Private property is
therefore
not contrary
1 Cf.
1 Cf.
Thomas Carlyle
Tunc vero dominatur aliquis alteri
ut libero, quando dirigit ipsum ad
proprium bonum ejus qui dirigitur, vel
ad bonum commune: et tale domi-
nium hominis ad hominem in statu
innocentise fuisset, propter duo. Primo,
quia homo naturaliter est animal
sociale : undo homines in statu inno-
centise socialiter vixisseut: socialis
autem vita multorum esse non posset,
nisi aliquis presideret, qui ad bonum
commune intenderet : multi enim per
se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad
unum: et ideo Philos dicit, in princ.
Politic: quod quandocumque multa
ordinantur ad unum, semper invenitur
unum ut principale et dirigens. Se-
cundo, quia si unus homo habuisset
super alum supereminentiam scientise,
et justitise, inconveniens fuisset, nisi
? ? hoc exequeretur in utilitatem aliorum. "
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? OHAP. EC]
13
CONVENTION AND NATURE.
tration of this in the work of Egidius Colonna in the latter
years of the thirteenth century.
Egidius' treatise, ' De Eegimine Principum,' is obviously
and explicitly related to the Aristotelian Politics, to which
he constantly refers, and it was directly or indirectly from
St Thomas that he had learned to know Aristotle. He gives
an account of the reasons why the State (civitas) was created
which is founded immediately upon the " Politics "--namely,
that men might live and have enough, and that they might
live well and virtuously. 1 He asks why, if this is so, if man
is naturally political (civilis), there are some who do not live
thus, and he answers, some because they are too poor (mean-
ing by this, presumably, a pastoral or hunting people), some
because they are vicious and criminal, and some because
they seek a more perfect life of contemplation. And it is in
this sense that he interprets Aristotle's saying that he who
is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is
sufficient in himself, must be either a beast or a god. 2 In
the following chapter he explains the statement that the
State is natural, first, by contending that it is the proper
development of the family and the village, and secondly, by
an appeal to Aristotle's principle that the nature of a thing
lies in its end or perfection. 3
We can then trace very clearly the development in the
latter part of the thirteenth century of a new conception
in political theory, and can recognise in St Thomas Aquinas
and Egidius Colonna the effect of the recovery of the
Aristotelian philosophy and its conception of the State, not
as a conventional institution arising out of the vicious or
sinful condition of human nature, but rather as the natural
1 Egidius Colonna, ' De Rcgimino
Principum,' iii. 1,2: " Constitute
autem jam civitate et homines per-
spicaciores intuentes et videntes quod
non satis est habere sufficientiam in
vita nisi vivant bene et virtuose. Cum
sine lege et justitia constitute civitas
stare non posset, ordinarunt communi-
tatem politicam quse facte erat ad
vivere et ad habendam sufficientiam
in vita et ad bene vivere et ad vivere
secundum legem et virtuose. "
> Id. id. , iii. 1, 3.
3 Id. id. , iii. 1, 4: " Nam finis
generationis est forma quod per auto-
nomasiam est quidem naturale et est
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? 14
[PAET I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
expression and embodiment of the moral as well as the
physical characteristics of human nature. In order, how-
ever, to complete our appreciation of the nature of this
change, we must consider how far we find the same principles
in the treatment of the other great institutions of society,
and especially of property and slavery.
We have in previous volumes set out the principles of the
Fathers and the Canon Lawyers with regard to these, and
have seen that to them it was clear that private property
did not belong to the primitive order, but arose from the
vicious and greedy appetities of men. 1
It is interesting to observe that these were still the prin-
ciples of Aquinas' great Franciscan predecessor in systematic
theology, Alexander of Hales, who seems to be unaffected,
at least in this matter, by the Aristotelian influence; but,
as we shall see, both he and some of the Canonists of the
middle of the thirteenth century were drawn by their study
of the Eoman Law to another interpretation of the " natural
law. " In one passage he discusses carefully the meaning of
natural law, and asks whether it can be changed. He
cites St Isidore of Seville as saying that by the natural
law all property is common, and says that if now a man
may lawfully possess a thing as his own, it would appear
that the Lex Naturale is mutable. He replies to this that
when it is said that by natural law all things are common,
this refers to the condition of man before he sinned, but
when man had sinned private property became lawful by
natural law. 2 In another part of the same discussion he
1 Cf. vol. i. chap. 12 ; vol. ii. part ii.
chap. 6.
2 Alexander of Hales, ' Summa
Theologise,' iii. Q. 27, M. 3, Art. 2:
" ' An lex naturalis mutabilis sit quan-
tum ad prsecepta juris naturalis ? '. . .
Isidores : ' Jus naturale commune
est omnium nationum : hoc jure com-
munis est omnia possessio, et omnium
una libertas. ' Si ergo sanctio ista
mutate est, ita ut meo jure sit aliquid
proprium ; patet quod mutabilis est
lex naturalis quantum ad suas sane-
tiones et mandate. . . . Item in Decretis
distinct. 8 (Gratian, Decretum D. , viii.
part L). ' Differt jus naturale a con-
suetudine, nam jure naturali omnia
sunt communia omnibus: jure vero
consuetudinis et constitutionis, hoc
meum est, illud vero alterius. ' . . .
Resolutio. Ad primam ergo rationem,
quse ostendit quod sit mutabile in se :
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? chap, n. ]
15
CONVENTION AND NATURE.
maintains that the natural law prescribes some things as of
obligation, some things as good, and some as equitable. It
is of obligation that in case of necessity all things are common.
It is good that in the state of nature, when all things were
well ordered, all things should have been common, but that
in a corrupt state some things should be the property of
particular persons, otherwise the wicked would take all and
the good would be in want. It is equitable that some things
should never be appropriated, while others which belong
to no one should belong to the person who " occupies "
them. 1
Alexander of Hales very clearly represents the patristic
and normal mediseval view that private property did not
belong to the primitive condition of innocence, but was the
result of sin. It is to the influence of some phrases of the
Eoman Law 2 and to the recognition by some of the Bologna
Civilians like Azo that the term " jus naturale " could be
used in different senses,8 that we may trace Alexander's con-
ception that in one sense private property may be related to
natural law. His assertion that in the case of necessity all
dicendum, quod jure naturali essent
omnia communia, et omnium una
lihertas, hoc fuit ante peccatum, et
post peccatum quse dam sunt quibusdam
propria, et hue duo sunt per legem
naturalem. "
1 Id. id. id. , Q. 27, M. 4, Art. 3 :
' Hoc habito quseritur propter illud,
quod dicitur in definitiono lsidor:
' Communis omnium possessio. ' Utmm
do lege naturali siut omnia communia.
. . . Sol: Dicendum, quod lex naturalis
circa communionem et proprietatem
dictat differenter. Dictat enim aliquid
quia debitum, et aliquid quia bonum,
aliquid quia suquum. Quia debitum
dictat, quod in statu necessitatis sint
omnia communia : in statu enim isto
sunt omnia communicanda; et hoc
modo in precepto est communicatio :
hoc est dictamen respectu rerum ad
sustentationem personarum, et inde
sumitur. . . . Alitor dictat circa com-
munionem et proprietatem aliquid
quia bonum quia in statu nature bene
institute dictabat omnia esse com-
munia : in statu vero naturse cor-
ruptse dictabat, quod bonum est esse
aliqua propria : alioquin boni egerent,
et non staret societas humana, quia
mali rape rent omnia : et in secundum
diversos status dictat bonum esse, quod
omnia siut communia, et quod aliqua
sint propria. Dictat enim circa pro-
prietatem et communionem aliquid
quia iequum, et secundum dictamen
aquitatis dictat, qusedam esse in-
appropriabilia, ut serem, mare, littora :
dictat etiam, quod ea quse siut appro-
priabilia, si in nullius sint bonis,
occupanti concedantur : . . . Et bine
est acquisitio eorum, quse coelo, terra,
marique capiuntur; ut captio avium et
piscium : si cut dicunt leges humanse. "
a Cf. vol. i. pp. 61-54.
? ? >> Cf. vol. ii. pp. 28-33.
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? 16
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
things are common is related to the theory of the Fathers
and of the Canonists,1 and we shall return to the subject
when we deal presently with the theory of property in
St Thomas Aquinas.
When we turn from Alexander of Hales to the Canonists
of the middle of the thirteenth century, we find the same
combination of the influence of the Patristic tradition and
of the Eoman Law. Innocent IV. , in his ' Apparatus,' or
Commentary on the Decretals, discusses the origin and
rationale of private property in terms which are related to
both traditions. The earth, he says, is the Lord's ; He is
the creator of all things, and in the beginning of the world
these were the common property of all men. It was by the
custom of our first ancestors that private property arose ;
but this was good, not evil, for things which are common
property are apt to be neglected, and the common ownership
of things tends to discord. Men were therefore permitted to
take by occupation that which belonged to no one but to
God. 2 The great Canonist whom we know as Hostiensis
defines carefully the nature of possession, and says that it is
natural--that is, it was created by the " natural law of
nations," not by the primeval law which belonged to all
animals. 3
1 Vol. i. chap. 12 ; vol. ii. part ii.
chap. 6.
* Innocent IV. , ' Apparatus ad quin-
que libros Deeretalium,' hi. 34, 8 :
" Et nos respondemus quod in veritate
Domini est terra, et plenitudo ejus,
orbis terrarum et universi qui habitant
in ea. Ipse enim est creator omnium,
idem ipse Deus hsec omnia fecerat, ut
habemus in i. c. Gen. Et hsec a prin-
cipio seculi fuit communis, quo usque
usibus priorum parentum introductum
est quod aliqui aliqua, et alii alia sibi
appropriaverunt. Nec fuit hoc malum,
immo bonum, quia naturale est res
communes negligi, et communio dis-
cordiam parit, et fuerunt a principio
cujuscunque qui occupavit, quia in
nullius bonis erant nisi Dei. Et ideo
licebat cuilibet occupare quod occu-
patum non erat, sed ab aliis occu-
patum, occupare non licebat, quia
fiebat contra legem naturse, qua cuilibet
inditum est, ut alii non faciat, quod
sibi non vult fieri. "
8 Hostiensis, ' gumma super titulis
Decretalium,' ii. , ' De Causa Posses-
sionis,' i. : " Quid sit possessio ? Cor-
poralis rei detentio, corporis et animi
juris adminiculo concurrente. . . . Hseo
autem possessio, quum quis corpore
et animo suo adipiscitur, naturalis est,
ft. eo. 1. 1 (Digest 41, i. 1). Sive de
jure naturali gentium inducta vel
approbate, non dioo de jure pnmotvo,
communi omnibus animalibus. Inst,
de iu. na. gen. et ei. in prin. (Insti-
tutes, i. 2, 1). "
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? ChAP, n. ] CONVENTION AND NATURE.
17
It is clear that these writers did not look upon private
property as strictly primitive, but that it was created by
human custom. If they sometimes call it " natural," this
is due to the ambiguity of some of the phrases of the
Eoman Law and the Bologna Civilians. They still rep-
resent the Patristic and Stoic conception of property
as, properly speaking, a conventional and not a natural
institution.
When we now turn to the treatment of private property
by St Thomas Aquinas, we find ourselves in a very different
atmosphere. He was, indeed, confronted at the outset with
the dogmatic statements of the Fathers, and especially of
St Ambrose, that nature had given all things to men in
common, that God meant the world to be the common posses-
sion of all men and to produce its fruits for all, and that
avarice produced the rights of possession. 1 He puts the
question with characteristic fairness and precision in the
' Summa Theologica. ' It is contended, he says, that it is
not lawful for a man to possess anything as his own, for
everything which is contrary to natural law is unlawful, and
according to natural law all things are common, and he refers
to St Basil, St Ambrose, and Gratian's Decretum as repre-
senting this view. He replies by making a distinction
in the relations of men to things as property; the first
consists in the power of acquiring and distributing things,
and this is lawful, for it tends to efficiency and to the
tranquillity of society; the second is their use, and
as far as this is concerned men should hold them in
common.
In the detailed answers, which in his method follow the
general one, he replies to the contention that by natural
law all things are common, and says that this does not mean
that the natural law prescribed that all things are to be in
common, and nothing is to be held as an individual possession,
but that it is not the natural law which establishes the separa-
tion of possessions, but human agreement, and this belongs
to positive law.
Private property is therefore not contrary
1 Cf. vol. i. chap. 12.
VOL. V. B
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? 18
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
to natural law, but is added to natural law by human
reason. 1
It is true that in this passage St Thomas does not refer
directly to Aristotle, but it is fairly clear that his arguments
are in large measure founded upon the discussion of the sub-
ject in ' Politics,' ii. 5, including the important distinction
between the right of acquisition and the right of use. The
principles laid down by St Thomas in this passage may be
further illustrated from two other places in the 'Summa. '
In the seventh article of the same " question," he discusses
more fully the significance of the principle that, as far as the
use of things is concerned, the common right of property
continues. He considers the question whether it is lawful
to steal in case of necessity, and cites the ' Decretals ' as
imposing a penance of three weeks upon the man who com-
1 St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' 2. 2, 66, 2 : "Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur, quod non
liceat alicui rem aliquam quasi pro-
priam possidere : omne enim quod est
contra jus naturale est illicitum : sed
secundum jus naturale omnia sunt
communia: cui quidem communitati
contrariatur proprietas possessionum :
ergo illicitum est cuilibet homini appro-
priaro sibi aliquem rem exteriorem . . .
Kespondeo dicendum, quod circa rem
exteriorem duo compotunt homini :
quorum unum est potestas procurandi
et dispensandi: et quantum ad hoc
licitum est, quod homo propria possi-
deat; est etiam necessarium ad hu-
manam vitam, propter tria. Primo
quidem, quia magis sollicitus est unus-
quisque ad procurandum aliquid, quod
sibi soli competit, quam id, quod est
commune omnium vel multorum : quia
unusquisque laborem fugiens, relinquit
alteri id, quod pertinet ad commune ;
sicut accidit in multitudine minis-
trorum. Alio modo, quia ordinatius
res humanse tractantur, si singulis
immineat propria cura alicujus rei
procurandss; esset autem confusio, si
quilibet indistincte quselibet procu-
raret. Tertio, quia per hoc magis
pacificus status hominum conservatur,
dum unusquisque re sua contentus est:
unde videmus, quod inter eos qui
communiter, et ex indiviso aliquid
possident, frequentius jurgia oriuntur.
Aliud vero, quod competit homini
circa res oxtorioros, est usus ipsarum :
et quantum ad hoc non debet homo
habere res exteriores ut proprias, sed
ut communes; ut scilicet de facili
aliquis eas communicet in necessitate
aliorum : unde apostolus dicit, I. Ad
Timoth : ult. ' Divitibus hujus sseculi
prsecipe facile tribuere, communicare
de bonis,' &c.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod
communitas rerum attribuitur juri
naturali : non quia jus naturale dictet
omnia esse possidenda communiter, et
nihil esse quasi proprium possidendum ;
? ? sed quia secundum jus naturale non
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? chap, n. ]
19
CONVENTION AND NATURE.
mits theft from hunger, and St Augustine as saying that it
was not lawful to steal in order to give alms. St Thomas
dogmatically asserts the contrary, and maintains that in a
case of necessity all things are common, and that in such
a case it is not sinful to take another man's property. He
justifies this by a detailed argument. The institution of
human law cannot abrogate the natural or Divine law, and
according to the natural order which was instituted by the
Divine providence, the inferior things were to serve men's
needs, and therefore the division or appropriation of things
which was instituted by human law may not hinder their
use for this purpose, and, therefore, if any man possesses a
superfluity of things, the natural law requires that this should
be used for the maintenance of the poor. The administration
of this help is normally left to the discretion of the owner of
superfluous property ; but if there is evident and urgent
need, and there is no other means of help, then a man
may openly or secretly take another man's property for
his need, and this has not properly the character of theft;
and, he adds, in a case of the same need, it is lawful to
take another man's property to help one's neighbour who
is in want. 1
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 66, 7 : "Sod contra
est, quod in necessitate sunt omnia
communis, et ita non videtur esse
peccatum, si aliquis rem alterius
accipiat, propter necessitatem sibi
factam communem. Respondeo di-
cendum quod ea quse sunt juris hu-
manse, non possunt derogari juri
naturali, vel juri divino: secundum
autem naturnlem ordinem ex divina
providentia institutum, res inferiores
sunt ordinate ad hoc, quod ex his
subveniutur hominum necessitati ; et
ideo per rerum divisionem, et appro-
priationem ex jure humano proce.
den tem non impeditur quin hominis
necessitati sit subveniendum ex hujus-
modi rebus ; et ideo res, quas aliqui
superabundanter habent, ex naturali
jure debentur pauperum sustentationi;
unde Ambrosius : dicit (Sermo- 64, De
Temp. ), et habetur in Deeret: Dist.
47 (Gratian, Decretum, Dist. 47, 8. 4).
* Esurientium panis est, quam tu
detines ; nudorum indumemtum est:
quod tu recludis: miserorum re-
demptio et absolutio est pecunia quam
tu in terram defodis ' : sod quia multi
sunt necessitatem patientes, et non
potest ex eadem re omnibus subveniri,
committitur arbitrio uniuscujusque
dispensatio propriarum rerum, ut ex
eis subveniat necessitatem patientibus :
si tamen adeo sit evidens et urgens
necossitas, ut manifestum sit instanti
necessitati de rebus occurrentibus esse
subveniendum (puta cum imminet
poraonse periculum, ot alitor subveniri
non potest) tunc licite potest aliquis
ex rebus alienis sus e necessitati sub-
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? 20
[PAST L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
In a very important section of the ' Summa,' to which we
shall return later, where he deals in detail with the whole
conception of natural law, he recognises very frankly the
weight of the tradition that by natural law all things are
common. He quotes the famous passage from the ' Etym-
ologies ' of St Isidore of Seville, in which, as the Middle Ages
understood it, this doctrine is set out, but he replies to it by
the contention that while natural law did not create private
property, this was established by human reason, because it
was useful to human life, and thus natural law was not changed
but only added to. 1
The position of St Thomas with regard to the institution
of private property represents an attempt to harmonise the
principles of the Fathers with those of Aristotle. He is not
prepared, in face of the patristic authority, to maintain
that it is " natural " in the proper sense of the word, but he
refuses to admit that it is a consequence of sin. It is a " con-
ventional " institution, but an institution created by human
reason, for the advantage of human life. But also, it is limited
by the principle of the natural law that material things were
intended by God to meet the needs of men, and therefore he
understands the right of private property to be the right
to acquire and to control the destination of material things,
but not an unlimited right to use them for one's own con-
venience.
venire, sive manifeste, sive occulte
sublatis: neo hoc proprie habet
rationem furti vel rapinse. . . . Ad
tertium dicendum, quod in casu similis
necessitatis etiam potest quis occulte
rem alienam accipere, ut subveniat
proximo sic indigenti. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 94, 5 : "Isidorus dicit
in lib. v. etym. {v. 4) ' Quod com-
munis omnium possessio, et una
libertas, est de jure naturali': sed
hut: videmus esse mutate per leges
humanas; ergo videtur quod lex
naturalis sit mutabilis.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid
dicitur esse de jure naturali dupliciter :
uno modo, quia ab hoc natura inclinat;
sicut non esse injuriam alteri faciendam:
alio modo, quia natura non inducit
contrarium: sicut possemus dicere,
quod hominem esse nudum est de jure
naturali; quia natura non dedit ei
vestitum, sed an adinvenit: et hoc
modo ' communis omnium possessio
et una libertas ' dicitur esse de jure
naturali : quia scilicet distinctio posses-
sionum, et servitus non sunt inductse
a natura : sed per hominum rationem
ad utilitatem humane vita, et sic
etiam in hoc lex naturse non est mutata
nisi per additionom. "
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? ChAP, n. ]
21
CONVENTION AND NATURE.
We turn to the theory of slavery. We have seen that the
Canonists and Civilians were agreed that slavery was not
an institution of the natural law, and the Canonists held that
it was a consequence of sin. 1 Innocent IV. thus merely
restated the traditional doctrine when he said that the lord-
ship over men as property belongs to the law of nations
or the civil law, for by the law of nature all men are free. 2
Hostiensis, indeed, describes slavery as created by the divine
law, confirmed by the law of nations, and approved by the
Canon Law ; but he probably does not mean by this more
than that it was a divine punishment and remedy for sin,
the doctrine both of the Fathers and the Canonists. 3
St Thomas endeavoured to bring together the tradition
which he inherited from the Stoics and the Fathers with
what he had learned from Aristotle. In one place he main-
tains that in the state of innocence there was government,
but no slavery. It is of the essence of slavery that while the
free man is " causa sui," the slave " ordinatur ad alium,"
and is used by the master for his own advantage, and this
could not have existed in the state of innocence. * In another
1 Cf. vol. ii. part i. chap. 4 ; part ii.
chap. 5.
2 Innocent IV. , * App. in quinque
lib. dec. ,' iii. 34, 8 : " Super homines
autem quasi super suos nullus habuit
dominium, nisi de jure gentium vel
dvili. Natura enim oinnes homines
liberi sunt. Inst, de libert" (Inst. i. 6).
8 Hostiensis, ' Summa Sup. Tit.
Dec. ,' v. , 'De servis Iudseorum et Sara-
cenorum,* ? > : '* Sed numquid servus
baptizatus manebit servus sicut prius.
Sic nam et servitus de jure divino est
introducta, 36 Dist. Sexto. (Oratian,
Dec retum, D. 35, 8) et confirmata de
jure gentium, i. Dist. jus gentium.
(Gratian, Decretum, i. 9) et de jure
canonico approbata, ii. Qusest. 2 ab illo.
C. si quia de servis, usque ad C.
ecclesiarum servos (Gratian, Decretum,
C. xii. 2, 57-69). Puto tamen quod
non est deeseviendum in eum, sicut
prius, imo est inter alios servos non
Christianos traotandum leniter ot bo-
nigne, arg. ? . De maio. et obe. per
tuas (Decretals, i. 33, 7). Nam nec
in sorvum aliquem est mmis acriter
sseviendum, Inst. De his qui sui juri
vel alio. sunt. Dominorum (Inst. , i. 8). "
* St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' i. 96, 4: " I'raterea.
Illud quod est introductum in poenam
peccati, non fuisset in statu innocen-
tise: sed hominem subesse homini
introductum est in poonam peccati . . .
Respondeo dicendum, quod dominium
accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, se-
cundum quod opponitur servituti:
et sic dominus dicitur cui aliquis sub-
ditur, ut servus. Alio modo accipitur
dominium, secundum quod communiter
refertur, ad subjectum qualitercum-
que: et sic etiam ille, qui habet offi-
cium gubernandi, et dirigendi liboros,
dominus dici potest; primo ergo modo
? ? accepto dominio, in statu innocentise
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? 22
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
place, however, he deals with the question in more detail,
and explains the nature of slavery under different terms.
St Thomas in this place is discussing directly the relation of
the jus gentium to the jus naturale (we shall return to this
subject later), and his reference to slavery is incidental to
this discussion. He first states his reasons why it might
be contended that the " jus gentium " is the same as the
" jus naturale," and the second of these reasons is that while
Aristotle says that slavery is natural, for some men are
naturally slaves, St Isidore says that slavery belongs to the
jus gentium; the jus gentium, therefore, is the same as the
jus naturale. Against this he cites St Isidore as distinguishing
between natural law, civil law, and the law of nations. He
endeavours to solve this opposition by arguing that jus may
be said to be natural in two different senses, in the absolute
sense, or in relation to its consequences. The jus gentium
represents that which man's natural reason declares with
regard to the consequences of jus. Slavery, therefore, belongs
to the jus gentium, and is natural, not in the absolute sense,
but because it is useful for the slave to be controlled by the
wiser man, and for the wiser man to be helped by the slave. 1
homo homini non dominaretur : sed
secundo modo accepto dominio, in
statu innocentise homo homini domi-
nari potuisset. Cujus ratio est, quia
servus in hoc differt a libero, quod
' liber est causa sui' ut dicitur in
Metaph. (Cap. ii. ): 'Servus autem
ordinatur ad alium'; tuno ergo
dliquis dominatur alicui ut servo,
quando eum, cui dominatur, ad pro-
priam utilitatem sui, scilicet domi-
nantis, refert. Et quia unicuique est
appetibile proprium bonum; et pet
consequens contristabile est unicuique,
quod illud bonum, quod deberet esse
suum cedat alteri tantum : ideo tale
dominium non potest esse sine poena
subjectorum: propter quod, in statu
innocentise non fuisset tale dominium
hominis ad honinem. "
1 Id. id. , ii. 2, 57, 3 : " Prssterea.
Servitus inter homines est naturalis:
quidem enim sunt naturaliter servi,
ut philos. probat in I. Polit. (chaps.
3 and 4): sed servitutes pertinent ad
jus gentium, ut Isid: 'dicit (Lib. v.
Etym. Cap. vi.
ut libero, quando dirigit ipsum ad
proprium bonum ejus qui dirigitur, vel
ad bonum commune: et tale domi-
nium hominis ad hominem in statu
innocentise fuisset, propter duo. Primo,
quia homo naturaliter est animal
sociale : undo homines in statu inno-
centise socialiter vixisseut: socialis
autem vita multorum esse non posset,
nisi aliquis presideret, qui ad bonum
commune intenderet : multi enim per
se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad
unum: et ideo Philos dicit, in princ.
Politic: quod quandocumque multa
ordinantur ad unum, semper invenitur
unum ut principale et dirigens. Se-
cundo, quia si unus homo habuisset
super alum supereminentiam scientise,
et justitise, inconveniens fuisset, nisi
? ? hoc exequeretur in utilitatem aliorum. "
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? OHAP. EC]
13
CONVENTION AND NATURE.
tration of this in the work of Egidius Colonna in the latter
years of the thirteenth century.
Egidius' treatise, ' De Eegimine Principum,' is obviously
and explicitly related to the Aristotelian Politics, to which
he constantly refers, and it was directly or indirectly from
St Thomas that he had learned to know Aristotle. He gives
an account of the reasons why the State (civitas) was created
which is founded immediately upon the " Politics "--namely,
that men might live and have enough, and that they might
live well and virtuously. 1 He asks why, if this is so, if man
is naturally political (civilis), there are some who do not live
thus, and he answers, some because they are too poor (mean-
ing by this, presumably, a pastoral or hunting people), some
because they are vicious and criminal, and some because
they seek a more perfect life of contemplation. And it is in
this sense that he interprets Aristotle's saying that he who
is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is
sufficient in himself, must be either a beast or a god. 2 In
the following chapter he explains the statement that the
State is natural, first, by contending that it is the proper
development of the family and the village, and secondly, by
an appeal to Aristotle's principle that the nature of a thing
lies in its end or perfection. 3
We can then trace very clearly the development in the
latter part of the thirteenth century of a new conception
in political theory, and can recognise in St Thomas Aquinas
and Egidius Colonna the effect of the recovery of the
Aristotelian philosophy and its conception of the State, not
as a conventional institution arising out of the vicious or
sinful condition of human nature, but rather as the natural
1 Egidius Colonna, ' De Rcgimino
Principum,' iii. 1,2: " Constitute
autem jam civitate et homines per-
spicaciores intuentes et videntes quod
non satis est habere sufficientiam in
vita nisi vivant bene et virtuose. Cum
sine lege et justitia constitute civitas
stare non posset, ordinarunt communi-
tatem politicam quse facte erat ad
vivere et ad habendam sufficientiam
in vita et ad bene vivere et ad vivere
secundum legem et virtuose. "
> Id. id. , iii. 1, 3.
3 Id. id. , iii. 1, 4: " Nam finis
generationis est forma quod per auto-
nomasiam est quidem naturale et est
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? 14
[PAET I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
expression and embodiment of the moral as well as the
physical characteristics of human nature. In order, how-
ever, to complete our appreciation of the nature of this
change, we must consider how far we find the same principles
in the treatment of the other great institutions of society,
and especially of property and slavery.
We have in previous volumes set out the principles of the
Fathers and the Canon Lawyers with regard to these, and
have seen that to them it was clear that private property
did not belong to the primitive order, but arose from the
vicious and greedy appetities of men. 1
It is interesting to observe that these were still the prin-
ciples of Aquinas' great Franciscan predecessor in systematic
theology, Alexander of Hales, who seems to be unaffected,
at least in this matter, by the Aristotelian influence; but,
as we shall see, both he and some of the Canonists of the
middle of the thirteenth century were drawn by their study
of the Eoman Law to another interpretation of the " natural
law. " In one passage he discusses carefully the meaning of
natural law, and asks whether it can be changed. He
cites St Isidore of Seville as saying that by the natural
law all property is common, and says that if now a man
may lawfully possess a thing as his own, it would appear
that the Lex Naturale is mutable. He replies to this that
when it is said that by natural law all things are common,
this refers to the condition of man before he sinned, but
when man had sinned private property became lawful by
natural law. 2 In another part of the same discussion he
1 Cf. vol. i. chap. 12 ; vol. ii. part ii.
chap. 6.
2 Alexander of Hales, ' Summa
Theologise,' iii. Q. 27, M. 3, Art. 2:
" ' An lex naturalis mutabilis sit quan-
tum ad prsecepta juris naturalis ? '. . .
Isidores : ' Jus naturale commune
est omnium nationum : hoc jure com-
munis est omnia possessio, et omnium
una libertas. ' Si ergo sanctio ista
mutate est, ita ut meo jure sit aliquid
proprium ; patet quod mutabilis est
lex naturalis quantum ad suas sane-
tiones et mandate. . . . Item in Decretis
distinct. 8 (Gratian, Decretum D. , viii.
part L). ' Differt jus naturale a con-
suetudine, nam jure naturali omnia
sunt communia omnibus: jure vero
consuetudinis et constitutionis, hoc
meum est, illud vero alterius. ' . . .
Resolutio. Ad primam ergo rationem,
quse ostendit quod sit mutabile in se :
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? chap, n. ]
15
CONVENTION AND NATURE.
maintains that the natural law prescribes some things as of
obligation, some things as good, and some as equitable. It
is of obligation that in case of necessity all things are common.
It is good that in the state of nature, when all things were
well ordered, all things should have been common, but that
in a corrupt state some things should be the property of
particular persons, otherwise the wicked would take all and
the good would be in want. It is equitable that some things
should never be appropriated, while others which belong
to no one should belong to the person who " occupies "
them. 1
Alexander of Hales very clearly represents the patristic
and normal mediseval view that private property did not
belong to the primitive condition of innocence, but was the
result of sin. It is to the influence of some phrases of the
Eoman Law 2 and to the recognition by some of the Bologna
Civilians like Azo that the term " jus naturale " could be
used in different senses,8 that we may trace Alexander's con-
ception that in one sense private property may be related to
natural law. His assertion that in the case of necessity all
dicendum, quod jure naturali essent
omnia communia, et omnium una
lihertas, hoc fuit ante peccatum, et
post peccatum quse dam sunt quibusdam
propria, et hue duo sunt per legem
naturalem. "
1 Id. id. id. , Q. 27, M. 4, Art. 3 :
' Hoc habito quseritur propter illud,
quod dicitur in definitiono lsidor:
' Communis omnium possessio. ' Utmm
do lege naturali siut omnia communia.
. . . Sol: Dicendum, quod lex naturalis
circa communionem et proprietatem
dictat differenter. Dictat enim aliquid
quia debitum, et aliquid quia bonum,
aliquid quia suquum. Quia debitum
dictat, quod in statu necessitatis sint
omnia communia : in statu enim isto
sunt omnia communicanda; et hoc
modo in precepto est communicatio :
hoc est dictamen respectu rerum ad
sustentationem personarum, et inde
sumitur. . . . Alitor dictat circa com-
munionem et proprietatem aliquid
quia bonum quia in statu nature bene
institute dictabat omnia esse com-
munia : in statu vero naturse cor-
ruptse dictabat, quod bonum est esse
aliqua propria : alioquin boni egerent,
et non staret societas humana, quia
mali rape rent omnia : et in secundum
diversos status dictat bonum esse, quod
omnia siut communia, et quod aliqua
sint propria. Dictat enim circa pro-
prietatem et communionem aliquid
quia iequum, et secundum dictamen
aquitatis dictat, qusedam esse in-
appropriabilia, ut serem, mare, littora :
dictat etiam, quod ea quse siut appro-
priabilia, si in nullius sint bonis,
occupanti concedantur : . . . Et bine
est acquisitio eorum, quse coelo, terra,
marique capiuntur; ut captio avium et
piscium : si cut dicunt leges humanse. "
a Cf. vol. i. pp. 61-54.
? ? >> Cf. vol. ii. pp. 28-33.
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? 16
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
things are common is related to the theory of the Fathers
and of the Canonists,1 and we shall return to the subject
when we deal presently with the theory of property in
St Thomas Aquinas.
When we turn from Alexander of Hales to the Canonists
of the middle of the thirteenth century, we find the same
combination of the influence of the Patristic tradition and
of the Eoman Law. Innocent IV. , in his ' Apparatus,' or
Commentary on the Decretals, discusses the origin and
rationale of private property in terms which are related to
both traditions. The earth, he says, is the Lord's ; He is
the creator of all things, and in the beginning of the world
these were the common property of all men. It was by the
custom of our first ancestors that private property arose ;
but this was good, not evil, for things which are common
property are apt to be neglected, and the common ownership
of things tends to discord. Men were therefore permitted to
take by occupation that which belonged to no one but to
God. 2 The great Canonist whom we know as Hostiensis
defines carefully the nature of possession, and says that it is
natural--that is, it was created by the " natural law of
nations," not by the primeval law which belonged to all
animals. 3
1 Vol. i. chap. 12 ; vol. ii. part ii.
chap. 6.
* Innocent IV. , ' Apparatus ad quin-
que libros Deeretalium,' hi. 34, 8 :
" Et nos respondemus quod in veritate
Domini est terra, et plenitudo ejus,
orbis terrarum et universi qui habitant
in ea. Ipse enim est creator omnium,
idem ipse Deus hsec omnia fecerat, ut
habemus in i. c. Gen. Et hsec a prin-
cipio seculi fuit communis, quo usque
usibus priorum parentum introductum
est quod aliqui aliqua, et alii alia sibi
appropriaverunt. Nec fuit hoc malum,
immo bonum, quia naturale est res
communes negligi, et communio dis-
cordiam parit, et fuerunt a principio
cujuscunque qui occupavit, quia in
nullius bonis erant nisi Dei. Et ideo
licebat cuilibet occupare quod occu-
patum non erat, sed ab aliis occu-
patum, occupare non licebat, quia
fiebat contra legem naturse, qua cuilibet
inditum est, ut alii non faciat, quod
sibi non vult fieri. "
8 Hostiensis, ' gumma super titulis
Decretalium,' ii. , ' De Causa Posses-
sionis,' i. : " Quid sit possessio ? Cor-
poralis rei detentio, corporis et animi
juris adminiculo concurrente. . . . Hseo
autem possessio, quum quis corpore
et animo suo adipiscitur, naturalis est,
ft. eo. 1. 1 (Digest 41, i. 1). Sive de
jure naturali gentium inducta vel
approbate, non dioo de jure pnmotvo,
communi omnibus animalibus. Inst,
de iu. na. gen. et ei. in prin. (Insti-
tutes, i. 2, 1). "
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? ChAP, n. ] CONVENTION AND NATURE.
17
It is clear that these writers did not look upon private
property as strictly primitive, but that it was created by
human custom. If they sometimes call it " natural," this
is due to the ambiguity of some of the phrases of the
Eoman Law and the Bologna Civilians. They still rep-
resent the Patristic and Stoic conception of property
as, properly speaking, a conventional and not a natural
institution.
When we now turn to the treatment of private property
by St Thomas Aquinas, we find ourselves in a very different
atmosphere. He was, indeed, confronted at the outset with
the dogmatic statements of the Fathers, and especially of
St Ambrose, that nature had given all things to men in
common, that God meant the world to be the common posses-
sion of all men and to produce its fruits for all, and that
avarice produced the rights of possession. 1 He puts the
question with characteristic fairness and precision in the
' Summa Theologica. ' It is contended, he says, that it is
not lawful for a man to possess anything as his own, for
everything which is contrary to natural law is unlawful, and
according to natural law all things are common, and he refers
to St Basil, St Ambrose, and Gratian's Decretum as repre-
senting this view. He replies by making a distinction
in the relations of men to things as property; the first
consists in the power of acquiring and distributing things,
and this is lawful, for it tends to efficiency and to the
tranquillity of society; the second is their use, and
as far as this is concerned men should hold them in
common.
In the detailed answers, which in his method follow the
general one, he replies to the contention that by natural
law all things are common, and says that this does not mean
that the natural law prescribed that all things are to be in
common, and nothing is to be held as an individual possession,
but that it is not the natural law which establishes the separa-
tion of possessions, but human agreement, and this belongs
to positive law.
Private property is therefore not contrary
1 Cf. vol. i. chap. 12.
VOL. V. B
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? 18
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
to natural law, but is added to natural law by human
reason. 1
It is true that in this passage St Thomas does not refer
directly to Aristotle, but it is fairly clear that his arguments
are in large measure founded upon the discussion of the sub-
ject in ' Politics,' ii. 5, including the important distinction
between the right of acquisition and the right of use. The
principles laid down by St Thomas in this passage may be
further illustrated from two other places in the 'Summa. '
In the seventh article of the same " question," he discusses
more fully the significance of the principle that, as far as the
use of things is concerned, the common right of property
continues. He considers the question whether it is lawful
to steal in case of necessity, and cites the ' Decretals ' as
imposing a penance of three weeks upon the man who com-
1 St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' 2. 2, 66, 2 : "Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur, quod non
liceat alicui rem aliquam quasi pro-
priam possidere : omne enim quod est
contra jus naturale est illicitum : sed
secundum jus naturale omnia sunt
communia: cui quidem communitati
contrariatur proprietas possessionum :
ergo illicitum est cuilibet homini appro-
priaro sibi aliquem rem exteriorem . . .
Kespondeo dicendum, quod circa rem
exteriorem duo compotunt homini :
quorum unum est potestas procurandi
et dispensandi: et quantum ad hoc
licitum est, quod homo propria possi-
deat; est etiam necessarium ad hu-
manam vitam, propter tria. Primo
quidem, quia magis sollicitus est unus-
quisque ad procurandum aliquid, quod
sibi soli competit, quam id, quod est
commune omnium vel multorum : quia
unusquisque laborem fugiens, relinquit
alteri id, quod pertinet ad commune ;
sicut accidit in multitudine minis-
trorum. Alio modo, quia ordinatius
res humanse tractantur, si singulis
immineat propria cura alicujus rei
procurandss; esset autem confusio, si
quilibet indistincte quselibet procu-
raret. Tertio, quia per hoc magis
pacificus status hominum conservatur,
dum unusquisque re sua contentus est:
unde videmus, quod inter eos qui
communiter, et ex indiviso aliquid
possident, frequentius jurgia oriuntur.
Aliud vero, quod competit homini
circa res oxtorioros, est usus ipsarum :
et quantum ad hoc non debet homo
habere res exteriores ut proprias, sed
ut communes; ut scilicet de facili
aliquis eas communicet in necessitate
aliorum : unde apostolus dicit, I. Ad
Timoth : ult. ' Divitibus hujus sseculi
prsecipe facile tribuere, communicare
de bonis,' &c.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod
communitas rerum attribuitur juri
naturali : non quia jus naturale dictet
omnia esse possidenda communiter, et
nihil esse quasi proprium possidendum ;
? ? sed quia secundum jus naturale non
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? chap, n. ]
19
CONVENTION AND NATURE.
mits theft from hunger, and St Augustine as saying that it
was not lawful to steal in order to give alms. St Thomas
dogmatically asserts the contrary, and maintains that in a
case of necessity all things are common, and that in such
a case it is not sinful to take another man's property. He
justifies this by a detailed argument. The institution of
human law cannot abrogate the natural or Divine law, and
according to the natural order which was instituted by the
Divine providence, the inferior things were to serve men's
needs, and therefore the division or appropriation of things
which was instituted by human law may not hinder their
use for this purpose, and, therefore, if any man possesses a
superfluity of things, the natural law requires that this should
be used for the maintenance of the poor. The administration
of this help is normally left to the discretion of the owner of
superfluous property ; but if there is evident and urgent
need, and there is no other means of help, then a man
may openly or secretly take another man's property for
his need, and this has not properly the character of theft;
and, he adds, in a case of the same need, it is lawful to
take another man's property to help one's neighbour who
is in want. 1
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 66, 7 : "Sod contra
est, quod in necessitate sunt omnia
communis, et ita non videtur esse
peccatum, si aliquis rem alterius
accipiat, propter necessitatem sibi
factam communem. Respondeo di-
cendum quod ea quse sunt juris hu-
manse, non possunt derogari juri
naturali, vel juri divino: secundum
autem naturnlem ordinem ex divina
providentia institutum, res inferiores
sunt ordinate ad hoc, quod ex his
subveniutur hominum necessitati ; et
ideo per rerum divisionem, et appro-
priationem ex jure humano proce.
den tem non impeditur quin hominis
necessitati sit subveniendum ex hujus-
modi rebus ; et ideo res, quas aliqui
superabundanter habent, ex naturali
jure debentur pauperum sustentationi;
unde Ambrosius : dicit (Sermo- 64, De
Temp. ), et habetur in Deeret: Dist.
47 (Gratian, Decretum, Dist. 47, 8. 4).
* Esurientium panis est, quam tu
detines ; nudorum indumemtum est:
quod tu recludis: miserorum re-
demptio et absolutio est pecunia quam
tu in terram defodis ' : sod quia multi
sunt necessitatem patientes, et non
potest ex eadem re omnibus subveniri,
committitur arbitrio uniuscujusque
dispensatio propriarum rerum, ut ex
eis subveniat necessitatem patientibus :
si tamen adeo sit evidens et urgens
necossitas, ut manifestum sit instanti
necessitati de rebus occurrentibus esse
subveniendum (puta cum imminet
poraonse periculum, ot alitor subveniri
non potest) tunc licite potest aliquis
ex rebus alienis sus e necessitati sub-
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? 20
[PAST L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
In a very important section of the ' Summa,' to which we
shall return later, where he deals in detail with the whole
conception of natural law, he recognises very frankly the
weight of the tradition that by natural law all things are
common. He quotes the famous passage from the ' Etym-
ologies ' of St Isidore of Seville, in which, as the Middle Ages
understood it, this doctrine is set out, but he replies to it by
the contention that while natural law did not create private
property, this was established by human reason, because it
was useful to human life, and thus natural law was not changed
but only added to. 1
The position of St Thomas with regard to the institution
of private property represents an attempt to harmonise the
principles of the Fathers with those of Aristotle. He is not
prepared, in face of the patristic authority, to maintain
that it is " natural " in the proper sense of the word, but he
refuses to admit that it is a consequence of sin. It is a " con-
ventional " institution, but an institution created by human
reason, for the advantage of human life. But also, it is limited
by the principle of the natural law that material things were
intended by God to meet the needs of men, and therefore he
understands the right of private property to be the right
to acquire and to control the destination of material things,
but not an unlimited right to use them for one's own con-
venience.
venire, sive manifeste, sive occulte
sublatis: neo hoc proprie habet
rationem furti vel rapinse. . . . Ad
tertium dicendum, quod in casu similis
necessitatis etiam potest quis occulte
rem alienam accipere, ut subveniat
proximo sic indigenti. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 94, 5 : "Isidorus dicit
in lib. v. etym. {v. 4) ' Quod com-
munis omnium possessio, et una
libertas, est de jure naturali': sed
hut: videmus esse mutate per leges
humanas; ergo videtur quod lex
naturalis sit mutabilis.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid
dicitur esse de jure naturali dupliciter :
uno modo, quia ab hoc natura inclinat;
sicut non esse injuriam alteri faciendam:
alio modo, quia natura non inducit
contrarium: sicut possemus dicere,
quod hominem esse nudum est de jure
naturali; quia natura non dedit ei
vestitum, sed an adinvenit: et hoc
modo ' communis omnium possessio
et una libertas ' dicitur esse de jure
naturali : quia scilicet distinctio posses-
sionum, et servitus non sunt inductse
a natura : sed per hominum rationem
ad utilitatem humane vita, et sic
etiam in hoc lex naturse non est mutata
nisi per additionom. "
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? ChAP, n. ]
21
CONVENTION AND NATURE.
We turn to the theory of slavery. We have seen that the
Canonists and Civilians were agreed that slavery was not
an institution of the natural law, and the Canonists held that
it was a consequence of sin. 1 Innocent IV. thus merely
restated the traditional doctrine when he said that the lord-
ship over men as property belongs to the law of nations
or the civil law, for by the law of nature all men are free. 2
Hostiensis, indeed, describes slavery as created by the divine
law, confirmed by the law of nations, and approved by the
Canon Law ; but he probably does not mean by this more
than that it was a divine punishment and remedy for sin,
the doctrine both of the Fathers and the Canonists. 3
St Thomas endeavoured to bring together the tradition
which he inherited from the Stoics and the Fathers with
what he had learned from Aristotle. In one place he main-
tains that in the state of innocence there was government,
but no slavery. It is of the essence of slavery that while the
free man is " causa sui," the slave " ordinatur ad alium,"
and is used by the master for his own advantage, and this
could not have existed in the state of innocence. * In another
1 Cf. vol. ii. part i. chap. 4 ; part ii.
chap. 5.
2 Innocent IV. , * App. in quinque
lib. dec. ,' iii. 34, 8 : " Super homines
autem quasi super suos nullus habuit
dominium, nisi de jure gentium vel
dvili. Natura enim oinnes homines
liberi sunt. Inst, de libert" (Inst. i. 6).
8 Hostiensis, ' Summa Sup. Tit.
Dec. ,' v. , 'De servis Iudseorum et Sara-
cenorum,* ? > : '* Sed numquid servus
baptizatus manebit servus sicut prius.
Sic nam et servitus de jure divino est
introducta, 36 Dist. Sexto. (Oratian,
Dec retum, D. 35, 8) et confirmata de
jure gentium, i. Dist. jus gentium.
(Gratian, Decretum, i. 9) et de jure
canonico approbata, ii. Qusest. 2 ab illo.
C. si quia de servis, usque ad C.
ecclesiarum servos (Gratian, Decretum,
C. xii. 2, 57-69). Puto tamen quod
non est deeseviendum in eum, sicut
prius, imo est inter alios servos non
Christianos traotandum leniter ot bo-
nigne, arg. ? . De maio. et obe. per
tuas (Decretals, i. 33, 7). Nam nec
in sorvum aliquem est mmis acriter
sseviendum, Inst. De his qui sui juri
vel alio. sunt. Dominorum (Inst. , i. 8). "
* St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' i. 96, 4: " I'raterea.
Illud quod est introductum in poenam
peccati, non fuisset in statu innocen-
tise: sed hominem subesse homini
introductum est in poonam peccati . . .
Respondeo dicendum, quod dominium
accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, se-
cundum quod opponitur servituti:
et sic dominus dicitur cui aliquis sub-
ditur, ut servus. Alio modo accipitur
dominium, secundum quod communiter
refertur, ad subjectum qualitercum-
que: et sic etiam ille, qui habet offi-
cium gubernandi, et dirigendi liboros,
dominus dici potest; primo ergo modo
? ? accepto dominio, in statu innocentise
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? 22
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
place, however, he deals with the question in more detail,
and explains the nature of slavery under different terms.
St Thomas in this place is discussing directly the relation of
the jus gentium to the jus naturale (we shall return to this
subject later), and his reference to slavery is incidental to
this discussion. He first states his reasons why it might
be contended that the " jus gentium " is the same as the
" jus naturale," and the second of these reasons is that while
Aristotle says that slavery is natural, for some men are
naturally slaves, St Isidore says that slavery belongs to the
jus gentium; the jus gentium, therefore, is the same as the
jus naturale. Against this he cites St Isidore as distinguishing
between natural law, civil law, and the law of nations. He
endeavours to solve this opposition by arguing that jus may
be said to be natural in two different senses, in the absolute
sense, or in relation to its consequences. The jus gentium
represents that which man's natural reason declares with
regard to the consequences of jus. Slavery, therefore, belongs
to the jus gentium, and is natural, not in the absolute sense,
but because it is useful for the slave to be controlled by the
wiser man, and for the wiser man to be helped by the slave. 1
homo homini non dominaretur : sed
secundo modo accepto dominio, in
statu innocentise homo homini domi-
nari potuisset. Cujus ratio est, quia
servus in hoc differt a libero, quod
' liber est causa sui' ut dicitur in
Metaph. (Cap. ii. ): 'Servus autem
ordinatur ad alium'; tuno ergo
dliquis dominatur alicui ut servo,
quando eum, cui dominatur, ad pro-
priam utilitatem sui, scilicet domi-
nantis, refert. Et quia unicuique est
appetibile proprium bonum; et pet
consequens contristabile est unicuique,
quod illud bonum, quod deberet esse
suum cedat alteri tantum : ideo tale
dominium non potest esse sine poena
subjectorum: propter quod, in statu
innocentise non fuisset tale dominium
hominis ad honinem. "
1 Id. id. , ii. 2, 57, 3 : " Prssterea.
Servitus inter homines est naturalis:
quidem enim sunt naturaliter servi,
ut philos. probat in I. Polit. (chaps.
3 and 4): sed servitutes pertinent ad
jus gentium, ut Isid: 'dicit (Lib. v.
Etym. Cap. vi.
