sua,
ipse non variabilis, ipse non est tem-
poralis in dispensationibus vel volun-
tatibus suis : immo ejus voluntas est
constans et perpetua : ipse enim non
habuit principium nee habet vel habebit
finem. "
' Fragmentum Pragense,' iii. 9:
" Set quia in justitia jus initia habet,
et ex ea quasi rivulus ex fonte manat,
ideo eam anteponit. "
Cf. vol. ii. p. 11, note 1, and p. 13,
note 2.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 38
[PABT L.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
the relation of law to reason, and maintains that the proper
character of law is to command and to forbid; but to com-
mand belongs to reason, therefore law is a thing related to
reason. It is reason which directs things to their end. 1
Having thus set out the general nature of law, he goes on
to discuss it under four terms--the eternal law, the natural
law, the divine law, and human law. St Thomas deals first
with the eternal law. It is manifest, he says, that the whole
universe is governed by the divine reason, and therefore this
"ratio gubernationis " has the character of law; the end
of the divine government is God Himself, and His law is not
other than Himself. 2
The natural law is different from but related to this. All
things which are subject to the divine providence are indeed
controlled by the eternal law, but the rational creature is
subject to the divine providence in a more excellent way,
for it partakes in the work of providence, it " provides " for
itself and others, and this participation of the rational creature
in the eternal law is called natural law. The light of natural
reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil,
belongs to the natural law; it is nothing else than the im-
1 St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' i. 2, 90, 1: " Sad contra
est quod ad legem pertinet prsecipere
et prohibere : sed imperare est rationis,
ut supra habitum est (Q. xvii. I) ergo
lex est aliquid rationis. . . . Regula
autem et mensura humanorum actuum
est ratio, quse est principium primum
actuum humanorum, ut ex pradictis
patet (Q. 66, 1). Rationis enim est
ordinare ad finem, qui est primum
principium in agendis, secundum phi-
loeoph. (' Lib. ,' vii. , ' Ethic. ,' c. 8).
In unoquoque autem genere in quod
est principium, est mensura, et regula
illius generis : sicut unitas in genere
numeri est motus primus in genere
motuum. Inde relinquitur quod lex
sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem. "
* Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 1: " Responded
dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum
est (i. e. , Q. 90) nihil est aliud lex,
quam dictamen practicse rationis in
principe, qui gubernat aliquam com-
munitatem perfectam. Manifestum est
autem, supposito quod mundus divina
providentia regatur, ut in I. habitum
est (i. 22, 1 and 2) quod tota com-
munitas universi gubernatur ratione
divina; et ideo ipsa ratio guberna-
tionis re rum in Deo, sicut in principe
universitatis existens, legis habet ratio-
nem ; et quia divina ratio nihil con-
cipit ex tempore, sed habet seternum
conceptum, ut dicitur Prov. viii. , inde
est, quod hujusmodi legem oportet
dice re ai tern am. . . . Ad tertium dicen-
dum, quod lex importat ordinem ad
finem active . . . sed finis divinse
gubernationis est ipse Deus ; nee ejus
lex est aliud ab ipso, inde lex seterna
? ? non ordinatur in alium finem. "
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. IV. ]
39
THE NATURE OF LAW.
pression of the divine light in us. The natural law is, there-
fore, the participation of the rational creature in the eternal
law. 1 St Thomas was indeed aware of the fact that the term
natural law had been and might be used in more than one
sense,2 but his own conception is perfectly clear.
In order, however, to understand the full significance of
this conception, we must observe another distinction of great
importance, which St Thomas makes in another place--that
is, the distinction between natural law and positive law, a
distinction which applies both to human and divine law.
Men can, by a common agreement, establish a law as just,
in matters otherwise indifferent, so long as it is not contrary
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 2: " Inde cum
omnia, quse divinse providentise sub-
duntur, a lege eterna regulentur et
mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet, mani-
festum est, quod omnia participant
aliqualiter legem eternam ; in quantum
scilicet, ex impressione ejus habent
inclinationes in proprios actus et fines.
Inter csetera autem, rationalis creatura
eccellentiore quodam modo divinse
providentise subjacet, in quantum et
ipsa fit providentise particips, sibi ipsi
et aliis providens: unde et in ipsa
participator ratio eterna per quam
habet naturalem inclinationem ad
debitum actum et Qnem: et talis
participatio legis setenue in rationali
creatura lex naturalis dicitur : unde
quam pesimista dixisset (Ps. iv. ).
' Sacrificate sacrificium justitise,' quasi
quibusdam quserentibus, quie sunt
justitise opera subjungit: * Multi di-
cunt: quia ostendit nobis bona ? '
Cui queetioni respondene, dicit, ' Signa-
tum est super nos lumen vultus tui,
Domine. '* Quasi lumen rationis natu-
ralis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum,
et quid malum, quod pertinet ad
naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam
impressio divini luminis in nobis:
unde patet, quod lex naturalis nihil
aliud est, quam participatio legis eternse
in rationali creatura. "
Cf. the treatment of Natural Law
by the Canonists, vol. ii. part ii.
chap. iii.
2 Id. id. , 1. 2, 94, 2 : " Inest, enim,
primo inclinatio homini ad bonum
secundum naturam, in qua communicat
omnibus substantiis; prout scilicet,
qselibet substantia appetit conserva-
tionem sui esse secundum suam na-
turam, et secundum hanc inclinationem,
pertinent ad legem naturalem ea, per
quse vita hominis conservatur, et con-
trarium impeditur. Sec undo, inest
homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis
specialia secundum naturam, in qua
communicat cum ceteris animalibus:
et secundum hoo dicuntur ea esse de
legi naturali, quse natura omnia ani-
malia docuit; ut est commixtio maris
et fcenrinse, educatio et liberorum et
similia. Tertio modo inest homini
? ? inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 40
[FAST I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
to natural justice, and this is positive law ; and there is a
positive divine law as well as a natural. 1
The term Divine law is used by St Thomas to describe
that twofold law of God which is revealed in the Old and
New Testaments. It was needed for various reasons, because
the final end of man is beyond human reason, because of the
uncertainty of men's judgments, because human law can
only deal with the external actions of men, because human
law cannot prohibit or punish all evil actions, lest it should
do more harm than good. The divine law does not indeed
contradict or annul the natural law, but it was added that
men might participate in the " eternal law" in a higher
manner. 2
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 57, 2 : "Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas humana ex
communi condicto potest aliquid face re
justum in his, qusi secundum se non
habent aliquam repugnantiam ad natu-
ralem justitiam : et in his habet locum
jus positivum: undo Philos dicit in
T. Ethic (cap. 7) quod ' legale justum
est, quod ex principio nihil differt sic
vel alitor; quando autem ponitur
differt. ' Sed si aliquid de se repug-
nantiam habeat ad jus naturale, non
potest voluntate humana fieri justum ;
puta si statuatur, quod liceat furari,
vel adulterium committere; unde
dicitur Isa. 10. ' Vbs qui condunt
leges iniquss. '
Ad tertium dicendum, quod jus
divinum dicitur, quod divinitus pro-
mulgatur : et hoc quidem partim est
de his, quse sunt naturalitcr justa, sed
tamen eorum justitia homines latet;
partim autem de his qus? fiunt justa
institutione divina; unde etiam jus
divinum per haec duo distingui potest,
sicut et jus humanum: sunt enim
in lege divina qusdam prsecepta quia
bona ; et prohibita quia mala: quse-
dam vero bona quia precepta, et mala
quia prohibita. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, S1, 4: " Bespondeo
dicendum, quod prsetcr legem natu-
ralem, et legem humanam, necessarium
fuit ad directionem humanse viti
o
habere legem divinum. Et hoc propter
quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia
per legem dirigitur homo ad actus
proprios in ordine ad ultimum finem :
. . . sed quia homo ordinatur ad finem
beatitudmis seternse, quse exoedit pro-
portionem naturalis facultatis humanse
. . . ideo neoessarium fuit, ut supra
legem naturalem et humanam, diri-
geretur etiam ad sum finem lege divi-
nitus data. Secundo, quia propter
incertitudinem humani iudicii . . .
contingit de actibus humanis diverso-
rum esse diversa iudicia ex quibus
etiam diversse ct contrarise leges pro-
oedunt . . . necessarium fuit, ut in
actibus propriis dirigeretur per legem
divinitus datum, de qua constat, quod
? ? non potest errare. Tertio, quia de his
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? ChAF. IV. ]
41
THE NATURE OF LAW.
Human law is described by St Thomas in another article
of the same question under the terms of its relation to reason.
Law is a command of the practical reason, for the human
reason must draw out and apply to particular circumstances
the general precepts of the natural law. 1 St Thomas, however,
also points out that this general conception of the nature of
human law requires a further analysis. The term human law
includes two different kinds of law, the " ius gentium " and
the "ius civile. " The first is derived from the natural
law, as conclusions are derived from premisses, and forms
that body of laws without which men could not live together.
The second is derived from the natural law, " per modum
particularis determinationis," and is that which any State
establishes as being suitable to its own conditions. 2
Law, then, in all its forms is the expression of reason, but
it is also, in the judgment of St Thomas, the expression of
justice, and we must briefly consider this. He accepts the
definition of justice, given by Ulpian in the ' Digest,' " Justitia
est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi "
quod est necessarium ad conservationcm
humanam; ut ergo nullum malum
improhibitum, et impunitum remaneat,
neceesarium fuit supervenire legem
divinam, per quss omnia pecoata pro-
bibentur .
Ad prinum ergo dicendum, quod per
naturulcm legem partioipatur lex
seterna secundem proportionem capaci-
taiis humane nature: sed oportet,
ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in
ultimum finem supernaturalem; et
ideo superadditur lex divinitus data,
per quam lex eterna participatur altiori
modo. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 3 : " Kespondeo
dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum
est lex est quod dam dictamen practicse
rationis . . . ita etiam ex praceptis
legis naturalibus, quasi ex quibusdam
principiis communibus, et indemonstra-
bilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana
procedat ad aliqua magia partiru-
lariter diaponenda: et istae particu-
lars dispositiones adinventse secundum
rationem humanam dicuntur leges
humanse. "
" Id. id. , 1. 2, 95, 4 : " Est enim
primo de ratione legis humanse, quod
sit derivata a lego naturse, ut ex dictis
patet (Art. ii. , hujus Q. ); et secundum
hoc dividitur jus positivum, in jus
gentium et jus civile, secundum duos
modos, quibus aliquid derivatur a lege
nature, ut supra dictum est: nam
ad jus gentium pertinent ea quse
derivantur ex lego natura? , sicut con-
clusiones ex principiis: ut justrc
emptiones, veuditiones et alia hujus-
modi, sine quibus homines ad invicem
convivere non possent: quod est de
lege nature : quia homo est naturaliter
animae sociabile, ut probatur in I.
Polit. (c. 2): quse vero derivantur
a lege nature per modum particularis
determinationis, pertinent ad jus civile,
secundum quod qusslibet civitaa aliquid
? ? sibi aocommode determinat. "
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 42 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. [PART ?
('Dig. ,'i. 10) if it is properly understood. 1 Inalater "Quaestio"
indeed, he discusses the various parts or aspects of justice,
and accepts the Aristotelian distinction between " distribu-
tive " and " commutative " justice. 2 It does not, however,
appear that in St Thomas' judgment this interferes with the
general truth of Ulpian's definition.
The whole system of law, and here St Thomas uses the
word "jus," is so called, according to St Isidore, because
it is just (justum), and the just and "jus " are the " objec-
tion " of justice,3 and St Thomas gives his considered and
emphatic assent. *
He therefore goes on to describe " judicium," which is
the action of the judge, as being the definition or determina-
tion of that which is just or lawful, and this belongs to justice ;
this is what Aristotle meant when he said that men go to the
judge as to a living justice. 5 Perhaps the most emphatic
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 58, 1 : "Ad Primum
sic prooeditur. Videtur quod incon-
venienter definiatur a jurisperitis,
quod justitia est ' perpetua et constans
voluntas jus suum uniouique tri-
buendi' . . . Respondeo dicendum,
quod predicta justitise definitio con-
veniens est, si recto intelligatur . . .
et si quia vellet eam in debitam formam
definitionis reducere, posset sic dicere,
quod justitia est habitus, secundum
quem aliquis constant! et perpetua
voluntate jus suum unicuique tribuit;
et quasi est eadem definitio cum ea,
quam Philos ponit in v. Ethic (cap. v. )
dicens, ' Quod justia est habitus,
secundum quem aliquis dicitur opera-
tivus, secundum electionem justi. ' "
* Id. id. , 2. 2, 61, 1: " Sed contra
est quod Philos in v. Ethic (c. 2) ponit
duas partes justitise, et dicit, quod
una est directiva in distributionibus,
alia in commutationibus.
Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut
dictum est, justitia particularis ordina-
tur ad aliquam privatam personam :
quio comparatur ad communitatem,
sicut pars ad totum: potest autem
ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi:
unus quidem partis ad partem ; qui
similis est ordo unius privatse personse
ad aliam; et hunc ordinem dirigit
commutative justitia, quse consistit
in his quse mutuo fiunt inter duas
personas ad invicem; alius ordo
attenditur totius ad partes: et huio
ordini assimilatur ejus quod est com-
mune ad singular personas: quem
quidem ordinem dirigit justitia dis-
tributiva, quse est distributiva com-
munium secundum proportionalitatem :
et ideo duse sunt justitise species:
scilicet -. distributiva, et commutativa. "
s Id. id. , 2. 2, 57, 1: "Sed contra
est quod laid. : dicit in eodem libro
(' Etym. ,' v. 3), quod jus dictum est
quia est justum: sed justum est
objectum justitise: dicit enim Philos
in v. Ethic (cap. i. ) quod ' omnes
talem habitum volunt dicere justum
a quo operativi justorum sunt'; ergo
jus est objectum justitise. "
? ? 4 Id. id. id. , Resp.
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. IV. ]
43
THE NATURE OF LAW.
assertion by St Thomas of the relation between law and
justice may be found in another " Article " of the same " Ques-
tion," where he asks whether the judgment of the judge must
always be in accordance with the law. He decides that
while normally this must be so, this will only hold if the
law is just. Laws which are contrary to the natural law
are unjust, and have no force. It may even happen that laws
which are in themselves right may not be adequate to certain
cases, and would, in such cases, be contrary to the natural
law. In such circumstances men must not judge according
to the letter of the law, but must recur to that equity which
the legislator desired to attain. 1
est: judex autem dicitur, quasi jus
dicens : jus autem est objectum justi-
tise, ut supra babitum est: et ideo
judicium importat, secundum prim am
nominis impositionem, definitionem vel
determinationem justi, sive juris:
quod autem aliquis bene defmiat
aliquid in operibus virtuosis, proprie
procedit ex habitu virtutis: sicut
cast us recto determinat ea, quse perti-
nent ad cartitatem ; et ideo judicium,
quod importat rectum determinationem
ejus, quod est justum, proprie pertinet
ad justitiam: propter quod Philos, in
v. Ethic (cap. 4) dicit, quod homines
ad judicem confugiunt, sicut ad quan-
dam justitiam animatam. "
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 60, 5: " Respondeo
dicendum, quod sicut diotum est,
judicium nihil aliud est quam qusedam
definitio, vel determinatio ejus quod
justum est: fit autem aliquid justum
dupliciter, uno modo ex ipsa natura
rei quod dicitur jus naturale: alio
modo ex quodam condicto inter ho-
mines ; quod dicitur jus positivum
ut supra habitum est (Q. 57, 2): leges
autem scribuntur ad utriusque juris
declarationem : alitor tamon, et alitor :
nam legis scriptura jus quidem natu-
rale continet, sed non instituit: non
enim - ha bet robin- ex lege, sed ex
natura : jus autem positivum scriptura
legis et continet, et instituit, dans ei
auctoritatis robur; et ideo necesse
est, quod judicium fiat secundum legis
scripturam, aloquim judicium deficeret
vel a justo naturali vel a justo positivo.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod
lex scripta sicut non dat robur juri
naturali, ita nec potest ejus robur
minuere, vel auferre : quia nec volun-
tas hominis potest immutare naturam :
et ideo si scriptura legis oontineat
aliquid contra jus naturale, injusta
est, nec habet vim obligandi; ibi enim
jus positivum locum habet, ubi quan-
tum ad jus naturale nihil difiert, utrum
sic vel aliter fiat, sicut supra habitum
est (Q. 57, 2); et ideo nec tales scrip-
ture leges dicuntur, sed potius legis
corruptiones, ut supra dictum est
(1. 2, 95, 2): et ideo secundum eas
non est judicandum.
? ? Ad secundum dicendum, quod
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 44
[PABT (.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
St Thomas' conception of the nature of law is, then,
founded upon two principles, that it is the expression of
reason, and that its purpose is justice. It is interesting to
compare his conception with that of the mediseval Jurists,
with which we have dealt especially in the second and third
volumes of this work. 1 His treatment represents a very im-
portant development of the significance of the rational element
in law, while it also brings out very emphatically the funda-
mental mediseval conception of its moral or ethical nature.
ea nos duriore interpretatione contra Cf. id. id. , 1. 2, 95, 2, Resp,
ipsorum commodum producamus ad 1 Cf. vol. ii. part i. chaps. 1 and 2 ;
severitatem': et in talibus etiam legia- part ii. chap.
Hoc autem certum est, quod ipse Dcus
per se a principio exercuit jurisdic-
tionem, ut no. S. De foro comp. licet.
(' Dec. ,' ii. 2, 10). Item per electionem
potorunt habere principes, sicut ha-
buerunt Saul et multos alios, viii. Q. 1,
licet. . . . Sic ergo audactor (Gratian,
'Decretum,' C. viii. 1, 15, 18) et in
pluribus aliis c. predicta, inquam(? )
Sic dominia, possessiones et jurisdic-
tiones licite sine peccato possunt esse
apud infideles. Hsec enim non tantum
pro fidelibus sed pro omni rationabili
creatura facta sunt, ut est predictum ;
' Ipse enim solem suum oriri facit
super bonos et malos '; ' Ipse otiam
volatilia pascit,' Mattei c. v. circa fi.
et. vi. Et propter hoc dicimus, non
licet Papse vel fidelibus auferro sua
sive dominia, sive jurisdictiones infi-
delibus, quia sine peccato possident.
Sed bene tamen credimus, quod Papa
qui est vicarius Jesu Christi, potes-
tatem habet non tam super Chris -
tianos, sed etiam super omnes in
fideles. "
* St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' 2. 2, 10, 10 : " Rospondeo
dicendum, quod circa hoc dupliciter
loqui possumus. Uno modo de dominio
vel prelatione infidelium super fideles
de novo instituenda; et hoc nullo
modo permitti debet, cederet enim
hoc in scandalum et in periculum fidei.
. . . Alio modo possumus loqui de
? ? dominio, vel prelatione jam pre-exis-
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. HL] NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE STATE. 35
It is therefore clear that in the judgment of all the writers
on political theory in the thirteenth century there is no doubt
whatever that the end and purpose of the State is a moral
one--that is, the maintenance of justice, or, in the terms
derived from Aristotle, the setting forward of the life accord-
ing to virtue, and that the authority of the State is limited
by its end--that is, by justice, and that it is derived from God
Himself.
ex gratia, non tollit jus humanum,
quod est ex naturali ratione; ideo
distinctio fidelium et infidelium secun-
dum ee considerata non tollit domi-
nium et prelationem supra fideles.
Potest tamen juste per sententiam vel
ordinationem ecclesiio auctoritatem Dei
habentis tale jus dominii vel prelationis
tolli; quia infideles merito suse in-
fidelitatis merentur potestatem amit-
tere super fideles, qui transferuntur
in filios Dei. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 36
CHAPTER IV.
THE NATURE OF LAW.
We have in the last chapter endeavoured to set out our
confident judgment that to the Middle Ages it was clear
that the nature and purpose of the State was a moral one,
that it came from God, and that its function was to maintain
and set forward justice. This may at first sight seem a con-
ception which, however important, is somewhat abstract, and
therefore, in order to appreciate its full significance, we must
go on to observe that both to the thinkers and to the practical
men of the Middle Ages justice had a definite and concrete
embodiment in the law.
We shall have occasion presently to consider the beginnings
of the theory of what is called sovereignty, but it is impossible
to understand the political ideas of the people of the Middle
Ages at all, if we do not begin by understanding that to them
there was only one supreme authority in the State, and that
was not the ruler, whether king or emperor, but only the law.
Behind the law of the State there was, indeed, a more august
law still, the law of nature or of God, to which the law of the
State was subordinate. But within the State, and subject
always to this higher authority, the law was supreme.
We may, indeed, say that it was the characteristic defect
of mediseval civilisation that it was, if anything, too legal;
but as the men of that time saw it, it was the majestic fabric
of the law which stood between them and anarchy, the anarchy
of mere disorder, or the anarchy of a capricious tyranny.
To them liberty, true liberty, was not something contrary to
law, but rather was to be found in law itself. We have in
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. IV. ]
37
THE NATURE OF LAW.
previous volumes endeavoured to set out something of all
this, and we have seen that in this matter there was no differ-
ence between the political writers of the ninth century and of
the eleventh and twelfth, between Feudalists and Civilians ; 1
but we may here recall a few of their most significant sayings.
Let the king, says Bracton, recognise in the law that
same authority which the law gives to him, for there is no
king where mere will rules and not the law. The Lord or the
Lady is only Lord of law (or right), they have no authority
to do wrong ; such is the doctrine of the Assizes of the king-
dom of Jerusalem. 2 The Bologna Civilians are only express-
ing the same judgment in more general terms when Azo says
of justice that it is the mind or will of God which is in all
things right and just, and when the author of the ' Prague
Fragment' says that the law flows from justice as a stream
from its source. 3
Before, however, we deal with the questions related to these
principles, we must in this chapter consider the systematic
treatment of the nature of law in its largest sense by St
Thomas Aquinas, so far, that is, as it is related to our
subject.
There are two very important sections of the ' Suinma
Theologica ' in which he considers this: in the first he con-
siders it in relation to reason, in the second he deals with it
in relation to justice. He begins his discussion by considering
1 Cf. vol. i. chaps. 18 and 19; vol.
ii. part i. chap. 2; vol. iii. part i.
chap. 2 ; vol. iii. part ii. chap. 6.
9 Bracton, ' De Legibus,' i. 8, 6:
" Attribuat igitur rex legi, quod lex
attribuit ei, videlicet, dominationem
et potestatem, non est enim rex ubi
dominatur voluntas, et non lex " (cf.
vol. iii. p. 38).
Assizes of Jerusalem, ' Assises de
la Cour des Bourgeois,' xxvi. : " Oar
la dame ne le aire n'en est seigneur
so non dou dreit . . . mais bien sachies
qu'il n'est mie seigneur de faire tort"
(cf. vol. iii. p. 33).
3 Azo, ' Summa Institutionum,' i. 1:
" Quasi dice ret, iustitia est Dei dis-
positio quse in omnibus rebus recte
consistit et juste disponit: ipse retri-
buit unicuique secundum opora sua,
ipse non variabilis, ipse non est tem-
poralis in dispensationibus vel volun-
tatibus suis : immo ejus voluntas est
constans et perpetua : ipse enim non
habuit principium nee habet vel habebit
finem. "
' Fragmentum Pragense,' iii. 9:
" Set quia in justitia jus initia habet,
et ex ea quasi rivulus ex fonte manat,
ideo eam anteponit. "
Cf. vol. ii. p. 11, note 1, and p. 13,
note 2.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 38
[PABT L.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
the relation of law to reason, and maintains that the proper
character of law is to command and to forbid; but to com-
mand belongs to reason, therefore law is a thing related to
reason. It is reason which directs things to their end. 1
Having thus set out the general nature of law, he goes on
to discuss it under four terms--the eternal law, the natural
law, the divine law, and human law. St Thomas deals first
with the eternal law. It is manifest, he says, that the whole
universe is governed by the divine reason, and therefore this
"ratio gubernationis " has the character of law; the end
of the divine government is God Himself, and His law is not
other than Himself. 2
The natural law is different from but related to this. All
things which are subject to the divine providence are indeed
controlled by the eternal law, but the rational creature is
subject to the divine providence in a more excellent way,
for it partakes in the work of providence, it " provides " for
itself and others, and this participation of the rational creature
in the eternal law is called natural law. The light of natural
reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil,
belongs to the natural law; it is nothing else than the im-
1 St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' i. 2, 90, 1: " Sad contra
est quod ad legem pertinet prsecipere
et prohibere : sed imperare est rationis,
ut supra habitum est (Q. xvii. I) ergo
lex est aliquid rationis. . . . Regula
autem et mensura humanorum actuum
est ratio, quse est principium primum
actuum humanorum, ut ex pradictis
patet (Q. 66, 1). Rationis enim est
ordinare ad finem, qui est primum
principium in agendis, secundum phi-
loeoph. (' Lib. ,' vii. , ' Ethic. ,' c. 8).
In unoquoque autem genere in quod
est principium, est mensura, et regula
illius generis : sicut unitas in genere
numeri est motus primus in genere
motuum. Inde relinquitur quod lex
sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem. "
* Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 1: " Responded
dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum
est (i. e. , Q. 90) nihil est aliud lex,
quam dictamen practicse rationis in
principe, qui gubernat aliquam com-
munitatem perfectam. Manifestum est
autem, supposito quod mundus divina
providentia regatur, ut in I. habitum
est (i. 22, 1 and 2) quod tota com-
munitas universi gubernatur ratione
divina; et ideo ipsa ratio guberna-
tionis re rum in Deo, sicut in principe
universitatis existens, legis habet ratio-
nem ; et quia divina ratio nihil con-
cipit ex tempore, sed habet seternum
conceptum, ut dicitur Prov. viii. , inde
est, quod hujusmodi legem oportet
dice re ai tern am. . . . Ad tertium dicen-
dum, quod lex importat ordinem ad
finem active . . . sed finis divinse
gubernationis est ipse Deus ; nee ejus
lex est aliud ab ipso, inde lex seterna
? ? non ordinatur in alium finem. "
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. IV. ]
39
THE NATURE OF LAW.
pression of the divine light in us. The natural law is, there-
fore, the participation of the rational creature in the eternal
law. 1 St Thomas was indeed aware of the fact that the term
natural law had been and might be used in more than one
sense,2 but his own conception is perfectly clear.
In order, however, to understand the full significance of
this conception, we must observe another distinction of great
importance, which St Thomas makes in another place--that
is, the distinction between natural law and positive law, a
distinction which applies both to human and divine law.
Men can, by a common agreement, establish a law as just,
in matters otherwise indifferent, so long as it is not contrary
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 2: " Inde cum
omnia, quse divinse providentise sub-
duntur, a lege eterna regulentur et
mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet, mani-
festum est, quod omnia participant
aliqualiter legem eternam ; in quantum
scilicet, ex impressione ejus habent
inclinationes in proprios actus et fines.
Inter csetera autem, rationalis creatura
eccellentiore quodam modo divinse
providentise subjacet, in quantum et
ipsa fit providentise particips, sibi ipsi
et aliis providens: unde et in ipsa
participator ratio eterna per quam
habet naturalem inclinationem ad
debitum actum et Qnem: et talis
participatio legis setenue in rationali
creatura lex naturalis dicitur : unde
quam pesimista dixisset (Ps. iv. ).
' Sacrificate sacrificium justitise,' quasi
quibusdam quserentibus, quie sunt
justitise opera subjungit: * Multi di-
cunt: quia ostendit nobis bona ? '
Cui queetioni respondene, dicit, ' Signa-
tum est super nos lumen vultus tui,
Domine. '* Quasi lumen rationis natu-
ralis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum,
et quid malum, quod pertinet ad
naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam
impressio divini luminis in nobis:
unde patet, quod lex naturalis nihil
aliud est, quam participatio legis eternse
in rationali creatura. "
Cf. the treatment of Natural Law
by the Canonists, vol. ii. part ii.
chap. iii.
2 Id. id. , 1. 2, 94, 2 : " Inest, enim,
primo inclinatio homini ad bonum
secundum naturam, in qua communicat
omnibus substantiis; prout scilicet,
qselibet substantia appetit conserva-
tionem sui esse secundum suam na-
turam, et secundum hanc inclinationem,
pertinent ad legem naturalem ea, per
quse vita hominis conservatur, et con-
trarium impeditur. Sec undo, inest
homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis
specialia secundum naturam, in qua
communicat cum ceteris animalibus:
et secundum hoo dicuntur ea esse de
legi naturali, quse natura omnia ani-
malia docuit; ut est commixtio maris
et fcenrinse, educatio et liberorum et
similia. Tertio modo inest homini
? ? inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 40
[FAST I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
to natural justice, and this is positive law ; and there is a
positive divine law as well as a natural. 1
The term Divine law is used by St Thomas to describe
that twofold law of God which is revealed in the Old and
New Testaments. It was needed for various reasons, because
the final end of man is beyond human reason, because of the
uncertainty of men's judgments, because human law can
only deal with the external actions of men, because human
law cannot prohibit or punish all evil actions, lest it should
do more harm than good. The divine law does not indeed
contradict or annul the natural law, but it was added that
men might participate in the " eternal law" in a higher
manner. 2
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 57, 2 : "Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas humana ex
communi condicto potest aliquid face re
justum in his, qusi secundum se non
habent aliquam repugnantiam ad natu-
ralem justitiam : et in his habet locum
jus positivum: undo Philos dicit in
T. Ethic (cap. 7) quod ' legale justum
est, quod ex principio nihil differt sic
vel alitor; quando autem ponitur
differt. ' Sed si aliquid de se repug-
nantiam habeat ad jus naturale, non
potest voluntate humana fieri justum ;
puta si statuatur, quod liceat furari,
vel adulterium committere; unde
dicitur Isa. 10. ' Vbs qui condunt
leges iniquss. '
Ad tertium dicendum, quod jus
divinum dicitur, quod divinitus pro-
mulgatur : et hoc quidem partim est
de his, quse sunt naturalitcr justa, sed
tamen eorum justitia homines latet;
partim autem de his qus? fiunt justa
institutione divina; unde etiam jus
divinum per haec duo distingui potest,
sicut et jus humanum: sunt enim
in lege divina qusdam prsecepta quia
bona ; et prohibita quia mala: quse-
dam vero bona quia precepta, et mala
quia prohibita. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, S1, 4: " Bespondeo
dicendum, quod prsetcr legem natu-
ralem, et legem humanam, necessarium
fuit ad directionem humanse viti
o
habere legem divinum. Et hoc propter
quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia
per legem dirigitur homo ad actus
proprios in ordine ad ultimum finem :
. . . sed quia homo ordinatur ad finem
beatitudmis seternse, quse exoedit pro-
portionem naturalis facultatis humanse
. . . ideo neoessarium fuit, ut supra
legem naturalem et humanam, diri-
geretur etiam ad sum finem lege divi-
nitus data. Secundo, quia propter
incertitudinem humani iudicii . . .
contingit de actibus humanis diverso-
rum esse diversa iudicia ex quibus
etiam diversse ct contrarise leges pro-
oedunt . . . necessarium fuit, ut in
actibus propriis dirigeretur per legem
divinitus datum, de qua constat, quod
? ? non potest errare. Tertio, quia de his
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? ChAF. IV. ]
41
THE NATURE OF LAW.
Human law is described by St Thomas in another article
of the same question under the terms of its relation to reason.
Law is a command of the practical reason, for the human
reason must draw out and apply to particular circumstances
the general precepts of the natural law. 1 St Thomas, however,
also points out that this general conception of the nature of
human law requires a further analysis. The term human law
includes two different kinds of law, the " ius gentium " and
the "ius civile. " The first is derived from the natural
law, as conclusions are derived from premisses, and forms
that body of laws without which men could not live together.
The second is derived from the natural law, " per modum
particularis determinationis," and is that which any State
establishes as being suitable to its own conditions. 2
Law, then, in all its forms is the expression of reason, but
it is also, in the judgment of St Thomas, the expression of
justice, and we must briefly consider this. He accepts the
definition of justice, given by Ulpian in the ' Digest,' " Justitia
est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi "
quod est necessarium ad conservationcm
humanam; ut ergo nullum malum
improhibitum, et impunitum remaneat,
neceesarium fuit supervenire legem
divinam, per quss omnia pecoata pro-
bibentur .
Ad prinum ergo dicendum, quod per
naturulcm legem partioipatur lex
seterna secundem proportionem capaci-
taiis humane nature: sed oportet,
ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in
ultimum finem supernaturalem; et
ideo superadditur lex divinitus data,
per quam lex eterna participatur altiori
modo. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 3 : " Kespondeo
dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum
est lex est quod dam dictamen practicse
rationis . . . ita etiam ex praceptis
legis naturalibus, quasi ex quibusdam
principiis communibus, et indemonstra-
bilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana
procedat ad aliqua magia partiru-
lariter diaponenda: et istae particu-
lars dispositiones adinventse secundum
rationem humanam dicuntur leges
humanse. "
" Id. id. , 1. 2, 95, 4 : " Est enim
primo de ratione legis humanse, quod
sit derivata a lego naturse, ut ex dictis
patet (Art. ii. , hujus Q. ); et secundum
hoc dividitur jus positivum, in jus
gentium et jus civile, secundum duos
modos, quibus aliquid derivatur a lege
nature, ut supra dictum est: nam
ad jus gentium pertinent ea quse
derivantur ex lego natura? , sicut con-
clusiones ex principiis: ut justrc
emptiones, veuditiones et alia hujus-
modi, sine quibus homines ad invicem
convivere non possent: quod est de
lege nature : quia homo est naturaliter
animae sociabile, ut probatur in I.
Polit. (c. 2): quse vero derivantur
a lege nature per modum particularis
determinationis, pertinent ad jus civile,
secundum quod qusslibet civitaa aliquid
? ? sibi aocommode determinat. "
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 42 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. [PART ?
('Dig. ,'i. 10) if it is properly understood. 1 Inalater "Quaestio"
indeed, he discusses the various parts or aspects of justice,
and accepts the Aristotelian distinction between " distribu-
tive " and " commutative " justice. 2 It does not, however,
appear that in St Thomas' judgment this interferes with the
general truth of Ulpian's definition.
The whole system of law, and here St Thomas uses the
word "jus," is so called, according to St Isidore, because
it is just (justum), and the just and "jus " are the " objec-
tion " of justice,3 and St Thomas gives his considered and
emphatic assent. *
He therefore goes on to describe " judicium," which is
the action of the judge, as being the definition or determina-
tion of that which is just or lawful, and this belongs to justice ;
this is what Aristotle meant when he said that men go to the
judge as to a living justice. 5 Perhaps the most emphatic
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 58, 1 : "Ad Primum
sic prooeditur. Videtur quod incon-
venienter definiatur a jurisperitis,
quod justitia est ' perpetua et constans
voluntas jus suum uniouique tri-
buendi' . . . Respondeo dicendum,
quod predicta justitise definitio con-
veniens est, si recto intelligatur . . .
et si quia vellet eam in debitam formam
definitionis reducere, posset sic dicere,
quod justitia est habitus, secundum
quem aliquis constant! et perpetua
voluntate jus suum unicuique tribuit;
et quasi est eadem definitio cum ea,
quam Philos ponit in v. Ethic (cap. v. )
dicens, ' Quod justia est habitus,
secundum quem aliquis dicitur opera-
tivus, secundum electionem justi. ' "
* Id. id. , 2. 2, 61, 1: " Sed contra
est quod Philos in v. Ethic (c. 2) ponit
duas partes justitise, et dicit, quod
una est directiva in distributionibus,
alia in commutationibus.
Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut
dictum est, justitia particularis ordina-
tur ad aliquam privatam personam :
quio comparatur ad communitatem,
sicut pars ad totum: potest autem
ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi:
unus quidem partis ad partem ; qui
similis est ordo unius privatse personse
ad aliam; et hunc ordinem dirigit
commutative justitia, quse consistit
in his quse mutuo fiunt inter duas
personas ad invicem; alius ordo
attenditur totius ad partes: et huio
ordini assimilatur ejus quod est com-
mune ad singular personas: quem
quidem ordinem dirigit justitia dis-
tributiva, quse est distributiva com-
munium secundum proportionalitatem :
et ideo duse sunt justitise species:
scilicet -. distributiva, et commutativa. "
s Id. id. , 2. 2, 57, 1: "Sed contra
est quod laid. : dicit in eodem libro
(' Etym. ,' v. 3), quod jus dictum est
quia est justum: sed justum est
objectum justitise: dicit enim Philos
in v. Ethic (cap. i. ) quod ' omnes
talem habitum volunt dicere justum
a quo operativi justorum sunt'; ergo
jus est objectum justitise. "
? ? 4 Id. id. id. , Resp.
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. IV. ]
43
THE NATURE OF LAW.
assertion by St Thomas of the relation between law and
justice may be found in another " Article " of the same " Ques-
tion," where he asks whether the judgment of the judge must
always be in accordance with the law. He decides that
while normally this must be so, this will only hold if the
law is just. Laws which are contrary to the natural law
are unjust, and have no force. It may even happen that laws
which are in themselves right may not be adequate to certain
cases, and would, in such cases, be contrary to the natural
law. In such circumstances men must not judge according
to the letter of the law, but must recur to that equity which
the legislator desired to attain. 1
est: judex autem dicitur, quasi jus
dicens : jus autem est objectum justi-
tise, ut supra babitum est: et ideo
judicium importat, secundum prim am
nominis impositionem, definitionem vel
determinationem justi, sive juris:
quod autem aliquis bene defmiat
aliquid in operibus virtuosis, proprie
procedit ex habitu virtutis: sicut
cast us recto determinat ea, quse perti-
nent ad cartitatem ; et ideo judicium,
quod importat rectum determinationem
ejus, quod est justum, proprie pertinet
ad justitiam: propter quod Philos, in
v. Ethic (cap. 4) dicit, quod homines
ad judicem confugiunt, sicut ad quan-
dam justitiam animatam. "
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 60, 5: " Respondeo
dicendum, quod sicut diotum est,
judicium nihil aliud est quam qusedam
definitio, vel determinatio ejus quod
justum est: fit autem aliquid justum
dupliciter, uno modo ex ipsa natura
rei quod dicitur jus naturale: alio
modo ex quodam condicto inter ho-
mines ; quod dicitur jus positivum
ut supra habitum est (Q. 57, 2): leges
autem scribuntur ad utriusque juris
declarationem : alitor tamon, et alitor :
nam legis scriptura jus quidem natu-
rale continet, sed non instituit: non
enim - ha bet robin- ex lege, sed ex
natura : jus autem positivum scriptura
legis et continet, et instituit, dans ei
auctoritatis robur; et ideo necesse
est, quod judicium fiat secundum legis
scripturam, aloquim judicium deficeret
vel a justo naturali vel a justo positivo.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod
lex scripta sicut non dat robur juri
naturali, ita nec potest ejus robur
minuere, vel auferre : quia nec volun-
tas hominis potest immutare naturam :
et ideo si scriptura legis oontineat
aliquid contra jus naturale, injusta
est, nec habet vim obligandi; ibi enim
jus positivum locum habet, ubi quan-
tum ad jus naturale nihil difiert, utrum
sic vel aliter fiat, sicut supra habitum
est (Q. 57, 2); et ideo nec tales scrip-
ture leges dicuntur, sed potius legis
corruptiones, ut supra dictum est
(1. 2, 95, 2): et ideo secundum eas
non est judicandum.
? ? Ad secundum dicendum, quod
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 44
[PABT (.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
St Thomas' conception of the nature of law is, then,
founded upon two principles, that it is the expression of
reason, and that its purpose is justice. It is interesting to
compare his conception with that of the mediseval Jurists,
with which we have dealt especially in the second and third
volumes of this work. 1 His treatment represents a very im-
portant development of the significance of the rational element
in law, while it also brings out very emphatically the funda-
mental mediseval conception of its moral or ethical nature.
ea nos duriore interpretatione contra Cf. id. id. , 1. 2, 95, 2, Resp,
ipsorum commodum producamus ad 1 Cf. vol. ii. part i. chaps. 1 and 2 ;
severitatem': et in talibus etiam legia- part ii. chap.
